

The 2008 Mumbai Attack and Press Nationalism: A Content
Analysis of Coverage in the *New York Times*, *Times of
London*, *Dawn*, and the *Hindu*

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Hariwardhan Reddy Jannepally

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This thesis titled
The 2008 Mumbai Attack and Press Nationalism: A Content
Analysis of Coverage in the *New York Times*, *Times of*
London, *Dawn*, and the *Hindu*

by

HARIWARDHAN REDDY JANNEPALLY

has been approved for
the E. W. Scripps School of Journalism
and the Scripps College of Communication by

Joseph P. Bernt

Professor of Journalism

Gregory J. Shepherd

Dean, Scripps College of Communication

Abstract

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This study examines the *New York Times*, *Times* of London, *Hindu*, and *Dawn* coverage of the 2008 Mumbai attack. Since the U.S. and Britain had considerable interests in South Asia, the study used the framework of press nationalism to analyze the coverage. A content analysis of the coverage in the four newspapers suggests national interests were at work. The debate over the war and issues like religious unrest were different in the four newspapers. The Western press was unequivocal in condemning the war option; the coverage also reflected an agreement on issues like Kashmir and the War on Terror. The Asian media also focused on avoiding war but differed from each other on many aspects. *Dawn* raised issues like Muslim unrest and Hindu fanaticism while avoiding Pakistan's failure to curb terrorist activities. The *Hindu* was unambiguous in pinning the blame on Pakistan while condemning the failure of the Indian security apparatus.

Approved: _____

Joseph P. Bernt

Professor of Journalism

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The November 26, 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai killed 173 people and left 288 injured.¹ Since then, the attack has been referred to as "India's 9/11." But it was not the "deadliest" terrorist attack in India. After all, the July 2006 Mumbai commuter train bombings resulted in 209 deaths and serial bomb blasts in 1993 killed 257 people.² In between, bombs went off frequently in all major cities. Since 2000, 1,120 innocent lives were lost in 69 Islamic terrorist attacks.³ In 2007, the United States' National Institute of Counter Terrorism calculated that between January 2004 and March 2007, the death toll in India from all terrorist attacks was 3,674, second only to Iraq during the same period.⁴

The Mumbai attack commanded attention from the whole world for the military precision, meticulous planning, use of ultra-modern electronic equipment, sophisticated weaponry, and ability to hold hostages for 60 long hours.

In the final report submitted to a court, the Mumbai police stated, "The assault was meticulously planned and executed only after the completion of long and arduous training with thorough preparation and briefing. The

primary intention of the terrorists was to create unprecedented raw fear and panic in the minds of the Indian citizenry and foreign visitors to Indian soil."⁵

This study explored the coverage of the Mumbai attack in four newspapers--the *New York Times*, the *Times* of London, *Dawn*, and the *Hindu*. This study explored whether the concept of press nationalism was still at work and influencing the coverage of the attack to suit each paper's national interests.

For the first two days of the attack official authorities were not certain about the number of terrorists. On the second day Chief Minister Vilas Rao Deshmukh of Maharashtra, a north-western state for which Mumbai is the capital, believed "20 to 25 suspected terrorists to have entered Mumbai."⁶ This confusion largely impeded effective force deployment and rescue operations. After 60 hours, on November 29, 2008, the elite Indian security force, National Security Guards (NSG), reclaimed the landmark hotel Taj Mahal Palace from the terrorists. During the 60 hours, 173 innocent lives were lost, including 15 policemen and 26 foreign nationals. Of the 10 terrorists who were involved in the attacks, 9 were killed

in the ensuing gun battle with security forces in four different places, and one terrorist was captured alive.⁷

Even after a year, very few details are known about the 10 terrorists who participated in the attack except, all the attackers were reported to be Pakistanis in their early 20s.⁸ The British newspaper the *Observer* revealed that the lone surviving terrorist Ajmal Amir Kasab came "from a village in the Okara district of the Pakistani Punjab."⁹

Sea-borne attack

The Mumbai attackers came by the Arabian Sea from Karachi on the Pakistani cargo vessel Al Husaini.¹⁰ On November 23, 2008 they hijacked an Indian fishing trawler, the M V Kuber, within Indian waters. Then, they murdered four sailors leaving the captain alive, and proceeded to Mumbai.¹¹ On nearing the Mumbai shore they killed the captain. On reaching the shore, heavily-armed terrorists divided into four teams, one with four men and three with two men each.

One two-man team went to the Chatrapati Shivaji Terminus, Mumbai's main railway station. There, they sprayed bullets and lobbed hand grenades on unsuspecting passengers for nearly 90-minutes¹² until they were confronted by better equipped police. Then the terrorists

headed to the Trident-Oberoi Hotel. On the way to the Oberoi the terrorists were intercepted by police, and, in the ensuing gun battle, one terrorist was killed and the other, Amir Ajmal Kasab, was wounded and captured. This team alone was responsible for a third of the fatalities.¹³

The second team headed to the Nariman House or Chabad House, a commercial-residential complex run by the Jewish Chabad Lubavich movement. This team accounted for eight deaths, including Rabbi Gavriel Holtzberg from Brooklyn and his wife Rivka from Israel. The third team went to the Trident-Oberoi hotel where they continued the killing spree for nearly 42 hours before they were gunned down by the security forces. Before they died, they had killed 35 persons, including nine foreigners.¹⁴

The fourth, a four-man, team headed to the Taj Mahal Palace hotel. The terrorists briefly entered the Leopold Café, a spot popular with foreigners, spraying its customers with automatic weapons' fire, killing 10 people.¹⁵ The siege, at the Taj hotel, ended 60 hours later when the last of the four terrorists was killed by the NSG. Here they killed 36 guests including nine foreigners.¹⁶

Why Mumbai

Mumbai was easily accessible by sea from Pakistan, and it is considered India's commercial capital. It also attracts a large number of foreign tourists, and it is the most populous city of India. Rabasa and others described this in *The Lessons of Mumbai*:

From the terrorists' perspective, the Taj Mahal Palace and Trident-Oberoi Hotels provided ideal venues for killing fields and financial bastions. As landmark properties, especially the historic Taj, they were lucrative targets because of the psychological effect of an attack on them. They were filled with people--foreigners and local elite. The attack on foreigners guaranteed international media coverage.¹⁷

Perpetrators and aim

From the very outset fingers were pointing toward Laskar-e-Taiba, a Pakistan-based terrorist group. A day after the attacks began, Indian police claimed that they had evidence to prove the attacks were carried out by Lashkar-e-Taiba. They also claimed that the injured terrorist, along with two other captured Pakistani nationals, had identified themselves as operatives of LeT.¹⁹

On November 29, 2008, the Indian intelligence agency Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), using the internet protocol addresses, traced back the origin of an e-mail sent to media houses during the attack to a computer in Pakistan.²⁰ A few days after the attack, the investigators

discovered the payments for VoIP telephones, which terrorists called during the attacks, were made from Karachi through a Western-Union money transfer.²¹

Lashkar-e-Taiba

Lashkar-e-Taiba (hereafter LeT), which literally means Army of the Pure, is one of the largest and most active and lethal terror networks in South Asia. LeT is a militant offshoot of Markaz-ud-Dawa-Wal-Irshad, an Islamic organization²² renamed as Jamat-ud-Dawa (hereafter JuD) after the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament. It was founded by Osama bin-Laden's ideological mentor and a professor of religious studies, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, in 1987. Today, the Pakistan-based JuD runs a web of educational, medical charitable--and military--institutions on a campus at Muridke near Lahore.²³

LeT's focus long was limited to the liberation of Jammu and Kashmir from India, but recently it has been trying to expand its terror operations. In an undated pamphlet, *Hum Jihad Kyon Kar Rahe Hein* (Why we are fighting a jihad), it argued:

Muslims ruled Andalusia for 800 years but they were finished to the last man. Christians now rule [Spain] and we must wrest it back from them. All of India, including Kashmir, Hyderabad, Assam, Nepal, Burma, Bihar and Junagarh were part of the Muslim empire that was lost because Muslims gave up jihad. Palestine is occupied by the Jews.

The Holy Qibla-e-Awwal in Jerusalem is under Jewish control. Several countries such as Bulgaria, Hungary, Cyprus, Sicily, Ethiopia, Russian Turkistan and Chinese Turkistan were Muslim lands and it is our duty to get these back from unbelievers.²⁴

In the same pamphlet it also declared, "The United States, Israel and India as existential enemies of Islam."²⁵

LeT's terror trail in India

LeT's numerous terrorist attacks in Kashmir are well known. The other major attacks perpetrated by LeT in India are: The 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament, in which nine security guards were killed, and the 2006 Mumbai commuter train blasts, which resulted in 209 deaths.²⁶

ISI and LeT

The terrorist organizations--Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Jaish-e-Mohammad, LeT, and a few splinter groups--came into being to fight the Soviet troops in Afghanistan during 1980s with support from Pakistan. Haqqani described the relationship in a nutshell: "The most significant jihadi group of Wahhabi persuasion is Lashkar-e-Taiba, founded in 1989 by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed(sic). LeT is backed by Saudi money and protected by Pakistani intelligence services."²⁷

Soon these terrorist groups turned their attention toward India, mainly waging low-intensity war in Jammu and Kashmir. Raman elaborated further, "Since 1994 Pakistan's

Inter-State Intelligence (ISI) has been mainly relying on these organizations for its proxy war against India in Jammu and Kashmir and other parts of India."²⁸ The *Economist* supported this argument, "Pakistan's generals have consistently employed Islamist militants as proxies, from 1947 onwards."²⁹ The ISI's role in organizing 1993 serial bomb blasts in Mumbai that killed 209 people and in giving shelter to mafia don Dawood Ibrahim who was sought by India, proves an unbreakable relationship between the ISI and terrorist groups. After many attacks in India, under U.S. pressure then Pakistan President and General Musharraf placed JuD on a watch list, but that doesn't seem to have hampered its relations with the ISI.¹⁸

Aftermath: Fervent accusations and vehement denials

On November 27th, a day after the attacks had begun, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said "external forces" were behind the attack, a veiled reference to terrorist groups from Pakistan. Hours later he asserted that a group "based outside the country" carried out the attacks.³⁰ He also warned "neighbours" of consequences if they continued to allow the terror groups the use of their territories: "there would be a cost if suitable measures are not taken

by them" to prevent use of their territory for attacks against India.³¹

The Pakistani civilian government reacted very quickly; condemning the attacks, they rejected any talk of Pakistani involvement.³² And, in an unprecedented move to defuse mounting tensions, the Pakistan government decided to send its ISI's chief Ahmed Shuja Pasha to India. But within days Pakistan made a U-turn; Pakistan President Zardari on *CNN-IBN's Devil's Advocate* program called it miscommunication: "There was a miscommunication. We had announced that director [level officer] would come from the ISI, because it is too early for the Director-Generals to meet at the moment. Let the evidence come to light; let the investigation take its course. Then, perhaps, is the position where the Director-Generals could meet [sic]."³³

Soon, the Pakistani civilian government, under pressure from the army, turned bellicose and said "let's show evidence, we'll take action."³⁴ President Zardari talking on *CNN's Larry King Live* dismissed the Indian claim of the Pakistani connection, terming the captured terrorist as a "stateless individual." Zardari, categorically denying the Pakistan state involvement, added: "We have not been given any tangible proof to say that he is definitely a

Pakistani, I very much doubt it."³⁵ A few days later, he also refused to hand over terrorists such as Dawood Ibrahim, Maulana Masood Azhar, and Zakhiur Rahman Lakhvi who have taken shelter in Pakistan. But in another interview President Zardari promised to take action against any individual or group involved in the Mumbai attacks.

India feared even if the Pakistani government acts under international pressure, mainly under U.S. pressure, it would be a short-term measure, not a complete dismantling of the terror infra-structure. Vardarajan portrayed India's doubts:

As the Pakistani 'crackdown' on jihadi groups enters its third day, Indian officials greeted the news of the house arrest of Jaish-e-Mohammed chief Masood Azhar with skepticism, noting that previous bouts of detention had done little to deter the extremist leader from planning and organizing violent attacks against India. Mr. Azhar, who was released by the Indian government in 2000 following the hijacking of an Indian Airlines flight to Kandahar, was first placed under house arrest by the Pakistani authorities in January 2002 in the wake of the December 2001 terrorist attack on India's parliament. "He may not have stirred out of his house in Bahawalpur after that," a former intelligence official who closely followed the matter at the time told *The Hindu*, "but he was constantly in touch with his people. The front door was shut but the back door was open all the time."³⁶

Hoax call fiasco

As Indian security forces were battling inside the Taj Palace to flush out the terrorists and rescue trapped guests, the Pakistan President received a late night call

from India, and the caller identified himself as Indian Foreign Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee. He reportedly threatened to attack Pakistan if it failed to rein in terror groups. A concerned Zardari put the army on high alert.³⁷ The Pakistan Air Force took to the skies, swiftly moving aircraft to forward bases on the eastern front. The next day ISI chief General Shuja Pasha threatened to move the army to the eastern front from the Afghan border.³⁸ The troop build up flummoxed the Indian side. The suspense ended when U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice questioned Pranab Mukherjee about the threatening call, which he denied.

In this whole episode one thing was missing: protocol. "No one was clear whether the protocols for screening such calls were followed and 'Mukherjee' was put through."³⁹ Indian authorities believed it to be the handy work of the ISI⁴⁰ or the Pakistani military to escalate the tension levels. They had all the incentives to do it, Chengappa noted:

If India turns the heat on, Kiyani can legitimately pull his troops out from the unpopular war they are conducting on the Afghan front and reposition them on the Indian border. It would also force the US to intervene and give President-elect Barack Obama an excuse to appoint a special envoy like Bill Richardson to mediate on Kashmir between India and Pakistan. Such a move is certain to sour the strong relations that India and the U.S. have built up

after the nuclear deal. All these developments would eminently suit both Kiyani and Pakistan.⁴¹

The U.S. response

Both then President Bush and President-elect Obama offered full assistance to India. On December 3, 2008, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, visiting India, asked Pakistan "to follow the evidence from the terror strike 'wherever it leads' and to do that in the most committed and firmest possible way." Conveying Pakistan's intent to help she assured India: "On all scores, the Pakistanis have emphasized their desire to get to the bottom of this and to help in any way that they can. I think this is a time for complete, absolute, total transparency and cooperation. And that's what we expect." And, she promised to persuade Pakistan to take "very direct and tough action."⁴² In the days that followed, U.S. senators John Kerry and John McCain and Admiral Mike Mullen visited both New Delhi--to counsel against any surgical strikes or war--and Islamabad--to persuade Pakistan to take "tough action."

Many quarters in India were skeptical about the U.S. intervention and assurances, despite recently developed camaraderie. The thinking was the U.S. would at best push the terror groups into hibernation through exerting

pressure on the ISI. That is because the U.S. has tangible interests on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. For the Obama administration, it was important to deliver on the Afghan front; for that to happen the Pakistani army's help is critical. Varadarajan explained this in *The Hindu*:

At the end of the day, Indian officials remain wary of the extent to which the Bush administration – or indeed the incoming Obama administration – would be prepared to take the fight against terrorism to the Pakistani military and its Inter-Services Intelligence. As part of the process of managing the post-Musharraf transition, Washington had expressed a high degree of confidence in the anti-jihadi credentials of Pakistan's Army chief, Ashfaq Kiyani, and the man he picked as head of the ISI, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha in place of Lt. Gen. Nadeem Taj. "I don't think they are going to admit they made a mistake now," an official said. When Indian officials informally aired their understanding that the LeT had mounted the Mumbai attacks with the knowledge of the ISI, they found their U.S. counterparts in a state of denial. After all, it was barely weeks since Lt. Gen. Shuja Pasha had visited Washington to help coordinate the ongoing coalition efforts against the Taliban in the FATA region of Pakistan.⁴³

Just before the Mumbai attacks the Pakistani army efforts in the War on Terror were well appreciated by the U.S. The *Washington Post* columnist David Ignatius summed up the mood in both camps:

Pakistan is publicly complaining about U.S. airstrikes. But the country's new chief of intelligence, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, visited Washington last week for talks with America's top military and spy chiefs, and everyone seemed to come away smiling. They could pat themselves on the back, for starters, for the assassination of Khalid Habib, al-Qaeda's deputy chief of operations. Habib, reckoned by some to be the No. 4 leader in al-Qaeda, was involved in recruiting operatives for future terrorist attacks against the United States. ... U.S. military and intelligence chiefs applaud Pakistan's cooperation. But

they're still nervous. The U.S.-Pakistan relationship hangs by a slender thread...⁴⁴

A *New York Times* report talked about reconciliation between India and Pakistan and how central it is to American interests: "An important element of Mr. Obama's plan to reduce militancy in Pakistan and turn around the war in Afghanistan has been to push for a reconciliation between India and Pakistan, so that the Pakistani government could focus its energy on the tribal areas..."⁴⁵ The Indian apprehension was the U.S. would again use aggressive diplomacy to dampen anger in New Delhi like it did in the ISI-orchestrated attack on Indian embassy in Kabul.⁴⁶ *The Hindu* reported, "Even though American citizens had been killed in the Mumbai attacks, the sources said India "can't expect the U.S. to do what suits us." The Americans, they said, would play this for what suits them-- to say, "OK, little boys, don't fight, we'll help you sort things out."⁴⁷

The Indo-U.S.-Pak triangle

In international relations, countries are known by the enemies they keep. If one goes by that maxim, India and Pakistan have been known by each other since their independence. In this see-saw game played out by India and

Pakistan the U.S. weight, often, tilts the scale. The triangle of relationships is replete with controversial happenings, some by accident and some by design.

Friends sans trust: The U.S. and India

There are many books about this suspicious friendship, and the titles say it all for example: 1) *Estranged democracies*, 2) *Comrades at odds*, 3) *The unfriendly friends*, and 4) *The Eagle and Peacock*.⁴⁸ Many factors constitute this deep distrust, such as India's Non Alignment Movement, its perceived or real close relations with the USSR, and its disdain for the U.S. Shukla in *India Today* named only "four American regimes as 'good for India' and seven regimes as 'bad for India.'" He rated the Bush era as the most propitious for India.

Jawaharlal Nehru, who shaped India's foreign policy, considered the U.S. as the epitome of capitalism.⁴⁹ In contrast he liked Russia's socialism and regarded it as India's natural friend, and all this made him less neutral in the eyes of American policy makers. Nehru's demand for recognition of the People's Republic of China and his insistence for a permanent seat in the Security Council for China furthered distance (c.1950).⁵⁰

The relations deteriorated further during the 1962 Indo-China war, when the U.S. refused to entertain New Delhi's frantic calls for help. Though, after the drubbing from China, India received military aid from the U.S., this was also short-lived. During the 1971 India-Pakistan war, Nixon "ordered the nuclear aircraft carrier, USS Enterprise, to sail toward the Bay of Bengal,"⁵¹ which India construed as American hostility toward India.

The U.S., India, and terrorism

India has always argued that the terrorists were abetted by Pakistan. But the U.S. view was quite different; its thinking was similar to that of Pakistan: a fine distinction between "freedom fighters" and "terrorists." Burns explained America's covert or overt support:

During the Cold War, and even until 9/11, the United States tolerated, applauded, or overlooked Pakistan's association with jihadi groups. In regard to Kashmir, Washington was as likely to criticize India for the heavyhandedness of its security forces as to condemn Pakistan's training and financing of "freedom fighters." In Afghanistan, the United States and Pakistan were partners in supporting the mujahideen's anti-Soviet struggle.⁵²

This was partially changed when Harkat-ul-Ansar, a terrorist group in Kashmir, kidnapped six Americans in 1995. After 9/11 America's strategy changed overnight; terrorism became the White House's top priority. But that

doesn't mean India can expect the full support of the U.S.

for its fight against terrorism, Raman explained in detail:

U.S. cooperation with India has not been as vital for the pursuit of Washington's interests as has its cooperation with Pakistan. This is largely because there has been no act of jihadi terrorism mounted against the United States from Indian territory... In contrast, practically all the post-1992 jihadi terrorist strikes against US nationals and interests have been planned and mounted from Pakistan-Afghan territory. In the light of this, it is inevitable that where there is a conflict of interest between American counterterrorism policy requirements vis-à-vis Islamabad and those vis-à-vis New Delhi, the requirements relating to Pakistan would have primacy and would receive priority over those relating to India. It is, therefore, likely that Indo-US cooperation in counterterrorism would not have much scope for any spectacular evidence against the terrorism today.⁵³

Raman's argument was not without any evidence; in fact, over the last two decades the U.S. refuted the Indian arguments about Pakistani sponsorship of terrorism or snubbed Indian claims outright. At best, the U.S. shared intelligence with India about terrorist acts planned in Pakistan but refused to act on Pakistan sponsorship. Two incidents that stand out are: abetment of the Sikh terrorism during 1980s and the 1993 Bombay blast perpetrated by mafia don Dawood Ibrahim. During the 1980s, all aircraft hijacked by Sikh terrorist organizations were forced to fly to Lahore. Despite clear evidence, the U.S. never criticized Pakistan but "showed greater sensitivity

to the problems faced by India in dealing with these terrorists." ⁵⁴

The second incident was the 1993 Bombay blasts perpetrated by mafia headed by Dawood Ibrahim at the behest of ISI. In unraveling the origins many countries actively helped India: "Austria identified the hand grenades made in a Pakistani factory with equipment and technology from Austria, the U.K. identified AK series rifles as manufactured in China and U.S. forensic experts identified the timer recovered as made in the U.S. and as part of a consignment supplied to Pakistan during the Afghan war in 1980s." ⁵⁵

British and Austrian experts had no objection to Indian investigators using their findings in the trial against the accused. However, U.S. experts not only ruled out the use of their findings, but also failed to return the timer which they had taken to the U.S. for forensic tests. U.S. officials later claimed it had been destroyed by mistake. ⁵⁶ Later, the U.S. also denied Indian claims of Pakistani involvement and reasoned that the terrorists might have procured it on the black market. ⁵⁷

The 2008 Mumbai attacks might also become another case in point. Widespread feeling in Indian strategic circles

and media is that the U.S. nipped the Indian idea of surgical strikes in the bud with its aggressive diplomacy.

Parthasarathy argued:

In instances like 26/11(the Mumbai attack), retribution must be immediate. There should have been precision strikes on terrorists' infrastructure in Pakistan within 72 hours... We have let ourselves into a situation of being pushed by the Americans who want us to be sensitive to their agenda on Afghanistan... On the diplomatic side we have let the initiative slide to a situation where we are being told by the Americans that your deployment of forces is affecting our war in Afghanistan. Evidence by the Americans proves it is not just the ISI, it is the Pakistan Army establishment as a whole.⁵⁸

A relation out of necessity

There goes a saying, the most powerful place in Pakistan is the U.S. embassy; another says Pakistan is all about three A's: Army, America, and Allah. That may not be correct, but at any given point of time in Pakistan's checkered history these three 'A's have been the most powerful entities that shaped its history. U.S.-Pakistani relations began a few years after it became independent. As India embraced non-alignment, Pakistan was the only choice in South Asia for the U.S. It served America's twin purposes, to contain communism spreading into South Asia and as a strategic base from which it could attack Russia. For Pakistan it was more than ideal to balance the equation with India.⁵⁹

By the late 1950s, the U.S. had established total control over Pakistan by supporting the army which toppled the civilian government in a coup.⁶⁰ The influence waxed and waned according to American interests and Pakistan's strategic value in achieving those interests. For the first time relations soured when America granted nearly \$80 million in military aid to India after the 1962 Indo-China war. Then, in 1971 the relations came back on track when Pakistan arranged a secret meeting between Beijing and Washington.⁶¹ The relations touched a nadir in 1979 when mobs burned the U.S. embassy and several information centers while the Pakistan government stood by.⁶² But in the 1980s both countries moved together to thwart the Russian occupation of Afghanistan; the alliance continued for a while before American interest gradually faded away along with the Russian troops in Afghanistan.

Since 9/11 Pakistan has occupied center stage in U.S. foreign policy, Cohen wrote: "After September 11, 2001, Pakistan was again characterized by American officials as a vital ally, even though it was caught, and admitted to, covertly spreading nuclear technology to a number of states; further, its enthusiasm in tracking down al Qaeda and Taliban leaders was suspect."⁶³ Since then it has

received \$10 billion for supporting the "War on Terror."⁶⁴

With this, American influence has reached greater heights;

Tariq Ali wrote how:

Arranged marriages can be a messy business... That this is equally true in political life became clear in the ill-fated attempt by Washington to tie Benazir Bhutto to Pervez Musharraf. The single, strong parent in this case was a desperate State Department--with John Negroponte as the ghoulis go-between and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown as the blushing bridesmaid....⁶⁵

The U.K.'s response

British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, too, offered full assistance equally quickly, "Britain is ready to do everything we can to help the Indian authorities."⁶⁶ In New Delhi, supporting India's contention that LeT was behind the attacks, he observed that Pakistan had a "great deal to answer for."⁶⁷ Later in Islamabad, on the same day, at a joint press meeting along with Pakistan President Zardari, he described the attacks as "horrific" and "a human tragedy on a terrible scale."⁶⁸ Subramanian wrote:

British Prime Minister Gordon Brown on Sunday delivered the bluntest public message yet from the international community to Pakistan, asking it to clean out terrorists operating from its territory in order to make the world a more secure place. "The time has come for action, not words," Mr. Brown said.⁶⁹

Until the British Foreign Secretary Miliband's India visit everything was smooth as Britain desisted from its pet topic--Kashmir. It was more forthcoming than the U.S.

With his visit to India all that has changed; Britain was back to its old ways. Miliband, singling out the LeT, refused to believe the Pakistan state involvement in the attacks.⁷⁰ Making matters worse, he urged India not to insist on the extradition of terrorists behind the Mumbai attack.⁷¹ Not only did it surprise India but it was at odds with the U.K. policy on extradition in relation to crimes committed by foreigners on its soil. A day after his visit, he stirred up yet another controversy with an article in *The Guardian*; this time it was Kashmir:

I am arguing that the best antidote to the terrorist threat in the long term is cooperation. Although I understand the current difficulties, resolution of the dispute over Kashmir would help deny extremists in the region one of their main calls to arms, and allow Pakistani authorities to focus more effectively on tackling the threat on their western borders.⁷²

But this was nothing new to either India or to Britain, as it was consistent with the Labour Party policy on Kashmir. In fact, Labour Party policy on Kashmir has always been annoying to India. The Labour Party resolution passed in 1995 on Kashmir read, "Britain must accept its responsibility as the former imperial power in a dispute that dates from the arrangements for [Indian and Pakistani] independence. Britain is under an obligation to seek a

solution based on our commitment to peace, democracy, human rights and mutual tolerance."⁷³

In 1997, then Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, before commencing his visit to India, kicked up a controversy by promising to take up the "Kashmir issue" with India. He was quoted in the Pakistan newspaper *Jang* as saying, "The Labour Party wishes to solve this [Kashmir] problem according to the aspirations of the people of Kashmir, and, therefore, the two parties should accept her role in this regard."⁷⁴ That was not the end of this; Cook's successor Jack Straw "speaking on the *BBC's Newsnight* program at the height of India-Pakistan tensions in 2002, described Kashmir as an "unfinished business."⁷⁵ But this time India was appalled by Miliband's timing, since India considered the attack as part of the LeT's global terrorist campaign, which was evident in the attack as the terrorists specifically targeted Americans, Britons, and Israelis for murder.⁷⁶

The Indo-U.K.-Pak triangle

The U.K.'s relation with India was also a tempestuous one, and a host of reasons contributed to it. Britain's handling of the Kashmir issue was one of the two main reasons, the other being the Sikh terrorists and their

operations from Britain. The Kashmir issue started in October 1947 with the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India. In fact, the accession was done according to the Indian Independence Act enacted by the British rulers. But the subsequent British support to Pakistan on Kashmir in the United Nations and outside widened the gap between India and Britain, Rasgotra wrote:

Between 1947 and 1956, successive British governments did everything possible to embarrass and pressure India in the UN Security Council and elsewhere into undoing the Jammu and Kashmir States' accession to India. British representatives in the UN co-operated with Pakistan to divert attention from the central issue of Pakistan's aggression and pillory India on false and irrelevant issues. ...Pakistan and Britain on the other hand, moved forward towards partnership in a variety of military alliances--MEDO, CENTO, SEATO, etc.⁷⁷

Britain's affinity toward Pakistan was clearly evident during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war. British Prime Minister Harold Wilson accused India of aggression, ignoring the earlier Pakistani aggression. Later he regretted his mistake. But inevitably some damage had been done.⁷⁸

War, terrorism, and cooperation

Britain's inept handling of terrorism perpetrated against India from its territory resulted in much strain in relations. Many Sikh and Jammu and Kashmir terrorist groups operated from Britain in the mid 1980s.⁷⁹ Britain turned down many Indian requests for deportation of Indians who

committed crimes in India, despite existing Commonwealth arrangements, and granted them British nationality or right of residence. Britain's failure in tracking down the killers of a high ranking Indian diplomat, who was killed in the U.K. in 1986 by the Kashmiri terrorists, further strained the relationship. England's attempts to dissuade Mizo separatist leaders in negotiating with India, and acting against other North-Eastern separatist leaders⁸⁰ all contributed to Indian distrust in Britain.

Media's role in erosion

British media coverage of India has always been controversial, especially the BBC's. Reports filled with selective facts about Kashmir, covering a section [Muslim] of victims in violence that followed the Babri Mosque demolition by Hindu fanatics and lionization of the Sikh terrorism were some of those controversies that strained already fragile Indo-British relations. Sometimes the coverage mimicked official policy and sometimes media took the initiative, Singh contended: "...Given their tendency to toe the official line, especially on foreign affairs, they have in fact aided the erosion of the relationship. A glaring example was their endorsement of Britain's numerous votes against India on the Kashmir in the United Nations."⁸¹

Indeed, a survey commissioned by the Press Institute of India to analyze British media coverage of the 1965 war has found "the volume of anti-India reports outweighed the volume of anti-Pakistan reports."⁸² It was in accordance with pro-Pakistan stance adopted by Harold Wilson's government.

British media coverage of the Kashmir issue was another case in point that was in line with the official stance. There was "studious avoidance of the murder and rape of Hindus and the pillage of property, and the equally acute though lesser suffering of Christians and Kashmiri Muslims at the hands of Masud tribesmen of Pakistani marchland."⁸³ Even after half a decade the trend of distortion continued in 1993; an *Independent* report talking about human-rights violations claimed "that in 1990, more than 30,000 Hindus were swept out of Kashmir valley so that the Indian security forces could have a clear shot at the Muslim insurgents..."⁸⁴ Addy asserted, "Nothing is ever said about the 300,000 Kashmiri Hindu Pandits who have been driven from their homes for safe but squalid sanctuary of refugee camps in Delhi and Jammu."⁸⁵

The BBC's handling of the Khalistan Movement, demanding a Sikh State, in 1980s was another incident that

touched India's raw nerve. Singh wrote: "On the Khalistan issue, the BBC behaved irresponsibly by broadcasting an inflammatory statement by Jagjit Singh Chohan, which could be, and was, interpreted as incitement to violence against the head of a foreign government, Mrs. Indira Gandhi. Regrettably, the BBC persisted with its gross indiscretion by inviting Chohan again, after Mrs. Gandhi's assassination, to express his 'pleasure' at the foul deed."⁸⁶

'War'ring neighbors

An "international migraine" was how former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright described Pakistan after the Mumbai mayhem. *India Today* in its editorial wrote: "It may be that for the rest of the world but for India it is a malignant tumour in its brain. It has been so for the last 60 years. After 26/11, it crossed a new threshold of pain which needs immediate intervention."⁸⁷ Since independence both countries had fought wars in 1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999.

Goal and significance of the study

This thesis examined how newspapers from four countries--namely India, Pakistan, the U.S. and the U.K.--covered the Mumbai attacks. Newspapers from these four

countries were selected because each country has considerable interests in the fallout of the attacks. India is a victim of the terror attack. The U.S. was selected because it has tangible interests on the Afghan-Pakistan border that would eventually suffer if Pakistan and India decide on war. The U.K. was chosen because its citizens had been killed in the attack, and it also tried to broker peace between the two nations. Britain is also fighting the War on Terror in Afghanistan and Pakistan. A Newspaper from Pakistan was analyzed because the attack was planned in Pakistan and India alleged Pakistan state involvement in the attacks. The rationale behind newspapers' selection is discussed more fully in the methodology section.

The study examined, under the premise of a press nationalism frame work, whether the U.S. media was be more pro-Pakistani than the British media and whether the British media was more likely to criticize India than the U.S. media. This is because both nations tended to see the attack from different points of view, the U.S. from the "War on Terror" and the U.K. from Kashmir. This study also examined what were the prominent issues addressed by the media in four nations that suited their national interests: for example, the U.S. media concentrating on the "War on

Terror" and the British media on Kashmir, and India on Pakistan state links with terrorist groups.

Though, terrorism has long been the curse of India, no substantial studies had been conducted by academic scholars to analyze the coverage of terrorist attacks in India. This study was meant to fill that void by analyzing the Mumbai attack coverage in four newspapers: *The New York Times*, the *Times of London*, *Dawn*, and the *Hindu*.

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CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

Many press nationalism studies have shown how media coverage of international crises changes in line with U.S. policy. Partially this results because journalists find it difficult to report against national interests. So, in times of international crises journalists simply "rally round the flag" favoring the government stance. Lehman argued: "During international crises, media in most countries usually operate within the sphere of a prevailing national consensus. Journalists as well as citizens are less likely to criticize their governmental leadership during times of perceived threats to national security."¹

Many press nationalism studies have shown that the U.S. media heavily relies on U.S. government sources at the expense of other sources, thus promoting government policy. Based on a study of thirty-five U.S. foreign policy crises since 1945, Zaller and Chiu called the media "government's little helper."²

Studies have revealed how the press changes its coverage in line with the U.S. President. Many press and foreign policy studies have also revealed how the press limits itself to a few particular themes or frames,

excluding some. Gitlin contended, "Their discernment involves selecting and highlighting of some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation and/or solution."³

The press and foreign policy studies have also revealed over representation or no representation of a country in accordance with U.S. policy toward that country. To explain this phenomenon Herman and Chomsky proposed the propaganda model; Pamela Shoemaker and Herbert Gans used news filters. This section explores these models and a few previous studies based on these models.

Herman and Chomsky, in *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*, proposed a propaganda model of the mass media that explains why the media serve the interests of the government and dominant private classes of society. The authors proposed five news filters that obliterate dissent. They argued that these filters are so powerful and built into a system in such a way that alternative news choices are hardly imaginable. These filters are:

1. The size, ownership and profit orientation of the dominant mass-media firms.
2. Advertising as the primary income source for the mass media.

3. Reliance of the media on information provided by the government and businesses, and "experts" provided and funded by these agents of power.
4. The use of flak to control the mass media. Flak refers to negative responses from the government and corporate-sponsored media watchdog groups and is aimed to prevent the media from straying too far from the elite's viewpoints.
5. The ideological fear of Communism, which is used as a national religion and control mechanism. This fear helps mobilize the populace against an enemy and because the concept is fuzzy it can be used against anybody.⁴

Herbert Gans, in *Deciding What's News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek and Time*, defined press nationalism as a filter that constrains foreign news in terms of its relevance based on U.S. foreign policy. He found that three types of countries dominate foreign news. The first group includes America's closest political allies. The second group includes Communist countries. The third group comprises the nations from rest of the world that typically make the news when they are the sites of unusually dramatic happenings such as wars, coups, and disasters. This pattern of news coverage strengthens the argument that the media trails American foreign policy and covers countries based on a country's proximity or relevance to the U.S. Gans identified seven categories of foreign news that were favored by the U.S. media:

1. American activities in a foreign country, including what Americans do to, for and in foreign countries.
2. Foreign activities that affect Americans and U.S. policy overseas, such as when American policy clashes with the policy of another nation.

3. Communist-bloc country activities, such as those that involve their relationship to the U.S., internal problems reducing their military, economic or political power vis-à-vis the U.S.
4. Elections and other peaceful changes in foreign government personnel.
5. Political conflict and protest.
6. Natural disasters, such as earthquakes and floods.
7. The excess of dictatorship, mainly on the violation of American political values by dictators, illustrating once more the extent to which American ideas and values dominate the reporting of foreign news.⁵

Gans also contended explicit value judgments were found in foreign news, particularly from Communist countries, because of less detachment and disdain.

Gans identified personal attitudes of media workers that influence the content; they are: ethnocentrism, altruistic democracy, responsible capitalism, small-town pastoralism, individualism, moderatism, social order, and leadership.⁶

The Herman-Chomsky Propaganda Model and press nationalism argue that the American media cover foreign nations through these filters that can slant foreign news according to U.S. policy.

Propaganda studies

To test their Propaganda Model, Herman and Chomsky compared and evaluated the amount of coverage given to the murder of a Polish priest, Jerzy Popieluszko, in October 1984, against the coverage given to 100 religious victims

killed in Latin America between 1964 and 1985; this included four U.S. female religious workers murdered in El Salvador and Archbishop Oscar Romero, shot in 1980. The researchers contended that "a propaganda system will consistently portray people abused in enemy states as worthy victims, whereas those treated with equal or greater severity by its own governments or clients will be unworthy."⁷

In this case, Popieluszko who was murdered in Poland, an enemy state and member of the Soviet bloc, would be a worthy victim; and, in contrast priest killed in client states in Latin America would be unworthy.

Herman and Chomsky analyzed the coverage given by the *Time*, *Newsweek*, *New York Times* and *CBS News* to all the victims. They coded the number of editorials, articles, column inches and front-page articles in the *New York Times*. They coded the number of articles and column inches in *Time* and *Newsweek* magazines and the number programs by *CBS News* that mentioned the victims. The period of coverage was from the time of the killing to 18 months afterward.

Quantitative analysis

Herman and Chomsky found that the Popieluszko murder received more coverage than the murder of 100 Latin American

religious victims in the four U.S. media they analyzed. Seventy-eight stories were written about the Polish priest's murder in the *Times*. There were three editorials in the *Times* deploring the murder; there were 10 stories on the front page about the Popieluszko murder. There were no editorials about the Latin American victims, who received a total of 57 stories with eight appearing on the front page of the *Times*. Results for *Time*, *Newsweek*, and *CBS News* were no different. *Time* and *Newsweek* wrote 16 articles about the Polish priest's murder, compared to 10 for the 100 Latin American victims. Sixty-nine *CBS* newscasts mentioned the murder of Popieluszko as compared to 53 newscasts about the 100 victims in Latin America.⁸

Qualitative analysis

In qualitative analysis of the coverage, Herman and Chomsky found that the four news media paid more attention to the details of the Popieluszko murder than to any of the 100 victims, including four U.S. religious workers who had been raped and killed in El Salvador.

Popieluszko was an activist priest who was a strong supporter of the Solidarity movement in Poland. In an effort to eliminate or intimidate him, members of the Polish secret police abducted him. He was beaten, bound, gagged, and

thrown into a reservoir.⁹

Herman and Chomsky found that the four U.S. media repeated these details at every opportunity, generating the maximum emotional impact on readers. The finding of Popieluszko body appeared on the front page; in fact, the failure to find the body made the front page. The nature of his wounds was recounted extensively. On the other hand, the finding of the bodies of four U.S. women was a back-page item in the *Times*. Accounts of the violence done to the women were succinct and omitted many details in all the four news media.

The coverage given to the other Latin American victims was neither so detailed nor so charged with emotion. Even the murder of Archbishop Oscar Romero, who was the highest Catholic Church official in El Salvador, did not generate much coverage in the four U.S. media. There were very few quotations and expressions of outrage by supporters of Romero. There were no statements or quotations suggesting that the murder was intolerable and that the guilty must be found and brought to justice. The *Times* did not have an editorial condemning, or even mentioning, the murder.

In Popieluszko case, the press conveyed the impression of intolerable outrage and demanded immediate justice. The

U.S. media also raised the question about how high up the act was known and approved. An article in the *Times* also brought in a Soviet link in the murder of the Polish priest. The three editorials in the *Times* called for responsibility on the part of higher authorities in Poland, freely applying words like thuggery, shamelessness, and crude to the Polish State. There were 18 articles in the *Times* that stressed the question of higher responsibility.¹⁰

In the Romero case, there were no editorials condemning, or even mourning, the murder. It was quickly placed in the larger frame work of alleged killings by both the left and the right. Herman and Chomsky concluded that Romero wasn't just an unworthy victim, but he was also an important activist in opposition to the local alliance of army and oligarchy and to the U.S. policy in El Salvador.¹¹

Herman conducted a study of the *New York Times'* coverage of the national elections of 1984 in El Salvador and Nicaragua to test the propaganda framework. He argued that the *Times* would cast the El Salvador election as a step toward democracy and good, while casting the Nicaragua election--conducted by the Socialist Sandinista government, an enemy of the U.S.--as an election run by the out-of-favor regime, farce, and not legitimate.¹²

Herman selected a sample of 28 *Times* articles published between February 1 and March 30, 1984, the period of the El Salvador election. And 21 articles were selected between September 5 and November 6, 1984, the period of the Nicaraguan election. He developed a list of topics supportive of elections that included democratic purpose and hopes, rebel disruption, voter turnout, election mechanics, personalities and political infighting, etc. Non-supportive topics included public relations purpose, fraud in a prior election, limits on free speech and assembly, limits on ability of candidates to qualify and campaign, and other topics.

The results found supportive topic mentions in the *Times* were more prominent in the El Salvador election than in the Nicaragua election by a ratio of five to one. Emphasis in the El Salvador election was placed on its democratic purpose and rebel disruption. The Nicaragua election received a moderate number of mentions for voter turnout, the only supportive topic that was on even-footing with coverage in El Salvador. Non-supportive topic mentions in coverage of Nicaragua outweighed those in coverage of El Salvador by more than a two-to-one ratio. Public relations purpose, limits on free speech and assembly, and limits on

ability of candidates to qualify and campaign were prominent themes in coverage of the Nicaragua election. Mentions for the same topics in El Salvador were negligible.

Herman found the most glaring difference in the number of articles that focused on freedom of speech and freedom of press. There were 14 articles about these issues in Nicaragua election; ironically there was only one in El Salvador's case.¹³

A study by Jothik Krishnaiah, Nancy Signorielli and Douglas McLeod tried to find whether the U.S. media performance was consistent with the Propaganda Model. The researchers examined the *New York Times'* coverage of the Soviet intervention and withdrawal from Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989 in the context of easing tensions between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union. They predicted that the *Times'* coverage of the issue would change after 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev introduced perestroika and glasnost that were appreciated by the U.S.¹⁴

The researchers content analyzed 319 randomly selected stories during this period from a compilation of stories based on the Index of the *New York Times*. Eight thematic elements were examined, which were divided into two

categories: threatening and non-threatening based on U.S. interests. The non-threatening elements were: the U.S., the Afghanistan resistance, the U.N. negotiations, and the Afghanistan civilians. The threatening elements included the USSR, the Soviet troops, the Afghanistan government, and intervention. The general tone of each story toward these eight elements was assessed on a seven-point scale, one being very negative, four being neutral, seven being very positive. They hypothesized that the tone of threatening elements would be less negative after Gorbachev introduced reforms in 1985.

Longitudinal results showed all the non-threatening elements received positive scores whereas the threatening elements received negative scores, but after 1985 the threatening elements were also portrayed more positively, closely following the policy shifts. The researchers concluded that news coverage of the issue was consistent with U.S. foreign policy interests.¹⁵

All the above studies strongly supported the propaganda framework. As Herman contended, "When situations arise in which 'points' may be 'scored' against 'enemy' countries or threatening ideas, the mass media will frequently be active in 'publicity campaigns' of great

intensity and passion. Conversely, when similar events occur in friendly countries, the media will show recognition of the special circumstances involved and pursue a policy of benign neglect."¹⁶

Press and foreign policy

Media scholars argue that the press coverage of international events, to a great extent, lets the government define the parameters of the debate by toeing the line of government policy. Lance Bennett contended, "Reporters tend to 'index' their coverage to reflect the range of views that exists within the government."¹⁷ Zaller and Chiu argued, "It is a truism that journalists find it difficult to report critically on government activities during foreign policy crises. They must contend not only with officials who strain to control the news, but with fear that tough reporting will undermine the government's ability to deal with the crisis. As a result, journalists often simply 'rally round the flag' and whatever policy the government favors."¹⁸

A qualitative analysis of the *New York Times'* coverage of El Salvador by Tom McCoy showed how closely the press follows the policy. McCoy contended that the daily foreign affairs practices of the paper rarely disturbed Washington's

foreign-policy strategies and their communication to the American people. It did adhere to political parameters, established in Washington, and those policies influenced the nature of news coverage.¹⁹ McCoy concluded that the *Times'* foreign editors decided where to place stories or whether to publish them at all based on U.S. policy interests. McCoy wrote:

Since 1979, the Carter, Reagan and Bush administrations have shared two propositions: The violence in El Salvador is due to rabid extremists of both the right and left, with everyone else consequently suffering, and only U.S.-sanctioned elections will guarantee the maintenance of democracy as exercised by a decent, honest, honorable government, a government which has, since it is freely elected, the people's interests at heart. These two propositions have been faithfully reflected in the reporting of the *New York Times*.²⁰

Barranco and Shyles compared *Times* coverage of Israel to the coverage of 10 Arab nations in the Middle-East. The researchers hypothesized the *Times* would demonstrate an "aggrandizement" of values,²¹ in line with government policy toward Israel and other countries. The nations in focus were: Israel, and 10 Arab nations that included Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Sudan, Iraq, Palestine/PLO, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Libya and Kuwait.

The researchers examined two six-month periods, one in 1976 and the other in 1984. A sample of 30 publication dates was randomly selected from each six-month period for

analysis. A total of 309 articles were analyzed. Their analysis took a two-pronged approach. First, they analyzed headlines for the frequency of each nation's appearance in headlines. Second, they analyzed the first two paragraphs to determine the primary and secondary nations of focus.

The results showed, for headlines, Israel and the U.S. received almost 40 percent of proper name mentions during two periods. In fact, Israeli proper name mentions appeared at least twice as often as did the proper name mentions of any single Arab nation, with the exception being Lebanon.²² The authors contended that this was due to the civil war in Lebanon that flooded the news media. For primary and secondary nations in focus, in 1976 all 10 Arab nations accounted for 65.6 percent of the coverage with Lebanon accounting for more than one-third of this; Israel and the U.S. accounted for 18.4 and 16 percent respectively. In 1984, coverage of 10 Arab nations slipped to 55.6 percent, and Israel and the U.S. received 20.3 and 24.1 percent of the coverage respectively. Barranco and Shyles concluded this type of coverage has the potential to mar the American, as well as, the international comprehension of events in the Mid-East.²³

Press and presidential policy

Tsan-Kuo Chang examined how the U.S. media covered Reagan's policy toward China before and after he became president in 1980. Chang examined two aspects of the press coverage: a) how the press covered the policy before and after? and b) what was the nature of the treatment?

To answer these two questions, Chang examined news, editorials and columns in the *New York Times*, *Washington Post* and the *Los Angeles Times*. He analyzed 18 months of coverage, nine months before and nine months after the inauguration, starting from May 1980 to October 31, 1981. Chang used the paragraph as recording unit with the item as context unit. The categories were: U.S.-China relations, U.S.-Taiwan relations, China-Taiwan issue, China's reactions, Taiwan's reactions and U.S. officials' reactions. They were also coded for the direction--positive, negative and neutral.

During the presidential campaign Reagan advocated that U.S.-Taiwan relations be upgraded to an "official" level from "unofficial" level. But after the inauguration Reagan dropped that argument and favored relations with China.²⁴ Results were in tune with the change: U.S.-Taiwan relations were prominent before Reagan took office, and U.S.-China

relations received more coverage after the inauguration. In terms of direction, Reagan's China policy received more positive treatment in three newspapers after he became president. Results indicated that newspapers mimicked Reagan.²⁵

Yu and Riffe examined how the three newsmagazines covered two national leaders, Mao Tse-Tung of China and Chiang Kai-Shek of Taiwan, during changing times. They examined the coverage of *Time*, *Newsweek*, and *U.S. News & World Report* from October 1949 to September 1976, a 27-year period, to study the portrayal of Mao and Chiang. The study was conducted on the premise that the U.S. media image of a nation's leader may signal that nation's status as friend or foe. They also hypothesized change in relations between nations would influence that image.²⁶

They divided the 27-year period into three periods. First, 1949 to 1959, the *hostility* era, marked by Chiang's withdrawal to Taiwan, China's pro-Soviet stance, Cold War and America's pro-Chiang sentiment. Second, 1960-1969, the *transition* era, marked by increasingly friendly American gestures toward China. Finally, 1970-1976, an *alliance* era, marked by the U.S.-China rapprochement, culminating in the

Nixon administration's "new" China policy. The researchers coded all articles for contexts and directions.

Overall, during this period the three magazines devoted 52 articles to Chiang and 132 articles to Mao. Both were treated neutrally, but Mao was increasingly treated positively after the *hostility* era. As time went on, Mao was portrayed as "Charismatic guiding helmsman of the Chinese ship" and Chiang as "exiled" leader. Yu and Riffe concluded, "The slight but monotonic increase in prevalence of favorable articles about Mao seems to support the press coverage parallels policy idea, as does the concomitant decrease in prevalence of unfavorable coverage, as the U.S. and China moved from Cold War hostility to pragmatic alliance."²⁷

Press nationalism, source bias, and framing

Many press nationalism studies have suggested that the U.S. media coverage of a country is consistent with U.S. foreign policy toward that country. Many studies have demonstrated this by using some extra-media indicators such as government records to link policy and coverage. Paletz and Entman argued that the U.S. government response, based on its national interests, might influence the way the U.S. media report international news.²⁸ Lee and Yang content

analyzed the Associated Press and Kyodo News Agency coverage of the Tiananmen movement. They reported the coverage of AP was consistent with U.S. ideological interests and portrayed it as a fight for democracy where as Japanese economic interests dominated in Kyodo accounts.²⁹

Another important aspect of coverage is source selection, as it profoundly influences the coverage. Leon Sigal wrote about how important sources are to news:

Even when the journalist is in a position to observe an event directly, he remains reluctant to offer interpretations of his own, preferring instead to rely on his news sources. For the reporter, in short, most news is not what has happened, but what someone says has happened.³⁰

Critics of foreign policy coverage often charge media with depending on official sources, mainly sources from the executive branch and "co-opted experts" at the expense of others. Sourcing is crucial because news sources can construct social reality through the agenda-setting and framing process. Some argued that sourcing patterns can predict news content without looking into the text.³¹

Sigal, in *Reporters and Officials: The Organization and Politics of Newsmaking*, found that the majority of the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* sources were U.S. government officials. Sigal examined the sources used by

these papers in stories on their front page during two randomly selected weeks in 1949, 1954, 1959, 1964 and 1969. Then he coded sources for types: U.S. government/foreign, state or local and non-government. U.S. sources were also classified by branch of government. Sigal found that nearly half of all the sources cited were government officials. Foreign officials led the group, with state and local officials second, and non-government officials third. By branch of government, nearly all U.S. sources were from the executive branch, with just 6 percent from Congress and a mere 2 percent from the judicial branch. Sigal found that U.S. officials were the primary sources for many stories even from around the world. For example, U.S. officials were 21.2 percent of the sources for news from London, 24.8 percent from Paris, nearly 16 percent from Moscow and 54 percent for news out of Saigon.³²

Sandra Dickson examined the sourcing pattern of the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* in covering the Nicaraguan crisis. She posited that the press would depend excessively on government sources rather than other sources or information providers. Dickson content analyzed 1,633 randomly selected articles from the *Times* and *Post* from 1983 to 1987. The source categories included U.S. officials,

U.S. non-officials, Nicaraguan officials, Nicaraguan non-officials, Contras, and others. Results showed a heavy reliance on government sources in particular and overall U.S. sources. U.S. official sources in the *Times* constituted 49 percent and in the *Post* 51 percent. Other U.S. sources constituted 10 and 13 percent respectively, thus totaling nearly 60 percent of U.S. Sources in both papers.³³

Many researchers asserted that in reporting international news the media select and highlight particular aspects of reality, particularly those favoring government voices. Studies have also shown that the media "frame" things in line with foreign policy. James Tankard defined frame as "a central organizing idea for news content that supplies a context and suggests what the issue is through the use of selection, emphasis, exclusion, and elaboration."³⁴

Steven Hook and Xiaoyu Pu examined the coverage of 2001 spy plane crisis by the American and Chinese press. On April 1, an American surveillance plane and a Chinese fighter jet collided off the coast of China. The Chinese jet crashed into the sea, and the pilot was presumed dead.³⁵ The study was based on the premise that the coverage would

"rally round the flag."³⁶ They content analyzed coverage by two news media from each country for the month of April 2001. The *New York Times* and *Washington Post* from the U.S. and *People's Daily* and *Xinhua* news agency from China were used.

The study mainly looked for the frames employed by news outlets. The results supported the premise. The Chinese media predominantly used thematic frames such as U.S. hegemony and Chinese sovereignty. The Chinese sovereignty frame accounted for 50 percent of the coverage whereas the hegemony frame constituted nearly 26 percent. In contrast, the U.S. media coverage was filled with episodic frames of accident and diplomacy. The accident frame accounted for 36 percent and the diplomacy frame, which included the aftermath and American captives and efforts to free them, for 56 percent. The hegemony frame appeared in just five percent of the articles whereas the sovereignty frame appeared in 15 percent of articles.³⁷ Hook and Pu concluded that news coverage in both countries consistently framed the crisis around themes that reflected their government perspectives.³⁸

Indian context

Lee Becker examined the coverage of 1971 war between Indi and Pakistan by the *New York Times* and the *London Times*. He tested for the relationship between U.S. governmental policy and U.S. press coverage. During March and April of 1971, West Pakistani troops waged a civil war against the Bengali population of East Pakistan. The Bengalis had rebelled against the rule of dominant West Pakistan. India had joined the East Pakistani people, and war erupted in late fall of 1971.³⁹ During the civil turmoil between the two Pakistani states, U.S. policy was one of neutrality. Because of a developing alliance between the U. S. and China and the role of West Pakistani leaders in forming that alliance, U.S. policy shifted. Richard Nixon decided to support China and West Pakistan. Russia did the opposite.⁴⁰

Because of the policy shift in favor of West Pakistan, Becker decided to study a newspaper from a country that did not change its policy toward the combatants. England had retained its neutrality before, during and after the war. He studied pre-war and post-war coverage from two samples, one each from the *London Times* and the *New York Times*. He found that the *London Times* did remain neutral in its coverage,

whereas the *New York Times* coverage changed from pro-Pakistan to neutral. Becker concluded the U.S. government was unsuccessful in attempts to change its news copy as the nation's policy shifted.⁴¹

Another study by Jyotika Ramaprasad and Daniel Riffe examined the relationship of American government policy toward India and the coverage of India in the *New York Times*. They content analyzed the news coverage given to India from 1973 to 1980, this period was chosen as there were no drastic changes or polarization.

They divided this period into four policy periods. The first period was the year 1973, which saw a transition in relation from "poor" to "improving." The second was from January 1974 to June 1975, which was marked by gradually improving relations. The third period, was from July 1975 to March 1977, saw a trend of declining relations as India declared a national "emergency" and suspended the fundamental rights of its citizens. The fourth policy period, from April 1977 to December 1980, was a time of most favorable Indo-American relations when the decidedly pro-India Jimmy Carter was president and when democratic conditions had been restored in India. Ramaprasad and Riffe demarcated these time periods by studying U.S. State

Department bulletins and other congressional publications. All items on India were coded for slant (favorable, neutral and unfavorable), and positive or negative topic.

They found that the press coverage over the four foreign policy periods did not parallel U.S. foreign policy. They contended the coverage suggested the "independence" of *Times* coverage. However, the researchers found that when the first three periods were compared to the last one, coverage tended to reflect policy.⁴²

These preceding studies have suggested the U.S. media's tendency to follow U.S. foreign policy. Many other studies also have suggested this phenomenon, for example 1) *Framing the War: A Comparative Study of Coverage of the Iraq War by Two Chinese Newspapers and Two U.S. Newspapers* by Huang Zhi and 2) *Looking Beyond Flawed Journalism: How National Interests, Patriotism, and Cultural Values Shaped the Coverage of the Iraq War* by Ravi Narasimhan.⁴³ Entman argued news coverage consistently revealed a pattern of news framing that legitimizes the government's position and perceptions of issues. U.S. news magazines, for example, alleged criminality in the 1983 Soviet attack on a Korean airliner; five years later, the same magazines framed the

U.S. Navy's similar attack on an Iranian passenger jet as an accidental "tragedy of technology."⁴⁴

Relevance to thesis

The press nationalism framework was considered relevant to study the coverage given to the Mumbai attacks by one newspaper each from four different countries that have considerable interest in fallout. As discussed earlier in the introduction, the United States has an interest in the stability of the region. Any fallout from the Mumbai attacks has the potential to derail its "War on Terror" on the Afghan border. Unlike in previous terrorist attacks in India, this time the U.S. reacted quickly by sending Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to calm the charged atmosphere and reduce the hostilities between the two nuclear-armed states of India and Pakistan. By the time Rice reached India, the Pakistani army had already declared they would retaliate if India were to strike terror camps in Pakistan or Pakistan-occupied Kashmir as it amounts to infringement on Pakistan's sovereignty. Pakistani Army Chief General Kiyani threatened to move troops from the western border and NWFP, where the U.S. needs Pakistan army to defeat the Taliban and al Qaeda, to the eastern border to fight with India. From the American point of view, Indian

restraint was all the more crucial, or perhaps central, to its "War on Terror."

The U.K. also has interest in the War on Terror. Apart from that, it feels it has the moral obligation as a former colonial power to solve the Kashmir issue. This was evident when Foreign Secretary David Miliband established the link between the Mumbai attacks and Kashmir in his column in the *Guardian*.

An *Economist* article described the mood in Pakistan after the Mumbai attacks, "Ever since India alleged, with subsequent corroboration from America and Britain that Pakistani terrorists carried out last month's mass murder in Mumbai the country's politicians, generals and fire-breathing journalists have been declaring themselves ready for war—if that's what India chooses."⁴⁵ After the attack, President Zardari denied any Pakistan involvement describing the captured terrorist as a non-state actor.

This study will examine how four newspapers from different countries covered the Mumbai attacks, focusing and highlighting certain aspects making them more salient with selective source usage and advocating solutions that are in line with its nation's interests and policy.

Based on previous studies these hypotheses were developed:

H1: The *New York Times* and the *Times* of London will portray war as not a solution to the crisis whereas the *Hindu* will project war as the most suitable option and *Dawn* will ready its citizens for an eventual war.

H2: The *New York Times* will increasingly refer to its war in Afghanistan, and the *Times* of London will refer to Kashmir.

H3: The *New York Times*, *Dawn*, and the *Times* of London will refer to religious fanaticism and Muslim unrest in India by frequently referring to previous attacks in India; at the same time, they will be less likely to mention previous attacks either abetted by Pakistan or the available evidence of Pakistani involvement whereas the *Hindu* will refer to previous attacks abetted by Pakistan.

H4: The *New York Times*, the *Times* of London and *Dawn* will more likely portray Pakistan as a victim, whereas the *Hindu* will be less likely do so.

H5: The *New York Times* and the *Times* of London will refer more frequently to nuclear arms than will the *Hindu* and *Dawn*, despite the avowed stand of Pakistan not to use nuclear arms first.

H6: The *Hindu* will link responsibility to the Pakistan government, whereas The *New York Times* and the *Times* of London will only limit it to the terror groups based in Pakistan, and *Dawn* will altogether deny Pakistan's involvement.

H7: The newspapers will be more likely to depend on sources from their countries to support their point of view.

Notes

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⁴. Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, *Manufacturing Consent: The political Economy of the Mass Media* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), 1-31.

⁵. Herbert J. Gans, *Deciding What's News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek and Time* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2004), 31-38.

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^{31.} See Kuang-Kuo Chang, "Constructing a Theoretical Framework for Sourcing Pattern: A Case Study on Selection of News Sources in Israeli Palestinian Conflict," 3.

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^{37.} Ibid.

^{38.} Ibid.

^{39.} See, Lee B. Becker, "Foreign Policy and Press Performance," *Journalism Quarterly* 54 (1977): 364-368.

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^{41.} Ibid.

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CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

A content analysis was used to measure the coverage of the Mumbai attacks in four newspapers, one from each country--namely India, Pakistan, the U.K., and the U.S.

Rationale behind these newspapers' selection

The *New York Times* was selected for study because of its ascribed role as "reference index" for other newspapers. The *New York Times* is also acknowledged as a "leading" or "elite" newspaper.¹ And, it is one of the most influential papers in foreign policy making and prints more foreign news than any other newspaper in the U.S.² The *New York Times* has tremendous influence even outside U.S. borders. The *New York Times* is owned by The New York Times Company, which also owns other newspapers such as the *Boston Globe*, the *International Herald Tribune* and nearly 50 websites such as www.boston.com and www.about.com. The New York Times Company is a public company headed by Arthur O. Sulzberger, Jr.

Merrill and Fisher, in *The World's Great Dailies*, identified the *Times* as one of the U.K.'s best newspapers. The *Times*, they wrote, best-known elite paper, has always been considered the establishment paper, a daily to read to

keep up with the affairs of the empire.³ The *Times* is owned by News International, which also owns tabloids such as the *Sun* and the *News of the World*. News International is the main UK subsidiary of News Corporation headed by Rupert Murdoch.

From India the *Hindu* was profiled among the world's top fifty dailies by Merrill and Fisher. They rated the *Hindu* among top five national newspapers in India. But among the five, the *Hindu* enjoys the highest reputation for reliability and concern for truthful coverage. It also commands the widest international respect. The *Times* of London rated the *Hindu* as one of the world's ten best newspapers.⁴ The *Hindu* is owned by The Hindu Group, a private company, which also owns the *Hindu Business Line*, a business daily; *Sportstar*, a weekly sports magazine; and *Frontline*, fortnightly magazine.

Dawn was chosen from Pakistan because not only it enjoys large circulation but also a reputation for being an independent newspaper. LaPorte, Jr. wrote, *Dawn*, the leading English-language newspaper in Pakistan, has in recent years emerged as an excellent daily providing serious coverage of domestic, regional, and international

events.⁵ *Dawn* is owned by the Dawn Media Group, a private company, which also owns *DawnNews* TV, CityFM89.

November 27, 2008, was chosen as the beginning date for this content analysis because the Mumbai attacks began about 8 p.m. on November 26, 2008 and lasted for 60 hours; the first report appeared in newspapers on November 27. December 13, 2008 was chosen as the end date, exactly two weeks from the date on which the siege ended.

The Dow Jones newspaper archive Factiva was used to retrieve articles using the key words, (Mumbai or India) and (terror\$ or attack\$) for all other newspapers except Pakistan's *Dawn*. For *Dawn*, its archive was used as it was not available on any database.

All articles from November 27 to December 13, 2008 were coded; included were editorials, opinion columns, news stories, and columns in the main section. However, lifestyle features, letters to the editor, and articles that appeared in the sports section were not coded. Stories from Indian newspapers that were not relevant to the study, such as human interest stories, were not coded.

The author and a journalism student from a medium-sized state university in the Midwest coded 22 articles--four each from the *New York Times* and the *Times* of London,

six from *Dawn*, and eight from the *Hindu*. The number of articles from each newspaper was selected in proportion to the total number. A total of 16 variables for the 22 stories were coded.

Overall intercoder reliability based on percentage of agreement was 91 percent. The highest rate of agreement for categories such as headline, newspaper, and dateline was 100 percent. The lowest rate of agreement for "main theme of the story" was 70 percent. This was due to the fine distinction between categories "advocates war" and "embraces war." For statistical purposes these two categories later were collapsed.

The following five datelines were developed for coding: India, Pakistan, the U.S., the U.K., and other.

A total of six coding categories were developed for sources. Each source was counted only once per article. The source categories were: U.S. sources, U.K. sources, Indian sources, Pakistan sources, other country sources, and U.N. sources.

Sources from a country included: sources from legislative and executive branch, military officers, terrorism experts, academia, victims and their families, and terrorists.

Six story themes were developed, which were: **War denouncement** (stories that focused on efforts to avert a war or its negative effects were coded as war denouncement), **War advocacy** (stories that focused on India's right to attack either terrorist camps in Pakistan or wage a full-scale war were coded as advocating a war), **Embracing war** (stories that focused on eventual war, and a nation's ability or right to defend itself were coded as embracing war), **Extradition of terrorists** (stories that focused on terrorists' extradition to India for trial were coded as extradition of terrorists), **Trial in Pakistan** (stories that focused on terrorists trial in Pakistan were coded as trial in Pakistan), and **Others**. For additional information, see appendices.

Notes

¹ See, Jyotika Ramaprasad and Daniel Riffe, "Effect of U.S.-India Relations on *New York Times* coverage," *Journalism Quarterly* 64 (1987): 539.

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³ John C. Merrill and Harold A. Fisher, *The World's Great Dailies: Profiles of Fifty Newspapers* (New York: Communication Arts Books, 1980), 150, 322.

⁴ Ibid, 170.

⁵ Robert LaPorte, Jr., "Pakistan: A nation still in the making," in *India & Pakistan*, eds. Selig S. Harrison, Paul H. Kreisberg and Dennis Kux, (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press, 1999), 56.

CHAPTER IV

Findings

As expected, the two Western newspapers were different from the two Asian newspapers in sheer number of stories. The *Hindu* published 132 stories and *Dawn* had 102 stories (Table 1). Together, they accounted for 72 percent of the items examined. The *New York Times* had 53 stories while the *Times* of London published 35 stories. The *New York Times* and the *Times* of London accounted for the remaining 28 percent.

There were significant differences in "the place of origin." The *New York Times* and the *Times* of London filed 43 percent and 48 percent of their stories respectively from India.

At the same time, the *New York Times* had 18 percent (N=10) of its stories from Pakistan, whereas the *Times* of London got only 8 percent (N=3) of its stories from Pakistan. The *New York Times* had one story from the U.K. and the *Times* of London reciprocated the gesture by having one story from the U.S.

The *Hindu* and *Dawn* too differed in this aspect. Of the *Hindu's* stories 65 percent were from India. Meanwhile, only 28 percent of *Dawn's* articles were from India; this was

substantially lower than 43 percent and 48 percent that the *New York Times* and the *Times* of London reported from India. The other difference was that nearly 10 percent of the *Hindu* stories and 20 percent of *Dawn* stories were filed from the U.S., an indication of American influence on both nations.

Table 1. Place of Origin of news stories about the Mumbai attack published, Nov. 27 - Dec. 13, 2008

	New York Times	Times of London	Dawn	Hindu
U.S.	18(33.9%)	1 (2.8%)	19(18.6%)	13(9.8%)
U.K.	1 (1.8%)	14(40.0%)	0 (0.0%)	3(2.27%)
India	23(43.3%)	17(48.0%)	29(28.4%)	86(65.1%)
Pakistan	10(18.8%)	3 (8.5%)	51(50.0%)	25(18.9%)
Other	1 (1.8%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (2.9%)	5 (3.7%)
Total	53 (100%)	35(100%)	102 (100%)	132 (100%)

The other major difference was stories filed from Britain. The *Hindu* filed a little more than two percent of its news stories from Britain. Meanwhile, *Dawn* completely

ignored London. In a way it was indicative of how both Pakistan and India considered the former colonial power as a fringe player vis-à-vis the U.S.

H1: The *New York Times* and the *Times* of London will portray war as not a solution to the crisis whereas the *Hindu* will project war as the most suitable option and *Dawn* will ready its citizens for an eventual war.

There was a clear difference between the Asian newspapers and the Western newspapers. Both the *New York Times* and the *Times* of London never advocated war editorially or published a story that talked of war as a possible solution to the Mumbai carnage.

At the same time, the *New York Times* denounced war four times (7.54%) in its total coverage. There were two editorials and two op-ed columns that rejected the idea of war. Interestingly, the *New York Times* had two editorials and both of them denounced war as an option. This clearly indicated the *Times'* stand, and in a way that of the U.S as well, to avoid war between India and Pakistan.

The *Times* of London had three editorials of which one denounced war and the other two talked about terrorism in general. It had one op-ed article that supported non-confrontation. Overall, of the 35 articles the *Times* of

London published it had two articles (5.71%) that rejected war. Both Western newspapers had no news articles that denounced war.

Table 2. Main theme of the stories in the coverage of the Mumbai attack, Nov. 27 - Dec. 13, 2008

	New York Times	Times of London	Dawn	Hindu	Total
Denounces	4 (7.5%)	2 (5.7%)	11(10.7%)	14(10.6%)	31
Advocates	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (2.9%)	3 (2.2%)	6
Other	49(92.4%)	33(94.2%)	88(86.2%)	115(87.1%)	285

Since five expected cell frequencies were lower than 5, a Chi-square test could not be run for significance.

Meantime, the two Asian newspapers' coverage differed from that of their western counterparts. Both the *Hindu* and *Dawn* more or less equally denounced war as an option. But at the same time each had three stories that advocated war.

At the individual level, the *Hindu* was somewhat similar to the *New York Times*. Overall it published three editorials of which two condemned the option of war. It also had three op-ed articles that found fault with all uses of force--surgical strikes to dismantle terrorism

infrastructure inside Pakistani occupied/administered Kashmir (PoK or PAK) and full-fledged war. It had the highest number of news stories (N=9) that rejected the war option. These were news stories quoting mostly Indian government sources, such as the prime minister, foreign relations minister, and home minister denying the rumors that India was planning to attack terrorist bases near Karachi city in Pakistan and Muzaffarabad in PoK/PAK. In total, the *Hindu* had 14 articles (10.6%) that denounced war, which was the highest of all four newspapers. However, the *Hindu* also published three news articles (2.27%) that advocated the idea of war. All three were news articles, where sources controlled the direction. Interestingly, two of them were filed from Pakistan.

Dawn had the highest number of editorials (N=10, 9.8%) among the four newspapers. Surprisingly, only one of 10 editorials deplored the idea of going to war, and the remaining nine editorials were neutral. At the same time *Dawn* had the highest number of op-ed articles, six from a total of 15, which espoused non-confrontation. Also, it had four news articles that fell into the "denouncing war" category.

Like the *Hindu*, *Dawn* also had three stories that advocated war with India. Quite interestingly, it had one op-ed article that supported war. This was the only op-ed article in the four newspapers to support the idea of war. The remaining two were news articles.

Places and directions

Overall, there were 31 stories that portrayed war as an unworthy option. Of these 13 (41.9%) originated in India; eight (25%) were from Pakistan; six (19.3%) came from the U.S.; two (6.3%) were from Britain and two from other nations.

There were six stories that advocated war, three each in *Dawn* and the *Hindu*. Not surprisingly, five of them originated in Pakistan and one in India. The Mumbai terrorist attack, in India and around the world, was widely seen as Pakistani terrorists' and the notorious ISI's game plan to divert forces to the eastern border from the western border abutting Afghanistan, where it was fighting a deadly war with al-Qaeda and the Taliban as part of the War on Terror.

Overall, the hypothesis was partially supported. While a few news stories in the Asian papers supported the option of war, they overwhelmingly joined the Western media in

denouncing war, an option supported in three of five editorials published in the two Western newspapers.

The coverage of the Mumbai attack was focused on a few topics. Selection and highlighting of these topics were important, since focusing on certain topics while overlooking the other could portray the attack, causes, and its consequences in a completely different light. It was hypothesized that each newspaper would select and highlight certain topics while ignoring the others to suit its national interests. Indeed it was true. Newspapers did differ from each other.

H2: The *New York Times* will increasingly refer to its war in Afghanistan, and the *Times* of London will refer to Kashmir.

Security failure: Indian security apparatus' failure was a prominent topic in the *Times* of London, resulting in 12(25%) mentions (Table 3). The *Hindu* and the *New York Times* were quite similar in this aspect. The *Hindu* mentioned security failure 28 times in 26(41.1%) stories, followed by the *Times* that had 11 mentions in 10(27.5%) stories. Meanwhile, *Dawn* mentioned it in 14(20.2%) stories.

Table 3. Prominent topics in the coverage of the Mumbai attack, Nov. 27 - Dec. 13, 2008

	New York Times	Times of London	Dawn	Hindu	Total
Sec.failure	11(27.5%)	12(25.0%)	14(20.2%)	28(41.1%)	65
Hindu fan'cism	3 (7.5%)	5(10.4%)	8(11.5%)	4 (5.8%)	20
Muslim unrest	3 (7.5%)	7(14.5%)	9(13.0%)	3 (4.4%)	22
Kashmir	12(30.0%)	10(20.8%)	16(23.1%)	16(23.5%)	54
War on terror	11(27.5%)	7(14.5%)	22(31.8%)	17(25.0%)	57

Since four expected cell frequencies were lower than 5, a Chi-square test could not be run for significance.

Kashmir: This time the *New York Times* led the pack with 12 (30%) mentions followed by *The Hindu* with 16 (23.5%) mentions. *Dawn* had it 16 (23.1%) times and *The Times of London* had it in 10 (20.8%) stories.

War on Terror: Mention of the War on Terror was one category where national interests of newspapers were very apparent. *Dawn* mentioned it 22 (31.8%) times, mostly

talking about how it was fighting the War on Terror on America's side and losing hundreds of soldiers. The *New York Times* came second with 11 (27.5%) mentions, where it talked about how Pakistan was trying to pull its troops from the western border to redeploy on the eastern border and what it meant for the situation in Afghanistan. The *Hindu* had it in 17 (25%) stories. The *Hindu's* coverage was similar to the *New York Times'* in noting how Pakistan's army would exploit the situation to redeploy its forces from the western border and with an added emphasis on how the U.S. would try to snub India's plans, if any, to strike terror camps in Pakistan. The *Times* of London had it seven (14.5%) times, but its emphasis was not limited to any one aspect.

Indeed the U.S media referred to the War on Terror frequently, but it was the second most prominent topic along with Indian security apparatus failure. The most prominent topic was Kashmir with 12 references. Security failure was the most prominent topic in the *Times* of London with 12 references, followed by Kashmir with 10 references.

The evidence partially, though quantitatively mixed, qualitatively clearly supported the hypothesis.

H3: The *New York Times*, the *Times* of London, and *Dawn* will refer to religious fanaticism and Muslim unrest in India by frequently referring to previous attacks in India; at the same time, they will be less likely to mention previous attacks either abetted by Pakistan or the available evidence of Pakistani involvement whereas the *Hindu* will refer to previous attacks abetted by Pakistan.

Hindu fanaticism: The *Times* of London had five (10.4%) mentions of Hindu fanaticism, followed by *Dawn* that brought up the issue in eight (11.5%) stories. The *New York Times* mentioned it three (7.5%) times, whereas, the *Hindu* logged in last with four (5.8%) mentions (Table.3).

Muslim unrest: Once again the *Times* of London topped the table with seven (14.5%) mentions of Muslim unrest, which was slightly more than *Dawn*, which came second with nine (13%) mentions. The *New York Times* mentioned it three times (7.5%); Muslim unrest found a place in three (4.4%) stories in the *Hindu* (Table.3).

When talking about India's brush with terror each newspaper was distinctly different from the other. The *New York Times* talked about previous terrorist strikes that have no strong external links, such as a string of bomb blasts in various cities in 2007, in 10 (18.86%) instances,

while mentioning only four (7.54%) times other major terrorist attacks--the parliament attack, the Bombay blasts and a series of flight hijacks--which have conclusive links to Pakistan (Table 4).

Table 4: Mentions of Previous attacks in the coverage of the Mumbai attack, Nov. 27 - Dec. 13, 2008

	New York Times	Times of London	Dawn	Hindu	Total
Prev. in Ind.	10(18.8%)	8(22.8%)	14(13.7%)	7 (5.3%)	39
Abett. by Pak	4 (7.5%)	9(25.7%)	1 (0.9%)	6 (4.5%)	20
Other	39(73.5%)	19(54.2%)	87(85.2%)	119(90.1%)	262

Chi-square = 41.5 df = 6 p< 0.0001.

Meanwhile, the *Times* of London's coverage had an almost equal number of mentions of the indigenous attacks and attacks with Pakistani links. It referred to indigenous attacks eight (22.8%) times, while attacks with Pakistani links appeared nine (25.71%) times. The *Hindu's* coverage was also somewhat similar to that of the *Times* of London, but it had fewer mentions about both types of attacks. It referred seven (5%) times to previous terrorist attacks

that have no established external links. At the same time, it mentioned terrorist attacks with Pakistani links in six (4.5%) instances. *Dawn* was entirely different from the other three newspapers; 14(13.72%) times it talked about previous terrorist attacks in India, while avoiding attacks with a Pakistani connection by only mentioning in one (.9%) story.

The data provided mixed evidence in support of this hypothesis. The *New York Times* coverage contained more references to previous attacks in India than previous attacks abetted by Pakistani terrorist groups. But it had fewer number of mentions about Muslim unrest and Hindu fanaticism. At the same time, the *Times* of London and the *Hindu* had more or less the same number of mentions about both types of attacks in India. In fact, the *Times* of London did mention attacks abetted by Pakistan (N=9) slightly more than the indigenous attacks in India (N=8), but its references to Hindu fanaticism and Muslim unrest in India were more frequent than any other newspaper. The *Hindu* had least number of mentions about Hindu fanaticism and Muslim unrest. *Dawn's* coverage was clearly one-sided, with previous attacks in India outnumbering references to previous attacks by Pakistan-based terror outfits at a 14

to 1 ratio. *Dawn* also raised Hindu fanaticism and Muslim unrest frequently. These findings support the hypothesis, partially if not fully.

H4: The *New York Times*, the *Times* of London, and *Dawn* will more likely portray Pakistan as a victim, whereas the *Hindu* will be less likely do so.

Similar to mentions of the previous attacks in India category, the *Hindu* and *Dawn* were poles apart. The *Hindu* pinned the blame on Pakistan on 23 (17.42%) occasions (Table 5).

Table 5. Portrayal of Pakistan in the coverage of the Mumbai attack, Nov. 27 - Dec. 13, 2008

	New York Times	Times of London	Dawn	Hindu	Total
Perpetrator	8(15.0%)	0(0.0%)	1 (0.9%)	23(17.4%)	32
Victim	1 (1.8%)	0(0.0%)	13(12.7%)	0 (0.0%)	14
Both	0 (0.0%)	0(0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (0.7%)	1
Other	44(83.0%)	35(100%)	88(86.2%)	108(81.8%)	275

Since eight expected cell frequencies were lower than 5, Chi-square test could not be run for statistical significance.

In one instance it also described Pakistan as a victim as well as a perpetrator. On the contrary, of 102 articles *Dawn* portrayed Pakistan as perpetrator in a single story. But on 13 (12.74%) occasions it painted Pakistan as a victim.

The *New York Times* depicted Pakistan as perpetrator in eight (15.09%) stories, while also describing Pakistan as a victim on one occasion. But it was quite different from coverage in the Asian newspapers. The *Hindu* and *Dawn* used editorials to portray Pakistan as perpetrator and victim respectively in two instances. The *New York Times* remained neutral in its editorials and most op-ed articles, except one op-ed article in which it blamed Pakistan. The remaining seven were news stories, where mostly sources directed the story in the immediate aftermath of the attack.

Completely different was the *Times* of London coverage. In all 35 stories Pakistan was viewed neither a perpetrator nor a victim.

As explained in the methodology section, comments such as Pakistan's inability to control terror groups, its overt or covert support to these terrorist groups, and its

turning a deaf ear or blind eye to terrorist activities were considered as negative assertions.

The *New York Times'* reporters made 10 negative remarks in nine (16.9%) stories. These comments were mostly regarding Pakistan's inability or unwillingness to act firmly against terror groups. Never did they make a remark on links between the ISI and terror groups. Remarks in the *Times* of London were more or less in a similar vein, the only difference was that they made only four (11.4%) remarks. The *Hindu* had six (4.5%) negative assertions in its reports. Interestingly, each newspaper made one negative comment in one of their editorials about Pakistan. As might be expected, there were no negative remarks in *Dawn's* coverage. The findings partially supported the hypothesis.

H5: The two western newspapers will refer more frequently to nuclear arms than will the two Asian newspapers, despite the avowed stand of Pakistan not to use nuclear arms first.

There was a marked difference between the two Western papers and the two Asian papers, though Asian newspapers also differed from each other. Both the *New York Times* and the *Times* of London were excessively focused on nuclear arms. The *New York Times* mentioned nuclear arms nine (17%)

times, while the *Times* of London was slightly behind with five (14.28%) mentions (Table 6).

Table 6. Mention of Nuclear Arms in the coverage of the Mumbai attack, Nov. 27 - Dec. 13, 2008

	New York Times	Times of London	Dawn	Hindu	Total
Yes	9 (16.9%)	5 (14.2%)	9 (8.8%)	4 (3.0%)	27
No	44 (83.0%)	30 (85.7%)	93 (91.1%)	128 (96.9%)	295

Chi-square 11.64, df=3, p<0.008.

Mention of nuclear arms made its way into *Dawn's* pages on nine (8.8%) occasions. The *Hindu* was least bothered about nuclear arms mentioning them only four (3%) times in its 132 stories. The findings fully supported the hypothesis.

H6: The *Hindu* will link responsibility to the Pakistan government, whereas the *New York Times* and the *Times* of London will only limit it to the terror groups based in Pakistan, and *Dawn* will altogether deny Pakistan's involvement.

The *New York Times*, the *Hindu* and the *Times* of London were similar in one aspect: all three papers blamed Pakistan-based terrorist groups, mostly Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad, for the attack. The *Hindu* mainly accused terrorist groups in Pakistan in 78 (59%) stories; the *New York Times*' coverage was nearly similar with pinning the blame on LeT and others in 29 (54%) stories, followed by the *Times* of London with 18 (51%) stories (Table 7).

At the same time, one of the *New York Times* stories and two of the *Hindu* stories fell into the "No Pak connection" category. The *Times* of London was different from the *New York Times* and the *Hindu*, as there were no stories exonerating Pakistan but it portrayed the attacks as the work of "Indian terrorist" groups and disgruntled Muslim elements of India in two stories.

Press nationalism was clearly apparent in *Dawn*. Only in 37 (36.2%) stories did *Dawn* report the attack as the handiwork of terrorist groups based in Pakistan, while three times it found no Pak connection. On five occasions the attack was painted as an indigenous attack.

Table 7. Group most associated with the attack in the coverage of the Mumbai attack, Nov. 27 - Dec. 13, 2008

	New York Times	Times of London	Dawn	Hindu	Total
Ex-army	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (0.7%)	1
Pak ter. grps	29(54.7%)	18(51.4%)	37(36.2%)	78(59.0%)	162
No Pak. con	1 (1.8%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (2.9%)	2 (1.5%)	6
Indigenous	0 (0.0%)	2 (5.7%)	5 (4.9%)	0 (0.0%)	7
Other	23(43.3%)	15(42.8%)	57(55.8%)	51(38.6%)	146

Since 12 expected cell frequencies were lower than 5, a Chi-square test could not be run for statistical significance.

The hypothesis was partially supported. As hypothesized, the Western newspapers pinned the blame only on terrorist groups. The *Hindu* did raise some questions about the complicity of government elements, but it clearly separated the notorious Pakistani army and the ISI from the nascent civilian government for the blame. *Dawn* clearly exhibited press nationalism, for it was the newspaper with the least number of mentions linking the attack to Pakistan-based terrorist groups.

H7: The newspapers will be more likely to depend on sources from their countries to support their point of view.

Overall, Indian sources were widely used in all newspapers except *Dawn*, followed by Pakistani sources. U.S. sources were also widely quoted in all newspapers except the *Times* of London. British sources were least used, trailing behind the "other sources" category that included sources from the UN and all nations. At an individual level, the *New York Times* used 3.81 sources per story on average, which was the highest among the four newspapers.

Indian sources were the largest category in the *New York Times*. In total, it used 82 Indian sources (Table 8). On an average it used 1.52 Indian sources per story, which was significantly higher than all other newspapers used, while 1.05 American sources were used per story totaling 56 sources in 53 stories. This was also interesting because on average the *New York Times* employed more domestic sources than any other paper. In fact, the *New York Times* used more sources from each category than any other paper. It used .83 Pakistani sources per story, higher than *Dawn's* usage of Pakistani sources. Overall it quoted 44 Pakistani sources. It also used more British sources than the *Times* of London. In the "other sources" category it had 12

sources, which means on average it quoted .22 other sources per story.

Table 8. Use of sources in the coverage of the Mumbai attack, Nov. 27 to Dec. 13, 2008

	New York Times	Times of London	Dawn	Hindu	Total
US Sources	56 (27.7%)	9 (11.8%)	56 (27.7%)	29 (11.8%)	150
UK Sources	8 (3.9%)	5 (6.5%)	3 (1.4%)	9 (3.6%)	25
Ind. Sources	82 (40.5%)	36 (47.3%)	60 (29.7%)	110 (45.0%)	288
Pak. Sources	44 (21.7%)	23 (30.2%)	79 (39.1%)	84 (34.4%)	230
Other Sources	12 (5.9%)	3 (3.9%)	4 (1.9%)	12 (4.9%)	31

Chi-square = 48.68, df=12, p<.0001.

The *Times* of London used 1.02 (N=36) Indian sources on average, while using only .65 (N=23) Pakistani sources per story. Interestingly, as mentioned earlier, it used .25 (N=9) U.S. sources per story which was higher than the use of British sources, which was .14 (N=5) sources per story. Overall, it used 2.17 sources per story.

The *Hindu* used 1.84 sources per story, lower than all other newspapers. It employed 110 Indian sources or .83 sources per story, while using .63 (N=84) Pakistan sources per story. As for western source usage, it used .21 (N=29) American sources per story, and at the same time it only employed .06 (N=9) British sources per story.

Once again, *Dawn's* coverage differed from that of the other three newspapers. Unlike other newspapers it depended more on Pakistani sources than Indian sources. It employed 79 Pakistan sources or .77 sources per story. It used 60 Indian sources or .58 sources per story, which was significantly lower than the usage of the *New York Times* and the *Times* of London. The *New York Times* used 1.54 Indian sources per story, and the *Times* of London used 1.02 Indian sources per story. *Dawn's* use of American sources was significantly different from that of the *Times* of London and the *Hindu*. *Dawn* quoted .54 (N=56) U.S. sources per story, which more than doubled the usage by the *Times* of London (.25) and the *Hindu* (.21). The hypothesis was partially supported.

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION and CONCLUSION

Lehman argued: "During international crises, media in most countries usually operate within the sphere of prevailing national consensus. Journalists as well as public are less likely to criticize government."¹ Zaller and Chiu argued, "During foreign policy crises journalists must contend not only with officials who strain to control the news, but with fear that tough reporting will undermine the government's ability to deal with the crisis. As a result, journalists often tend to "rally round the flag" and whatever policy government favors."²

For India and Pakistan the Mumbai attack was a crisis, as Zaller and Chiu suggested, where the tough reporting had the potential to undermine governments' abilities to deal with the situation. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, the public mood in India was in favor of revenge. In Pakistan, it was more or less the same, after a series of veiled references to Pakistan's involvement by Indian ministers. As Lehman suggested, similar to the public, journalists also were less likely to criticize governments. For the U.S., as mentioned earlier, stability in South Asia is of paramount importance to the continuation of its War

on Terror in Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan. Siraj, analyzing the image of Pakistan in U.S. newspapers in 2007 maintained, "During the coverage period in 2001 and 2002, (after the Parliament attack) that the US government never wanted war between Pakistan and India, rather wanted Pakistan to fully concentrate on the war against terrorism and to mobilize its forces on the border with Afghanistan to combat terrorism."³ Great Britain's interests were not too different from those of the U.S. except in the case of its colonial vestige--Kashmir.

The coverage by the four newspapers, in part, if not entirely, supported the argument of press nationalism, especially if qualitative information from the articles coded is considered. The *New York Times* in two of its editorials denounced war, and its most prominent topics were Kashmir and the War on Terror. Coverage in the *Times* of London was little different; the failure of the Indian security agencies was the prominent topic, followed by Kashmir. The *Hindu* portrayed Pakistan as perpetrator in 23 stories while presenting Pakistan as a victim in one story. *Dawn* projected Pakistan as victim in 13 stories, while pinning the blame on Pakistan in only one story. It also used the least number of Indian sources compared to all

other newspapers. *Dawn* tried to mould its coverage by employing more Pakistani sources and American sources, who were often times ambiguous than Indian sources, who were more forthright about a Pakistan connection. This certainly suggests press nationalism was at work.

Seven hypotheses were developed at the outset to test press nationalism in the coverage of the Mumbai massacre by four newspapers.

Hypothesis one predicted that the *Hindu* would advocate war, whereas the *New York Times* and the *Times* of London would denounce and *Dawn* would embrace the option of war.

The western media did denounce war, though the coverage of the *New York Times* and the *Times* of London differed from each other. The *New York Times* denounced war in all its editorials but the *Times* of London condemned the war option in one of three editorials. In the Asian media, *Dawn* portrayed war as an unworthy option 11 times and embraced an eventual war in three stories. While the *Hindu's* coverage was mixed, in 14 stories it denounced the idea of war. There were three stories supporting war, and interestingly only one of the three was from India and the remaining two were from Pakistan.

The findings partially supported the hypothesis; the *New York Times* and the *Times* of London denounced war as hypothesized. But, the two Asian newspapers joined their western counterparts in denouncing the war option contrary to the hypothesis.

Hypothesis two predicted the *New York Times* would refer to war in Afghanistan more frequently, whereas the *Times* of London would refer to Kashmir. The two newspapers indeed referred to war in Afghanistan and Kashmir frequently, but Kashmir was the most frequently referred topic in the *New York Times* followed by war in Afghanistan. The most prominent topic in the *Times* of London was the Indian security failure followed by Kashmir.

But qualitatively, the *New York Times* mostly referred to terrorist groups operating from both PoK/PAK and Jammu and Kashmir. At the same time, the *Times* of London referred to finding a solution to the Kashmir dispute along with militancy in Kashmir.

Hypothesis three predicted that the two western newspapers along with *Dawn* would refer to Hindu fanaticism, Muslim unrest and previous attacks in India frequently while avoiding previous attacks abetted by Pakistan. At the same time the *Hindu* would refer to attacks with Pakistani

links more frequently. The findings provided mixed evidence for this hypothesis.

The *New York Times* referred to previous attacks in India that have no external link more frequently than those abetted by Pakistani terrorist groups. But, the *Times* of London and the *Hindu* had more or less the same number of mentions about both types of attacks in India. *Dawn* frequently mentioned about indigenous attacks while completely ignoring attacks with external links. Qualitatively *Dawn's* coverage was the most vitriolic of all when it talked about Hindu fanaticism or Muslim unrest in India. It frequently referred to a little-known Hindu extremist group and its unproven links to a recent bomb attack, while completely overlooking Pakistani sponsored terrorism that claimed thousands of lives in Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere in India. The *Times* of London's references to Hindu fanaticism and Muslim unrest in India were more frequent than any other newspaper. The *New York Times*, too, did raise some questions about the possible involvement of Indian Muslims but it never held them solely responsible for the attack. The *New York Times* frequently referred to previous attacks in India but only occasionally referred to Pakistan-sponsored attacks; this was consistent

with American foreign policy of shielding Pakistan from the blame. The *Hindu* had the least number of mentions about Muslim unrest and Hindu fanaticism.

Hypothesis four predicted that the two Western newspapers along with *Dawn* would be more likely to portray Pakistan as a victim, whereas the *Hindu* would be less likely to do so. The results partially supported the hypothesis.

The *New York Times* portrayed Pakistan as a perpetrator in eight instances while projecting it as victim in only one story, contrary to what was hypothesized. The *Times* of London portrayed Pakistan neither as a perpetrator nor as a victim. The *Hindu* portrayed Pakistan as a victim as well as perpetrator in only one story, while projecting it as a perpetrator in 23 articles. *Dawn* overwhelmingly projected Pakistan as a victim. Its arguments included Pakistan fighting a war, War on Terror, that was not its own and terrorist groups also killing innocent people in Pakistan. At the same time, reasons in the coverage ranged from Pakistan's intelligence agency Inter Services Intelligence's (ISI) covert or overt support for terrorist groups to Pakistan's failure to control the terrorist groups operating from its territory.

Hypothesis five predicted the two Western newspapers would refer to nuclear arms more frequently than that of the two Asian newspapers. The findings supported the hypothesis.

The Western media did refer to nuclear arms more frequently than the Asian media. The *New York Times* and the *Times* of London mentioned nuclear arms in 16.88 percent and 14.28 percent of their stories respectively. Meanwhile, nuclear arms found a place in 8.8 percent of *Dawn's* stories and 3.0 percent of the *Hindu's* coverage. Overall, the coverage indicated that the two western newspapers were more concerned about a possible nuclear war, while the two Asian newspapers' coverage did not indicate any such possibility.

Hypothesis six predicted the *Hindu* would link the responsibility to the Pakistan government, whereas the *New York Times* and the *Times* of London would only assign it to terrorist groups in Pakistan, and *Dawn* would altogether deny Pakistan's involvement.

The hypothesis received mixed support. The *Hindu* never linked it to the civilian government of Pakistan, but it did raise some questions about the possible complicity of the ISI and the ex-army officials. However, the group that

was held responsible for the attack was mostly a terrorist organization--Lashkar-e-Taiba-- operating from Pakistan. The Western media mostly pinned the blame on Pakistan-based terrorist groups, although once the *New York Times* denied any Pakistani connection. The *Times* of London condemned indigenous terrorist groups for the attack in two instances. In *Dawn* three articles denied a Pakistani connection, and on five occasions it portrayed the attack as the handiwork of Indian terrorist groups. Only 36 percent of *Dawn* articles linked the attack to Pakistani terrorist groups, the least among all newspapers. *Dawn* clearly exhibited press nationalism, for it was the newspaper with the least number of mentions linking the attack to Pakistan-based terrorist groups. It had the highest number of stories that fell into either "No Pakistani connection" or "indigenous attack" category. Qualitatively also, it was completely different from the other newspapers. Never did it raise a solitary question about the present or past nexus between the ISI and terrorist organization operating from Pakistan and Kashmir.

Hypothesis seven predicted the newspapers would more likely depend on sources from their countries to support their point of view.

Though the evidence partially supported this hypothesis, it was inconclusive. The *New York Times* employed more Indian sources than American sources, but on average the *New York Times* had more domestic sources than any other newspaper. The *Times* of London used more Indian sources followed by Pakistani and American sources, British sources were the least used, marginally higher than "other country" sources. The *Hindu* and *Dawn* used more sources from their own countries. But after all, the attack happened in India, and more than 90 percent of those killed were Indians. The excessive usage of Indian sources was more than obvious. But *Dawn's* usage of sources was clearly different from that of the other three newspapers. On average it used the least number of Indian sources among all the newspapers, only slightly more than American sources.

Conclusion

Overall, this study found some evidence of press nationalism in the coverage of the Mumbai terrorist attack by the four newspapers. As argued in the literature review, media tried to limit the coverage to certain aspects of the attack. Entman argued, "Framing entails selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making

connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution."⁴ Framing was evident in the coverage of the attack. By selecting and highlighting a few aspects, such as Kashmir, the War on Terror, and the failure of Indian security agencies with the help of cherry-picked sources, media skirted many important issues, such as the complicity of the ISI and Pakistani army, willful negligence on part of Pakistan's government, and questions about the funding of these terrorist organizations.

Source bias was evident in the coverage of *Dawn*, depending heavily on sources from Pakistan and the U.S., whose primary interest was Afghanistan and not the attack. Another manifestation of press nationalism was *Dawn's* portrayal of Pakistan as a victim, while completely ignoring the ISI' and army's past and present associations with terrorist groups.

The *New York Times'* coverage also exhibited some evidence of press nationalism. The *New York Times* failed to raise critical questions, such as "how high the act was known and approved," as it did in the Polish priest Popieluszko murder case. As The Herman-Chomsky propaganda model argued, The *New York Times* covered the attack through

the filter of U.S. foreign policy, which was keeping the War on Terror in view. It carefully avoided questions like links between the ISI and terrorist organizations, closely following priorities of the American government. That the *New York Times* linked the attack to terror groups but failed to raise questions about Pakistan's official agencies mirrored then U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice statement:

"I think we do believe that there was - there is evidence of involvement somehow on Pakistani soil...even if these were non-state actors, which I believe they were - non-state actors operating on Pakistani soil. It is still Pakistan's responsibility to respond." ⁵

This study used one elite newspaper each from the U.S., the U.K., Pakistan, and India. Hence, it cannot be argued that the coverage by these four newspapers represents or reflects the entire coverage given to the attack.

The study content analyzed each "relevant" article that appeared between November 27, 2008 and December 13, 2008. Seventeen days of coverage is arguably small, and an extended period may have produced different results. However, this was impossible considering the extensive

coverage the attack received in the Asian media, as opposed to the "tapered-off coverage" in the Western media.

Press nationalism has many manifestations: use of sources, prominence of story, frequency of stories, headlines, positive and negative comments, framing, highlighting certain aspects of an issue while willfully ignoring others, selection of adjectives and adverbs, and so forth. This study was limited to the use of sources and selection and highlighting of a few topics versus downplaying certain topics.

Developing variables, defining topics and themes, deciding what was a negative assertion and what was not, and categorizing sources were all subjective. After coding, in two instances categories were collapsed in order to run statistical tests; they were: "Other country sources" and "UN sources" and "embracing war" and "advocating war." Decisions like this, coding Hindu fanaticism and Muslim unrest separately though they were intertwined in some cases, and differentiation between the Pakistani army and civilian government were all arbitrary.

Similar to many other press nationalism or propaganda studies, this study did not include any extra-media indicators—such as government records and official foreign

policy information--to compare with the coverage. This attack was more of an event than a process as a war might be, where coverage could be categorized as before and after a major policy shift.

Future research

Future studies of press nationalism may compare the coverage with government policy information, which would provide an objective record to compare with the coverage. But it is impossible to get official records from the Indian government, and in Pakistan's case, with so many power centers, it may be even more difficult to get access to policy information.

Future studies may examine the content qualitatively as it would expand the scope of analysis. This would also allow comparison of the coverage with presidential and ministerial statements.

It would be a prudent idea to compare Asian newspapers separately by including one or more newspapers from each country and the same could be done with Western newspapers. Since the coverage in Western newspapers tapered off within a month, extending the period of study may also skew the results.

A study focused on editorial and op-ed columns could eliminate the chances of sources controlling the direction of the story. Editorials and op-ed columns reflect a newspaper's ideology.

A study might also examine both the nationality and the positional authority of sources used in news stories to determine, for instance, if political figures, military officers, business leaders, or ordinary citizens were featured differently by the newspapers.

The findings of press nationalism in the coverage of these four newspapers were mixed and limited to coverage of one event. Similar events in other countries than the United States should be conducted to further test whether newspapers in other parts of the world than the United States also exhibit press nationalism tendencies found in this study that included a newspaper from India and from Pakistan.

Finally, researchers may test Lehman's argument that "during international crises, media in most countries usually operate within the sphere of prevailing national consensus" by comparing the coverage of *Dawn* and the *Hindu* with available, reliable, opinion polls, and national surveys during various stages of the trial. Such a

comparison would make it clear whether the public mood has any bearing on newspapers' coverage.

Notes

- ¹. Ingrid A. Lehman, "Exploring the Transatlantic Media Divide Over Iraq: How and Why U.S. and German Media differed in Reporting on UN Weapons Inspections in Iraq, 2002-2003," *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 10 (2005): 63-69.
- ². John Zaller and Dennis Chiu, "Government's Little Helper: U.S. Press Coverage of Foreign Policy Crises, 1945-1991," *Political Communication* 13 (1990): 385-405.
- ³. Siraj, Syed Abdul, "War or Peace Journalism in Elite U.S. Newspapers: Exploring News Framing on Pakistan-India Conflict," Conference Papers -- International Communication Association, 2008 Annual Meeting, p1-24, 24p.
- ⁴. Entman, Robert M, "Political Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House's Frame After 9/11," *Political Communication*, 20, 4 (Oct-Dec2003): 415-433.
- ⁵. "Rice: evidence of involvement 'somehow' on Pakistan soil," *The Hindu*, 08 December 2008.

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Appendix
Coding Sheet

1. Headline:_____
2. Newspaper:_____

1= NY Times 2= W Post 3= L Times 4= Guardian 5=Dawn
6=Nation 7= Hindu 8= Times of India
3. Date ____/____/____ (YYYY/MM/DD)
4. Dateline:_____

1=India 2=Pakistan 3= the U.S. 4= the U.K. 5=Other
5. Type of news story:_____

1) News article 2) Editorial 3) Op-ed article 4) Other
6. Main theme of the story

1) Denounces war_____

2) Advocates war_____

3) Embraces war_____

4) No mention of war_____
7. The theme of story advocates (Please tick)

1) Extradition of Terrorist to India_____

2) Trial in Pakistan_____
8. Referred to nuclear arms_____

1. Yes 2. No

9. Frequency each type below appears in story
- 1) India's security apparatus failure_____
 - 2) Hindu religious fanaticism_____
 - 3) Muslim unrest in India_____
 - 4) Kashmir_____
 - 5) On going American war in Afghanistan_____
 - 6) Pakistani government's failure_____
 - 7) Other_____
10. Were there any references to (please tick all applicable)
- 1) Previous attacks in India_____
 - 2) Previous attacks abetted by Pakistan_____
11. Was Pakistan projected as _____
- 1) Perpetrator 2) Victim 3) Both
12. Frequency of the sources that asserted the Pakistan government link
- 1) U.S. Sources_____
 - 2) U.K. Sources_____
 - 3) Indian Sources_____
 - 4) Pakistani Sources_____
 - 5) Other Country Sources_____
 - 6) The UN sources_____

13. Frequency of the sources that denied the Pakistan government link

- 1) U.S. Sources_____
- 2) U.K. Sources_____
- 3) Indian Sources_____
- 4) Pakistani Sources_____
- 5) Other Country Sources_____
- 6) The UN sources_____

14. Frequency of the sources that neither denied nor asserted the Pakistan government link

- 1) U.S. Sources_____
- 2) U.K. Sources_____
- 3) Indian Sources_____
- 4) Pakistani Sources_____
- 5) Other Country Sources_____
- 6) The UN sources_____

15. Number of assertions (by the reporters) against the Pakistan government_____

16. Group most associated with the attack_____

- 1) The Pakistani civilian government
- 2) The Pakistani army
- 3) The ISI
- 4) Ex-army officials
- 5) The terrorist groups only

6) No Pakistani connection

7) Indigenous attack only

Coding instructions

6. For main theme of the story, look for the *sine qua non*, the *sine qua non* is the key event without which the story would not have been written.
9. For frequency type, please look for type of issues that are referred to separately. For eg. the Babri Mosque demolition and the Gujarat riots are two different types of Hindu fanaticism. Likewise, Pakistan's inability to curb terror camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir is different from its failure to stop Talibanization of Swat valley.
11. Please, look for mere references not frequencies for both previous attacks in India and previous attacks abetted by Pakistan.
- 12, 13 & 14. Please, count one source only once per article.
15. For eg. India needs to guide Richard Holbrooke in his work as envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan and tell him the core issue is no longer Kashmir but the nature of the Pakistani establishment. This can be construed as an assertion against Pakistan.

16. For group most associated with attack, please look for the group that is frequently linked to the attack either by reporters or sources in a story.