Between Hope and Despair: The UN Observer Missions of ONUCA and MINURSO

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Ayumi Hama

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Between Hope and Despair: The UN Observer Missions of ONUCA and MINURSO

by

AYUMI HAMA

has been approved for

the Department of Political Science

and the College of Arts and Sciences by

Patricia A. Weitsman

Professor of Political Science

Benjamin M. Ogles

Dean, College of Arts and Sciences

Abstract

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In modern international relations, the analysis of UN peace-keeping operations involved in the civil wars is increasingly important because of its significant impact on international security. To understand the effectiveness and limitations of UN peacekeeping operations, first, I define the terms of successes and failures of peace-keeping missions and the fundamental factors for successful missions, and introduce realism and liberalism as the framework of the analysis in this thesis. Second, I examine two case studies – peace-keeping operations in Nicaragua (ONUCA) and in Western Sahara/Morocco (MINURSO). Finally, I will discuss contemporary UN peace-keeping and the theoretical implications on the case studies through the framework of realism and liberalism. The analysis reveals that the UN is useful in settling civil wars because it provides a favorable environment for peace. On the other hand, it is almost powerless when warring parties and other actors in the conflict are not willing to cooperate.

Approved: _

Patricia A. Weitsman Professor of Political Science To those who have dedicated their lives to realize peace all over the world.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Introduction

In modern international relations, the analysis of civil war is increasingly important because of its significant impact on international security and its prevalence in the world. At the same time, the frequency of UN peace-keeping operations involved in the civil wars has been increasing as well. There seems to be a demand and great expectations in the international community that the UN peace-keeping operation to settle civil wars and maintain international security.

While the needs to support war-torn countries are great, the success of the operations in civil wars is difficult to achieve for a number of reasons. It is a challenge for the international community to manage modern intrastate wars because they influence not only domestic politics and economics, but also have an impact on the security of neighboring countries. The brutality of civil wars is another worrying factor. According to scholars of international relations, civil wars are more likely to result in a greater number of civilian casualties than would interstate wars.

It is true that some scholars criticize the United Nations (the UN) as ineffectual in peace-keeping missions, but the organization has begun to take the initiative in tackling civil wars. As Mason and Quinn discuss, it is not practical to develop a system to prevent conflict, rather, it is more fruitful to intervene when the time is "ripe for resolution."¹ Therefore, it is important to understand the different nature of civil wars compared to

¹ T. David Mason and Jason Quinn, "Stopping the Recurrence of Civil Wars," In *Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Post-War Societies*, ed. T.David Mason and James D. Meernik, (New York: Routledge, 2006), 16.

interstate conflicts, and to understand the power and limitations of the UN mission in order to know what is efficient in the way of UN intervention.

To understand the effectiveness and limitations of UN peace-keeping operations, this thesis proceeds as followed. First, I discuss the effects of civil wars and the significance of UN peace-keeping operations. This chapter is devoted to discussing what is distinctive about civil wars and examines the impact of the UN in terms of intervention in such wars. Then, I will discuss how the UN became involved in cases of intrastate warfare. The observation of these factors is important as a basis to understanding the successes and failures of UN intervention. Second, defining the terms of successes and failures of peace-keeping missions, and the fundamental factors for successful missions sets the foundation of the discussion, and the introduction of realism and liberalism determines the framework of the analysis in this thesis. Third, after determining the conditions of argument, I examine two case studies – peace-keeping operations in Nicaragua (ONUCA) and in Western Sahara/Morocco (MINURSO) - to understand the mechanism of peace-keeping operations and find the factors which brought success or failure to these cases. After observing the two cases, I analyze those two UN peacekeeping missions by comparison and discuss the insights of the case studies. Finally, I will discuss contemporary UN peace-keeping and the theoretical implications on the case studies through the framework of realism and liberalism. These two theories help in understanding the logic of actions of actors involved in the conflicts, which causes certain results in the peace-keeping operations.

Comparison of these two cases of peace-keeping operations reveals a couple of lessons in terms of international institutions. The institution, such as the UN, can have a positive impact for promoting the peace process by creating a favorable environment for peace, as institutional liberalists would suggest. The UN is useful in settling civil wars. On the other hand, it is almost powerless when warring parties and other actors in the conflict are not willing to cooperate. The UN peace-keeping observer missions are more likely to succeed when having cooperative external powers, such as neighboring countries and involved great powers, in addition to the cooperation of warring parties.

Distinctiveness of Civil Wars

Doyle and Sambanis define civil war as "an armed conflict that pits the government and national army of an internationally recognized state against one or more armed opposition groups able to mount effective resistance against the state" and conflict which has "more than a thousand deaths."² Since the end of the 1980s, most conflicts have been intrastate rather than interstate, and have been of concern to the international community. For the international community and scholars of international relations, civil wars have become an important concern in terms of international security. Here, one may question why the international community cares so much about the conflicts within a state. In answer to this question Schnabel points out that internal conflicts can affect the

² Doyle, Michael and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 31.

security of other countries, especially neighboring countries.³ Refugees created by civil war in one state could flow into the neighboring states; economic crises that occur, due to the civil war, can affect the regional economy; there can be a flood of illegal arms from neighboring countries.

The number of internal conflicts has been increasing. According to Wolter, increase in "weak or failed states and…limited statehood" is related to the growing number of civil wars.⁴ The increasing number of the interstate wars is evident in quantitative research: "[B]etween 1946 and 2003 out of 166 wars, 109 have been intrastate wars ... and 16 sub-state wars" and the number increased between 1971 and 1980.⁵ Mason and Quinn also point out that "since 1945 the predominant form of armed conflict has been civil war (revolution, secession, ethnic conflict); interstate war has become relatively rare."⁶

Despite the concerns of the international community, it is difficult to give sufficient peace-keeping aid in the case of civil war. First of all, civil wars usually have higher rates of civilian casualties. According to Mason and Quinn, "among all nations with population over 500,000, there have been five times as many civil wars as interstate wars ... and ... [those] civil wars have resulted in five times as many casualties as

³ Albrecht Schnabel, "Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Second-Generation Preventive Action," In *Recovering from Civil Conflict: Reconciliation, Peace and Development*, ed. Edward Newman and Albrecht Schnabel (London and Portland: Frank Cass, 2002), 9.

⁴ Detlev Wolter, A United Nations for the 21st Century: From Reaction to Prevention: Towards an Effective and Efficient International Regime for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007), 33.

⁵ Sven Chojnaki, "Provaotosoerte Gewalt. Substaaliche Kriege und Formen alternativer Gwartproduktion," *International Politik* 60: 9 (September, 2005), 35, and Collier et al, 2004, "On the duration of Civil War," *Journal of Peace Research* 41: 3 (2004), 253-273, cited by Detlev Wolter, A United Nations for the 21st *Century: From Reaction to Prevention: Towards an Effective and Efficient International Regime for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007), 33.

⁶ T. David Mason and Jason Quinn," (2006), 13.

interstate wars (16.2 million versus 3.3 million)."⁷ Therefore, fatalities and huge numbers of displaced people are likely to generate more hatred among parties involved in civil wars than in interstate wars.⁸ Developed hatred and increased hostility in the society makes post-conflict reconciliation recovery of a stable state difficult.⁹ The danger of recurrence of civil war in post-conflict areas is always a headache for peace-keeping operations. Furthermore, intervention in intrastate conflicts is limited due to the sovereignty of states, and many states are reluctant to commit to long-term involvement in conflicts in other countries. Most of the time, political leaders hesitate to intervene and sacrifice their own people in conflicts.

Moreover, peace-keeping for intrastate wars tends to be more complicated than peace-keeping operations (PKOs) for inter-state wars. For example, cease-fire agreements or settlements of conflict for interstate wars tend to be formal. Political institutions of warring parties are often well-structured and enforcement of a peace agreement by a local government can be expected. On the other hand, civil wars usually destroy law enforcement systems, police systems, and administrative institutions, rendering the enforcement of the peace agreement more difficult and relatively shortlived. The peace-keeping operations are expected to prepare an environment encouraging

⁷ Mason and Quinn (2006), 13 referring to Fearon, J.D. and D.D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97: 2 (May, 2003), 269-292.

⁸ Albrecht Schnabel, "Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Second-Generation Preventive Action," *Recovering from Civil Conflict: Reconciliation, Peace and Development*, ed. Edward Newman and Albrecht Schnabel, (London and Portland: Frank Cass, 2002), 10.

⁹ Schnabel, (2002), 10 and Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 30.

warring parties to maintain the agreement in addition to preparing a negotiation table and creating buffer zones between warring parties.¹⁰

It is true that intervening in a civil war is extremely difficult for states or intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), but civil wars need to have the support of the international community to achieve stable peace. Mason and Quinn argue that civil wars do not end on their own without intervention of a mediation third party. This is because civil wars are less likely to end with victory for one side, but rather hurt both sides. Moreover, there is a potential of recurrence: without intervention of a third party, it is likely that the state will renew the conflict.¹¹ The shorter the civil war, the less the possibility of recurrence.

Some scholars of international relations believe that international assistance to fragile post-conflict states can bring stable peace to war-torn countries. Sambanis and Doyle argue that international intervention in civil war is effective to prevent recurrence of civil war and to implement a peace agreement between the parties.¹² Third-party intervention is effective not only to sustain peace achieved by negotiation, but also to observe and implement power sharing of involved parties and resolution of arms, which contribute to lasting peace.¹³ Doyle and Sambanis consider peace after conflict is more likely to last when the intervener is the United Nations.

¹⁰ Lise Morjé Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars (New York: Cambridge, 2008), 6.

¹¹ Mason and Quinn, (2006), 15.

¹² Doyle and Sambanis, (2006), 49.

¹³ Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampton, "Making Peace Settlements Work," *Foreign Policy* 104. (Autumn, 1996), 63 and Mason and Quinn, (2006), 21.

Transition of the Role of the UN

Some international relations scholars believe that the UN can be successful in interventions in intrastate conflicts, though others criticize the inefficiency of UN peace-keeping operations. But, whether criticized or supported, the UN is seen to have a great impact on the security and peace-keeping issues in the international community, in both international relations and intrastate security. However, the UN was not established to be concerned with the intrastate conflicts that it sees these days. In the beginning, the authority of the UN to intervene in domestic issues was limited: Bennett and Oliver explain that "the list of principles in Article 2 of the Charter concludes with a severe limitation upon UN authority... which forbids the United Nations 'to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state'."¹⁴ Then, how and why did the role and expectation of the UN change over time? In this section, I explore the transition of the role of the UN and the reasons for the transition.

The United Nations was established by the victorious Allies after WWII because of their regrets about the tragedy of the war. Its original intention was to prevent international wars through a modified collective security system. According to Alger, collective security is one kind of strong deterrence system.¹⁵ It is true that the UN has not been completely successful as a collective security system, which obligates member states to immediate response against any aggressor in the community whenever aggression takes place. However, the UN has gained more enforcement power than its predecessor the League of Nations, had in terms of maintaining security.

¹⁴ A. LeRoy Bennett and James K. Oliver, *International Organizations: Principles and Issues*, 7th ed. (Upper Saddle River: Pearson Education, 2002), 63.

¹⁵ Chadwick F. Alger, the United Nations System (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2006), 10.

Since its establishment in 1945, however, the United Nations has seen its function transformed to fit the needs of the international community in terms of security and peace issues. When it was signed in 1945, the UN Charter provided "peace tools" such as "collective security," "peaceful settlement and disarmament" and "arms control," which were inherited tools from the League of Nations.¹⁶ Then, according to Alger, in 1950 the UN started to function as a peace-keeping tool. In the same time period, the UN started to promote more non-traditional security, such as economic and environmental security.¹⁷

The end of the Cold War brought the UN its new role in international relations. Since then, the practice of the UN has been expanded to humanitarian intervention and preventive diplomacy.¹⁸ Beyond its original intention to prevent international war, the UN has been participating more and more in civil wars. The United Nations itself reports this transition, "In recent years ... [compared to the past] peace-keeping has more often addressed conflicts within States, sometimes where Governments no longer function" and "the international community has had ... to rethink the United Nations role in securing peace in what has come to be known as the 'failed State'."¹⁹

While the UN Charter Article 2.7 states that no intervention in domestic issues by the UN is authorized, its peace operations in civil wars started to increase towards the end of the Cold War. Most scholars consider 1988 as the turning point for UN peace-keeping operations. For example, Crocker argues that "[n]ine out of fourteen [UN peace] operations mounted between 1945 and 1987 involved essentially interstate conflict,

¹⁶ Alger, (2006), 10.

¹⁷ Alger, (2006), 10.

¹⁸ Alger, (2006), 10.

¹⁹ The United Nations, *The Blue Helmet: a Review of United Nations Peace-keeping*, 3rd ed. (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), 3.

whereas only six of the twenty-two operations begun between 1988 and 1994 were at least partially interstate in character...;" which means the peace operations by the UN for interstate conflicts decreased by half in these two time periods.²⁰ Diehl also reports that "[s]ince 1988 ... more than 90 percent of the peace operations have involved civil conflict."²¹ Experiencing the transition of the role of the UN, Boutros-Ghali, the Secretary General that time, issued *An Agenda for Peace* in 1992. This report encourages intervention by the UN in emergency cases:

A central theme of this report is that the role of the United Nations must be to assist in a progression from conflict prevention, resolution and emergency assistance to reconstruction and rehabilitation, and then to economic and social development. Peace-keeping should be part of an integrated approach to peace-building, encompassing political, social, economic, humanitarian and human rights aspects.²²

Many scholars track the first use of the term *peace-keeping* to Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace*, which recognized a significant turning point of the mandates of the UN and its future direction. The definition of PKOs by Boutros-Ghali in *An Agenda for Peace* will be discussed later in this paper.

The Explanation of the Transition of the Role of UN Peace-keeping

When the UN started to act in civil war situations, new operations required

different approaches. According to Diehl, during the Cold War period, the mission of

²⁰ Chester A. Crocker, "The Varieties of Intervention: Conditions for Success," In *Managing Global Chaos*, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, DC.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 184.

²¹ Paul F. Diehl, "The Transformation of Peace Operations," *Conflict Prevention and Peace Building in Post-War Society: Sustaining the Peace*, ed. T.David Mason and James D. Meernik (New York: Routledge, 2006), 125.

²² The United Nations, (1996), 5.

peace-keeping was to separate hostile combatants and monitor ceasefires. Diehl describes the mission in this era as "... the passive monitoring of a temporary peace agreement was the hallmark of traditional operation."²³ Recent new missions seem to be more complicated and must be more multifunctional due to the nature of the intrastate conflicts.

The increasing number of missions in intrastate conflicts and acceptance of its new role in international peace-keeping in official documents show the clear transition of the role of the UN. Scholars of international relations suggest several explanations.

First of all, as many scholars have noticed, the end of the Cold War was a turning point. Diehl notes that superpowers became reluctant to support other states' wars, and therefore, those warring states needed to deal with conflict on their own.²⁴ Moreover, Jett points out that the end of the Cold War contributed to the increase of the UN mission because the USSR and the US no longer contradicted one another on the Security Council.²⁵ The great powers even cooperated with each other to carry out peacekeeping missions. Therefore, the end of the Cold War provided an easier condition to gain agreement of the great powers if the mission was necessary.

Secondly, the shift of the international system influenced the domestic politics in some countries. Jett points out that "today's conflict is usually internal struggle, with irregular forces, light weapons and guerrilla tactics" to describe how the nature of war has changed.²⁶ Internal conflict is more difficult to deal with and tends to produce more

²³ Paul F. Diehl, (2006), 124.

²⁴ Diehl, (2006), 125.

²⁵ Denis C. Jett, *Why Peaekeeping Fail* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 9.

²⁶ Jett, (2000), 9.

civilian casualties than do interstate wars. The changing nature of the conflict calls for attention from the international community.

Third, Diehl suggests "the demand side of the equation" explains the increasing number of UN missions in civil wars.²⁷ He continues, "… peacebuilding arises because most of the threats to international peace and security in the 1990s and beyond are civil conflict, including failed states."²⁸ Therefore, the transition of the UN role to peace-keeping missions is a response to the international community which has different demands in terms of maintaining security these days.

In addition to these mechanical causes of the increase in peace-keeping operations in civil wars, Diehl suggests that there are theorists explaining this change normatively. Paris is one of these scholars and suggests that the norm matters when considering peacebuilding issues.²⁹ He theorizes that the ideology of liberalism, such as building a liberal market democracy in post-conflict states, drives the international community to be involved in civil war.³⁰ Since spreading the free market economy and democracy benefits the states which adopt these systems, the international community is more likely to be cooperative in intervening in civil wars.

Another suggestion, raised by both Diehl and Jett, is that the concerns of the international community have shifted to "the individual, human rights, and government legitimacy", and in addition, there is "a corresponding decline in the strength of state

²⁷ Diehl, (2006), 126.

²⁸ Diehl, (2006), 126.

²⁹ Roland Paris, "Broadening the Study of Peace Operations," *International Studies Review* 2:3 (Autumn, 2000), 37.

³⁰ Paris, (2000), 43.

sovereignty."³¹ Diehl suggests concern for human rights has become obligatory in the international community, and therefore humanitarian intervention has gained more legitimacy over states' sovereignty. Jett describes it as an idea of humanitarian intervention, which has been gaining popularity in the international arena. Therefore, these days, the UN is more likely to choose to intervene in intrastate conflicts as a humanitarian intervention than it did in the past.

The last explanation for the expansion of UN peace-keeping operations in civil war is a combination of the above two. Jackson suggests the spread of "international supervision" and understands that there is a change in the norm in terms of human rights and democracy.³² Interpreting Jackson's argument, Diehl points out that the peace-keeping operations in civil wars is promoted by the international community, first because it is forced under the international system of liberal institutionalism, and second, because the international community believes in humanitarian interventions.

After the Cold War, the international community was more capable of peacekeeping functions since the veto powers in the UN Security Council had become more cooperative in authorizing such missions. In addition, the community recognized the need for more intervention in civil wars. These two conditions thus created an environment in which the UN peace-keeping transformed its role and operated more missions in the 1990s.

³¹ Talentino, A., "One Step Forward, One Step Back?: The Development of Peacebuilding as Concept and Strategy," *Journal of Conflict Studies* 25 (2004): 36-48, cited in Paul F. Diehl, "The Transformation of Peace Operations," *Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Post-War Society: Sustaining the Peace*, ed. T. David Mason and James D. Meernik, (New York: Routledge, 2006), 126.

³² Robert Jackson, "International Engagement in War-Torn Countries," *Global Governance* 10 (January 2004), 34.

Variation of Peace-keeping Operations and the Various Generations

Facing a new era, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in the report *An Agenda for Peace*, suggested four important functions that the UN should practice. These practices, clearly stated in the report, are preventive diplomacy, peace-making, peace-keeping and reconstruction of peace. In addition to these four points, Doyle and Sambanis argue that Boutros-Ghali implies peace enforcement as a fifth function in *An Agenda for Peace*.³³ In that document, Boutros-Ghali emphasizes, especially, post-conflict reconstruction as crucial function for future peace-keeping missions.

Preventive diplomacy is a technique to avoid conflict before it starts. The *Agenda* describes preventive diplomacy as an action "to ease the tensions before they result in conflict," and the UN Secretary General, the Security Council or regional organizations are expected to take action when extreme tensions are detected.³⁴

Peacemaking missions are expected "to bring hostile parties to agreement" utilizing peaceful methods. Chapter VI of the UN Charter (pacific settlement of disputes) determines that the disputing parties have to find a peaceful settlement of the conflict on their own prior to consulting with the Security Council of the UN. The Security Council, too, must seek the settlement of conflicts through peaceful methods, according to Chapter VI.³⁵

³³ Doyle and Sambanis, (2006), 10-11.

³⁴ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping: A/47/277 - S/24111" (June17, 1992), http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html, (accessed on Feb 4, 2009).

³⁵ Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VI, http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/ (accessed on Feb 4, 2009).

Among these functions, peace-keeping traditionally has been practiced by the UN. Peace-keeping missions are expected to monitor maintenance of achieved peace. This kind of mission usually contains a minimal armed force and police officers for the completion of mandates. Sometimes, observation missions are included in this category.

Post-conflict reconstruction is a new concept of peace-keeping operations. The UN emphasizes the necessity of achieving positive peace – securing fundamental human rights, promoting social and economic development, running a fair election and demobilizing former soldiers, in addition to the absence of violence in the post-conflict zone.

Traditionally, peace-keeping operations were for interstate wars. Traditional missions are called first generation PKOs. They were designed to respond to interstate wars with a minimum amount of troops. Their mandates were mostly monitoring cease-fires and withdrawal of troops, and maintaining buffer zones.³⁶

In contrast to the traditional peace-keeping operations prior to 1989, secondgeneration peace-keeping is called multi-dimensional peace-keeping operations. In the United Nations report, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping*, second generation peace-keeping is defined as "multi-functional, with political, humanitarian, social and economic components." ³⁷ The characteristics of recent observation missions fell somewhere between the first and the second generations of peace-keeping operations.

³⁶ Doyle and Sambanis, (2006), 12.

³⁷ United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping* (New York: the United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), 5.

The Required Conditions to Operate Peace-keeping Missions

While there is a demand for and an increase of peace-keeping operations by the UN, the results of these missions are not always evaluated positively. Some conditions in operating peace-keeping missions might reduce the possibility of failure.

The most important condition is the consent of the host state. This consent is more difficult to get these days than it was in the period of the Cold War, and therefore, it is often ignored prior to peace-keeping operations. During the Cold War, the notion of state sovereignty was stronger than it is now. In contrast, at present, the reasoning based on human rights often outweighs the sovereignty of a state. On the other hand, difficulty in gaining consent from a state to intervene may be because peace-keeping missions now mostly deal with failed states, in which there is no legitimate government to provide consent for the peace-keeping troops.

Agreement to intervention among involved parties is indeed important for the later success of peace-keeping operations even while it is difficult to get such consent (and therefore, the agreement from all warring parties to accept intervention is often absent). Diehl believes the unwillingness of host states to cooperate makes the operations very complicated and difficult to mobilize.³⁸ When there is no consent, as in the case of Somalia, the peace-keeping operation is likely to fail.

In addition to consent before intervention, Crocker discusses several additional conditions for operating peace-keeping missions successfully. He considers the intervener first must have the capacity for "prompt decision making" and understanding of full-

³⁸ Paul F. Diehl, "Forks in the Road: Theoretical and Policy Concerns for 21st Century Peacekeeping," In *The Politics of Global Governance: International Organizations in an Interdependent World*, ed. Paul F. Diehl (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 211.

commitment.³⁹ Moreover, he discusses the necessity of a political initiative in the peacekeeping intervention.

Finally, it is important to choose *the right type* of operations. According to Doyle and Sambanis, there are four categories of UN intervention – traditional peace-keeping missions, observation missions, peace-enforcement and multi-dimensional peace-keeping operations.⁴⁰ Originally, the purpose of the peace-keeping operations was only for monitoring. The forms of the intervention have been changing, and multi-dimensional peace-keeping operations, which support re-building of legitimate governments, laying a track to re-build the economy of a state, monitoring disarmament, and so forth, are the newest and most successful forms so far. Since the conditions of civil wars vary case by case, it is important to find the most appropriate form of peace-keeping prior to the intervention.

Conclusion

As shown here, many international relations scholars agree on the increasing number of civil wars and the necessity of intervention by a third party to achieve peace. This is because it is difficult for civil wars to end on their own and to sustain peace after a cease-fire. In addition, some authors argue that the UN is more likely to succeed in intervention in civil wars than would be by other parties. While the original purpose of the UN peace-keeping was not designed to operate in civil wars, the UN has responded to

³⁹ Chester A. Crocker, "The Varieties of Interventions: Conditions for Success," Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict, eds. Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamela Aall (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Process, 1996), 190.

⁴⁰ Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, (2006), 10-18, 91.

demands to intervene in the intrastate wars of the modern international community, thus transforming its role in the international security system. Having analyzed the transforming role of the United Nations, the success and failure of the UN peace-keeping missions are examined in later chapters through case studies of ONUCA and MINURSO.

Chapter 2: Definition and Theories

What are the Indicators of Success and Failure?

The borderline between success and failure of PKOs is vague, and the international relations scholars continue the debate on how to determine the success or failure of the United Nations PKOs. Many complex indicators define success and failure. The most frequently used indicators are fulfillment of mission mandates, absence of violence, long-lasting peace and so forth. It should be noted that a mission could still be meaningful (if not totally successful) even if its mandates were not completed satisfactorily. In the following sections, I indicate the criteria that I use to understand success and failure of peace-keeping operations after various approaches to determine the effectiveness of UN PKO.

First, fulfillment of mission mandates is one of the most common indicators to determine the success and failure of the peace-keeping operations. Howard uses the completion of mandates as one of the indicators to determine success or failure of cases: she examines "success or failure in *mandate implementation* for the various tasks assigned to the mission" as an important criterion to determine the result of UN PKOs in her researching of UN peace-keeping operations.⁴¹ The completion of the mission mandate could be useful as barometer of how much the UN peace-keeping missions could achieve. For example, ONUCA completed its mission to demobilize the rebels and observe an election to be free and fair. The mandates were successfully achieved, and therefore, the ONUCA was terminated smoothly after the expiration date of the mission. On the other hand, the most important mandate of MINURSO, conducting a referendum

⁴¹ Lise Morjé Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 7.

for self-determination has not yet achieved for 15 years since the establishment of mission.

While fulfillment of mission mandates seems to be a reasonable indicator, it should not be the only indicator to determine the result of PKOs. For example, Diehl criticizes using the completion of mandates as an indicator of a successful mission though this is a popular approach. He thinks the language of mandates determined by the Security Council is often vague, and therefore, determining the completion of a mission is naturally difficult. Moreover, he argues that fulfillment of mandates is not a sufficient gauge since there are "common purposes peacekeeping operations share regardless of mandate."⁴²

Therefore, some scholars capture the success and failure of missions based on not the completion of mission mandates but the impacts on the reality of the civil wars conditions. The minimalist approach is to determine success of missions as an absence of violence. Diehl suggests the following criteria: If the peace-keeping operations are able to limit armed conflicts, if "the peacekeeping force is able to prevent accidental engagements near border areas or minor disputes that stem from physical proximity," and if peace-keepers are able to "detain violators of the cease-fire" when they patrol the postconflict area.⁴³ This is called minimalist definition of success since its focus is largely on the absence of violence only. While definition of Diehl was determined based on the observation of the intervention of PKOs in inter-state conflicts, these criteria are useful as

 ⁴² Paul F. Diehl, *International Peacekeeping* (Baltimore and London: the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 33.

⁴³ Diehl, (1994), 35.

indicators of successful missions for civil wars as well because absence of violence is fundamental and initial requirement of peace-process.

In contrast, other scholars consider the indicators of success of mission should be more extensive and comprehensive. Paris favors a more extended notion of successful peace-keeping operations. Although many scholars consider the absence of violence the most significant indicator, Paris does not consider it sufficient enough to claim the achievement of peace. In his view, PKOs in civil wars can be considered successful when there is social and economic improvement in society: "The goal of peace-building is not simply to stop the fighting, but to create conditions that will allow peace to endure long after the departure of the peacebuilders themselves."⁴⁴ Utilizing social and economic liberalization as a measurement of successful peace, Paris acknowledges the influence of international intervention on the society.⁴⁵ Howard also agrees with Paris's criteria. She suggests examining "the state of the country after completion of the UN intervention" to determine the success of UN peace-keeping operations.⁴⁶

Doyle and Sambanis attempt a more explicit definition with utilizing these two perspectives. To understand the peace-building process, they have created two categories of indicators to evaluate the success of missions: "sovereign peace" and "participatory peace."⁴⁷ They define "sovereign peace" is one that "requires an end to the civil war, undivided sovereignty, no residual violence … and no mass-level human rights abuses by

⁴⁴ Roland Paris, "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism," *International Security* 22: 2 (Fall, 1997), 57.

⁴⁵ Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 1-26, 55-62

⁴⁶ Howard, (2008), 7.

⁴⁷ Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, (2006), 73.

the state," which they recognize as negative peace.⁴⁸ On the other hand, "participatory peace" is "sovereign peace plus a minimum level of political openness," which is usually considered an achievement of positive peace.⁴⁹ In addition to these definitions, they determine missions successful if PKOs can achieve these categories of peace in two years. The indicators of Doyle and Sambanis attempt compromising between minimalist indicators and more comprehensive indicators.

I agree with the somewhat minimalist idea of determining success or failure of peace-keeping operations. In this thesis, I focus on the process until UN peace-keeping operations leave the mission site. As Doyle, Sambanis and Diehl agree, the absence of violence is the most important criterion to achieve in peace-keeping operations. Second, the achievement of the Security Council's mandates should be examined. Third, PKOs are considered a failure if the mission goes on for extremely long. While I have suggested some of the criteria to determine successful or failed cases, I will investigate two cases closely to understand the context of civil wars.

Sources of Success and Failures of Peace-keeping Missions

From the experience of UNSOM I and II (United Nations Operation in Somalia I and II), many international relations analysts consider peace enforcement to be beyond UN capability. In a peace enforcement mission, the Security Council does not obtain the consent of the warring parties to intervene, nor is a cease-fire agreed upon. The peacekeepers have a very difficult time remaining neutral, and often are involved in the

⁴⁸ Doyle and Sambanis, (2006), 73

⁴⁹ Doyle and Sambanis, (2006), 73.

conflict as if the mission were one of the warring parties. Therefore, many scholars consider that for the mission to succeed, it is important to obtain consent from a state when the Security Council intervenes in a civil-war case.

In addition to this fundamental condition for successful peace-keeping operations, international relations scholars suggest some others. Some scholars focus on the surrounding conditions, such as the degree of civil wars and foreign influence on civil wars. Others concentrate their analysis on the operations of the UN itself, and attempt to understand its behavior and impacts on the peace-keeping operations.

For case analysis of UN peace-keeping operations, for example, Stedman suggests possible causes which influence the result of peace-keeping operations. He suggests that the environment of conflict, such as the causes of conflicts and the process to bring about a ceasefire, is not the only factor causing the success or failure of missions.⁵⁰ Stedman insists that "[i]nternational willingness is also crucial" to complete a peace-keeping mission successfully.⁵¹ Since the UN does not have its own military and relies on the resources of member states, peace-keeping missions can lack crucial resources if no state is willing to participate in a PKO. Lack of resources will restrict the capability of a PKO. In addition, Stedman suggests a significant influence of "major power interests" for success of missions due to the resource matter.⁵² In the case of Nicaragua, the involvement of the US with a UN PKO was crucial for its success, which is ironic

⁵⁰ Stephan John Stedman, "International Implementation of Peace Agreements in Civil Wars: Findings from a Study of Sixteen Cases," *Turbulent Peace: the Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 742.

⁵¹ Stedman, (2001), 742.

⁵² Stedman, (2001), 724.

considering a dictatorship of violence and the following instability in these countries were enforced by the US as well. In the case of Morocco, the intervention of Western powers such as Spain, France and the US has had a strong influence on the Western Sahara in addition to the involvement of Algeria.

Durch gives another set of hypotheses about the cause of success or failure: (1) "Peacekeeping requires local consent, and consent derives from local perceptions of the impartiality and moral authority of the peacekeeper's sponsoring organizations;" (2) "peacekeeping requires the support of the Great Powers and the United States in particular;" (3) "peacekeeping requires a prior alteration of the local parties' basic objectives, from winning everything to salvaging something; a frequent corollary of attitude change is combat exhaustion or battlefield stalemate."⁵³ Durch's hypothesis fits well for the cases of ONUCA and MINURSO. In both cases of ONUCA and MINURSO, the UN achieved some kind of consent from warring parties to UN intervention. However, the case of Morocco and Western Saharan case did not achieve cooperative attitude of the great powers and the US, which has discouraged peace process in this region.

Differing slightly from the above scholars, Howard points out four unique factors considered to be influential on the result of peace-keeping operations. The factors include 1) "the situational difficulty" (an idea developed by Alexander George), 2) "security council interests" (frequency and intensity of established Resolutions and Reports), 3) "the 'rules' of peacekeeping" (if UN maintains its neutral position towards all warring

⁵³ William J. Durch, "Introduction," *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*, ed. William J. Durch (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 12.

parties and if disputing parties consented to UN intervention), and 4) "organizational learning" (if the UN learns from its previous experience and functions as an effective institution, with tools such as information sharing, coordination and leadership).⁵⁴

While Durch's hypothesis focuses on surrounding environment of civil wars as causes of success and failure of UN peace-keeping operations, Howard emphasizes the functions of the UN as an institution. Through the case studies, 2) "security council interests" and 4) "organizational learning" are more important factors to bring success or failure of missions of these cases.⁵⁵ As the discussed in previous section, the UN peacekeeping operations has transformed since 1989, and the two case studies show slightly different attitudes of the UN and its coordination because UN learns through missions. At the same time, because there were many missions were established in the 1990s, the division of the UN attention to each case were unavoidable, which influence negatively on MINURSO case.

Observing various suggestions as sources of the successes and failures of peacekeeping missions, the causal factors of successes and failures of peace-keeping operations can be explained by the degree of civil war and the influence of foreign countries on the peace-keeping operations in addition to the intervention of the UN and its management power over involved parties. To analyze two selected case studies, I focus on the background conditions of civil wars and the influence of foreign countries on peace processes to understand success and failure of the UN peace-keeping operations, while

⁵⁴ Harward, (2008), 8-20. ⁵⁵ Harward, (2008), 8-20.

touching the function of UN as an operating organization as an influential factor to the missions.

Theoretical Background

Realism

Although cooperation among states is desirable, it is difficult to achieve from the perspective of realists. Since states cannot predict others' behavior, they have to rely on themselves for their security. Waltz argues that "among states, the state of nature is a state of war," explaining the competitive nature of international anarchy. Waltz's explanation on the nature of the state is that each state perceives its capabilities in the international community based not on its absolute power but on its relative power.⁵⁶ Therefore, each state develops its armed forces, alliances and economic benefits to overwhelm other states for its survival. In addition, the behavioral patterns of states are determined by the balance of power. As a consequence, states fall into security dilemmas in competition for the improvement of their security.

In terms of interstate cooperation, realists argue that states usually have little faith in developing cooperative relationships with one another. As Waltz argues, states question "how the gain be divided."⁵⁷ In a cooperative relationship, states are anxious about the reality that other states might gain more from the relationship and become a threat to one another in the future. Moreover, states consider increasing dependency on

⁵⁶ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Random House, 1979), 101.

⁵⁷ Waltz, (1979), 105. Waltz states, "When faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutual gain, states that feel insecure must ask how the gain will be divided. They are compelled to ask not 'Will both of us gain?' but 'who will gain more?' if an expected gain is to be divided, say, in the ratio of two to one, one state may use its disproportionate gain to implement a policy intended to damage or destroy the other".

other states heightens their own insecurity for strategic reasons.⁵⁸ Therefore, Mowle agrees with Waltz that interstate cooperation is limited in international relations.⁵⁹

The issue of the security dilemma is crucial in intrastate war as well. Posen points out that heightened tensions among various ethnic groups could cause a security dilemma. He claims such dilemma occurs when one group fears other groups within a state.⁶⁰ In the post-conflict situations after civil wars, the difficulty of peace negotiation and demobilization of the military can be explained by Posen's application of the security dilemma into the domestic setting. Disputing parties are less likely to cooperate in establishing peace and disarming themselves since there is no institution to guarantee their security. According to the realist, the defection of one or another within the parties is more likely.

In the modern era, however, states seem to be seeking interstate cooperation through creating institutions to encourage mutual cooperation, regardless of the notion of realists. For example, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was transformed into the African Union (AU) in 2001 and given more authority to carry out cooperative actions to foster security in this region.

⁵⁸ Waltz, (1979), 105-106.

⁵⁹ Thomas S. Mowle, "Worldviews in Foreign Policy: Realism, Liberalism, and External Conflict," *Political Psychology* 24: 3 (Sept., 2003), 561.

⁶⁰ Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival 35: 1 (Spring, 1993), 27-47.

Liberalism

In contrast to realists, liberalists argue that a cooperative relationship among states can be achieved and subsequent harmony among states can exist.⁶¹ Also, some of them recognize that international institutions can increase possibilities of cooperation among states, and can "promote conflict management and prevention."⁶²

First, cooperation among states is possible because states share common interests, and therefore, cooperate with each other to increase their gains. This is often discussed by neo-liberalists. For example, neo-liberalists emphasize that promoting democracy and a free market system is beneficial to international security because states are driven by common economic interests. States seek peaceful cooperation to maintain preferable conditions for their economies. Mowle argues that maintaining an institution is beneficial from the perspective of long-term gains, and states make an effort to maintain the cooperative institution to which they belong, even if it is not directly related to their gaining of benefits in the short-term.⁶³ For example, it might not be beneficial in the short term to send troops for a peace-keeping mission to one of the member states in an international community because the sending state might lose much money and personnel in the operation. On the other hand, it could be beneficial in the long term if the action contributes to bringing back peace and maintaining economic transactions among states.

Second, liberalists consider international institutions facilitators that can play the role of increasing transparency of states' intentions and circulation of information. They

⁶¹ John H. Hertz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 2: 2 (Jan, 1950), 158.

⁶² Kathy Powers and Gary Goertz, "The Evolution of Regional Economic Institutions (REIs) into Security Institutions or the Demise of Realist Military Alliances?" (mimeograph, Penn State University and University of Arizona, December 2006), 2.

⁶³ Mowle, (2003), 596.

provide a facility to negotiate international rules, and monitor member states if rules agreed by the states are followed, even though they do not have sovereignty to govern member states. Thus, misperceptions of one another could be reduced. Moreover, international institutions act as a channel for communication among states.

Third, international institutions can deter states from aggressive actions, namely, by facilitating collective actions. If one state violates a norm of the international institution to which it belongs, that state would be expected to be punished by other members; or, if not, would lose benefits it could receive through the institution. This mechanism can function effectively to encourage other states to follow the norm of the community, particularly with the use of force.⁶⁴ For military security reasons, this is of the foremost concern.

Fourth, liberalists argue that it is attractive for a state to have a cooperative system because it is an economical way to provide state security. If a state tried to secure itself through facilitating alliances with a hundred states, the time and money required would be daunting. It would be cheaper and quicker for the state to form an international institution, thus establishing multiple relationships at stroke. Also, international institutions can function to collect information necessary for maintaining cooperation which might be too costly for individual states to accomplish.

Therefore, cooperative behavior is not only achievable but also preferable for states. Such behavior is more likely to occur when there is an international institution. If liberalists are right about the cooperative behavior of states, the success of cooperation

⁶⁴ Mowle, (2003), 567-568.

for the sake of security is more likely to happen. Also, it is expected that the international institution can expect supportive behavior from member states in order to function.

While these functions of international organizations based on liberal institutionalism might be more effective in the settlement of interstate war or in deterring states from aggression, it is questionable how effective they are for settlement of intrastate war.

The Case Selection

Recognizing these transitions of mandates of UN peace-keeping missions, Doyle and Sambanis divided peace-keeping operations into four categories: Traditional peacekeeping missions, observer missions, peace-enforcement missions based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and multi-dimensional missions.⁶⁵ Since each category has different mandates and a different capacity as a PKO mission, I chose two cases which are considered observation missions of the UN. Moreover, the missions were established in the early post-Cold War period. Since one of the interests of this research is to understand the influence of the international environment on the effectiveness of PKO performance, I chose two cases deliberately – MINURSO (Morocco and Western Sahara) and ONUCA/ONUVEN (Central America /Nicaragua) from a similar time period.

These selected cases share other characteristics. For example, the regional organizations actively attempted to influence settlement of disputes; and the regional powers' intentions had a considerable impact on the results of the two missions.

⁶⁵ Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *United Nations Peace Operations: Making War and Building Peace* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 90.

Although sharing similar situational factors, ONUCA and ONUVEN are considered successful missions and MINURSO is a failure. Through comparison of these two cases, this paper explores the sources of success and failure of the peace-keeping operations.

Chapter 3: United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) for Nicaragua

Historical Background

Nicaragua is one of the Central American countries which experienced intense civil wars toward the later period of the Cold War. The two civil wars it experienced were the War of Liberation (1978-1979) that ended over 40 years of dictatorship, and the Contra War (1981-1990) that was fought between the Nicaraguan government and the Contras.⁶⁶ The War of Liberation is often described as a revolutionary civil war. During the dictatorship, the civil wars and the revolutionary regime, the US supported the Somoza family administrations and the Contras, parties opposed to revolution and its regime in the context of Cold War strategies. The foreign relations, especially with the US, prolonged the civil wars and suffering of people in Nicaragua in this time period.

In the 1960s and the 1970s, the Nicaraguan people suffered from economic recession under the Somoza dictatorship. The problem became even more severe after the earthquake in 1972, which largely destroyed the capital city and the Nicaraguan economic middle class.⁶⁷ Although Nicaragua received international relief aid, Somoza used the aid to invest in reconstruction projects and the banking sector, which in the end increased his assets. Somoza's action increased disapproval of the administration from businessmen who earlier had supported it.⁶⁸ In addition to economic wars, the Somoza

⁶⁶ Thomas W. Walker, *Nicaragua: Living in the Shadow of the Eagle*, 4th ed. (Boulder: Westview, 2003), 25, 59.

 ⁶⁷ John A. Booth, Christine J. Wade and Thomas W. Walker. *Understanding Central America: Global Forces, Rebellion, and Change*. 4th ed. (Boulder: Westview press, 2006) 74.
 ⁶⁸ Walker, (2003), 32.

family dictatorship was brutal and betrayed human rights, which drew international attentions.⁶⁹

Economic instability and discontent against the dictatorship encouraged people to join unions and government oppression motivated people to mobilize against the dictatorship. *Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional* (FSLN), capturing the moment and supported by young elites and business people, opened a guerrilla campaign against Somoza in 1974.⁷⁰ The Somoza administration responded by creating terror. For example, the government killed "several thousand mostly innocent people" because they were suspected of being sympathetic to FSLN.⁷¹ The civil war intensified in 1977 and continued until July of 1979 when the Sandinistas took over Managua.⁷²

While the FSLN won the civil war, it suffered from various economic, political and security issues in its administrations throughout the 1980s. The Nicaraguan economy was shattered by war and the country was heavily burdened by the debt built during former administrations. The economy shrank even more due to an economic embargo by the United States. US intervention was not confined to the economy. The US supported former the National Guards, renamed the Contras by the time, who fled to Honduras or Costa Rica during the civil wars. The Contras attacked Nicaragua with terrorism and exhausted the Nicaraguan and revolutionary governments which had already suffered from the civil war.⁷³ Since the US funded Honduras and Costa Rica to encourage their support of the Contras in their own countries and sent the Contras *humanitarian aid*, the

⁶⁹ Walker, (2003), 32.

⁷⁰ Walker, (2003), 32.

⁷¹ Booth, Wade, and Walker, (2006), 74-75.

⁷² Booth, Wade, and Walker, (2006), 74-76.

⁷³ Booth, Wade, and Walker, (2006), 77-86.

Contras never had financial or weaponry problems in their long fight against the revolutionary government of Nicaragua.⁷⁴ In addition, the US attempted to defeat the Sandinista politically. In 1989, the US started supporting a coalition of opposition parties of the Sandinistas, which are favorable parties to the US, to win the election. Although this election was originally called for by the Sandinistas, the timing of the election did not help them win.⁷⁵ Finally, Nicaragua could not continue the Contra War, and gave in to international pressure to have an election and end the violence.⁷⁶

Political instability, terrorism, severe violation of human rights and civil war casualties (30,865 people, 0.9 percent of the population, including civilians, died in Contra War)⁷⁷ in Nicaragua and other Central American, such as El Salvador and Guatemala, became concerns of the Central American states and the international community towards the end of the 1980s. The following sections explain the international interventions in Nicaragua, including regional states, the US, the OAS and the UN to achieve peace.

Regional Efforts to Bring Peace to Central America and the US as a Counter Power **Overview**

The Contadoras, the Group of Eight and the Group of Friends made regional efforts to actively bring peace in Central America. These initiatives by Latin American

⁷⁴ Jack Child, *The Central American Peace Process*, 1983-1991, (Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), 67 and Booth, Wade and Walker, (2006), 77-86.

⁷⁵ Thomas W. Walker, "Nicaragua: Transition Through Revolution," *Repression, Resistance, and* Democratic Transition in Central America, ed. Thomas W. Walker and Ariel C. Armony (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2000), 76-77. and Booth, Wade and Walker, (2006), 77-86. ⁷⁶ Booth, Wade and Walker, (2006), 77-86.

⁷⁷ Walker, (2003), 56.

political leaders launched several declarations which encouraged promotion of peace and cessation of war. The main declarations were the Declaration of Esquipulas, the Declaration of Caracas and the Esquipulas II Agreement. In addition, these groups pressured political leaders of neighboring countries at war to take action to stop or avoid conflicts. The series of action was not taken based on strategic interests of neighboring countries in countries in civil wars, but regional security concern.

This regional effort to end wars with peaceful solutions was at odds with the interests of the superpower – the United States – during the Reagan administration. For strategic reasons in the Cold War context, the US aided the Contras, against the newly established socialist government in Nicaragua during the 1980s. This US foreign policy shifted from contributing to the civil war by supporting the Contras to promoting an election to end the war under the first Bush administration. Since 1989, the US became cooperative to this peace-process.

The Contadoras

Starting in the late 1970s, the effort of the political leaders of Central American countries to stop civil wars in member states was significant. Going beyond the principle of sovereignty, the group aggressively worked for regional peace. In 1977, for example, they pressured Somoza of Nicaragua to step down from the presidency to gain peace, though he refused.⁷⁸

⁷⁸ Diego Arria, "Bringing Leverage to the Peace Process in El Salvador and Central America," *Leveraging for Success in United Nations Peace Operations*, ed. Jean Krasno, Bradd C. Hayes and Donald C. F. Daniel, (Westport and London: Preager, 2003), 55.

The previous movement among the Central American countries led to the establishment of the Contadora group on July 23, 1983,⁷⁹ through "initiatives by the government of Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela."⁸⁰ The concerns of the Contadora group were revolutionary movements with armed force in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala, and they "promoted peacefully negotiated resolutions rather than military solutions to the conflicts" in these countries⁸¹ The initiatives of the Contadoras were significant in regard to the peace process in the Central America in the 1980s while the US deterred the Organization of American States (OAS) from functioning as a mediator of regional conflicts.⁸² While the *Contadoras* rejected the US influence on regional security issues, their influence in the peace process "was limited by the power of U.S. interests in the region that supported the Contras in the Nicaraguan conflict and the government in the Salvadoran civil war during the Reagan Administration."⁸³

The Declarations

The Esquipulas Declaration

The effort of several negotiations among the Central American political leaders in the 1980s produced fruit in the meeting held in Esquipulas, Guatemala, on August 6 and 7 in 1987. "The Central American Peace Agreement" or "Esquipulas Declaration" – the agreement they reached in this meeting – was "presented by the Costa Rican president,

⁷⁹ Arria, (2003), 58.

⁸⁰ The United Nations, (1996), 409.

⁸¹ Roland Paris, *At the War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 112. and Arria, (2003), 58.

⁸² Arria, (2003), 58.

⁸³ Arria, (2003), 59.

Oscar Arias" and was "endorsed by the presidents of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica."⁸⁴ The declaration encouraged peace and elimination of war; holding dialogues as a method to end civil wars; and establishing the Central American Parliament to work for reconciliation within Central America.⁸⁵

Declaration of Caracas

An unofficial meeting of the presidents of the Group of Eight in Caracas, Venezuela, was held on February 4, 1989, with two main topics on the agenda.⁸⁶ First, related to the civil war in Nicaragua, the group of presidents pressured Daniel Ortega, the Sandinista leader, to hold an election as soon as possible to avoid intervention by the US to their politics.⁸⁷ Although Ortega did not want an election, he did not have enough international support to refuse one. He expected help from the Soviet Union, but that state could not afford to intervene in international events at that time because it was, itself, collapsing in 1989. There was no strategic interest of great powers to support Ortega administration. Therefore, Ortega bent to the suggestion of the Group of Eight and held on election in 1990 under the observation of the UN.

In addition, the Group of Eight discussed how they could take the initiative to stop civil war in El Salvador, and agreed to act as a group to support the peace process there as they had done in the case of Nicaragua. This agreement is called Declaration of Caracas and is another strong peace initiative that the regional countries had. The

⁸⁴ Paris, (2004), 112.

 ⁸⁵ US Department of States, cited by Jack Child, *The Central American Peace Process, 1983-1991; Sheathing Swords, Building Confidence* (Boulder and London: Lynn Rienner Publication, 1992), 178.
 ⁸⁶ Arria, (2003), 61.

⁸⁷ Arria, (2003), 61.

Declaration of Caracas was followed up very closely by the Group of Eight, and they had several meetings shortly after the first unofficial one. Through procedure, such as the Declaration of Caracas, the Group of Eight was successful in pressuring Nicaragua to have peace-keeping intervention of the UN.

Esquipulas II

Esquipulas II is also called the Guatemala Procedure, though its official name is "'Procedure for the Establishment of a Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America.'"⁸⁸ The goal of this declaration was to deal with:

issues of national reconciliation; an end to hostilities; democratization; free elections; termination of aid to irregular forces and insurrectionist movements; non-use of the territory of one State to attack other States; negotiations on security, verification and the control and limitation of weapons; refugees and displaced persons; cooperation, democracy and freedom for peace and development; international verification and follow-up; and a timetable for the fulfillment of commitments⁸⁹

As shown by this list, Esquipulas II is much more progressive than the previous declarations as a peace initiative. While the first two declarations focused on the absence of violence and a procedure to achieve non-violence in society – negative peace – Esquipulas II was meant to deal with matters of democracy, such as political freedom and humanitarian issues, including refugees. This matches the policy of peace-keeping operations by the United Nations. The range of their concern is not limited to a cease-fire

⁸⁸ The United Nations, (1996), 409.

⁸⁹ The United Nations, (1996), 409.

but also involves a peace-building process after the conflict. The framework of peace used in the declarations was shifted from negative peace to positive peace through the series of initiatives. In addition, the series of Esquipulas declaration attracted of the UN to be involved in the case.

The Position of the US

Under the Reagan Administration, the United States first sought military solutions to end civil war in Nicaragua. The US, fearing that Nicaragua could turn out to be like Cuba, made all possible efforts to avoid it.⁹⁰ Therefore, the strategic interests of the US did not match those of the Contadoras, who tried hard to avoid US influence on regional security issues and to end civil war by peaceful procedures.

The change of administration from Reagan to George H. W. Bush also changed the US approach to the Central American countries. While still maintaining high interest for strategic reasons, the US decided that joining the multi-lateral effort to end civil wars in Central America would eventually be to its own benefit. Therefore, the US supported the declaration of Esquipulas II. In addition, the first Bush Administration negotiated with the USSR to stop sending aid to the Sandinistas in exchange for the US promising not to support the Contras during the election time, though history tells that the US lied about this agreement.

⁹⁰ Walker, (2003), 38.

Observation of Regional States' Influence on Civil Wars in Nicaragua

The initiatives of the Contadoras, the Group of Eight and the Group of Friends were significant for bringing about a cease-fire in Nicaragua. It is true that these initiatives and the groups had only limited power against the US and that they did not have the military resources to stop the civil wars or the authority to actually intervene in states with ongoing civil wars. Yet, efforts were successful in establishing the foundation of peace-keeping and peace-building in cooperation with such international organizations as the UN and the OAS.

While the action in Nicaragua is usually considered to be a successful peacekeeping operation by the UN, the impacts of the regional states on solving civil wars should not be overlooked. In the peace process of the Nicaraguan case, the neighboring countries did not support either side of the conflict, but remain impartial. Their roles were to draw international attention to the matters and establish agendas for regional security, which worked well for the Nicaraguan peace process.

At the same time, the case of Nicaragua also indicates that neighboring states with ongoing civil wars do not always act in favor of peace. For example, the US influenced the regional peace negatively. In fact, the US desired a one-sided victory instead of peaceful negotiation as a result of the intervention. Therefore, it prevented regional organizations, such as the OAU, from negotiating and supported one side of the warring party financially and materially. While the initiatives and the groups of Central America had functioned effectively, the smooth peace process stood to be ruined by the US if it did not change its foreign policy towards Central America. This analysis indicates that the behaviors of regional states can be crucial for successful peace-keeping missions. In the case of Nicaragua, the overall regional influence was a negative factor for the settlement of the conflict internal. Later, it impacted positively since all of the main actors agreed on the general direction of the peace process at that time.

Peace-keeping Operations by International Organizations

Towards the end of the civil war in Nicaragua, the Central American countries successfully brought the Sandinistas and the Contras to mediation by international actors through the Esquipulas process in 1989.⁹¹ Differing from previous other peace-keeping operations, the Central American countries requested involvement of both the OAS and the UN in Nicaragua's peace settlement. The Nicaraguan case became the "first joint operation between the U.N. and a regional organization."⁹² Such involvement of the UN and a peace settlement became possible because the regional states collaborated to achieve a peaceful settlement, the US softened its policy in Central America at the end of the Cold War, and there was close communication between the secretary-generals of the UN and the OAS.⁹³

The establishment of the *Mission de Observadores de las Naciones Unidas en Centroamerica* (ONUCA) was determined by the UN Security Council in November,

⁹¹ Paris, (2004), 114.

⁹² Yves Beigbeder, International Monitoring of Plebiscites, Referenda and National Elections: Selfdetermination and Transition to Democracy, (Dordrecht, Boston and London: Marinus Nijhoff Publisher, 1994), 164.

⁹³ Jack Child, "External Actors: The United Nations and the Organization of American States," In *Repression, Resistance, and Democratic Transition*, eds. Thomas W. Walker and Ariel C. Armony (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 2000), 166.

1989.⁹⁴ The missions of ONUCA were demobilization of the Contras and their return to Nicaragua from Honduras, and observation of the 1990 election. (The OAS was responsible for demobilization of the Contras in Nicaragua in collaboration with CAIV).⁹⁵ During its full strength, ONUCA patrolled daily and "was manning 14 verification centres ... and 3 operational posts" to carry its mandates.⁹⁶ The mandate of ONUCA was expanded "to include verification of any cessation of hostilities and demobilization of irregular forces that might be agreed upon in the region" and the UN Security Council approved to add more "military personnel" to strengthen the demobilization process in 1990.⁹⁷ The mission was further expanded in 1990 to "monitor both the cease-fire and the separation of forces" after the election held in 1990.⁹⁸

As Child, Doyle and Sambanis determined, the nature of ONUCA is that of a traditional peace-keeping operation – an observer mission.⁹⁹ As ONUCA was one of the first missions after the end of the Cold War, the UN still hesitated to be actively involved in internal conflict, though it acted as if its peace-enforcement mission with the Contras continued as a mission mandate.¹⁰⁰ While maintaining the traditional peace-keeping stance, ONUCA carried a new generation of functions, such as disarmament and monitoring democratic elections in a sovereign country.

Another mission in Nicaragua was the *Misión de Observadores de las Naciones Unidas en Verificación de Elecciones en Nicaragua* (ONUVEN). This mission did not

⁹⁴ The United Nations, (1996), 410.

⁹⁵ Child, (2000), 171.

⁹⁶ The United Nations, (1996), 416.

⁹⁷ The United Nations, (1996), 416.

⁹⁸ The United Nations, (1996), 417.

⁹⁹ Doyle and Sambanis, (2006), 90 and Child, (2000), 168.

¹⁰⁰ Child, (2000), 168.

have a military staff, and therefore, the UN report did not consider its work a peacekeeping mission. The mandate of ONUVEN was to observe and monitor the election in 1990, one year after the end of civil war.¹⁰¹ Jack Child argues that it is well-known that ONUVEN was a significantly successful mission because of its "dedication, professionalism, and neutrality."¹⁰² The success of ONUVEN enhanced the further activities by ONUCA.¹⁰³

In addition to UN activities, various regional international organizations were key to the peace process in Nicaragua. While the OAS was inactive until the end of the 1980s, it took an important role in supporting UN missions. In fact, its observer mission for the elections of Nicaragua in 1989 and in 1990 was its first active mission and redefined the role of the OAS in the region.¹⁰⁴ During the post-conflict period of Nicaragua, the OAS supported both ONUVEN and ONUCA, not only in monitoring the election but also in the demobilization process. Their work was especially significant in the matter of resettling the Contras. In this period, decision-making of the OAS was noticeably freer from US influence.

Another important regional international actor for ONUCA was the Comisión Internacional de Apoyo y Verificación (CIAV), which was expected to carry out humanitarian and development issues in Nicaragua. The important mandate of the CIAV was receiving "arms, equipment and military supplies from the members of the

 ¹⁰¹ The United Nations, (1996), 410.
 ¹⁰² Child, (2000), 172.

¹⁰³ The United Nations, (1996), 410.

¹⁰⁴ Joaquin Tacsan, "Searching for OAS/UN Task-sharing Opportunities in Central America and Haiti," The Third World Quarterly 18: 3, (1997), 495.

Nicaraguan resistance and storing them."¹⁰⁵ CIAV collaborated with the OAS for the demobilization of the Contras in Nicaragua until 1993.¹⁰⁶

In operating in the peace-keeping process, these regional institutions walked a thin line – they needed to balance carefully to keep all the involved parties somewhat satisfied. If CIAV and the OAS did too little in favor of the Contras, the US, which influenced the OAS, would pressure the peace-keeping mission to do otherwise. This might jeopardize its mission. On the other hand, if these institutions in favored the Contras too much, then the Sandinistas would not trust them as negotiators, which would also deteriorate the achievements of the mission.¹⁰⁷

Receiving international intervention, Nicaragua safely and successfully carried out the first election after the civil war. Daniel Ortega, the leader of the Sandinistas and the winner of the civil war, lost to Chamorro, the leader of a coalition of opposition parties. Despite this unexpected turn of events, the Sandinistas accepted the results of the democratic election and did not stage a coup d'etat.¹⁰⁸ Consistent with liberal institutionalism, the election is often described as the most fair and transparent one. The UN successfully reduced betrayal of each party participated in election by providing transparent environment. In addition, the presence of the UN was deterrent to those parties and smoothed the process of election.

Moreover, the disarmament of the Contras was carried out successfully. Establishing a Security Zone, the UN started demobilizing the Contras within the Zone in

¹⁰⁵ The United Nations, (1996), 411.

¹⁰⁶ Child, (2000), 172.

¹⁰⁷ Child, (2000), 172.

¹⁰⁸ Paris, (2004), 116.

1990. By the end of June, the UN had completed "demobilization of all armed and unarmed members of the Nicaraguan Resistance … at all locations, except one in Nicaragua."¹⁰⁹ As a result, "a total of 19,614 armed and unarmed members of the Nicaraguan Resistance had been demobilized in Nicaragua and 2,759 in Honduras," which was considered a satisfactory result as completion of mission by the UN.¹¹⁰ Again, the presence of the UN pressured the rebels to demobilize according to the schedule, and at the same time, it created environment that the Contras were willing to be cooperative with the peace process. Moreover, after the departure of the UN, further demobilization of the FSLN, after it lost the election, took place as well. ESLN accepted the reduction of its troops "from more than 80,000 to less than 15,000" between 1991 and 1993, under pressure from the United States.¹¹¹

What Went Well in the Peace Process in Nicaragua?

The case of Nicaragua gives a couple of insights in terms of peace-keeping operations. The United Nations was successful in carrying mandates under the agreement of the warring parties within a relatively short period of time. This meant that the UN could work under relatively ideal conditions. Only a handful of international personnel were authorized for ONUCA: "260 military observers, as well as crews and support personnel for an air wing and a naval unit," compared to the case of ONUSAL (United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador), a UN peace-keeping operation in El Salvador

¹⁰⁹ The United Nations, (1996), 418.

¹¹⁰ The United Nations, (1996), 418.

¹¹¹ Walker, (2003), 61.

right after the ONUCA, which received about 900 military observers and 30 international civil servants in four years of operations.¹¹²

ONUCA was successful as a mission despite the limited involvement of the UN because of other surrounding conditions. The major factor that made the UN operation to promote peace in Nicaragua effective and smooth was the strong role of the neighboring countries in Central America. The Contadora group, established in 1983, and the Group of Eight led peace initiatives, such as the Esquipulas Declaration, the Declaration of Caracas and Esquipulas II. In fact, the mandates of the UN operation for Nicaragua were in response to a request by Esquipulas II. These peace initiatives called for the attention of the international community on peace-keeping operations, determined the mandates necessary for the region, and convinced the government of Nicaragua to accept UN troops for a peace-keeping observation mission.

As most of the scholars agree, gaining the consent of warring parties to accept UN operations is a crucial condition for a successful peace-keeping operation. ONUCA had achieved this condition through a regional effort, rather than through strong initiatives of the UN, for example, by the Secretary General.

The domestic security of the neighboring countries seemed to be an important issue for other Central American countries at that time. First, they shared a common interest to reduce the influence of the United States on the domestic politics of the Central American countries, which had been prolonging civil wars in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala. Second, civil wars in Nicaragua (and other neighboring

¹¹² Quotation is cited from the United Nations, (1996), 421 and information about the case of ONUSAL is available in the United Nations, (1996), 443.

countries) endangered other countries' security. As Schnable points out, civil war in a state can affect neighboring countries' security because of the flood of refugees and illegal arms trade, among of factors.¹¹³ In fact, the bases of the Contras were mainly located in Honduras and Costa Rica, which made the civil war in Nicaragua an international matter.

On the other hand, the influence of another neighboring country, the US, was an important factor in discussing the success of ONUCA. The US had opposed peaceful settlement of the Nicaraguan civil war and continuously supported the Contras. In the Cold War context, the US did not want to give any legitimacy to a socialist regime in the Nicaraguan government. In fact, when Nicaragua held an election in 1984, the US tried to find fault with Nicaragua. The US effort to disturb the stability of Nicaragua under the Sandinista administration successfully exhausted Nicaragua and its people, and created favorable conditions for the US-supported candidate to win in the 1990 election. Therefore, the peace-keeping mission in Nicaragua was also a result of the strategic mind of a regional super power, in addition to regional cooperation. In fact, the success of ONUCA did not stop US influence in Nicaragua.

While liberal institutionalism often claims that international institutions, such as the UN, can promote cooperation of the states for peaceful action, the ONUCA case suggests the other way around. It means that the cooperation among the states in Central American region occurred before the intervention by the UN and the OAS. The Central American countries used the power of the UN to realize their wills. At the same time, the existence of the UN, the international organization which is an impartial negotiator, had

¹¹³ Schnabel, (2002), 9.

promoted the process of the demobilization of Nicaragua. While demobilization was difficult for both sides of warring parties because they feared betrayal, the presence of a strong international entity utilizing a security zone and its deterrence power ensured the process of demobilization and the security of both parties as liberal institutionalism would suggest.

In summary, the peace-keeping mission ONUCA was successful because there was consent from both warring parties, cooperative attitudes of neighboring countries for achieving peace, intervention of international organizations such as the UN and the OAS to ensure the completion of the peace process. The case of Nicaragua was fortunate since the intent to reduce tensions within the civil war and promote peace was stronger than any wish to intensify the conflict among the neighboring countries as a total. However, the UN mission does not always receive such support. The following case of the MINURSO suggests the limitations of institutional liberalism to promote cooperation among states for achieving peace.

Chapter 4: United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)

The Historical Background of Disputes Between Morocco and Western Sahara

The territory of Western Sahara was colonized by the Spanish in 1884 and remained under the control of Spain till the 1970s.¹¹⁴ The Western Saharan population is dispersed over its territory: There were "fewer than 74,000 people" in "more than 260,000 square kilometers," according to the census taken by Spain in 1975. This survey was the last record taken by Spain, since it withdrew from Western Sahara in 1976.¹¹⁵ The current population living in the territory (not including refugees in Tindouf, Algeria) is 300,000.¹¹⁶ Although most of the territory is covered by the Sahara Desert, Spain had kept its interest in Western Sahara till 1976 largely because of "the discovery of large deposits of phosphates in the territory" in the 1940s.¹¹⁷

While the first UN General Assembly Resolution on the self-determination of Western Sahara was made in 1965, it was not until 1974 that Spain finally publicized its intention of having a self-determination referendum in the following year.¹¹⁸ Spain's intention, however, was, "interrupted" by Morocco and Mauritania.¹¹⁹ These interruptions became a concern of the UN General Assembly, which submitted a request for an International Court of Justice (ICJ) "advisory opinion on" the issue of Western

¹¹⁴ Teresa Whitfield, Friends Indeed?: The United Nations, Groups of Friends, and the Resolution of Conflict, (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 166.

¹¹⁵ Whitfield, (2007), 166.

¹¹⁶ Erik Jensen, Western Sahara: Anatomy of a Stalemate (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publshers, 2005), 14.

¹¹⁷ Whitfield, (2007), 166.

¹¹⁸ The United Nations, (1996), 269. and William J. Durch, "Building on Sand: UN Peacekeeping in the Western Sahara," International Security 17: 4 (Spring 1993), 155.

¹¹⁹ Whitfield,(2007), 166.

Sahara in 1974.¹²⁰ In October, 1975, evidence submitted to it the Court found "the existence, at the time of Spanish colonization, of legal ties of allegiance between the Sultan of Morocco and some of the tribes living in the Territory." ¹²¹ Nonetheless, the ICJ concluded that it did *not* find any legal ties to "affect ... the principle of self-determination" in Western Sahara.¹²² The UN interpreted this as evidence to support the "1960 General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)," which demanded the self-determination of the Western Sahara people.¹²³ Morocco welcomed this conclusion because it interpreted the ICJ decision as "an affirmation of Morocco's claim."¹²⁴

On the other hand, the other warring party, Morocco, achieved its independence from France and Spain in 1956 after approximately a quarter century of colonial occupation. When Morocco became an independent country, the territory of Western Sahara was not included in its kingdom. In 1974, about 20 years after its independence, Morocco launched a series of "diplomatic offensive" and led Spain, the former colonial master of Western Sahara, to "cede most of the Western Sahara to Morocco in 1975."¹²⁵ According to Bever, as the result of the offensive move against Western Saharan territory, the government and King Hassan II gained absolute popularity in Morocco. However, this resulted in domestic conflict in the 1990s, which would require UN

¹²⁰ Jensen, (2005), 14 and Whitfield, (2007), 167.

¹²¹ The United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping*, 3rd ed. (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), 269.

¹²² The United Nations, (1996), 269.

¹²³ The United Nations, (1996), 269.

¹²⁴ Whitfield, (2007), 167.

¹²⁵ Edward Bever, Africa: International Government & Politics Series (Phoenix: Oryx Press, 1996), 73-74.

intervention later on.¹²⁶ The legacy of European colonialism complicated the disputes between Morocco and Western Sahara.

While Morocco became independent from France and from Spain within the same year, some of the territory in Morocco still remained under Spanish control.¹²⁷ At the early stage of independence, Moroccan politicians led strong political campaigns to get rid of Spanish influence over Moroccan territory in order to unite Moroccan territory and to be truly liberated from the colonial powers. During this campaign, Moroccan politicians agitated the nations to gain greater territory for an independent Morocco, which included Tangier (current Morocco), Western Sahara and Tindouf (current Algeria near the border with Morocco). At one time, they even demanded the removal of Algerian-Moroccan borders to unify the Maghreb.¹²⁸ Later, the dream of the unification of the Maghreb under the great Kingdom of Morocco was diminished by minor international disputes with Algeria and Mauritania. However, Morocco never gave up on Western Saharan territory. To ensure Morocco's claim on Western Saharan territory, King Hassan II "organized the 'Green March' of 350,000 unarmed Moroccans into the Western Sahara" in 1975. This march pushed Spain to agree that the Western Saharan territory be divided between Morocco and Mauritania through the secret "Madrid Accord'."¹²⁹ Although Spain agreed to withdrawal from the territory, it made sure it still had access to the phosphate deposits.¹³⁰

¹²⁶ Bever, (1996), 73-74.

¹²⁷ Jensen, (2005), 25.

¹²⁸ Jensen, (2005), 25.

¹²⁹ Bever, (1996), 74. and Whitfield, (2007), 167.

¹³⁰ William J. Durch, "Building on Sand: UN Peacekeeping in the Western Sahara," *International Security*, 17: 4 (Spring, 1993), 155.

The resistance from *the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro* (POLISARIO) opposed this agreement among Mauritania, Morocco and Spain. When Morocco reported to the Secretary General of the UN that it had received approval for "reintegration' of … [Western Saharan] territory with Mauritania and Morocco" from "a local assembly" of Western Sahara the day after the withdrawal of Spain, POLISARIO declared the independence of Western Sahara on the same day.¹³¹ The resistance group, established "in 1973 to resist Spanish control," has fought back against Morocco ever since. Later, in 1976, the group established a government in exile, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), to claim independence from Morocco.¹³² Declaration of the independence of SADR was "supported at the time by Algeria, Libya, and Cuba."¹³³ To contain such movement and prevent infiltration of POLISARIO, the Moroccan military built a sand wall, about two thousand kilometers long.¹³⁴

Algeria supported the new SADR diplomatically and financially. The new Republic received swift international recognition based on its military prowess and, more importantly, its diplomatic capability.¹³⁵ For example, Mauritania gave up its claim to Western Sahara territory by 1979, and the sovereignty of Western Sahara was accepted by 34 states in total, including 20 African countries. Moreover, the Organization of

¹³¹ Marrack Goulding, *Peacemonger* (Baltimor: the Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 199.

¹³² Bever, (1996), 74 and Durch, (1993), 156.

¹³³ William J. Durch, "Building on Sand: UN Peacekeeping in the Western Sahara," *International Security*, 17: 4 (Spring, 1993), 156.

¹³⁴ Jensen, (2005), 14. and Goulding, (2003), 199. Jensen reports that the sand wall is 2000 kilometers long. On the other hand, Goulding reports it measures about 1,600 kilometers including a 400-kilometer extension.

¹³⁵ Bever, (1996), 74.

African Unity (OAU) voted for, and recognized Western Sahara as, an independent member of the OAU in 1984.¹³⁶

The regional context accelerated Moroccan ambition for control over Western Sahara as well. After Spain withdrew from the territory, the rivalry between Morocco and Algeria intensified. The two countries competed for dominance within the Maghreb, and the self-determination issue of Western Sahara became a sort of proxy dispute between Morocco and Algeria. While Morocco tried hard to maintain control over Western Sahara, Algeria supplied the resistance group POLISARIO with weapons and financial resources.¹³⁷ The ambitions and consistent intervention of Algeria were, as Shelley points out, not the only reasons for the rise of independent movement of Western Sahara, but factored in prolonging the disputes in the region.¹³⁸

Moreover, the Western Saharan issue was of interest to some of the great powers. The US, France and Spain, especially, found strategic or economic interest in this region.¹³⁹ These three states became members of *A Group of Friends*, established in 1993 under the initiative of the US.¹⁴⁰ According to Whitfield, *A Group of Friends* was *A Friend* for Western Sahara. These great powers and *A Group* have impacted the Western Saharan issue through informal and formal negotiation channels.

The disputes intensified by the colonial history, regional rivalries and international interest in the region complicated the disputes between the government of

¹³⁶ Bever, (1996), 74. and Goulding, (2003), 199.

¹³⁷ Toby Shelley, *Endgame in the Western Sahara: What future for Africa's Last Colony?* (London and New York: Zed Books, 2004), 2.

¹³⁸ Shelley, (2004), 2.

¹³⁹ Shelley, (2004), 2,16-19.

¹⁴⁰ Whitfield, (2007), 165 and 171.

Morocco and the POLISARIO resistance group. Because of the prolonged conflict and never-conducted referendum, many Sahrawi people became refugees. According to Shelley, there are "some 160,000 people exiled in one of the most inhospitable parts of the Sahara."¹⁴¹ Also, some people were externally displaced; Goulding reports that there are "some 50,000 Sahrawis" living in the refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria.¹⁴² The situational difficulty of the Moroccan and Western Sahara case as a candidate for intervention by the UN was relatively high based on the long historical roots of the conflict, non-cooperative warring parties and other actors. Nonetheless, the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was established in April, 1991, and its mission has continues to the present day.

The OAU Intervention in the Western Sahara/Moroccan Case

While the Organization of African Unity (OAU) attempted to take the initiative in settling this dispute between the King Hassan II administration and the POLISARIO, the peace initiative of OAU alone failed because it was not recognized as an impartial institution. Instead of being recognized as a mediator, OAU was used as a diplomatic tool for POLISARIO to gain international attention and sovereignty. From the beginning of the conflict, Morocco refused to recognize SADR as an independent territory and insisted the Western Sahara was its own territory. Therefore, any effort to gain SADR international attention worked against Morocco and so the initiative of OAU was taken as a hostile action against Morocco.

¹⁴¹ Shelley, (2004), 3.
¹⁴² Goulding, (2003), 200.

The OAU became involved in this case in 1978. Jensen described a frustrating effort: the OAU committee composed of "at least five heads of states," which was "known as the Committee of Wise Men" gathered in Khartoum and discussed the issues of Morocco and Western Sahara.¹⁴³ However, the OAU did not make any significant progress since Morocco kept refusing to recognize POLISARIO.¹⁴⁴ While Morocco accepted having a self-determination referendum at the OAU summit in 1981, that was only to ensure that the Western Saharan territory be part of Morocco.¹⁴⁵

The attitude of Morocco hardened after full admission of POLISARIO as an official member of OAU. Algeria started "lobbying to have SADR admitted to OAU membership" and attempted to put international pressure against Morocco. At that time, however, the OAU presummit vote to admit Western Sahara as an independent state did not have legitimate support since 19 states walked out of the conference at the time of the vote.¹⁴⁶ This fact illustrates the institutional problem that OAU was weak and did not function as legitimate. It is crucial that the organization have legitimacy since the information which it provides should be reliable to gain the trust of member states.

Opposing the decision of the OAU to accept its membership of SADR in 1984, Morocco finally withdrew from the organization.¹⁴⁷ These series of incidents revealed that the deterrent power to prevent Morocco from violating the rules in regional security did not work within the framework of OAU. The issues between Morocco and Western

¹⁴³ Jensen, (2005), 32.

¹⁴⁴ Jensen, (2005), 32.

¹⁴⁵ Jensen, (2005), 32-33.

¹⁴⁶ Muthiah Alagappa, "Regionalism and conflict management: a framework for analysis," *Review of International Studies*, 21 (1995), 376 and Jensen, (2005), 33.

¹⁴⁷ Bever, (1996), 74.

Sahara went beyond the capacity of the OAU. The UN started to be seriously involved in the case of Morocco in 1986 after multiple General Assembly Resolutions to encourage direct negotiations between Morocco and POLISARIO and self-determination referendum had gone on for a long time.¹⁴⁸ While Morocco rejected the OAU as a mediator, OAU's peace effort continued as a joint mission with the UN. In addition, the UN carried the idea of a peace-settlement plan of OAU, as reflected in the 1988 UN settlement proposal.¹⁴⁹

MINURSO

Negotiation Process

The case of Morocco and Western Sahara has been a concern of the UN General Assembly, and the General Assembly has supported the self-determination right of the Sahrawi people since 1963 through "repeated resolution adopted by the General Assembly."¹⁵⁰ The UN became more actively involved when the General Assembly passed Resolution A/36/46 in 1981 to reaffirm the right of the people in Western Sahara and its independence. Furthermore, the Resolution supported the OAU effort to settle the issue of Western Sahara.¹⁵¹

After the 1981 Resolution, in order to hold a referendum in Western Sahara, the UN Secretariat took the initiative to promote negotiations with the OAU, King Hassan II of Morocco and the leader of POLISARIO. While the OAU became involved in the

¹⁴⁸ Jensen, (2005), 34.

¹⁴⁹ Anna Theofilopoulou, "The United Nations and Western Sahara: Never-ending Affair," United States Institute of Peace, Special Report, no. 166, July, 2006, http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr166.pdf, (accessed on Feb 1, 2009), 3.

¹⁵⁰ Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, Pilgrimage for Peace, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 333.

¹⁵¹ Pérez de Cuéllar, (1997), 334.

disputes between Morocco and Western Sahara, its initiative failed. This was partially because the OAU lacked the financial resources to establish a referendum and institutional legitimacy. More importantly, Morocco did not recognize the OAU as an impartial party because the organization accepted the representation of SADR as one of its members. Morocco was furious about this and thus denied the initiative by the OAU. On the other hand, because "the General Assembly has never recognized the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as a state," Morocco put more trust in the UN as a mediator to negotiate with Western Sahara.¹⁵²

A series of negotiations behind closed doors to prepare for a referendum in Western Sahara continued throughout the 1980s at the initiative of the Secretary General of the UN. In 1985, the Secretary General met with Abdelaziz, the representative of POLISARIO, and King Hassan II. However, the negotiation process between Morocco and POLISARIO was making slow progress. Morocco denied any possibility of direct negotiation with Western Sahara on conducting a referendum and accepting the independence of Western Sahara, while POLISARIO strongly demanded direct negotiation with Morocco. Moreover, Morocco had no intention of having a fair referendum. While King Hassan II repeatedly stated that he would support a selfdetermination referendum in the territory, Morocco indeed had another intention – to gain the integration of Western Sahara into Morocco, in the referendum.¹⁵³

¹⁵² Pérez de Cuéllar, (1997), 334.
¹⁵³ Pérez de Cuéllar, (1997), 336.

Another discouraging fact regarding the UN peace initiative is that Morocco had a strong diplomatic position at the negotiation table due to its military strength.¹⁵⁴ Thus, Morocco saw no necessity to soften its attitude during the negotiation process in the pre-MINURSO period.

Despite the agreement of the King Hassan II to conduct a referendum, the UN was unsuccessful in gaining willingness from the warring parties to cooperate with the UN peace-keeping initiative. Without such willingness, the basic conditions to a successful mission were in jeopardy.

In the same year, the UN Secretary General again pushed both parties to have direct negotiations in addition to a referendum, but the attempt was not successful.¹⁵⁵ Furthermore, the antagonism between Morocco and POLISARIO worsened in the General Assembly. In addition, Morocco threatened that it would no longer negotiate on the Western Sahara issue through the UN. Morocco criticized the UN because "the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly approved a draft resolution again calling for direct negotiation between Morocco and POLISARIO" and because the Resolution, which called for negotiations between the warring parties, passed the General Assembly.¹⁵⁶ Thus, this series of efforts by the UN to promote the peace process in Western Sahara and Morocco was ineffective.

In the following year, 1986, the Secretary General again visited Morocco and was successful in establishing some conditions to which both parties could agree. For

¹⁵⁴ Pérez de Cuéllar, (1997), 334.

¹⁵⁵ William J. Durch, "Building on Sand: UN Peacekeeping in the Western Sahara," *International Security* 17, no.4 (Spring, 1993), 156.

¹⁵⁶ Pérez de Cuéllar, (1997), 338.

example, both Morocco and POLISARIO agreed to the involvement of the UN in conducting a referendum, and Morocco accepted the withdrawal of troops from Western Sahara while the referendum was conducted and monitored.¹⁵⁷ This tendency was continued on in the Security Council in 1988, as reported in the Security Council Resolution 621.¹⁵⁸

The UN publicized the decision to send a dispatch to investigate the capacity of the territory of Western Sahara to conduct a referendum in 1987.¹⁵⁹ While Morocco supported the decision, POLISARIO guaranteed neither cooperation nor the security of the UN staff in the region until just one day prior to the departure of the dispatch.¹⁶⁰ The investigation group found a lack of capacity to have a referendum and "wide dispersal of the population" in the Western Sahara territory. After the UN investigation, the negotiation process proceeded since both parties agreed on the major conditions: They would declare a self-determination referendum free and fair; there would be a transitional period while the UN organized and monitored the referendum; and the result of the referendum would be respected.¹⁶¹

Establishment of MINURSO

After the long uneasy negotiation process, the UN Security Council established the observer peace-keeping mission MINURSO in 1991. The mandates of the mission were to

¹⁵⁷ Pérez de Cuéllar, (1997), 338

¹⁵⁸ Beigbeder, (1994), 193.

¹⁵⁹ Pérez de Cuéllar, (1997), 339.

¹⁶⁰ Pérez de Cuéllar, (1997), 339.

¹⁶¹ Pérez de Cuéllar, (1997), 339-340.

- monitor the ceasefire;
- verify the reduction of Moroccan troops in the Territory;
- monitor the confinement of Moroccan and Frente POLISARIO troops to designated locations;
- take steps with the parties to ensure the release of all Western Saharan political prisoners or detainees;
- oversee the exchange of prisoners of war ...;
- implement the repatriation programme ...;
- Identify and register qualified voters;
- Organize and ensure a free and fair referendum and proclaim the results.¹⁶²

MINURSO was mostly successful in achieving a cease-fire between the warring

parties. While the negotiation process has been continuing, they have hardly reached a consensus concerning who are eligible voters for the free and fair self-determination referendum.¹⁶³ While MINURSO was originally planned to last between 1991 and 1993, the deployment of mission kept extending. It was not until 1994 that the project to identify the potential voters for self-determination referendum was finally launched. But, the voter identification process was complicated because the potential voters are sometimes in the refugee camps in neighboring countries. The applications for the voting were collected in Morocco, Western Sahara and Mauritania by Morocco, POLISARIO and MINURSO. Since the demography of the registrants could determine the result of the self-referendum, the process was unreasonably delayed by the involved parties. In the end, the transparency of the process was questioned. It was not till 1995 that this problem was somewhat settled.¹⁶⁴

There was frustration within the UN about the conflict between Morocco and Western Sahara. The Resolution of the Security Council in 1996 even implied the

¹⁶² United Nations Peacekeeping, "Western Sahara – MINURSO – Mandate," 2005

http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minurso/mandate.html (accessed on Feb 3, 2009). ¹⁶³ United Nations, 2005.

¹⁶⁴ Theofilopoulou, (2006), 4-5.

withdrawal of MINURSO.¹⁶⁵ In 1997, Boutros-Ghali reported to the Security Council, describing the disputes between Morocco and POLISARIO as "'irreconcilable'."¹⁶⁶ The UN needed another initiative in addition to the UN Secretary General to promote peace process between Western Sahara and Morocco.

Kofi Annan, who succeeded Boutros-Ghali, appointed James A. Baker III, a senior U.S. statesman, to the envoy hoping he could shepherd MINURSO into the next stage.¹⁶⁷ The initiative and consultation by Baker III was extended not only to the warring parties, but also the neighboring countries, but his initiatives did not succeed. Baker worked for this mission until 2004, and then resigned after enduring the non-cooperative attitude of the warring parties for seven years.¹⁶⁸ The once-settled issue of voter registration and the argument of their legitimacies as voters kept coming back, and prevented the UN from proceeding to the next process.¹⁶⁹In addition, while Baker III took the peace initiative by preparing suggested documents for the warring parties – for example by suggesting a "draft Framework Agreement on the Status of Western Sahara" (prepared in 2001) and a "Peace Plan for Self-Determination for the People of Western Sahara" (presented in 2003) – they have never been accepted by all involved parties because one of them always finds a point of complaint and chooses not to accept them.¹⁷⁰

As of 2009, MINURSO is still an ongoing mission without a self-determination referendum. The inflexible position of each warring party not to compromise at all to the

¹⁶⁵ Theofilopoulou, (2006), 5.

¹⁶⁶ Whitfield, (2007), 178.

¹⁶⁷ Whitfield, (2007), 179.

¹⁶⁸ Whitfield, (2007), 179 and Theofilopoulou, (2006), 1.

¹⁶⁹ Theofilopoulou, (2006), 7.

¹⁷⁰ Theofilopoulou, (2006), 9 and 11.

other's demands blocked the peace-keeping process by the UN, making it almost impossible to move forward. Contrary to the expectations of liberal institutionalists, the UN was not effective in creating a favorable environment to encourage warring parties to cooperate with the peace process. While the negotiation process is blocked, Moroccan *de facto* control over the Western Saharan territory continues.

Effects of the Regional Countries and Superpowers

The Western Saharan disputes occurred at an unfortunate time for gaining international attention since most of the states with strategic interests in the region were too concerned with their own domestic situations. In addition, the Western Sahara case did not have initiatives led by the regional states to promote peace as was the case in Nicaragua. Rather, there were more factors to prolong the conflict.

First of all, Spain did not have the capacity to deal with the dispute since Francisco Franco "lay dying" in 1975.¹⁷¹ The death of Franco made the fragile state even more unstable. This was one of the causal factors for the withdrawal of Spain from the territory of Western Sahara. While Spain could not maintain full control over the territory, it did not give up holding a concession to reach the natural resources in Western Sahara.¹⁷²

With Spain was too occupied with domestic concerns to intervene in the Western Sahara case, the US and France became active in supporting Morocco. For example, the US provided "considerable military and technical support since the beginning of the

¹⁷¹ Whitfield,(2007), 166.

¹⁷² Whitfield, (2007), 167.

war.¹⁷³ These two countries mainly supplied military equipment to Morocco, but did not want to have too much involvement in the Western Sahara case. The US wanted to avoid the same mistake made in Angola, and therefore, tried maintaining a balance between supporting an administration which offered a good economic access to the US and while maintaining a somewhat distant position from the conflict itself. In contrast, Algeria remained a major supporter of POLISARIO, though it lost much of the enthusiasm it had in the beginning.

The attitude of the superpowers in terms of Morocco/Western Sahara became contradict only starting in 1993. The policy of only supporting Morocco shifted to a balance between Morocco and Western Sahara due to a strong interest in the regions. The US took the initiative for establishing *The Friends of Western Sahara* and both France and Spain were involved. The strategic interest of these three countries was to maintain influence in Mediterranean trading and policy establishment kept them in the initiative, where they tried to balance between Morocco and POLISARIO. The US kept its influence over the region by maintaining diplomatic pipelines both open to Morocco and POLISARIO. ¹⁷⁴ Then, France went through political and economic connections built through colonial history, and Spain started to establish treaties, such as "a Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness, and Cooperation in 1991."¹⁷⁵

The actions of *the Friends* were neither stable nor consistent. Once it attempted working with the Security Council as The Friends of Security Council and started

¹⁷⁴ Whitfield, (2007), 171-173.

¹⁷³ Yahia H. Zoubir, "The Western Sahara Conflict: Regional and International Dimensions," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 28: 2 (June, 1990), 233.

¹⁷⁵ Whitfield, (2007), 173.

including some Security Council states in those years as member states, though the idea was rejected by the Council. While the Friends took some initiatives to forward the mission of MINURSO in the 1990s, the intentions of *the Friends of Western Sahara* were somewhat apart from those of the UN initiatives and they did not work hand in hand. The involvement of the Friends in the case of Morocco and Western Sahara were, in the end, driven by their own strategic interests in the region, and their involvement complicated the already difficult peace-keeping operations. The initiative by the Friends was defused in the 2000s.¹⁷⁶

What Went Wrong in The Peace Process for MINURSO?

The MINURSO was not successful for a couple of unfortunate conditions, such as the timing of the mission. At the same time, the mission failure could come down to the lack of enthusiastic cooperation among involved states, peace including the warring parties. The case of MINURSO, therefore, shows the limitations of an international institution, the UN, to enhance cooperation among states as liberal institutionalists assume.

First, MINURSO unfortunately received insufficient attention from the UN Security Council at the beginning of the conflicts. As discussed in the previous section, the attention of the UN was elsewhere. In addition, the UN Security Council was not interested enough at the beginning of the case to appoint a full-time Special Representative to take the initiative of peace-keeping. The UN was not full-force in taking care of the disputes between Morocco and Western Sahara.

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¹⁷⁶ Whitfield, (2007), 189-190.

Second, perhaps more importantly, cooperation among warring parties did not exist in the case of MINURSO. The warring parties would not change their positions set more than 15 years ago, and had no posture to compromise with each other. These attitudes made the progress of the UN mission very difficult. While the function of the UN is to promote peace and to soften the negotiation positions of warring parties by removing any potential danger to either party, the MINURSO was not able to achieve this because of lack of cooperation by the warring parties and their lack of trust of the UN. Another international institution, the OAS, failed to gain the trust of Morocco at the beginning of the conflict because, according to Morocco, the OAS did not maintain on impartial position.

As international relations scholars point out, gaining the consent from the warring parties to accept UN missions is a crucial factor for a successful mission. While both Morocco and POLISARIO gave consent for UN involvement in their disputes as official records, their response was not positive. This case shows that given consent is meaningless unless there is a willingness to cooperate in the peace process from the warring countries.

Third, MINURSO does not have neighboring countries actively encouraging the peace process as was so in the case of Nicaragua. Instead, the involvement was of foreign states with strategic interests in the region. For example, Algeria was heavily involved in the disputes between Western Sahara and Morocco, but not to reduce the tensions between these two parties, while the resistance group POLISARIO had its military base inside Algerian territory. The involvement of other neighboring countries is not significant in MINURSO.

In addition to the Algerian intervention, the superpowers did not impact positively on the progress of MINURSO. The US, France and Spain were interested in the peace process because they wanted to protect their strategic interests in the region. These superpowers did not share the same interests for supporting the peace-process. In the consequence, the peace initiative they have established was defusing in time and their financial and diplomatic involvement to Morocco prolonged the conflicts in the territory of Western Sahara. In this sense, the case of MINURSO exemplifies the power of a realist understanding of international relations than that of the liberalists. Strategic interests of the great powers over the region were powerful, and overwhelmed the initiative of the UN to promote peace.

Chapter 5: Comparisons of the Case Studies and Analysis

What Worked, What Did Not?

Common Factors

The cases of ONUCA and MINURSO were monumental peace-keeping missions of the UN and share several common characteristics. First, the establishment of the UN peace-keeping operations for both cases was in the same time period. The peace-keeping operations had just started to be involved in intrastate wars. Until the late 1980s, the main concern of the Security Council was to send peace-keeping operations involving interstate wars, and the number of the UN missions for civil wars exploded from the late 1980s throughout the 1990s. Both ONUCA and MINURSO were established in such a mood at the United Nations.

Second, both cases were joint missions between the UN and regional international organizations, such as OAS and OAU. The UN had just started having joint missions in the end of the 1980s. ONUVEN was in fact the first such case in which the UN joined other institutions for peace-keeping missions. In MINURSO, OAU was also expected to work as a partner in peace-keeping operations of the United Nations.

Third, both cases were some of the earliest cases in which the UN started including multiple ventures in peace-keeping operations. As I discussed earlier, UN peace-keeping missions had just started changing from first-generation to secondgeneration. Both Nicaragua and Western Sahara/Morocco included new generation mandates, such as monitoring and conducting national elections and demobilization of the former militias. At that same time, the UN remained a somewhat traditional peacekeeper; it had not acted as a transitional government, but traditionally remained an observer. Particularly in the case of Nicaragua, the involvement of the UN was rather reserved in the peace-keeping operations.

Fourth, both of the cases occurred near at the end of the Cold War. This dramatic change of the international security structure affected the behavior of nations, especially the superpowers, in regard to peace-keeping operations. It should be noted that peace-keeping operations do not start suddenly. There is always a preparation period for the mission. For example, the UN started to be actively involved in the case of Morocco in the early 1980s, which means the states were still acting in the framework of the Cold War context.

Fifth, the peace negotiation process in each of the cases involved neighboring countries and the great powers. While the impacts for peace-keeping operations were not always positive, they were considerable for the results of the missions. Close observation of the behaviors of neighboring countries in each case is key to understanding its success or failure.

While the contexts of the civil wars were different in two cases – a revolutionary civil war in Nicaragua and the separatist civil wars in the framework of decolonization in Western Sahara/Morocco – five common factors shared by the two peace-keeping operations of the UN make comparison of the cases meaningful. In the following sections, the detailed differences will be discussed in order to understand sources of the success or failure of the UN peace-keeping missions.

Nicaragua

The peace-keeping operation in Nicaragua through ONUCA in combination with ONUVEN is usually considered a successful case of mission. From the minimalist point of view, the mission was successful because there was no major violence observed, demobilization of the former resistance went smoothly, and the mission successfully conducted a fair election. More importantly, the results of the election were respected and the state did not go back to a situation of conflict. Then, what strongly impacted the results of the mission?

First, the UN successfully gained consent from the warring parties to accept its involvement. Many scholars of international organizations agree that this consent is crucial to successful missions. In addition, the warring parties accepted the result of UN intervention and the elections, though the result did not favor of one of them.

Second, the strategy of the mission was effective. Through ONUCA, the UN peace-keepers deployed not only in Nicaragua, but also in neighboring countries, such as Honduras. This strategy was effective because the members of Contras, the resistance group opposing the Nicaraguan government, were spread in multiple countries and took refuge there. The demobilization and disarmament of all the members were important, and the reduction of arms increased the security of the region as well.

Third, and most importantly, the neighboring countries' peace initiatives made the peace-keeping successful. For example, the Group of Eight was successful in pressuring the Nicaraguan government to accept the UN peace-keeping mission. Also, declarations, such as *Esquipulas I and II* attracted the attention of the UN to be actively involved in the case. Most Central American countries have experienced internal wars, were tired of

them, and sought peace in the region. The common interest within the region united the regional powers to cooperate with one another.

Another interesting part of this case is that the warring parties, the Nicaraguan government and the Contras, did not have external support to continue the disputes at the peace-negotiation stage. While the Contras had been receiving the steady US support, the US changed from supporting militias to supporting the peace process in Nicaragua. This shift in policy of the great power US was an important factor for successful and short-duration operations. In addition, the countries opposing the US in the Cold War were no longer supportive of the socialist Nicaraguan government. In 1989, the USSR was occupied with its domestic matters in the days right before its collapse. Cuba also did not support the Nicaraguan government either diplomatically or militarily, though the Nicaraguan government was expecting to receive some kind of support. Therefore, neither warring party had external support to keep fighting. Absence of great power strategic interests in the region during the years of the peace-keeping operation facilitated the successful factors of ONUCA. Overall, the case of Nicaragua had multiple conditions to lead the UN mission to a successful case.

Western Sahara/Morocco

Many international relations scholars have consider MINURSO a failed UN peace-keeping mission since its early stage of deployment. It is true that the UN achieved a cease-fire at the moment of intervention; and throughout the deployment of the mission, the UN maintained a cease-fire, for the most part. However, they did not fulfill some of the criteria for successful missions. They have not achieved the mission mandates; and the intervention ("peace 'stimulus'") did not bring about a peace settlement within a two-year time period.¹⁷⁷ Therefore, MINURSO has not been a successful peace-keeping mission.

As in the case of Nicaragua, MINURSO ultimately achieved consent from warring parties to intervene in the disputes. However, the situation surrounding the intervention was very delicate. For example, before the establishment of the MINURSO, the UN sent a dispatch to see if conditions in Western Sahara were right to hold a referendum. POLISARIO did not give consent nor did they guarantee the security of the UN staff until just the day before the dispatch arrived Western Sahara. Moreover, the year that MINURSO was established the hostility between the warring parties was intense. Compared to the case of Nicaragua, MINURSO faced more situational difficulties in trying to settle the civil war because the warring parties were less willing to cooperate in the peace settlement process.

Neither POLISARIO nor the government of Morocco found it necessary to compromise, especially during the 1970s and the 1980s because they had external support. Strategically, they were confident enough that they could continue fighting to get what they wanted. For example, Morocco could get military supplies from the US and France, and therefore, the government believed they had a strategic advantage over POLISARIO. On the other hand, POLISARIO was militarily supported by Algeria, though support from Algeria declined at the end of 1987 when the Morocco and Algeria relationship improved.¹⁷⁸ POLISARIO had been diplomatically successful since its

¹⁷⁷ Doyle and Sambanis, (2006), 74.

¹⁷⁸ William J. Durch, "Building on Sand: UN Peacekeeping in the Western Sahara," (1993), 157.

membership as a sovereign state was accepted by the OAU. In addition, their political agenda to conduct a self-determination referendum was supported by the Resolutions of the UN General Assembly, which assured international support for POLISARIO. Therefore, neither party perceived necessity to compromise. In summary, the warring parties were not willing to cooperate with the UN initiatives though they accepted its involvement for settling their disputes.

Unlike the case of ONUCA, neighboring countries did not take an initiative to seek regional peace in the case of MINURSO. The states which were interested in Western Sahara or Morocco simply had strategic reasons for seeking influence in the region. The strategic interests of great powers and neighboring countries made the success of the missions in Morocco and Western Sahara less likely.

As Durch points out in his article, the UN was disorganized and not efficient as an institution. For example, no good horizontal communication existed among departments when operating the MINURSO, and therefore, necessary information was not shared. In addition, Manz the first Special Representative for MINURSO was not fully dedicated to the mission. It was impossible for a Special Representative, who had "full-time duties with the Swiss foreign ministry while serving as Special representative," to give enough attention to achieve success.¹⁷⁹ Besides, implementation of the peace settlement was not his mandate.¹⁸⁰

Another unfortunate condition for MINURSO was that the UN was already occupied with many other missions, such as Angola and El Salvador. Since the

¹⁷⁹ William J. Durch, "Building on Sand: UN Peacekeeping in the Western Sahara," (1993), 158.

¹⁸⁰ William J. Durch, "Building on Sand: UN Peacekeeping in the Western Sahara," (1993), 158.

intentions of the UN Security Council and those of the great powers did not match in regard to the disputes between Morocco and POLISARIO, effective peace-keeping was not possible. This differs from the case of Nicaragua, where the UN, OAS, neighboring countries and the US agreed on the direction of the peace-keeping mission and worked cooperatively towards a successful mission.

In conclusion, MINURSO did not have sufficient potential to succeed. First, the external powers' intervention in Morocco and Western Sahara contributed to the prolonging of conflict. Second, the initiative of the UN was neither efficient nor successful in gaining serious cooperation from any party to ensure peace in the region.

Implications of Case Studies on Peace-keeping Operations

The comparisons of the two case studies reveal that the UN peace-keeping operations do not achieve effective and successful results on their own. Favorable conditions for a successful mission include: 1) the consent of warring parties on the deployment of peace-keeping parties; 2) no external state support for warring parties; 3) the willingness or conditions to promote warring parties to compromise for achieving peace; 4) a group of states promoting peace, whose intentions match other peaceinitiatives, such as that of the UN; and 5) a context of international peace-keeping. If other peace-keeping operations receive more international attention, a case like MINURSO receives less attention which is detrimental to the success of the mission. Pressure to end conflicts and resources from the global community often advances peacekeeping missions. If a dispute receives little international attention, conflicts can continue for a longer period. UN peace-keeping missions, especially observer missions as these two selected cases, are not peace-enforcement missions. Diplomatic efforts with deterrent power, rather than weapons, advance observer missions. In addition, a UN peace-keeping mission can facilitate an impartial space for negotiation between warring parties. The UN can reduce warring parties' fear of being betrayed after the negotiation by conducting disarmament or monitoring elections. These UN functions are some of the characteristics which are often emphasized as unique functions of international institutions.

On the other hand, the peace-keeping missions cannot operate effectively when the warring parties have no motivation to reach a peace settlement. In such cases, the UN needs *cooperative* external powers which can pressure warring parties to begin the peace process. While the UN does not have enforcement powers, it can influence warring states with collective pressure from the international community. At the same time, unfortunately, the initiative of the international organization does not always work to promote peace. As in the case of MINURSO, strong initiatives were taken by the UN, but were disturbed by the uncooperative attitude of warring parties and other states which had strategic interests in the region. The UN failed to facilitate the proper table for negotiation between warring parties.

Insights for Past or Future Missions

In the post-Cold War era, most peace-keeping missions are established to settle intrastate conflicts, while UN missions were mostly intervention in interstate wars in the Cold War period. As I discussed it in the introduction, the situational difficulties of civil wars are more severe than those of interstate wars. There tend to be more casualties, especially among civilians, more complicated historical backgrounds and longer durations in civil wars. Even after they end, the nature of civil wars generates intense hatred in societies. The situational difficulties that contribute to interstate wars are often more conducive to successful missions than are civil wars. If the UN seeks only easy missions they should not focus their efforts toward settling civil wars.

Despite the difficulties of peace-keeping in civil wars, many missions have succeeded. The UN operation in Nicaragua was one successful case. To overcome situational difficulties, the UN needs innovative strategies for peace-keeping missions. Because the global needs in terms of security change, the UN has to be always innovative to fit current realities. In the case studies of ONUCA/ONUVEN and MINURSO, the UN utilized new methods that have become common strategies in the post-Cold War era.

First, the UN has started collaborating with international regional organizations in peace-keeping operations. While Chapter VIII of the UN Charter determines the importance of regional efforts to seek peace settlements, ONUVEN was the first joint operation between the UN and a regional organization, though ONUVEN was not technically a peace-keeping operation since it "was not authorized by a decision of the Security Council."¹⁸¹ One of the important functions of the involvement of regional international organizations is that they understand the needs for the settlement of disputes better than the international organizations, the UN. In the cases of both ONUCA and MINURSO, the initial peace settlement plans of the UN peace-keeping operations were based on what these regional organizations or initiatives developed. Collaboration with

¹⁸¹ Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VIII, http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/pdf/uncharter.pdf, (accessed on Feb3, 2009), and the quotation is from Beigbeder, (1994), 164.

the regional institutions had a positive result in the case of Nicaragua; but a similar effort had a negative impact in the disputes between the Moroccan government and POLISARIO because other factors were not conducive to peace.

On the other hand, collaboration with regional international organizations could be a detriment to a peace-keeping mission because the regional powers' strong interests might reflect on the intentions of the organizations more than necessary. In the future, joint operations of the UN and regional international organizations can be meaningful when both parties remain impartial to the warring parties, maintaining the consistency of the peace-keeping policies and having a capacity to promote peace.

Second, starting a multi-ventured peace-keeping is a key factor of the post- Cold War period. While ONUCA/ONUVEN and MINURSO were just observer missions, their components included monitoring a cease-fire, confining troops to bases, observing the withdrawal, monitoring elections and disarmament, which seemed to work positively, especially in the case of Nicaragua. These multi-venture operations can effectively bring about sustainable and positive peace in the post-conflict stage. These days, multidimensional peace-keeping with the UN as a transitional administration has become the main stream of peace-keeping operations. Therefore, it should be noted that the Nicaraguan case did not involve transitional administration by the UN, yet the operation was completed successfully.

Finally, the ONUCA and MINURSO cases reveal the active initiatives of the United Nations to promote peace. The name *observer* might even be misleading in consideration of their diplomatic efforts to bring about peace. Also, no matter the results, success or failure, the UN has credibility as an impartial mediator. The MINURSO case clearly contains that point. While the peace initiative of the UN has been disappointing, the process would not even have started if the UN had not been involved because Morocco did not trust any institution other than the UN to mediate the dispute. The UN functioned as a legitimate entity as a mediator of the disputes, and its role as an impartial mediator is an asset for the future peace-keeping operations. Differing from peaceenforcement missions, in which inevitably the UN takes sides with one of the warring parties and UN itself becomes a warring party, the observer missions can fully utilize the strength of the UN as an international institution and mediator of inter- and intra-state disputes.

Chapter 6: Conclusion and Theoretical Implications

Contemporary UN Peace-keeping

After the boom in UN peace-keeping operations in the 1990s, the number of the missions was reduced in the 2000s. In the 1990s, 35 peace-keeping missions were established while only ten missions have been established between 2000 and 2009. Among the missions established in the 1990s, four are still active.

However, the decrease in the number of UN missions does not mean a decrease in the demands on the UN. Instead, they seem to be increasing in recent years. The population of uniformed personnel in UN peace-keeping has been increasing since the end of the 1990s (Appendix A). For example, while 47,778 uniformed personnel served as UN peace-keeping troops in 1991, the number reached 91,712 by the end of 2008. The Security Council report SC/9583 states the UN is overwhelmed with ever-increasing demands for peace-keeping operations. Despites recent demands, the UN's financial and human resources have been very limited.¹⁸²

A possible explanation for the decreasing number of the missions with an increasing number of peace-keeping personnel is that each UN mission has become a big mission. The recent trend of the peace-keeping operations involves multi-dimensional peace-keeping operations. Multi-dimensional operations such as ONUSAL (El Salvador) and UNTAET (East Timor) tend to be larger than other types missions, and require involvement of more peace-keeping personnel.

¹⁸² United Nations Security Council, United Nations, 6075th Meeting, SC/9583, Jan 23, 2009 http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2009/sc9583.doc.htm (accessed on Feb 3, 2009).

Also, multi-dimensional missions including the UN as a transitional government promote the dependency of recipient countries. Instead of utilizing the existing administration of a state, UN acts as a temporal government. It is true that, in some cases, the internal administrative system is completely shattered by a war and therefore there is the necessity of a wholistic approach to peace-keeping operations. At the same time, it is difficult to believe that all cases need transitional administration by the UN. In addition, multi-dimensional missions are relatively costly. Recently, the average budget of 16 ongoing peace-keeping operations is US\$441,109,475(gross). In contrast, the budgets for ONUCA and MINURSO were US\$ 92,400,000 (gross) and US\$47,702,500 (gross) respectively, about 10% and 20% of average spending for recent operations.¹⁸³ If the UN needs to modify the form of peace-keeping operations, it could use the model of successful cases of observer missions as the hins.

The Implications for International Relations Theory

As acknowledged in the introduction, intrastate wars are difficult to settle because of their unique characteristics compared to interstate wars. The hostility and distrust intensified through the civil war make it difficult for warring parties to negotiate with one another because they are afraid of betrayal by the others. As Walter significantly observed "civil wars almost always failed to reach successful negotiation solutions to their conflicts unless an outside power guaranteed the safety of the belligerents during the ensuring transition period," the significance of peace-keeping operations in settlement of

¹⁸³ The United Nations, "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Background Note: 31 December 2008," 2008 http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/bnote010101.pdf, (accessed on Feb 4, 2009).

civil wars should be clearly noted.¹⁸⁴ During the unstable post-conflict period, when even the administrative power of the state is not strong enough, intervention by the UN is useful to promote the peace process. The two observed cases of ONUCA and MINURSO suggest that UN involvement was necessary to some degree to ensure or begin the process to settle disputes peacefully. At the same time, the case studies clearly show the significance of the impact of neighboring countries and superpowers in terms of success or failure of peace-keeping operations. In this section, I examine which theory of realism or liberalism explains the behaviors of warring states, foreign powers involved in the conflicts and the impact of international organizations in each case.

Institutional liberalism clearly explains the mechanism of success of ONUCA which gained the cooperation of parties involved in the disputes. The liberalists believe that international cooperation is possible when states share common interests, and the international institution can promote such behavior by facilitating negotiation opportunities and increasing the transparency of states' intentions and information. Moreover, the institution can deter warring parties from aggressive actions. In the case of the mission in Nicaragua, the involved parties behaved as liberalists claim.

First, one of their claims is that the international institution can promote peace because it provides a negotiation table for warring parties, increases transparency of the intentions of parties and can reduce the misperceptions towards other parties. In the case of ONUCA, UN intervention created an environment where both warring parties could commit to demobilization and an arms-control program. The UN observed whether

¹⁸⁴ Barbara F. Walter, "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement," *International Organization*, 51: 3 (Summer, 1997), 360.

warring parties followed the order and consent they gave to the institution. The strictly planned missions showed the expected actions from both sides with schedules and the closely monitoring UN mission promotes certainty of the commitment of warring parties to the peace process because it left no room for negotiation to reduce the speed of demobilization. If there is no observer mission, the demobilization process of each party is less transparent and causes unnecessary suspicion, and the demobilization process can eventually fail because each party would be afraid of defections by the other side.

Second, the UN intervention in the ONUCA case was useful to deter the warring parties and prevent them from going back to the civil war state. While only 260 military personnel were involved in this observation mission, they had a total of eight manned points and patrolled every day. These enthusiasms of the UN peace-keeping troops showed that there was an international eye on the actions of the parties. It was a deterrent power since none of the warring parties had resources to fight back the collective international will. In other words, it was meaningless for the government of Nicaragua or the Contras to work against the missions of the UN because they were aware there would be severe punishment from the international community if they did not follow the directions of the peace-keeping mission.

Third, another claim of the liberalists, that the shared interests among states can encourage them to be involved in the peaceful actions, seemed to be true in the peacekeeping operations in Nicaragua. Nicaragua's neighboring countries shared a common interest to promote peace to stabilizes their region and reduce the influence of the US. Therefore, they cooperated with each other without the initiative of the international institution. It is an interesting phenomenon of ONUCA: Cooperation among neighboring countries and peace initiatives, such as A Group of Eight, occurred before the implementation of the UN peace-keeping operations. The regional initiatives which are adopting internationally accepted norms, democratic solutions for ending civil war, encouraged the involvement of the UN peace-keeping operations in Nicaragua, which later led to the modified peace-keeping operations, the first joint operations of OAS and the UN in regard to peace settlement.¹⁸⁵ The social interaction of regional member states and their needs for a new format for the peace-keeping operations reframed and reconstructed the manner of the peace-keeping operations provided by the international institutions that they belong to. These interactions between neighboring countries of Nicaragua and the international community could be an example of social construction rather than liberal institutionalism.

On the other hand, the failed peace-keeping operation, of MINURSO is a counter example of liberalism. This example shows that cooperation among states does not occur simply because of the existence of the international institutions. If the liberal institutionalists are always correct in terms of the impact of the international institutions on member states, a more productive peace process between Morocco and Western Sahara than really exists now could have been expected. In reality, however, a cooperative attitude among warring parties toward peace negotiations has not progressed for over 15 years and the neighboring countries and superpowers have influenced

¹⁸⁵ Mark Peceny and William Stanley, "Liberal Social Reconstruction and the Resolution of Civil Wars in Central America," *International Organization* 55:1, (Winter, 2001), 155.

Moroccan government and POLISARIO in a way that delayed the negotiation process rather than encouraging it.

It is true that the UN created some kind of negotiation channel between the Moroccan government and POLISARIO, which is one example of the function of international institutions to encourage peaceful behavior. Yet, the UN failed to forward the negotiations between the warring parties and create an environment for cooperative behavior from all actors in this dispute. The functions of the institution, such as creating a more transparent environment to check the defections of one or another party, encouraging communications between warring parties and a deterrence which should encourage disputants to cooperate with the will of the international institution, did not work. This is because the warring parties did not fully trust the UN as a mediator which would bring them a benefit from the peace process, and they had no reason to compromise since both sides were constantly fueled financially and diplomatically.

In the case of MINURSO, realism explains their behavior better than liberalism. First, realism assumes cooperation among states is difficult because each state fears defection from the other and avoids a situation in which it has to pay-off from a cooperative attitude in case the other party betrays the agreement. It explains the behavior of the Moroccan government and POLISARIO. For Morocco, any possibility of increasing the voters for POLISARIO meant a loss of strategic power over Western Saharan territory in the future. Therefore, Morocco delayed the process of voter registration for a self-determination referendum. In addition, Morocco has never negotiated with POLISARIO directly since it would give diplomatic advantage and be an excuse for POLISARIO to be recognized as an independent country. As a result, the relative advantage that Morocco has as a sovereign state would be undermined. For POLISARIO, they did not want to accept anything less than a self-determination referendum in a fair and free environment. They would not accept any UN compromise suggestion, such as giving some degree of autonomy to Western Sahara to improve peace in the region. This is because POLISARIO believed any compromise would give Morocco a chance to govern their territory as a sovereign state and the international environment was too dangerous to risk any possibility of losing. Both parties preferred to maintain the status quo rather than risk losing anything they already had by changing the balance between them.

In addition, the neighboring countries and great powers did not have common goals to achieve which could encourage a cooperative attitude among them. Each state acted to benefit itself. For example, the US had a strategic interest of retaining its influence in the Mediterranean region and it perceived Morocco as more cooperative state to the US than other countries in the Northern African region because of their domestic political settings. Therefore, the US supported Morocco for maintaining an appropriate diplomatic relationship. Then, France and Spain could not accept the expansion of US influence in their backyard where they had strong connections through a shared colonial history. Strategically and geographically the Northern African region was important for them. Therefore, these two countries involved themselves in the case of Morocco to compete against the US. At the same time, there was no agenda for Western society to do anything to discourage democratic methods anywhere in the world. To avoid any criticism from the international community, these three countries did not choose one-sided support for Morocco, but supported the self-determination referendum for Western Sahara. The actions of these countries towards Western Sahara and Morocco were motivated by their strategic interests. If they did not have anything to gain from peaceful settlement of the conflict, they had no need to cooperate.

More importantly, the UN did not have power to deter these great powers. The great powers, especially the US, were strong and therefore did not need to fear the international community would punish them if they were not completely cooperative with the UN's will. This is the weakest part of the international cooperation by an institution. If the international institution does have deterrent power over any member state, then it does not have any tool to pull desired actions from member states.

Comparison of these two cases of peace-keeping operations reveals a couple of lessons in terms of international institutions. The institution can have a positive impact for promoting the peace process by creating a favorable environment for peace. It is useful in settling civil wars. At the same time, it is almost powerless when warring parties and other actors in the conflict are not willing to cooperate.

Conclusion

Starting in the late 1980s, the international community has realized increasing demands to react to civil wars in the new international framework of the post-Cold War era. While civil wars obviously existed before the late 1980s, the ending of the Cold War

shifted the security concerns of the international community from the balancing of the USSR and US super powers to humanitarian intervention. Also, the brutality resulting from the civil wars, the international impact of domestic wars and the difficulty of self-recovery after civil war raised caution in the international community. Therefore, the demands for intervention in civil war cases were intensified despite the difficulty of the settlement of the civil wars.

While the UN peace-keeping operations are an established function to settle interstate wars, the UN started to respond to such international demands. It explained the booming number of peace-keeping operations in the 1990s. The end of the Cold War also made cooperation between veto powers much easier in the UN Security Council where any peace-keeping operations would be established. At the same time, the format of peace-keeping operations was transformed in this period. In addition to traditional peace-keeping operations including observer missions, the UN has practiced peace-enforcement missions and multi -dimensional peace-keeping operations. New functions, such as monitoring elections, demobilization of former combatants and temporary administrating of post – conflict states, are added in a repertoire – of peace-keeping operations. The new ways of operations, such as joint missions with regional organizations, started in this period, too.

ONUCA and MINURSO were peace-keeping operations established in such context of international relations. The UN was still suspicious of the new ways of peacekeeping operations, as shown in the case of ONUCA. These two cases described the positive functions of the UN in settling civil wars in the new era, but they unfortunately reveal the weaknesses and limitation of the UN in practicing peace-keeping. Cooperation by the warring parties and member states of the UN can be promoted as liberal intuitionalism assumes as the ONUCA case shows. In this sense, this case shows hope for the future of the UN peace-keeping operations. At the same time, however, such cooperation is not always possible as the MINURSO case shows. For the success of its peace-keeping operations, the UN needs to gain the right moment and the right conditions which will maximize the cooperation of warring parties and other parties interested in being involved in the disputes. In addition the UN needs to have basic conditions such as gaining the consent of warring parties for UN intervention and having the resources to support peace-keeping operations.

The format of UN peace-keeping operations keeps changing. These days, the main stream of peace-keeping is in multi-dimensional missions. Such missions have been successful at peace-keeping, and also in maintaining a liberal democracy after the departure of the peace-keeping missions. Observing the importance of post-conflict maintenance these days, the interest of the UN Security Council has been shifting. It started focusing more on the peace-building process as a transition from the post-conflict stage to a long-lasting stable society to maximize the effect of peace-keeping operations. While the wholistic approach of multi-dimensional peace-keeping is effective to gain peace and maintain it, the enlarged mandates of the missions require more personnel and a larger budget, which are the headaches for the UN. In addition, scholars of the international relations question if the UN peace-keeping function as a transitional administrator encourages too much dependency of host states and if it

defuses the notion of sovereignty too much, becoming a tool for strong countries to manipulate the politics of smaller countries.

Discussion of the UN cannot be stopped here because there are still many more problems that must be faced in the modern era despite its constant improvement. In this paper, I focused on the impact of the peace-keeping operations to settle civil wars and the discussion does not go beyond that due to limitations of time and space. For future research, there are more areas to be explored in terms of this topic. For example, the issue of sovereignty and the UN peace-keeping for civil wars under the name of humanitarian interventions should be examined more. If the UN functions as a completely impartial negotiator or as a tool of great powers so they can manipulate hosting countries is always questionable. In addition, it is also important to exam conditions of a state after the departure of peace-keeping operations. For example, ONUCA was a successful mission to achieve peaceful settlement of a civil war, but it suffered from assassination of political officials and an unstable economic and political situation after the departure of the PKO. Exploration of later impacts of peace-keeping operations would have given more comprehensive understanding of the UN peace-keeping operations and its impacts.

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
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Appendix A: Uniformed Personnel in UN Peacekeeping: 1991 – Present

Source: United Nations Peacekeeping, Overview, "Peacekeeping Chart: 1991-present," http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/chart.pdf (accessed on Feb 4, 2009).