ABSTRACT

THE ITINERARY OF JAN HUYGEN VAN LINSCHOTEN: KNOWLEDGE, COMMERCE, AND THE CREATION OF THE DUTCH AND ENGLISH TRADE EMPIRES

by William Blanke Elgin

This thesis is a study of the main work by the Dutch navigator Jan Huygen van Linschoten, titled Itinerario: His Discourse of Voyages into the East & West Indies (1596). Drawing on van Linschoten's travels to South Asia in the late sixteenth century, the work offered a wealth of information on shipping routes, forms of merchandise, and other commercial opportunities. The *Itinerario* would prove critically important in informing and inspiring merchants in both the early Dutch Republic and England to launch their first expeditions into Southeast Asia. Van Linschoten largely based the *Itinerario* upon information he had gathered during his years abroad as a secretary to the Portuguese Archbishop of Goa, Vicente de Fonseca. He then collaborated with a network of like-minded Dutchmen as he drafted the *Itinerario*. A similar network in England was instrumental in the publication of the English translation, appearing in 1598. These networks included founding members of each country's East India Companies, tying the book to the early process of empire-building. These endeavors not only tapped into mercantilist and proto-nationalist ideals within these countries, but also evidence transnational collaboration in knowledge production in the interest of developing global commercial ventures.

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Dedication

To my family.

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Introduction

During the seventeenth century, the Dutch Republic and the English monarchy turned their gaze to Southeast Asia, establishing trading ties there and laying the foundations for their rise as global merchant powers. These early-modern maritime explorations and commercial ventures of the Dutch and English into the East Indies, as they were known in Europe at the time, have been well documented and explored. What is less well known is that both of these endeavors were indebted to a little-known Dutchman named Jan Huygen van Linschoten. During the late sixteenth century, the Southern European economic and political hegemony began to fade, and was quickly eclipsed by the rising stars of the Kingdom of England and the early Dutch Republic. While this is a well-understood historical process, van Linschoten's own journey from Portuguese accountant to Dutch economic influencer serves to highlight this transitional process further. Van Linschoten drew upon his own travels and research to produce a number of nautical texts during his lifetime that proved quite popular both within the Dutch Republic and its European neighbors. Foremost amongst these texts was the *Itinerario: Voyage ofte schipvaert van Jan Huyghen van Linschoten naer Oost ofte Portugaels Indien, 1579-1592* [*"Itinerario: Jan van Linschoten's Voyage or Naval Expedition to the East, or Portuguese India"*], which was instrumental in both inspiring European mercantile expeditions and providing them with the information necessary for success.

Despite the *Itinerario's* success and van Linschoten's fame during his lifetime, few historians have attempted to demonstrate the correlation between the *Itinerario's* publication and the development of early mercantile expeditions. To this point, the majority of the scholarship regarding van Linschoten has focused on the ethnographic analysis of his depictions of the disparate peoples that he encountered on his journey from Lisbon to Goa, where he was employed by the Portuguese Archbishop, Vincente de Fonseca. Authors such as Ivo Kamps and Jyotsna Singh have used van Linschoten's work to examine how, in his view, the ideal colonizer ought to behave, and thus reimagine how the Portuguese colonial system maintained a system of increasing hybridity and fluidity

between the colonizer and colonized.[1] Additionally, recent works by Joan-Pau Rubiés, Alexander Henn, Julia Schleck, and Guido van Meersbergen have explored the legacies of sixteenth century Indian-European hybridity and cultural interchange.[2] Other authors, such as Rene J. Barendse, have instead studied the intersection of the European, Islamic, and East Asia worlds that occurred during the seventeenth century and the ways in which the first steps towards globalization of trade and cultural exchange were undertaken.[3] More recent works by Charles H. Parker, Sanjay Subramanyam, Philip J Stern, Pim de Zwart, and J. L. van Zanden have sought to examine these early instances of globalization that characterized the early-modern period as a time of great commercial and cultural interaction.[4] While these studies are of fundamental importance for our historical understanding of cultural interaction during what used to be called the Age of Discovery, I believe the *Itinerario* can be of further use to historians by analyzing it as a work of economic incentivization.

The study of the *Itinerario* and its publication both in England and the Netherlands can tell us much about how knowledge of the East played a critical role in the North Sea countries overcoming Iberian hegemony of Eastern trade. The book informed and incentivized mercantile and political elites (of whom many occupied positions in both spheres) to forego intermediaries and seek to seize the riches of the East for themselves. As we shall see, it was published intentionally during a time of great

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[1] For an example of these studies, see Ivo Kamps, Jyotsna Singh, *Travel Knowledge: European "Discoveries" in the Early Modern Period*, (Palgrave MacMillan, 2001). See also:
Ernst van den Boogaart, *Civil and Corrupt Asia: Image and Text in the Itinerario and the Icones of Jan Huyghen van Linschoten* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).

[2] Joan-Pau Rubiés, *Travellers and Cosmographers: Studies in the History of Early Modern Travel and Ethnology* (Ashgate, 2007); Alexander Henn, Hindu-Catholic Encounters in Goa: Religion, Colonialism, and Modernity (Indiana University Press, 2014); Julia Schleck, "The Marital Problems of the East India Company," *Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies,* 17, no. 3 (2017): 83-104; Guido van Meersbergen, "Writing East India Company History after the Cultural Turn: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Seventeenth-Century East India Company and Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie," *Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies* 17, no. 3 (2017): 10-36.

[3] Rene J. Barendse, *The Arabian Seas: The Indian Ocean World of the Seventeenth Century* (New York: Routledge, 2001).

[4] Charles H. Parker, *Global Interactions in the Early Modern Age, 1400-1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Philip J. Stern, "Seeing (and Not Seeing) like a Company-State: Hybridity, Heterotopia, Historiography," *Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies*, 17, no. 3 (2017): 105-20; Sanjay Subramanyam, *Europe's India: Words, People, Empires, 1500–1800* (Harvard University Press, 2017); Pim de Zwart and J. L. van Zanden, *The Origins of Globalization: World Trade in the Making of the Global Economy, 1500-1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

political and economic upheaval when the Dutch Republic was in its formative stages and the Kingdom of England was unmooring from its traditional political ties with Spain. In this case, the Spanish conflict with both of these states (and thus by extension the Portuguese conflict as well) would prove instrumental in motivating these states to find ways of undermining their powerful enemy. These complex and fluctuating diplomatic circumstances can do much to tell us not only about the role knowledge played in the forging of these empires, but also the ways in which different parties within each state sought to use it. For some, the *Itinerario* was a diplomatic tool with which to reward their allies; for others, it was an advantage to be jealously guarded, and for others it was an opportunity for great enrichment. These allied yet competing interests, both within the Dutch Republic and England, had to work with one another to pursue their ultimate aims, but also had to deal with frictions between each other. These frictions are emblematic of the conflicts that occurred within and without empires throughout history, and it is in discussion of them that I believe my work can engage with other contemporary historiography on similar topics.

As mentioned earlier, the recent historiography on van Linschoten has largely focused on an ethnographic analysis of the *Itinerario*. Over the course of this thesis, however, I will demonstrate how the *Itinerario* has much to contribute to a recent trend in historical scholarship concerning empires. While this development has proceeded primarily with the examination of empires in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, I believe that this 'transnational turn,' as suggested by Kamissek and Kreienbaum, could be a useful lens with which to view the development of early modern empires as well.[5] Kamissek and Kreienbaum suggest that recent works of authors such as Sebastian Conrad and T. Ballantyne have explored empires "in conjunction with one another" in order to analyze their encounters.[6] The hope of such studies is to move beyond the national histories of the past and to embrace the wider scope of recent imperial histories that offer a more holistic view. Kamissek and Kreienbaum take this one step further, as they propose that a historiographical gap exists in the study of what some historians have

[5] Christoph Kamissek and Jonas Kreienbaum, "An Imperial Cloud? Conceptualising Interimperial Connections and Transimperial Knowledge," *Journal of Modern European History / Zeitschrift Für Moderne Europäische Geschichte / Revue D'histoire Européenne Contemporaine* 14, no. 2 (2016): 165.
[6] *Ibid.*, 165.

referred to as "a common reservoir of knowledge" that emerged between empires as they developed the means with which they ruled vast swathes of territory and many disparate peoples.[7] This reservoir has been referred to as a 'settler archive' by Lorenzo Veracini and as a 'colonial archive' by Robert Gerwarth and Stephan Malinowski.[8]

My interest in these recent developments is specifically what they can say about the way in which historians have begun to conceptualize how multiple empires could work in conjunction to develop knowledge about empire-building. This work, while in conjunction, did not necessarily need to be collaborative; in the case of van Linschoten it took a form of espionage as he accumulated and later divulged Portuguese state secrets. Nonetheless, Portuguese knowledge became Dutch knowledge via the *Itinerario*, and via the same medium it became English knowledge (possibly to the chagrin of some Dutch merchants, who similarly to the Portuguese saw the *Itinerario* as too valuable to share with potential rivals). This process is essential to understanding the development of these reservoirs of imperial knowledge. A thorough study and understanding of their early modern roots could contribute much to a fuller picture of these 'Imperial Clouds,' as Kamissek and Kreienbaum call them. While the works of these authors are rooted particularly in an analysis of the 'empire building' of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, their discussions of patterns of knowledge exchange between different polities are a relevant framework with which to view this project as well, which is rooted in the period of early modern commercial expansion and globalisation.

Additionally, an observation must be made about the *Itinerario*'s close relationship with early modern cartography. Just as the text within the work contributed to sixteenth-century Europe's understanding of Southeast Asia, its maps helped their minds to picture its layout, even if they lacked the accuracy of modern depictions. At least one of the individuals in van Linschoten's Enkhuizen network was a well-known cartographer, and contributed a map to an early copy, as discussed in the second chapter. Other scholars have mentioned the connections between the *Itinerario* and early modern

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[7] *Ibid.*, 166.

[8] Lorenzo Veracini, "Colonialism and Genocides: Notes for the Analyses of a Settler Archive", in: A.D. Moses (ed.), *Empire Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in Global History*, (New York: 2008), 148-161. Robert Gerwarth and Stephan Malinowski, "Hannah Arendt's Ghost: Reflections on the Disputable Path from Windhoek to Auschwitz", *Central European History*, Vol. 42, (2009): 279-300.

cartography; works by both Thomas Suarez and Arun Saldanha helped to contribute to this thesis' understanding of the relationship.

Van Linschoten's travels abroad proved both formative and enlightening for the man himself. The first chapter of this thesis will focus on the travels themselves, from the time he spent as a child in his hometown of Enkhuizen, to his departure to Spain, to his subsequent travel to Lisbon and from thence to Goa. During his time abroad, van Linschoten likely took painstaking notes in order to assemble a great deal of knowledge about the empires of the Iberian powers. The vast majority of this knowledge pertained to the Portuguese Empire and its possessions on the coasts of Africa and the Far East. Van Linschoten likely amassed this knowledge both on his voyages and during his time in Goa in the employ of the Portuguese Archbishop. While abroad, he formed negative opinions of both the Portuguese and the Spanish, opinions that when taken in conjunction with his early childhood experiences during the Dutch Revolt, can be understood to be fundamental reasons for him to betray his Iberian employers and seek to disseminate their closely guarded secrets amongst their enemies.

The Dutch held the work of van Linschoten in high esteem, and upon his return to the Netherlands a group of individuals (mostly natives of van Linschoten's hometown of Enkhuizen) gathered together to advise him as he wrote the *Itinerario* based upon his notes that he brought back from his travels abroad from 1579 to 1592. The second chapter of this thesis will seek to outline the development of the *Itinerario* before its publication, as well as to demonstrate the close ties between those who sought its publication and those who had lobbied for the Dutch Republic to engage in trade with the East directly. Linking the *Itinerario* with the mercantile development of the Republic is a key intervention of this thesis; I believe this text played a formative role in the establishment of North European trade colonies in the East. Most importantly, I believe the *Itinerario*, and those that sought to have it published, went on to play important roles within the formation of the Dutch East India Company, which would go on to become the dominant force in Eastern trade for the better part of a century. The publication of the *Reysgeschrift* or *Pilot's Guide* in 1595[9] and the full *Itinerario* in 1596 took much of

[9] The *Reysgeschrift* was van Linschoten's reconstruction of Portuguese travel data and recommendations, and was published a year early so as to be available for initial Dutch expeditions to the East.

Europe by storm, with several translations, including an English, German, and Latin translation all being published before the year 1600.

The third chapter of this thesis will focus on a similar process of intellectual and economic development that occurred across the English Channel in England. As with the Netherlands, several men in England saw the *Itinerario* as an irreplaceable source of important knowledge, and also as a powerful incentive to do away with Iberian middle-men and trade directly with the East itself, a source of great wealth in the minds of the mercantile elite. Evidence of the interest Europeans had regarding van Linschoten's publications (of which there were several, including the *Reysgeschrift*, the first section of the *Itinerario*, published early) is not difficult to come by. The first English edition to be published includes an *Epistle Dedicatorie*, or letter of dedication, penned by John Wolfe, the London publisher responsible for the first English edition of van Linschoten's *Itinerario*. English interest in the *Itinerario* existed within relatively high levels of the Elizabethan government, and as we shall see in the third chapter, the actions of Richard Hakluyt were instrumental in cementing the *Itinerario* as a foundational source of information for the English East India Company itself.

Chapter One

From Outsider to Informant: The Origins of the *Itinerario*

In order to understand the *Itinerario* as a text, it is necessary to understand its primary author. Over the course of this first chapter I will examine Jan Huygen van Linschoten's life before and during his travels to the East; this period would prove to be fundamentally influential on the man himself and his later work. Before we begin, there are several critical points to note. Van Linschoten's life and work are inherently inseparable, but it is important to note that the available evidence does not suggest that he intended to write any sort of book when he first departed from Enkhuizen in the Netherlands in 1579. The experiences he had whilst abroad would give him the necessary material to do so, but it seems that the decision to compile the information he collected into a book was not reached until his return more than a decade later, in 1592. Secondly, as an author, I have relied on the *Itinerario* as my primary source for reconstructing van Linschoten's life abroad. The events described in the text may have been recorded well after they occurred, and conclusions that van Linschoten reaches in his work are unlikely to reflect his exact sentiments when he experienced the events firsthand. This chapter pursues a retrospective analysis, as opposed to building an argument of linear inevitability. I will explain and analyze the formative life experiences that prepared Jan Huygen van Linschoten to later write a text that would prove singularly influential in inspiring North-European colonial efforts.

While he traveled, van Linschoten assembled a repository of knowledge about basic commercial information (such as rates of exchange and different kinds of merchandise) as well as Portuguese customs, practices, administration, and navigation knowledge that was published in Amsterdam in 1596 as the *Itinerario*. Equally important were the personal experiences van Linschoten had with the Portuguese and Spanish, as they provided him with an ideological incentive to collect the knowledge that would later take countries on both sides of the channel by storm. In effect, van Linschoten ended up working as an agent of Dutch imperialism, even if he may not have originally intended to play such a role.

1. Background

Any study of the *Itinerario* as a product of intelligence gathering would be incomplete without an in-depth understanding of Jan Huygen van Linschoten's background, as it provided the basis for both his personal beliefs and loyalties as well as a wealth of experiential knowledge. Born as the son of Catholic[10] parents in Haarlem, the family moved to Enkhuizen when van Linschoten was young, and his father became a well-known local businessman who owned the Golden Falcon, a local inn.[11] Enkhuizen had historically been a fishing port, but the war had caused a downturn in its fortunes. That changed soon after, however, when Dierik Sonoy, the Sea Beggar leader, established his base in Enkhuizen, converting the city into a major rebel base in the northern Netherlands.[12] In this atmosphere of excitement and upheaval, Jan would have been a young boy approaching his teenage years. One can imagine him listening in awe to the stories that veteran sailors told at his father's inn during these years that may have inspired his own predilections towards travel and exploration. Also important to note is his hometown's significance in the early stages of the Dutch Revolt. Its early seizure in the summer of 1572 made it one of the early epicenters of resistance to Philip II, and it is easy to imagine the effects fears of Spanish sieges and retaliation would have had on the mind of the young van Linschoten.

Despite this rich background of political turmoil, van Linschoten makes very little mention of his city or his background in the *Itinerario* when he first remarks upon his departure. His reason for leaving, in his own words, was that he, "being young, and living [idle] in my Native Countrie… found my minde so addicted to see and travaile into strange Countries, thereby to seek some adventure, that in the ende to satisfie my selfe I determined to leave my Native Countrie (and my friendes), although it greeved me, yet the hope I had to accomplish my desire, together with the resolution, taken in the end overcame my affection."[13] Whilst finding the prospect of leaving his family difficult, he nevertheless decided in favor of seeing the world in order to satisfy his wanderlust. This decision was probably made easier with the knowledge

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[10] Jan Huygen van Linschoten. *John Huighen Van Linschoten: His Discours of Voyages into Ye Easte & West Indies: Divided into Foure Bookes* (Printed at London: By John Wolfe printer to ye Honorable Cittie of London, 1598), 195-196. These pages provide van Linschoten's most in-depth discussion of the various religious denominations active in Europe. While van Linschoten was raised Catholic, he remains silent on his religious upbringing within the *Itinerario* (likely a pragmatic decision to maximize the book's marketability). During his later employment, it seems that he would have remained at least nominally Catholic, in order to avoid the suspicion of the Inquisition.
[11] Charles McKew Parr, *Jan van Linschoten: the Dutch Marco Polo* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1964), 14.
[12] Jonathan Irvine Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall: 1477-1806* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), 173.
[13] Van Linschoten, *His Discours of Voyages into Ye Easte & West Indies*, 1.

that his two older half-brothers had already traveled to Spain and begun making connections. Van Linschoten briefly mentions departing from his parents, "who as then dwelt in Enckhuysen" and afterwards embarking on a commercial fleet that was departing the port of Texel for San Lucar de Barrameda in Spain.[14] Jan left his hometown in 1579, departing from Texel the same year on 6 December.

At this point, it is important to note the circumstances as to why van Linschoten wished to depart from his homeland. The *Itinerario* does not specifically address this question; its author only makes vague statements regarding his desire to see the world and explore. It is possible that van Linschoten feared remaining ignorant of the true nature of the world, and all of its moving parts. He justified his desires to travel as his attempts to spend his time wisely by acquiring knowledge. While his childhood likely provided him with the thirst for adventure, his familial connections would provide him with an opportunity to sate them. His half-brothers had already made inroads into the Spanish Imperial system, and its connections across the globe promised to provide a cure for the young van Linschoten's ignorance. With such an opportunity awaiting him, it is unsurprising that Jan looked to book passage aboard a merchant vessel headed for Spain.

While van Linschoten does not address his specific reasoning for traveling in the midst of a fleet (which in his own recall numbered at least eighty ships),[15] we can hazard a guess that he was aware of, and sought to avoid, confrontation with the Spanish-sponsored pirate fleets operating out of Dunkirk.[16] Many Dutch captains in this period refused to sail within the English channel without armed escort ships due to the threat of such rampant piracy. These men caused a great deal of consternation in the provinces of both Holland and Zeeland.[17]

Hailing from a pirate haven himself, van Linschoten would have been well aware of the dangers the so-called Dunkirkers could pose to his first overseas journey, and may have booked his passage accordingly. If we suppose that from such an early age van Linschoten was intimately acquainted with both the dangers but also the highly profitable nature of piracy, he surely also understood the inherent value of the nautical data he later collected. As a resident of the Zuiderzee and located not far from the treacherous North Sea, van Linschoten would have

[14] *Ibid.,* 1.
[15] Van Linschoten, *His Discours of Voyages into Ye Easte & West Indies*, 1.
[16] Parr, *Dutch Marco Polo*, 17.
[17] Israel, *The Dutch Republic,* 257.

been well aware of the irreplaceable value of insider knowledge regarding the safest shipping routes. While he may not have originally left Enkhuizen to write a book that would break the Portuguese monopoly in East Asia, van Linschoten was eminently well-equipped to do so from the beginning.

Departing his homeland for a career in the Spanish imperial system would have provided opportunities for advancement, but it also thrust van Linschoten into an alien system in which he was very much an outsider. Luckily for the young traveler, he could call upon familial ties to help him find his footing. Arriving in San Lucar de Barrameda on 25 December, he quickly left after only staying "two or three dayes" for Seville, "where [he] found one of his brethren"[18] on 1 January. Van Linschoten himself gives very little context here as to who these 'brethren' are, but from clues we can confirm that they (there were two of them) were his half-brothers.[19] One dwelt in Seville for business, and van Linschoten states that the other "was newly ridden to the court, lying as then in Madrid."[20] Apparently he wished to travel onward, presumably to join his brother at the court, but was unable to do so "for want of the Spanish tongue."[21] Staying in Seville, he resolved to gain a greater mastery of the language so as to be able to more effectively travel and do business. Whilst staying with family allowed him to ease himself into this new world, the language barrier nonetheless proved itself the first obstacle to van Linschoten's success, and served to underline his own 'otherness.'

In 1580, the Cardinal King of Portugal, Henry, died on January 31st. Van Linschoten remarks on this, especially as the King had named Philip II of Spain as his heir. This was intolerable to some of the Portuguese nobility, who were quick to proclaim Antonio, the Prior of Crato, King instead. The illegitimacy of Antonio and the military superiority of Philip II allowed Philip to seize Lisbon and make good his claim. The Duke of Alva, one of Philip's most trusted commanders, led the Spanish troops who secured the country; a fact that would not have been lost on the young van Linschoten, who would have been immersed in tales of the man's supposed cruelties during his tenure as Philip II's commander in the Netherlands. The town van Linschoten's family originally lived in, Haarlem, was put to siege in December of 1572,[22] when van Linschoten himself was a child. Alva's conquest of the town must have struck quite close to

[18] Van Linschoten, *His Discours of Voyages into Ye Easte & West Indies*, 1.
[19] Parr, *Dutch Marco Polo*, 15-16.
[20] Van Linschoten, *His Discours of Voyages into Ye Easte & West Indies*, 2.
[21] *Ibid.,* 2.
[22] Israel, *The Dutch Republic,* 178.

home, both literally and figuratively. The conquest of Portugal was important for other reasons as well. Spanish control of Portugal and its trade was beneficial to Philip II's coffers, but it also exposed Portuguese colonies and shipping to attacks from his enemies, who prosecuted the war at land and on sea.[23]

As Philip seized control of Portugal, van Linschoten decided he had learned enough of the Spanish language to attempt to travel to Portugal. To do so, he writes that on "The fift day of August in the same yeare, hauing some vnderstanding in the Spanish tongue, I placed my selfe with a Dutch gentleman, who determined to trauaile into *Portingal,* to sée the countrie, and with him stayed to take a more conuenient time for my pretended voyage."[24] Traveling to Badajoz, they rendez-voused with Jan's brother who was traveling with the King's court.[25] This brother and his royal connections would later prove instrumental in securing van Linschoten the job that would get him permission to travel to Goa. In the aftermath of the conquest, Vincente de Fonseca, whom van Linschoten introduces as the former "chaplen unto Sebastian, King of Portingale"[26] had recently been appointed as the Archbishop of Goa.

Van Linschoten's brother had recently arranged to be granted the job of "purser in one of the ships that the same yere should sail unto the East Indies"[27] by leveraging his own good relations with his employer, "beeing one of his Majesties secretaries"[28]. When van Linschoten realized the ship his brother was to travel aboard would also be part of the fleet that would convey the new Archbishop to Goa, he quickly decided to appeal to his brother for a place aboard the ship. Given that his brother's "Master was a great friend and acquaintance of the Archbishops"[29], Jan was able to secure employment as a clerk to the newly minted Archbishop. He had finally accomplished his most sought after dream. He would get to travel 'into strange countries, thereby to seek adventure.' More importantly for someone so interested in the acquisition of knowledge, his appointment would allow him to travel into one of the Iberian kingdoms's most heavily guarded secrets: their maritime trade networks in the East Indies.

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[23] *Ibid.*, 318.
[24] Van Linschoten, *His Discours of Voyages into Ye Easte & West Indies*, 2.
[25] *Ibid.,* 2. Van Linschoten provides no other details about this gentleman; we can infer that he was not family as he would likely have recorded if he was.
[26] *Ibid.,* 3.
[27] *Ibid.,* 4.
[28] *Ibid.,* 3.
[29] *Ibid.,* 4.

2. Intelligence Gathering

The Portuguese far eastern trade networks had been of great interest to many in Europe for decades prior to van Linschoten's departure. In the Netherlands, the well developed shipping industry was integral to the economy, with many ships quite experienced frequenting the trade routes in the Baltic, the North Sea, and the coastal Atlantic.[30] These mercantile connections had allowed for the port of Amsterdam to become one of northern Europe's leading centers of distribution for pepper, spices, and sugar in northern Europe, rivaling Hamburg, after 1585 (specifically after Philip II lifted his embargo against the Dutch in 1590).[31] These mercantile connections and conditions had been of interest to the Dutch for quite some time, but the problem of how to cut out the middle-man remained.

The navigational secrets of just how exactly to get to the East remained hidden away, guarded fiercely by the Portuguese themselves, who were unwilling to see their domination of these trade routes slip through their fingers. Having grown up in a community with a proud seafaring tradition, van Linschoten would have presumably been well aware of the Portuguese trade with the East and just how fiercely it was guarded. As he took a ship to the East, he likely kept a journal, as he makes many mentions of the places that they stopped, their 'equinoctial' locations, and the dates that they reached them. Even early in his travels, he makes note of very specific bits of information that would be of great interest to those seeking to recreate, or usurp, the Portuguese networks in the East, collecting the intelligence that would later result in the Itinerario. One such passage that demonstrates this well is his recollection of the facilities in the Portuguese outpost of Mozambique. Van Linschoten pointedly notes that: "The Portingales have therein a verie faire and strong castle which about now 10 or 12 yeares past was fullie finished… [it] is one of the best and strongest built of all the castle throughout the whole Indies, yet have they but small store of ordinance or munition, as also not any soldiers more then the Captaine and his men that dwel therin."[32]

The explicit information regarding the state of the fortifications and the availability of munitions would have been of great use to any who planned to storm the town. This notation is by no means an isolated incident either. He also devotes time to describing fortifications at

[30] Israel, *The Dutch Republic,* 117.
[31] *Ibid.*, 318.
[32] Van Linschoten, *His Discours of Voyages into Ye Easte & West Indies*, 9.

Hormuz and Diu, to name a few additional other instances.[33] The attention to detail regarding the strengths and weaknesses of these fortifications can tell us much about van Linschoten's mindset during this period. The Dutch Revolt was a war heavily characterised by siege warfare. Growing up, in a center of revolt, Jan would have likely been aware of the constant preparations undertaken to outfit towns to survive being besieged by Spanish fortresses. The fear of Spanish attack throughout his childhood would also have done little to ingratiate the young man to them.

Van Linschoten analysis of Mozambique goes beyond simply outlining the military capabilities of the fortress, however. He also specifically notes the effect that seasonal weather patterns have on the facilitation of trade, as he states: "They sayle from thence into India but once every year, in the month of August til half September, because that throughout the whole countries of India they must sayle with Monssoyns, that is with the tides of the year, which they name by the windes, which blow certaine monthes in the yeare."[34] Such knowledge would be essential to anyone looking to succeed in a seaborne expedition to the East, and would go beyond the basic information that a map would provide. The sheer amount of information meticulously recorded within the *Itinerario* speaks to van Linschoten's keen eye for recording information that would be of use to future sailors and navigators; he also makes note of hazardous areas to be avoided, such as when he describes the "Flats of the Iewes" off of the Isle of St. Lawrence, now known as Madagascar.[35] His description of their exact location and the hazards they pose to ships passing through the strait between Madagascar and the mainland is exactly the sort of information a newcomer would lack, and thus value heavily.

Van Linschoten, throughout all of these passages, never mentions that he was asked to record any of this. During this period, the navigational charts containing information about the East and its trade networks were jealously guarded by the Portuguese, and those that attempted to undermine their monopoly faced death or imprisonment.[36] It was not unheard of that the Portuguese were willing to massacre entire crews that intruded upon Portuguese waters.[37] All this suggests that the Portuguese would have been not only uninterested in van Linschoten's observations, but would have likely gone to great lengths to prevent them from being recorded at all. He does not share how he took these notes without notice, but it is possible that he recorded

[33] *Ibid.*, 14-18.
[34] *Ibid.*, 11.
[35] *Ibid.*, 7.
[36] Parr, *Dutch Marco Polo*, xvii.
[37] Parr, *Dutch Marco Polo*, 49.

them under the auspices of a diary. He may also have chosen to record his thoughts in his native tongue, frustrating any attempts of those who harbored suspicions to read them. With this in mind, we can surmise that our intrepid voyager recorded these insights of his own volition. Sadly, he gives little context as to why he did so, but it may simply be that he recognized the potential value, based upon his own background and the sheer secrecy surrounding the pilots charts.

Van Linschoten arrived in Goa on 21 September, 1583. He quickly began to gather descriptions of the coasts of India and the various polities that lay along them, along with a description of the Portuguese bases established all the way from Goa to Macau to Japan. He likely did this by consulting with Portuguese sailors and mariners who had stopped ashore; much like he might have listened to tales from the Sea Beggars in his childhood. Van Linschoten believed a description of these places will allow the reader to construct a mental image "to vnderstande the situation of the Countrey, and of the coasts lying on the East side, to the last and highest part of the borders of *China*, which the Portingales haue trauelled and discouered, together with their Ilandes."[38] That the Portuguese are referenced in the third person (both in this chapter and many others) is an important detail to note. With this information the reader can infer that the Portuguese were not the intended audience. Additionally, van Linschoten devotes quite a few chapters of the work to describing the coasts in detail, including information about, once again including information about the state of the fortresses, such as the one in "Cananor", which supposedly was "the best fortresse that the Portingalles have in all Malabar, and there is much pepper."[39] Once more, both his description of the Portuguese in the third person (and the description of their military capabilities in the area) is strong evidence that the information being compiled was for potentially hostile outside audiences.

Van Linschoten leaves little in doubt regarding his reasoning for collecting intelligence on the nature of the Portuguese empire in the East. He says as much when he states: "I wil in truth set downe, as I my selfe for the most parte haue séene it with mine eyes, and of credible persons, both Indians, and other inhabiters in those Countries learned and required to know, as also the report and fame thereof is nowe sufficiently spread abroade throughout the world by diuers of our neighbour countries and landes which traffique and deale with them, namely our

[38] Van Linschoten, *His Discours of Voyages into Ye Easte & West Indies*, 13.
[39] *Ibid.*, 21.

countrey, the East Countries, England, Fraunce, &c. which likewise are founde and knowne by the Portingalles themselues, which dayly trafficke thither."[40] Knowing that much of this information had been a well-kept secret, it was no doubt an additional motivation for him to keep such meticulous records of the stories and histories he was told, as was the case when he outlined the history of Malabar as he was told it.[41] Just as with the use of the third person to describe the Portuguese, the use of 'our' in the above passage can narrow down the potential audiences even further. His reference to a collective whole likely means that he always intended for the intelligence he painstakingly collected to be disseminated within the Netherlands, his own 'countrey'.

3. Attitudes Towards the Spanish and Portuguese

While van Linschoten was collecting this information for his countrymen, he was undoubtedly exposing himself to the rich multicultural nature of the city of Goa. When he first arrived in Spain, he had taken several months to learn Spanish, an absolutely necessary step in order to function within the Spanish Empire. Pragmatism however, should not be mistaken for complacency. When taken into account with his childhood being heavily impacted by the Dutch Revolt, one can understand how his opinions of the Spanish likely ranged from ambivalent to outright hostile. Traces of his attitudes can be found through the Itinerario, beginning with his description of Philip II's conquest of Portugal and the Azores from a rival claimant. Van Linschoten states was done "most cruelly" and notes that the prisoners were either beheaded or condemned to row "the Gallies".[42]

It is likely that witnessing the subjugation of Portugal and the brutal conquest of the Azores left van Linschoten feeling sympathetic towards the Portuguese. Having grown up in a region subjected to Spanish brutality, he probably felt a connection to the people of that country. The presence of the Duke of Alva assuredly made the comparison between the Netherlands and Portugal all the more easy to ascertain. This common ground was not to last long, however. Jan's positive initial impression began to fade away the moment he embarked for India. In the narrow confines of a ship, cultural differences began to mount, and the violent ways of the sailors disturbed the young traveler. A festival was soon put on, as according to van Linschoten: "being

[40] *Ibid.*, 13.
[41] *Ibid.*, 23.
[42] *Ibid.,* 3.

Whitsonday, the ships of an ancient custome, doe use to chuse an Emperor among themselves."[43] During the feast and festivities, a fight broke out and men were killed. It took the personal intervention of the Archbishop for the men to stand down allowing the perpetrators to be thrown in chains and their weapons confiscated. Reading van Linschoten's description of the matter, it is easy to see that this event troubled him. The pride and violence of the festival aboard the ship no doubt left an impression upon the young man, an impression that would later characterize his increasingly hostile views towards his employers.

These experiences provided him with the incentive necessary to collect intelligence whose dissemination would be harmful to the Spanish, and by extension, Portuguese imperial systems. This alone, however, was not enough, as history is full of examples of individuals who worked within the administrations of empires that they despised. It would be van Linschoten's own experiences in Goa with the Portuguese administration that provided him with the conviction necessary to undermine his own employers.

As an employee of the Archbishop, van Linschoten was immediately immersed in the tradition and ceremony of the administration. "The 30. of September the Archbishoppe my maister with great triumph was brought into the towne of Goa, and by the Gentlemen and Rulers of the countrey, led unto the cathedrall Church, singing Te Deum laudamus, and after many ceremonies and auncient customers, they convayed him to his pallace, which is close by the Church."[44] His experience with the official installation of the archbishop was the first moment of many which would characterise his experiences in Goa. He was quite taken aback by the wealth and extravagance of many in charge of the Portuguese administration, including the governors, who were known to hoard the gifts sent by monarchs within the subcontinent which were originally intended for the Jesuits.[45] The archbishop himself was not adverse to receiving magnificent gifts, receiving a magnificent ivory crucifix from the island of Ceylon, but decided its masterful quality was so exquisite that he sent it along to the King of Spain.[46] Such gift giving was one of the many ways that Portuguese administrators enriched themselves personally, while the many denizens of Goa lived in abject poverty, something that van Linschoten quickly ascertained as a flaw within *Asia Portuguesa*. When van Linschoten had departed from Lisbon a

[43] *Ibid.,* 6.
[44] *Ibid.*, 13.
[45] *Ibid.*, 63.
[46] *Ibid.*, 25.

few years previously, he had likely seen the Portuguese as victims of Spanish aggression. Once he had arrived in Goa, however, his perception of the Portuguese began to change for the worse, as he found their morals to be lacking. The hoarding was only the first example of this.

Whether or not van Linschoten had moral qualms with the consolidation of wealth and power within Goa itself, he was quickly put to work in his capacity as a clerk for the archbishop. He must have been quite good at his job, as when the archbishop later left for Portugal in order to appeal directly to the King for support in a dispute, he left van Linschoten as "the general Clarke throughout all India, to keepe account of the said receits, & gave me one of the keyes of the chest, wherein the monie lay, with a good stipend, and other profits belonging to the same, during the time of his absence: thereby the rather to binde me that I should remain in his house, and keepe the same til I return againe, as I had promised."[47] This is one of the few passages where he remarks directly on what his actual job entailed, and we can assume that he was entrusted so after several years of valuable and trustworthy service.

We can surmise that the employee and the employer had a beneficial relationship from other moments as well. During his service to the archbishop, van Linschoten made the acquaintance of several Englishmen who had been imprisoned in Goa for supposedly attempting to "spy on the country" and on the suspicion of them being "heretickes."[48] These men had originally been detained in Hormuz, a Portuguese outpost on the Persian Gulf, and had been sent to Goa for trial by the garrison's commander, who was unwilling to pass the judgement himself. Upon their arrival, their interrogation revealed nothing untoward, by van Linschoten argues that the Jesuits of Goa did not wish to release them, having discovered that they possessed a great deal of wealth. They encouraged them to become Jesuits and donate their money to the order. They refused, except for one of their number who agreed to paint the Jesuit's compound in return for his freedom. The others remained in prison for some time, but were eventually able to contact van Linschoten, whose relationship with the archbishop was strong enough to request that he negotiate their release. He was able to do so after they had paid a "suretie of 2000 Pardawes."[49] Jan's experience with the English soured his opinion of the Portuguese administration further, as he felt they'd been treated unjustly.

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[47] *Ibid.*, 150-151.
[48] *Ibid.,* 140.
[49] *Ibid.*, 141.

This anecdote concerning the Englishmen is a valuable passage for several reasons beyond simply proving van Linschoten had influence over the Archbishop. This helps to confirm the great lengths the Portuguese were willing to go to preserve their domination of trade with the Orient. Even the suspicion of espionage was enough to condemn several men to long prison sentences. We know from van Linschoten himself that the reason they were originally charged was that they had begun to compete with local Italian gem traders in Hormuz, who were immediately unhappy about their monopoly being undermined.[50] He also elaborates that the English actually arrived overland, having traveled from Aleppo to Hormuz with the intention of "buy great quantities of precious stones, as diamantes, Pearles, Rubies."[51] It one from one of these very Englishmen that van Linschoten learned "of all the waies, trades, and viages of the countrie, betweene Aleppo and Ormus, and all of the ordinances and common customes, which they usually hold during their Viage over land, as also of the places and townes wher they passed."[52] English interest with the Levant and its potential for profitable trade had been around for decades by this point, with the English Muscovy Company leading the way, as it had negotiated a treaty with Sultan Suleiman to trade within the Ottoman Empire in 1553.[53] Additionally, in 1557 it had established a direct overland route through Persia to circumvent Portuguese dominance of the seas.[54]

If anything, witnessing the confinement of these Englishmen would only have reinforced van Linschoten's own views on the Portuguese control of the East, as well as his beliefs that his own intelligence was valuable. He himself had been incredibly lucky to be able to take the overseas route to the East, avoiding the deserts, banditry, and hostile administrations of the Middle East that many Italian and other European merchants were subjected to. These men and their experiences would have been a testament to the irreplaceable value of the nautical, economic, and militaristic value of the data that he had been recording. The Englishmen may not have been the only ones to convince him of this. A friend, a certain "Barnard Burcherts of Hamborough,"[55] another servant of the archbishop, also sent him letters from the Middle East at this time, outlining his own experiences therein.

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[50] *Ibid.*, 140.
[51] *Ibid.*, 140.
[52] *Ibid.*, 142.
[53] Robert Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and London's Overseas Traders, 1550-1653* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 13.
[54] *Ibid.*, 13.
[55] Van Linschoten, *His Discours of Voyages into Ye Easte & West Indies*, 145.

While his experiences with the detained English were undoubtedly important, they were not the sole experiences that colored his impression of the Portugese. While he stayed in Goa, he was introduced to the racial ranking system that the Portuguese had devised, in which Mestico peoples occupied an important spot. He begins his description of the Mestico peoples by defining their status within Portuguese India, which is based upon their proximity of blood to a fully Portuguese individual. Mestico refers to the child of a Portuguese-Indian union, whereas Castico refers to a fully Portuguese child born in India.[56] For the Portuguese, societal status was a fundamental element that society was ordered around. Those of noble lineage occupied the most exalted positions in the colonial administration, such as the post of viceroy. Van Linschoten's attitude towards those of noble birth can be fairly easily discerned as negative; he characterises those of high status in Goa as going about "with a great pride and a vainglorious majesty".[57] The system of ranking individuals by their blood had been amended to include those of more diverse backgrounds, such as the Mestico population of Goa.

Hailing from a relatively more meritocratic background in the early Dutch Republic, we can assume that this system of rank was rather repulsive to van Linschoten. His childhood had been spent amongst those who made their livelihoods by seizing Spanish shipping, revolting against the imposition of autocratic and imperial rule. Arriving as a Dutchman into this entirely new world, it is completely reasonable to assume that Jan felt like an outsider, if not an intruder. These feelings of isolation would no doubt have only been exacerbated by the ponderous system of rank that he would have been automatically fit into. His lack of Portuguese blood likely relegated him to a lower status, perpetually seen as both a fellow European, yet still an outsider.

His status presumably placed him somewhere between the Portuguese and the native population, his status uncomfortably similar to that of a Mestico individual. Evidently this bothered him, as he spends quite a few of his early chapters decrying the moral depravity of both Indian and Mestico individuals, particularly the women of both communities, with passages such as the following characterising their behavior: "The women are verie luxurious and vnchaste, for there are very few among them, although they bee married, but they haue besides their husbands one or two of those that are called souldiers, with whome they take their pleasures: which to effect, they vse al the slights and practises they can deuise, by sending out their slaues and

[56] *Ibid.*, 53.
[57] *Ibid.*, 53.

baudes by night, and at extraordinary times, ouer walles, hedges, and ditches, how narrowlie soeuer they are kept and looked vnto."[58] This hostile fixation on the women of Goan society is by no means just a reaction to their alien ways; it can also be understood as a sign of van Linschoten's own revulsion at the hybrid, yet stifling Portuguese-Indian culture that had emerged after nearly a century of Portuguese administration.

For a better understanding of why van Linschoten feared the sexuality of both Indian and Mestico women, we must turn to Ivo Kamp's discussion of their symbolic undermining of colonial authority. Kamps argues that van Linschoten considers the marriage between colonizers and indigenous peoples to be a dire threat to the stability of the colony, as it undermines the separation between the two that reinforces colonial authority.[59] The constant recounting of the supposed infidelities of women in India poses a question for the reader: if the Portuguese are unable to control their wives, how are they capable of controlling the peoples they've subjugated? Van Linschoten was greatly troubled by the "rapprochement" (as Kamps calls it) between the Portuguese and their colonial subjects. Kamps states that to van Linschoten, the lack of Portuguese control over their wives symbolized their weakening grip on India.[60] This perceived weakening deeply troubled him, and undoubtedly soured his perception of their administration. For a colonizer to maintain their authority, they must assuredly keep their distance.

Van Linschoten's critiques of Portuguese practices went beyond simply taking issue with their system of ranking. From his position at the center of their commercial empire in the east, he was also well acquainted with their system of export. According to the King's law, only a limited number of ships were sent each year to carry back pepper and other spices from the East, presumably to drive up prices in Europe. This was inherently problematic as it resulted in both the merchants and the crews choosing to pack as many barrels and containers of the product aboard each ship as was possible; often far more than was considered safe. Van Linschoten describes the situation in the following way: "In that sort most of the ships depart from *Cochiin* so that if any of them come safelie into *Portingall*, it is only by the will of God: for otherwise it were impossible to escape, because they ouer lade them, and are so badly prouided otherwise,

[58] *Ibid.,* 60.
[59] Ivo Kamps and Jyotsna G. Singh, *Travel Knowledge: European "Discoveries" in the Early Modern Period* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 166.
[60] *Ibid.*, 168.

with little order among their men: so that not one ship commeth ouer, but can shew of their great dangers by ouerlading, want of necessaries and reparations of the ship, together with vnskilfull Saylers, yet for all these dayly & continuall dangers, there is no amendment, but they daily grow worse and worse."[61]

Throughout his accounts of the East, there are many references to this dangerous practice. Van Linschoten was not shy in his criticism of this practice, and his thoughts seem to be in line with his general perception of the Portuguese administration at this point, which is to say he felt that their greed and general indifference had corrupted nearly every aspect of their administration. On his own return trip, he described his ship as being so packed with goods for export below decks that it "seemeth like a labyrinth or maze".[62] His own background in a culture intimately familiar with maritime trade would undoubtedly have left him even more frustrated with these perceived failures, and the lack of Portuguese response to his concern likely resulted in feelings of greater alienation. This understanding of the Portuguese as inefficient or uncaring probably fueled his desire to continue collecting the intelligence he was compiling.

One of van Linschoten's lifelines as an outsider within the Portuguese imperial system was his tenuous communication with family and friends back home. There are multiple instances where he discusses letters he received, including one "In the month of August [1585], there came letters from Venice by land, that brought newes of the death and murther of the Prince of *Orange,* a man of honourable memorie, as also of the death of *Mons*. the Duke of *Alenson,* or *Amon*, with the mariage of the Duke of *Sauoy* to the King of Spaines daughter."[63] From this it appears he had asked to be kept informed of the political situation in Europe, and his description of the Prince of Orange as a 'man of honorable memory' is telling. Once again, evidence suggests that employment did not necessitate that he abandon his own personal loyalties. It's also possible to calculate a general travel-time for letters, as William of Orange was assassinated on July 10, 1584,[64] meaning it took approximately thirteen months for news of his death to reach van Linschoten.

[61] Van Linschoten, *His Discours of Voyages into Ye Easte & West Indies*, 150.
[62] *Ibid.*, 163.
[63] *Ibid.*, 145.
[64] Israel, *The Dutch Republic,* 216.

4. Hostility Against the Spanish

Having stayed in Goa for several years (in which his hostility to the Portuguese administration had been cemented), events finally transpired to motivate van Linschoten to depart. As mentioned previously, van Linschoten's employer left Goa in January of 1587, hoping to get the King's support for his side in a dispute he had with the current viceroy. Their feud was not to last, as in an odd twist of fate both men died in the same year, with the Viceroy passing first in May and word of the Archbishop's death arriving in September. He had apparently died on the voyage back to Portugal. [65] Given their close relationship, there is little doubt that the loss of his employer's ear meant that van Linschoten would no longer have the influence or sway that he had had previously within the city. He also states that the death of his brother, William Tin (in a shipwreck), the same brother that had helped him to take ship to India in the first place, had left him feeling particularly isolated.[66] Combined with the earlier loss of his father, these familial losses pushed the young man over the edge, and he began to look for ways to travel home.

Once more, van Linschoten's connections proved invaluable. He states he ran into a certain "Diricke Garrison… after he had been 20 yeares in India, was minded then to saile in that shippe to Portingall, with whom because of olde acquaintance, and for his company, I minded to see if I could get any place within the shippe."[67] Van Linschoten provides no other information regarding this other enigmatic Dutchman, but Arun Saldanha identifies him as "Dirck Gerritsz Pomp, called "Dirck China" … probably the first Dutchman in the Far East."[68] Between his personal familiarity with a member of the ship's crew and his political connections with the "Foukers and Velsares of Augsburg"[69], van Linschoten was able to secure his place on the ship in order to return home. According to Israel, van Linschoten's ties to the Fuggers in particular may have proven valuable in this process.[70] Van Linschoten himself claims that his Dutch nationality was also a huge benefit, as the banking families of Augsburg employed many Dutchmen in their pepper factories in the East, giving him an opportunity to make his case amongst his own countrymen.[71]

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[65] Van Linschoten, *His Discours of Voyages into Ye Easte & West Indies*, 154.
[66] *Ibid.*, 154.
[67] *Ibid.*, 160.
[68] Saldanha, Arun. "The Itineraries of Geography: Jan Huygen Van Linschoten's "Itinerario" and Dutch Expeditions to the Indian Ocean, 1594–1602." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 101, no. 1 (2011): 158. Saldanha cites (IJzerman, 1915) as his source for this information.
[69] Van Linschoten, *His Discours of Voyages into Ye Easte & West Indies*, 160.
[70] Israel, *The Dutch Republic,* 320.
[71] Van Linschoten, *His Discours of Voyages into Ye Easte & West Indies*, 160.

Whilst his years in Goa had seemingly opened his eyes to the moral bankruptcy of the Portuguese administration, his return voyage would provide van Linschoten with the final motivating factors to publish the intelligence he had gathered for years. While on his return trip, his ship anchored at St. Helena, and the Portuguese crew were shocked to find that the island, which was ordered to remain uninhabited by the King, had had its chapel defaced by an English crew months earlier.[72] The English, continuing their efforts to break into the profits of trade with the East, had been experimenting with various routes for years, finally concurring that the Cape of Good Hope was the best route to the East.[73] While the Portuguese may have been disturbed at English activity that far south, van Linschoten himself made careful observations regarding the island's plentiful stocks of foodstuffs (primarily animals such as pigs imported by the Portuguese) and the abundance of fresh water. He also took care to dutifully record its location. After having weathered the brutal storms and foreboding African coastlines of the return voyage, the value of an island perfectly positioned as a point of resupply would not have been lost upon him. He does not record his reaction to the English presence, but it can be surmised that he took little issue with the undermining of Portuguese ascendancy. Additionally, seeing evidence of other European forays into the East would likely have convinced him the time was right for the publication of his findings.

The presence of hostile English ships in waters that had long been regarded as Portuguese only increased the further north that they sailed. Van Linschoten partially attributes this to the King having signed away his own monopoly on the importation of pepper; which resulted in "the Admiraltie of Portingall are now waren verie carelesse to see them well conveied, as they used to be during the times of the Kings of Portingal, when all the pepper came for the Kings own accounts. And although the King hath promised continually to send his Navie by Sea as far as the flemish islands, there to stay for the coming of Indian ships, and from thence to conveye them unto Lisbone, yet since they were farmed out there are few fleetes sent forth, so that they are but little thought upon, but howsoever it is in the payment of the fee farme, for pepper the king will not lose a pennie of his due, nor once abate them any thing."[74] This lack of interest didn't only have to do with the signing away of the King's monopoly, however. For van Linschoten's return

[72] *Ibid.*, 172.
[73] Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution*, 21.
[74] Van Linschoten, *His Discours of Voyages into Ye Easte & West Indies*, 162.

also coincided with one of the most geopolitically important events of the day: the failure of the Spanish Armada.

In the aftermath of the Armada's failure in 1588, the English responded by conducting naval sortees of their own into the Atlantic.[75] Van Linschoten, who had reached the Azores in the summer of 1589, recorded frequent raids on shipping near the islands, as well as the islands themselves. He specifically mentions both the "Earl of Cumberland", "Sir Francis Drake", and "one Martin Furburher" who is most likely Sir Martin Frobisher.[76] Martin Frobisher in particular had interests in the eastern trade, having from 1576-1578 been personally involved in three separate ventures to chart a route to the East under the auspices of the Muscovy Company.[77] The frequency of these raids were so intense that the King apparently ordered for the Fleets from both the East and West Indies to delay their departures, as he didn't wish for any additional ships to be captured.[78]

It is important to outline the circumstances that found van Linschoten spending two years in the Azores, as opposed to his original intentions of returning home immediately. He tells us that an important ship of the East Indies fleet, sailing out of Malacca, had sunk off of the coast of the islands.[79] While many of its surviving crew were able to safely take another ship to Lisbon, van Linschoten decided to go back into the employment of Philip II in order to arrange for the preservation of the goods that had survived, and in order to arrange for their shipment to Lisbon when an opportunity arose. The incessant English raids made it nearly impossible to do so, resulting in his being delayed for such a long period of time.

Forced to stay due to his working commitments, van Linschoten quickly fell back into his old habits of exploration and gathering intelligence. He himself states that his employment status was of great benefit to him: because he and his companion had been appointed "Factors for the Kinges Pepper"[80], they were treated as "naturall borne Portingalles" and were able to travel about and explore the islands at their leisure. This was a great luxury for foreigners at the time, as he is quick to inform the reader that the islands had been heavily garrisoned and travel amongst them restricted. The English in particular were "forbidden to traffique thether" but were able to

[75] Israel, *The Dutch Republic,* 507.
[76] Van Linschoten, *His Discours of Voyages into Ye Easte & West Indies*, 179-190.
[77] Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution*, 20.
[78] Van Linschoten, *His Discours of Voyages into Ye Easte & West Indies*, 190.
[79] *Ibid.,* 180.
[80] *Ibid.*, 184.

discover a workaround by using "the names of Scots and French men".[81] As he did with Goa and the surrounding areas, he drew maps of the islands, remarked on their resources, and gave descriptions of their defensive capabilities.[82]

Whilst van Linschoten's stay in Goa had soured his opinions with regard to the Portuguese, his time on the Azores likewise cemented his disdain for the Spanish. His stay on the islands seems to have provided him with additional ideological reasons for wishing to undermine Spanish hegemony. His narrative during these chapters is filled with many separate accounts of the supposed arrogance and cruelty of the Spanish towards others, with one scenario in which Spanish sailors executed captured English sailors described in great detail. Van Linscoten takes the time to describe these events as, in his words: "This I thought good to note, that men might understand the bloodie and honest mindes of the Spaniardes, when they have men under their subjection".[83]

In addition to his anecdotes describing Spanish cruelty, his dedication of several paragraphs to a certain Sir Richard Greenfield are telling. Greenfield, according to van Lisnchoten, was one of the commanders of the English fleet that was gathered to resist the armada. While the other commanders advised caution, he refused, leading an attack on the Spanish. Due to a lack of support from the other captains, he was killed in action. Van Linschoten includes a speech he supposedly made on his deathbed after being captured.[84] The most interesting part about this story's inclusion is that van Linschoten glowingly praises the valor and tragic bravery of a man at war with his nominal employer. While as a child he may have been regaled with stories of Spanish oppression and cruelty in his father's tavern, in the Azores he was able to see its supposed effects personally, which clearly left a strong impression.

With the failure of the Armada, the Spanish were unable to enforce peace on the English, and the raids on their shipping only escalated in intensity. In light of this, in addition to the extremely limited availability of Royal shipping, van Linschoten was able to negotiate a deal where they could hire private vessels to carry the goods they'd been designated to protect back to Lisbon.[85] After two years in the Azores, van Linschoten finally arrived on the outskirts of Lisbon on January 2nd, 1592. He did not spend much time in the city itself, only taking a few

[81] *Ibid.*, 182.
[82] *Ibid.*, 185.
[83] *Ibid.*, 189.
[84] *Ibid.*, 193.
[85] *Ibid.*, 196.

months to settle some of his affairs before booking passage on a convoy of twelve ships sailing for Enkhuizen. Departing in the month of July, they had at several points had to fight off raiding vessels with their cannons before finally reaching the "channel between England and Fraunce"[86] on the twenty fourth of August. Passing "Dover and Calleys" on the thirtieth, the fleet arrived in Enkhuizen on the third of September. Van Linschoten ends his account with the following passage: "The third of September wee arrived in *Enchuisen*, where I founde my mother, brother and sister, all living and in good health, it being twelve yeares, nine monethes and a halfe after my departure from thence. For the which God Almighty with his sonne Christ Jesus our Sauior, be praised and blessed, to whom belongeth al power, honor and glorie now and for evermore, Amen."[87]

Arriving back in the Netherlands after a journey that had lasted over a decade, van Linschoten was a changed man. His experiences with both of the Iberian monarchies within the context of the Spanish imperial system had hardened his heart towards the Spanish and Portuguese. Over his years abroad, he had meticulously gathered intelligence regarding both the military and economic nature of the Portuguese East Indies, knowledge that the Portuguese had managed to keep hidden from most of Europe for the better part of a century. The stage was thus set for the writing and distribution of the *Itinerario*, a series of events that would reshape European colonial networks for years to come.

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[86] *Ibid.*, 196.

[87] *Ibid.*, 197. While van Linschoten ends the *Itinerario* with a prayer, he remains remarkably silent on the subject of religion itself within the *Itinerario*. Van Linschoten's most open comment on the subject matter can be found in his discussion of the death of Sir Richard Greenfield (discussed earlier in this chapter), in which he states that when his deceased body was cast into the sea, as they believed him to have "took part with Lutheranes and Heretickes… they verily thought that as he had a devilish faith and religion, and therefore ye deuils loued him so hee presently sunk into the bottom of the sea, & down into Hell, where he raised up all the devils to the revenge of his death: and that they brought so great storms and torments vpon the Spaniards, because they only maintained the Catholic and Romish religion: such and the like blasphemies against God, they ceased not openly to utter without that any man reported them therein or for their false opinions, but the most part of them rather said and affirmed, that of truth it must needs be so." (Van Linschoten, *His Discours of Voyages into Ye Easte & West Indies*, 195.) While this is the closest that van Linschoten ever goes to offering a declaration of faith within the *Itinerario*, he still stops frustratingly short of outright declaring his religious sentiments. Given his earlier employment within the Catholic hierarchy of the Portuguese, it seems likely he remained outwardly Catholic during his employment with the Iberian powers. After returning to the Netherlands, and given the animosities he had developed, it would seem likely that he adopted a more pro-Protestant sentiment, especially given that he would go on to work so closely with avowed Protestants.

Chapter Two
Networks of Knowledge in the Early Dutch Republic

In 1596 Jan van Linschoten published a book entitled *Itinerario: Voyage ofte schipvaert van Jan Huyghen van Linschoten naer Oost ofte Portugaels Indien, 1579-1592* [*"Itinerario: Jan van Linschoten's Voyage or Naval Expedition to the East, or Portuguese India"*], with the printer Cornelis Claeszoon of Amsterdam. The work described the author's travels to and around the Indian Ocean region described in the previous chapter, and it contained detailed information about navigation routes, geographical features, commercial products, and indigenous cultures of the areas he visited or heard of across much of South East Asia and South America and the Caribbean. Dutch historiography has recognized the significance of the *Itinerario* for its critical contributions to Dutch expansionism in the East beginning with its publication in 1596. Over the course of this chapter, I will demonstrate that the *Itinerario* was, in fact, not simply important but instrumental in inspiring the Dutch to act to seize Portuguese possessions around the globe based upon the intelligence (both nautical, mercantile, political, and cultural) Jan Huygen van Linschoten had gathered in his years abroad.

Van Linschoten's knowledge represented an opportunity for the Dutch: his return to Amsterdam came at the perfect time when the merchant class was eager for new mercantile opportunities, and the government was eager to exploit any weaknesses in the Spanish Habsburg monarchy that could be found. The *Itinerario*'s significance can be understood in two primary ways. First, it tapped into the Dutch eagerness to develop commercial ventures in the East. Second, after its publication it popularized these sentiments amongst the power brokers of the Republic, the political and mercantile elites with the resources to invest in trade ventures, by providing them with the knowledge necessary to mount successful expeditions. Most importantly, a network of individuals gathered around van Linschoten during the years after his return, a network that would advocate for and contribute to the publication of his accumulated intelligence, realizing its strategic value as the key to imperial expansion in the East Indies at the expense of the Portuguese.

1. The Itinerario

Upon his return to the Netherlands in 1592, van Linschoten concluded his narrative in the *Itinerario* with the passage: "The third of September wee arrived in *Enchuisen*, where I founde my mother, brother and sister, all living and in good health, it being twelve yeares, nine monethes and a halfe after my departure from thence. For the which God Almighty with his sonne Christ Jesus our Sauior, be praised and blessed, to whom belongeth al power, honor and glorie now and for evermore, Amen."[88]. Relying on other sources and the clues from the text itself, we can begin to piece together what may have happened next. As discussed in the last chapter, van Linschoten returned from his travels a changed man. He likely harbored deeper resentments against the Spanish and Portuguese, perceiving them to be proud and unnecessarily cruel.[89] Additionally, his many years abroad (from 1576 to 1592) had exposed him to the intricacies of trade in the East and the vast potential for profits to be made.

Importantly, he had been exposed to the exact routes taken by the Portuguese around Africa, and was intimately aware of their strongest (and weakest) fortifications and their diplomatic relationships with polities in the East.[90] He explicitly states this exposure on the cover of his first work, the During this time, the *Reysgheschrift vande navigatien der Portugaloysers in Orienten* ["Travel Account about the Portuguese Maritime Journeys in the East"]. The title states that the *Reysgheschrift* includes "the navigation route from Cabo de Lopo Gonsalvez to Angola, and all the way to Ethiopia, as well as all routes, harbors, islands, deep and shallow waters, sandbanks and dry spots, reefs, cliffs, and their location and extension. Likewise, the times of year when the winds blow, with the true signs and knowledge of the tides, the weather, waters and currents at all coasts and harbors of the East, as all of this has been observed and drawn by the pilots and royal steersmen based on the ongoing navigations they have done and the experience they have developed. All this gathered together, most reliably, with great seriousness and accuracy, and translated from the Portuguese and Spanish into our common Dutch

[88] Jan Huygen van Linschoten, *John Huighen Van Linschoten: His Discours of Voyages into Ye Easte & West Indies: Divided into Foure Bookes* (London: John Wolfe printer to ye Honorable Cittie of London, 1598), 196.
[89] As discussed in Chapter 1, van Linschoten's time in the Azores had proven formative with regards to his perceptions of the Spanish.
[90] There are several passages within the *Itinerario* that detail Portuguese relationships with local rulers, giving the reader a relatively clear idea of Portuguese relations with their neighbors at the time.

language."[91] In this passage, van Linschoten is informing his audience of his sources, giving credibility to the information contained within. Also important to note is that he originally intended the book to be disseminated in the Netherlands, given his statement on 'our common Dutch language.'

During his time abroad, he had developed an overall opinion of the Portuguese Empire in the East as a morally bankrupt construct, describing the nobility in power as possessing "a great pride and a vainglorious majesty"[92] and the women as "verie luxurious and vnchaste."[93] These attitudes, in addition to his insider knowledge, would likely have been capitalized on by his later colleagues as they began to coalesce around similar interests in the East. His thoughts on the Portuguese, as well as the Spanish (discussed at length in the previous chapter), are central to establishing one of his motives for publication of such damaging material.

Judging by the content of his *Itinerario*, van Linschoten had probably kept a regular journal of his travel experiences and taken detailed notes on specific topics, including those mentioned in the previous paragraph. While, in drafting the Itinerario, he may have relied in part on memory, it is unlikely that he wrote the whole book from scratch following his return. In addition, as van Linschoten drafted his book, he integrated the elements of the work of others into his own: this included maps by Petrus Plancius, and footnote-like contributions concerning botanical matters by co-author Bernardus Paludanus. Additionally, Paludanus contributed significantly to the third section of the *Itinerario*, entitled *Beschryvinghe van de gantsche custe van Guinea*, where he described the coastal West Africa and the Americas, focusing heavily on Brazil. These contributions, along with likely input from others (including mapmaker Lucas Waghenaer and fellow traveler Dirck Gerritsz Pomp) were critical in creating a volume that contained a relatively unparalleled amount of information that made the creation of an empire possible.

Much of this information would have been concerning the commodities that could be purchased in the East, their individual prices, and the best locations to obtain them (all information that would appear in later *Itinerario*). Additionally, notes about the journey to and from the East would likely have been recorded as well, including the best routes to take, where

[91] Jan Huygen van Linschoten, *Reysgheschrift vande navigatien der Portugaloysers in Orienten* (Amsterdam: Cornelis Claesz, 1595), 1.
[92] Van Linschoten, *His Discours of Voyages into Ye Easte & West Indies*, 53.
[93] *Ibid.,* 60.

Portuguese outposts existed (and how well fortified they were), and where to stop in order to take on additional supplies. Lastly, van Linschoten's own experiential recollections were likely recorded in some form at this point as well, given that much of the future book would be devoted to his own memories in the form of anecdotes.

A first product of van Linschoten's work was published in 1595. The *Reysgheschrift* was published a year before the full *Itinerario* so as to be sent along on the fateful voyage of Cornelis Houtman, discussed at length later in the chapter. Given that the license to publish the *Itinerario* was "granted by the States-General in October of 1594,"[94] it seems likely that the process of creating the *Reysgheschrift* was just one part of the process of writing the full *Itinerario*; a process that had begun at least as early as 1594. The *Reysgheschrift,* published before the rest of the work, differs from the *Itinerario* in that the use of imagery is less common (more images can be found in the later *Itinerario*). Both include poems at the beginning, as was customary at the time. The type is set in the same fashion, running in two columns down the length of each page. Such similarities are to be expected as both works were published by Cornelis Claeszoon. The *Itinerario* is described as measuring thirty centimeters; this initial edition includes three volumes, along with 36 plates (illustrations) and 6 maps. The plates were engraved by Baptista and Joannes van Doetechum after designs by van Linschoten, while the maps were drawn and illustrated by Arnoldus and Hendrik Floris van Langeren.[95] Interestingly, "the first map folded into the book is the famous 1594 world map in two hemispheres of Petrus Plancius (Petrus Platvoet)."[96] Petrus Plancius was, as we shall see later, an integral figure in the process of the *Itinerario's* publication. Below, I have included a table summarising the three distinct portions of the *Itinerario* for reference for the reader:

Itinerario (published 1596)	Contains the story of van Linschoten's journey to the East Indies from Lisbon to Goa. Also contains a wealth of information

[94] Thomas Suarez, *Early Mapping of Southeast Asia: The Epic Story of Seafarers, Adventurers, and Cartographers Who First Mapped the Regions between China and India* (North Clarendon: Periplus Editions, 1999), 178.
[95] This information was all accessed using WorldCat's search function to access the notes regarding the first edition of the *Itinerario*.
[96] Arun Saldanha, "The Itineraries of Geography: Jan Huygen Van Linschoten's *Itinerario* and Dutch Expeditions to the Indian Ocean, 1594–1602," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 101, no. 1 (2011), 155.

	about the state of the Portuguese Empire in the East at the time of its writing, including knowledge about where their hold was tenuous. Additionally, information concerning where to obtain valuable commodities (i.e. spices, textiles, etc.) was also included.
Reysgheschrift (published 1595, included in full volume)	Compiled from van Linschoten's collection of Portuguese nautical and geographic data, this was his reconstruction of Portuguese state travel instructions, long kept secret. It is likely van Linschoten obtained this data when he was in the employ of the Portuguese Archbishop of Goa, Vincente de Fonseca (either from Portuguese archives or from fellow administrative employees).
Beschryvinghe van de gantsche custe van Guinea (Published 1596)	A collection of information concerning both coastal West Africa and the Americas. Paludanus contributed most significantly to the work in this section (given van Linschoten's lack of experience with these locations), using his own breadth of knowledge to give the readers access to knowledge of the peoples and lands of these regions.

Information concerning the number of books printed for the first edition is not available, but we can assume that the book was an impressive success given the number of reprints and translations. English, German and Latin translations were published in 1598, followed by an

Italian translation in 1599.[97] The sheer number of editions and translations of the *Itinerario* is a testament to the work's relevance to the changes occurring in Europe at the time, as well as the high value placed upon knowledge of the East Indies and how to get there.

2. Historical Context

Before examining the process by which van Linschoten was able to have his writings published, it is necessary to examine the situation of the northern Netherlands upon his return in 1592, in order to have a more accurate appraisal of why the *Itinerario* immediately inspired such interest. To understand the importance of the *Itineario*, background knowledge of the development of the United Provinces during the early years of the Revolt is critical. Particularly important to this narrative is the ascendancy of the northern provinces and the rise of Holland (and its chief city of Amsterdam) as the leading power of the Revolt.

When van Linschoten returned to Holland in 1592, he found his home country dramatically different from how he had left it in 1576. Before he had departed, he had likely been well aware of the early events that had been instrumental in marking the beginning of open warfare between the Dutch and the Spanish, such as the Battle of Heiligerlee in 1568 and the capture of Den Briel and a number of other towns by the Sea Beggars in 1572. The formal renunciation of allegiance to Philip II in 1581[98] would have occurred whilst van Linschoten was in the employ of a merchant in Lisbon.[99] Tension had been building for some time, and as

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[97] Bibliographic citations for these works are as follows:
English: Jan Huygen van Linschoten, *John Huighen Van Linschoten: His Discours of Voyages into Ye Easte & West Indies: Divided into Foure Bookes* (London: John Wolfe printer to ye Honorable Cittie of London, 1598).
German: Jan Huygen van Linschoten, Johann Adam Lonicerus, Theodor de Bry, Johann Israel de Bry, Johann Theodor de Bry, *Ander Theil der Orientalischen Indien, Von allen Völckern, Insulen, Meerporten, fliessenden Wassern vnd anderen Orten, so von Portugal auss, lengst dem Gestaden Aphrica, biss in Ost Indien vnd zu dem Landt China, sampt andern Insulen zu sehen seind. : Beneben derenselben Aberglauben, Götzendienst vnd Tempeln, item von jren Sitten, Trachten, Kleidungen, Policeyordnung, vnd wie sie hausshalten, beid so viel die Portugesen, welche dam im Landt wohnen, vnd auch das inheimische Landvölcklein anlangt. Dessgleichen von der Residentz dess Spanischen Viceroys vnd anderer Spanier in Goa, item von allen Orientalischen, Indianischen Waaren vnd Kummerschafften: sampt deren Gewichten, Masen, Müntzen vnd ihrem Valor oder Wirdtgung*, (Gedruckt zu Franckfurt am Meyn: Durch Johan Saur., 1598).
Latin: Jan Huygen van Linschoten, Johann Theodore de Bry, and Johann Israel de Bry, *II. pars Indiæ Orientalis : in qua Iohan. Hugonis Lintscotani nauigatio in Orientem, item regna, littora, portus, flumina, apparentiae, habitus moresque Indorum & Lusitanorum pariter in Oriente degentium : praeterea merces, monetae, mensurae, & pondera, quæ quibus in locis, quóve compendio prostent, accurate proponuntur*. Francfordii : Ex officina W. Richteri, 1599.
It is important to note that many of these early translations were published by the de Bry brothers in concert with van Linschtoen. Born in Strasbourg, they operated a successful family printing and engraving business in Frankfurt.
[98] C.R. Boxer, *The Dutch Seaborne Empire 1600-1800* (London: Penguin Books, 1990), 12-15.
[99] Van Linschoten, *His Discours of Voyages into Ye Easte & West Indies*, 2.

discussed in the last chapter, van Linschoten's own childhood was marked by experiences related to the Revolt. His hometown of Enkhuizen was one of the first cities to be captured by the Sea Beggars; Jonathan Israel states that "on June 2 the Beggar Leader, Dierick Sonoy, [William of Orange's] commander in North Holland, established his base in Enkhuizen, which became the nerve-centre of rebel operations throughout North Holland, and initially, also Friesland."[100]

It is not unlikely that the Sea Beggar occupation of his hometown was an exciting moment for van Linschoten, who would have been able to hear all about the Sea Beggars' seizure of coastal towns in order to raid Habsburg shipping.[101] Several events of note, such as the Duke of Alva's Council of Troubles (or Blood, depending on who was describing it), the Tenth Penny tax, and the executions of the Counts of Egmont and Horn, all served as important precipitating factors that motivated the Dutch to attempt to cast off their Spanish overlords during this time as well. Alva's subsequent massacre of the people of Naarden on 2 December, 1572 further radicalized those in revolt, instead of compelling them to stand down, as he had hoped.[102]

It is impossible to know what the exact thoughts of the van Linschoten family were during this time, but it is plausible that Jan van Linschoten, a teenager, was encouraged to depart to work with his brothers in Spain in 1576 as an alternative to remaining in the Netherlands where the conflict grew bloodier by the day. While van Linschoten deliberated on his options for foreign travel, the various factions who had played roles in the initial stages of revolt were forced to begin working together: these included the recalcitrant nobility of Holland (including the Prince of Orange), the mercantile elite (who controlled the political apparatuses of the cities) and the Sea Beggars, who represented the more radical Calvinist nobility and citizens. Over time this coalition began to work more efficiently, with William of Orange becoming the figurehead of the movement, but tensions continued under the surface (specifically with regard to how autonomous each of the individual cities and provinces would be able to become).

Orange had been appointed stadhouder in 1559 by Philip II, an office that conveyed control over provincial assemblies and granted the authority to lead armies. Given control over Holland, Zeeland, and Utrecht[103] (which were to become major epicenters of the Revolt), Orange

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[100] Jonathan Israel, *The Dutch Republic, Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477-1806* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 173.
[101] *Ibid.*, 170.
[102] *Ibid.*, 178.
[103] *Ibid.,* 139.

was naturally in a position to negotiate with the rebel leadership, and his subsequent alignment with the Revolt allowed for his office to become increasingly powerful; it often found itself balancing the interests of various provincial factions and amassing a considerable political following. His authority and leadership was respected even outside of the Netherlands; van Linschoten mourns his death within the *Itinerario*, stating: "In the month of August [1585], there came letters from Venice by land, that brought newes of the death and murther of the Prince of *Orange,* a man of honourable memorie."[104] William of Orange (also known by his epithet 'the Silent') left a potent political legacy even after his death; his sons would go on to occupy the office of stadhouder in his place and continue to lead both militarily and politically. As we will see, Jan van Linschoten was later to enter politics with the support of his eventual father-in-law, Meinert Simonszoon Semeyns, who was a political advisor to Maurice of Orange, one of the sons of William the Silent.[105]

Over time and under the leadership of William of Orange and the leadership of the individual states, a political entity began to form. Despite negotiations between Don Luis de Requesens (the Duke of Alva's successor) and the rebel leadership, the political divide widened as it became clearer and clearer that the two parties could not come to any sort of lasting arrangement. The subsequent sack of Antwerp in November of 1576, perpetrated by soldiers in Spanish employ who had gone unpaid for a great deal of time, pushed many who were "on the fence" to join the cause of the rebels.[106] While the Revolt had broadened in scope, it was by no means a united coalition. The creation of the Union of Utrecht, an initiative championed by Holland, was designed "purely and simply to create a northern defensive structure dominated by Holland and excluding the Antwerp States General."[107] William of Orange, ever the moderating influence, resisted this initiative, seeking to maintain the influence of the Southern provinces. "As late as April 1579 Orange and the States of Brabant were still working on proposals for a different form of Union, one which would assign more power to the States General at Antwerp, and strengthen central authority, as well as expressly guarantee the toleration of Catholic worship… The rival schemes for union represented profoundly different concepts of how to

[104] Van Linschoten, *His Discours of Voyages into Ye Easte & West Indies*, 145.
[105] Charles McKew Parr, *Jan van Linschoten: The Dutch Marco Polo* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1964), 185.
[106] As mentioned previously, it is possible that van Linschoten's departure for Spain in December of 1576 may have been partially motivated by the increasing brutality of the Revolt; his departure only a month after the Sack of Antwerp seems to corroborate this.
[107] Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, 199.

shape the Netherlands future, one based on Holland, the other on the 'south'."[108] This conflict was multi-faceted, as many resisted the growing influence of Holland, viewing its mercantile strengths and Calvinist leanings as aspirations of hegemony over the other provinces of the Revolt. Holland's power (and that of Amsterdam, its principal city) only grew when the Duke of Parma's reconquest of the southern provinces began in earnest, the power of the northern rebels waxed with regard to those of the more moderate faction led by William the Silent. This strengthening of the radicals was demonstrated most notably by the Act of Abjuration in 1581, renouncing any ties of allegiance to Philip II in Spain.[109]

From the Spanish perspective, Philip II's ever-changing strategic objectives were also of great benefit to the early Republic. When the long-standing tensions between England and the Spanish Habsburg monarchy finally boiled over into outright war, the King of Spain was forced to commit significant forces to the conquest of England, in terms of both manpower and ships. Organizing such an operation put considerable strain on the empire, and resulted in far-reaching consequences for all powers involved. Somewhat ironically, from the Dutch perspective, the Armada was extremely fortuitous. The English (who had been invited into the provinces in hopes of securing foreign support) had been attempting to strengthen their control over their new protectorate, both by opposing its centralization (which would prove detrimental to their own influence) and using their garrisons in major cities to leverage control. Both of these initiatives collapsed when the Armada became a more definite threat, as "Elizabeth appreciated that she needed Dutch naval cooperation and was not going to get it whilst her officers, in the Republic, continued obstructing the States on her orders. In April 1588, Elizabeth withdrew her support for the anti-Holland factions, issuing instructions that her commanders henceforth co-operate with Maurits, as captain-general, and the States of Holland."[110] According to Israel, these efforts removed one of the major impediments to the consolidation of the States.

The Armada's defeat in 1588 also proved fortuitous. When van Linschoten had arrived in the Azores two years after the Armada's defeat, he recorded incessant attacks led by Englishmen in the employ of the Queen against Spanish and Portuguese shipping returning from both the East and West Indies. The Spanish grip on the Atlantic was still significantly weakened, although not totally destroyed. Both England and the Republic were quite interested in taking advantage

[108] *Ibid.,* 202.
[109] *Ibid.*, 210.
[110] *Ibid.*, 237.

of this, and the 99th chapter of the *Itinerario* is filled with incidents involving ships being sunk or captured by English raiders. One particular expedition is described as follows: "The seuenth of August a Nauie of English shippes was seene before *Tercera,* being *20* in number, and fiue of them the Quéenes shippes: their Generall was one *Martin Furbusher,* as wee after had intelligence. They came purposely to watch for the Fleet of the Spanish Indies, and for the *Indian* shippes, and the ships of the countries in the West"[111]. Martin Frobisher was one of many dispatched to take advantage of these maritime weaknesses in the years following the failure of the Armada to conquer England.

Philip's commitments abroad did not end with his attempts to suppress the Dutch revolt or organize an invasion of England. On land, the decisive opportunity for the rebelling provinces came when Philip II "[decided] to switch the bulk of the Spanish army of Flanders away from the north Netherlands, and intervene in the French civil war, in the hope of preventing the protestant Henri IV from securing himself as king of France."[112] This change allowed for the rebel leadership to go on the offensive for the first time in years, greatly expanding their areas of control and securing major rivers and cities in the area. The decision to intervene in France was a costly one for the Spanish, and may have deprived them of any remaining opportunity to subdue the revolt in the Netherlands.

In the Azores, van Linschoten remarks on this incident as well: "The *30.* of August we receiued very certaine newes out of Portingal, that ther were *80.* ships put out of ye Carunho [possibly A Coruña], laden with victuals, Munition, money, and Souldiers, to goe for Britaine to aide the Catholicks, and Leaguers of Fraunce, against the King of *Nauarre.*"[113] It was simply a matter of too many wars on too many fronts. Something had to give, and the first to do so was the strategic situation in the Netherlands. Once significant resources had been made available for the French intervention, Maurits struck back. Spanish efforts at this point in the reign of Philip II read very similarly, as the empire was forced to fight several fires with insufficient water. Metaphors aside, the French intervention came at a critical time for the Republic, allowing it both a respite and an opportunity for a counterattack. In addition to this, its financial prospects began to improve around this time as well.

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[111] Van Linschoten, *His Discours of Voyages into Ye Easte & West Indies*, 190.
[112] Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, 241.
[113] Van Linschoten, *His Discours of Voyages into Ye Easte & West Indies*, 190. In this passage, van Linschoten is likely referring to Philip II's support of the French Catholic League, an organization that fought against the future King Henry IV on the grounds of his Calvinist religion.

Interest in the 'rich trades,' as Israel calls them, began in the early 1590s for a variety of reasons. Israel lists several. The initial Spanish reconquest of the south had driven many refugees northward. Many in Antwerp's merchant community had either left of their own volition or had been expelled due to their religious sympathies, settling in Amsterdam. This flight had become mandatory for several reasons; following the brutal Spanish sack of Antwerp in 1576, many had fled the city. This decline in population had become even more pronounced following the subsequent fall of the city in 1585, when Spanish forces were able to negotiate the city's capitulation after a year-long siege. The non-Catholic citizens were given four years to leave the city, which resulted in many of the merchants and craftsmen of the city departing for the North, allowing for the growth of cities such as Amsterdam. With them they brought their mercantile experience and connections. The change upon the northern cities of Holland and Zeeland was immediately appreciable. Previously their trade had been confined to "the freightage of bulky goods of low value, especially grain, timber, salt and fish… this meant that [they] possessed hardly any major merchants, little commercial wealth, and far less export-oriented industry than Flanders or Brabant."[114] With this vast influx of wealthy and experienced merchants, the seafaring resources of Holland could not only be harnessed in a new manner, but they could additionally be harnessed without the competition of Antwerp, the city that had dominated trade in Northern Europe for centuries. Many of the merchants and businessmen uprooted in this time of turmoil would later be instrumental in contributing to, and advocating for, the publication of the *Itinerario* as will be seen later.

This change in the seafaring cities of the northern Netherlands also happened at a fortuitous time. After years of warfare, the monetary strain on the Spanish Empire had grown great enough that Philip II's advisers convinced him to lift the embargo he had imposed upon the Low Countries in 1590. This allowed for the merchants of the Low Countries (many of whom had once worked in Antwerp but had taken their businesses northward) to trade with Iberia once more, and soon their coffers swelled with access to "spices, sugar, silks, dyestuffs, Mediterranean fruit and wine, and Spanish American silver."[115] This only succeeded in whetting their appetite. The "Spanish ministers [soon] realized that Dutch access to Spain and Portugal… was fuelling the sensational expansion of Dutch power and wealth."[116]

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[114] Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, 15-16.
[115] *Ibid.*, 312.
[116] *Ibid.*, 312.

The Spanish thus attempted to renew the embargo with the ascension of Philip III. They decided to strangle this newfound source of wealth by "[reimposing] embargoes in Spain and Portugal on Dutch ships, goods, and merchants."[117] This was somewhat effective at preventing Dutch merchants from actually trading in Iberia, but it had the unintended and adverse effect of forcing them to no longer treat those lands as the entrepot for East Asian goods. Instead, the reimposition of the embargo in 1598 provided the necessary incentive for the Dutch to strike east by depriving them of their ability to trade with the Iberian states. This "served only further to strengthen the burgeoning Dutch overseas trading system by forcing the elite merchants of Holland and Zeeland… to invest immediately, and heavily, in a new direct traffic to the Indies east and west."[118] Whilst the merchants of the Dutch seagoing provinces were compelled to act this way in 1598, there had already been those advocating for this change in course years earlier, when the *Itinerario* was first written and published.

3. Strategic dissemination

Let us once again turn to a passage from Jonathan Israel's work that summarizes the conventional understanding of Jan Huygen van Linschoten's contribution to the Dutch efforts in the East Indies. He states that "in 1590… knowledge about the commerce in the East Indies, as well as of the commodities of Asia, was being widely disseminated in the Dutch mercantile towns."[119] According to Israel, this was due to a variety of factors, including "the publication of several books… Preeminent amongst [them] was the *Itinerario* (1596) of Jan Huygen van Linschoten, who had gone out to Goa in 1584 … and returned to Europe in 1592. His book was a veritable merchants' manual of routes, commodities, and conditions in the East Indies."[120]

Upon his return to his hometown, van Linschoten was likely greeted with great interest. Van Linschoten had sent letters to his family whilst abroad, the contents of which had likely made him something of a local celebrity in Enkhuizen.[121] Upon his return, he put this notoriety to

[117] *Ibid.*, 313.
[118] *Ibid.*, 312-313.
[119] *Ibid.*, 319.
[120] *Ibid.*, 319-320. Israel does not say outright what each of these books were; he only directly mentions the *Itinerario*. It is possible that he might be referring to books published by Plancius or Waghenaer, discussed later in this chapter.
[121] Parr, *The Dutch Marco Polo*, 185. Troublingly, Parr does not provide explicit citations of letters that he used in the writing of *The Dutch Marco Polo*. An online search for access to van Linschoten's letters has also proven unsuccessful. What we can gather is that van Linschoten did engage in correspondence with his family whilst

good use, becoming sponsored by one "Burgomaster Meinert Simonszoon Semeyns, Councillor for the Stadtholder Count Maurice of Nassau,"[122] who was a fellow resident of Enkhuizen. Their personal relationship and connections deepened further when Jan married the Burgomaster's daughter Reinu three years after his return.[123] Van Linschoten's later years are summed up succinctly in this following passage: "Shortly after his return to Holland, he was appointed to take part in the first expedition to the North Seas, and sailed on board the Mercury of Enckhuysen… He likewise accompanied the second expedition, and wrote an account of both voyages… he also published an account of his voyage to the East Indies, etc. Linschoten was afterwards treasurer of the town of Enckhuysen, and died there in 1633."[124] Van Linschoten's journeys to the Northeast will be discussed at greater length later in the chapter. It is reasonable to assume that his prominence in Enkhuizen and connections with the Burgomaster also facilitated other ties with local notables, including Doctor Francois Maelson (another political notable who also had ties to Maurice of Orange and had served in a diplomatic capacity to Elizabeth I several years previously) and Lucas Janszoon Waghenaer, a "renowned maritime cartographer."[125]

Maelson and Semeyns' connections to Maurice of Orange were likely helpful in securing high-level interest in the publication of the *Itinerario*. Nowhere is this more clear than the letter of dedication included in the first edition of the *Itinerario*, dedicated to "To the noble-born prince and lord Maurice prince and lord of Orange, count of Nassau, Catzenelleboghe, etc. […] and to the upstanding, honorable, most learned, wise and prudent lords councillors of the Admiralty in Holland, Zeeland, and West-Friesland."[126] Of even greater interest is the passage that follows: "Although among all activities with which humans occupy themselves especially, the acquisition of land has always been considered the oldest, most important, and most glorious, nevertheless it seems to me (unless corrected) that for good reason maritime shipping may be compared to it, and deemed of similar worth, especially when we pay attention to the location of countries…

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abroad, as he mentions learning of several events from home, such as the death of William of Orange and the death of his own father. Beyond that, he sheds little light on what content these letters contained.

[122] Parr, *The Dutch Marco Polo*, 185.

[123] *Ibid.*, 185.

[124] Gerrit de Veer, *A true description of three voyages by the north-east towards Cathay and China: undertaken by the Dutch in the years 1594, 1595, and 1596* (Amsterdam, 1598), 40. This volume was later translated into English in 1609 and then reprinted for the Hakluyt Society in 1853.

[125] Parr, *The Dutch Marco Polo*, 188-189.

[126] Jan Huygen van Linschoten, *Itinerario: voyage ofte schipvaert van Jan Huygen van Linschoten naer Dolt ofte Portugaels Indien* (Amsterdam, Cornelis Claesz, 1598), 3.

[The acquisition of wealth] cannot be done with greater profit, nor at lower cost, than with the help of ships, with the principal aid of proper harbors and the sea, which no doubt reaches farthest and widest… The famous riches and glory of the kings of Egypt were derived largely from the sea; the power of the Athenians rested mostly on their ships. And what has brought the Venetians to their current power and glory if not that fishermen became sailors and, reaching ever farther, have brought Thrace, Syria, and Egypt to its shores, as it were with a bridge? And – praise God – to this we owe, seeing the remarkable prosperity of our country, our improvement and strength."[127] In this dedication van Linschoten argues that the Netherlands derives much of its wealth from the sea, and advocates for the expansion of trade to the furthest corners of the globe. He is essentially advocating for what he and his network of collaborators had come to see as an unprecedented opportunity for the early Republic. Other members of the circle had also published influential texts in previous years, cementing their influence in the maritime circles of the Republic.

Waghenaer had published the *Spieghel der Zeevaerdt* over the course of the years 1583-1585.[128] Importantly, this text had also been published in England, a connection that would likely prove valuable later when it came time to promote English interest in the *Itinerario*. Printing of the work began in late 1583 in Leiden, under the auspices of Christoffel Plantijn (another Antwerpian printer who had relocated north).[129] It gained popularity quickly, being reprinted four times in the first two years.[130] In his article entitled "Lucas Janszoon Waghenaer: A Sixteenth Century Marine Cartographer," C. Koeman states: "[Waghenaer's] advocate, Maelson, had in the meantime become pensionary of Holland and West Friesland, and in 1585, was sent as an ambassador to England. He seems to have shown a copy of the *Spieghel der Zeevaerdt* to the English Privy Council. Waghenaer had already prepared a dedication to Queen Elizabeth, which was included in the Latin edition of 1586. It did, in fact, excite considerable interest in England, as appears in Richard Slotboom's introduction to the German translation of 1589. An English edition did appear in London in 1588, but was never reprinted."[131] Most

[127] *Ibid.,* 3.
[128] Parr, *The Dutch Marco Polo*, 189. Parr translates this work's title as "*The Mariner's Mirror*."
[129] C. Koeman, "Lucas Janszoon Waghenaer: A Sixteenth Century Marine Cartographer," *The Geographical Journal* 131, no. 2 (1965): 207.
[130] *Ibid.*, 207.
[131] *Ibid.*, 207.

importantly, through Waghenaer, van Linschoten had access to Francois Maelson and his connections across the channel.

Above all of these newfound influential connections stands the figure of Doctor Bernardus Paludanus, originally known as Barent ten Broecke. Educated at the University of Padua, Paludanus had also traveled extensively during his younger years, throughout both Europe and the Levant, before eventually returning to the Netherlands and becoming a physician and local notable in Enkhuizen.[132] He operated a museum and gathered together a group of like-minded travelers into a group that included "Lucas Waghenaer, Dirck "China" and Jan [van Linschoten]."[133] Several passages within the *Itinerario* itself reference Paludanus' museum, such as van Linschoten's description of an herb used for clothing: "They have likewise other linnen excellently wrought of a hearbe, which they spinne like yearne: this yearne is to be seen at the house of Paludanus: it is yealowish, and is called the hearbe of Bengalen."[134]

Importantly, this is not the first occasion we have heard of Dirck "China". Van Linschoten had known this man for years by this point, as he had been a fellow traveler in East Asia, and their friendship had been instrumental in securing Jan permission to leave Goa after the death of his employer. Jan mentions him in the *Itinerario* when discussing his departure from Goa, stating: "Diricke Garrison… after he had been 20 yeares in India, was minded then to saile in that shippe to Portingall, with whom because of olde acquaintance, and for his company, I minded to see if I could get any place within the shippe."[135] Turning to other secondary literature, Arun Saldanha identifies him as "Dirck Gerritsz Pomp, called "Dirck China" … probably the first Dutchman in the Far East."[136] What becomes apparent from all this is that Doctor Paludanus, amongst others, had a deep interest in men who had actually been to East Asia, men with first-hand knowledge of the situation on the ground and the commercial networks the Portuguese had constructed. It is also important to note that this impromptu group also counted a professional cartographer amongst their numbers, someone quite capable of taking their notes and sketches and producing reasonably accurate maps and nautical charts of the East.

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[132] Parr, *The Dutch Marco Polo*, 190-198.
[133] *Ibid.*, 198.
[134] Van Linschoten, *His Discours of Voyages into Ye Easte & West Indies*, 28.
[135] *Ibid.,* 160.
[136] Saldanha, "The Itineraries of Geography," 158. Saldanha cites (IJzerman's Dirck Gerritsz Pomp, alias Dirk Gerritsz China, de eerste Nederlander die China en Japan bezocht (1544-1604): zijn reis naar en verblijf in Zuid-Amerika, grootendeels naar Spaansche bescheiden bewerkt, door J.W. Ijzerman, met twee kaarten, published in 1915) as his source for this information.

The last addition to this assembly was one Cornelis Claeszoon, a businessman who had fled Brabant during the Spanish reconquest and settled in Amsterdam, establishing a printing business that became the "pioneer Dutch publisher of geographical maps and writings."[137] Working alongside him was one Petrus Plancius, a "learned astronomer and geographer… [and] clergyman."[138] They had begun their business after being hired to set up the city library of Amsterdam, using confiscated books from Catholic monasteries.[139] After finding success on that front, the two had opened their publishing business. It was Cornelis Claeszoon who became interested in the potential of the *Itinerario* as a book of economic import. When he approached van Linschoten about having it published, he agreed so long as his friend, the acknowledged scholar Bernardus Paludanus agreed to be the coauthor.[140]

Many chapters in the *Itinerario* contain italicised paragraphs referring to botanical knowledge and other scientific clarifications are the result of the Doctor's input. Paludanus' earlier travels and his operation of a museum in Enkhuizen had provided him with a wealth of botanical knowledge that he was happy to include in the *Itinerario*. Paludanus, a well-traveled academic in his own right, likely added wisened intellectual legitimacy to the project. Additionally, he reflects the blend of commerce with that of medicine and science that had come to characterize the Republic's elites at the time, where "the beginnings of a global science occurred during the period of the rise of a global economy."[141]

The influence of Waghenaer, Plancius, and Claeszoon comes through particularly strongly with the *Itinerario's* focus on cartography. Several intricate maps of Southeast Asia are scattered throughout the texts, credited to van Linschoten, but perhaps with the assistance of his friends with experience in map making. It seems likely that they would have at least played an advisory role in the final drawings that were published; we know that Waghenaer drew upon van Linschoten's illustrations for his own works and thus it is probable that he returned the favor. Further evidence that there was collaboration exists as well. In April of 1592, the States General of the Netherlands recorded that they had granted a patent to the Amsterdam publisher Cornelis [Claesz] to "print… such twenty-five special sea charts as he obtained by the direction of Petrus

[137] Parr, *Dutch Marco Polo*, 198-199.
[138] *Ibid*., 199.
[139] *Ibid*., 198.
[140] *Ibid*., 201.
[141] Harold Cook, *Matters of Exchange: Commerce, Medicine and Science in the Dutch Golden Age* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 416.

Plancius, but at his own expense, from Bartolomeu Lasso".[142] Plancius' earlier interest in Southeast Asian cartography and work on assembling the works of Lasso for publication would likely have prepared him to assist with the maps shown in the *Itinerario*. It also neatly ties him to the growing group of intellectuals and businessmen present in the Netherlands advocating for a direct presence in the east. Plancius' work was published in 1594, and there are instances of the Plancius map being featured in additions of the *Itinerario*,[143] further evidence of collaboration and cross-pollination.[144]

It is important to note that while van Linschoten collaborated heavily with these men, his work was still very much his own. The *Itinerario* featured its own maps and information regarding the East Indies, drawn from different sources from Plancius'. It also contained its own unique advice to mariners seeking to evade the Portuguese: in addition to notifying its readers of locations and fortresses that were often left critically undermanned and supplied, it also "provided the geographic 'key' to unlocking Portuguese grip on passage through the Malacca Strait: Linschoten advocated approaching the Indies from the south of Sumatra through the Sunda Strait, thereby minimizing the danger of Portuguese notice or reprisal."[145] These sorts of innovations would be of great interest to van Linschoten's growing network of supporters, many of whom (like Claeszoon) harbored little regard for the Spaniards and their Portuguese proxies. Many of them were "capitalists from the Southern Netherlands who had been dislodged from the world metropolis of Antwerp by the ruin which the Spaniards had brought to their industrial and commercial trade."[146]

Once the decision to publish the *Itinerario* was made, the work proceeded for several years. The license for its publication was "granted by the States-General in October of 1594"[147] and the completed work was finally released in 1596. During this time van Linschoten became involved with two Dutch attempts to find the fabled Northeast Passage around Russia, all of which were largely commercial failures. They nonetheless increased his notoriety and seafaring expertise. By the autumn of 1595 van Linschoten had returned to the Netherlands and had become embroiled in attempts to reassure investors in the northerly expeditions that their

[142] Thomas Suarez, *Early Mapping of Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Periplus, 1999), 177.
[143] The Plancius map appears in several editions of the *Itinerario*, beginning with the first edition in 1596, according to a search on WorldCat.
[144] Suarez, *Early Mapping of Southeast Asia*, 178.
[145] *Ibid.*, 178.
[146] Parr, *Dutch Marco Polo*, 207.
[147] Suarez, *Early Mapping of Southeast Asia*, 178.

contributions were not entirely in vain.[148] A third attempt was made by Jacob Heemskerk and Willem Barentz in 1596, but this too ended in failure.[149] All of these attempts reflect a prevailing Dutch interest in reaching the East Indies by way of a new route. Their failures served only to convince those interested that the future of Dutch trade lay "along the Cape route."[150]This undoubtedly lent further credibility to the *Itinerario*, a portion of which having been published had already garnered great interest and provided detailed instructions regarding how to make a successful voyage to the East using that very same route. The fact that van Linschoten was also heavily involved with failed attempts to find a northerly route seems to have had little effect on his popularity at the time.

The critical moment that cemented the *Itinerario's* influence occurred soon after, when Cornelis Houtman returned from his successful voyage to the East Indies during the summer of 1597.[151] Houtman's success was in large part due to the first part of the *Itinerario* and its early publication; he had been provided with a copy of the *Reysgeschift* before his departure. The network that supported van Linschoten and the *Itinerario* was involved here as well; beyond providing a copy of the *Reysgeschift*, "Plancius was a scientific consultant for the pioneering voyage to Southeast Asia being planned by Cornelis and Frederik de Houtman."[152] The success of his mission caused an immediate upswing in support for the Cape Route, and it was not long before several additional expeditions were organized. These included "one, commanded by a seafaring Rotterdam innkeeper, Olivier van Noort, [who] took the South American and Pacific route to make the first Dutch voyage around the world; but the most encouraging result was… led by Jacob van Neck. Four of these vessels returned in July 1599, after a fifteen-month absence and with a costly cargo of spices."[153]

Afterwards, trade with the East exploded. Boxer states that "Commercial companies for trading to the East sprang up like mushrooms… the lure[154] of the Spice Trade was such that fourteen fleets totalling sixty-five ships left for the East Indies in 1601." According to Parr, "excessive competition" and an overabundance of East Indies ventures caused a glut in the

[148] Parr, *Dutch Marco Polo*, 267.
[149] *Ibid.*, 269-270.
[150] *Ibid.*, 270.
[151] *Ibid.*, 272.
[152] Suarez, *Early Mapping of Southeast Asia*, 177.
[153] Boxer, *The Dutch Seaborne Empire*, 25.
[154] *Ibid.* 25.

availability of goods from the east, driving prices down and causing an economic crisis.[155] Israel corroborates this, stating "by 1601 both prices and profits were falling steeply. It was this that led the merchants participating in the various companies to ask the States of Holland and Zeeland to intervene to impose order on the traffic, warning that if this were not done the newly burgeoning Dutch East India traffic would suffer severe difficulties and perhaps collapse."[156] The success of the initial missions had led to the establishment of a plethora of different companies dedicated to trade with the East. "By 1599, there were no fewer than eight different companies participating in the East India traffic in Holland and Zeeland, based at Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Middelburg, Hoorn, and Enkhuizen."[157] Israel goes on to state that by 1601 Dutch traffic to the East had far outstripped its competitors in England and in Portugal.[158] It was clear that some degree of regulation or control had to be imposed, otherwise the value of the trade -and its returns- would be undermined altogether. The solution would come in the form of the Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie, or the VOC.

The founding of the VOC was seen as a solution to the danger of oversaturation. Additionally, it incentivised investors by offering the prospect of risk-sharing and insurance. Helpfully, "marine insurance also underwent a development at Amsterdam during this period. A chamber of assurance was organised there in 1598, which supervised the registration of policies and settled any disputes about claims arising out of them."[159] The involvement of the Republic itself ensured governmental support for its endeavors, including naval protection of the VOC's commercial vessels. As they had in the beginning stages of the revolt, the mercantile and political leaders of the Republic gathered to create "a chartered, joint-stock monopoly strongly backed by the state which was, at the same time, federated into chambers which kept their capital, and commerce operations, separate from each other, while observing general guidelines, and policies, set by a federal board of directors."[160] In many ways the unique structure of the VOC emulated the Dutch Republic itself, with its relative internal autonomy balanced by a central administration. Its monopolistic nature helped to bring the glut of East Asian goods under control, ensuring that the trade would remain profitable and thus advisable.

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[155] Parr, *The Dutch Marco Polo*, 274.
[156] Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, 321.
[157] *Ibid.*, 320-321.
[158] *Ibid.*, 321.
[159] Boxer, *The Dutch Seaborne Empire*, 22.
[160] Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, 321.

The company's foundation also represented a victory for the mercantile interests within the Republic who had long advocated for a more aggressive approach against the Spanish and their Portuguese proxies. As discussed before, a network of political and business elites had quickly realized the value of the *Itinerario* and had arranged for its publication. These men had helped to draft it and to secure support from the States General for its publication, and now they sought to reap the benefits of this new explosion of interest in East Asian trade. Many of the initial investors in the VOC were among the first investors in the company. Parr states that "among some of the most prominent shareholders were Petrus Plancius and Isaac le Maire; the Semeyns family were also shareholders, probably acting on the advice of Jan van Linschoten, who was now recognized as the leading authority on matters pertaining to trade with the East."[161] Suarez corroborates this, stating that beyond being just a shareholder, Plancius was "instrumental in motivating and focusing Dutch energy toward Southeast Asia, and was one of the primary forces in the creation of the V.O.C. (Dutch East India Company) in 1602."[162]

Also important to note is this the role of knowledge as a critically important asset. In his article entitled "Writing Travels: Power, Knowledge and Ritual on the English East India Company's Early Voyages," Miles Ogborn examines the role played by the exchange of royal letters in business exchanges in the East. While the specific context of the royal letter is different from the writing of the *Itinerario*, I believe his thoughts regarding the role of texts in these early global exchanges serves to demonstrate the *Itinerario*'s import as a text of knowledge as well. He states: "understanding such inscriptions as material, practical, and traveling objects foregrounds the active making of power and knowledge as a contested enterprise involving multiple agents."[163] The creation of these empires was, as has been discussed throughout this chapter, an effort that involved actors in each locus of power, whether that be on the imperial periphery, in the halls of government, the major mercantile entrepots, or in the publishing houses. The knowledge provided by the authors of the *Itinerario* was thus key to contributing to both the Dutch, and the general European ability to forge empires; it also aided in the establishment of a common European 'manual' of empire by disseminating not only data regarding how to seize holdings in the East, but also the 'dos and don'ts' of actual colonial governance.

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[161] Parr, *Dutch Marco Polo*, 275.
[162] Suarez, *Early Mapping of Southeast Asia*, 177.
[163] Miles Ogborn, "Writing Travels: Power, Knowledge and Ritual on the English East India Company's Early Voyages," *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 27, no. 2 (2002): 167.

The publication of the *Itinerario* in several languages in rapid succession lends credence to the claim that it had a multinational impact. Kamissek and Kreienbaum argue that "empires were connected with each one another in multiple ways, sharing parts of their imperial knowledge, notions and narratives."[164] They posit that one way to conceptualize this sharing of knowledge is to think of it as akin to the cloud data storage used on the Internet today. The *Itinerario,* with its multinational appeal and contribution to imperial legacy has real potential to be viewed as one major contributor to such a construct. As Kamissek and Kreienbaum state, often "historians of empire tend to limit their research to analysing phenomena inside imperial units. They remain wedded to a national-history paradigm, hardly cognizant of other empires and of the broader world around them."[165] The study of texts like the *Itinerario* can thus not only teach us about the interconnectedness between the production of both itself as a text and its ties to the creation of the Dutch colonial empire, it can also serve as a 'jumping-off point' for scholarship on the used of shared imperial knowledge amongst European states.

Dutch interest in the East had long existed within the Netherlands, at the very least since the early 1590s. Plancius, Claeszoon, and Bathasar de Moucheron (the man who had funded van Linschoten's northerly expeditions) are among the most prominent of these men. The network that advocated for the publication of the *Itinerario* in the early 1590s and the subsequent Houtman expedition is proof positive that there was a powerful initiative towards seizing control over the Eastern trade networks (or at the very least taking a portion of their proceeds). Additionally, their influence upon leading merchants of the period, such as "Isaac le Maire and Balthazar de Moucheron" who Boxer describes as "leading directors of pioneer companies" during this period,[166] was instrumental in securing the funding necessary to actually outfit expeditions. Critically, the production of knowledge in connection to commercial expansion was this network's major contribution to the development of the Dutch Empire in the East. By publishing the *Itinerario*, they not only garnered increased interest in the opportunities for the acquisition of wealth in the East, but also provided Dutch mariners and merchants with the knowledge necessary to actually make a successful bid for eastern hegemony.

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[164] Kamissek, Christoph, and Jonas Kreienbaum, "An Imperial Cloud? Conceptualising Interimperial Connections and Transimperial Knowledge," *Journal of Modern European History / Zeitschrift Für Moderne Europäische Geschichte / Revue D'histoire Européenne Contemporaine* 14, no. 2 (2016): 181.
[165] *Ibid.,* 181.
[166] Boxer, *The Dutch Seaborne Empire*, 26.

Chapter Three
Cross-Channel Collaboration:
The *Itinerario* and its English Impact

In the first chapter we discussed van Linschoten's travel to the East and the formative effect it had on his outlook towards the Iberian powers as well as the ways in which he collected information concerning the layout of Portuguese trade as well as its nature. In the second chapter we examined his return to the Netherlands and the network of individuals that both encouraged and assisted him with regards to publishing his collection of notes, advice, and recollections. These men came from several different backgrounds, and were a fundamental part of both creating the *Itinerario* and ensuring its influential dissemination. As previously discussed, many also went on to become founding members of trade missions to the East themselves, culminating with the foundation of the Dutch East India company.

This chapter will examine the people and events that advocated for a similar process to take place in London. I will argue that as in the Netherlands, influential men in England saw the value of the wealth of navigational, commercial and cultural knowledge contained within the *Itinerario*'s pages and thus sought to secure its translation, publication and dissemination within England so as to guide their own nation to seek new mercantile opportunities abroad whilst engaged in a rapidly expanding global conflict with the Iberian kingdoms. This chapter's aim is to identify the Englishmen who gathered to advocate for the translation, publication, and dissemination of the *Itinerario*. As with the original group in Enkhuizen, the individuals who supported the *Itinerario* supported its publication within England consisted of three relatively distinct groups: the merchants, the political elites, and the intellectuals. Each of these groups had its own reasons for advocating for the publication (i.e. monetary, diplomatic, or out of a proto-nationalistic sentiment), and while this could bring about tensions, also made it possible for a cooperative effort based upon mutual benefit. These men, acting in the interests of their country, are the ones I believe to have played an instrumental role in motivating England's rapid response to the success of the Dutch expeditions.

1. Historical Context

In order to understand the circumstances in which the *Itinerario* generated such interest, a discussion of England and its mercantile community as it existed in the late 1500s is warranted. Much of the scholarship regarding Elizabethan England during this era focuses heavily on England's conflict with Spain as one of the catalysts for its burgeoning mercantile interests. Two works by Alan Gordon Rae Smith and Robert Brenner address this particular element in detail as it related to the development of English overseas endeavors. Published in 1997 and 1993 respectively, these occupy the earlier end of the historiographical spectrum but nonetheless have proven singularly influential texts in their fields.[167]

According to Brenner, many traditional narratives about the change in English mercantile interests have focused overly much on the decline in the wool trade with the Netherlands, a trade that had dominated the economies of both polities during the Middle Ages.[168] He instead refocuses on the significance of English contacts with North Africa, the Middle East, Africa, and Russia, all trades that began during the reign of Elizabeth I and emphasized the acquisition of commodities of high value that could be sold internally.[169] The English (like the Dutch) had originally relied on other European states to acquire these goods before purchasing them in the great entrepots of Antwerp, Lisbon, and Venice. Following the Dutch Revolt and the disruption of these trades, however, English merchants began to consider that the acquisition of these goods might be made more feasible (and profitable) by cutting out the middlemen altogether and establishing direct English contact with the suppliers. New information about the Far East and the attempts of other European states (such as the Dutch) to circumvent Portuguese hegemony provided even more incentives.[170]

Smith's work explains the motivation within England that prompted interest in trade with the Far East. Smith too reiterates Brenner's argument in that much of the initial English contact

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[167] Alan Gordon Rae Smith, *The Emergence of a Nation State: the Commonwealth of England 1529-1660* (London: Longman, 1997).
Robert Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and London's Overseas Traders, 1550-1653* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1993.
[168] Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution*, 4-5.
[169] *Ibid.*, 5.
[170] *Ibid.*, 5.

with the East had originated as second-hand exposure via the Portuguese. By the late 1500s, however, the English were attempting to insert themselves directly into this exchange in order to tap into the vast profits that had made the Portuguese the envy of Europe.[171] Importantly, many of the merchants that opposed this economic reorientation belonged to groups centered in ports such as Bristol and Chester which had relied heavily on the cloth trade with the Iberian kingdoms and had suffered a great deal after the outbreak of war.[172] This limited their ability to monetarily oppose the London mercantile networks that advocated for a much more direct and aggressive approach. Both Smith and Brenner thus establish that English trade in the East was largely inspired and necessitated by war with the Spanish Habsburg monarchy and the subsequent disruption of the traditional English patterns of trade. This would have left merchants quite open to the prospect of new mercantile opportunities, creating a pool of potential investors. Additionally the publication of the *Itinerario* during this time could not have been more fortuitous, as it fed the imaginations of this very merchant class, eager for new opportunities.

Later historiography tends to corroborate these findings by earlier historians. A recent work by L. H. Roper emphasizes that private interests (such as members of the mercantile elite and the nobility) spearheaded the efforts to break into this trade, rather than state-sponsored entities.[173] As we will see later in the chapter, merchants found it necessary to seek the Crown's consent to engage in trade expeditions, but funded such endeavors themselves. Roper argues that the Crown, and by extension the government of England, at the time had neither the resources nor the incentive to pursue these overseas adventures, leaving privately motivated individuals to be responsible for their undertaking. In sum, it seems the historiography concerning the English trade with the Far East was primarily undertaken by individuals of their own volition in the face of upheaval and loss of opportunity on the continent.

These findings are corroborated by other sources as well, and they mark the early seventeenth century as the point at which London Merchant companies began to accept that they would have to seek out their own avenues of trade in order to match the newfound wealth of their continental rivals, particularly Spain.[174] Such efforts were aided in particular by Sir Francis

[171] Alan Gordon Rae Smith, *The Emergence of a Nation State: the Commonwealth of England 1529-1660* (London: Longman, 1997), 155-156.
[172] *Ibid.,* 238.
[173] L. H. Roper, *Advancing Empire: English Interests and Overseas Expansion, 1613-1688* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
[174] Nicholas Canny, *The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Origins of Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 4.

Walsingham, who served as Elizabeth's Secretary of State and Spymaster.[175] Walsingham was a strong advocate for the expansion of overseas trade, and is said to have had close ties with both the Muscovy Company and the Levant Company.[176] His ties with these two companies are emblematic of how officials in the Elizabethan administration pursued ties with private businesses both as sources of profit and to further their political agendas. We shall see another example of such a phenomenon later in the chapter during our examination of Julius Caesar. Such instances are emblematic of the tenuous alliance that existed between the Crown's bureaucracy and the merchant community; an alliance that was often built out of mutual interest. Walsingham and his fellow advocates were inspired to act both due to their enmity towards Spain and because of the aforementioned disruption of traditional trade relationships with the European mainland.[177]

Having explored the factors that motivated the change, it is now important to consider the historical circumstances surrounding the first actual endeavors attempted by the English. Historians agree that for the most part, the English were initially inspired by the Venetians and their overseas, Mediterranean-based importation of Eastern goods.[178] While the Venetians had exposed Europe to the broad array of goods that could be obtained from far abroad, the Portuguese taught Europeans that those goods could be obtained directly from their source. Their development of the Cape Route around Africa had allowed them to dominate the trade with the East for nearly a century by the time the English began to seriously consider making their own attempts.[179] While the disruption of trading networks was a major impetus for the English, the Dutch forays into the East also proved motivating. These attempts, inspired in no small part by van Linschoten and the *Itinerario*, laid the foundation for the Dutch Republic's rapid assertion of power in the East Indies. The network of intellectuals that had advocated for such expansion had finally succeeded in enlisting the support of powerful merchants to their cause.

As discussed earlier in this chapter, by the mid 1580s intellectual cross-pollination had already begun across the channel. Waghenaer's *Spieghel der Zeevaerdt* had been favorably received in England and had garnered a significant readership of its own. The news of the

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[175] *Ibid*., 4.
[176] John Cooper, *The Queen's Agent: Francis Walsingham at the Court of Elizabeth I* (London: Faber & Faber, 2011), 237.
[177] Canny, *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, 4.
[178] Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution*, 5.
[179] Marshall, *Oxford History of the British Empire*, 266.

Houtman expedition was quickly met with a great deal of interest in London. It is likely to have inspired a group of 101 subscribers to raise 30,000 pounds in order to dispatch a trade mission to the East.[180] To that end, they sought a royal charter for a monopoly over any trade that began as a result of their expedition; the charter was granted in September 1600.[181] The speedy response to the Dutch expedition suggests that there were already well-developed channels of information between the Dutch Republic and England. Clearly, there was a growing interest in the East and all the wealth it could bring.

As discussed earlier, it was especially London's merchant community that proved key in making the transition to these new trades. This was partially due to the community's capability to raise capital, at least in theory.[182] The key, as Brenner states, was to provide proper incentives for investment. While there was indeed a great deal of wealth that could be made available for new ventures, merchants were often loath to part with their investment capital, given that new investments could be incredibly risky. Merchants were often only able to be persuaded to invest in new ventures after having received their returns from previous expeditions. [183] This trend only began to change after several additional years of operations that had a success rate of around ninety percent.[184] While insurance companies and joint-stock investments helped to alleviate these concerns, investments still did not rise significantly until the routes had been proven successful. Additionally, Royal consent was necessary to actually organize expeditions, as they often were seen as having wide-ranging diplomatic ramifications with the Iberian kingdoms. Contacts within the Royal administration were important links between the merchants and Crown, and often had personal financial stakes in these burgeoning companies.

All of this information paints a picture of a mercantile community that had been forced to reinvent itself in the face of continental upheaval and change, but also one that was not necessarily willing to take serious risks in order to regain its former wealth. They would need assurances of support and of a reasonable chance of success. The first came in the form of the charter granted to them in September 1600.[185] The second would come from the news of the Dutch expeditions launched across the Channel, many of which came back with cargoes that

[180] William Foster, *England's Quest of Eastern Trade* (London: 1933), 146.
[181] Marshall, *Oxford History of the British Empire*, 266.
[182] Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution*, 96.
[183] *Ibid.*, 96.
[184] *Ibid.*, 96.
[185] Marshall, *Oxford History of the British Empire*, 266.

brought great wealth to their investors. These two major assurances, along with the translation and publication of the *Itinerario* in London in 1598, would provide the necessary impetus for the formation of the English East India company and the beginning of its forays into the East.

2. The Interest of Englishmen

Now that we have established the reasons behind the English mercantile community's desire to engage in direct trade with the East, we can examine the actual intellectual discourse concerning nautical travel and expansion of trade that had been occurring across the Channel since the mid 1580s. Dutch navigational literature had become popular amongst the English elite during this period, in no small part due to the efforts of Dutchmen who had crossed the Channel seeking an alliance with Elizabeth I. During their stay, these individuals promoted Dutch explorational and navigational literature amongst their English colleagues, no doubt sensing the great degree of interest in the subject matter both from the political and mercantile quarters. One such individual was a Dutch ambassador who went by the name of François Maelson. Maelson was good friends with Lucas Janszoon Waghenaer, an author of important North Sea navigational texts, the foremost amongst them entitled the *Spieghel der Zeevaerdt*. Koeman cites Maelson as being critical to the effort of promoting the *Spieghel der Zeevaerdt* within England, as apparently he had read a portion of the work to members of the Privy Council during his time serving as one of the Dutch ambassadors to England in 1585.[186] Dutch efforts to foster foreign support had resulted in an acknowledgement of Elizabeth I as sovereign. While this arrangement proved to be temporary, it was certainly a valuable time for discourse between the two peoples. As a promoter of these efforts, Maelson, whose Dutch name was Frans Pietersz Maekschoon, utilized his ambassadorial position to promote the work of his friend abroad.

Maekschoon, like Waghenaer, traced his roots to the port town of Enkhuizen, having been born there in 1538.[187] His biographical entry confirms that he was both a statesman and a supporter of Waghenaer, his friend and fellow townsman, and helped him to publish the *Spieghel der Zeevaerdt*.[188] Interestingly, he was also involved in efforts to find an arctic route to China in

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[186] C. Koeman, "Lucas Janszoon Waghenaer: A Sixteenth Century Marine Cartographer," *The Geographical Journal* 131, no. 2 (1965): 207.
[187] P. C. Molhuysen and P. J. Blok, ed., *Nieuw Nederlandsch Biografisch Woordenboek*, vol. 9 (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1911), 640.
[188] *Ibid.,* 641.

the year 1594, almost assuredly placing him in the same circles van Linschoten frequented.[189] Between his economic endeavors and his friendship with Waghenaer, Maekschoon almost certainly knew of van Linschoten and his work. Additionally, we know that it was thanks to his efforts as ambassador that Waghenaer's book was later translated into English, proving that there was a market for Dutch navigational texts in England at least as early as the mid 1580s.[190]

Further evidence of both this market and the efforts of the Dutch ambassadors to stimulate it can be found in the introduction to the 1586 edition of the *Spieghel der Zeevaerdt*. Waghenaer makes a special effort to thank the "famous and learned men Io. Dowza Baron of Nortwick, and M. Doctor Maelson" for promoting his work while serving as ambassadors to the Queen of England.[191] While we are already acquainted with Maelson, a search concerning the Baron of Nortwick reveals that this was likely Paulus Buys, another ambassador to England and later an ally to the Earl of Leicester during his deployment to the United Provinces.[192] It seems that when the *Spieghel der Zeevaerdt* was presented to the Privy Counsel it was done in the presence of "Charles Howard, Baron of Effingham, Lorde Admirall of England", another known advocate of English overseas expansion during this period and defender of the country against the Spanish Armada.[193] While the *Spieghel der zeevaerdt* did not pertain to matters of navigation outside of Europe, it likely laid the groundwork for further intellectual cross-pollination between the English and the Dutch.

After the publication of the *Reysgheschrift* in 1595 and the *Itinerario* a year later in 1596, it did not take long for an English edition to be translated and published in 1598, demonstrating what can be assumed to be a great deal of interest in the text. Considering that many of its Dutch advocates already possessed important contacts across the channel, this should come as no surprise. The first English edition to be published included an *Epistle Dedicatorie*, or letter of dedication, penned by John Wolfe, the London publisher responsible for the first English edition of van Linschoten's *Itinerario*. Wolfe dedicated this letter to "The Right Worshipfull Julius Caesar Doctor of the Lawes, Judge of the High Court of the Admiralty, Master of Requests to the

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[189] *Ibid.,* 641.
[190] *Ibid.,* 641.
[191] Lucas Janszoon Waghenaer, *Spieghel der zeevaerdt*, trans. Anthony Ashley (London: Printed by John Charlewood, 1588), unnumbered. Taken from the 'The Authors Admonition to the Reader'. Accessed on EEBO.
[192] John Bruce ed., *Correspondence of Robert Dudley, Earl of Leycester, during his Government of the Low Countries, in the Years 1585 and 1586* (Camden Society, 1844), xiii.
[193] Waghenaer, *Spieghel der zeevaerdt*, unnumbered.

Queen's Majesty, and Master of Saint Katherines."[194] Wolfe's dedication to Caesar makes political sense, as he not only occupied a position of political import, but also had long standing familial connections with the Royal bureaucracy dating to the reign of Elizabeth's sister Mary.

Caesar came from a family of Italian immigrants who could trace their family's origins to Treviso in Italy.[195] His father, Caesar Adelmare, had come to Italy to be a physician to Queen Mary, and would likely have provided his sons with introductions to the Royal administration.[196] Sir Julius himself had entered into the service of Queen Elizabeth, serving in several different capacities throughout his life. Lodge tells us that Caesar became "Judge of the Admiralty Court the thirtieth of April the following year [1584]."[197] He served in this capacity for several decades, until 1605, at which point he assumed other roles in the English administration. It was under his jurisdiction that the John Wolfe was able to get the translated *Itinerario* published; he did so under Caesar's name, citing the common practice of writers crediting those who proved helpful; in the publication of their works by becoming patrons.[198] It seems that Wolfe was able to work out some sort of arrangement with Sir Julius in order to secure the publication of this text.

While we do not have direct evidence of this, it may be that Sir Julius saw financial opportunity within the pages of the *Itinerario*, as others did. It is important to note that during this time "the judges of the Admiralty court had no stipends from the crown, but depended for their emoluments wholly on fees… Dr. Caesar, according to the practice of all ranks, just at this time, was engaged in commercial speculations."[199] It is very possible that Sir Julius Caesar allowed for the book's publication and agreed to become its patron in return for some financial incentive. Even if this was not the case, his position as a Judge within the High Court of the Admiralty would certainly have made him privy to the ambitions of many within the Elizabethan court to secure England's financial destiny overseas. Some of these individuals included Sir Francis Walsingham and Secretary Cecil, with whom Caesar had maintained correspondence in order to appeal for financial remuneration from the English Crown.[200]

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[194] Jan Huygen van Linschoten, *John Huighen Van Linschoten. His Discours of Voyages into Ye Easte & West Indies.: Divided into Foure Bookes* (Printed at London: By John Wolfe printer to ye Honorable Cittie of London, 1598), 1.
[195] Edmund Lodge, *Life of Sir Julius Caesar* (London: John Hatchard and Son, 1827), 7.
[196] *Ibid.*, 7.
[197] *Ibid.*, 11.
[198] Van Linschoten, *His Discours of Voyages into Ye Easte & West Indies*, 2.
[199] Lodge, *Life of Sir Julius Caesar*, 14.
[200] *Ibid.,* 12-16.

While Caesar may have hoped for some sort of financial benefit to follow his endorsement, we have reason to believe that John Wolfe, the publisher, saw opportunities for profit as well. It seems that during this time there was much interest in Dutch publications within England. Evidence for this can be found when we examine the translator employed by Wolfe at his printing firm. Looking into the contributors of the *Itinerario*, one William Phillip is credited as the translator of the text into English.[201] It seems that Phillip was tasked with translating several contemporary Dutch works, suggesting that there was indeed a market for such texts at the time in London at the very least. Phillip is described as a "translator, [who] made several translations, chiefly of books of travel, from the Dutch."[202] His short biography credits him with the translation of *The Pathway to Knowledge, Written in Dutch and translated into English* in 1596, *The Description of a Voyage made by certaine Ships of Holland into the East Indies, with their adventures and Successse; together with the Description of the Countries, Townes, and Inhabitants of the same: who set forth on the Second of April, 1595, and returned on the 14 of August, 1597*[203] in 1598, along with *John Huygen van Linschoten his Discourse of Voyages into the East and West Indies. Devided into Foure Bookes*, also in 1598.[204] Phillip is credited with several other translations as well, but to list them all would go beyond the scope of this argument.

What is clear from Phillip's work as a translator for Wolfe is that Wolfe's publishing company was already following events in the Dutch Republic closely during the 1590s, clearly sensing an opportunity for profit in translating the works of Dutch travelers and mariners. This suggests that many in England were already voracious consumers of any information being published about the East. Importantly, however, the readers of these texts were not just casual consumers. Their numbers included many amongst the merchant elite actually advocating for the outfit and dispatch of English expeditions. Evidence for this is can be found in the East India Company's records where they cite various contributors to their knowledge of the East Indies. Under the "Hollanders" section, beneath "John Huygen van Linschoten's worke" is "The first

[201] This is drawn from the bibliographic entry for the work on WorldCat. Van Linschoten remains the chief author, but William Phillip is credited as the translator, with William Rodgers and Robert Beckit also cited. John Windet appears to be the actual printer, while John Wolfe remains the publisher and primary employer.
[202] Leslie Stephen and Sidney Lee, *Dictionary of National Biography*, vol. 45 (London: Smith, Elder & Company, 1896), 191.
[203] This work no doubt described the expedition headed by Cornelis Houtman, as its dates correspond exactly with those of Houtman's departure and return.
[204] *Ibid.*, 191-192.

voyage of Hollanders to Java and Baly, in printe… [as well as] The second voyage to Java, in Dutch and English."[205] These citations, specifically listed as having been written in Dutch and assumably translated into English, are strong evidence to suggest that the English mercantile elite were consuming every bit of Dutch literature that they could find on the subject of trade and exploration in the East. Given what was discussed in the second chapter (primarily that van Linschoten's network was instrumental in inspiring the Houtman expedition to begin with), we can begin to see just how influential the *Itinerario* was in both the Netherlands and England. The *Itinerario* was to prove essential in promoting interest in Eastern trade and equipping merchants with the necessary know-how to make initial expeditions successful, particularly in the case of the English East India Company, as we shall see below. Both Wolfe and Caesar are examples of governmental officials who acted according to 'national interest' and opportunities for personal profit in order to see the *Itinerario* published.

In his letter of dedication, Wolfe also states that "a learned Gentlemen" brought him a copy of the *Itinerario* and encouraged him to see it translated and published in England, assuring him that it contained information of great import to their country.[206] It appears quite plausible that the 'learned Gentleman' Wolfe conversed with was none other than Richard Hakluyt,[207] who had already become a well-known advocate for English expansion overseas. As we shall see below, Hakluyt had become a well-known advocate of the *Itinerario* amongst England's mercantile elite. The language of Wolfe's dedicatory letter makes it quite clear that he feels that the *Itinerario* had great potential to both equip English merchants with the tools necessary to engage in hitherto unaccessed avenues of trade as well as to incentivize them to do so. Additionally, many in higher echelons of the English government would have understood that the merchants of their nation, particularly London, were already looking for new opportunities for investment and profit, largely due to shifts in political realities on the continent that had disrupted their traditional networks.

Recent Dutch success in mercantile adventures in the East had almost certainly inspired some English merchants to attempt similar expeditions. These merchants, likely readers of the

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[205] John Bruce, *Annals of the Honorable East India Company*, *From their Establishment by the Charter of Queen Elizabeth 1600, To the Union of the London and English East India Companies, 1707-8* (London: Cox, Son, and Baylis, 1810), vol. 1, 120.
[206] Van Linschoten, *His Discours of Voyages into Ye Easte & West Indies*, 2.
[207] Peter C. Mancall, *Hakluyt's Promise*: *An Elizabethan's Obsession for an English America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 222.

Itinerario (published in English in 1598), would go on to become the founding members of the English East India company. In their company records, they explicitly state that they were inspired to act by "the success of the [voyage] performed by the [Dutch]" and thus resolved to organize an English trade mission in order to advance the interests of their own country.[208] By the month of September in 1599 these founding members were ready to appeal to the Queen for her approval to launch an expedition to the East Indies.[209] They framed their expedition as a venture inspired by their own patriotism, citing their love for their country as the primary reason for their desire to embark upon this expedition. These proto-nationalistic sentiments were at an all-time high during this period, following the English victory against the Spanish Armada over a decade before and subsequent English attacks on the Spanish. Securing Royal approval was essential to ensure the voyage's profitability. But to ensure the mission's success they also sought to draw upon contemporary Dutch knowledge of Eastern trade networks and the geographic layout of the East Indies. In order to do so, they drew upon the information contained within the *Itinerario* and the experience and it's great English advocate, Richard Hakluyt.

In 1589 Hakluyt had published *The Principall Navigations, Voiages and Discoveries of the English Nation*, one of his most famous texts. Throughout the work are anecdotes and first-hand accounts of English travelers abroad, painstakingly compiled by Hakluyt himself for the purposes of stimulating English interests in travel and trade abroad. Two travelers mentioned in Hakluyt's work are of particular interest, namely Ralph Fitch and John Newbery, who were "brought in as prisoners from Ormus in December 1583 and then freed with van Linschoten's intervention."[210] If this account sounds at all familiar, it is because we examined the very same story from van Linschoten's perspective as recorded in the *Itinerario* within the first chapter. Van Linschoten had heard of these two Englishmen, who had been imprisoned in Goa for supposedly attempting to "spy on the country" and on the suspicion of them being "heretickes."[211] After meeting with them personally, he had been able to arrange their release after they had paid a "suretie of 2000 Pardawes."[212]

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[208] Bruce, *Annals of the Honorable East India Company*, 113.
[209] *Ibid.*, 111.
[210] Arun Saldanha, "The Itineraries of Geography: Jan Huygen Van Linschoten's *Itinerario* and Dutch Expeditions to the Indian Ocean, 1594–1602," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 101, no. 1 (2011), 158.
[211] Van Linschoten, *His Discours of Voyages into Ye Easte & West Indies*, 140.
[212] *Ibid.*, 141.

Fitch and Newbery are mentioned several times in Hakluyt's work, as well as their imprisonment within Goa.[213] While I could not find mention of van Linschoten in the main text, he is listed in the index at several points, most importantly as "Linschoten, John Huighen, of Enkhuizen, servant of the Archbishop of Goa (1583)"[214] Hakluyt would have undoubtedly been informed of van Linschoten's involvement in the release of these two prisoners via the letters they exchanged with him. We can thus infer that he likely knew of him for quite some time, and given his already extensive interests in travel knowledge, would have watched both the Houtman voyage and the publication of the *Itinerario* with interest. If he obtained a copy, it would have been well within his character to present it to his contact John Wolfe and push for its translation and publication at his London press.

Further evidence of Hakluyt's interest in the *Itinerario* is not hard to come by. As discussed previously, the founders of the East India company required much in the way of assurances that their initial ventures would be profitable. While they themselves had been convinced by the Dutch successes across the channel, the Royal Government, particularly Elizabeth I, required confirmation that any English forays into the East Indies would not jeopardize the peace negotiations that were currently underway with Spain.[215] The company was not to be deterred, however. Summoning Richard Hakluyt, they planned to use his knowledge to convince the Queen of their outlook. D. B. Quinn's Hakluyt handbook corroborates this information, with an entry that states that on the 29th of January 1601, Hakluyt attended the meeting of the East India Company's administrative officers and read to them excerpts from various texts. We know from other sources that the main text read to these company members was the English translation of the *Itinerario*. The information within proved to be the most significant inspiration for their belief that their Eastern expedition would not interfere with the truce being established with the Spanish Crown. Hakluyt's reading also convinced them of the great wealth that was readily available in the East.[216]

Hakluyt quickly laid out the various outposts and possessions of both the Spanish and Portuguese Crowns in the Far East. The East India Company's message to the Queen contained

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[213] Richard Hakluyt, *The Principle Navigations, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation*, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1905), 128.
[214] *Ibid.*, 296.
[215] Heidi Brayman Hackel and Peter C. Mancall, "Richard Hakluyt the Younger's Notes for the East India Company in 1601: A Transcription of Huntington Library Manuscript EL 2360," *Huntington Library Quarterly* 67, no. 3 (2004): 429.
[216] D. B. Quinn ed., *The Hakluyt Handbook, Volume 1*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 314.

"certain reasons why the English Merchants may trade into the East-Indies, especially to such rich kingdoms and dominions as are not subjecte to the Kinge of Spayne and Portugal; together with the true limits of the Portugals conquest and jurisdiction of those oriental parts."[217] A record of the list they prepared is accessible in the Company's Annals.[218] Importantly, many of the locations that they explicitly mention ('Masambique, Diu, Goa, Malaca'), are locations that featured prominently throughout the *Itinerario*. But there is even more explicit evidence that van Linschoten was relied upon during this meeting. Below the list of Portuguese and Spanish possessions, the Company listed a series of locations and polities where the Spanish and Portuguese had no concrete claim ('Bengala, Siam, Sumatra,' etc.). They specifically stated that great wealth could be obtained from establishing trading posts within these regions, and made sure to emphasize the lack of any Spanish or Portuguese presence.[219] Subsequently provided is a detailed list of authors of nautical texts, listed as contributors to the Company's understanding of the situation in the East. Included in a section entitled 'Hollanders,' "John Huygen de Linschoten's worke, which lived above seven years in India"[220] is cited.

As can be seen from the plethora of evidence, both Richard Hakluyt and the leadership of the East India Company were intimately familiar with van Linschoten's work. Hakluyt likely had a longstanding familiarity with him, having advocated for the translation and publication of the *Itinerario* in 1597 or 1598 and then subsequently using its contents to convince the Elizabethan administration that opportunities for expansion and trade within the East Indies were still available. In Hakluyt, van Linschoten and his *Itinerario* had found a powerful ally. But Hakluyt was just one of several men who would go on to form the network of advocates that would go on to make the *Itinerario* grow in influence and help to inspire England to take its first steps east.

3. Conclusion

In the conclusion of the second chapter, we examined the *Itinerario* as a work that had a multinational impact. One of the major elements of this argument relied upon the rapid publication of several translations of the *Itinerario* as evidence that it was received with great interest throughout Europe (particularly the countries bordering the English Channel). Within

[217] Bruce, *Annals of the Honorable East India Company*, 115.
[218] *Ibid.,* 115-118.
[219] *Ibid.,* 118.
[220] *Ibid.,* 120.

this chapter, that argument has been built upon with evidence that shows that the English were indeed voracious consumers of texts relating to Eastern trade and exploration, and that the *Itinerario* featured most prominently in the readings and recommendations of Richard Hakluyt. Most importantly, the records of the English East India Company explicitly state that van Linschoten and his work were used as evidence to convince the Queen that mercantile opportunities existed in the East, and that those opportunities would not lead to war with Spain or Portugal (at least in their interpretation of the text).

It is also important to consider that the *Itinerario* was written with this multinational impact in mind. Van Linschoten said as much when he stated "I wil in truth set downe, as I my selfe for the most parte haue séene it with mine eyes, and of credible persons, both Indians, and other inhabiters in those Countries learned and required to know, as also the report and fame thereof is nowe sufficiently spread abroade throughout the world by diuers of our neighbour countries and landes which traffique and deale with them, namely our countrey, the East Countries, England, Fraunce, &c. which likewise are founde and knowne by the Portingalles themselues, which dayly trafficke thither."[221] He was well aware of the appeal that his work would have, and intended for it to be used as a source of valuable intelligence to undermine the Spanish, who he had grown to intensely dislike during his years working on the Azores.[222]
It is important to consider what the study of the English efforts at publication can tell us about the tenuous alliance that existed between the merchants, Royal administration, and intellectuals that made Eastern ventures possible. Opportunities for mutual profit were able to override the frictions between the various groups. For example, Hakluyt, representing the intellectuals and contracted by the merchants, was able to alleviate Royal concerns and secure Royal approval. No doubts these efforts were made possible by the efforts of many within the Royal bureaucracy that supported such efforts, likely due to holding stakes in many of the burgeoning trade companies themselves. Additionally, as we've seen previously, many of these men acted upon what they considered to be a 'national interest' by publishing the *Itinerario* and encouraging foreign trade, hoping to see the English grow wealthy at the expense of their rivals.

As discussed in the conclusion of the previous chapter, Kamissek and Kreienbaum state that "Imperial knowledge, produced by manifold actors and institutions in the course of imperial

[221] Van Linschoten, *His Discours of Voyages into Ye Easte & West Indies*, 13.
[222] As discussed in Chapter 1.

rule, spread across boundaries in many ways… Of special importance is also the spread of written texts between empires."[223] We have seen one particularly important instance of this as we followed the *Itinerario*'s progress across the English Channel and examined the ways in which it played a formative role in the East India Company's planning. Aside from its significance in partially inspiring English and Dutch exploration and trade within the East, the *Itinerario* also serves to validate the concept of a work as an example of what Smith and Schmidt have described as the "shared and collective nature of knowledge making."[224] Study of the *Itinerario* can offer historians a far more in-depth look at how exactly this collective process of creating knowledge occurred in the early modern period of commercialization and globalization.

[223] Christoph Kamissek and Jonas Kreienbaum, "An Imperial Cloud? Conceptualising Interimperial Connections and Transimperial Knowledge," *Journal of Modern European History / Zeitschrift Für Moderne Europäische Geschichte / Revue D'histoire Européenne Contemporaine* 14, no. 2 (2016): 172-173.
[224] Pamela H. Smith and Benjamin Schmidt, ed., *Making Knowledge in Early Modern Europe*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 7.

Conclusion

Over the course of the past three chapters, we have seen how Jan Huygen van Linschoten underwent a transformation from traveler to influencer. His life experiences were essential in allowing him to amass a great deal of knowledge that he would later record in several books. Knowledge in this context is a layered term: it can be used as a catchall referring to data relevant to scientific pursuits (such as botanical and geological information), as well as in reference to the strategically revealed trade interests of the Iberian powers. The *Itinerario* occupies an unassailable position as van Linschoten's most historically significant work, as it was specifically used by both the Dutch and English to inform and incentivize expeditions to Southeast Asia. As we saw in the second and third chapters, the efforts of highly diverse networks of individuals, including members of the mercantile, intellectual, and political communities in both countries, were required to allow the book to reach so many. Their efforts to publish the *Itinerario* undoubtedly represented a keen interest on their part to inspire their countries to advance their economic and political interests across the globe.

The early sixteenth century saw the explosive growth of England and the Dutch Republic as major political and economic powers as they embraced new opportunities for profit and influence. Their rise represented a more general shift in European political and economic hegemony away from the Southern European countries along the coasts of the Mediterrean to the rising powers along the English Channel. While this phenomena has been discussed at length for the past several decades, Jan van Linschoten and his *Itinerario* serve as an excellent example of this very development. His journey from an employee within the colonial bureaucracy of Portugal to a major influence upon Dutch and English mercantile affairs can be seen as a microcosm of these larger transitions taking place during the late sixteenth century. The ongoing wars with the Iberian powers were important in disrupting past networks of exchange and inspiring many within England and the Dutch Republic to advocate for a new path. The *Itinerario*, with its wealth of mercantile, societal, navigational, and military data proved invaluable in their efforts to convince others and to equip them with the tools necessary for the Dutch and English to establish their first footholds in East Asia.

I believe that this study has made several significant interventions worth summarizing in this conclusion. Firstly, the *Itinerario* occupies a key position in both British and Dutch

mercantile and political history as it served as a catalyst of sorts to inspire, incentivize, and inform early merchants and mariners. Its contributions to the formation and early success of both the Dutch and English East India Companies cannot be overstated. Secondly, the process of writing the *Itinerario*, as well as its later dissemination, occurred in the midst of an extraordinary intellectual cross-pollination, both within 'national' borders (I use quotations here to denote the somewhat anachronistic use of the word) and without. Studying the writing of the *Itinerario* gives one a window into the intense mercantile, intellectual, nautical, and political cooperation that occurred as individuals from each of these fields worked together on a project that they themselves deemed to be in their country's interest.

Thirdly, this thesis has chosen to refer to this intellectual alliance using the terminology of 'networks.' The study of these networks is a critical part of understanding the intellectual backdrop of early North European colonial endeavors. It is important to note that many of the intellectuals who advocated most strongly for the publication of the *Itinerario* in both the Dutch Republic and England were later founding members of each country's East India Company, showing a demonstrable link between the intellectual and mercantile networks. This revelation is directly supportive of Cook's earlier argument in *Matters of Exchange*. One of the aims of this thesis has been to accurately portray this link between the networks that were instrumental in efforts to publish the text in multiple languages and to show that there were direct connections between those that published the *Itinerario* and those that financed the first mercantile expeditions to East Asia.

Finally, these networks operated partially out of a sense of patriotism -- as is readily apparent in several of the dedicatory letters included in several editions and translations of the *Itinerario* -- but also out of a sense of international collaboration. This led to a dynamic in which the *Itinerario* was championed as a text of 'national' interest yet instead of being concealed as a state secret, it was quickly translated and disseminated abroad. I believe this can be explained by the fact that while an intellectual coalition had formed to assist van Linschoten in his writing process, the members of this coalition did not all possess the same end goals. Additionally, in the Dutch Republic the *Itinerario* was conceived to a certain degree as a weaponizable asset against the Republic's Spanish enemies, and thus could have been seen as an important diplomatic tool to share with the country's English allies. This interplay between national interests and international cooperation calls into question existing preconceptions about mercantilist and

proto-nationalist values that consider them as unassailable values of most states during this period. The *Itinerario* seems to suggest that while these were viewed as important elements, there still existed a great deal of intellectual exchange on the international level, lending credence to aforementioned studies that suggest that later empires engaged in forming 'imperial clouds.'

One area in which the *Itinerario* is notably silent is on the enslavement of human beings. A word search of the entire 1598 English translation produced only two instances of the word 'slave' used, and only used when describing scenes from Portuguese Goa, where enslaved persons attended their masters.[225] This of course does beg the question: why were van Linschoten and the *Itinerario* so silent on the subject? He offers neither exhortation nor condemnation, only quiet observation of the reality. Given the economic centrality of the slave trade to the Western European states at the time, it seems possible that van Linschoten viewed it as one of the myriad sources of income for colonial powers. While he did not visit the New World in person, his later dialogues with those who had would have undoubtedly left him informed of the growing importance of the institution in the 'West.' It is also possible that the *Itinerario* does not devote much time to the topic as it simply was practiced in a different form in the 'East,' leaving van Linschoten with the impression that it was not of particular interest or importance to his prospective audience. Whatever his reasons, his silence is telling, in its own way. The lack of attention devoted to the subject and the casual descriptions of slavery employed in an everyday setting leave us with the distinct impression that the author had few, in any, moral concerns with the institution.

The subsequent publication history of the *Itinerario* also lends credence to its importance as a text of historical significance. The sheer number of editions published in several languages is compelling: Dutch editions were published in 1596, 1614, 1623 and 1644; with a English translation in 1598 and French translations in 1610, 1619, and 1638. There were also German translations in 1598, 1599, and 1600, along with a Latin translation in 1599.[226] These early translations and editions, reprintings and translations suggest that the text generated international interest especially in the key period of commercial expansion of North-Western European

[225] Jan Huygen van Linschoten, *John Huighen Van Linschoten. His Discours of Voyages into Ye Easte & West Indies.: Divided into Foure Bookes* (Printed at London: By John Wolfe printer to ye Honorable Cittie of London, 1598), 65-66.
[226] Cornelis Koeman, "Jan Huygen van Linschoten," *Revista da Universidade de Coimbra* no. 32 (1985) 41-43.

nations. It was only much later that it was discovered as a document of historical interest, as the Hakluyt (English-1885) and Kern (Dutch-1910) editions testify.

I will conclude this thesis with a few suggestions for further research. Using the methods demonstrated in this thesis, I believe that further studies of the French and German translations of the *Itinerario* would yield similar findings to those in this thesis. Given the emergence of France as a global political and economic power during this period, I believe a study of the efforts to translate the *Itinerario* into French could be particularly fruitful. The Latin translation of the *Itinerario* also warrants a special mention, as the translation of the *Itinerario* into the learned *lingua franca* of late-sixteenth-century Europe truly symbolized its introduction into the so-called 'Republic of Letters' that was conceptualized at the time. The Latin translation would have allowed for the greatest possible dissemination of the text throughout Europe. More broadly, studies could be undertaken in order to demonstrate how a wide variety of texts like the *Itinerario* occupied a singularly important role in the formation of Northern Europe's 'reservoir' of global commercial knowledge as it was being created, translated, and circulated.

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