

ABSTRACT

2008 TIBET RIOTS THROUGH A WESTERN LENS: A FRAME ANALYSIS OF NEWS COVERAGE OF 2008 TIBET RIOTS ON BBC AND CNN NETWORKS

by Jing Guo

This thesis applies an empirical approach to study the use of news frames using the issue of 2008 Tibet riots on BBC and CNN online news as a case study. 72 news articles were coded to detect the type of news frames in the Tibet uprising news coverage and to compare the framing schemes employed by the two networks. The results suggested that while CNN and BBC framed the Tibet crisis in different ways, there were many more similarities. The data showed that both news outlets held a bias against the Chinese government and often utilized multiple frames in one news article. Moreover, the examination of the use of the anti-communism frame revealed that both media attempted to foster anti-communism emotions in their readers.

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ON BBC AND CNN NETWORKS

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

In 2008, the People's Republic of China experienced a number of events, including the opening of the Olympic Games, the biggest snow storm in Southern China in a century, the earthquake in Sichuan Province, and the riots in Tibet (Merkel-Hess, 2009). Due to a long-lasting political controversy, the Tibet riots received a great deal of the intensive media coverage around the world. On March 10, 2008, Tibetans erupted into protest on the anniversary of Tibet's unsuccessful 1959 uprising, in reaction to China's policies toward their land (Roberts II & Roberts, 2009). The 2008 uprising marked the fourth climax of the Tibetans' persistent struggle against Chinese sovereignty since the Chinese People's Liberation Army's occupation of Tibet in 1950. Since the middle of last century, the greatest dispute over the Sino-Tibetan conflict dwells on the nature of this occupation and the legitimacy of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile. Consistent with the agreement signed in 1951 by both the Chinese government and Tibetan delegation, Tibet became the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) in China, which allowed it to have a high level of autonomy under the governance of the central Chinese government (Goldstein, Siebenschuh, & Tsering, 1997). While the communist Chinese government justified their liberative action with a combination of old historical claims and a new Marxist mission, the pro-Tibetans claimed that Tibet residents live under the control of a totalitarian system, with their basic rights trampled by the communist authoritarians (Heath, 2005).

Eight years after the agreement, the Dalai Lama fled to India with an estimated 80,000 followers and established a "government-in-exile" after an unsuccessful armed separatist revolt in 1959. As a rebellion against the establishment of the Tibet Autonomous Region in 1965 by the Chinese government, Tibetans staged revolts and protests sporadically, with the biggest two occurring before the 2008 incident taking place in 1988 and 1999 (China-Tibet, 2008). In 2008, anti-China protests escalated into the worst violence Tibet had seen in 20 years.

The timing of the protests may well have been intended to draw the world's attention to the Tibetans' grievances five months before the Olympic Games in Beijing. The Tibetans chose the date of the 49th anniversary of the Tibetan National Uprising to symbolize that the Tibetan spirit could not be crushed (Roberts II & Roberts, 2009). As violent riots occurred through the "Chinese-held" territory of Tibet, images and information once again play a major role in international response to the situation. BBC and CNN, as two of the world's biggest and most

influential networks, have intensively covered the riots since they first took place. The BBC Online and the CNN Online, both influential online news outlets well represent the two continents. Investigating their coverage patterns allows a comparison of the coverage trends followed by the BBC and CNN to inform the citizens of the world about the conflict in China.

This study will examine the frames used by the BBC and CNN online news in their coverage of the 2008 Tibet riots. Entman's (1993) proposes a concise and yet complete definition of framing. According to him, "framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text (p.52)." Frequencies of frames will be analyzed, and the use of frames by two networks will be compared. The coding will follow their scheme adapted from Semetko and Valkenburg (2000), and be conducted based on revised "common frames" outlined by Semetko and Valkenburg (2000, p. 95). In addition to study the frequency of each frame, the applicability of the anti-communism filter proposed by Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman in today's American media and even British media will be tested.

Statement of the Research Problem and Research Questions

The goal of this study is to conduct a cross-national, comparative analysis of frames in BBC and CNN online news coverage of the 2008 Tibet Riots. As news frames can affect perceptions of issues and people in the news and determine what enters the minds of readers (Price, Tewksbury, & Powers, 1997), this research aims to provide insights into the use of frames that shape public perceptions of the 2008 Tibet uprising as seen on these two media outlets. The news frames that emerge are contingent on the social influences exerted by organizational environment, pressures from interest groups, government policies and practices, and the attitudes, ideologies and values of journalists (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). Thus, news frames can vary from media outlet to outlet. Therefore, the similarities and difference of the framing processes between the two news networks will be studied in this project. In addition to assessing the presence of particular frames, the applicability of the anti-communism filter of Noam Chomsky's propaganda model (Herman & Chomsky, 1988) in today's United States as well as Britain will be examined by looking at the frequency of each frame and the biases held by both outlets. Therefore, the following research questions are developed:

1. Which frames were used in the BBC online news and CNN online news in their coverage of the 2008 Tibet riots? Which frames are most frequently used?

2. How does frame usage in reporting over the 2008 Tibet riots differ between BBC online news and CNN online news?
3. Does each media outlet hold any bias against either side of the conflict? If so, how does it vary from BBC to CNN?
4. Which frame is most associated with which frame?
5. How was each side of the tension portrayed by the two media through framing? How does the portrayal differ between BBC and CNN?
6. Is the anti-communism filter of Chomsky's propaganda model still applicable to today's American media? Is it also applicable to British media?

Literature Review

News Coverage and Dominant Ideology

Gitlin (1980) claims that news not only creates and transmits knowledge, but it also reifies dominant ideology through its power to normalize definitions of particular events and issues. The practice of news making serves to reinforce the inevitability of the established order to make the world beyond direct experience look natural. Nevertheless, news stories are not natural, they are the product of cultural meanings, practices and ideologies working together to stress and omit certain characteristics of reality in order to create a cohesive and independent story suitable for mass audience comprehension. Because the media constitute a significant social force in terms of forming and delimiting ideology, the selection, emphasis and exclusion of journalistic practices work to set the public agenda both politically and socially by influencing public political actors and individual reader alike (Gitlin, 1980). Gitlin's analysis leads to the conclusion that the marginalized groups are in a dire situation. According to Chomsky and Herman, the Soviet, Chinese, and Cuban revolutions were traumatic for Western elites during the Cold War, and the ongoing conflicts and the well-publicized abuses of communist states have contributed to elevating opposition to communism to a first principle of Western ideology and politics (1988). After the collapse of the USSR, China was the only major communist power in the global political arena and thus was a common target of international challenge and criticism. Because news becomes a powerful creator of knowledge which supports and usually reinforces the dominant ideology, the representations of a "deviant" political power are necessarily a concoction of journalistic practices responding to the dominant ideological and political forces working together. Berkowitz (1997) developed two threads in discussing the relationship between news content and the building and rebuilding of ideology—a subconscious set of values and interpretations that stem from the dominant power base in a culture. In the first thread, journalism appears as a shared culture among those who practice it—a professional ideology. Journalists look to each other to learn how the news is "supposed to go" (Berkowitz, 1997, p. 397). A second thread is that the news media, as social institutions, are facilitators of an ongoing social dialogue that maintains the social status quo. To do so, journalists learn to draw from socially legitimated sources who can frame and debate issues in ideologically resonant ways. The media practices and the professional ideology which is based upon the social functions of news media together support and reinforce the role of media as facilitators of the maintenance of the

social status quo. For instance, Reese found that objectivity as a journalistic professional ethic requires that journalists avoid developing strong personal values outside the mainstream (Reese, 1997). The mainstream here refers to the established order that journalistic practices have to conform to. The news media play an essential role in maintaining the authority of the political system, and the news paradigm is seen as operating within this larger ideological sphere.

News Bias

Another important concept related to news coverage and ideology is “bias.” McQuail defines “bias” as “a consistent tendency to depart from the straight path of objectivitive truth by deviating either to left or right” (1992, p.191), but Hemanus points out that the favored middle way (between left and right deviations) may itself be a form of bias (1976). The term bias and ideology are relevant in that the latter is considered as a major type of bias in McQuail’s “typology of news bias” (McQuail, 1992, p.193). McQuail (1992) proposes four types of bias based on a basic differentiation made between the main varieties of bias in terms of two basic variables: “hidden” or “open” on the one hand, and “intended” or “unintended” on the other, and the cross-classification helps identify four main kinds of news practice. Ideology, as one of them, is categorized as “hidden but unintended bias” (McQuail, 1992, p.194). The need for news media to have established and authoritative sources in society reinforces the tendency towards expressing consensual values. The constant pressure of surrounding society helps to shape the news in a way which is fundamentally supportive of the established social structure and its political culture (McQuail, 1992). However, as it is embedded in texts, it is often difficult to investigate, partly because it is concealed and can only be uncovered by close interpretation. Like the ideology bias, the case of propaganda is another type of hidden bias. Although it is intended, the concealed intention is usually hard to uncover. However, sometimes, the presence of propaganda may be signaled by particular presentational devices and uses of language (indicators include prominence and attention exceeding any obvious news value; innuendo; flattering language, etc); suspicious juxtaposition of items and attributes, which associates known propaganda “targets” with positive or negative contexts (McQuail, 1992). By contrast, the other two types of bias are more noticeable. Partisanship, as open and intended bias, is normally identified in the structure of news media by its form (editorial leading article, opinion column, forum or access slot, and letter, etc). In such cases, partisan is separated from alleged objective sections (McQuail, 1992). Unlike partisanship, the unwitting bias is open but not intentional. It is

unbalance in the selection of topics, events and news angles, and can usually be recognized as “systematic patterns of preferential attention or avoidance which are not justified by any statistical reality, but where there is no reason to suspect propagandist purpose” (McQuail, 1992, p.194).

McQuail’s study provides comprehensive summary of the nature of bias. However, the complexity and disputed status of the concept of bias prevents researchers from proposing any simplistic approach to identify the presence and strength of bias (Hackett, 1984). The literature reveals that many scholars have been seeking various indicators and definitions, in keeping with the complexity of the concept. For instance, Frank (1973) sees bias from a neutral standpoint and defines it as “selective encoding”. Efron (1971) writes that political bias is a “specific type of selective process in a specific political context” and the issue is neither one of objective truth nor falsity but of “according preferential status to certain political positions and opinions” (p.4). Hofstetter (1976) argues that bias can be identified through four types of presence, including *lies*, deliberate, purposeful deception by assertion of untruth; *distortion*, when the news stories are affected by unjustifiable omissions of significant facts and unbalanced emphasis of certain aspects of an event; *value assertion*, in the form of ideology; and *structural bias*, when all major news outlets cover a similar set of issues in much the same way. Similarly, Starkey (2007) concludes that adding bias to news coverage can be done in many ways, from overt criticism to subtle nuance. Bias appears when “only certain sources need to be quoted, and dissenting voices can be ignored or other material may be used to discredit them” (p.58). This can be also done in a totally hidden manner: covert practices intended to distort reality in order to support a particular position on a controversy (Starkey, 2007). Parenti proposes more specific indicators of the presence of bias. He notes that the media distortions are of a more political nature and reveal a pattern of bias that favors the dominant class interests and statist ideology (Parenti, 1993). He (1993) also argues that the common and effective methods by which the bias is packaged and presented include “selectivity and deliberate omission” (p.191), “lies and face-value transmission” (p.194), “false balancing” (p.198), and “framing and labeling” (p.201), etc.

News Frames

Since Goffman and Bateson introduced the concept of framing to the social sciences decades ago, it has become one of the key theoretical concepts in communication studies (Entman, 1993; Reese, Gandy & Grant, 2001). According to Entman’s (1993, p.52) concise and

yet complete definition, “framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text.” It is through the selection and salience of certain aspects of an issue that texts come to interact with individual cognitive action, constructing a confined reality which is not representative of the whole picture. Goffman (1974) defines frames as “schemata of interpretation” that enable individuals “to locate, perceive, identify, and label” occurrences of life experiences (p.21). He proceeds to show how our common sense knowledge performs its constructive role in our everyday life and how such schemata of interpretation are “acted out.”

The convergence of the basic agenda-setting idea and framing has long been recognized by scholars in mass communication. Many of them consider framing as a “second-level agenda setting” (McCombs & Ghanem, 2001, p.69). Unlike agenda-setting which is conceptualized as a list of issues, framing is a list of attributes of an issue. Agenda-setting research has shown less interest in media portrayals of how social problems are caused. Through agenda setting, the media tell us what to think about, whereas through framing the media tell us how to think about it (McCombs, 1992). In other words, while agenda setting focuses primarily on which issues were covered, we conceptualize framing research as dealing more with how an issue or event is portrayed in the news. It is within this “second level” that frames reside, creating layers of meaning that agenda-setting alone cannot measure (McCombs & Ghanem, 2001, p.69). The results of framing research provide a more complex and detailed picture of the nature of public debate as represented in the social institution of media. Thus framing as a research paradigm broke free of agenda-setting work, and has developed into a field completely devoted to understanding not just what media cover, but how they do so.

Entman (1993) argues that the concept of framing consistently offers a way to describe the “power of a communicating text” (p.51), and analysis of frames illuminates the way in which influence over human consciousness is exerted by the transfer of information from one place to another. To further describe the power of frames, he claims that frames have four functions which are defining problems, diagnosing causes, making moral judgments and suggesting remedies (Entman, 1993). By defining problems, frames determine what a causal agent is doing with what costs and benefits. Based on this, forces creating problems are identified. Later, frames make moral judgments by evaluating causal agents and their effects, and offer and justify remedies for the problems and predict their likely effects. However, a frame in any particular text

may not necessarily include all four functions. Nonetheless, a single sentence may also perform more than one of these four framing functions.

Frames are important to analyze because they expose persistent patterns in news coverage. Their four functions are prominent when it comes to the news coverage of controversial political/social events. By presenting topics in a problem-solution format, the frame rules out other possible ways of thinking about the issues under discussion before the readers can think on their own first (Gitlin, 1980). In other words, just short of lying, the media can mislead people in a variety of ways, telling them what to think about a story before they have had a chance to think about it for themselves (Parenti, 1993). In this way, media create a desired impression without resorting to explicit advocacy and without departing too far from the appearance of objectivity.

Frames in Political News

Frames provide models of reality and reflect journalists' implicit theories about how politics works (Kerbel, Apee & Ross, 2000). They are shared understandings about how politics work as well as the themes that direct attention to or from particular political issues, which provide audiences with a context for making sense of these issues. In other words, framing heavily influence their responses to communications and perceptions of political events (Entman, 1993). According to Goffman, frames can help audiences "locate, perceive, identify and label (1994, p.21)" the flow of information. Similarly, Tuchman argues that they narrow the available political alternatives (1978). Entman (1993) states that frames can call attention to some aspects of reality while obscuring other elements, which might lead audiences, listeners and readers to have different reactions. Therefore, they are offered pre-set standards when they perceive certain political events and evaluate the meaning and purpose of politics. Framing in a political news text is the imprint of power—it registers the identity of actors or interests that competed to dominate the text.

De Vreese suggests a dichotomy for studying frames, namely generic frames versus. issue-specific frames, in observing political and economic news (De Vreese, C. H., Peter, J., & Semetko, H. A., 2001). According to him, issue-specific frames pertain to specific topics or news events, whereas generic frames are broadly applicable to a range of different news topics (2001). More specifically, issue-specific frames refer to those that accompany specific topics. Studies examining issue-specific frames include, as examples, an analysis of the coverage of the U.S. national budget deficits (Jasperson, et al, 1998) and an investigation of U.S. press and television

network coverage of two international airline accidents (Entman, 1991).

Generic frames could be generalized to compare different framing process. These frames, unlike issue-specific frames, are examples of a more generic conceptualization of a kind of news frame that has the ability to “transcend issue, time, and space limits” (De Vreese, Peter, & Semetko, 2001, p.109). Some frames investigated in previous studies can be included in this category, such as the strategy frame identified by Cappella and Jamieson (1996, 1997) and other frames such as conflict and economic consequences identified by Neuman, Semetko and Valkenburg (1992, 2000). For instance, the economic consequences frame reflects a “preoccupation with the ‘bottom line,’ profit and loss” (Neuman, et al, 1992). Meanwhile, this way of framing events and issues is consistent with research on more general news values, in which the extent of economic loss is consistently considered as one of the most critical criteria for identifying which events will be reported on newspapers.

Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) conducted a review of framing literature to determine that five frames largely account for all the frames that have been found in the news including the *conflict* frame, the *human interest* frame, the *economic consequences* frame, the *morality and the responsibility* frame. The conflict frame emphasizes conflicts between individuals, groups, or institutions as a means of capturing audience interest, while the economic consequences frame is defined as a frame which reports an event, problem or issue in terms of the consequences it will have economically on an individual, group institution, region or country. Graber (1993) also argues that the wide economic impact of an event is an important news value. The human interest frame brings a human face or an emotional angle to the presentation of an event, issue, or problem. Such frames refer to an effort to personalize the news, dramatize or “emotionalize (p.96)” the news, in order to capture and keep the audience’s interest. In addition, the morality frame is identified as another common frame in the news. Unlike the human interest frame, this frame puts the event, problem, or issue in the context of religious tenets or moral prescriptions. The responsibility frame serves as another important and common frame in the news and coincides with one of the four functions of framing—diagnosing causes (Entman, 1993). This frame presents an issue in such a way as to attribute responsibility for its cause to either the government or to an individual or group (Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000). The five common frames, due to their generality, are all generic frames.

Ideology of Anticommunism in the News

Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky have proposed a propaganda model, which focuses on inequality of wealth and power and its multilevel effects on mass-media interests and choices. It traces the routes by which money and power are able to filter out the news fit to print, marginalize dissent, and allow the government and dominant private interests to get their messages across to the public (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). The propaganda model includes five filters that screen the content of the news production. The essential ingredients of the model, or set of news filters, fall under the following headings: 1) the size, ownership, and profit orientation of the mass media; 2) advertising as the primary income source of the mass media; 3) the reliance of the media on information provided by government, business, and experts funded and approved by these primary sources and agents of power; 4) flak and its enforcers, and 5) anticommunism as a national religion and control mechanism (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). Communism as the ultimate evil has always been considered as the specter threatening property owners, as it shakes their class position and superior status to the foundations (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). The Soviet, Chinese, and Cuban revolutions were disturbing for Western elites, and the ongoing conflicts and the well-publicized abuses of communist states have given rise to opposition to communism to a first principle of Western ideology and politics (Herman & Chomsky, 1988).

This anti-communism control mechanism reaches through the system to exercise a profound influence on the mass media. In normal times as well as in periods of Red scares, issues tend to be framed into “a dichotomy of communist and anti-communist (Herman & Chomsky, 1988, p.30).” Herman and Chomsky conclude that the demand for serious evidence in support of claims of “communist” abuses is suspended, and even highly unreliable individuals and organizations can thrive as evidential sources when anti-communist fervor is aroused. Defectors, informers, and assorted other opportunists move to center stage as “experts” (Herman & Chomsky, 2006, p.178), and rooting for “our side” is considered an entirely legitimate news practice (Herman & Chomsky, 1988, p.31). Over twenty years have passed since the fall of the Soviet Union and its Eastern bloc communist regimes, and as a result the anti-communism that once prevailed in United States media has been thought of as diminished. A timely research on the anti-communism filter in current American and world media may provide great insight into the modern applicability of this classic theory.

Scope of the Thesis

The population of this study includes all news stories on the BBC and CNN websites (<http://search.bbc.com/> and <http://search.cnn.com/>) dealing primarily with Tibet riots from March 10th (the first day of the uprising) till March 23rd (one day before the Beijing Olympic Games torch relay). Most of the news stories after the torch relay shifted their focus from the protests itself to the international reactions to the torch relay. Therefore, they cannot well reflect the response of the public to Tibetan riots and the Chinese government's reaction. After a search of key terms like "Tibet", "Tibetan" and "Tibet Riots", etc and elimination of the duplicates, 62 articles about Tibet riots on BBC News online are found and 10 articles available on CNN News online.

Methodology

To analyze frames utilized by the two websites, two coders completed a quantitative coding analysis of articles dealing with the 2008 Tibet Riots. The 10 articles on the CNN website and 62 stories on the BBC websites were coded according to a revised "common frames" approach as outlined by Semetko and Valkenburg (2000, p.95), including both generic and issue-specific frames (De Vreese, C. H., Peter, J., & Semetko, H. A., 2001). The coding procedure will follow the guidelines of content analysis, a procedure devised to examine the content of recorded information as well as the specific framing analysis conducted by Semetko and Valkenburg (2000). Two coders were presented with a detailed codebook and go through extensive training to reach ideal inter-coder reliability.

In order to empirically study the use of those frames, the five "common frames" outlined by Semetko and Valkenburg (2000, p.95) will be used as a template for developing the "common frames" in this research. The revised "common frames" will not only include all generic frames like Semetko's. Instead, it will also incorporate some issue-specific frames, since the issue-specific approach to the study of news frames allows for investigation of the framing of particular events in great specificity and detail (De Vreese, C. H., Peter, J., & Semetko, H. A., 2001), and it may capture specific aspects of selection, organization, and elaboration that are present in news coverage of Tibet protests. The revised "common frames" will consist of the *human interest* frame, the *attribution of responsibility* frame, the *international condemnation* frame, the *victim versus villain* frame, the *authoritarian versus democratic* frame, and the *anti-communism* frame. The first two frames were originally identified in Semetko's research, and the

last four were newly developed particularly for the current study. The reason for substituting the new four for the original ones is that they are more closely relevant to the present research topic and serve better to answer the research questions. For each article, coders will complete coding sheets with a likert scale (adapted from Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000) to determine the frame and bias of each article. Although Semetko and Valkenburg's binary coding scheme yields high inter-coder reliability (2000), the Likert scale rating will provide more depth of information and the subtlety of possible differences in the use of frames. To determine the strength of a frame, questions related to the frame need to be answered in order to get a numerical indicator of the frame strength. The answer to each question is formatted as a Likert scale. More specifically, five choices (never, rarely, occasionally, often, and very often) will be provided and will be given numerical values (0, 1, 2, 3, and 4) in ascending order. For instance, if the *victim versus villain* frame is measured with three questions, the coder may answer each one with an answer among the five options. The mean of numerical responses to these questions will be used as the indicator of the strength of each frame. This process tracks down the strength instead of numbers of appearance of each frame, thus allowing for multiple frames to be present simultaneously in one article and allows one single frame to appear more than once. The questions about the *human interest frame* and the *attribution of responsibility frame* replicate those that appeared in Semetko's coding questionnaire (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000), while questions regarding the other four frames are developed newly for this study. Since the number of all articles that primarily deal with this crisis during the designated period was within a hundred, the study did not randomly choose a sample out of the population. Instead, two coders coded the entire population (72 articles in total). Thus, the research did not need to run any inferential statistical test to see the differences of frame use between two outlets. However, in order to examine the association between frames, the Pearson correlation test was still necessary.

Framing is a major technique which media often employ and it corresponds effectively with other "methods of misrepresentation" (Parenti, 1993, p.191). This research will not only be confined to studying the frequencies of frames and the possible internal connections between them, but it will also delve into the possible appearance of bias between the lines through analyzing the framing process. For example, when examining the strength of the *victim versus villain* frame, numbers of questions will be asked in favor of the Chinese government, such as "Does the story portray Han Chinese people as a group being hurt by the Tibetans?" Meanwhile,

questions against the Chinese will also be raised, such as “Does the story emphasize how Tibetans are beaten by the Chinese government?” A comparison between the means of both types of questions will reveal whether both sides of the conflicts are portrayed in an unbiased manner or not. The same approach will also be applied to the analysis of other frames. To examine the applicability of the “anti-communism filter” (Chomsky & Herman, 1988) to today’s Western media, the use of the anti-communism frame and its possible association with other frames will be studied in particular.

CHAPTER TWO

Review of Tibet History

The history which bears and determines us has the form of a war rather than that of a language: relations of power, not relations of meaning. History has no “meaning.”

--Michel Foucault (1984, p.56)

Introduction

The adage that history is written by the victors may once have been true. It is often believed that when a formidable force conquered and completely subjugated its enemies, the latter were deprived of the right to tell their stories to the outside world. Only the conqueror took control over the production of historical narratives (Powers, 2004). However, in modern times, it has not always been the case. One of the hallmarks of conflicts between competing groups continued to be a constant ideological, political, and even moral battle over the production of “truth” decades after the military defeat (Powers, 2004). The contested “truth” of the “Tibet question” has captivated the attention and passion of people around the world, ever since the Chinese troops entered Tibet in 1950, and has escalated after the Dalai Lama escaped into exile in 1959 (Blondeau & Buffetrille, 2008). The greatest dispute over the Sino-Tibetan conflict dwells on the nature of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s occupation of Tibet and the legitimacy of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile.

World opinion about this incident is divided, cutting along lines for or against the People’s Republic of China. On the one hand, Beijing asserts that Tibet is officially an autonomous region of China and accuses the 14th Dalai Lama and his followers of masterminding the unrest (Ardley, 2002). For most Chinese, Tibet has always been an integral part of China’s territory, and the events in the 1950s represented a peaceful liberation and a return to the motherland after Tibetans had suffered from western interference by colonial powers in the first half of the twentieth century. From the Chinese perspective, Tibet was a backward and uncivilized land. Before the liberation, people suffered under the highly hierarchical society and the cruel rule of lamas and aristocrats (Ardley, 2002). However, following the Chinese takeover in the 1950s, Tibetans got rid of serfdom and finally embarked on modern development. The state media revealed that since the “democratic reform (p. 249)” and especially since 1978, the economy in Tibet has developed rapidly and outstanding

achievements have been made. For instance, industry has gradually climbed from zero to more than 250 medium sized and small enterprises (Blondeau & Buffetrille, 2008). This view and similar positive interpretation of Sino-Tibet history are widely accepted not only by members of the Chinese Communist Party but also by most Chinese citizens (Blondeau & Buffetrille, 2008).

The opposing view, widely held outside China, mainly in the West, is that the “entry of Chinese troops into Tibetan territory was the invasion of a sovereign nation, a nation that was different from China in language, history, culture, and religion” (Blondeau & Buffetrille, 2008, p. xvii). The western world often believes that Tibet had no international allies who were prepared to be overt with their support, and Britain abandoned any interest it had in Tibet in 1947 with Indian independence. As a result, Tibetans were vulnerable to the Communist Party’s occupation and alleged invasion (Heath, 2005). In 1951, a Tibetan delegation in Beijing was coerced by the Chinese government into signing an agreement with them to cede Tibet to the People’s Republic of China. Out of anger, Tibetans organized multiple anti-repression protests, and they were all quashed by the brutal Chinese security force (Blondeau & Buffetrille, 2008). The western media also reported that almost all religious activities were banned and practically all of Tibet’s monasteries were destroyed by the Chinese. The pro-Tibet media and population justify and support the Tibetan revolts by claiming that human rights violations have continued and Chinese repression have increased steadily in Tibet, including heightened control on religious activities, intensive re-education programs and even genocidal action (Ardley, 2002). It was also claimed by pro-independence activists that over one million Tibetans have died as a result of Chinese occupation (Ardley, 2002).

The Chinese and Tibetan renditions of the events of the past fifty years in Tibet are mutually contradictory and neither of them can be completely accurate (Blondeau & Buffetrille, 2008). While the Chinese central government broadcasts at home and abroad its own view, the political stance and opinions against China and in support of the cause of Tibetan independence have also been articulated and iterated by the Dalai Lama, his Government in exile, and his proponents around the world via media. The fact is that, to this day, no government in the world has officially recognized Tibetan independence. Foreign powers, including the United States and the United Kingdom, that have played a role on the Tibetan scene have merely pursued their own political interests (Blondeau & Buffetrille, 2008). Since 1949, both Britain and the United States

have shown great concern over the prospect of communist control of Tibet. However, given their own situations and interests, the two giant powers approached the issue realistically (Zhai, 1994).

Throughout the debate about the Tibet question, both Chinese and Western media have played a critical role in informing the world of past events. However, news media's treatment of other countries has always been considered a problematic terrain, since there is no international press institution as such and the case of international news reporting is closely tied with international enmities and alliances as well as economic and political competition and relations of dependency (McQuail, 1992). When it comes to the analysis of western news coverage of the 2008 Tibet Riots, it is necessary to judge with caution the distance between different ideological and cultural systems of values, revealed by the spirit that breathes through the journalists' choice, narration and discussion of events. Crocenzi (2008a) argued, based on his analysis of the international news coverage of the Lhasa uprising of 1987-1989, that it is difficult to have an objective and real description of the events, since each aspect of the reviews by the Chinese and foreign press are partial and clash in every respect, namely, in the judgment of the subjects of revolt, the political and religious nature of the uprising, and the political status of Tibet. As this thesis aims to examine the American (CNN) and British (BBC) news coverage of the most recent unrest in Lhasa, reviewing the patterns followed by the western media in reporting the previous riots in Tibet can provide new insights into the way we analyze the journalistic production pertaining to the latest Tibetan revolts.

To understand how the Tibet question emerged and was interpreted by the Chinese officials and the western world, this chapter will first outline the history of Sino-Tibet since the Yuan Dynasty and will highlight the major Tibetan revolts that have taken place after the Communist Party takeover. Next, it will explain Sino-US and Sino-UK relations in regard to the Tibet issue in the past century and changes in their prominent positions taken on the issue in contemporary political debate will be discussed. Specially, the emergence of Tibet's human rights debate will be examined. Media play a crucial role in interpreting and disseminating the messages of the Tibet issue, as discussed in the first chapter's examination of framing. Finally, this chapter will provide an overview of the British and American media's coverage of the Tibet question as well as Sino-US and Sino-UK relations.

Sino-Tibet History

From the middle to the end of last century, the Tibet question has been one of the most controversial international political issues. The interpretation of Sino-Tibet relation has been heatedly debated and contested in many international forums (Norbu, 2001). When contemporary Chinese politicians assert that Tibet has always been a part of China, they are possibly implying that Tibet, since the middle of the thirteenth century, used to participate in Chinese tribute-paying relations. However, if it is the case, historians holding the opposing view argue that the tribute relations comprised a pan-Confucian international system which most of the East, Southeast and Central Asian states (including Korea and Vietnam, not only Tibet), used to participate in (Norbu, 2001). Since the Communist Party's takeover in the 1950s, similar disputes over Sino-Tibet history emerged and were not well addressed. Historian Norbu states that there is no easy answer to Sino-Tibet relations and he summarizes that "during this long period of time the Chinese exercise of power in Tibet has ranged from mild dominance, characteristic of tribute relations, to extreme forms of direct political intervention and domination, as the communists have done" (Norbu, 2001, p.3).

This chapter will trace Sino-Tibet relations to as early as the Yuan Dynasty (1279-1368) and then elaborate on the relations between them from the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) to modern China.

Yuan Dynasty (1279-1368)

In 1206, the Mongolians of northern China founded the Mongol Khanates. After having conquered several kingdoms in China, Genghis Khan and his supporters established the Yuan Dynasty in 1271 (Scott, 1995). The Chinese authority claims that as early as the 1240s, various political forces in Tibet had pledged allegiance to the Mongols and Tibet then became an administrative region under the Yuan. In the following 700 years, Tibet remained under the jurisdiction of China's central governments (Blondeau & Buffetrille, 2008).

However, this interpretation of Sino-Tibet relations was refuted by many western scholars and pro-independent activists. One of the most popular arguments is that the Yuan Dynasty's official history (the Yuanshi), in detailing the geography of the Yuan realms, excludes Tibet from the relevant chapters (Blondeau & Buffetrille, 2008). Thus, they conclude that Tibet, although under the domination of the Mongol rulers of the Yuan Dynasty, was not attached by them to China, much less made an "integral part" of China (Blondeau & Buffetrille, 2008).

Moreover, the administrative arrangements in Tibet allowed for a considerable amount of decentralization in the country, including the posting of local officials from the Iranian part of the Mongol empire to those areas considered to be under the jurisdiction of the Mongol ruling house in Iran (Blondeau & Buffetrille, 2008). Although, this cannot undermine the actual Yuan position in Tibet, it still indicates that Mongol arrangements for Tibet were far more complex than the Chinese authority claims. Historians like Gyailcian and Wang tried to generalize the opposing view held by communist Chinese historians and pro-Tibet historians. The former emphasize the political dimension of the relationship between China and Tibet which leads them to conclude that it was a relation between superior and subordinate and sovereign and subject (Wang & Gyailcian, 1997), whereas the latter calls attention to the religious nature of the relationship and thus conclude that it was essentially a patron-priest relationship (Shakabpa, 1967). Norbu argues that since the relations were complex and long, there is evidence for both the viewpoints and there seems to be some truth in both versions (Norbu, 2001).

Ming Dynasty (1368-1644)

From beggar to emperor, the rise of Zhu Yuanzhang, founder of the Ming dynasty outdistances most modern success stories on the theme of rags to riches. He captured Peking (now Beijing) in 1368, driving out the last Mongol emperor, and was proclaimed emperor in the same year (Scott, 1995). According to the Chinese official interpretation of Ming-Tibet relations, the Ming Dynasty basically inherited the arrangements of the Yuan Dynasty. Tibetan officials were summoned to come to China for reconfirmation of their titles and offices. Later the emperor created six new titles and bestowed them upon the high-ranking lamas who governed Tibet (Blondeau & Buffetrille, 2008). Ming established a primary unit for Tibet called the Xi'an Branch Regional Guard based at Hezhou, a frontier town in Gansu. In this establishment, a Chinese official named Wei Zheng was placed at its head. The Chinese media gave strong emphasis to the establishment of this office as a proof of Ming China's sovereignty over Tibet (Blondeau & Buffetrille, 2008).

By contrast, some western scholars claim that Wei Zheng, the highest official in the region, is unknown in any Tibetan historical sources and the supposed administrative unit only exercised "ceremonial authority" anywhere beyond the frontier region (Blondeau & Buffetrille, 2008, p.20). They further argue that the titles accorded to Tibetan officials cannot be taken as carrying real political authority in Tibet. Moreover, the official history of the Ming Dynasty

places Tibet outside the geography of Ming China (Blondeau & Buffetrille, 2008). Again, similar to how the Yuan-Tibet history was contested; the Chinese authority and the pro-Tibet scholars stick to their own views. More moderately, historian Norbu considers the Tibet-Ming relation as a “tribute relation” (Norbu, 2001, p.59). Nonetheless, the Ming tribute relations differed from the Yuan system. The reasons for these are as follows: 1. being preoccupied with the Mongol threat, Ming could not spare military forces to back up their tribute relations with Tibet; 2. and, thus, in order to maintain control over Tibet, the Ming dynasty pursued typical “Confucian methods of diplomacy (p. 59)” such as granting an unlimited number of titles and gifts. Since Confucian restoration was given precedence, the Buddhist factor, to which great importance had been attached in the Yuan Dynasty, was relegated to a respectable secondary position (Norbu, 2001). Thus, according to Norbu, though the Tibet-Sino relations changed with the subversion of the Yuan Dynasty, Tibet still bonded with Ming China in a superior-versus-subordinate relation.

Qing Dynasty (1644-1911)

The Qing Dynasty, also known as the Manchu Dynasty, was founded by the Manchu clan Asin Gioro in what is today northeast China. Manchus are today an ethnic minority of China (Scott, 1995). According to the Chinese official interpretation of the Sino-Qing relations, Tibet’s incorporation into the Qing Dynasty was as smooth and voluntary as its acceptance of Ming rule. In order to support this argument, the Chinese officials place emphasize on the fact that in 1642, the 5th Dalai Lama sent envoys to pay homage to the Qing court. Besides, the Qing Dynasty strengthened its administrative control on Tibet and the “29-article regulations” were formulated in 1793. These regulations included that the reincarnations of the Dalai Lama and other high lamas should be approved by the Qing emperor, and that Tibetan officials were forbidden to correspond with foreign countries (Blondeau & Buffetrille, 2008). Some Western scholars also agreed that these regulations did fortify the role and power of the emperor’s representatives in Lhasa, namely the “*ambans*” (Blondeau & Buffetrille, 2008, p. 23). These people were mostly selected from members of the Manchu and Mongolian nobility and were typical military officers or administration bureaucrats with many years of practice in other parts of the Empire (Kolmas, 2003).

However, many others argue that Chinese political control in Tibet was merely nominal, as Manchu took very little interest in what they considered to be the “outer reaches” of their Empire (Palace, 2005, p. 1). The Tibetan area was left to the provincial government of Sichuan

to administer (Palace, 2005). Nonetheless, this depiction of the Qing-Tibet relation still reveals that Tibet used to be under China's sovereignty, though the Qing court's interest in it waned and waxed later on.

Britain initiated their invasion into Tibet in 1904. This led to the collapse of the Qing Dynasty (Blondeau & Buffetrille, 2008). Britain was not the only foreign power that coveted Tibet. Under the pressure of its rival Russia, it withdrew from this region years later. However, Tibet remained as one of the important issues in British-Sino relations.

Modern China (1911-now)

After recalling the history of Tibet-Sino relations from the Yuan Dynasty to China's last feudal empire, the Qing Dynasty, it can easily be seen that the Sino-Tibet relation is a vast and complex area with two sides making varied claims upon which there is no clear consensus. The controversy over the Tibet question was not brought to an end by the 1911 Republican Revolution. The end of the Qing Dynasty followed the revolt led by Yuan Shigai, who had formerly commanded China's southern armies. His revolutionary movement was transformed into the Guomingdang political party (this party later fled to Taiwan and is now one of the major parties there) (Powers, 2004). During the reign of Yuan Shigai, the government only held dominion over a small part of China. Areas like Tibet, which had not been under direct administration of the central Chinese government, tried to distance themselves from China and pursued their independent agendas (Powers, 2004). After Yuan's death in 1916, Sun Yat-sen became the leader of the party and he was succeeded by Chiang Kai-shek after Sun's death in 1925 (Scott, 1995). During Chiang's tenure, he attempted to foster nationalism, with the ambition to "regain China's lost territories, to restore unity and to end the humiliations inflicted on China by foreigners" (Powers, 2004, p. 97). Though Chiang's government was later on the verge of being overthrown by the communists, Chiang still envisioned China as a unified country that included all territories of the Qing Dynasty; Tibet, which he considered as China's territory for centuries definitely was in his blueprint (Ardley, 2002).

However, Chiang did not succeed in carrying out his intention. During the thirty eight years of Nationalist administration, there were literally hundreds of civil wars in China (Powers, 2004). The Communists' leading role in Anti-Japanese wars and their attempt to promote land distribution greatly enhanced their image among Chinese citizens, especially among the peasants (Powers, 2004). In 1945, after defeating the Japanese invaders, the Nationalists failed to

capitalize on their limited effort to combat the Japanese. Meanwhile, being close to the United States, which intended to aid Guomindang in hope of driving the Communist Party out of China, the Nationalists were actually opposed by the Chinese people due to their complicity with outsiders who would intervene in China's internal affairs (Powers, 2004). In 1949, the communists won a series of battles against Nationalist forces, and became in control of most of the country. In the same year, on October 1st, the People's Republic of China was established by the Communist Party (Sullivan, 1997).

According to the communist government, when the new China was founded, most of the Tibetan areas were not yet liberated. Tibetans were longing for the arrival of the Chinese army to help them out of their sufferings, drive the imperialist forces out of their region, and thwart the schemes to sever Tibet from China (Sullivan, 1997). The imperialist forces may refer to either British or Indian colonists at that time, according to the history interpreted by Zhai (1994). Thus, by saying that Tibetans are so desired to be embraced by the "motherland," the People's Liberation Army (P.L.A), in the late 1950s, advance troops of the PLA began moving into Tibet. With the mission of ascertaining the strength of the opponent, the PLA had to find out the information about Tibetan's military capacity and the power of its leaders (Powers, 2004). One month later, in response to the threat of China, the Tibetans Assembly enthroned the fourteenth Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso who was only fifteen years old. The pro-independence Tibetans even wrote letters to the United Nations and the United States protesting the Chinese military incursions (Powers, 2004). Unfortunately, the long period of isolation from the outside world had led to Tibet's isolation in the international political arena. Almost none of the western powers would risk their newly-built relations with communist China (Powers, 2004).

Though China was aware of its increasing political and military power, Mao Zedong still feared a possible major Tibetan counterattack and other western states' intervention in China's "internal matter." Therefore, in 1951, twenty thousand Chinese troops massed at Tibet's eastern border, and Tibet was ordered to send representatives to Beijing to negotiate a treaty for the "peaceful liberation" (Heath, 2005). The result of the negotiation is the "Seventeen-Point Agreement," which has remained as one of the most controversial and significant documents in the history of Sino-Tibetan relations (Norbu, 2001). This agreement comprises 17 articles, which served as a quasi-legal instrument used to legitimate China's takeover of Tibet. According to the Chinese official record, the main contents of the document include provisions that:

The Tibetan people shall unite and drive out imperialist aggressive forces from Tibet; the local government of Tibet shall actively assist the PLA to enter Tibet and consolidate the national defense; Tibet shall practice regional ethnic autonomy, the existing political system in Tibet and the established status, functions and officials of various ranks shall continue to hold office; a policy of religious freedom and respect for the Tibetan people's customs will be implemented; Tibet's spoken and written language and school education, as well as agriculture, animal husbandry and commerce, will gradually be developed, and the living standards of the Tibetan people improved; Tibet's foreign affairs should be placed under the unified management of the Central People's government; in matters related to various reforms in Tibet, there will be no arbitrary enforcement on the part of the central authorities; the local government of Tibet shall carry out reforms of its own accord, and reforms demanded by the people will be executed by means of consultation with the leading administrators of Tibet; the established status, functions and powers of the 13th Dalai Lama and of the 9th Panchen when they were on friendly and amicable terms shall be maintained; funds for the People's Liberation Army and personnel sent to the Tibetan areas shall be provided by the central government. (Question 8, 2005, para. 2)

The pro-independence activists argue that this agreement was preceded by a long preamble which asserts that Tibet was and is a part of China, and according to Goldstein: “There was no discussion regarding the Preamble” (Goldstein & Beall, 1989, p. 765). Goldstein also argues that the Chinese government did not hesitate to use threat or blackmail, when the Tibetan representatives brought up opposing views (Goldstein & Beall, 1989). By sharp contrast, the Chinese government claims that all participants at the meeting praised the work of Tibetan representatives and expressed their support for the agreement (Question 9, 2005). According to the Chinese official website 100 Questions and Answers about Tibet, On October 24, the Dalai Lama sent a telegram to Chairman Mao Zedong, expressing that he completely embraced the 17-Article Agreement. The telegram reads:

The local government of Tibet sent five fully authorized representatives headed by Kaloon Ngapoi to Beijing in late April 1951 to conduct peace talks with the fully authorized representatives of the Central People's Government. On the basis of friendship, representatives of both sides concluded the Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet on May 23, 1951. The local government of Tibet, ecclesiastics and

secular people unanimously support this agreement and, under the leadership of Chairman Mao and the Central People's Government, will actively support the People's Liberation Army in Tibet in consolidating national defense, driving out imperialist forces from Tibet and safeguarding the unification of the territory and the sovereignty of the motherland. I hereby cable you to inform you of this. (Question 9, 2005, para. 2)

This telegram illustrates that the agreement was signed on a basis of mutual understanding and benefits, which sounds quite different from the general western interpretation of China's takeover of Tibet. Meanwhile, the announcement of the letter from the Dalai Lama did not stop the criticism of pro-independent Tibetans and western media. In 1956, the Tibet Special Administrative Region was set up by the Chinese government. The Chinese officials did not know that a major Tibetan protest was just around the corner.

Tibetan Protests

To the Chinese government, "through the peaceful liberation in 1951, Tibet shook off imperialist invasion and trammels, ended its chronic isolation and stagnancy, and created the basic conditions for realizing progress and prosperity along with the rest of China" (The State Council Information Office, China, 2009). To some Tibetans, the central government did not keep their promises as how they had claimed to the outside world. The Chinese began their occupation of Tibet after the agreement by showing respect for the Tibetan people, treating them well and allowing the Tibetan government to operate more or less as it had done previously. However, within the first three years, the mood had changed as more and more Tibetans began to resent the Chinese presence (Heath, 2005). The Chinese troops began requiring extra food, which led to shortage for the Tibetans. This situation basically violated Article 13 of the Seventeen-Point Agreement (Question 8, 2005, para.2). Moreover, Tibetans found that some of the terms and conditions of the Seventeen Point Agreement were contradictory and ambiguous which left sufficient scope for future revolutionary action. It is difficult to see how the traditional Tibetan polity could have been maintained while a much more powerful political system was being set up (Norbu, 2001). The first historical case of "one country, two systems (Norbu, 2001, p208)" still sounded unreal and problematic to Tibetans. Between the year of 1954 to 1987, there were numerous revolts in Tibet, including Kanting Rebellion in 1954 (Peissel, 1972, p.73-94), the Lithang Rebellion in 1956 (Peissel, 1972, p.73-94), the Chushi Gang-drug from June 1958 to March 1959 (Patterson, 1960, p.125-35), the Lhasa Uprising in March, 1959 (Norbu, 2001,

p.210-227), the pro-independence demonstrations in Lhasa in September , 1987 (Schwartz, 1994, p. 74-108), and another round of pro-independence demonstrations in Lhasa in October, 1987 (Herold, 1994). Among these protests, the 1959 Lhasa Riots and demonstrations in 1987 were the severest. Moreover, the 2008 Tibet Riots, which broke out on the 50-year anniversary of the 1959 Lhasa Riots also will be examined in this chapter.

1959 Lhasa Riots

A series of major uprisings took place in Kham (Eastern Tibet) in 1956-1957 as a result of local dissatisfaction with communist policies (Norbu, 2001). The unrest moved to Amdo (Northeastern Tibet) in 1958, and finally swept into Lhasa in 1959. The PLA's extensive suppression campaigns in Kham and Amdo further infuriated the protestors, which led to the surviving rebels to a slow march to the capital (Norbu, 2001). The situation in Tibet was intensified when the Chinese government announced that no Khampa without a Chinese identification card was permitted to stay in Lhasa. This measure drove the Khampas out to an area south of the capital, where they began to plan an even larger "nationalist" resistance movement to the Chinese government (Norbu, 2001). What set the tense situation on fire was purportedly the Chinese government's invitation to the Dalai Lama to a theatrical play on March 10th. Unfortunately, this date, which was picked by the Dalai Lama himself, coincided with the Great Prayer Festival in Lhasa. What really enraged the Tibetans were the constant reminders sent by the Chinese officials to the Dalai Lama when he was participating in a public ritual attended by Tibetans all over Tibet (Norbu, 2001).

The anger among Tibetans spread around Lhasa rapidly. By March 10 1959, approximately 30,000 protestors from all walks of life in Tibet had gathered around their spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama to "protect, defend and fight for all that he symbolized to the Tibetans" (Norbu, 2001, p. 224). The street was full of agitated Tibetans and their anti-Chinese and anti-communist slogans, such as "Drive away Chinese," Independence for Tibet," and so forth (Richarson, 1962). The most popular street song through out Tibet was the anonymous verse: "We would rather have Dalai Lama than Mao Zedong; we would rather have Buddhism than communism" (Norbu, 2001, p. 225).

The rebellion, thought to be initiated by the Khampas, had later escalated into a very large scale unrest including participants of most of Lhasa's 20,000 monks, and a great number of the 10,000-30,000 public that surrounded the Dalai Lama's palace. It is reported by the Tibetans

that 87,000 Tibetans were killed by the Chinese during the suppression of the revolt (Goldstein & Beall, 1989). However, hardly any information on the death toll of Chinese people was recorded in books written by western writers.

The Chinese government seemed to have a completely different version of the story. In 1959, the central Chinese government decided not to conduct reforms in Tibet during the Second Five-year Plan (1958-62), waiting until the Tibetan people and their leader would recognize its feasibility. However, the Tibetan ruling class tried to perpetuate feudal serfdom. Cornered by the outside forces both from Tibetans and the Chinese government, they secretly plotted to start an armed rebellion against the Chinese government, utilizing innocent Tibetan civilians (Blondeau & Buffetrille, 2008). In general, to the Chinese government, the purpose of the Tibetan rebellion was to serve the interests of the ruling class of Tibet to preserve feudal serfdom and to “sabotaging” the 17-Point Agreement. There is no easy way to prove either side of the conflict was right. However, barely any scholar backed up the Chinese’ claim except the Chinese historians.

After the failed uprising, about 85,000 Tibetans followed the Dalai Lama in his escape to India. In India, he re-established his friendship with Jawaharlal Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister, who was very helpful. With his assistance, the Dalai Lama set up the Government-in-Exile which was later called the Central Tibetan Administration. The town of Dharamsala was chosen as the location of the government (Heath, 2005). Though the Government-in-Exile was never officially recognized by any other government in the world, Tibetans consider it as “a natural continuation of the government in Lhasa” (Ardley, 2002, p.42).

1987 Demonstrations

There are two main phases of resistance to Chinese sovereignty in Tibet: “the armed resistance from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s and non-violent protest from the late 1980s to the present” (Ardley, 2002, p. 21).

As a result of frustration with the ambiguities of the Chinese government’s liberative actions during the mid to late 1980s, serious unrest broke out in Lhasa in September 1987 (Ardley, 2002). Another catalyst for the demonstrations was the announcement of the Dalai Lama’s Five Point Peace Plan to the US Congress on 21st of September in the same year. The main contents of the plan are “The whole of Tibet to become a ‘Zone of Peace’; China to abandon the population transfer policy; Human rights and democratic freedom in Tibet to be

respected; Tibet's environment to be protected, including the removal of the nuclear industry; and Serious negotiations between Tibet and China" (Ardley, 2002, p. 23). The United States' recognition of the document inspired the Tibetans, who watched the meeting between the Dalai Lama and the US Congress on TV. In the week leading up to the 27th of September, some of the monks decided to stage some kind of public show of support for the Dalai Lama. The plan rapidly spread out to Lhasa through a network among young Tibetans. On the 27th of September 1987, groups of young Tibetans started marching toward the Tibetan Autonomous Region government building, carrying their self-made Tibetan flag and shouting the slogans "Tibet is Independent" and "May the Dalai Lama Live Ten Thousand Years" (Schwartz, 1994). However, this peaceful protest was dispersed without violence by the police soon.

On Chinese National Day (1 October 1987), another demonstration was staged beginning at 9:00am in the morning. This demonstration was started by twenty three monks, but soon escalated into an uncontrollable situation. Hours after the demonstration had begun, 2000-3000 Tibetans gathered to show their hatred of the Chinese occupation. A crowd of protesters stoned the police station and smashed a rifle inadvertently dropped by a policeman (Schwartz, 1994). Numbers of police standing in front of the police station were all forced to retreat into the compound. The protestors put blankets and wooden stall-tables next to the wooden door of the station and set them on fire with kerosene. This unrest was squelched by the security forces and a night-time curfew was enforced in Lhasa (Schwartz, 1994).

Five days later, on 6 October 1987, a group of fifty young Tibetan monks walked into Lhasa to demonstrate in front of the Tibetan Autonomous Region Government compound to protest against the continued detention of the twenty-one monks who were arrested by the police during the first demonstration in September (Schwartz, 1994). The enraged monks started to shout pro-independence slogans and later walked up to the main street of the city. These monks didn't go very far; they returned to the government compound, where they continued fierce protests. Later that afternoon, the demonstration was put to an end by the presence of 250 armed police. All the arrested monks were released from the police station after a two-day detention (Schwartz, 1994).

During the protest, around fifty foreigners were in Lhasa and five of them were arrested for taking photographs. While the Tibetans were grateful for their presence, the Chinese government barred foreign journalists from the autumn of 1987 onward (Heath, 2005).

These major demonstrations have initiated a new phase of Sino-Tibetan relations and new terms have also appeared in the Tibetan political vocabulary. From simply asking for independence, the Tibetan monks and nuns started to associate their struggles for independence with demands for democracy and human rights from the 1987 demonstrations and onward (Schwartz, 1994). The new definition of the pro-independence movements as pro-democracy and pro-human-rights struggles seemed to help Tibetans win more sympathy and support from the international community. The fact that the Dalai Lama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989 (Schwartz, 1994, p.172) was seen by most Tibetans as a pro-Tibetan political message conveyed by the outside world. Though during the 1990s, there was no major protest or demonstration in Tibet, the “freeing Tibet” movements seemed to go global. Working with the Ministry of Religion and Culture in Dharamsala, India, in 1991 Tibet House inaugurated the International Tibet Year (Roberts II & Roberts, 2009, p.192). In 1994, the free Tibet movement spread to colleges and universities, Students for a Free Tibet was formed with the joint effort of the International Campaign for Tibet and the U.S. Tibet Committee (Roberts II & Roberts, 2009, p. 194). In the 21st Century, the free Tibet movement had become a popular global cause (Roberts II & Roberts, 2009, p. 202), which complicated the consequences of the 2008 Tibet Riots.

US-Sino-Tibet Relations

A basic principle of U.S policy toward Tibet has been the recognition of China’s sovereignty over Tibet (Zhai, 1994). To avoid offending the Chinese government, the communication between Tibet and the U.S. during the 1940s was based on the prerequisite that the Dalai Lama is a religious rather than secular leader of Tibet even though the U.S. and Tibet had developed close relations within the last few years of the 1940s. In 1948, a Tibetan trade mission visited the United States. Under strong pressure from the Chinese government, the White House treated the mission informally with the Commerce Department acting as their hosts rather than holding a diplomatic visit between two countries (Sprouse memo of telephone conversation, 1948). While there was frequent communication between Tibet and U.S., the American government was still highly cautious about the potential harm to Sino-US relations that their relations with Tibet might cause.

However, the U.S. policy toward Tibet did not remain unchanged during the following years. Instead, it was a dramatic period of history. In early 1949, Loy Henderson, a State

Department Soviet and East European specialist, suggested that “in view of the changing conditions in Asia, a review of American policy toward Tibet was appropriate” (Zhai, 1994, p. 52). He proposed that if Mao’s communist forces took over the country, the United States should be prepared to treat Tibet as independent (Zhai, 1994). In fact, the United States did seek in turn to support Tibet at different times, when a Chinese attack seemed imminent (Goldstein & Beall, 1989, p.747-757). A U.S. State Department memorandum dated April 12, 1949, says: “If Tibet possesses the stamina to withstand communist infiltration... it would be to our interest to treat Tibet as independent rather than to continue to regard it as a part of China which has gone communist” (quoted in Apri, 1999, p.250-251)

While the American government took a “wait-and-see” stand on the Tibetan question during the 1940s, the new order of international political relations pushed Eisenhower to the point of making a decision. During the Cold War, the Central Intelligence Agency secretly began its covert operation in Tibet (Roberts II & Roberts, 2009). In 1959, Fidel Castro ousted Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista in January and took over Cuba, which made America feel that now it “was essential for the United States to fight back against International communism in Tibet” (Roberts II & Roberts, 2009, p.61). For the U.S. government, the Tibetans were for independence and wanted to drive out the Chinese from “their land.” The CIA wanted to make trouble for the PLA and disrupt and finally destroy international communism. The two objectives were not identical but were compatible. Based on this, the Eisenhower Administration decided to use the Tibetans for its own political purposes (Roberts II & Roberts, 2009). Since they did not want to cause direct confrontations with China, a covert opposition was the most appropriate.

The big loss of Tibetan guerrillas during the 1959 Lhasa Riots was a heavy blow for America since their previous secret support did not help them to frustrate the communist Chinese government. Thus, President Eisenhower approved an expansion of their covert program. Code-named ST BARNUM and ST BAILEY, his program authorized covert financial assistance in for guerrilla warfare inside Tibet on a larger scale than ever before (Roberts II & Roberts, 2009, p.62-63). They even paid the Indian government for having the Government-in-Exile in their country after the Dalai Lama’s escape and supported the Tibetan exile government to make its presence financially possible (Roberts II & Roberts, 2009).

Nixon entered the White House as President in 1968. The Tibetan protestors did not know that this person would sacrifice their interest after years of secret cooperation. Nixon

studied the Sino-Soviet rift since the late 1950s and he believed that if America could engage China, the USSR would be forced to cooperate in ending the Vietnam War. Ironically, the Tibetan resistance captured classified Chinese documents proving the credibility of the Sino-Soviet rift (Van Wie Davis, 2000). This affirmed Nixon's theory. In 1969, the National Security Advisor informed the leader of the Tibetan resistance fighters of the decision that the Nixon administration would wind down its support for the Tibetan resistance. The U.S.'s realistic decision later caused many internal conflicts with Tibetan guerrillas who felt that they were betrayed and cheated (Roberts II & Roberts, 2009). The Tibetans realized that the Tibet question was one of the many bargaining counters in political relations between China and the U.S. The termination of waging Tibetan resistance marked another phase of Sino-Tibet-US relations. In July, 1971, Kissinger and a crew of American diplomats boarded an aircraft to fly to Beijing for a secret meeting with Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai. Both sides agreed to sign a communiqué on July 15 summarizing the objective of the talks. One year later, President Nixon pursued the dialogue by visiting China, meeting Chairman Mao Zedong. Nixon was widely praised for overcoming political resistance from the right wing to bring back the rapprochement with China (Roberts II & Roberts, 2009). Many commentators also emphasized that the rapprochement with Beijing and the termination of American support to the Tibetan resistance implied recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet (Blondeau, 2008). While American never would risk starting the World War III by directly challenging China on the Tibet question, it adopted other methods to pin down the Chinese government.

The United States first directly raised the human rights issue in regard to China at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of 1980s, when the U.S. formally established its diplomatic relations with China during the Carter Administration. Though due to strategic concerns, the United States had seldom confronted China with human right issues during the cold war, beginning in 1981, President Reagan resumed the issue against China (Van Wie Davis, 2000). After the Tiananmen Square incident, the human rights issue became one of the focuses of the American policy toward China and Tibet question has remained as a major human rights issue since then (Van Wie Davis, 2000). During the 2008 Tibet riots, Speaker of the US House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi condemned China for trampling human rights by saying "If freedom-loving people throughout the world do not speak out against China and the Chinese in

Tibet, we have lost all moral authority to speak out on human rights" (US Lawmaker demands Tibet Inquiry, 2008).

British-Sino-Tibet Relations

It was not only the US that coveted Tibet; other foreign powers like the UK also attempted to take possession of it to serve their own political interests. When the Chinese government took control over the Tibetan area, they defined their act as a liberative mission to help Tibetans drive the imperialist forces out of their territory (Sullivan, 1997). The so-called imperialist forces referred to British colonists who were active in Tibet before the communists occupied the area (Zhai, 1994). Unlike the history of US-Sino-Tibetan relations, the major two turning points of British-Sino-Tibet relations were the 1907 British-Russian Agreement and Britain's retreat from India in 1947.

Throughout the nineteenth century, Central Asia had always been a consistent target of British colonial competition with Russia. Having first conquered India and Burma, the British attempted to penetrate Tibet (Palace, 2005). By 1900, the rivalry between Britain and Russia in Central Asia resulted in both countries' forward movements towards Tibet. Though the Manchu emperors agreed to defend Tibet when the threat of foreign invasion was posed in return for the Dalai Lama's personal spiritual protection, Russians were still highly involved in Tibetan-Russian trade and covert political communication (Palace, 2005). Thus, the British government was anxious to increase their political influence in Tibet through the Indian government in order to counter any Russian interference. Taking advantage of the Russian-Japanese War, British troops invaded Tibet but they could not stay long. In 1906, under the British-Russian agreement of 1907, Britain agreed to withdraw from Tibetan internal affairs and only maintain its relations with Tibet through China (Zhai, 1994). According to the Simla Convention in 1914 which China never ratified, the UK had recognized China's "suzerainty" as long as the Chinese government promised to respect Tibet's autonomy (Zhai, 1994, p.49). The reason why the Chinese officials did not ratify the achievement of the Simla Convention was that they insisted on "sovereignty" instead of the British interpretation of China's status in Tibet as "suzerainty" (Norbu, 2001). "Suzerainty" is a diplomatic term used to denote a condition under which a dependent state (in this case Tibet) enjoyed local autonomy over domestic matters, while living under the rule of a more powerful entity (in this case China) that exercised control over external affairs and defense. "Sovereignty," on the other hand, describes a situation in which one state exercise total control

over another (Grunfeld, 1996). Thus the Sino-Tibetan relationship was transformed through a politics of vocabulary.

After retreating from India in 1947, Britain's interest in Tibet simultaneously decreased. With India's declaration of independence of Britain, London transferred its treaty rights and other obligations in Tibet to India and decided to withdraw any separate representative in Tibet (Zhai, 1994). However, London claimed that they would continue their contacts with the Tibetan government and would still be interested in the future prosperity of Tibet as well as its maintenance of autonomy (Foreign Office Proposal, 1948). In view of the communist's victories in China in 1949, Britain was unwilling to see Tibet fall into the hands of the Communist Party. The British policymakers decided that they might be able to encourage India to support the Tibetan resistance so as to curb the expansion of communist forces. Unfortunately, India, for its own part, was reluctant to take sole responsibility to support Tibet, as it might lead to direct confrontation with the Chinese government (Zhai, 1994).

The British officials thought that because India looked less suspicious than Britain in Chinese minds, supplies of arms to Tibet an resistance should come from there and not from Britain or America. Any direct action by London or Washington might arouse Chinese enthusiasm for defending their triumph in Tibet. Thus, the British believed that India could be used as a cat's paw to maintain their political influence in Lhasa by providing small arms to the Tibetan resistance through them (Zhai, 1994).

Unfortunately, India was aware of the fact that they were merely acting as a British puppet and the British government was only "passing the buck" to them (Zhai, 1994, p.50). Interestingly, the Indian government tried to pass the buck to Nepal. However, Katmandu was also reluctant to provide direct assistance to Tibet a resistance. When the Communist Party entered Lhasa in 1950, the Tibetans requested aid from the Nepalese government in accordance with the Tibetan-Nepalese Treaty signed in 1856. Surprisingly, the Nepalese denied any obligation to offer military assistance to Tibet under that situation (Nepal Promises China to Pre-empt Tibetan Protest, 2009).

After failing to persuade Indian or Nepal to get involved, Britain started to cautiously keep a moderate relation with the Tibetan upper class and later with the Tibetan Government-in-Exile in India. When Lhasa requested help from the UK to gain U.N. membership, the British government also resolutely ruled out the possibility of recognizing Tibetan independence and

their proposal to enter the U.N. From then on, official British-Tibetan relations have remained low-profile. Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair's 2004 refusal of meeting the Dalai Lama (Tempest, 2004) and Gordon Brown's barring the Dalai Lama from Downing Street (Coates, 2008) both revealed that Britain was reluctant to provide active support to the Tibetans.

Media Coverage of Tibet Question

Tibet has long been a source of fascination to the Western media. Tibet was first featured in LIFE magazine in 1939, when they covered the story that Tenzin Gyatso was recognized as the reincarnation of Tibet's Thirteenth Dalai Lama (Roberts II & Roberts, 2009). Twelve years later, when China took over Tibet in 1951, LIFE also devoted its cover and a twenty-five photo spread on the Dalai Lama's temporary refuge on India's border. The TIME magazine also followed the Dalai Lama and published an issue with his picture on its cover in April, 1959 (Roberts II & Roberts, 2009). The LIFE magazine was not the only news outlet that covered the Dalai Lama's life and the Tibetan resistance to Chinese sovereignty. The media coverage of history of Sino-Tibet relations and previous Sino-Tibet conflicts may provide new insights into the way we examine the Western media's coverage of the Tibet Riots in 2008. During the previous media's report on the Tibetan question, the news coverage of the Lhasa demonstrations in 1987 was a typical example of how the Western media interpreted and covered the uprising of Tibetan resistance against the Chinese rule.

Crocenzi argues that, examining journalistic sources from different countries requires a clear distinction between Western and Chinese newspapers due to the distance between different ideological and cultural systems of values (Crocenzi, 2008a). The essentials of the Dalai Lama's ideals embraced the respect for individual and human rights which coincide with the public opinion in Western countries where people think that Tibet was deprived of independence by the intrusion of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA). Though the media in the West were not considered as a propaganda tool by the public, they were a "medium for expression by a society that had regarded democracy and the defense of human rights as two inspiring principles of the social, political and ideological reconstruction of society after the World War II" (Crocenzi, 2008a, p.22). Thus, the function of western journalism gave rise to the controversial interpretation of the demonstrations in 1987. To better understand the western news coverage of the incident, the Chinese interpretation of the unrest may serve as a useful contrast.

In the Chinese analysis of the Lhasa Revolt, the Dalai Lama was depicted as the manipulator of the Lhasa uprising and the Tibetan resistance. The Chinese press never questioned the identification of the Dalai Lama with the 1987 incident and they argued that the Chinese argument about the national integrity of the country was based on the international acknowledgement of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of China and international acknowledgement, at least by most countries, of China's sovereignty over Tibet (Crocenzi, 2008a).

While the Chinese media accused the Dalai Lama of instigating the demonstrations and focused on the violence of the rioters, which contradicted the peaceful struggle that the Dalai Lama had publicized abroad, the Western media gave prominence to the monks' courage and the cause of freedom and human rights (Crocenzi, 2008b). The Western reports were full of ordinary people's criticisms of the uprising and the uprising was seen as a religious revolt to fight against Chinese's suppression of the religious freedom in Tibet (Crocenzi, 2008b). By describing the repression by the Chinese central government, especially the reports of violations of human rights in the prisons and other events witnessed by the journalists themselves and other tourists, China was portrayed by the Western journalists as a state where the presence of dissidents was not allowed. The reports of the Western media aimed at criticizing the results of militarization and its widespread disruption to the life of ordinary residents in Tibet (Crocenzi, 2009). These media attempted to estimate the death toll and the number of prisoners, though not paying much attention to the Chinese victims and they highlighted the curfews, the arrests and the parades of the PLA in the Lhasa city (Crocenzi, 2009). Crocenzi was almost neutral when evaluating the news coverage coming from both sides of the ideological dichotomy. She noticed that while Western journalists explicitly expressed their respectable goal to unearth the hidden truth of the revolt, they still "had some dangerous omissions and altered the facets in order to defend the 'purity' of the political and cultural values of Western countries" (Crocenzi, 2009, p.25).

The example of the news coverage of the 1987 Lhasa Riots revealed that the western media found that emphasizing the human rights abuse in Tibet was an effective way to garner world criticism against the Chinese government. This coincided with the change in the American foreign policies pertaining to the Tibet question after the 1980s that human rights issue was one of the major tools used by America to curb Chinese power in Tibet (Van Wie Davis, 2000). It also accorded with Britain's change from resolute pro-Tibet policies in the early

twentieth century to a more gentle and indirect attitude toward the Tibet resistance. In view of the growing power of communist China, western nations felt the strong need to build ties with the Chinese government. The shift from tough foreign policies against China to the softer human rights diplomacy was reflected in the western news coverage of Tibetan riots and even the report about the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989, when the western media were present to record a crackdown by the Chinese security forces against their citizens, who were calling for democracy and human rights. CNN pioneered such real time coverage and other broadcasters also followed its style of intensifying emotional and on-the-spot depictions of conflicts between the government and students, instead of demonstrating direct and clear-cut judgment or criticism (Hoge, 1994).

Decades have passed, since the 1987 riots. Though the Tibet Riots in 2008 might not be covered in the same way as it was during the 1987 demonstrations, the journalistic pattern followed by the Western journalists could still prevail in the 2008 media war between China and the West. However, as Crocenzi put it, “the Chinese and foreign press are partial and clash in every respect” (Crocenzi, 2008a, p.22). As discussed in the first chapter, the news paradigm is always seen as operating within a larger ideological sphere, there is no easy answer to which approach to news coverage should be given precedence over the other, and the Western media may not even been seen as a whole based on each society’s own social and cultural systems of value.

The review of Sino-Tibet, US-Tibet and British-Tibet relations reveals that the Tibet question is a complicate and controversial issue that has persisted through hundreds of years. Because of the ambiguity involved in the understanding of the historical documents as well as the concerns about the political and economic interdependence between China and other Western countries, the media interpretation of Tibetan existence varies from one time to another. How did the media react to the 2008 Tibet riots this time? Were CNN and BBC, the most influential news outlets of the United States and the United Kingdom respectively, holding different views on the uprising? Did they fulfill their task of uncovering the truth of the unrest? Did the media convey any anti-communism message decades after the Cold War? These questions and other more details will be analyzed in the current research.

CHAPTER THREE

Case Study: News Coverage of 2008 Tibet Riots on BBC and CNN News Online

Introduction

As the historical review of the Sino-, US- and British-Tibet relations in the past century revealed, unpicking the history of the area is very complex, because each group has its own version of history, seemingly irreconcilable with that of its rivals. Furthermore, the previous chapter showed that the stances involved in this debate include much more than simple endorsement of or opposition to various interpretations of the historical changes taken place in this area. These positions are mostly determined by the pursuit of each group's political interest and financial capacity. Thus, the Tibet question is far more complicated than mere border controversies and human right disputes. According to Gitlin (1980), media constitute a significant social force in terms of forming and delimiting ideology and influence public political actors and individual reader alike. This chapter will examine how the media gave play to their function of shaping popular attitudes and mobilizing support for their own political priorities during the crisis in Tibet in 2008. Two western online newspapers involved in covering this unrest will be analyzed and the methods and results of the case study will be expounded.

The case study utilizes the techniques of content analysis to gauge the strength and use of frames in articles from the BBC online news and CNN online news. Framing plays a crucial role in shaping public perception of a news event. Parenti (1993) argues that through framing, media create a desired impression without resorting to explicit advocacy and without departing too far from the appearance of objectivity. This study attempts to look for persistent patterns of the news coverage of the 2008 Tibet Riots by examining the frames used in articles primarily dealing with the uprising, as framing studies can provide a more complex and detailed picture of the way that the two mainstream media outlets treat the issue, such as what attributes of the news event they want to stress, how these angles correspond with each other and whether these two media examples differ in their treatments. Additionally, quantitative content analysis can provide reliable and duplicable statistical evidence to help confidently generalize the framing patterns followed by BBC and CNN and contribute to future research on similar political and social debates.

Case Study

Tibet has rarely been a peaceful region in China after the Chinese government's takeover. Numerous revolts broke out there from 1954 to 1987, including the Kanting Rebellion in 1954 (Peissel, 1972, p.73-94), the Lithang Rebellion in 1956 (Peissel, 1972, p.73-94), the Chushi Gang-drug from June 1958 to March 1959 (Patterson, 1960, p.125-35), the Lhasa Uprising in March, 1959 (Norbu, 2001, p.210-227), the pro-independence demonstrations in Lhasa in September, 1987 (Schwartz, 1994, p. 74-108), and another round of pro-independence demonstrations in Lhasa in October, 1987 (Herold, 1994). Among these protests, the 1959 Lhasa Riots and demonstrations in 1987 drew the most attention from the outside world.

These riots were only few documented ones among dozens of uprisings of all scale in last decades in Tibet. On March 10, 2008, hundreds of monks launched another protest against the rule of the Chinese government. Due to the timing of the uprising and continuous controversies about the Tibet question, the riots drew a great deal of attention from international media. CNN News online and BBC News online, as very influential global media, both devoted extensive coverage to this crisis.

The Situation of the Tibet Uprising in 2008

On the date of the 49th anniversary of the Tibetan National Uprising, March, 10, 300 monks assembled at Drepung monastery to march toward the historic Barkhor quarter of Lhasa to issue their demand that authorities release their fellow monks detained as political prisoners by the Chinese authorities (Roberts II & Roberts, 2009). They picked the date intentionally to show that the Tibetan spirit could not be easily crushed. Unlike previous protests, the monks did not demand independence of Tibet. Instead, they pressed the government to release the detainees. Though the confrontation started with a seemingly mild motive, it was again doomed to escalate into a large riot with more monks and protestors joining in the protest and the government refusing to compromise. On the first day, March 10, the monks shouted their demands in front of a barricade manned by the People's Armed Police. The police waded into the crowds of monks with their firearms at ready to break their formation. More than fifty people were arrested and those who refused to compromise staged a sit-in on the street (Roberts II & Roberts, 2009). On March 11, 500 monks from the Sera monastery marched in protest and it ended after seven-hour sit-in. Three days later, on the fateful March 14th, the Chinese government came to the decision to break up new protests swiftly with "heavy force" (Roberts II & Roberts, 2009, p.215). This

decision further aggravated the tension within Tibet. Using gasoline and cylinders filled with fuel for stoves, the Tibetans set fires to Chinese-owned shops. Almost a thousand Chinese shops were in flames. Foreign tourists saw Chinese Han people being beaten by the Tibetan protestors. The authority dispatched a heavy security force in an attempt to stop the violence, while protestors used stones to drive them off (Roberts II & Roberts, 2009). The Tibetan Autonomous Region was bogged down in rage and chaos. As the protest entered the second week, protestors spread to provinces bordering the Himalayan region, such as Gansu, Qinghai, and Sichuan (Bristow, 2008). Tibet was sealed and was swarmed with the military force and the angered Chinese authority set a deadline for the protestors, saying they would offer leniency to those who surrendered themselves (China's premier blames Dalai Lama 'clique' for violence in Tibet, 2008). However, instead of bringing surrender; this statement evoked stronger opposition to the Chinese attempt to quench the riots.

During the crisis, the international debates over the Tibet Riots 2008 evolved around the real cause of the outbreak of the protest. The Chinese government declared that the protest was a political plot carefully orchestrated by the Dalai clique to bring about Tibet's secession and to ruin the Tibetans' normal, harmonious, and peaceful lives (Chinese Media Silent on Tibet, 2009). Furthermore, the Chinese authority responded in late March by inviting a select group of international journalists on a government-sponsored trip to Lhasa, hoping that the journalists would corroborate their version that the riots were masterminded by the Dalai Lama (Roberts II & Roberts, 2009). With the Beijing 2008 Olympics just months away, the wave of protests could not have come at a worse time. This irritated the government and seemed to support their accusation that the Dalai Lama purposely instigated the riots.

By contrast, protestors and pro-Tibet advocates attributed the uprising to the assumption that Tibetans simply could no longer live with the human rights infractions that had been constant in their "country" since the 1950 Chinese takeover. They wanted to voice their anger through a large-scale protest that demanded more freedom, both religious and political (Chen, 2008). They also illustrated certain historic events in the past decade which they considered as catalysts for today's outbreak.

The most direct cause for the protest, according to them, was the demand for the release of the Tibetan political prisoners. The Tibetan protestors claimed that these detainees lived under inhumane conditions, such as inadequate food and threadbare blankets in sparsely heated cells

(Roberts II & Roberts, 2009). The ill treatment to the imprisoned monks concerned the monks outside so much that it made them to decide to march in unison to protest.

In addition to the direct drive, the acknowledgement of the Tibetan spirit from the world's most powerful nation also immensely inspired the Tibetans. Former president of the United States, George W. Bush, personally bestowed a rare honor, the Congressional Gold Medal, to the Dalai Lama in a ceremony on Capitol Hill in front of phalanx of reporters and televisions, and Washington VIPs in 2007 (Roberts II & Roberts, 2009). While the Chinese government was undoubtedly outraged by the distinguished honor, the Tibetans throughout the world rejoiced. Before the announcement, for months, Chinese diplomats had lobbied Congress to dissuade them to vote for the decision. After the announcement, Minister of Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi gave immediate and harsh response to Bush's act and warned it would seriously damage Sino-US relations (Roberts II & Roberts, 2009). The Chinese government's reaction was considered frustrating by Tibetans who were celebrating the auspicious award to their spiritual leader.

Moreover, in 2006, China successfully opened a high-speed railway between Qinghai and Tibet, which was seen by the Chinese as a landmark of the government's effort to enhance Tibetans' living standards. Unfortunately, the gesture by the Chinese authority triggered unwanted resistance and resentment from the Tibetan residents, who suspected that the real purpose behind the project was to transport Chinese immigrants into Tibet to accelerate the process of cultural assimilation. While the Chinese most influential newspaper Xinhua commented that the railway broke the seclusion of Tibet, spurred investment in Tibet and made it possible for Tibetans who work outside the autonomous region to travel back home during the Chinese New Year (Zhou & Jia, 2006), some Tibetans felt that the influx of Chinese made them a minority and caused "rising unemployment and a spike in food costs" (Roberts II & Roberts, 2009, p.208). Though the benefits and the shortcomings of the project came hand in hand, anti-Chinese Tibetans use it to arouse anti-China sentiments, which may have paved the way for the large-scale protest two years later.

Examples of Media Coverage of the Riots: CNN and BBC News online

While many events happened as a prelude to the outbreak of the 2008 Riots in Tibet, the severity of the uprising and its rapid spread still stunned the world. From the first day of the Lhasa uprising, international media have attached great importance to the report of the situation

in this turbulent region. Photos of bloodied corpses, screaming protestors, and burning streets were smuggled out to the world by the journalists' cameras over the internet. With the riots getting out of control, the Chinese government started to shut down the news coming out of Tibet and charged the Dalai Lama with masterminding the riots. Barred from traveling to Tibet, journalists were even more determined to get "both sides of the story of the riots to the world public" (Roberts II & Roberts, 2009, p.218). Whether the coverage by the western media really provided a wide spectrum of opinions about this event was a question. However, their interpretations of the Sino-Tibet confrontations could play a critical role in shaping public attitudes toward the issue.

Given the global impact of the 2008 Tibet Riots, the role of global media in framing the crisis becomes an important topic. There were a number of international and regional providers that covered the uprising in Tibet. However, among them, the US-based Cable News Network (CNN) and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) are the most recognizable brands in global news operations (Yan & Stewart, 2005). This study compares CNN and BBC's framing of this issue through online news reports. These two news outlets were chosen for several reasons.

Firstly, BBC and CNN are respectively the leading news outlets in the United Kingdom and the United States and are both among the most well-known news media in the world (Yan & Stewart, 2005). BBC News is "the largest broadcast news operation in the world within more than 2,000 journalists and 48 newsgathering bureaus, 41 of which are overseas" (Sambrook, 2006). Between April and June 2003, the BBC News Online service reached 3.2 million UK internet users and much more readers across the world (Fact and Figures, 2006). BBC News reported from more than 150 countries and is a reputable global news provider reaching more than 260 million viewers and 150 million listeners (Sambrook, 2006). It covered many important events in China's history, including the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989 (Timeline: The Tiananmen protests, 2009) and the Lhasa Uprising in 1987 (A Struggle of Blood and Fire, 1999). What makes BBC even more exceptional is their 32-language news service, including news in Chinese, French, Turkish and so forth. Meanwhile, CNN had tremendous success in establishing its television news throughout the world more than 20 years ago (Yan & Stewart, 2005). CNN.com is also the world's leader in online news and information delivery. Staffed 24 hours, seven days a week in the States and in bureaus worldwide, CNN news online provides the most updated news stories with the joint effort of 4,000 news professionals (About CNN.Com, 2009).

Back in 1989, CNN also devoted a great amount of coverage to the Tiananmen Square Massacre (Botelho, 2004). Additionally, it provided high-quality reports about other critical historic moments in Chinese history, such as the Sichuan Earthquake in 2008. (Soldiers press search for quake survivors, 2008). With extensive reach to and impact on the world viewers, as well as their constant attention given to China, CNN and BBC News online are the most appropriate brands for studying the global news reporting about the 2008 Tibet Riots.

Secondly, CNN and BBC not only serve as perfect examples of global news outlets with considerable international effect, they can also aptly represent the attitudes held by UK and US toward the Tibetan protests. Given that the US and UK have different relations with and interests in Tibet and Mainland China, it is possible that the BBC and CNN News delivered the stories based on different political orientations and accents. The history of Sino-US and Sino-UK relations reveals that America and Britain did not always agree with each other on issues like Taiwan and Hong Kong (Yan & Stewart, 2005). In addition, the current British-Tibet and US-Tibet relations were built on decades of historic relationship. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the possible different positions on the Tibet Riots can be reflected in framing this crisis. Thus, the framing of the Tibetan protests from CNN and BBC deserves exploration and analysis.

Finally, feasibility of the research is another important factor which affects the selection of media examples. Both CNN and BBC have archival news on their website. Therefore, the comparison of their coverage of a specific issue during a specific period is feasible. After a search of key words like “Tibet,” “Tibetan Riots,” etc, many news articles concerning the 2008 Tibet Riots were found on BBC and CNN news online. Therefore, in summary, analyzing the western news coverage of the Tibetan crisis by looking at CNN and BBC online is reasonable and viable.

Methods

This case study examined the frames used by the two online newspapers in their coverage of the Tibet Riots in 2008. To analyze the frames utilized by two websites, two coders completed a quantitative coding analysis of articles dealing with the crisis. The 10 articles on the CNN website and 62 stories on the BBC websites were coded according to a revised “common frames” approach outlined by Semetko and Valkenburg (2000, p.95). The two coders followed

the guidelines of content analysis and were provided a code book about the specific coding procedure.

The five “common frames” approach outlined by Semetko and Valkenburg (2000, p.95) were used as a template for developing the “common frames” in this research. The revised “common frames” consisted of both issue-specific frames and generic frames (De Vreese, C. H., Peter, J., & Semetko, H. A., 2001). The revised “common frames” consisted of the *human interest frame*, the *responsibility frame*, the *international condemnation frame*, the *victim versus villain frame*, the *authoritarian versus democratic frame*, and the *anti-communism frame*. The first two frames were originally created in Semetko’s research, and the last four were newly identified particularly for the current study. The new four frames were more closely relevant to the present research topic and served better to answer the research questions. For every article, coders completed coding sheets which are formatted in a likert scale (adapted from Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000) to determine the frame and the potential bias of each article. While Semetko and Valkenburg’s binary coding scheme yields high inter-coder reliability (2000), the likert scale rating would provide more depth of the information and the subtlety of possible differences in the use of frames. To determine the strength of a frame, questions related to the frame were answered to get a numerical indicator of the frame strength. The answer to each question was formatted as a likert scale. More specifically, five choices (never, rarely, occasionally, often, and very often) were provided and were each given a numerical value in ascending order. For instance, if the *victim versus villain frame* is measured with three questions, the coder may answer each one with an answer among the five options. The mean of numerical responses to these questions was the indicator of the strength of each frame. To measure the internal correlations between questions about each frame needs at least ten coders’ coding data. Due to the limited resource, this was not tested and thus the new scale was subject to potential problems of its internal consistency.

This process kept track of the strength instead of numbers of appearance of each frame, thus allowed for multiple frames to blend simultaneously in one article and let one single frame to appear more than once. The questions about the *human interest frame* and the *attribution of responsibility frame* replicated those that appeared in Semetko’s coding sheets (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000), while questions regarding the other four frames were developed newly for this study. To compare CNN with the BBC, some statistical tests were conducted to reveal

differences in frame usage in the coverage of the Tibetan uprising.

Krippendorff (2004) recommends using a codebook to outline definitions of important terms and guidelines about coding procedures. Thus, a codebook was developed to describe each frame as well as the details of the coding process (See Appendix). Descriptions for frames which were identified in Semetko and Valkenburg (2000)'s version of "common frames" were taken directly from their original research, while definitions for newly developed frames (*international condemnation frame*, *victim versus villain frame*, *authoritarian versus democratic frame*, and *anti-communism frame*) were also given based on the goal of the current study. Moreover, example articles for each frame were drawn from the original population of CNN and BBC News Online.

Desirable intercoder reliability can help guarantee the persuasiveness and reliability of a content analysis. Informal intercoder reliability was assessed during multiple training sessions to ensure that two coders read the article more or less in the same way and that they understood the coding process. Through three informal coding sessions and two pilot tests, an acceptable level of interrater reliability was achieved in the last pilot coding. This test included a representative sample of the population chosen randomly and consisted of 14 articles, or 20% of the entire population. A computer software macro program (in SAS version 9.1 for Windows) was used to calculate a measure of intercoder reliability between the responses on the 32 questions in the coding sheet across the two raters. This calculation adopted a measure developed by Shrout and Fleiss (1979) that assumes that all items were rated by the same two raters, who are assumed to be a random subset of all possible raters. Thus, the result was an intraclass correlation measure. A value of 0 would mean there is no internal consistency (or reliability) between the two raters; a value of 1 would mean there is perfect agreement between the two raters. There was no threshold value above which you could say that there was or was not inter-rater reliability: rather, it was just a descriptive measure of agreement—the closer it was to 1, the better the agreement (consistency) was. The test yielded a satisfactory intercoder reliability coefficient, which is 0.85.

Once intercoder reliability was computed, the data were analyzed with respect to the research questions set forth. This study was confined to studying the strength of frames and the possible internal connections between them, but it would also delve into the possible appearance of bias between the lines through analyzing the framing process. For example, when examining

the strength of the *victim versus villain* frame, a numbers of questions were asked in favor of the Chinese government, such as “Does the story portray the Han Chinese people as a group being hurt by the Tibetans? (See question 16)” Meanwhile, questions against the Chinese were also raised, such as “Does the story emphasize how Tibetans are beaten by the Chinese government? (See question 18)” A comparison between the means of responses to both types of questions could reveal whether both sides of the conflicts were portrayed in an unbiased manner or not. The same approach were applied to the analysis of other frames. To examine the applicability of the “anti-communism filter” (Chomsky & Herman, 1988) to today’s Western media, the use of anti-communism frame and its possible association with other frames were studied in particular.

This study included all news stories on the BBC and CNN websites (<http://search.bbc.com/> and <http://search.cnn.com/>) dealing primarily with Tibet riots from March 10th (the first day of the uprising) till March 23rd (one day before the Beijing Olympic Games torch relay). After a search of key terms like “Tibet,” “Tibetan,” and “Tibet Riots,” etc. and elimination of the duplicates, 62 articles about Tibet riots on BBC News online were found and 10 articles were available on CNN News online. The study did not randomly choose a sample out of the small population. Instead, two coders coded all of the 72 articles. Thus, no inferential statistical test was needed to see the differences of frame use between the two outlets. However, in order to examine the association between frames, the Pearson correlation test was still of necessity.


Results

To examine the use of frames in two online news providers, the coders first determined the strength of each frame. They answered 3-6 questions related to each frame to get a numerical indicator of the frame strength. As was mentioned before, the answer to each question was formatted as a Likert scale. Five choices (never, rarely, occasionally, often, and very often) were provided and were given numerical values (0, 1, 2, 3, and 4) in ascending order indicating how much the coders agreed on the question. For instance, if the *victim versus villain* frame is measured with three questions, the coder may answer each one with an answer among the five options. The mean of numerical responses to these questions could be used as the indicator of the strength of each frame. The closer the mean is to 4, the more present the frame was in the coverage.

This project’s primary research question asked, “Which frames were used in BBC online

news and CNN online news in their coverage of the 2008 Tibet Riots? Which frames are most frequently used?” The data showed that both newspapers used all five frames in the revised “common frames.” The *human interest frame*, the *responsibility frame*, the *international condemnation frame*, the *victim versus villain frame*, the *authoritarian versus democratic frame*, and the *anti-communism frame* were all present. However, their presence varied. See Figure 1 for results.

Figure 1: Overall Frame Usage



The value on top of each “pillar” showed the mean score of the frame strength in particular news outlet. For example, the *human interest frame* in CNN News online got 2.06. This came from two steps of calculation. There were five questions regarding the *human interest frame* in the coding sheet (See Appendix). For each article on CNN, a mean score of the responses to the five questions was calculated to indicate the strength of this frame in this particular article. As ten articles drawn from CNN were under study, all these mean scores of ten articles were added up and then were divided by ten (the number of the articles) to yield a overall mean score of the strength of the *human interest frame* on CNN News.

As it was mentioned that the closer the mean was to 4, the more visible the frame was. Therefore, with respect to the first research question, “Which frames were used on BBC online news and CNN online news in their coverage of the 2008 Tibet Riots? Which frames are most frequently used?” Figure 1 showed that almost all six frames could be found in CNN and BBC.

On BBC News, the most often used frame overall was the *attribution of responsibility frame* with a mean of 1.6. The second most often used frame was the *human interest frame* with a mean of 1.59 which was very close to the first. The third was the *victim versus villain frame* whose mean was 1.37. The *authoritarian versus democracy frame*, the *international condemnation frame* and the *anti-communism frame* were following with means of 0.79, 0.51, and 0.09 respectively. On CNN News, the most frequently used frame was the *attribution of responsibility frame* with a mean of 2.12. The second most visible frame was again the *humane interest frame* whose mean was 2.06. The *victim versus villain frame* followed right behind with a mean of 1.73. The least often used frame was the *anti-communism frame* with a mean 0.13. The means of the other two frames, the *authoritarian versus democracy frame* and the *international condemnation frame* were both below 1, which were 0.3 and 0.99.

The data in Figure 1 can also be used to answer the second research question, “How does frame usage in reporting over the 2008 Tibet Riots differ between BBC online news and CNN online news?” Given that the entire population was coded, a Chi-square test was not needed to examine the differences between them. A straight comparison between the data from two news providers revealed that, in general, BBC and CNN followed a similar framing pattern. In both media outlets, the most often used frame was the *attribution of responsibility frame* and the second was the *humane interest frame*. The *victim versus villain* ranked as the third most frequently used frame with the *authoritarian versus democracy frame*, the *international condemnation frame* and the *anti-communism frame* following behind. Thus, in terms of frame strength, BBC and CNN generally used the six frames in the same way. Whether they were similar in other aspects was also examined and will be expounded soon.

The project’s third important question was “Does each media outlet hold any bias against either side of the conflict? If so, how does it vary from BBC to CNN?” The questions on the coding sheets were tailored in a particular way to make this research question viable. In order to quantify the possible appearance of bias between the lines through analyzing the frames, all questions concerning each frame were asked in a binary way, except those about the *human interest frame* and the *attribution of responsibility frame*, since the current study replicated them from those original questions in Semetko’s project (2000).

For example, when examining the strength of the *victim versus villain* frame, numbers of questions were asked in favor of the Chinese government, such as “Does the story portray Han

Chinese people as a group being hurt by the Tibetans? (See question 16)” Meanwhile, questions against the Chinese were also raised, such as “Does the story portray Tibetans as a group being hurt by the Chinese people/government (See question 17)” A comparison between the means of both types of questions could quantitatively determine whether both sides of the conflicts were portrayed in an unbiased manner or not. The same approach was also applied to the analysis of other frames. Nonetheless, the questions about the *anti-communism frame* were asked in a regular format. While it was reasonable to ask “Does the story suggest that China is a communist country? (See question 30),” it was difficult to design questions the other way around. Figure 2 and 3 showed the results of comparing answers to questions regarding the *international condemnation frame*, the *victim versus villain frame* and the *authoritarian versus democracy frame*.

Figure 2: Average Scores of Anti- and Pro-China Questions on CNN





Figure 3: Average Scores of Anti- and Pro-China Questions on BBC



The values in both diagrams were computed in the same way as those in Figure 1. For instance, the first blue point in Figure 2 was 0.5. It represented the mean score of all responses to anti-China questions regarding the *international condemnation frame*. Similarly, the first red point (0) indicated that the mean score of the answers to all pro-China questions concerning the same frame. Therefore, the margin between them suggested the presence of bias on the news outlet when they used this frame.

Figure 2 showed the use of the *international condemnation frame*, the *victim versus villain frame* and the *authoritarian versus democracy frame* on CNN news online. The data suggested that the average scores of the answers to anti-China questions were a lot higher than those of the answers to pro-China questions, which revealed that bias against the Chinese government was present. Among the frames under study, the *victim versus villain frame* carried the most bias against China, as the mean of answers to pro-China questions was only 0.5 and the average score of answers to anti-China questions was as high as 2.97. The *authoritarian versus democracy frame* held the second most bias, with pro-China and anti-China means as 0.15 and 1.83 respectively. The small margin between anti-China and pro-China means indicated that there was little bias against the Chinese government with the use of the *international condemnation frame*.

A similar bias pattern was found in the Figure 3 about the BBC News online. The data suggested that the average scores of responses to anti-China questions in the coding sheet were higher than those of the answers to pro-China questions, which pointed out that bias against the Chinese government was also present on BBC. The *victim versus villain frame* again carried the

most bias against China, as the mean of answers to pro-China questions was only 0.66 and the average score of answers to anti-China questions was as high as 2.07. The *authoritarian versus democracy frame* also held bias against the Chinese government, as the anti-China mean was 1.38 and the pro-China one was only 0.21. The very close margin between the anti-and pro-China means regarding the *international condemnation frame* suggested that the bias against China existed with this frame but it was weak. Interestingly, BBC and CNN were again very similar in terms of the presence of bias. Bias against the Chinese government was found on both networks and this bias was most noticeable when the *victim versus villain frame* was used.

Question 4 asked that “Which frame is most associated with which frame?” In order to answer this question, Pearson correlation tests were run to yield the correlation coefficients. A correlation coefficient is a numerical index that reflects the linear relationship between two variables. The value of this descriptive statistic ranges between -1 and +1. The closer to either extreme denotes stronger correlation (Salkind, 2004). See Figure 4 and 5 for the test results.

Figure 4. Frame correlations on CNN

	CF1M	CF2M	CF3M	CF4M	CF5M
CF2M	0.416 0.232				
CF3M	-0.227 0.528	0.616 0.058			
CF4M	0.803 0.005	0.775 0.008	0.172 0.634		
CF5M	0.523 0.121	0.823 0.003	0.487 0.153	0.837 0.003	
CF6M	0.158 0.663	-0.018 0.961	0.000 1.000	0.355 0.315	0.401 0.250

Cell Contents: Line 1: Pearson correlation coefficient
Line 2: P-Value

The data suggested that in the articles drawn from CNN News online, frame 1 (the *human interest frame*) was highly and positively correlated with frame 4 (the *victim versus villain frame*), $r=0.80$, $p<0.05$. Moreover, frame 2 (the *attribution of responsibility frame*) was also highly and positively correlated with frame 4 (the *victim versus villain frame*), $r=0.78$, $p<0.05$. Furthermore, frame 5 (the *authoritarian versus democracy frame*) was both greatly and

positively associated with frame 2 (the *attribution of responsibility frame*) and frame 4 (the *victim versus villain frame*). The correlation coefficients were $r=0.82$, $p<0.05$ and $r=0.84$, $p<0.05$ respectively. By saying these frames were positively correlated, it suggested that when the presence of one frame increased, that of the other increased too.

Figure 5: Frame correlations on BBC

	BF1M	BF2M	BF3M	BF4M	BF5M
BF2M	<u>0.455</u> <u>0.000</u>				
BF3M	0.035 0.789	<u>0.426</u> <u>0.001</u>			
BF4M	<u>0.725</u> <u>0.000</u>	<u>0.572</u> <u>0.000</u>	0.145 0.261		
BF5M	<u>0.312</u> <u>0.013</u>	<u>0.423</u> <u>0.001</u>	0.107 0.407	<u>0.609</u> <u>0.000</u>	
BF6M	-0.137 0.289	0.027 0.837	0.122 0.346	-0.118 0.360	0.055 0.669

Cell Contents: Line 1: Pearson correlation coefficient
Line 2: P-Value

Figure 5 indicated more frame correlations than Figure 4. It showed that in articles drawn from BBC News online, frame 1 (the *human interest frame*) was moderately correlated with frame 2 (the *attribution of responsibility frame*), $r=0.46$, $p<0.05$. Frame 1 (the *human interest frame*) was strongly correlated with frame 4 (the *victim versus villain frame*), $r=0.73$, $p<0.05$. Besides, the *human interest frame* was also moderately associated with frame 5 (the *authoritarian versus democracy frame*), $r=0.31$, $p<0.05$. The data pointed out that frame 2 (the *attribution of responsibility frame*) was all moderately correlated with frame 3 (the *international condemnation frame*), $r=0.43$, $p<0.05$, frame 4 (the *victim versus villain frame*), $r=0.57$, $p<0.05$, and frame 5 (the *authoritarian versus democracy frame*), $r=0.42$, $p<0.05$. Lastly, frame 4 (the *victim versus villain frame*) was moderately correlated with frame 5 (the *authoritarian versus democracy frame*), $r=0.61$, $p<0.05$. All seven correlations were positive ones.

A number of correlations between frames were found in both media's news coverage of the 2008 Tibet Riots. It suggested that the frames were strongly interrelated and were used to achieve integrated impact on the readers. The detailed analysis of the frame correlations will be given in the last chapter.

The fifth research question asked “How was each side of the tension portrayed by the two media through framing? How does the portrayal differ between BBC and CNN?” In fact, the data in Figure 4 and 5 could be used as a part of the answer to this question. As the correlations between frames could suggest how frames were used together by the journalists in their writing to build up an image of either side of the conflicts. Besides, Figure 2 and 3 could also prove that there was obvious bias against the Chinese government. In other words, BBC and CNN portrayed the Chinese side as the one that deserved more criticism and condemnation on the Tibet issue. In order to get a more detailed description of how the bias worked and supplement the answer to the fifth research question, this study also examined the potential correlations between questions on the coding sheet, mainly the anti-China ones.

The Pearson correlations tests revealed that following correlations were found. See Table 1 and 2 for results.

Table 1: Found Question Correlations on CNN

Question Pairs	Results
Q7, Q17	$r = 0.81$ P-Value = 0.004
Q7, Q20	$r = 0.85$ P-Value = 0.002
Q7, Q24	$r = 0.87$ P-Value = 0.001
Q13, Q26	$r = 0.89$ P-Value = 0.000
Q17, Q24	$r = 0.85$ P-Value = 0.002
Q18, Q28	$r = 0.96$ P-Value = 0.000
Q20, Q24	$r = 0.90$ P-Value = 0.000
Q22, Q30	$r = 0.76$ P-Value = 0.010
Q22, Q32	$r = 0.76$ P-Value = 0.010

(For specific questions, please refer to the coding sheet, See Appendix)

Table 2: Found Question Correlations on BBC

Question Pairs	Results
Q7, Q13	$r = 0.26$ P-Value = 0.038
Q7, Q17	$r = 0.68$ P-Value = 0.000
Q7, Q18	$r = 0.45$ P-Value = 0.000
Q7, Q20	$r = 0.59$ P-Value = 0.000
Q7, Q24	$r = 0.73$ P-Value = 0.000
Q7, Q28	$r = 0.30$ P-Value = 0.019
Q13, Q17	$r = 0.27$ P-Value = 0.036
Q13, Q32	$r = 0.27$ P-Value = 0.032
Q17, Q24	$r = 0.70$ P-Value = 0.000
Q17, Q28	$r = 0.58$ P-Value = 0.000
Q18, Q24	$r = 0.47$ P-Value = 0.000
Q18, Q28	$r = 0.59$ P-Value = 0.000
Q20, Q22	$r = 0.28$ P-Value = 0.029
Q20, Q24	$r = 0.70$ P-Value = 0.000
Q20, Q28	$r = 0.37$ P-Value = 0.003
Q22, Q32	$r = 0.32$ P-Value = 0.012

(For specific questions, please refer to the coding sheet, See Appendix)

Table 1 illustrated that nine pairs of questions pertaining to the frame usage on CNN online, which all had strong correlations. These correlations were computed by looking at the mean of responses to each question. The strongest two correlations existed between question 20 (Does the story suggest the Tibetans are powerless) and Q24 (Does the story suggest that Tibetans' lives are disrupted and controlled by the Chinese occupation? For instance, their human rights are deprived and the local culture is eroded), $r=0.90$, $p<0.05$ and Q 18 (Does the story emphasize how Tibetan individuals/groups are beaten and killed by the Chinese government?) and Q 28 (Does the story emphasize how the protest is oppressed by the Chinese security force?), $r=0.96$, $p<0.05$. Other correlations that were identified on CNN were all strong ones, as their Pearson correlation coefficients were all larger than 0.70. Meanwhile, these correlations were all positive, which meant that when the answer to one question increased numerically, the answer to its pair question raised numerically as well, which suggested more

visible presence in the news article. Interestingly, the last two pairs of correlation suggested some level of connection between the *anti-communism* frame and the *authoritarian versus democracy frame*, given that Q22 (Does the story indicate that the Chinese government invaded and occupied Tibet with military force in 1950s?) was highly correlated with Q30 (Does the story suggest that China is a communist country?) and Q 32 (Does the story employ words like “communist” and “communism” to indicate and describe the Chinese government?) respectively.

As for Table 2, it included 16 pairs of correlations, among which four were significant. The strongest correlation was between Q7 (Does the story suggest that some level of government is responsible for issue?) and Q24 (Does the story suggest that Tibetans’ lives are disrupted and controlled by the Chinese occupation? For instance, their human rights are deprived and the local culture is eroded), $r=0.73$, $p<0.05$. The high correlation between answers to these two questions could be seen as a skillful delivery of combined messages that the 2008 Tibet crisis was mostly caused by the Chinese government, whose occupation of Tibet disrupted the lives of local Tibetan residents. Other significant correlations were found between Q7 (Does the story suggest that some level of government is responsible for issue?) and Q17 (Does the story portray the Tibetan protestors as a group being hurt by the Chinese people/government?), $r=0.68$, $p<0.05$, Q17 and Q24, $r=0.70$, $p<0.05$, and Q20 (Does the story suggest that Tibetans are powerless?) and Q24, $r=0.70$, $p<0.05$. While other correlations between different questions were moderate and weak, they could still demonstrate some links between these questions which had conspicuous political orientations.

Generally, given that this question deals more with interpretation, rather the presentation of results, it will be given more attention in the final chapter. Likewise, the last research question “Is the anti-communist filter of Chomsky’s propaganda model still applicable to today’s American media? Is it also applicable to British media?” will be answered in detail by analyzing data already presented in multiple tables and figures.

CHAPTER FOUR

Conclusion: Discussion of Results

Study Overview

This study examined the BBC Online News and CNN Online News' coverage of the Tibet riots in March 2008. The first chapter traced the development of framing theory from its roots in uncovering media's ability to shape public perceptions of key issues to its current incarnations as a way to discover not just what the media cover, but how they cover it. Since framing researchers differ upon everything from how to define framing to how to measure it, it was important to specify the definition of framing and the way to measure its presence and strength in the current study. In this research, "framing" essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text (Entman, 1991). To measure the frames, this study utilized and revised Semetko and Valkenburg's (2000) deductive "common frames" approach to quantitatively examine CNN and BBC's "schemata of interpretation" (Goffman, 1974, p.21) of the 2008 Tibet crisis. The "common frames" approach was adopted here for several reasons. Firstly, this method seemed to tap into the important features of the debate over the Tibet riots. Secondly, though the common frames were revised according to the research goals in this study, Semetko's outline for the approach and their tested frame measurement provided evidence of its validity, and therefore, usefulness. The common frames used in the current study were the *human interest frame*, the *responsibility frame*, the *international condemnation frame*, the *victim versus villain frame*, the *authoritarian versus democratic frame*, and the *anti-communism frame*. The *anti-communism* frame was added especially to test if the anti-communism news filter still existed in today's American media and if it also prevailed in British news coverage of the uprising in Tibet in 2008. Compared to defining framing, the definition of "bias" is more controversial and the studies that attempted to identify and measure it quantitatively were few. This study designed binary questions about certain frames to help quantitatively determine whether any bias against either party involved in the unrest was present. The data obtained could also illustrate the orientation as well as the strength of the bias.

To contextualize the debates over the 2008 Tibet riots, the second chapter reviewed a number of historical accounts of the issue, explaining how the Tibet question emerged over hundreds of years and in what context the Tibetans again united to protest against the Chinese

rule, when the Olympics was only months away. The second chapter further situated the 2008 crisis by briefly outlining the history of major Tibetan demonstrations and riots in the twentieth century. The positions of American and British governments on the Tibet question were discussed and the changes in their diplomatic policies toward China and Tibet were also recalled. The analysis showed that the stances involved in this debate included much more than simple endorsement of or opposition to various interpretations of the historical changes taken place in this area. These positions were mostly determined by the pursuit of each group's political interest and financial capacity. Since this study focuses on the media's reaction to the 2008 Tibet unrest, while providing an overview of Tibetan history and its relations with US and UK, the second chapter summarized the pattern which western media had followed when covering the Tibet protests in the past. This summary aimed to provide useful insights into the way that the western media had interpreted the riots and shed light on the current analysis of their 2008 news coverage of the latest protest.

To better understand the media representation of the crisis, chapter three provided brief descriptions of the histories as well as the influence of the online newspapers under study in this research and came to a conclusion that the study of CNN and BBC online news was representative, important and feasible. Given that media portrayed the crisis differently, the third chapter tried to narrate the outbreak and aggravation of the unrest which later spread to other provinces adjacent to Tibet and illustrate both Chinese government and protesters' interpretations of the story. While the Chinese government declared that the protest was a political plot carefully orchestrated by the Dalai clique, the protesters and pro-Tibet advocates attributed the uprising to the assumption that Tibetans simply could no longer live with the human rights infractions that had been constant in their "country" since the 1950 Chinese takeover. In addition, the third chapter enumerated three possible historical accounts that could have led to the uprising in March 2008, which situated the riots as well as current study in a more specific social and historic context. The background information of the case study was provided in detail for the purpose of facilitating the understanding of the analysis of the news texts pertaining to the current crisis in Tibet. Chapter three ended with the results of coding the 72 news articles drawn from BBC and CNN, and paved the way for further discussion and analysis of the data obtained in the last chapter.

Finally, returning to the online newspapers' coverage of the 2008 Tibet riots, based on the detailed description of the specific method of content analysis used in this study and the large amount of useful data, this chapter will analyze and discuss those results, answer research questions, examine study limitations, and provide suggestions for future research on the similar issue.

Discussion of Results

By examining the frames used on CNN and BBC online news, the current research approached the news coverage of the 2008 Tibet riots from many important aspects, such as the frame frequencies, the potential bias in the news articles, the images of Tibetan protesters and the Chinese government portrayed by the two news outlets as well as the applicability of the "propaganda model (Chomsky & Herman, 1988)" in today's American as well as British media. These central questions will be elaborated and responded to in detail in the following discussions.

The primary research question inquired directly into the frame usage on BBC and CNN online. It asked, "Which frames were used in BBC online news and CNN online news in their coverage of the 2008 Tibet riots? Which frames are most frequently used?" It could be clearly seen from the results that all frames outlined in this research were used, though their presence varied. This suggested that newspaper journalists did consistently utilize frames (consciously or unconsciously) to shape the information going out to the public. In other words, they kept selecting some aspects of the Tibet uprising in their articles and made them more salient and conspicuous to the readers. While it is interesting to see that all frames were employed by the journalists, ascertaining the differences between the uses of each frame would provide useful insight into the "agenda setting" of frames in the report on the Tibet issue.

As reported in chapter three, BBC online gave prominence to the *attribution of responsibility* frame. The overwhelming use of this frame was also most prominent in the CNN online news. The *attribution of responsibility* frame presents an issue or problem in such a way as to attribute responsibility for its cause or solution either to the government or to an individual or groups (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, p. 96) (See Codebook in Appendix). The presence of the *attribution of responsibility* frame coincided with at least two of Entman's four functions of framing, which are "making moral judgments" and "suggesting remedies" (1991). Using this frame most frequently suggested that both media outlets gave precedence to the question of "who should be responsible for it" over any other angles to approach this news event. It is important to

recall that the instrument measured the *attribution of responsibility* frame with questions like “Does this story suggest that some level of government has the ability to alleviate/resolve the issue,” “Does the story suggest solution(s) to the issue” and “Does the story that an individual (or a group of people in society) is responsible for the issue?” Therefore, the *attribution of responsibility* frame did not necessarily indicate the political orientation or the bias of the writing, since unlike the questions newly created about the *international condemnation* frame, *victim versus villain* frame and *authoritarian versus democracy* frame, Semetko did not design their questions about the *attribution of responsibility* frame and *human interest* frame in a binary way. Nonetheless, the data showed that instead of allowing the readers to have a chance to think about the event for themselves, both BBC and CNN had created a desired impression and a prescribed approach to interpret the conflict. More specifically, by consistently suggesting who should take the responsibility for it, the news articles led the readers to make easy judgments on the situation in Tibet.

The second most often used frame was the *human interest* frame. From the data collected, the difference between the *attribution of responsibility* frame and the *human interest* frame was tiny. Interestingly, both newspapers used the *attribution of responsibility* frame most often, and both newspapers used the latter second most frequently. The *human interest* frame brings a human face or an emotional angle to the presentation of an event, issue, or problem (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, p.95).” Such frames refer to an effort to personalize the news, dramatize or “emotionalize” (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, p.96) the news. For stories devoted to the 2008 Tibet riots, the “human face” could often be a Tibetan, who was either beaten or arrested by the police or innocent Chinese citizens whose shops were looted and burned. Some other stories may contain visual information—for example, dead bodies and infuriated protesters—that might generate feelings of outrage, empathy or compassion. Less frequently, stories may cover an individual’s personal life to arouse readers’ interests and emotions. For instance, a Portuguese journalist was quoted by BBC on March 14th, 2008 that “You could hear people shouting - whenever we tried to get close people started running from the direction where there was more fire. We heard explosions - a lot of them” (Witness Accounts, 2008). The story employed personal vignettes to generate feelings of sympathy and outrage among readers. Therefore it could capture and retain their interest in the news and prepare them for a suggestion of a solution to it. Importantly, the *human interest* frame itself was not used to completely oppose any side of

the conflict, since the questions concerning the frame were delivered in favor of neither sides. Though the overwhelming use of this frame indicated a lot of emphasis on the emotional and human side of the riots, it could not provide details about who and what were in the pictures shown by BBC and CNN or whom they wanted the readers to feel sympathetic to. It was associated with advocating both opposition to, and support of the Tibetan rioters, while these two stances were not necessarily stressed equally. However, this frame was a very powerful frame, since it placed real innocent people in the spotlight and forced the readers to engage the issue at a human level, rather than simply an analytical level. News coverage of the Tibetan riots that was allowed to engage with actual victims or other “human faces” involved in the issue could more easily seek compassion from the public and thus effortlessly instill the journalists’ ideas into their minds.

Another prominent frame in BBC and CNN’s news articles was the *victim versus villain* frame, which ranked the third in frame use frequency in both media outlets. This frame created a dichotomized world of victims and villains out of the news stories. Victimization around issues in some circumstances attracts surprising amounts of international resonance and support (Bob, 2002). The *victim versus villain* frame generates a confrontation between the persons being subjected to brutality and those who use violence toward them. For stories devoted to the 2008 Tibet riots, military and social conflicts between Tibetan protesters and the Chinese government were almost the focuses of the news coverage. Some articles, for example, may report that “Tibetan exile groups maintain at least 80 people were killed by Chinese security forces...” (Tourist video shows, 2008). In this case, the Tibetan protesters are victimized and the Chinese security forces are portrayed as villains. Meanwhile, some other news stories may adopt an opposite standpoint, depicting the protesters as the villains beating innocent citizens and looting their shops. The *victim versus villain* frame itself does not hint at any orientation of the news media until the questions concerning it were designed in a binary manner to reveal the potential bias existing with the frame. The third chapter reported that the margin between the responses to the anti-China and pro-China questions suggested the presence of bias and it will be expounded on later in this chapter.

The first three most often used frames could form an interesting logic continuum. The news articles on BBC and CNN online consistently inquired into the cause of the severe confrontation in Tibet (use of the *attribution of responsibility* frame). The readers carried those

questions throughout their reading experience and started to become sympathetic and outraged while being exposed to the “human faces,” words and visual information that generated dramatic emotions (use of the *human interest* frame). Meanwhile, being led by the *victim versus villain* frame, the readers gradually dichotomized all parties involved in the conflicts into good and evil. In this case, any bias-tinted view in the news stories would significantly determine or alter the readers’ interpretation and perception of the controversial and highly complex issue.

That the *authoritarian versus democracy* frame was used less often than the first three frames (*attribution of responsibility* frame, *human interest* frame and *victim versus villain* frame) suggested that the writers with both CNN and BBC preferred to conceive this issue in terms of making judgments and manifestation of “villain and victim” over the definition and diagnosis of the problems. The reason to associate the *authoritarian versus democracy* frame with defining and diagnosing causes is that it was often used against the Chinese by attributing the outbreak of the crisis to the human rights abuse and the invasion to Tibet by the authoritarian Chinese government. The *authoritarian versus democracy* frame provided the readers with an angle to examine the actors in the stories from political and ideological perspectives and performed a function of diagnosing the causes of the uprising, thus substantiating the judgments suggested by the first three most frequently used frames. However, in a democratic country, it is ultimately up to the will of the people to determine the “rights and wrongs” by perceiving the issue from various aspects. In this case, the public’s judgment about the cause of the Tibet protests was steered towards the political status quo of Tibet under the rule of the Chinese, ruling out other factors that could also have led to the social unrest.

Notwithstanding the lesser presence of the frame, it was still considered as highly visible with considerable mean scores on two news outlets (See Figure 1). Therefore, the political status quo of Tibet was seen by the American and British journalists as an important factor to the outbreak and the spread of the current protests and they would like the readers to conceive the issue from this particular angle. The *authoritarian versus democracy* frame is an ideology-loaded frame, thus it could provide a lot insights into the ideological and political orientation of the news media’s report, as long as the questions about the frame were designed effectively. Since the frame was not included in Semetko (2000)’s “common frames,” this study created a set of questions and purposely delivered them in a binary manner (See Coding Sheet in Appendix). Interestingly, this method did identify the existence of bias against the Chinese government

conveyed by the use of the *authoritarian versus democracy* frame, which will be analyzed in detail later. Owing to the prevalence of this frame, the bias bonded with it would easily permeate the public.

The last two frames were the *international condemnation* frame and the *anti-communism* frame. They were least often used frames in both CNN and BBC news articles. The lack of utilizing the *international condemnation* frame indicated that the journalists gave precedence to the situation in Tibet over the international reaction to it. Given that the *attribution of responsibility* frame and *human interest* frames were the most frequently used frames, the *international condemnation* frame could be simply tossed into the articles to provide greater context for them. Though it was least employed by the journalists, its presence still should not be overlooked. The *international condemnation frame* presented the criticism from a world known public figure, possibly a politician or a film star, about the acts of certain parties involved in the news event. When it comes to the coverage of the 2008 Tibet riots, this frame was present in articles which deal with the negative comments on actions of either side of the conflict from the international community. For instance, some articles cited that Nancy Pelosi, a senior US lawmaker, has called on the international community to denounce Chinese rule in Tibet (US lawmaker demands Tibet inquiry, 2008). Similar to the *victim versus villain* frame, the *international condemnation* frame could reveal the hidden stance carried by the news texts, as the newspapers could hint at their own positions by citing well-known figures in an unbalanced approach. Overall, the *international condemnation* frame, like the *anti-communism* frame, was used as a supplementary frame in the news coverage of the 2008 Tibet protests.

The *anti-communism* frame was tested with a specific research goal. It aimed to examine if the media portrayed the protests as a domestic crisis attributable to the nature of China's political system. To determine the use and the strength of the frame, the coding sheet asked, "Does the story suggest that China is a communist country" and "Does the story employ words like 'communist' and communism' to describe the Chinese government?" By asking these sorts of questions, the study learned whether the American and British journalists still intended to emphasize the nature of the Chinese government and make use out of it. The results reported in the last chapter clearly indicated that BBC and CNN online news rarely attempted to draw the public attention to this fact. Therefore, the "propaganda model" proposed by Chomsky and Herman (1988) seemed not applicable to the news coverage of the 2008 Tibet riots. While this

frame was seldom utilized, it did appear in some of the news articles. The later discussion in this chapter will illustrate that the *anti-communism* frame was usually interrelated with other highly visible frames and the blending of frames revealed some anti-communism messages.

The data collected in the last chapter not only revealed that there were significant differences between frames in their presence and strength, but also depicted the frame usage in the two news outlets under study. While the two media varied greatly in terms of the number of articles devoted to the 2008 Tibet protests, their use of all six frames did not differ widely. Both media outlets used the *attribution of responsibility* frame most frequently. The second most often used frame in both newspapers was the *human interest* frame. The *victim and villain* frame ranked the third, with the *authoritarian versus democracy* frame and the *anti-communism* frame following behind. The only difference between these two online newspapers in framing was that almost all frames in CNN's news articles were much more visible than those on BBC, since the mean score of each frame on CNN was higher than its counterpart on BBC except the *international condemnation* frame. This indicated that CNN was more inclined to emphasize the selected six aspects of the news event, while BBC adopted a comparatively milder way to guide the readers. Overall, there were not many differences between two news outlets in terms of general frame usage.

One of the reasons scholars seem to appreciate the use of framing as a mechanism to understand news media coverage of issues is that it creates discrete categories of classification and measurement. However, this does not preclude the possibility of concurrence of frames in one single news article. The analysis of the data suggested that very few articles drawn from CNN and BBC were characterized by the presence of just one frame, which meant that, in most news stories, frames were often combined and occurred simultaneously. The remarkable blending of frames is a phenomenon that deserves further study. This coincided with one of the important research questions in current project, "which frame is most associated with which frame?" This question aimed to examine the interrelation between frames and how the media achieved an integrated impact on their readers by using different frames simultaneously. These connections between frames were not random. They were believed to suggest some logic links which might have influenced people's judgments about the debates pertaining to the Tibet riots. In order to identify the interdependent relations between frames, this study tested all possible pairs of frames on BBC and CNN by using the Pearson correlation test. Given that the data

showed significant differences between two news outlets in frame correlation, the two online newspapers will be discussed separately.

The results obtained from CNN News online suggested that frame 4 (the victim versus villain frame) was both highly and positively correlated with frame 2 (the attribution of responsibility frame) and frame 1 (the human interest frame). The p values were all below 0.05, thus the relationship between any pairs of frames did occur by something other than chance. Here in this research, correlation was defined as a numerical summary of the type and strength of a relationship between variables (frames) (Frey, Botan, & Kreps, 2000). It did not say anything about the causal nature of the relationship, only that the frames were associated with one another (Salkind, 2004). Positive correlation here indicates that consistent increases in the units of the measurement scale of one variable (frame) are associated with a consistent increase in the number of units of the measurement scale for the other variable (frame) (Salkind, 2004). Therefore, the direct and significant correlations between the *victim versus villain* frame and the *human interest* frame and the *attribution of responsibility* frame respectively demonstrated that when the use of *victim versus villain* frame increased, the use of other two frames correspondingly intensified. While it should not be seen as a sign for causal relationships, it showed the patterns of concurrence of frames in the news articles. The blending of *victim versus villain* frame and the *human interest* frame demonstrated that CNN News intended to emotionalize and dichotomize the conflicts at the same time. Though the confrontations during the protests were not necessarily between two specific entities, the journalists attempted to divide the participants, cutting along lines of instigators and victims. Taking advantage of the dichotomy, the *human interest* frame played a big role in dramatizing and emotionalizing either the victims' suffering or the instigators' destruction, which further reinforced the definition of good and evil given by the *victim versus villain* frame.

Similarly, the blending of the *victim versus villain* frame and the *attribution of responsibility* frame created a logical tie which was analogous with the former one. By assuming that one group in the protests was the mastermind and the other was the victim, it was simple to attribute responsibility to the purported instigators and urge them to resolve the issue. Again, the use of the *attribution of responsibility* frame, in return, affirmed the assumption of the *villain and victim* relationship which might not necessarily be truthful.

Further investigation of frame correlations on CNN yielded more remarkable findings. It indicated that the *authoritarian versus democracy* frame was both highly and positively associated with the *attribution of responsibility* frame and the *victim versus villain* frame. Given that the correlation between last two frames was just verified, a triangle of correlations between the *authoritarian versus democracy* frame, the *victim versus villain* frame and the *attribution of responsibility* frame was established. The interplay between the three frames suggested that the political status of Tibet was something that CNN would most likely tap into when it guided the readers through the process of distinguishing right and wrong. The *authoritarian versus democracy* frame led the readers to consider questions like if the Chinese government invaded and occupied Tibet with military force in the 1950s and if Tibetans' lives are disrupted and controlled by the Chinese occupation, etc. As a result, these questions facilitated the readers' judgment on who should be responsible for the current chaos in Tibet. Therefore, in the correlation triangle, the *authoritarian versus democracy* frame played a critical role in shaping public attitudes and mobilizing support for the alleged victims. As it was mentioned earlier that the bias against the Chinese government was found with the presence of this frame, the triangle to a certain extent influenced the public perception of the parties involved and somewhat made people believe that the Tibetans were victimized by the authoritarian rule of the Chinese government.

Interesting enough, the BBC online news articles displayed an identical correlation triangle between the *authoritarian versus villain* frame, the *attribution of responsibility* frame and the *victim versus villain* frame. It indicated that BBC adopted the same framing scheme as CNN and potentially led the public to root for Tibetans owing to its bias against the Chinese government with the use of the *authoritarian versus democracy* frame.

Where the BBC's news coverage differed from the CNN's was that the *human interest* frame on BBC was not merely associated with the *victim versus villain* frame, but it also was correlated with the *attribution of responsibility* frame and the *authoritarian versus democracy* frame. In spite of the moderate correlation coefficients, it still pointed out that BBC was not satisfied enough with the integrated impact by combining the *human interest* frame with the *victim versus villain* frame. In order to make the stories more impressive, by utilizing the *human interest* frame, the journalists added more emotions and drama to the effects of the *attribution of responsibility* frame and the *authoritarian versus democracy* frame. In addition, the moderate

positive correlation between the *attribution of responsibility* frame and the *international condemnation* frame was a unique phenomenon in BBC's news articles devoted to the Tibet crisis. As the latter was generally much less used than the former, it often assisted the role of the *attribution of responsibility* frame by citing well-known figures' remarks about the crisis. While the questions concerning the *attribution of responsibility* frame were not formatted in a way that could suggest any bias (they were replicated from Semetko's project), it would alter the public interpretation of the issue, if the *international condemnation* frame carried a certain amount of bias. Unfortunately, the use of the latter was not impartial. The data reported in the last chapter revealed that there was a certain amount of prejudice against the Chinese government with the use of the *international condemnation* frame. Thus, these frames were not simply interrelated with one another, but they were interdependent of and supplementary to each other. Under the influence of more than one frame, the readers would more easily believe and accept the "reality" built up by the media outlets. In summary, despite the differences in the pairs of correlations, both on CNN and BBC, certain frames appeared in tandem with other frames. These correlations were statistically significant and had profound implications for the research on the BBC and CNN's frame usage. While discovering the presence of discrete frames was important, understanding the interaction between multiple types of frames provided new insights into the subtlety of persuasive techniques employed by the two media.

Returning to the construct, "bias", which was mentioned several times in the previous analysis. McQuail defines "bias" as "a consistent tendency to depart from the straight path of objectivitive truth by deviating either to left or right" (1992, p.191). In the current study, this concept was brought up to help understand how much the online newspaper articles supported or opposed the Tibetan protesters. The literature reveals that many scholars have been seeking various indicators and definitions, in keeping with the complexity of the concept. For instance, Frank (1973) sees bias from a neutral standpoint and defines it as selective encoding. Efron (1971) writes that political bias is a "specific type of selective process in a specific political context" (p.4). This study took Frank and Efron's interpretations and quantitatively measured this complicated construct by examining the "information selective process." Among all frames under study, questions concerning three frames (the *international condemnation* frame, *victim versus villain* frame, and the *authoritarian versus democracy* frame) were designed in particular to ascertain the potential bias in the news coverage of the 2008 Tibet riots. Two frames of the

other three were replicated from Semetko's (2000) research which did not focus on media bias. The last frame was the *anti-communism* frame, about which the binary questioning scheme was not applicable.

Based on the results collected in the last chapter, CNN and BBC both held strong bias towards the Chinese government when they employed the *international condemnation* frame, *victim versus villain* frame, and the *authoritarian versus democracy* frame. In spite of the slight differences in the average scores of the answers between the two online sites, the general presence and strength of the bias with all three frames was almost identical. Among the three frames, the *victim versus villain* frame displayed the most bias against the Chinese. The *authoritarian versus democracy* frame was found to carry the second strongest bias. The *international condemnation* frame was the third most slanted frame. It is important to recall that the instrument measured the *victim versus villain* frame by asking questions like "does the story portray the Chinese people as a group being hurt by the Tibetans," "does the story portray the Tibetan protesters as a group being hurt by the Chinese people/government," "does the story suggest that the Tibetans are powerless" and "does the story suggest the Chinese are powerless." To conclude that this frame was used in a highly biased manner because that the average score (2.97, CNN; 2.07, BBC) of the responses to the pro-Tibetan questions was greatly higher than that (0.5, CNN; 0.66, BBC) of the pro-Chinese ones. By using this frame, BBC and CNN instilled into the public without seemingly departing from the rule of objectivity that the Chinese people were hurting, beating and killing the powerless Tibetan protesters. In this case, the Chinese were portrayed as the instigators and villains, whereas the Tibetans were represented as vulnerable victims.

Likewise, when it comes to the *authoritarian versus democracy* frame, the data again indicated heavy prejudice against the Chinese government. The wide margin between the mean of responses to anti- and pro-China questions suggested that both media outlets preferred stressing the deficiencies of the Chinese rule in Tibet to mentioning anything good about the Chinese government. By referring to the specific questions in the coding sheet (See Appendix), it was clear that both newspapers portrayed the Chinese authority as an authoritarian invader, whose takeover disrupted the Tibetans' lives, deprived them of basic human rights and disallowed them to protest. In the particular context of the 2008 riots, the government was presented as an aggressive ruler who mercilessly oppressed the protest by force and drove out

foreign journalists in order to conceal the facts. While some of this slanted framing process was not very noticeable to the readers, some others were clearly pro-Tibetan, disregarding the complexity of the Tibet issue. For instance, the following caption appeared several times in many of BBC news articles. “Tibet had enjoyed long periods of autonomy before 20th century until China launched a military assault in 1950” (Tibetan Protester Deadline Passes, 2008). This statement openly defined the Chinese entry into Tibet in 1950 as a “military assault” which was unjust and invasive. Much news framing was designed not to excite or incite but to neutralize (Parenti, 1993). Based on this assumption, the questions inquiring into the presence of the *authoritarian versus democracy* frame were formatted in a balanced way. Unfortunately, the two online sites overtly leaned towards one side of the conflict by utilizing the frame.

Unlike the first two frames, the margin between average scores of answers to pro- and anti-China questions regarding the *international condemnation* frame was not significant. Nevertheless, given that the frame was seldom used in general, the mean of anti-China answers on CNN, 0.5 and that on BBC, 0.59 were considered very considerable compared to the means of pro-China responses, which were 0 on CNN and 0.02 on BBC respectively. The results showed that remarks in favor of the Chinese government almost never appeared in the news articles on BBC or CNN. Conversely, almost all other quoted comments condemned and criticized the Chinese or a third country’s direct or indirect support for the Chinese government. The reason to delve into the international reaction to the crisis was that merely by looking at the way in which Chinese officials defended themselves and the Tibetans argued in favor of the protesters would not reveal enough about the positions of the media. Firstly, media tended not to openly cite too much from one party that engaged in the confrontation, since the preference could be too obvious. Secondly, the responses of the outside world to the uprising could be more diverse than those hold by the people involved. Therefore, selecting one or two quotes from various standpoints could be very indicative of the media’s orientations. In spite of the diversity of the positions held by the international community, the attitudes shown in the news coverage were unanimously one-sided. The most typical condemnatory comments were “...calls on the international community to denounce China’s rule in Tibet” (China Locks down Restive Regions, 2008) and “... urges restraint on the part of the Chinese government in terms of how it responds to these protesters” (Chinese Premier Blames Dalai Lama Clique for Violence in Tibet, 2008). When similar expressions were prevalent in the news coverage of the Tibet riots, any harsh criticism of

the harm done by the protesters was almost never seen. While the data indicated the intense appearance of bias with all three frames, the readers might still not be aware of the unbalanced depiction imbedded in the news texts. Thus, the idea provided by the two highly recognizable media outlets more or less permeated them.

Moreover, as it was discussed previously, on BBC, the *international condemnation* frame, the *victim versus villain* frame, and the *authoritarian versus democracy* frame were all highly correlated with the *attribution of responsibility* frame. Likewise, on CNN, the *victim versus villain* frame and the *authoritarian versus democracy* frame were both closely associated with the *attribution of responsibility* frame. Since the *attribution of responsibility* frame was mainly about ascertaining where the responsibility lay, it is reasonable to assume that the bias against the Chinese government carried by the *international condemnation* frame, the *victim versus villain* frame, and the *authoritarian versus democracy* frame enormously affected the judgment on who should take the responsibility for the outbreak and spread of the unrest. Therefore, given that we could not quantitatively locate the bias conveyed through the *attribution of responsibility* frame, the strong correlations that it had with the highly slanted use of other three frames still could provide insights into the way that BBC and CNN had multiple frames interacted with one another and how they effectively fortified their bias pertaining to the Tibet riots by taking advantage of the interrelationship of frames.


While it was verified that the use of the *international condemnation* frame, the *victim versus villain* frame, and the *authoritarian versus democracy* frame was greatly one-sided, people may argue that the presence of bias with the use other frames still remains questionable. Owing to the format of the coding questions, the bias could not be traced in a normal way. However, the analysis of cross-frame correlations between specific questions will ascertain whether other frames contained bias and how it took effect. Similar to what was discussed in the last paragraph, the cross-frame question correlations will be based on frame correlations. Meanwhile it will also transcend the boundary of frames and give real insights into the way that the two influential media portrayed the Chinese and Tibetans to the readers in their news coverage. The correlation tests were not run randomly between any possible pairs of questions. This study only paired the anti-China questions taken from the three biased frames with one another and with other frames' potential anti-China questions to see how the biased frames built

up their prejudice and supported it and how their bias was spread out to other frames. Through the analysis, the image of each side of the tension in the two online newspapers will be discussed.

As it was suggested in the last chapter, the tests identified nine pairs of correlations between questions on CNN and 16 pairs on BBC. A correlation was only established when the p value was below 0.05. Unlike the latter, all the associations found on the former were strong positive ones. Among the 16 pairs on BBC, only three correlations could be considered significant (the correlation coefficient was no lower than 0.07), whereas all others displayed moderate or weak interrelation. Given the differences between the results about the two media outlets, the correlations will be discussed separately.

All question correlations on CNN were very significant with some of them close to 1 (See Table 1). This indicated that some aspects of the news event were made to interact closely with each other in CNN's news coverage of the uprising, even though they might belong to distinct frame categories. In order to facilitate understanding, the nine pairs of correlations were rearranged in four correlation clusters as the figure shows below (See Figure 6).

Figure 6: Question correlations on CNN



The first cluster showed the interrelation between question 7 (Does the story suggest that some level of government is responsible for the issue?) and other three questions on the coding sheets which are Q17 (Does the story portray the Tibetan protesters as a group being hurt by the Chinese people/government?), Q20 (Does the story suggest the Tibetans are powerless?) and Q24 (Does the story indicate that Tibetans' lives are disrupted and controlled by the Chinese occupation? For instance, their human rights are deprived and the local culture is eroded?). Additionally, the Table 1 also demonstrated that the last two questions (20 and 24) were closely interrelated with each other. Interestingly, these questions belonged to three different frames, the *attribution of responsibility* frame, the *victim versus villain* frame, and the *authoritarian versus democracy* frame, which were correlated with one another themselves. While the correlation between the three frames provided useful insights into the way they interacted and interplayed with one another, the current data which supported the correlations between the four questions disclosed what in particular in each frame was actually correlated. The positive correlation

between Q7 and other three questions, Q17, Q20, and Q24 denoted that the more the stories suggested that the government should be responsible for the protest; the more they portrayed the Tibetans as powerless and victimized. Though correlations do not represent causal relationships, it is still reasonable to conclude that Q17, Q20, Q24 were used as evidence to support Q7. In other words, when CNN attributed the crisis to the Chinese government, the reasons that they gave were that Tibetan protesters were a vulnerable group being hurt by the Chinese government and that they protested because their lives were disrupted and their land was invaded by the Chinese. Cluster 2 consisted of two questions, Q13 (Does the story present any criticism from the well-known non-Chinese or non-Tibetan individual or organization about the Chinese government?) and Q26 (Does the story suggest that the media coverage of the issue is monitored and censored by the government?). These two questions were from two separate frames, the *international condemnation* frame and the *authoritarian versus democracy* frame. While the two frames themselves were not interrelated in general, the questions interaction suggested that two aspects pertaining to them were highly associated. In other words, when the story quoted more criticism of the Chinese authority from the international community, there was more description of how the media coverage of the 2008 Tibet riots was controlled and censored by the Chinese government. Obviously, the latter was portrayed by CNN as one of the major reasons for blaming the Chinese for the crisis. The third cluster emerged again from two correlated frames, the *victims versus villain* frame and the *authoritarian versus democracy* frame. The correlation between Q18 (Does the story emphasize how Tibetan individuals/groups are beaten and killed by the Chinese government?) and Q28 (Does the story emphasize how the protest is oppressed by the Chinese security force?) specified the methods of the Chinese oppression, by stressing that the Chinese beat and killed the protesters. It did not disclose any new. Rather, it better served as a supplement to the relationships revealed in cluster 1.


The last cluster demanded special attention, as it touched upon a rarely seen frame, the *anti-communism* frame, which was also an important frame designed to test the applicability of the anti-communism filter in the propaganda model proposed by Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman (1988). As it was discussed previously, the *anti-communism* frame was barely used in the news coverage of the 2008 Tibet riots. However, it is still worthwhile to inquire into how this frame was used when it did appear. The last cluster showed the correlations between Q22 (Does the story indicate that the Chinese government invaded and occupied Tibet with military force in

1950s?) and Q30 (Does the story suggest that China is a communist country?) and Q32 (Does the story employ words like “communist” and “communism” to indicate and describe the Chinese government?) respectively. This indicated that, on CNN, when the news stories focused on the communist nature of China’s political system, the readers were very likely to read about the CNN’s interpretation of the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950s. While these two things might not necessarily be logically coherent, the journalists with CNN blended them to persuade the public to think in a particular way, that is, communist China invaded Tibet and the country that assaulted Tibet was communist. The more the readers were exposed to it, the more they might equate communism with invasion. Chomsky (1988) claimed in his book *Manufacturing Consent* that the well-publicized abuses of communist states contributed to elevating opposition to communism to a first principle of Western ideology and politics, even though serious evidence in support of claims of “communist” abuses was hardly provided. While this research did not find much use of the *anti-communism* frame in the news coverage of the Tibet uprising, the technique employed to apply this frame seemed to remain the same, which was to linking political abuses like the so-called invasion to the communist nature of the country. Since the concept of communism was fuzzy in the news stories, the anti-communist control mechanism still could exercise a profound influence on the public.

The question correlations on CNN provided a more detailed picture of how the protesters and the Chinese authority were portrayed by the American journalists. In summary, CNN suggested that the Chinese Communist party unjustly assaulted Tibet in 1950s and their takeover enormously disrupted Tibetans’ normal lives and eroded their culture. Owing to this, the government had some level of responsibility for the uprising. However, in order to oppress the large-scale protests, the government brutally beat and killed the protesters who were completely powerless. To put it more concisely, the Chinese were mostly portrayed as “villains”, whereas the protesters were seen as being inhumanely victimized.

Returning to BBC’s news coverage, the data also verified many noticeable connections between questions. Moderate (r was around 0.50) to significant correlations (r was no less than 0.70) will be discussed and the pair involving the *anti-communism* frame will again be given special attention. Similar to CNN, the correlations on BBC formed three clusters which are right below (See Figure 7).

Figure 7: Question correlations on BBC



As it was reported in Figure 7, the first cluster was almost identical to the first cluster on CNN. It also consisted of Q24 (Does the story indicate that Tibetans' lives are disrupted and controlled by the Chinese occupation?), Q7 (Does the story suggest that some level of government is responsible for the issue?), Q17 (Does the story portray the Tibetan protesters as a group being hurt by the Chinese people/government?), and Q20 (Does the story suggest the Tibetans are powerless?). The difference was that the four questions on BBC were more closely interrelated. They were all at least moderately correlated with one another, except the pair of Q17 and Q20, whereas, on CNN, the correlations all evolved around Q7 and only Q20 and Q24 were associated to each other themselves. These correlations indicated that, similar to CNN, BBC also established a link between the attribution of the responsibility to the government and the suffering of the Tibetans after China's takeover. Again, when BBC tried to blame the Chinese government for the unrest, the reasons that they gave were that Tibetan protesters were a vulnerable group being hurt by the Chinese government and that they protested because their lives were disrupted and their land was forcibly occupied by the Chinese.

Cluster 2 indicated the correlations between Q28 (Does the story emphasize how the protest is oppressed by the Chinese security force?) and Q17 (Does the story portray the Tibetan protesters as a group being hurt by the Chinese people/government?), and Q20 (Does the story suggest the Tibetans are powerless?) and Q18 (Does the story emphasize how Tibetan individuals/groups are beaten and killed by the Chinese government?) respectively. Interestingly, the same correlation between Q18 and Q28 was also identified on CNN. The interplay between Q17 and Q28 found on BBC denoted very similar message as the link between Q18 and Q28 did. They both serve to specify the methods of the government's oppression. While Q17 suggested that the Tibetans were hurt by the Chinese, Q18 showed that the Chinese killed and beat the protesters.

The last cluster was again also found on CNN. It indicated the correlation between Q22 (Does the story indicate that the Chinese government invaded and occupied Tibet with military force in 1950s?) and Q32 (Does the story employ words like "communist" and "communism" to

indicate and describe the Chinese government?). By associating these two questions, BBC connected the political nature of China to its military action in Tibet decades ago and attempted to make the readers believe that the “military assault” had something to do with the fact that China is a communist country. Though the *anti-communist* frame seldom appeared in BBC’s news coverage of the Tibet riots and the correlation between Q22 and Q32 was weaker than that on CNN, this relationship still could foster *anti-communism* emotions in the world readers.

The cross-frame correlation test results showed that two media outlets almost followed the same pattern for connecting one specific attribute of the event to the other. Both online newspapers tended to demonize the Chinese government and portrayed the protest as a reaction against the Chinese rule. Moreover, the techniques used decades ago to mobilize the populace against communist states were still found in the news coverage of the current crisis, though the *anti-communism* frame was not frequently used individually on the two news sites.

Study Limitations

The largest limitation of this study lay in the design of the coding sheet. Not all questions regarding the frames were formatted in a binary manner. This research was based on Semetko (2000)’s study on common frames and followed her guidelines to develop its own coding sheet. Since this study also examined the use of the *human interest* frame and *attribution of responsibility* frame which were also tested in Semetko’s project (2000), the questions about these two frames exactly replicated those in the previous research. These questions were adopted, because they were proved effective and internally consistent. However, they could only yield the information about the presence and strength of the two frames. As this research inquired into the presence and strength of bias on the two highly recognizable news media, the original questions seemed not very helpful in identifying the bias carried by the frame. For instance, the questions about the *human interest* frame could both refer to Tibetans and the Chinese. Therefore, though this frame was proved to be often used in the news coverage of the unrest, the coders could not determine whether it was used against any side of the confrontation only by analyzing the responses to the questions.

In addition to the limitation of the questioning format, this study was also limited by the categories of frames. Since the six frames consisted of both issue-specific frame and generic frame, the revised “common frames” could not always transcend time and space to be replicated in other studies like Semetko’s project. By saying the revised “common frames,” the author

referred to a new set of frames adapted from the original “common frames” and the study of them followed the guidelines in the previous research. It did not indicate that the frames could be used in any other kinds of studies. For instance, the *anti-communism* frame was included for a specific research question. Likewise, the *international condemnation* frame may not apply to other framing studies, as not every news event draws global attention.

Lastly, as this study focused on the media coverage of the 2008 Tibet riots, some earlier studies on the news coverage of preceding Tibetans’ demonstrations and uprisings would provide useful insights into the analysis of the current case. Unfortunately, besides Crocenzi (2008)’s sequential analysis of the Lhasa Uprisings in the 1980s, there was not much else about the media reaction to the Sino-Tibet conflicts. If more related information were available, the study would have compared the current media coverage to the previous one to see if the framing patterns had changed and how. Also, access to video/visuals and not just abstracts would help if it were available.

Directions for Future Research

This study was unable to design binary questions for the *human interest* frame, the *attribution of responsibility* frame and the *anti-communism* frame. Based on the binary questions concerning other frames which were proved to be reliable in the context of the 2008 Tibet riots, future studies may try to develop binary questions about the *human interest* frame, the *attribution of responsibility* frame and the *anti-communism* frame. In this case, the potential presence of bias with each frame will be tested. If the instrument in this study is repeatedly unreliable in other contexts, a new paradigm of framing and bias research might emerge.

The public tend to assume that, following the fall of the Soviet Union and its Eastern bloc communist regimes, the anti-communism that once prevailed in United States media has diminished. However, rarely had anyone statistically confirmed the assumption. While this study touched upon this topic, it was still far from a comprehensive examination of this particular media filter. Given the importance of the theme, future studies may further investigate it in other contexts.

Comparing the Chinese media coverage with the western media coverage of the similar incident would be another outlet for future research. Given the differences in ideology and media policies between the two parts of the world, the frame analysis of the mainstream news agencies

would yield interesting and profound information regarding the interplay between journalistic practices and the dominant ideology.

Meanwhile, this study, for the first time, tested bias by comparing the means of answers to anti- and pro-China questions. It seemed to be an effective way to quantitatively examine the bias of news reports, based on the results obtained. However, the binary questions concerning each frame could not cover all possible aspects of the use of the frame. Therefore, future research may expand the range of questions or develop a better-rounded paradigm of quantitative bias study.

Lastly, the study revealed to us that in a quantitative project, a certain extent of qualitative elements like data interpretation and application of theories was inevitable but helpful. There was link between quantitative and qualitative methods which could supplement one another.

Conclusion

The Sino-Tibet conflict has always been a contentious issue and drew a significant amount of global attention months before the 2008 Olympic Games. By examining the way that two influential online newspapers, BBC Online news and CNN Online news, covered the 2008 Tibet riots, this study provides useful information about how the two news outlets framed the issue and how bias emerged in the framing process. Meanwhile, analysis of the blending of frames allows the researchers to understand how the media tailored their messages for the greatest impact on the world public.

The study found that both media framed in the crisis followed a very similar framing pattern. They presented the issue in a highly emotional manner. Moreover, in view of the fact that the *attribution of responsibility* frame was the most often used frame, it is reasonable to conclude that the media gave precedence to blaming a certain group for causing the unrest over any other features of the news event. Furthermore, the study also suggested that BBC and CNN were not as neutral as they appeared, since significant bias against the Chinese government was found with the use of the *international condemnation* frame, the *victim versus villain* frame, and the *authoritarian versus democracy* frame. While the bias with other frames was not able to be surely determined, the remarkable blending of frames and significant correlations between questions across the frames revealed that almost all frames, to a certain extent, were involved in slanting the report in favor of the Tibetan protesters. In general, the Tibetans were portrayed by

both media as victims under the Chinese occupation and oppression, whereas the Chinese authority was represented as an invader who ruthlessly suppressed any opposing voices and movements. Lastly, the research results indicated that the *anti-communism* frame was rarely used in the news coverage of the 2008 Tibet uprising. However, the political nature of the government was constantly associated with the description of the government's invasion and killing. This technique which was identified by Chomsky (1988) decades ago was very effective in fostering *anti-communism* emotions in the world readers. While this study has limitations, it can still provide insights into how the current Western media chose to portray the Tibetans and the Chinese in the 2008 Tibet riots. This study is one of the few quantitative studies on Western media coverage of the Tibet riots and it aims to pave the road for future studies on the same issue.

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Frame Descriptions

The *human interest frame* “brings a human face or an emotional angle to the presentation of an event, issue, or problem (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, p.95).” Such a frame refers to an effort to personalize the news, dramatize or “emotionalize” (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, p.96) the news, in order to capture and retain audience interest. For stories devoted to the 2008 Tibet Riots, the “human face” is often a Tibetan who is either beaten or arrested by the police or innocent citizens whose shops are looted and burned. Some other stories may contain visual information—for example, dead bodies and infuriated protesters—that might generate feelings of outrage, empathy or compassion. Less frequently, stories may cover an individual’s personal life to arouse readers’ interests and emotions.

The *attribution of responsibility frame* “presents an issue or problem in such as way as to attribute responsibility for its cause or solution to either the government or to an individual or groups (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, p.96).” Entman (1993) argues that frames have four functions which are defining problems, diagnosing causes, making moral judgments and suggesting remedies. The attribution of responsibility frame here performs the function of diagnosing causes for the conflicts in the news story. This frames is particularly useful and revealing when it comes to the coverage of the 2008 Tibet Riots. For instance, an article may focus on the “military assault” (Davis, 2008) made by the Chinese government in 1950 to Tibet to show that the government is the initiating cause for the existing uprising and social instability in Tibet and adjacent provinces. Conversely, the article may cite the Chinese government’s statement that the Dalai Lama organized and monitored the riots. In this case, the “separatists” (China sets Tibet protest deadline, 2008) spearheaded by the Dalai Lama are considered as responsible for the unrest and its social and political consequences. Therefore, examining this frame is critical, since it provides a real insight into the potential inclination toward certain parties involved in the conflicts.

The *international condemnation frame* presents the criticism from a world known public figure, possibly a politician or a film star, about the acts of certain parties involved in the news event. When it comes to the coverage of the 2008 Tibet Riots, this frame is present in articles which deal with the negative comments on actions of either side of the conflict from the international community. For instance, some articles may cite that Nancy Pelosi, a senior US lawmaker, has called on the international community to denounce Chinese rule in Tibet (US

lawmaker demands Tibet inquiry, 2008). Similar to the victim versus villain frame, the international condemnation frame can help identify the hidden stance that underlies the news texts.

The *victim versus villain frame* creates a dichotomized world of victims and villains out of the news story. Victimization around issues in some circumstances attracts surprising amounts of international resonance and support (Bob, 2002). The victim versus villain frame generates a confrontation between the persons being subjected to brutality and those who use violence toward them. For stories devoted to the 2008 Tibet Riots, military and social conflicts between Tibetan protesters and the Chinese government were the main focuses of the news coverage. Some articles, for example, may report that “Tibetan exile groups maintain at least 80 people were killed by Chinese security forces...” (Tourist video shows, 2008). In this case, the Tibetan protesters are victimized and the Chinese security forces are portrayed as villains. Meanwhile, some other news stories may adopt an opposite standpoint, depicting the protesters as the villains beating innocent citizens and looting their shops.

The *authoritarian versus democracy frame* provides the readers with an angle to examine the actors in the stories from political and ideological perspectives. Authoritarian regimes refer to countries in which freedoms that do not directly threaten the absolute leadership are permitted, while any that could challenge their regime are restricted, depending on the vulnerability and power of the leadership (Spechler, 2009). By contrast, democracy as a political concept can be described in terms of methods or techniques of government. According to Barbu, democracy indicates the situation when “the administration is in the hands of the many, and not of the few” (2003, p12). A government of, by, and for the people, the sovereignty of the people, universal suffrage, popular and responsible government are often considered democratic (Barbu, 2003). The authoritarian versus democracy frame is present when an article directly or indirectly places a party or parties of the news event in either the democracy or the authoritarian category by referring to the freedoms and rights enjoyed by the people involved. Many articles covering the Tibet unrest may use the authoritarian versus democracy frame against the Chinese government by stating that Tibetans’ human rights have been trampled and their land was invaded by the Chinese army. This frame may also take other forms such as illustrating the Chinese government’s tight control over the journalistic practices of foreign correspondents.

The *anti-communism frame* is a frame adapted from the anti-communism filter of the propaganda model proposed by Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman (2006). Communism as the ultimate evil has always been considered as the specter haunting property owners, as it threatens the very root of their class position and superior status. The Soviet, Chinese, and Cuban revolutions were traumatic for Western elites, and the ongoing conflicts and the well-publicized abuses of communist states have contributed to elevating opposition to communism to a first principle of Western ideology and politics (Chomsky & Herman, 1988). In the articles that deal with the riots in Tibet in March 2008, this frame may still be used decades after the theory was created. It can be seen in articles when the author prefers to use “the communist China” and “the Communist Party” instead of simply referring to China and the Chinese government, so as to emphasize the political nature of the country and the administration.

General Coding Guidelines

1. The coding worksheet will use a 5-point Likert scale: 0=never, 1=rarely, 2=occasionally, 3=often, 4=very often. This scale will provide the research with more depth of information, compared to simply asking “yes” or “no.” In order to get a better sense of what are “never”, “rarely”, “occasionally”, and so forth, please read 5-10 articles before you start coding.
2. Read through each article at least once before answering the questions on the coding worksheet. Refer back to the article if you need to double-check your responses.
3. Respond to each question based on the facts presented in the article, rather than the overall feel of the article.

Human interest frame example

The human interest frame “brings a human face or an emotional angle to the presentation of an event, issue, or problem” (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, p.95). Such frame refers to an effort to personalize the news, dramatize or “emotionalize” (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, p.96) the news, in order to capture and retain audience interest. For stories devoted to the 2008 Tibet Riots, the “human face” is often a Tibetan who is either beaten or arrested by the police or innocent citizens whose shops are looted and burned. Some other stories may contain visual information—for example, dead bodies and infuriated protesters—that might generate feelings of outrage, empathy or compassion. Less frequently, stories may cover an individual’s personal life to arouse readers’ interests and emotions.

EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS: TIBET CLASHES

A day after violent clashes between protesters and security forces in Lhasa, Tibet, witnesses have been describing the tense atmosphere in the city.

JAMES MILES, CORRESPONDENT WITH THE ECONOMIST

“

The first clashes have now been taking place between Tibetan residents and the security forces.

They've been throwing stones at them, and there've been occasional volleys of teargas by the security forces at the rioters.

However, what we've not seen is a full-scale assault on the old Tibetan quarter.

So far it's been in the form of pin-prick strikes by the security forces into this maze of narrow alleyways, but they've not yet spread out right across this area. ”



The unrest began earlier this week

FRANS PLOOIJ, DUTCH TOURIST

“

This morning I counted 40 trucks of soldiers and 36 tanks moving inside the city.

All the streets in Lhasa have lots of security on them. Many Chinese shops were burned down and set on fire.

We heard from our Tibetan guide that at least 20 people had been killed [and that] Chinese authorities have imposed martial law where the riots were. ”

CATIA, PORTUGUESE JOURNALIST

“

There was a shop burning, still in flames, there was no police, no firefighters, no-one apart from the crowds looking and opposite, a car completely burned, upside down.

You could hear people shouting - whenever we tried to get close people started running from the direction where there was more fire.

We heard explosions - a lot of them. ”

BENTE WALLE, DANISH TOURIST

“

I just saw a lot of fire and everybody was running...

I didn't hear any shots. But there was a big fire on the market.

And I saw a lot of people with wounded heads, and blood, ambulance and tanks and policemen all over. ”

Attribution of Responsibility frame example

The attribution of responsibility frame “presents an issue or problem in such a way as to attribute responsibility for its cause or solution to either the government or to an individual or groups” (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, p96). Entman (1993) argues that frames have four functions which are defining problems, diagnosing causes, making moral judgments and suggesting remedies. The attribution of responsibility frame here performs the function of diagnosing causes for the confusions in the news story. This frame is particularly useful and revealing when it comes to the coverage of the 2008 Tibet Riots. For instance, an article may focus on the “military assault (Davis, 2008)” made by the Chinese government in 1950 to Tibet to show that the government is the initiating cause for the existing uprising and social instability in Tibet and adjacent provinces. Conversely, the article may cite the Chinese government’s statement that the Dalai Lama organized and monitored the riots. In this case, the “separatists” (China sets Tibet protest deadline, 2008) spearheaded by the Dalai Lama are considered as responsible for the unrest and its social and political consequences. Therefore, examining this frame is critical, since it provides a real insight into the potential inclination toward certain parties involved in the conflicts.

CHINESE REACT TO VIOLENCE IN TIBET


As the deadline for Tibetan protesters to surrender to the police passes, people elsewhere in China give their reaction to the protests and violence in Tibet.

ZHANG YI FAN, STUDENT, BEIJING

“I stand by my government on this issue.

The Dalai Lama is the main cause of the suffering of both Tibetans and Chinese in Tibet. He could stop the protesters but he doesn't.

He gave the people who remain loyal to him the wrong ideas and asked kind-hearted people to risk their lives for his political interests.



Zhang Yi Fan says the Dalai Lama should have called for restraint

Our government has had to send in the troops and protect our people to make society stable.

People haven't paid enough attention to the suffering of the Chinese in Tibet. They were targeted by the rioters.

We can't get enough information because the government doesn't let us know what is happening in Tibet. All the information I get is from foreign websites. Many people here don't know there is a serious situation in Tibet. It's just people like me who care about politics.

But I think the government has done the right thing in this instance. Many of their claims can be proved by the footage we have seen of destruction in Lhasa. ”

YU FU-MING, COMPANY MANAGER, BEIJING

“

I think Tibet is a small problem that can be resolved. The Chinese economy and Chinese society is very stable now. The economy is growing fast.

Life for people all across China and all its regions is getting better and better.

We must remember that all over the world there are battles between people with differences. And these differences exist in China too.

I think China needs its stability and so I think it is fine for the army to go into Tibet. Every government should show its force and its ability to control troubled situations.

If things are proving difficult to control, the army is the best option.

We get a lot of criticism but the best way is to follow law and government. I think Buddhism is a very good religion and I don't think the monks should act so much against government. ”

JINJIE CHEN, LAWYER, SHANGHAI

“

The timing is very sensitive. China is due to have its Olympic Games this year.

I think this is why those people chose this time to riot. Many are unsatisfied with the Chinese government and the country. They want to cause riots, maybe even engage in some terrorist activities before, during or after the Olympic Games.

These people know that it is a huge thing for China to have the Olympics. The world's attention is on us. It is a good opportunity for them to take advantage.

Honestly, I think these are the actions of a small number of people.

But, I have to say, it makes me angry. I think it makes most Chinese people angry. Everyone has their own problems but I do not think that such violent acts are a good option.

We must make the distinction between a peaceful demonstration and violent anti-social acts. I fully understand people who want to make their voice heard and raise their ideas. That is their right.

But I saw evidence that young Tibetans had planned to act violently. They had bought bricks and stones with them. That can't be right. ”



Jinjie Chen says people have the right to demonstrate peacefully

International condemnation frame example

The international condemnation frame presents the criticism from a world known public figure, possibly a politician or a film star, about the acts of certain parties involved in the news event. When it comes to the coverage of the 2008 Tibet Riots, this frame is present in articles which deal with the negative comments on actions of either side of the conflict from the international community. For instance, some articles may cite that Nancy Pelosi, a senior US lawmaker, has called on the international community to denounce Chinese rule in Tibet (US lawmaker demands Tibet inquiry, 2008). Similar to the victim versus villain frame, the international condemnation frame can help identify the hidden stance that underlies the news texts.

US LAWMAKER DEMANDS TIBET INQUIRY

A senior US lawmaker, Nancy Pelosi, has called for an independent investigation into China's claims that the Dalai Lama instigated the violence in Tibet.

Ms Pelosi, Speaker of the US House of Representatives, also called on the international community to denounce Chinese rule in Tibet.

She spoke out while holding talks in northern India with the Dalai Lama.

The Chinese authorities are continuing to tighten security following days of protests by Tibetans.

China says 19 people have been killed by rioters in Lhasa, the main city.

The Tibetan government-in-exile - headed by the Dalai Lama, regarded by many Tibetans as their spiritual leader - says at least 99 people have died in the crackdown by Chinese troops.

Chinese officials have accused the Dalai Lama and his supporters of organising violent clashes in Tibet in an attempt to sabotage this summer's Beijing Olympics and promote Tibetan independence.

Correspondents say the protests have presented the biggest challenge to Chinese rule in Tibet in almost two decades.



Ms Pelosi - a fierce critic of Beijing - heads a congressional delegation

“The situation in Tibet is a challenge to the conscience of the world”

Nancy Pelosi

Olympics boycott

Speaking in Dharamsala, seat of Tibet's government-in-exile, Ms Pelosi said: "We call upon the international community to have an independent outside investigation on accusations made by the Chinese government that His Holiness [the Dalai Lama] was the instigator of violence in Tibet."

She added: "The situation in Tibet is a challenge to the conscience of the world."

"If freedom-loving people throughout the world do not speak out against China and the Chinese in Tibet, we have lost all moral authority to speak out on human rights."

Ms Pelosi said she was not seeking a boycott of the Beijing Olympics, but warned that the "world is watching" events in China.



Chinese police and troops have converged on restive areas

Ms Pelosi is one of the sharpest critics of Beijing's human rights record in the US Congress.

Her visit at the head of a congressional delegation was planned before the protests began.

Rifles and bayonets

Anti-China protests began on 10 March in Lhasa and gradually escalated, spreading to Tibetan communities in neighbouring Gansu, Sichuan and Qinghai provinces.

China is not allowing foreign journalists into Tibet. Troops have also sealed off towns in the surrounding areas where unrest has taken place, witnesses say.

But the BBC's James Reynolds spent 24 hours in Hezuo in Gansu, where earlier this week Tibetan protesters tore down the Chinese flag.

Chinese security forces had swamped the town and the streets were full of police cars, check points and military trucks.

On the southern entrance to Hezuo there were rows of soldiers carrying AK47 rifles and bayonets, our correspondent said.

Public notices and police broadcasts told protesters to surrender by midnight on 25 March or face arrest and punishment.

Other witnesses have reported seeing hundreds of troop carriers heading for Tibetan areas in recent days.

Protesters shot

On Thursday Chinese authorities admitted for the first time that members of the security forces had fired on Tibetan protesters.

Police wounded four protesters "in self-defence" last Sunday in Aba county, a Tibetan area of Sichuan province, Xinhua news agency said.

An earlier Xinhua report said police had shot the four dead, but it was quickly changed.

Xinhua did not provide further details of the incident, but Tibetan activists say at least eight people were killed at a demonstration against Chinese rule near the Kirti monastery in Aba on Sunday.

Earlier this week, the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy circulated photos of bodies with apparent gunshot wounds, which it said were the result of police firing indiscriminately at protesters.



Tibetan activists say police killed protesters in Aba

On Thursday, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice held telephone talks with her Chinese counterpart, Yang Jiechi, in which she urged Beijing to show restraint.

But Mr Yang told her the protesters were trying to sabotage both the Olympics and social stability - and reiterated China's position that it blamed the Dalai Lama for the violence.

The Dalai Lama - who in 1989 won the Nobel Peace Prize for his commitment to non-violence in the quest for Tibetan self-rule - has called for talks with Chinese President Hu Jintao.

Victim versus villain frame example

The victim versus villain frame creates a dichotomized world of victims and villains out of the news story. Victimization around issues in some circumstances attracts surprising amounts of international resonance and support (Bob, 2002). The victim versus villain frame generates a confrontation between the persons being subjected to brutality and those who use violence toward them. For stories devoted to the 2008 Tibet Riots, military and social conflicts between Tibetan protesters and the Chinese government were almost the focuses of the news coverage. Some articles, for example, may report that “Tibetan exile groups maintain at least 80 people were killed by Chinese security forces...” (Tourist video shows, 2008). In this case, the Tibetan protesters are victimized and the Chinese security forces are portrayed as villains. Meanwhile, some other news stories may adopt an opposite standpoint, depicting the protesters as the villains beating innocent citizens and looting their shops.

CHINA POSTS WANTED LIST FOR TIBET

Chinese authorities have issued a list of 21 people wanted for their alleged role in anti-China riots in the Tibetan city of Lhasa last week.

Photos of the suspects were posted on the internet as China continued the crackdown that followed the unrest.

China has said that 19 people were killed in the Lhasa riots, which later spread to other Tibetan areas.

But Tibetan exiles say that nearly 100 have been killed by the Chinese security forces.

The official People's Daily newspaper said on Saturday that those responsible should be severely punished.

Rewards

"China must resolutely crush the conspiracy of sabotage and smash 'Tibet independence forces'," the paper said in an editorial.

In posting photos of suspects, authorities offered rewards and anonymity to those who helped.

The official Xinhua news agency said that two of the 21 suspects had already been arrested and a third had turned himself in.

The unrest began on 10 March in Lhasa and gradually escalated, spreading to Tibetan communities in neighbouring Gansu, Sichuan and Qinghai provinces.



There has been a steady security build-up in Tibetan areas

A week after the initial riots, estimates of how many people were killed and accounts of who was to blame differed wildly.

China says 18 civilians and a policeman were killed and hundreds injured.

But the Tibetan government-in-exile says at least 99 people have died in the crackdown by Chinese troops.

During the clampdown, troops have sealed off towns in the surrounding areas where unrest has taken place, according to witnesses. Authorities are not allowing foreign journalists into Tibet.

Other witnesses have reported seeing hundreds of troop carriers heading for Tibetan areas in recent days.

In Gansu, public notices and police broadcasts told protesters to surrender by midnight on 25 March or face arrest and punishment.

On Thursday Chinese authorities admitted for the first time that members of the security forces had fired on Tibetan protesters, wounding four protesters last Sunday in Aba county, Sichuan.

Tibetan sources say at least eight people were killed in the demonstration.

International pressure

Beijing has largely ignored international calls for dialogue with the Dalai Lama, regarded by many Tibetans as their spiritual leader.

Chinese authorities have blamed the Dalai Lama for orchestrating the unrest in an attempt to sabotage this summer's Beijing Olympics and promote Tibetan independence.

The Dalai Lama has criticised the violence.

He has stressed that he is seeking autonomy not independence and has called for talks with Chinese President Hu Jintao.

On Friday the Speaker of the US House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, called for an independent investigation into China's claims that the Dalai Lama instigated the violence in Tibet.

Speaking while visiting the Dalai Lama in northern India, she also called on the international community to denounce Chinese rule in Tibet.

TIBETAN PROTESTS



Tibet: Protests began in **Lhasa** on 10 March, dozens reported dead over weekend

Gansu: Unrest spread to **Machu**, where Tibetan government in exile says 19 died, and near **Hezuo**, where protesters were filmed tearing down Chinese flag

Sichuan: State media says four people 'shot and wounded' by police in **Aba**

Qinghai: Other unrest reported

Authoritarian versus democracy frame example

The authoritarian versus democracy frame provides the readers with an angle to examine the actors in the stories from the political and ideological perspectives. Authoritarian regimes refer to countries in which freedoms that do not directly threaten the absolute leadership are permitted, while any that could challenge their regime are restricted, depending on the vulnerability and power of the leadership (Spechler, 2009). By contrast, democracy as a political concept can be described in terms of methods or techniques of government. According to Barbu, democracy indicates the situation when “the administration is in the hands of the many, and not of the few”(2003, p12). A government of, by, and for the people, the sovereignty of the people, universal suffrage, popular and responsible government are often considered democratic (Barbu, 2003). The authoritarian versus democracy frame is present when an article directly or indirectly places a party or parties of the news event in either the democracy or the authoritarian category by referring to the freedoms and rights enjoyed by the people involved. Many articles covering the Tibet unrest may use the authoritarian versus democracy frame against the Chinese government by stating that Tibetans’ human rights have been trampled and their land was invaded by the Chinese army. This frame may also take other forms such as illustrating the Chinese government’s tight control over the journalistic practices of foreign correspondents.

TOWN SILENT AMID CHINESE BUILD-UP



The army has moved into Hezuo en masse

Soldiers clutching assault rifles stand guard on approach roads. Official checkpoints have sprung up all around. After several days of protests by Tibetans, the army has taken control of Hezuo.

Demonstrations in Hezuo and the surrounding towns and villages began last Saturday - part of wider protests that started in Lhasa, the Tibetan provincial capital.

Many Tibetans appear fed up with their lives under Chinese rule.

Protesters have been tearing down Chinese flags and replacing them with the flag of the Tibetan government in exile, based in Dharamsala, India.

Rewards offered

Hezuo, in the Gannan Tibetan autonomous prefecture, has a population of about 76,000. More than half of them are Tibetans.

Despite the seriousness of the situation in Gansu, China has only just admitted that there have been protests here.

A government notice posted around the town on Thursday warned protesters - or criminals, as the notice called them - have until midnight on 25 March to hand themselves in.

The notice, in both Chinese and Tibetan, makes it clear just how widespread the protests have been in Gannan.

Issued jointly by the prefecture's courts, prosecutor and public security bureau, it said there had been trouble in Xiahe, Luqu, Maqu, Zhuoni, Diebu and Hezuo.

"A number of criminals have attacked, smashed, looted and burned party and government organisations, judicial departments, schools, shops and residential areas," it says. The notice blames the disturbances on Tibet's spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama.

"This political conspiracy has been deliberately orchestrated by the Dalai clique that wants to split the motherland," it says.

The Dalai Lama, who fled Tibet in 1959 following a failed uprising, flatly rejects the charge that he is behind this latest wave of anti-Chinese protests.

The notice says those who turn themselves in will be treated leniently - but those who do not will be treated harshly, as will those who hide them.

The prefecture government has promised protection and rewards for those who turn in the "small group" of protesters to the authorities.

Deserted town

Security was noticeably tighter in and around Hezuo on Thursday after clashes were reported in the area.

There were checkpoints at road intersections, manned by soldiers and police, some of whom appeared to be wearing stab-vests. A number of soldiers had bayonets attached to their rifles.

It was extremely difficult for the BBC to move about the area and the Tibetans we approached outside Hezuo were reluctant to talk about what had happened.

Old men and women could be seen peering over the walls that surround their homes. Most people in the area are farmers or herders.

Residents in the town awoke on Thursday to find Hezuo blanketed in snow. They initially seemed reluctant to venture outside their homes.



Public notices blame the Dalai Lama for the violence

The streets had few people on them and buses were mostly empty. Toll booths on the roads outside town were deserted; no-one was collecting money. Later in the day, people in the town seemed to get a little bolder. They came out of doors to shop, chat and do household chores.

But the army was still very much in control. Truckloads of soldiers still occupied the town centre by dusk.

Anti-communism frame example

The anti-communism frame is a frame stemmed from the anti-communism filter of the propaganda model proposed by Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman (2006). Communism as the ultimate evil has always been considered as the specter haunting property owners, as it threatens the very root of their class position and superior status. The Soviet, Chinese, and Cuban revolutions were traumatic for Western elites, and the ongoing conflicts and the well-publicized abuses of communist states have contributed to elevating opposition to communism to a first principle of Western ideology and politics (Chomsky & Herman, 1988). In the articles that deal with the riots in Tibet in March 2008, this frame may still be used decades after the theory was created. It can be seen in articles when the author prefers to use “the communist China” and “the Communist Party” instead of simply referring to China and the Chinese government, so as to emphasize the political nature of the country and the administration.

TIBETAN MONKS: A CONTROLLED LIFE

China's crackdown on monk-led rallies in Lhasa is part of a long history of state control of monasteries, says Peter Firstbrook, producer of BBC Four series *A Year in Tibet*.

Buddhist monasteries are among the few institutions in China which have the potential to organize resistance and opposition to the government - so the Chinese Communist Party constantly worries about them.

Are some monks secret supporters of the Dalai Lama? Could they be working towards Tibetan independence? Beijing's fear is so great that being found with just a photograph of the Dalai Lama in your possession could land you in jail.

Government regulation of the monasteries started almost as soon as the People's Liberation Army marched into Tibet in 1950.

See a map of Tibet

The recent protests mark the 49th anniversary of the Tibetan uprising of 1959 when anti-Chinese and anti-communist demonstrations erupted on the streets of Lhasa, and were put down by force.

Lhasa's three major monasteries - the Sera, Drepung and Ganden, were seriously damaged by shelling. The Dalai Lama was forced to flee into exile and the Tibetan government-in-exile estimates that 86,000 Tibetans died.



Monks suffered after a Tibetan uprising was crushed in 1959

Less than a decade later, Mao's Cultural Revolution wrought havoc in the region and the Red Guards destroyed more than 6,000 monasteries and convents - just a handful survived.

Along with the buildings, hundreds and thousands of priceless and irreplaceable statues, tapestries and manuscripts were destroyed.

"At that time all the monasteries were destroyed. The whole country was changing during the revolution. The wave of change was unstoppable," says Dondrup, a 77-year-old monk at the Pel Kor Monastery in Gyantse.

'False' lama

Further evidence of Chinese control over Tibetan Buddhism came in 1995, with the naming of the new reincarnation of the Panchen Lama - second only to the Dalai Lama in terms of spiritual seniority in Tibet.

The Dalai Lama selected six-year-old Gedhun Choekyi Nyima - but within days the young boy and his immediate family disappeared, apparently abducted.

The Chinese government soon announced they had found the real Panchen Lama, a six-year old boy named Gyaltzen Norbu.

Gyaltzen Norbu just happened to be the son of two Tibetan Communist Party workers and he was soon whisked off to Beijing, where he continues to live today. Only occasionally does he appear in public, in carefully stage-managed events.

Most monks regard him as a "false" lama, though he is venerated by ordinary Tibetans.

We filmed his visit to the Pel Kor Monastery in Gyantse in September 2006. It was clear the authorities were worried about demonstrations as there were hundreds of police and army personnel on the streets and the monks had to go through a security check to get into their own monastery.

Since the 1980s the Chinese government has begun to rebuild some of the monasteries and also granted greater religious freedom - although it is still limited.

But almost every aspect of the lives of Buddhist monks and nuns is monitored and controlled by the government.

“ I visit these temples once or twice a month. I tell them what to do and what not to do. They all listen and say nothing ”

Butri
Communist Party official



“ Although we can't have that many lamas now, we can still absorb new lamas under the current regulations and policies ”

Tsultrim
Pel Kor monastery

Phone technology

Every monastery and nunnery in Tibet is visited at least once every few weeks by a Communist Party official, who checks that the government rules and regulations are being correctly applied.

Butri, a Tibetan Communist Party cadre, explains: "I visit these temples once or twice a month. I tell them what to do and what not to do. They all listen and say nothing."

The government is also very careful whom it allows to become a monk. All novices have to go through a detailed vetting procedure which takes years to complete. Even their families are checked for any subversive background.

The Chinese government also restricts the number of monks and nuns. In fact, monasteries can no longer perform many of their rituals correctly because of a shortage of monks.

Tsultrim, the deputy head lama of the Pel Kor monastery in Gyantse, said at its peak the monastery was home to 1,500 monks. Today the Chinese government restricts numbers to no more than 80.

"Although we can't have that many lamas now, we can still absorb new lamas under the current regulations and policies," he said.

"Of course, we need to check up on them, to see if they're the right people for us."

The recent conflict on the streets of Lhasa mirrors events almost 20 years ago - the last time there were major protests - when frustration among the monks and ordinary Tibetans finally reached boiling point in 1989.

But today, there is one important difference: technology. Practically every Tibetan monk I have met has a mobile phone. They even have special pockets sewn inside their robes to carry them.

In the past it has been notoriously difficult to communicate across the vast expanse of Tibet. Today, everybody is just a text away.



Coder: _____

Article#: _____

Human Interest Frame

	Never	Rarely	Occasionally	Often	Very Often
1) Does the story provide a human example or “human face” on the issue?	0	1	2	3	4
2) Does the story employ adjectives or personal vignettes that generate feelings of outrage, empathy/caring, sympathy or compassion?	0	1	2	3	4
3) Does the story emphasize how individuals and groups are affected by the issue?	0	1	2	3	4
4) Does the story go into the private or personal lives of the actors?	0	1	2	3	4
5) Does the story contain visual information that might generate feelings of outrage, empathy/caring, sympathy or compassion?	0	1	2	3	4

Attribution of Responsibility Frame

	Never	Rarely	Occasionally	Often	Very Often
6) Does this story suggest that some level of government has the ability to alleviate/resolve the issue?	0	1	2	3	4
7) Does the story suggest that some level of government is responsible for the issue?	0	1	2	3	4
8) Does the story suggest solution(s) to the issue?	0	1	2	3	4
9) Does the story suggest that an individual (or group of people in society) is responsible for the issue?	0	1	2	3	4
10) Does the story suggest the issue requires urgent action?	0	1	2	3	4

International Condemnation

	Never	Rarely	Occasionally	Often	Very Often
11) Does the story offer specific quotations from a world known public figure/an organization who/which is neither Tibetan nor Chinese?	0	1	2	3	4
12) Does the story present any criticism from the well-known (non Chinese/Tibetan) individual or organization about the Tibetan protesters?	0	1	2	3	4
13) Does the story present any criticism from the well-known (non Chinese/Tibetan) individual or organization about the Chinese government?	0	1	2	3	4
14) Does the story present condemnation of a third country’s direct /indirect support for the Tibet protesters from a famous (non Chinese/Tibetan) individual or organization?	0	1	2	3	4
15) Does the story present condemnation of a third country’s direct/indirect support for the Chinese government from a famous (non Chinese/Tibetan) individual or organization?	0	1	2	3	4

Victim versus Villain Frame

Often

Never Rarely Occasionally Often Very

16) Does the story portray the Chinese people as a group being hurt by the Tibetan protesters?	0	1	2	3	4
17) Does the story portray the Tibetan protesters as a group being hurt by the Chinese people/government?	0	1	2	3	4
18) Does the story emphasize how Tibetan individuals/groups are beaten and killed by the Chinese government?	0	1	2	3	4
19) Does the story emphasize how Chinese individuals/groups are beaten and killed by the Tibetan protesters?	0	1	2	3	4
20) Does the story suggest the Tibetans are powerless?	0	1	2	3	4
21) Does the story suggest the Chinese are powerless?	0	1	2	3	4

Authoritarian versus Democracy Frame

Never Rarely Occasionally Often Very Often

22) Does the story indicate that the Chinese government invaded and occupied Tibet with military force in 1950s?	0	1	2	3	4
23) Does the story indicate that the Chinese government liberated Tibet peacefully in 1950s?	0	1	2	3	4
24) Does the story suggest that Tibetans' lives are disrupted and controlled by the Chinese occupation? For instance, their human rights are deprived and the local culture is eroded?	0	1	2	3	4
25) Does the story suggest that Tibetans' lives are enhanced and their culture is respected by the Chinese government?	0	1	2	3	4
26) Does the story suggest that the media coverage of the issue is monitored and censored by the government?	0	1	2	3	4
27) Does the story suggest that the media coverage of the issue is not controlled by the Chinese government?	0	1	2	3	4
28) Does the story emphasize how the protest is oppressed by the Chinese security force?	0	1	2	3	4
29) Does the story emphasize how the Chinese security force allows the Tibetans to protest?	0	1	2	3	4

Anti-communism Frame

Never Rarely Occasionally Often Very Often

30) Does the story suggest that China is a communist country?	0	1	2	3	4
31) Does the story emphasize the political nature of the incumbent party in China?	0	1	2	3	4
32) Does the story employ words like "communist" and "communism" to indicate and describe the Chinese government?	0	1	2	3	4