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ABSTRACT

THE ORIGINS OF UNICEF, 1946-1953

by Jennifer M. Morris

In December, 1946, the United Nations General Assembly voted to approve an International Children's Emergency Fund that would provide relief assistance to children and their mothers whose lives had been disrupted by World War II in Europe and China. Begun as a temporary operation meant to last only until 1950, the organization, which later became the United Nations Children's Fund, or UNICEF, went far beyond its original mandate and established programs throughout the world. Because it had become an indispensable provider of basic needs to disadvantaged children and mothers, it lobbied for and received approval from the General Assembly to become a permanent UN agency in 1953.

The story of UNICEF's founding and quest for permanent status reveals much about the postwar world. As a relief organization, it struggled with where, how, and to whom to provide aid. As an international body, it wrestled with the debates that ensued as a result of Cold War politics. Its status as an apolitical philanthropic organization provides a unique perspective from which to forge links between the political, economic and social histories of the postwar period.

THE ORIGINS OF UNICEF, 1946-1953

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to the Faculty of

Miami University in partial

fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of History

by

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Miami University

Oxford, Ohio

2004

Dissertation Director: Judith P. Zinnser

Revised Version Accepted by the Graduate School
September 2010

Table of Contents

For Emily and Elyse

Acknowledgements

This journey, begun almost twenty years ago, would not have been possible without the support and encouragement of many. Charlotte Goldy's constant belief in me opened all the necessary doors, and gave me access to a wonderful group of scholars who helped me hone my skills. Adhiratha Keefe, UNICEF's generous and gracious archivist, provided me with abundant resources and a quiet place to work in the midst of Manhattan. Mary Frederickson, David Fahey and Laura Neack made thoughtful commentary that not only made my work better, but pointed out new directions it might take in the future. Bradley Morris, my brother and fellow scholar, offered constant moral support and had an uncanny knack for knowing just what to say to make me keep going when it seemed as if the road had come to an end. My parents and grandparents often provided financial support in addition to their love and understanding, a boon to any graduate endeavor. My husband, Bryan, and my daughters, Emily and Elyse, gave me infinite love and encouragement—thank you all so very much; I could not have done it without you.

Finally, to my mentor and friend, Judith P. Zinsser—words cannot express my gratitude for all the years you have spent with me in this project. You gave me the push I needed to fly.

Introduction

Until very recently, historians in the U.S. have shown little interest in the United Nations. Only a few have chosen it as a topic for historical analysis, producing to date a handful of dissertations focusing primarily on international law proceedings and political policy.[1] This reticence to study the United Nations, an institution now almost sixty years old, is baffling. The UN has vast archival material, has been involved in most major world events since its creation in 1945, and can be an effective means to examine not only individual countries, but the world. For these reasons, I have undertaken the study of a particular UN organization, one that has been surrounded by controversy of late—UNICEF, the United Nations Children's Fund. Few charitable organizations have achieved the status of global recognition enjoyed by UNICEF. Whether through its trick-or-treat boxes, holiday cards, or appeals from its famous goodwill ambassadors, UNICEF embodies the international effort to provide for children the world over.

UNICEF, like the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO), was created because of its synchronicity with the UN's stated purpose—to maintain peace in the world—as well as its own proposals to focus on and resolve issues identified as both critical and ongoing at the end of the war. UNICEF launched its operations in 1946 under the guise of providing emergency relief, but relied on continuing issues of children, including famine and disease prevention, to remain a viable concern. Its founding, early operations and eventual restructuring, therefore, also reveal a great deal about the concurrent political and economic events which have to date been the focus of most histories of the period. UNICEF's programs also provide insight into ideas about the postwar family, its structure, and expectations regarding the behavior of its individual members. Placed in historiographical context, this analysis of UNICEF promises to expand our knowledge of political and economic issues in the postwar period and to break new ground regarding the social dilemmas faced by the organization as it began operations in individual nations.

Studying UNICEF's role in the postwar period has not yet been undertaken. UN agencies have been almost entirely ignored by historians, and only two published histories of UNICEF exist, both the work of former UNICEF employee Maggie Black. Entitled *The Children and the Nations: the Story of UNICEF* and *Children First: the Story of UNICEF*, they provide information on UNICEF's later years and focus on yaws and tuberculosis treatment programs. They are not, however, analytical treatments of the organization. Rather, they read as laudatory biographies of the Executive Directors of UNICEF since 1965—the year both UNICEF's founder, Ludwik Rajchman, and first Executive Director, Maurice Pate, died.

My analysis of UNICEF, then, constitutes original work on several levels. It elucidates the difficulties faced by neutral, international organizations as they negotiated the increasingly polarized terrain of the early years of the Cold War. UNICEF found

[1] For example, in addition to two dissertations written during the early 1950s, the following dissertations on the United Nations have been completed: Benno Signitzer, "The Ordering of the Direct Broadcast Satellite: the International Legislative Process in the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space" (PhD dissertation, Bowling Green State University, 1975); Neba Denis Cheno , "The Legal Regime for the Management of the Area Under UNCLOS III" (PhD dissertation, University of Michigan, 1993); and Dmitri Hanna, "Perspectives on Decision Making: the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference, 1973-82" (PhD dissertation, George Mason University, 1995).

itself constantly in the direct line of fire between the Communist and Capitalist worlds, and had to develop a means to maneuver through the political quagmire in order to achieve its goals. Through this process, UNICEF gained permanent status as a UN agency; however, it lost the ability to provide aid wherever it was needed, as Communist nations rarely became UNICEF relief recipients. This study also examines how the roles of individual family members evolved on the institutional and individual level during this period, thereby broadening our all too narrow understanding of the Cold War era in general. In particular, social historians Siim, Jet Bussemaker and others have examined postwar definitions of citizenship in detail, and argue that despite declarations of equal rights for men and women, sex remained a critical factor in determining one's rights.[2] UNICEF programs can help us better understand how ideas regarding equality and citizenship were at the same time upheld and challenged, since these programs often relied on one's sex and age to determine eligibility for aid.

Histories of the postwar period, in addition to their exclusion of the UN, have not addressed issues outside the realm of high politics. They focus largely on diplomatic and economic policy, for example the work of modern European historians Keith Middlemas, Arnold Offner, Theodore Wilson and John Young. All of these have, for the most part, examined the origins of the Cold War in an effort to place blame for the protracted state of tension that could have, at any minute, erupted into total war.[3] Policies, as well as the individual policy makers, have remained the focus of these histories. More recent studies like those conducted by European historian Charles Maier have begun to examine the ways in which the threat of a danger of total destruction and the buildup of nuclear arsenals played a role in determining the strategic dimensions of the Cold War.[4] European historian William Hitchcock's work, which revises commonly accepted themes of European Cold War history, takes a different direction; he posits that France, despite the economic and material influences of the US, asserted a great deal of agency over its postwar future.[5] UNICEF's operations add another dimension to this debate, allowing an investigation of the Cold War from the perspective of the organization that in theory would not bind itself to any one government or political ideology.

Economic histories, too, have remained focused on the political in the postwar period. Concentrating on the Marshall Plan and the formation of the European Union, they emphasize the critical importance of US financial contributions as a primary factor

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[2] See Birte Siim, *Gender and Citizenship: Politics and Agency in France, Britain and Denmark* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Jet Bussemaker, "Citizenship, Welfare State Regimes and Breadwinner Arrangements: Various Backgrounds of Equality Policy." In *Sex Equality Policy in Western Europe*, Frances Gardiner, ed. (New York: Routledge, 1997); Alice Kessler-Harris, *In Pursuit of Equity: Women, Men, and the Quest for Economic Citizenship in Twentieth-Century America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); and Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, *Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977).

[3] Keith Middlemas, *Power, Competition and the State: Britain in Search of Balance, 1940-61* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986); Arnold A. Offner and Theodore A. Wilson, *Victory in Europe, 1945: From World War to Cold War* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000); John W. Young, *France, the Cold War and the Western Alliance, 1944-1949: French Foreign Policy and Post-War Europe* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990).

[4] Charles S. Maier, ed. *The Cold War In Europe: Era of a Divided Continent* (Princeton: Marcus Weiner Publishers, 1996).

[5] William I. Hitchcock, *France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998).

of postwar recovery, the most prominent written by U.S. diplomatic historian Michael Hogan.[6] Revisionists such as Alan Milward challenged this point of view, claiming that Europe's economy recovered in spite of the Marshall Plan.[7] What has been overlooked by both types of histories, however, is the fact that Europe's recovery enabled it to fund social programs that ultimately thwarted U.S. desires to eradicate socialism and communism in Western Europe, while thwarting Soviet desires to dominate all Eastern European governments, many of whom accepted UNICEF aid.

Social historians Robert Moeller, Seth Koven and Sonya Michel have examined postwar social programs and how traditional sex roles operated within them.[8] Establishing the ties between UNICEF and social welfare programs is essential given UNICEF's reliance on their infrastructure to distribute its aid. Created over the last fifteen years, this body of literature provides insight into state-run programs that influenced UNICEF's creators and first administrators. Historians of state-sponsored assistance programs Pat Thane, Susan Pedersen, and Gisela Bock have all written histories of social welfare programs begun in the nineteenth century in Europe that continued into the twentieth century and clearly influenced UNICEF. By comparing relief in different countries, Thane, Pedersen, and Bock reveal that programs borrowed from one another, eventually forming an informal international community of institutions and individuals, both public and private, that exchanged ideas as they worked to alleviate the suffering of the poor and disadvantaged-a tradition adopted by UNICEF in its aid programs.[9]

Sociologist Terry Kandal's work on intellectual shifts at the end of the nineteenth century provides insight into the creation of twentieth-century social welfare policies. He examines social policies designed to ameliorate the suffering of the poor, how they evolved, and how they affected women in particular. Gender historian Anne Digby, in collaboration with social historian John Stewart, studies these shifts further. Their work explores the ways in which gender roles both affected political agendas concerning social welfare and the creation of programs and policies. Labor historians Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward added yet another dimension to this process with their examination of the ways in which relief programs have been used to regulate the poor, all of which

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[6] Michael J. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

[7] Alan S. Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1951* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

[8] Robert G. Moeller, *Protecting Motherhood: Women and the Family in the Politics of Postwar West Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Seth Koven and Sonya Michel, eds., *Mothers of a New World: Maternalist Politics and the Origins of Welfare States* (New York: Routledge, 1993).

[9] Social welfare programs and the ways they exhibit gender biases have been the object of study in many fields during the last fifteen to twenty years. Economists, sociologists, historians and psychologists have examined the bases for establishing social welfare relief, how programs changed over time due to economic and social factors, why basic assumptions about providing relief on the basis of sex have remained largely unchanged for over 100 years, and how this disadvantages women in particular in their role as wage earner and primary provider. Pat Thane, *Foundations of the Welfare State* (New York: Longman, 1982); Susan Pedersen, *Family, Dependence and the Origins of the Welfare State, Britain and France, 1914-1945* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Gisela Bock and Pat Thane, eds., *Maternity and Gender Policies: Women and the Rise of the European Welfare States, 1880s-1950s* (London: Routledge, 1991).

support the contention that social welfare policies have often emerged with gender biases based on notions of masculinity and femininity.[10]

The dissertation, which will attempt to place UNICEF in the context of welfare policies, the growth of international public health programs and maternal and child health care, and Cold War politics, is divided into eight chapters that analyze the history of UNICEF from 1946 to 1953. Chapters one and two examine the two individuals most responsible for the creation of UNICEF, Herbert Hoover and Dr. Ludwik Rajchman, and explore their influence in the creation of its institutional identity. Both men had been deeply involved in international public service prior to 1946, and used UNICEF as a vehicle to continue their philanthropic careers. Hoover left behind voluminous documentation about his life, including a three-volume memoir, several books on his views about the US and its role in the world, and copious correspondence regarding his public career. Rajchman's trail is harder to follow. He left few papers, but others commented frequently on his career, his politics, his decisions and his management style. His great-granddaughter, Marta Balinska, recently wrote his biography, which includes references to journals, letters, formal reports and interviews with many who worked with Rajchman during his long career. More can be gleaned about Rajchman from formal reports written for the League of Nations and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, or UNRRA, as well as the many documents which recount his experiences with UNICEF as its first Executive Director. These chapters illustrate how these two men created the concept of UNICEF, laying out its goals, method of operation, and the foundation of its institutional identity.

Chapter three analyzes UNICEF's charter, the approval process that created the International Children's Emergency Fund (ICEF), and the meeting of the first Executive Board. Intended as a temporary relief organization whose functions would later be absorbed by other UN agencies, the ICEF began its life with a meager endowment from a former relief agency and very little else. The charter itself, along with correspondence, oral histories, and the ICEF's first meeting minutes, reveal a great deal about the type of organization Rajchman, who helped write the charter, had in mind—very different from the one envisioned by the General Assembly. The charter eventually became the resolution passed by the General Assembly that created the ICEF, and established its intended clientele, the type of assistance, and the conditions under which aid could be provided. Once in place, the ICEF quickly appointed an Executive Board that decided how it would operate.

Creating a work plan, the subject of Chapter four, became the focus of ICEF meetings during its first six months of life, primarily because it had no funds to put its ideas into action. Myriad suggestions from the Board came to the table, and each was in turn debated on its merits. The original meeting minutes, as well as histories of UNICEF and oral histories provide a vivid picture of the conversations that took place, and demonstrate that no two individuals on the Board had a like plan of action in mind. This chapter also examines how various countries viewed UNICEF, and how much support these countries provided, especially in terms of funding. Despite the US's initial

[10] Terry R. Kandal, *The Woman Question in Classical Sociological Theory* (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1998); Anne Digby and John Stewart, eds, *Gender, Health and Welfare* (New York: Routledge, 1996); Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, *Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1971).

contribution, much disagreement arose over continued funding because of Cold War tensions and the distribution of UNICEF aid to Communist nations. In the end, however, the Board defined two primary goals: food and medical care. It had to wait for funding to make these a reality.

Chapter five examines UNICEF's first food aid programs, put into action once it received its generous grant-in-aid from the US government. Based on the original concept created by Hoover during his work with the Commission for Belgian Relief from 1914 to 1917, these programs had three basic components. First, they required that individual governments assume part of the costs; second, they used already existing infrastructures, primarily school feeding programs, to distribute aid; and third, they focused on children and their mothers. Food programs required the cooperation of the Food and Agriculture Administration (FAO), and UNICEF found this extremely helpful in obtaining nutrition information and in borrowing staff. It also helped UNICEF entrench its food distribution programs, creating an ongoing need for its services, as evidenced in UNICEF Board meeting minutes, correspondence, and testimonies from UNICEF and FAO staff.

UNICEF had also agreed to provide medical aid, but this proved to be a more complicated task because of the presence of an interim UN health organization that did not agree that medical programs should be part of UNICEF's function. Chapter Six examines the two primary programs UNICEF established, as well as the sometimes rocky relationship it shared with the World Health Organization (WHO). This relationship, made even more complicated by Rajchman's history as the Director of the Health Section of the League of Nations, unfolds haltingly in Board meeting minutes, Rajchman's biography, and correspondence, testimony, and UNICEF histories. UNICEF and WHO worked together grudgingly, due in large part to the fact that WHO, anxious to take over UNICEF's health programs, did little to support UNICEF in its quest to become a permanent UN agency in 1950.

By 1950, the UNICEF Board, unanimous in its desire to make UNICEF permanent, made a concerted effort to obtain approval from the General Assembly. This year efforts concentrated almost entirely on ensuring that UNICEF's programs, which now enjoyed funding from a variety of sources ranging from national governments to private fund-raising efforts, became indispensable. UNICEF received approval to continue its operations until 1953, but Rajchman resigned as Chairman of the Executive Board amidst disagreements fueled by Cold War distrust. Chapter seven reviews this year, and examines the multiple efforts made to keep UNICEF a viable entity that required permanent status. Testimonies from those involved with the effort, in addition to meeting minutes, provide insight into the year-long battle.

Chapter Eight deals with the years between 1951 and 1953, during which UNICEF changed its leadership and its focus in order to ensure that it remained in step with changing trends in the UN. During these years, UNICEF's primary goal became publicizing its cause to the world, and it did so through projects such as holiday greeting cards, country committees for UNICEF, and Goodwill Ambassadors. Having received little encouragement from Western nations, it was also during these years that UNICEF forged strong ties with developing nations, thereby assuring that when the discussion about its fate came before the General Assembly, there would be overwhelming support from these developing nations for its establishment as a permanent UN agency.

UNICEF's own pamphlets and pictorial histories, as well as testimonies from UNICEF employees and volunteers recount the story of the final push for permanence, which UNICEF received in 1953.

This new study of UNICEF is significant for several reasons. The consequences of its policies, procedures and practices in the post-war world led to the prescription of appropriate roles for family members not on the basis of the UN's promise to create equality for men and women throughout the world, but according to sex-specific roles. It also demonstrates the ways in which the principles of European and North American social welfare programs came to be applied on a global scale. The political scientist, Cynthia Enloe, writes that after the chaos of World War II ceased, fluctuations in roles for women and men and what comprised a family ended as well. A new era had arrived, and in the "Cold War [that followed, a] deeply militarized understanding of identity and security…[relying] on distinct notions of masculinity [and femininity]" ensued.[11]

UNICEF's Executive Committee members never questioned these assumptions. Through its programs, it maintained most of the pre-war notions about the proper roles for women, men, girls and boys within a family, and upheld the concepts regarding the suitable roles for family and society in maintaining the well-being of a child. Women, based on classic ideas regarding femininity and biological function, remained relegated to the role of mother. UNICEF aid to women, like the Social Security Act, mother's pensions and child allowances "enshrined the notion of women's domesticity by maintaining the presupposition that women's…role was secondary to that of [their provider]."[12] Men, not eligible for UNICEF assistance in Europe, were nonetheless critical; their physical absence from the family, often due to military conflict, created the very void UNICEF used to step in and assume the role of provider for children whose families lacked a male breadwinner, reinforcing its institutional identity. These images of women, coupled with the plight of the fatherless family, allowed UNICEF to establish itself as indispensable to the well-being of children.

In 1950, UNICEF proved the need to continue its work for children by setting up operations throughout Asia and Latin America. It continued to establish relief programs that reinforced its original notion of the family established in 1946, but was confronted with cultural differences that would result in gradual changes in its dealings with women in its programs over the next four decades, expanding their role from mother only to farmer, entrepreneur, and provider. Joan Scott claims that "if the meanings of concepts are taken to be unstable, open to contest and re-definition, then they require vigilant repetition, reassertion, and implementation by those who have endorsed one or another definition."[13] UNICEF used this tactic during its formative years to achieve its goal of becoming a permanent UN agency. When the reinforced images forced individuals into roles that were at odds with geography, culture and custom, however, they began to lose their effectiveness, and allowed UNICEF to expand the image of women.

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[11] Cynthia Enloe, *The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 3.

[12] Heather Boushey, "Embracing Discrimination? The Interaction between Low-Wage Labor Markets and Policies in Aid of the Poor. In *Gender and Political Economy: Incorporating Diversity into Theory and Policy*, Ellen Mutari, Heather Boushey and William Fraher IV, eds. (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1997), 183.

[13] Joan Wallach Scott, *Gender and the Politics of History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 5.

Chapter One
Forerunners: Wartime Relief Organizations

May 8, 1945 marked the official end of six years of fierce warfare on the European continent that had begun when Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939. The United Nations alliance, which included the United States, the USSR, the United Kingdom and France, declared "The German Armed forces on land, at sea and in the air have been completely defeated…and Germany, which bears responsibility for the war, is no longer capable of resisting the will of the victorious Powers."[14] Having reconquered Europe from the Nazis, then ending the war in the Pacific in August of the same year, the United Nations found themselves faced with several imposing challenges as they mused over the most effective methods of returning affairs to a state remotely resembling normal. Industrial infrastructures had been destroyed by years of constant bombing, and agricultural production had all but ceased in many parts of the world. Casualties totaled more than forty million, and included a portion of civilian deaths that was far higher than ever before.[15] European society had experienced a form of destruction and suffering that changed it profoundly, and life in the East had been disrupted irreversibly as well. Reconstruction, therefore, became a very different enterprise than it had been before, posing new challenges while at the same time presenting new opportunities.[16] These included ensuring a lasting peace, providing financial assistance to rebuild industry and business in those areas that had been devastated by bombing, occupying and managing Germany and Japan, and ensuring that the surviving populations the world over had their basic human needs met.

In order to achieve these goals, the allies created an organization committed to the idea that countries could work together to maintain world peace. It would be dedicated to "saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war," maintain human rights, "promote social progress" and use "international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples."[17] They called their organization the United Nations, partly to signal their undisputed leadership, and partly to indicate that any nation wishing to join them must agree to their terms in order to 'unite' with them in their quest. Article Three of the charter establishing the organization states that "The original Members of the United Nations shall be the states which [participated] in the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco, or…previously signed the Declaration of the United Nations on 1 January 1942."[18] Article Four states that "Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations."[19] With

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[14] U.S. Department of State, "Declaration regarding the defeat of Germany and the assumption of supreme authority with respect to Germany by the Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the Provisional Government of the French Republic," June 5, 1945, *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, Volume 3.*
[15] Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century* (New York: Vintage Books, 1998), 212-213.
[16] See Mazower, 212-249.
[17] *Charter of the United Nations*, "Preamble." New York: United Nations Official Documents, 1945.
[18] *UN Charter*, Chapter II, Article Three: "Membership."
[19] *UN Charter*, Chapter II, Article Four.

these parameters in place, the Charter officially forming the group was ratified on June 26, 1945, in San Francisco, California, and went into effect in October of the same year.

In order to address the immediate and long-term postwar challenges it faced, the United Nations established six principal organs; the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat. Each had a specific membership and function designed to address the organization's primary goal of maintaining world peace.

Five of the six organs had a clearly defined set of responsibilities. The General Assembly constituted the discussant body, and would consist of no more than five representatives from all member nations. The Security Council maintained international peace and security, and would have the five founders as its permanent members. The Trusteeship Council was established to monitor trust territories to ensure their safe return to self-rule, while the International Court of Justice stood as the principal judicial organ of the UN. The Secretariat, which included the Secretary General, was the chief administrative body.[20] Only the Economic and Social Council had a vague charge—to monitor "international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters… [making] recommendations…to the General Assembly" and calling international conferences on any matters falling under its competence.[21] While all of these organs could establish sub-groups as necessary, the Economic and Social Council would create the most by far in its mission to heal the postwar world, thereby carrying out its mission.

Despite its many commitments, functions, organs and sub-groups, the United Nations seemed to have overlooked the postwar needs specific to children. This omission did not go unnoticed by two men in particular—Herbert Hoover and Ludwik Rajchman. Both men had worked for decades to provide aid to children, active in international relief work since World War I. Having witnessed firsthand the devastating effects of war on children, they came together to engage in humanitarian relief work for children and mothers on a scale previously unknown and unimagined. Though very different in background, education, and political conviction, they shared a philanthropic philosophy that would lead them first to each other, then to create an emergency relief organization specifically for children within the new United Nations. Their vision resulted in the founding of the International Children's Emergency Fund (ICEF) in December, 1946. Intended to provide interim relief to children and mothers in the immediate postwar period, the originally temporary organization eventually became the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the largest child relief and advocacy organization in the world.

When Hoover and Rajchman first began to discuss establishing this child-focused relief effort in 1946, the practice of providing food, clothing and medical care to mothers and children in need was not a new concept in the Western world. The Christian church, for example, had provided aid to the poor for centuries, but despite aid to mothers and children from churches and private charities, government sponsored assistance did not

[20] *UN Charter*, Chapter IV, Article 10; Chapter V, Article 24; Chapter XIII, Article 87; Chapter XIV, Article 92; Chapter XV, Article 97.
[21] *UN Charter*, Chapter X, Article 62.

appear until the 19th and 20th centuries.[22] During the late 19th and early 20th century, aid organizations increased in number and scope, many of them providing aid internationally during and after World War I. It was due in part to the legacy of these organizations that UNICEF came into existence. Unlike its predecessors, however, UNICEF's goals encompassed the globe. It would, like its forerunners, remain outside the realm of politics to ensure the health and well being of children and those responsible for their care; however, it would disregard nationalities or political affiliations and provide aid to all who required it. UNICEF began its immediate postwar operations in Europe and China, but quickly moved to establish aid programs for children throughout the world. By 1950, UNICEF could boast an aid outpost or clinic on almost every continent.[23]

That UNICEF had become a global presence in only four years, particularly in the wake of a devastating world war, may seem almost impossible. This amazing feat can be attributed to two primary factors. First, UNICEF, with the considerable influence of Hoover and Rajchman, brought together an unparalleled group of talented individuals whose expertise in the fields of fundraising, international aid, maternal and child care, supply procurement and diplomacy made it a force to be reckoned with. Second, it built on Hoover and Rajchman's past experiences and utilized any local, national and international social welfare and charity structures already in existence, many of which had been created by international coalitions established during and after World War I.

Prior to the outbreak of World War I, governments on both sides of the Atlantic had, to greater and lesser degrees, begun to deal with what they perceived as the issues surrounding the poverty-stricken in their populations. In the United States, Progressives had taken it upon themselves to care for the poor through private charities, residence and settlement houses and community education programs. It was through their dogged lobbying that the United States government began to take notice of the plight of the poor and eventually to play a role in alleviating their suffering, both by passing legislation and by creating departments designed to study, make recommendations, and provide assistance to families living in poverty. At the same time, European nations had created much more substantial social welfare organizations that were funded and administered by the state. Most of these provided for family relief and had already established food distribution programs and rudimentary medical care for families in need.

In addition to the pressure brought to bear by political activists on both continents, governments in both the U.S. and Europe had also begun to feel the pressure of the growing presence of a women's movement which asserted that children and mothers be regarded as separate groups when considering changes in social welfare programs.[24] In particular, activists called for better aid for women in poverty, as well as for changing the definition of those considered to be impoverished to make the group more inclusive.[25] In

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[22] Digby and Stewart write that, especially in Britain, the state did not become involved in welfare assistance to children and mothers until several causal factors appeared, including war, the increased prominence of the Labour Party, and the women's movement. See Digby and Stewart, 1-6.

[23] UNICEF's report of activities in 1950 to the Economic and Social Council included a summary of its allocations, which had expanded to include the Eastern Mediterranean and Europe. See E/ICEF/178, *International Children's Emergency Fund Report of the Executive Board, 22-24 May 1951.*

[24] Digby and Stewart, 5-7.

[25] In their examination of the relationship of the women's movement to the state, Bock and Thane note that transnational similarities began to emerge, and that tracking these movements on regional and local levels proved less complicated than tracking them between nations. See Bock and Thane, 3-9.

the United States, government departments designed specifically to assist children began to form, filling their ranks with Progressive men and women who had spent their careers in service to the poor.[26] France, Britain, Norway, Sweden, Italy, Spain and Germany also found themselves urged to consider children and mothers as groups possessing specific needs within their social welfare policies by individuals who believed it was possible to change the existing order for the better. Compelled by a group of well-educated activist individuals, governments debated how to provide adequate care for children and mothers living within their borders, especially those whom the state identified as dependent.[27]

The governments considered many options, from providing an additional wage increase for families with children to giving an allowance for the maintenance of children.[28] Providing a supplement to the household income marked a distinct departure from food and clothing distribution programs already in existence, which had given assistance directly to mothers which they in turn used to feed and clothe their children. The progression in the discussion over how to care for these mothers and children ceased, however, when in 1914 war erupted in Europe, shifting the priority from dealing with the poor to providing relief to those living with war.

In 1914, numerous new relief organizations materialized and sprang into action. Then, when the conflict dragged on rather than coming to a swift end as had been predicted, organizations began to focus their efforts more narrowly in order to assist specifically defined groups, including children. Dealing now with total war and the devastation it brought with it, these organizations not only saved countless lives through their distribution of food, clothing and medical care, but provided hundreds of individuals with the experience they would need and the infrastructure required to establish and run international relief organizations in the future. Because of its neutral stance for the first three years of the war, the United States provided most of the relief assistance to Europe through both public and private organizations. Coordinating one of these massive efforts was a thirty-year-old mining engineer from Iowa named Herbert Hoover.

Hoover would eventually become President of the United States at the age of fifty-four; however, by the time he and his wife, Lou, moved into the White House, Hoover had enjoyed a distinguished career in international mining, served in the Cabinets of three presidents, participated in the peace process that followed World War I, and organized and managed the largest relief efforts ever undertaken up to that time. Emerging from his inconspicuous beginnings, Hoover became known the world over as an unparalleled administrator and an exemplary humanitarian.

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[26] Kriste Lindenmeyer writes that the US Children's Bureau, conceived by individuals she identifies as part of the Progressive Child Welfare Movement, reflected the influences of both men and women Progressive activists. These included Homer Folks, Emma Lundberg, and John Spargo, all of whose writings had focused on industrialization and urbanization and how these had negatively affected the family and its children. Kriste Lindenmeyer, "*A Right to Childhood": The U.S. Children's Bureau and Child Welfare, 1912-1946* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997), 10.

[27] The change in notions of gender equality brought about by the women's movement seem to have caused a shift in the way states viewed women, moving away from focusing on biology and examining them instead on social and cultural terms. Bock and Thane, 14-15.

[28] For government policies, see Anne-Lise Seip and Hilde Ibsen, "Family Welfare, which policy? Norway's road to child allowances" and Jane Lewis, "Models of Equality for Women: the case of support for children in twentieth-century Britain." In Bock and Thane, 40-56, 73-89.

Herbert Clark Hoover was born on August 10, 1874 in West Branch, Iowa to Huldah Minthorn Hoover and Jesse Clark Hoover. As he told it in his memoirs, his happy days of sledding down the freezing snow on Cook's Hill and exploring the teeming woods by the Burlington railroad track came to an abrupt end when he lost both of his parents in rather quick succession, forcing Hoover and his brother and sister to be cared for by a series of friends and relatives. In the end, since no family member could accommodate all three children on a permanent basis, they were placed in separate households to be raised.[29]

Hoover recalled the years of his adolescence fondly, noting that although he "was at once put to school and chores…somehow I found time for baseball, jigsaws, building dams, swimming, fishing and exploring the woods with the other village boys."[30] In addition to his many activities, he also accompanied his uncle and guardian, Dr. Minthorn, on visits to his patients. From his uncle he received instruction in physiology, health and sickness, particularly about the "neglects that made [people] sick."[31] After working as an office boy for his uncle and taking classes at a small business college, Hoover exhibited an aptitude for math. And, after meeting a mining engineer in his uncle's office, he became interested in studying engineering.

Earlham College, a Quaker institution in Indiana, offered Hoover a scholarship, but he refused it because Earlham did not have an engineering program. He turned his attentions instead to a university in California founded by Senator Leland Stanford even though he deemed himself "sadly deficient in the other approaches to higher education."[32] To overcome this obstacle, he agreed to take remedial courses before the school year began and thus obtained admittance.[33] He began his college career in 1891 at Stanford University with the blessings (but not the financial support) of the Minthorn family, "$160.00, two suits of clothes and a bicycle."[34]

Opened formally on October 1, 1891, Stanford University included Herbert Hoover as a member of its first class; however, given his family's lack of financial support, staying at Stanford required that Hoover find a way to support himself. He first worked in the University office and for geologist Dr. John Branner as a typist.[35] After his first year, he held a series of summer jobs for the United States Geological Survey also because of Branner's intervention.

Hoover spent summers creating topographical maps throughout the United States. He made $60.00 a month plus expenses—a sum he called a "fortune" at the time.[36] He came in contact with some of the most abject poverty he had ever seen during these summers, where in the Ozark Mountains he found the living conditions "horrible;" for this plight, Hoover saw only one remedy—"to regenerate…vitality in the next generation through education and decent feeding of the children."[37]

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[29] Herbert C. Hoover, *The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, Volume I: Years of Adventure, 1874-1920* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1957), 1-5.
[30] Ibid., 11.
[31] Ibid., 12.
[32] Ibid., 15.
[33] Ibid..
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid., 15-17.
[36] Ibid., 17.
[37] Ibid., 18.

Hoover's concern for the less fortunate, as well as his ability to organize and manage, had become solidified by the time he graduated Stanford. Unfortunately, an economic depression in the 1890s made survival a necessity, and his talents remained untapped. Hoover recalled that the reality of the economic depression settled in when the only job he could find meant pushing a cart in the lower levels of a mine despite his excellent credentials.[38] His situation would change dramatically, however, when he obtained employment with Bewick, Moering and Company to run several of its mining interests in Australia. Only twenty-three and possessing no international experience, Hoover traveled to London to begin his first official job as a mining engineer.[39]

In addition to taking time to see the House of Commons, Westminster Abbey, and "a host of other landmarks," Hoover began earning a salary that allowed him to care for the needs of his family, illustrating his inherent philanthropic impulse.[40] Hoover worked in various locations throughout Australia until early1899 when Bewick Moering, having acquired mining interests in China, asked him in late 1898 to take the job of Chief Engineer over their Chinese mines. Hoover accepted the position, which, with its salary of $20,000.00 per year, allowed him finally to ask fellow Stanford graduate and longtime correspondent, Lou Henry, if she would marry him and accompany him to China.[41]

The couple married on February 11, 1899 and left for China the next day. The Hoovers both looked back on their time in China with fondness; however Hoover also formed very strong negative opinions about the Chinese governmental system. He recalled in his memoirs that democracy could never flourish in China because the Chinese were not good administrators—"They can at times be successful dictators—but usually not even that."[42] He described the rebels as "fanatics," and noted that "With their philosophic and emotional minds, they sometimes move with great violence, as witness in the Taiping, Boxer and Kuomintang rebellions."[43] He summed up his thoughts by proclaiming that "none of this is intended to disparage a great race. It is given simply as a caution to Western minds that China is not going to be made Occidental."[44]

Bewick Moering sent word to China in 1901 that its Belgian investors had purchased majority control of the Chinese mines, and would be sending a new director and his staff to replace the Americans. Hoover met the new director, Emile Franqui, later that year, and described him as "a most able but a most arbitrary person."[45] Hoover later mused, "I did not at this time suppose Franqui had the least lingering affection for me."[46] In just a few years' time, they would be forced to put aside their differences and find a way to work together to provide relief to the Belgian people during World War I.

After leaving China, Hoover spent the years from 1902 to 1914 working in what he described as "Engineering over the World."[47] With Bewick Moering he traveled to

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[38] Ibid., 25.
[39] Ibid., 28.
[40] Ibid., 28-29.
[41] Anne Beiser Allen, *An Independent Woman: The Life of Lou Henry Hoover* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2000), 20-21.
[42] Hoover, *Memoirs Vol. I*, 72.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid., 65.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Ibid., 73.

India, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the U.S., France, Italy, England, Germany, South Africa, Burma, the Malay States and the Hawaiian Islands.[48] In 1908, he left Bewick Moering and opened his own offices in London, New York, San Francisco, Petrograd and Paris.[49]

During his travels in Russia in 1913 Hoover again witnessed a governmental system he disliked. His business achieved success there, and he noted with satisfaction that "from the moment the fires in the new furnaces were started, the company made money," and the Americans and Russians got on well, he could not overcome his dislike for the "complex human relations" and "hideous social and governmental backgrounds" he observed.[50] One incident in particular proved so revolting that he recalled it gave him nightmares. While waiting for a train, "a long line of intelligent, decent people brutally chained together were marched aboard a freight car bound for Siberia," but their expressions haunted him; he observed that "Some were the faces of despair itself, some of despondency itself, some of defiance itself…Always there was a feeling among us that someday the country would blow up…centuries of poverty and repression do not express their explosions in law and peaceful transformation."[51]

Just a year after his disquieting experiences in Russia, Hoover had acquired both a considerable reputation and fortune. By 1914, however, his "whole mining empire was imperiled" due to the political upheavals occurring throughout Europe.[52] This may help to explain Hoover's motivation to change vocations to participate in relief efforts. Once he made the decision to refocus his energies, he became fully invested in philanthropic endeavors.

The opportunity for this new career evolved rapidly with the outbreak of war on the European continent, when in London hundreds of United States citizens found themselves stranded without access to funds and with no way to secure safe passage home. Working closely with the United States Embassy, he created the American Committee, providing what he could to help desperate travelers.[53] Having established his willingness and ability to manage relief efforts successfully, he turned his attention to the problems being faced by Belgian citizens as they began life under German occupation after being invaded in August 1914.

By October 9, 1914, virtually all of Belgium had fallen under German control. As a result, factories had closed, commerce had become paralyzed, and postal and telegraphic communication had all but ceased. Food supplies had been looted or requisitioned by German troops creating a desperate situation, since prior to the war, Belgium had only produced one-fourth of the food supply needed to feed its population, the balance coming from exports. Once made aware of these circumstances, Hoover

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[48] Ibid., 75-76
[49] Ibid., 99.
[50] Ibid., 103-105.
[51] Ibid., 105.
[52] George H. Nash, *The Life of Herbert Hoover: The Humanitarian, 1914-1917* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1988), 574.
[53]Harold Wolfe describes Hoover's involvement with Americans stranded in London as a result of the outbreak of war on the Continent; Hoover also recounts his efforts to organize relief and help Americans obtain currency as well as safe passage back to the United States. See Harold Wolfe, *Herbert Hoover: Public Servant and Leader of the Loyal Opposition, A Study of His Life and Career* (New York: Exposition Press, 1956), 34-35; and Hoover, *Memoirs Volume I*, 141-148.

swiftly set about converting his benevolent impulse and desire for public service into a plan to help the Belgian people.[54]

After establishing the mandate for the CRB, Hoover made his first trip to Belgium in December 1915. He found himself completely unprepared for the suffering he would encounter. Called "…the unemotional savior of starving Europeans," Hoover's subsequent philanthropic work indicates that the experience moved him deeply.[55] He never forgot what he saw, declaring that without the relief provided through the CRB "…1,400,000,000 human beings would have perished."[56] In addition, he and the CRB, having established a precedent for organizing relief on an international scale, provided what would become the basis and justification for founding UNICEF three decades later.

Hoover's experiences in Belgium seem to have fundamentally changed his views of relief work, and he made children his priority thereafter. All of Hoover's subsequent relief efforts began with the concern for suffering children, and then expanded to include their mothers and others.[57] Vernon Kellogg, who had become a close friend of Hoover's through his role as a CRB administrator, conjectured about Hoover's overwhelming interest in children. He claimed Hoover's experience with losing his own parents did not provide sufficient justification, nor did Hoover's belief in the value of children to the health of a nation. Ultimately, wrote Kellogg, Hoover was "deeply touched by the distress of children, and [was] impelled by this to use all of his intelligence and energy to relieve this distress."[58] Regardless of Kellogg's dismissal of the loss of Hoover's parents as an explanation for his focus on children, there can be little doubt that this catastrophic event influenced his ideas and actions. Having lost his father first, he no doubt witnessed the stresses experienced by his mother as she struggled to support three children on her own. When she died, Hoover's life as he had known it came to an end—he left his lifelong home, was forced to be separated from his siblings, and took up residence with a family that, despite all its good intentions, was a poor substitute for what he lost. That his child relief programs achieved a great deal of success is a testament to the passion with which he undertook caring for them, and his efforts brought him widespread acclaim.

Having witnessed Hoover's success in feeding Belgians and their children, Poland asked Hoover's organization to set up a food aid program similar to the CRB in 1915. This time, however, he found his efforts thwarted instead of aided by the German government.[59] Having witnessed the suffering in Belgium, Hoover hoped that feeding Poland would help it survive German occupation, avoid violence and dictatorship, and eventually establish an independent Polish state.[60] Hoover's attempts to establish an aid

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[54] Wolfe, 36-39; See also Herbert Hoover, *An American Epic, Volume I: Introduction: The Relief of Belgium and Northern France, 1914-1930* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1959).

[55] Joan Hoff-Wilson, "Herbert Hoover: The Popular Image of an Unpopular President." In *Understanding Herbert Hoover: Ten Perspectives*, Lee Nash, ed. (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1987), 5.

[56] Hoover, *An American Epic*, xv.

[57] Susan Estabrook Kennedy, "Herbert Hoover and the Two Great Food Crusades of the 1940s." In Lee Nash, ed., 87.

[58] Vernon Kellogg, *Herbert Hoover: The Man and His Work* (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1920), 12.

[59] George J. Lerski, ed., *Herbert Hoover and Poland: A Documentary History of a Friendship.* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1977), 3-4.

[60] George Lerski notes that Harold Fisher and Sidney Brooks, the official historians of the American Relief Administration, claimed that relief assistance not only helped Poland recover from war, but also helped support Poland's efforts to become an independent nation. Lerski, ed., 5-6.

program in Poland encountered several challenges; however, despite its rocky beginnings, his relationship with this country would be one of the most important and productive in his philanthropic career and would bring him to the attention of the President of the United States.

By 1916, Hoover's wish to become a public servant for the United States had been realized. Subsequently tapped to serve in the cabinets of the Wilson, Harding and Coolidge administrations for his philanthropic and business expertise, he achieved a significant level of national popularity in the US. His name began to be discussed as a viable Republican nominee for president despite the fact that he had been viewed by many in the party as somewhat controversial. Indeed, when reviewing Hoover's nomination to the cabinet of President Harding, Republican Senator Frank Brandergee proclaimed his discomfort in dealing with Hoover, stating that "Hoover gives most of us gooseflesh."[61] Brandergee's comment expresses the feelings of many in the Republican Party; President Harding, however, stayed loyal to Hoover, whose nomination for Secretary of Commerce ultimately won approval.[62] Regardless of detractors like Brandergee, Hoover's popularity among U.S. citizens remained strong, both for his philanthropic achievements and for his ability to remain outside the scandals that plagued the Harding Administration. When, in 1928, he won his bid to become President himself, he entered the office with high hopes. He could not have predicted that, four years later, he would no longer be characterized as the savior of thousands of Europeans who had so desperately needed food and clothing during and after World War I, but as a cold-blooded, inhuman, lifeless leader who had failed to provide help to United States citizens suffering from the effects of the Great Depression. His dramatic loss of popularity, as well as his loss of influence within government circles in Washington, D.C., proved a virtually insurmountable obstacle when his term as President ended. He spent several years searching for a place to utilize his talents, then decided to visit Europe in 1938 to investigate for himself "the cause or causes of the economic collapse of Europe in 1931," and placed a trip to Poland on the agenda.[63]

After his trip, Hoover founded the privately funded Commission for Relief in Poland on September 25, 1939 once the declaration of war against it became official. Unfortunately, he found the public far less willing or able to contribute to his causes, so he appealed directly to the US Congress for $50 million dollars to be used by the Red Cross for food and medical relief to Poland.[64] Hoover hoped his organization would help administer the funds and participate in the procurement and distribution of aid, but even though Congress approved the appropriation to help Poland, Hoover and his organization did not receive funding. His frustration at having his relief organization passed over was

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[61] Robert K. Murray, *The Harding Era: Warren G. Harding and His Administration* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969), 98-99.
[62] Murray, 98-99.
[63] Wolfe, 373.
[64] Hoover made a speech in New York on October 11, 1939, appealing to the public for help in providing aid to Poland. During his speech he claimed that "Our immediate task is to do what we can to alleviate the lot of the suffering and the homeless…that body merits your generous support." Herbert Hoover, *Further Addresses upon the American Road, 1938-1940* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940), 229-30.

evident when he expressed the hope that the United States Congress would "appropriate a part of our surplus of farm products to this great humane effort."[65]

Refocusing his energies on the private sector in 1939 after the latest rebuff from the U.S. government, now led by President Franklin Roosevelt, Hoover worked with Polish-American organizations and members of the Polish government in an attempt to provide relief to the Polish people. Impressed with his dedication and commitment, an old friend and Chairman of the Polish Council of National Unity, Ignace Paderewski, appealed to the Polish government in exile to make use of Hoover's talents.[66]

Because of Paderewski's influence, Hoover received a request from the Polish government on May 11, 1940, to "accept responsibility for relief of the population of occupied Poland."[67] This time, he obtained swift responses to his request for funds and supplies from private donors, and had collected almost $6 million in currency and gold by June 6, 1940.[68] Procuring ready cash to purchase supplies proved to be the easier task in this endeavor, however, as the actual transportation and distribution of food aid was met with resistance from both enemies and allies alike.

While Hoover worked to arrange wartime assistance for individuals in Europe suffering under German occupation, the Roosevelt administration had organized an international relief effort of its own. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), formed jointly with forty-three other nations, resolved that

> immediately upon the liberation of any area by the armed forces of the United Nations or as a consequence of retreat of the enemy population thereof shall receive aid and relief from their sufferings, food, clothing, and shelter, aid in the prevention of pestilence and in the recovery of the health of the people…and for assistance in the resumption of urgently needed agricultural and industrial production and the restoration of essential services…[69]

UNRRA would provide food, clothing, shelter and medical treatment, as well as restore "those segments of a nation's economy which were necessary to carry out the relief program, and to give each country and its people some of the tools to begin to help themselves."[70] UNRRA claimed that as a "…pioneer organization, doing a job of scope and significance new to history…it had to learn by doing."[71] In its official history it described its successes. It had brought together staff from many countries to conduct its relief operations,

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[65]Hoover spoke to the Polish National Council gathering at Madison Square Garden in New York City on March 12, 1940 to appeal for relief for Poland. In Hoover, *Further Addresses Upon the American Road*, 247; also see also "Hoover Says Poles Must Rise Again," *New York Times*, April 29, 1940.
[66] Lerski, ed., 44.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Ibid., 45.
[69]U.S. Congressional Record, "Resolution by the U.S. Congress November 9, 1943 approving U.S. participation in UNRRA," (Washington, D.C., 1943).
[70] *The Story of UNRRA*. Pamphlet issued by the Office of Public Information, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (Washington D.C., 1948), 5. (Hereafter referred to as TSOU)
[71] TSOU, 8.

and, in the end, provided relief assistance to "seventeen war-warped countries."[72]

Concerns over the number of countries being served, as well as the type of aid being provided and how it was obtained, however, placed UNRRA under scrutiny by the U.S. Congress almost immediately. This is evident in UNRRA's appearance before the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations in November, 1945. The committee, headed by Senator Kenneth McKellar of Tennessee and including Senator Patrick McCarran from Nevada, posed pointed questions about purchases and distribution of goods to the UNRRA administrators who wished to collect $550,000,000.00 already set aside for UNRRA, as well as procure an additional $1,350,000,000.[73]

The senators inquired about every aspect of UNRRA's operations, including what materials had been purchased, where they had been purchased, and for what purpose, as well as the number of individuals employed by UNRRA and the salary of each.[74] Several senators voiced concerns about providing items such as copper to Poland and steel pipes to Greece. In a section of the record entitled "Difficulty in Reconciling Purchase of Some Items with a Relief Program," Senator Richard Russell of Georgia asked, "Why was it necessary to ship 1,230 tons of copper to Poland? What was the particular demand for it?" The U.S. UNRRA representative, Mr. David Weintraub, responded, "…I don't know specifically, but I am sure that the general answer applies. That would be in order to reestablish the communications within Poland, and repair other public utilities." Senator McKellar quickly asked, "Well, are we going to do that? The object of this so-called charity is to put up telephone poles and establish communications and build trunk lines and things of that sort? If it is that, why, I think we ought to call a halt...When is this thing going to stop?"[75]

Resolving the question regarding limits on what UNRRA would and would not provide eluded Senator McKellar and his committee, since President Truman remained committed to providing assistance to the war-ravaged regions of Europe. However, he, too, had issues with UNRRA, primarily because the bulk of its food relief had ended up in Soviet-controlled territories.[76] UNRRA experienced several upheavals in the coming months and, when Fiorello LaGuardia became its Director in April, 1946, he immediately narrowed the focus of UNRRA to feeding newly liberated countries which had suffered the most and whose domestic resources had been most severely depleted. Even with these changes, UNRRA could not retain the support of the U.S. Congress, its primary source of funds, due to the still unresolved questions about its programs. "At the Fifth Council Session in

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[72] TSOU, 3.
[73] U.S. Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, *H.J. Res. 266, A Joint Resolution Making an Additional Appropriation for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration for 1946: Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations*, Seventy-ninth Congress, First Session, 1945, 1.
[74] Ibid., 42-43, 53, 77.
[75] Ibid., 42.
[76] Ibid.

Geneva in August, 1946, the United States and the United Kingdom" which followed its lead, announced their plans to cease support for the organization's operations.[77]

The U.S. provided many reasons to justify why it could no longer support UNRRA. Those given in Geneva included the fact that" most liberated countries" had established "functioning governments," and that these new governments could now turn to the "International Bank and Monetary Fund" for funding to establish their own programs.[78] Another factor was the U.S.'s adoption of the Marshall Plan, which required diverting funds from other types of foreign relief programs for its financing. UNRRA planned to make its last U.S. shipment in the spring of 1947. Hoover, always concerned with the plight of children, suggested that UNRRA make a special effort to furnish food aid to the young. Hoover's plea to take care of the world's children would eventually be realized when Dr. Ludwik Rajchman, now Poland's representative to UNRRA, combined Hoover's knowledge with his own and drafted the charter for a new organization that would ensure both their concerns would be addressed.

[77] TSOU, 44.
[78] TSOU, 44-45.

Chapter Two
Forerunners: Organizing International Health Care

Born in Warsaw in 1881, Ludwik Rajchman was the second child of Aleksander and Melinia Hirzfeld Rajchman. From an early age, he found himself surrounded by political activists and radical thinkers because of the social position of his family, as well as the late nineteenth century groundswell of nativist activism among Poles. Their goal, to regain sovereignty by driving the Austro-Hungarian, German and Russian rulers from the 'Kingdom,' had been of paramount importance to his parents and grandparents. It had even been rumored that his maternal grandfather Ludwik Hirzfeld, a successful banker and patron of the arts, had financed the Revolt of 1863, when Poles turned out in large numbers to demonstrate their deep resentment of Russian rule. His family, originally from Germany and of the Jewish faith, had developed and maintained a strong identification with Polish culture, having assimilated several generations earlier.[79]

Being Jewish in a country populated largely with Catholics set Rajchman apart, and he often viewed himself as an outsider, despite the "strong identification with Polish culture" exhibited by members of Rajchman's family.[80] Marta Balinska, Rajchman's biographer, posits that Rajchman and his family viewed themselves as Poles first and Jews second, which allowed them to obtain excellent educations, social status, and prosperity, as was true of Jews throughout the rest of Europe.[81]

Rajchman's older sister Helena recalled that both her parents wanted their children to have professions, as had their relatives before them, which reflected a constant striving for social justice. Inspired by his uncle, Boleslaw Hirzfeld, Rajchman eventually became increasingly interested in political issues. He joined the Union of Young Socialists at 17, noting his "philosophy was based on the struggle against tsarism. Our ideas concerning socialism were still rather vague."[82] Unlike his parents, however, who dreamed only of an independent Poland, Rajchman and his contemporaries worked for a sovereign Poland with a common Polish culture that would incorporate diverse social classes, ethnic groups and religions. This Poland, they hoped, would be a place that would allow social justice for all.

By the time he reached the age of 19, Rajchman became determined to leave Warsaw to attend university. Because they wanted him to stay in Warsaw, however, he and his parents eventually reached a compromise that would allow Rajchman to study in Cracow, as long as he studied medicine.[83] Rajchman therefore entered the University of Cracow in 1900, and found himself in an entirely different world. He became fascinated with the study of bacteriology and remained politically active, participating in the

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[79] Marta A. Balinska, *For the Good of Humanity: Ludwik Rajchman, Medical Statesman* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1998), 2-3.
[80] Ibid., 2.
[81] Ibid., 3.
[82] Ibid., 12.
[83] Ibid., 14-15.

People's Education Association.[84] Then, during the fall of 1903, he met Maria Bojancayk and, after a courtship that lasted only three months, the two married in 1904.[85]

The couple settled in Cracow and Rajchman continued to remain dedicated to a variety of social and political causes.[86] For example, Rajchman helped created the Summer University to allow Polish students to pursue their own work and research, and began to work with Joseph Pilsudski, who would eventually rise to lead the Polish Socialist Party which Rajchman joined in 1905. The Party led several major rebellions against Russian rule, including the formation of a Polish Legion that vowed to fight alongside the Japanese in the Russo-Japanese war.[87]

Having moved to Warsaw in 1906 to practice medicine, Rajchman quickly came under scrutiny because of his political affiliations. While attending a meeting of the Polish Socialist Party, Rajchman was arrested and held for four months. Rajchman's eventual release came with a condition; that he leave Warsaw permanently. After he departed Warsaw, Rajchman only lived in Poland for brief periods subsequent to his departure, and to satisfy the conditions of his release he left for Paris in 1907 to pursue further study, having obtained a position at the Pasteur Institute.[88]

Rajchman's work at the Pasteur Institute involved performing research the in the relatively new field of immunology, research that would influence his later work in the field of international public health.[89] He returned to Cracow briefly in 1909, where he worked for the Institute of Microbiology, but a mere year and a half later, he received word that he had been recommended to direct the bacteriology laboratory at the Royal Institute of Health in London.[90] Apparently based on his work with the Pasteur Institute, he received word that he had been chosen for the position, despite the fact that he did not speak English, and arrived in London in 1911.[91] He later became a researcher at King's College, then, when war came in 1914, he was made head of the central laboratory for the prevention of dysentery, and also began studying various methods of preventing the spread of polio and Spanish flu.[92] Because of his work, Rajchman, like Hoover, had achieved an international reputation by 1914. His years in Poland providing aid to the poor, his participation in Polish national movements, and his substantial research projects and credentials had established him as an individual willing to take on ambitious projects and ensure their success. And, as with Hoover, World War I, which "…overturned the course of history and moved it back a few thousand years," would play an important a role in establishing his future goals.[93]

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[84] Ibid., 16-17.
[85] Ibid., 18-19.
[86] Ibid., 19-20.
[87] Ibid., 20, 23 and see also Joseph Pilsudski, *The Memoirs of a Polish Revolutionary and Soldier* (London: Faber and Faber, 1935).
[88] Balinska, 25-27.
[89] Ibid., 29-41.
[90] Ibid., 33.
[91] Balinska does not give the exact date for Rajchman's move to London, but notes that, in 1913, he became a researcher at King's College after working at the Royal Institute of Health for two years, thereby indicating that he probably began his work at the Royal Institute of Health in 1911. Balinska, 33-34.
[92] Ibid., 34.
[93] Ludwik Hirzfeld as quoted in Balinska, 34. Hirzfeld was Rajchman's first cousin and also a bacteriologist.

During the war years, Rajchman had little choice but to remain in London and continue his research. His energies for international health concerns were put to use after the armistice in 1918, when he left London to participate in dealing with public health emergencies after the war.[94] He assumed the position of head of the Polish Ministry of Public Health, and arrived in Warsaw on November 20, 1918, finding Poland much changed by war.[95]

Despite the challenges he faced in post-war Poland, Rajchman quickly analyzed public health priorities and proposed a plan to the Polish government to fight the typhus onslaught.[96] Rajchman, who faced countless obstacles in his attempts to stop the rampant epidemic, found it particularly difficult to convince the international community to assist in his endeavor. Rajchman's institute therefore began by making several recommendations to improve Poland's overall public health, including establishing the number of doctors needed to care for Poland's population. He then requested assistance from the world over, including an appeal to the Rockefeller Foundation, for fellowships to allow Poles to train in the U.S. for medical careers.[97] While embroiled in his efforts to help heal Poland, he received notification from the League of Nations that he had been chosen to direct its newly created Health Section. At last, he had an international platform from which to voice his concerns regarding protecting international public health.[98]

Rajchman's appointment as chair of the Health Section of the League of Nations in 1921 lasted until 1939. Charged with coordinating medical information, conducting scientific research, and bringing together scientists from various countries to work together, he found himself increasingly plagued with setbacks as he tried to facilitate communication among and between an international community of scientists whose individual countries often mistrusted and disliked one another.[99]

Confrontation often came from individuals whose dedication to public health rose from their desire to maintain the purity and health of the inhabitants of their own nations alone, actions that directly countered the spirit of the League.[100] Despite this hostile atmosphere, Rajchman's hope for the emergence of a truly apolitical scientific community within the League did not falter, and he focused on bringing Asian nations into the League.[101] He traveled to Tokyo in 1925 and assessed Japan's public health practices as equal to or surpassing those in the West, which seemed to confirm the theory that illnesses had entered Japan from China. Once in China, he observed what he found

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[94] Balinska, 39.
[95] Ibid, 39, 42-43.
[96] Ibid., 43.
[97] Ibid., 45-47.
[98] Ibid., 48.
[99] Ibid., 121-123. A historian of the League of Nations, F.P. Walters, notes that the League began to receive requests for help with epidemics such as typhus, cholera and dysentery in the early 1920s, and that it formed the Health Section headed by Ludwik Rajchman to try and combat the spread of these diseases. He notes, however, that regardless of Rajchman's attempts, the governments of Russia, Germany and Czechoslovakia worked solely in their own interests which greatly complicated Rajchman's task. See F.P. Walters, *A History of the League of Nations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952), 100-102.
[100] Mazower writes that the trend toward focusing on national health became a means of maintaining public health in general, but was also used as a method to demonstrate a nation's strength; he focuses on its use in Nazi Germany. Mazower, 77-78.
[101] Balinska, 75.

to be a critically sub-standard level of public health that he felt should be addressed immediately by the League's Health Section.[102]

In his report to the League of Nations regarding China published in 1934, Rajchman noted that "…the Council decided to appoint a special committee to examine the action to be taken on the communication of the Chinese government" which had asked that the Health Section of the League of Nations provide assistance to China from its "technical organizations."[103] The 72-page report includes several sections intended to convince the ever-wavering League membership of China's need for both acceptance and assistance.[104] Rajchman's introduction consisted of a document from the Chinese government dated June 28, 1933, regarding the results of its technical collaboration with the League. Among its many points, this communication stated that China wished to have a League representative in residence to assist the government in matters of public health, that the League provide experts to advise and assist with planning, and that training be given to Chinese officials, making them competent to take over programs after the League representatives departed.[105] Subsequent chapters chronicled China's progress in the areas of economics, agriculture, cotton and silk production, water conservancy, and road construction in addition to chapters on public health and education. Rajchman's report, while demonstrating China's need, also attempted to portray it as a modern nation dedicated to achieving parity with its Western counterparts.[106]

Rajchman's recommendations, which began by extolling the virtues of League help to date, display his exemplary diplomatic skills. Quick to note that he did not want to "involve the League in responsibilities which the League Council would probably not desire to accept," he went on to make a plea for a "new stage of technical collaboration…[whose] need for the maintenance [and] its proper organization are desired at an early date."[107] Signed "L. Rajchman. Nanking, April, 1934," the report exemplifies Rajchman's desire to include China in the newly emerging world community, not as a mysterious Eastern nation, but as one that could adopt and incorporate the ideas of the West.

Rajchman's last years at the League of Nations proved to be tumultuous ones. It appears that from the time he filed his report on China in 1934 and continued his efforts to provide public health assistance beyond the borders of Europe, the nationally-focused atmosphere at the League conspired against him. Eventually, he was released from his duties as the Director of the Health Section in 1939. Balinska writes that some found Rajchman difficult to work with, and that delegates from France and Great Britain

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[102] Ibid., 76-81.
[103] Series of League of Nations Publications, General, 1934.1, *Report of the Technical Agent of the Council on His Mission in China from the date of his appointment until April 1st, 1934*, 6. (Hereafter referred to as *Report on China*)
[104] Ibid., 5-10.
[105] Ibid.
[106] In the chapter entitled "Reconstructive Activity of the Government as Outlined by M. Wand Ching Wei," Rajchman included detailed information about China's railway and aviation systems, shipping, and telephone and telegraph capabilities. Ibid., 64-67.
[107] Ibid., 69.

opposed him openly.[108] When he officially resigned his position, he focused his energies on China, having been removed from the work to which he had dedicated his life thus far.[109]

The parallels between Rajchman's life and Hoover's cannot be understated. They both had strong ties to their home countries despite a great deal of time spent abroad. This time abroad had markedly influenced the way both men viewed the world and its inhabitants. Both evidence a strong affection for their countries, and both endeavored to serve their countries at any opportunity. They had both organized relief assistance on an international level, and both had experienced job loss and disruption in their chosen vocations that had dramatically changed the direction of their careers. Rajchman, like Hoover, found it impossible not to work. Having cobbled together a dual mission to help both Poland and China, Rajchman left for the United States at the end of 1939 with renewed hope. In January 1940, Rajchman arrived in Washington, D.C. ready to be an advocate for China and Poland.[110]

Until they came together for the common cause of Polish relief in 1940, there is no indication that Hoover and Rajchman had met face-to-face despite the many opportunities they seem to have had to do so. According to Balinska, their mutual interest in providing aid to Poland allowed them to meet several times during Rajchman's visit to Washington, D.C., as they both understood the suffering occurring in Poland and wished to alleviate it as quickly as possible.[111] That they had not encountered one another prior to 1940 seems almost an impossibility. They had many friends in common, among them Maurice Pate, Hoover's long time friend and colleague, and Joseph Pilsudski, Rajchman's friend and political associate. When they met in Washington, D.C.to discuss the urgent need for providing relief to Poland, Rajchman, with the help of Hoover and the backing of the Polish government in exile, worked for the next three years to try and obtain aid for the Polish people. The success of this endeavor was limited, and Rajchman was replaced in his capacity as envoy. Rajchman found himself officially out of work.[112]

By 1944, the effects of another total war had left the world in need of leaders dedicated to ensuring an armed conflict on that scale would not happen again, and Rajchman, overflowing with ideas and hoping to be part of the post-war plan, was eager to contribute. That same year, he received a request from the assistant director of

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[108] Balinska writes that as early as 1934, Rajchman began to be opposed by delegates to the Health Section, who often asked that he be removed from his responsibilities. In addition, she states that the Polish, British and Italian governments had all weighed in against Rajchman, despite the fact that he possessed loyal supporters who used his extensive work with the Health Section as proof of his competence. See Balinska, 112-123.

[109] Ibid., 125-126.

[110] Ibid., 141-145.

[111] Ibid., 145.

[112] Balinska writes that, although several groups offered to assist in the Polish relief effort, the U.S. government hesitated due to the fact that the Polish government itself moved slowly on establishing how much it could bring to the table to financially support the effort. In addition, problems with transfers of funds due to political chaos inside Poland bogged down the situation which, in the end, may have compromised the relief plan. At this time, Rajchman remained in the U.S. as a private citizen and continued to work to assist with efforts to aid Poland. Balinska, 145-147.

UNRRA to review its policy for a health plan for refugees.[113] One can only imagine that Rajchman would have eagerly accepted, hoping the job would lead to a more permanent position with the organization. Having had little opportunity to utilize his skill and experience in the field of international public health, Rajchman like Hoover, welcomed the opportunity to resume his work.

UNRRA hired Rajchman as a private citizen on a contract basis, and his job responsibilities were clearly and, probably in Rajchman's view, narrowly defined, a stark contrast to the latitude he had enjoyed while Director of the Health Section of the League of Nations. His contribution to the organization was to be finite, ending with the submission of his final report on the major sanitary and administrative problems UNRRA could anticipate at the end of the war, and, once submitted, Balinska notes that "no other service was asked of Rajchman."[114] This had to have been frustrating for Rajchman, who had not, since his work with the League, truly been the leader of a major international public health relief effort.

Again without a place to exert his energies, Rajchman remained unemployed for several months until, on June 23, 1945, he received a request to be the Polish government's delegate for UNRRA.[115] It appeared, however, that this, too, might be a short-lived endeavor. According to the President's report to Congress regarding UNRRA operations for 1946, the United States understood the need to continue to provide relief through a program which had not yet been established in order to alleviate "…hunger, privation and suffering."[116] Without the substantial contribution from the United States, however, all involved acknowledged that UNRRA could not continue to function. Many officials talked of disbanding the organization altogether, especially those members of Congress who had balked during the hearings in early 1946 over providing any additional funding for the organization.[117] Balinska notes that Rajchman, hoping to redirect UNRRA's activities, proposed that its residual funds be used to "help children, the primary victims of war."[118]

The UNRRA Council had, in 1945 and 1946, consulted with assistants to the new Secretary General of the United Nations, Trygvie Lie, as well as with the Acting President of the Economic and Social Council. Then, in August, 1946, "…the Fifth Council Session in Geneva…took the position that it was time to bring the activities of UNRRA to a close."[119] Funds from UNRRA would be divided between several new organizations to be formed by the UN, one of which would be "The International Children's Emergency Fund, which was an outgrowth of an UNRRA Council resolution."[120] The draft resolution, authored by Rajchman, became one of the first to be

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[113] According to Balinska, the Assistant Director of UNRRA, Arthur Salter, contacted Rajchman directly about reviewing its policy on public health in 1944. Balinska, 186.
[114] Ibid., 186-187.
[115] Ibid., 190-191.
[116] U.S. Department of State, *The United States and the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1946* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947), 104.
[117] See U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, *A House Joint Resolution Making Appropriations for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration for the Fiscal year 1946: Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations*, Seventy-ninth Congress, First Session, 1945, 220-227.
[118] Balinska, 200.
[119] TSOU, 44.
[120] TSOU, 45.

considered by the General Assembly, and created an organization that satisfied both Rajchman's and Hoover's desire to ensure that relief continued to flow to children the world over.

Chapter Three
1946: The United Nations and Postwar Relief for Children

One of the first and most pressing questions facing the General Assembly upon its creation was where to locate the United Nations permanent headquarters. While it operated out of temporary headquarters in London, then in Flushing, New York, it came to the decision on February 14, 1946, that a permanent site would be established in the United States. During the latter half of 1945, a special United Nations site committee visited several possible locations, including Philadelphia, Boston and San Francisco, but the Committee ultimately settled on several locations just north of Manhattan, including Lake Success—Manhattan itself had not been seriously considered. The United Nations therefore established its headquarters in the small village of Lake Success located on Long Island, New York. The decision to settle there came after considerable debate among members regarding the best location for this new international body. By the end of 1946 the move to Lake Success had begun, with most UN members assuming it would become the organization's new, permanent home; however, when John D. Rockefeller offered a parcel of land in Manhattan proper, a majority of the members of the General Assembly voted to establish the permanent headquarters there. Lake Success housed the General Assembly until 1950, when it moved to its new location in New York City.[121] In spite of the many other issues it faced, including choosing a site for its operations, deciding on the symbol the United Nations would use, staffing its agencies and dealing with the complications of how to run an international organization, the General Assembly found time to consider Rajchman's resolution before 1946 ended.

Resolution 57 (I) created the United Nations International Children's Fund on December 11, 1946.[122] The resolution was unanimously approved on December 11, 1946 under the authority of article 55 which states that "with a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations… [the UN] shall promote solutions of international economic, social, and health related problems."[123] With a sanction to operate from the UN and the promise of funds from UNRRA, the International Children's Emergency Fund was begun.

In addition to the indisputable need to care for children, the ICEF received its original UN sanction for three additional reasons, all of which were based on the notion that the ICEF would be a rather small, unobtrusive effort. First, it would be a temporary organization, intended to continue UNRRA's work of providing aid to individuals whose lives had been devastated by the war in Europe and Asia. It would not be made an official UN sub-organization, and would cease to exist at the end of 1950 once the emergency facing children had subsided. Second, the scope of its relief work would be limited to children only, ensuring that its work would supplement, not overlap, with that of other UN organizations. Finally, the number of countries to which it provided assistance would be limited only to those experiencing difficulty in providing proper food, clothing and medical care to their child population, their infrastructures and

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[121] The history of the headquarters of the United Nations can be found at the UN's website, http://www.un.org.

[122] E/ICEF/160, *Final Report of the First Executive Board of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund 11 December 1946-31 December 1950,* 1.

[123] HIST/50, *The Contribution of UNICEF to the Peace Process*, 1.

agriculture having been devastated as a result of World War II. With this charge, Rajchman set about ensuring that the ICEF would not fail in its intended mission.

Rajchman claimed that "Health is the greatest commodity in the world. There are on earth somewhat more than two billion consumers."[124] Why, then, did he agree to compose the charter for an organization that could only adopt UNRRA's severely curtailed list of relief projects? One reason may be that his ambitions to create and direct a United Nations health organization went unrealized. At the same time proposals were being made for the ICEF, similar efforts were underway to establish an organization that would deal with international issues of health. Henry Van Zile Hyde, Chief of the Health Division of UNRRA, along with his colleagues, supported such an endeavor—but, without the participation of Rajchman.

In 1946, China and Brazil introduced a declaration to the General Assembly that called for the convening of an international health conference to consider organizing a health agency.[125] The General Assembly gave the declaration unanimous approval, and the Economic and Social Council convened the first committee. This Technical Preparatory Committee brought together many individuals who had worked in international public health, including Sir Wilson Jameson from Great Britain, Szeming Sze from China, and de Paula Sousa from Brazil.[126] They met in Washington, D.C. in April, 1946, to determine a course of action, a meeting Hyde attended. Part of their agenda included considering myriad proposals for the establishment of an international UN health organization, one of which had been submitted by Rajchman.

According to Hyde, Rajchman's proposal "somehow was buried, and was never considered. I'm not sure I ever saw it."[127] Hyde noted that, in addition to having a reputation for being extremely "high-handed" and demanding while working with the League of Nations, Rajchman's political leanings caused problems as well.[128] "Rajchman lived in the U.S., but …would go to Poland [and] was an all-out Communist," leaving Hyde to conclude that "some personal resentment" existed between Rajchman and several of the Committee members.[129] These resentments, according to Hyde, caused the Technical Committee to ignore any input from the former Director of the Health Section of the League of Nations. In the end, these disappointing developments seem to have spurred Rajchman to focus his attention on the creation of his own organization that would focus on relief for children.[130]

Thwarted from shaping a new UN health organization, Rajchman created a charter for the ICEF that, upon closer examination, evidences his intention to do much more than had originally been intended or approved by the General Assembly. By all estimates, more than thirty million children lacked adequate food, clothing and medical care as a result of the effects of years of armed conflict, and UNRRA's last shipments,

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[124] See Ludwik Rajchman, *"*Why Not? A United Nations Public Health Service*."* *Free World*, 6, no. 3 (September 1943): 216-221.

[125]Henry Van Zile Hyde interviewed by Richard D. McKinzie for the Harry S. Truman Library, July 16, 1975, 16. Accessed at the UNICEF Archives.

[126] Hyde Interview, 18-19.

[127] Hyde Interview, 67.

[128] Hyde Interview, 68.

[129] Hyde Interview, 69-70.

[130] Helenka Pantaleoni interviewed by Richard Polsky for the Oral History Research Office, Columbia University, April 12, 1977, 4-5. Accessed at the UNICEF Archives.

scheduled for the spring of 1947, created the pressing need for another organization to be ready to take over its operations.[131] Rajchman, employing his iron will and most persuasive tactics, made sure his proposed organization would be approved and ready.

According to a long-time UNICEF employee and volunteer Helenka Pantaleoni, who attended one of the first sessions of the General Assembly at Lake Success, Rajchman pushed "Delegations to the wall to get going."[132] But persuasion would not be enough, as gaining approval to become a UN sub-organization meant enduring a lengthy and time-consuming process, including establishing a committee to review proposals which would in turn make recommendations to the General Assembly which would eventually vote on them.[133] Because this process could take several years, Alfred Davidson, former counsel for UNRRA and future director of UNICEF's European Bureau, helped his long-time acquaintance Rajchman circumvent the bureaucratic roadblocks. He realized that defining children and their mothers as a group outside a state's relief efforts based on their unequal citizenship status and limited access to state programs would make them appear less likely to receive emergency relief assistance.[134] He concluded that the standard approval process, therefore, did not apply to the proposed ICEF since it could provide immediate assistance to this special group.[135] It is important to note that the distinction of mothers and children as apolitical would, in the future, allow the ICEF to create programs in Europe that excluded men altogether based on their status as full citizens of their respective nations. In the end, the General Assembly agreed with Davidson. Having circumvented the tedious and lengthy UN approval process by making a strong case that children and mothers constituted an apolitical body, Rajchman made public his choice for the ICEF's first Executive Director, a man with whom he had begun discussing the child relief organization even before its approval. Maurice Pate, Rajchman's colleague for many years, was a most logical and qualified choice.

Pate appears in early ICEF photos with horn-rimmed glasses. His white hair, considerable height and deeply lined face give him the appearance of a man with a great deal of wisdom and experience. His drive to help others developed when he was very young. At the age of four “while attending church with his family,” he listened intently to the minister who was pleading for help for poor children in the neighborhood. Judith Spiegelman writes that Pate, deeply moved by the notion that “children went to bed hungry,” overcame his shyness and a “serious stammer” to knock on doors, helping his family collect money for the needy.[136]

Pate attended Princeton University, where his classmates referred to him as a "tall, dark, wavy-haired figure of boundless geniality and seemingly infinite energy, whose view of the world was much more advanced that theirs."[137] Alexander Leitch writes in *A Princeton Companion* that while at Princeton, Pate participated in a number of extracurricular activities, including working for the undergraduate Red Cross

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[131] TSOU, 45.
[132] Pantaleoni Interview, 6.
[133] Balinska, 203.
[134] Ibid.
[135] Ibid.
[136] Judith M. Spiegelman and UNICEF, *We Are the Children: A Celebration of UNICEF’s First Forty Years* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986), 62.
[137] Alexander Leitch, *A Princeton Companion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 352.

Committee and running the launch for the crew team on Lake Carnegie. He graduated in 1915 a member of Phi Beta Kappa and with high honors.[138]

Pate worked in banking briefly after graduation, but decided to take his career in another direction when the opportunity arose to work with the Commission for Relief in Belgium. He became one of Hoover's field representatives in charge of food distribution. Leitch notes that when World War I ended, Pate's humanitarian impulses led him to work as Director of the American Relief Administration's child feeding operations in Poland, then as the Director of the American Red Cross program for Relief to Prisoners of War, and again with Hoover at the end of World War II to provide post-war relief of famine.[139] It was through his Red Cross work that he met Helenka Pantaleoni, who became one of his closest friends and a UNICEF ally.

By 1946, Pate had gained his own reputation in the field of emergency relief. Having begun his relief career with Hoover, he had since administered countless fundraising and food distribution programs over a period of almost thirty years. In September of 1946, Pate and his good friend Helenka Pantaleoni drove to Lake Success to visit the United Nations, as Pate had "barely heard anything about it" and "would like to [visit] very much."[140] They went into the Third Committee, which Pantaleoni recalled was the Social, Cultural, Humanitarian, Educational Committee—"where Eleanor Roosevelt was the United States Delegate"—and almost immediately, one of the delegates "fished [Pate] out," claiming he needed to speak to Pate about something "very important." That delegate, Ludwik Rajchman, said he had been "thinking about Pate and wanting to see him, because…[I want you] to organize an action, a fund for the benefit of children, war victims chiefly."[141]

According to Pantaleoni, Pate and Rajchman "disappeared for a couple of hours. Afterwards, on the way home…[Pate said] "I've just been asked to organize a fund for the benefit of children.""[142] Pate indicated, however, that he first had to discuss the matter with the Chief—Hoover—before he could give a final answer. The next day, Hoover gave his blessing and encouragement, so Pate took on the challenge of being "co-founder, guiding spirit and Executive Director of UNICEF."[143]

Neither Rajchman's nor Pate's leadership roles in the ICEF could become official until an Executive Board was selected and subsequently ratified their nominations. Initially, the Board consisted of representatives from twenty-one member nations, many of whom were selected because they were countries "who had money and that might be shamed into giving something if they were on the Board when the existing UNRRA money ran out."[144] It changed in number and composition repeatedly according to which representatives could attend the meetings.

In its early days, it is apparent that certain nations—the US among them—had not decided to put their full support behind the organization. Therefore, the initial make-up of the Board remained somewhat amorphous, and did not settle into a more fixed pattern

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[138]Ibid.
[139] Ibid.
[140] Pantaleoni Interview, 4.
[141] Pantaleoni Interview, 4.
[142] Pantaleoni Interview, 5.
[143]CF/HST/MON/1989-002, *Maurice Pate: UNICEF Executive Director, 1947-1965,* 6.
[144] Adelaide Sinclair interviewed by John Charnow, 17-18 November, 1982, 1. Accessed at UNICEF Archives.

until it was decided that thirty nations, chosen by the Economic and Social Council, would sit on the Board for three-year terms.[145]

The countries that sent a representative to the first ICEF Board had no specific selection criteria, and often had one representative who attended the meetings of many boards, as was the case with the United States representative, Eleanor Roosevelt.[146] Accountable for reporting on UN activity to their individual national governments, many juggled hectic schedules in order to relay as much as possible about the activities of the new organization. Others, like Adelaide Sinclair, a representative of the delegation from Canada, were selected specifically to be a member of the ICEF board.

Born in Toronto, Canada, Adelaide Sinclair graduated from the University of Toronto in 1922 with a degree in Political Science. She obtained a masters' degree in Economics in 1925, and did post-graduate work at both the London School of Economics from 1925 to 1926, then at the University of Berlin in 1929. She lectured in both fields until 1930, when she married Donald Sinclair and ceased teaching. Then, in 1942, she picked up the threads of her professional life again and became an economist with the Wartime Prices and Trade Board in Ottawa, Canada. She joined the Women's Royal Canadian Naval Service in March, 1943, and later became its director, retiring in 1946 with the rank of captain. Upon her retirement, she was asked to assume the position of Executive Assistant to the Deputy Minister of the National Department of Health and Welfare. It was this position which led to her nomination as Canada's representative to the ICEF.[147]

Sinclair remembered that, in 1946, the Canadian government "didn't care a hoot [about who they sent to the ICEF]; just as long as they got a body that would take the thing off them. They weren't interested at all."[148] The ICEF, she claimed had received unanimous approval "by default because certain people weren't going to say they were against children, but they certainly weren't going to pull for this to happen."[149] Once the resolution passed and Canada needed a representative, Sinclair quipped "they tossed it over to George Davidson…my boss in the Department of Health and Welfare…I came back from a weekend away…and George came into my office and he said, 'I'm afraid I've wished something on you while you were away, and I hope you don't mind.'"[150] Upon finding out she had been dubbed Canada's delegate to the new organization, Sinclair responded "All right, I'll be good. I'll go."[151] Having no idea what to expect since "I had no instructions because nobody gave a hoot" Sinclair remembered that "it was really more fun that they didn't because I made up my own."[152]

Sinclair's lack of information about the task she was about to undertake did not prevent her from becoming a staunch supporter of the ICEF and its programs, and she remained associated with the organization until 1967. Regardless of the overwhelming support it received from its individual Board members, the ICEF, with its temporary

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[145] Pantaleoni Interview, 12.
[146] E/ICEF/1, *Summary Record of the First Meeting Held at Lake Success New York 19 December 1946,* 27, 1.
[147] *Who's Who in the UN, November, 1959*. Accessed at UNICEF Archives.
[148] Sinclair Interview, 1.
[149] Sinclair Interview, 1.
[150] Sinclair Interview, 1-2.
[151] Sinclair Interview, 2.
[152] Sinclair Interview, 1-2.

permit to operate within the UN, its lack of support from powerful nations like the United States and Canada, and its meager funds, appeared to be off to a very shaky start. In addition, many UN delegates could not see the purpose in creating a fund whose functions could certainly be carried out by other UN organizations. Therefore, establishing its identity as its first meeting approached became critical to its immediate and long-term survival. What that identity would be became a matter of some debate, but one item was never in question, and that was that the ICEF should become a permanent UN sub-organization.

Rajchman's vision of the ICEF's organizational identity, one that included expansion and inclusion, can be discerned in the charter he created. He seemed to have specified its functions rather narrowly, but wrote that the Fund would "be utilized for the benefit of children and adolescents…of countries which were victims of aggression and in order to assist in their rehabilitation…[and] for child health purposes generally," allowing the Executive Committee some latitude to adjust programs as necessary.[153] The charter also identified the ICEF's intended constituency, children, which further clarified its identity. It committed to provide aid and assistance to children, but also to any persons or organizations affecting child health in general. In this way mothers, not specifically mentioned in the original resolution, became an integral part of all of the ICEF's programs. Who else, the ICEF argued, could have a greater impact on the health of a child than its mother? The ICEF's demographic, therefore, included children, pregnant women and lactating mothers, and mothers of children up to the age of 18.[154]

Rajchman knew the ICEF's constituency, made up of children and their mothers would be hard to oppose, and the ICEF ensured its initial survival through creating an identity that could obtain the overwhelming approval for its mission from governments and individuals dedicated to preserving childhood. According to Virginia Hazzard, a former UNICEF employee and historian, children had always been "the easily acceptable humanitarian target."[155] Additionally, providing aid to children in the wake of the war became, for many, the one cause capable of reuniting the world. Only the ICEF could salve the wounds of war by creating happy countenances of healthy, well-fed children. In the words of the Executive Board, they made up the group on which "the hope of the world rests," the best hope for its future.[156]

Rajchman's vision of the ICEF's identity in 1946 served several functions, both explicit and implicit. It allowed the ICEF to portray its programs as part of a popular humanitarian cause; it provided the ICEF's leaders and administrators with an institutional base from which to justify furthering their own scientific, political and humanitarian agendas; and, it institutionalized accepted Western roles of children, mothers and fathers within the family. Eventually, it also allowed the ICEF to adopt a

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[153] E/ICEF/160, 3.

[154] UNICEF's report to the Economic and Social Council in 1950 made it clear that children and adolescents, as well as pregnant and lactating mothers, had been the focus of most of its programs. In addition, since feeding programs were most often operated through schools, adolescents to the age of 18 would have been included along with their younger counterparts. Virginia Hazzard also notes that though children and adolescents remained UNICEF's focus, women as mothers were included from the beginning given their association with the survival of the child. E/ICEF/160, 3-6 and Virginia Hazzard, *UNICEF and Women, The Long Voyage: A Historical Perspective* (Geneva: United Nations Children's Fund, 1987), 1.

[155] Hazzard, 1.

[156] E/ICEF/160, 3.

much broader mandate than originally approved by the General Assembly, providing it with a means to change its identity as necessary to both meet the needs of children in distress and to satisfy the questions, requirements and ambitions of all involved in its operations. This, of course, satisfied what appears to have been Rajchman's intent—to establish a global, color- and nationality-blind organization that could work for the betterment of all.

The General Progress Report of the Executive Director dated 26 October 1950 noted that the estimated total number of beneficiaries from October to December of that year would be approximately "26,865,000" and these individuals would receive "supplementary feeding," shoes and clothing," and vaccination and treatment of communicable diseases."[157] This aid, distributed through "UNICEF-assisted programs," included such groups as "Palestine Refugees" and "refugee mothers and children in India and Pakistan."[158] The report also includes a request that the Economic and Social Council "give greater emphasis…for promoting the economic and social development of under-developed areas," which seems to corroborate the idea that UNICEF would become a global organization according to its commitment to help children and their mothers wherever in the world a need existed.[159]

In addition to those of Rajchman, Maurice Pate's personal views and experience provide insight into how he envisioned the ICEF as an organization and, more importantly, how his views differed from Rajchman's. Clearly, Pate's career indicates that he had always been dedicated to providing food, clothing and medical assistance, including maternal and child health care, to the disadvantaged. More important than his views on the value of aid programs, however, were Pate's views on maternal and child care relief. Based on the underlying assumption that sex roles defined adult status in the modern world, he believed, as did Hoover, that the ICEF should assume the role of primary provider for children and mothers in Europe. His close and prolonged association with Hoover indicates that Pate's vision for the institutional identity of the ICEF seem to have replicated many of the "conventional 'scientific' biological ideas about women's nature" precluded them from taking on roles other than that of mother.[160] Pate's work with Hoover had led him to believe that children and their mothers could not survive without the assistance of a primary provider—in the case of the ICEF, an institutional provider that would, in many ways, usurp the role of the male head of the household. Pate's ICEF, then, while serving the same constituency as Rajchman's, clearly diverged from Rajchman's notion that children and mothers, victims in times of war or other crisis, simply required relief assistance. Rajchman stated in the ICEF charter that the "International Children's Emergency Fund [was] to be utilized for the benefit of children and adolescents of countries which were victims of aggression…[and] for child health purposes generally," since these children had been deprived "for several cruel years…lived in a constant state of terror," and constituted the UN's most pressing problem—how to ensure their survival.[161]

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[157] E/ICEF/155, *General Progress Report of Executive Director [UNICEF] 26 October 1950,* 7.
[158] E/ICEF/155, 7.
[159] E/ICEF/155, 34.
[160] Kandal, xv.
[161] E/ICEF/155, 33.

These differing concepts of the ICEF's identity created tensions regarding the type of aid the organization should provide that would ultimately require resolution. Regardless, the initial staff of the ICEF appears to have been unanimous in its dedication to making it a permanent UN agency. Adelaide Sinclair noted that "I think you couldn't do that work for a long time without reaching some conclusions about moving on to more action, if you had intelligence. It was so obvious, in a sense, that although we would help solve an emergency it wasn't going to solve anything else if we'd just stopped at the end of that and left that country as it was before."[162] Helenka Pantaleoni claimed that the ICEF's original mandate to run for three years "was undetermined. Maurice Pate, who used to go to our [U.S.] government with a request for funds, [said during the ICEF's fourth year that] 'this is the last time;'" however, she noted that eventually, "…Maurice, with his large horizons…saw that it was extremely important to keep UNICEF going."[163] Other early ICEF employees, John Charnow and Julia Henderson, also remembered there being no question that the ICEF would go on beyond 1950.[164] Rajchman, through his charter resolution, had clearly identified his desire for the organization to continue even before Secretary-General Trygvie Lie opened the first meeting of the Executive Board of the International Children's Emergency Fund on December 19, 1946 in Lake Success, New York.

[162] Sinclair Interview, 9.
[163] Pantaleoni Interview, 12.
[164] Julia Henderson interview by John Charnow, July 30-31, 1983, 3-5. Accessed at UNICEF Archives.

Chapter Four
A Plan of Work

The first meeting of the ICEF, held on December 19, 1946 and opened by Trygvie Lie, Secretary-General of the UN, brought together representatives from twenty-one countries.[165] Lie, who felt it was important to hold the first meeting "before the Christmas holidays," put the Board to work directly on establishing procedure and a plan of work for the new Fund, then stated that it was "most important to get the best qualified man or woman for the job of Executive Director of the Fund." [166] He indicated that he did not have the name of any person in mind, but charged the Board to make its selection no later than January 10, 1947.[167] Rajchman had been selected to serve as Chairman on December 19, 1946, and had already hand-picked Pate for the position. He had floated Pate's name in September of that year, and no other nominations ever materialized. Helenka Pantaleoni recalled that when "he told them that Maurice Pate was his choice… everybody went along with him…[the ICEF] was new and small and nobody really cared enough, you know, to block it."[168] In fact, during the Board's next meeting on December 27, 1946 when questions arose as to the procedure for selecting the Executive Director, Rajchman quashed the discussion. According to the report, Rajchman requested that the vote be postponed until January 7, 1947, in all likelihood assuming the matter was closed.

The US representative, Katherine Lenroot, was not satisfied, however. She stated that "the time allowed to delegations for studying the candidatures for the post of Executive Director [was] too short," and asked that the names of candidates be communicated prior to January 6. Rajchman replied that "so far, no arrangement has been made to consider the matter," and blithely moved on to the next topic.[169]

After sidestepping the issue of democratically selecting an Executive Director, Rajchman stated that "now the International Children's Emergency Fund [is] a legal entity, and it [is] therefore essential to take action immediately."[170] Under Rajchman's direction, the next meeting centered on establishing the priority tasks on which the ICEF would concentrate. Rajchman first stressed the gravity of the world food shortage, noting that 1947 would be a difficult year for food supplies in Europe. Therefore, after obtaining "the requirements of children and adolescents in 1947," a task they felt would be "simple and speedy," the ICEF would implement a three-part plan of action.[171]

This plan of action would include "A. Nutrition; B. Relief (including questions related to equipment and miscellaneous institutions): C. Training of staff (medical and welfare staff and social workers) to be placed at the disposal of the countries to be assisted."[172] In order to carry out these tasks, Rajchman stated that the Fund would need

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[165] The countries were: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Byelorussia S.S.R., Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Greece, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, United States, USSR, and Yugoslavia. E/ICEF/1, 1.
[166] Ibid., 1-4.
[167] Ibid, 4.
[168] Pantaleoni Interview, 10.
[169] E/ICEF/2, *Summary Record of the First Meeting of the Work Committee Held at Lake Success New York 27 December 1946,* 4.
[170] E/ICEF/1, 4.
[171] E/ICEF/2, 2.
[172] E/ICEF/2, 2.

to gather information as to how children were affected by rationing systems, and how the Fund's food supply would be incorporated into national supply programs. It would need to familiarize itself with food programs such as canteens and school feeding, and "tackle the milk question in the various countries, a very serious problem."[173] For this task, the Fund hired Martha May Eliot, a pediatrician and employee of the United States Children's Bureau. Eliot, who had received her undergraduate degree from Radcliffe College in 1913 and her medical degree from Johns Hopkins University in 1918, was the only person Rajchman deemed qualified to take on such a task.

From the start of her career, Eliot had been interested in maternal and child health. After completing her residency, she became a member of the Pediatric staff at the Yale University School of Medicine in 1921. She remained on staff until 1935, but moved to Washington, D.C. in 1924 to direct the division of maternal and child health for the United States Children's Bureau. In 1934 she became Assistant Chief and served in that position until she was made Chief in 1951.[174] While at the Bureau, she assumed many other roles as well. In 1936 she went to Geneva as the US delegate to attend a meeting on nutrition sponsored by the Health Section of the League of Nations, and visited seven countries to study maternal and child health care practices.[175] This trip, she claimed, "was really invaluable to me because it gave me background with respect to children's programs in these countries long prior to the war and before there were any major international UN activities."[176]

During the period prior to and through World War II, she administered federal grants-in-aid in Washington. Then, in 1946, she became vice-chair of the delegation to the international conference in Geneva that drafted the constitution of the World Health Organization. "By the way," she recounted, "you may be interested to know that I was the only woman delegate at this conference to sign this report. And I was the only woman signing the Constitution of the World Health Organization (WHO)."[177]

Eliot became more directly involved with the UN when she attended the first International Health Conference in June, 1946. The conference "had been recommended to the United Nations International Conference for the Organization of International Activities in San Francisco in April 1945…that original conference laid the ground for the development of both WHO and UNICEF, the two organizations with which I have the greatest contact."[178]

While working with the Committee that would establish WHO, Eliot received an offer in the spring of 1947 to work for the ICEF as well. Pate approached Eliot and asked whether she "would make this study of the needs of children in war-torn countries. And, he interviewed me for this job. It was the first time I had ever been interviewed in my life…for any new job that I was to have. That in itself interested me and amused me very

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[173] E/ICEF/2, 2.
[174] See Lillian Faderman, *To Believe in Women: What Lesbians Have Done For America-A History* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1999), 229-305; Regina Markell Morant-Sanchez, *Sympathy and Science: Women Physicians in American Medicine* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 123-24, 303, 335.
[175] Martha May Eliot interviewed by Jeanette Cheek for the Schlesinger-Rockefeller Oral History Project, November 1973-May 1974, 181. Accessed at UNICEF Archives.
[176] Eliot Interview, 181.
[177] Eliot Interview, 186.
[178] Eliot Interview, 181-82.

much."[179] She went on to say that "apparently, what I knew about the countries of Europe, as a result of that earlier trip I had made in 1936…interested Mr. Pate. He also knew that at the time I was Associate Chief of the Children's Bureau, and that I knew the kind of work that was done for children, both voluntary and governmental."[180] Pate offered her the job, and she accepted; she did not give up her position at the Children's Bureau, however, but was granted a leave of absence by its Chief, Katharine Lenroot, also a member of the ICEF's Executive Board.

After enumerating the supplies she would need to conduct the study, including an assistant who spoke the European languages Eliot did not, she left for Europe on April 28, 1947 accompanied by Rajchman. They landed in Paris, and then took a train to Warsaw. When they arrived in Warsaw, Eliot "was shocked beyond belief by the destruction of the city." The group traveled to the area where the ghetto had been, and Eliot recalled that "It was completely wiped out." She found hope, however, in the "energy and zeal the Polish people were putting in to rebuilding …their own capital."[181] Her trip, which included visiting France, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Greece and Italy, concluded in time for her to return to the US and submit her report at the Executive Board meeting at the end of June, 1947. It covered not only the general condition of children in war-stricken countries of Europe, but included a section on the general principles of child nutrition which was broken down into specific categories and included pregnant and nursing mothers, infants, school age children and adolescents. Its results were subsequently incorporated into the Report of FAO/WHO/IO Committee on Child Nutrition presented at the ICEF's meeting in July, 1947. It concluded with the statement that the doctors and nutrition experts who had compiled the report strongly supported the aim of the ICEF. "Children," it stated, "are suffering from the effects of prolonged undernutrition…they need more and better food for satisfactory mental and physical development."[182]

Eliot's trip to Europe for the ICEF only confirmed the importance of its first official work item—providing food. Once it had been determined how much food aid would be required and how it would be provided, other challenges remained, among them how the ICEF would report on its activities to its overseer, the Economic and Social Council. Lenroot again opened the discussion, offering her thoughts on the best way to give and receive information. She began by requesting that a study be made of the broad aspects of the report, which should contain "numerical data in addition to the general plan of procedure." She hoped that, by reporting in this manner, the Economic and Social Council could "afford general guidance to the Executive Board in order to expedite its activity." Rajchman, not at all interested in being led, immediately responded that the ICEF did not need the guidance of the Council; the Fund, he stated, would only seek guidance "when guidance…had to be sought."[183]

Lenroot, who had replaced Eleanor Roosevelt after the first meeting as the US representative to the ICEF, pushed Rajchman and the other members of the Executive

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[179] Eliot Interview, 190.
[180] Eliot Interview, 191.
[181] Eliot Interview, 192-93.
[182] E/ICEF/23, *Programme Committee's Report to the Executive Board on Meetings Held in Hotel Majestic, Avenue Kleber, Paris, between 18th and 23rd August Inclusive, 1947*, 45.
[183] E/ICEF/2, 5.

Board during the first ICEF meetings to adopt her suggestions. Not having been a part of creating the organization and therefore left outside its inner circle, she relied heavily on her past experience in dealing with the US government, unaware she was threatening Rajchman's goals for the ICEF. It is important to understand the considerable experience and status Lenroot brought with her to the Executive Board in order to put her attitude about her participation in the ICEF into its proper context. Years in the field of social work, maternal and child care and public policy had made her a seasoned bureaucrat, and she displayed these qualities when, in its early meetings, the ICEF decided on its work plan.

Born in Superior, Wisconsin in 1891, Lenroot modeled herself after her activist politician father, Senator Irvine L. Lenroot.[184] Senator Lenroot, a Progressive Republican who began his political career in the State House of Wisconsin, wrote much of the legislation that earned Wisconsin its reputation as a leading Progressive state.[185] Katharine, who grew up among her father's political friends in Wisconsin and Washington, D.C., became inspired by his career in service to the public.[186] After university graduation, she secured a position with the Children's Bureau in Washington, and it was there she began her career with the US government at the age of twenty-four.[187]

The Bureau was created as a result of the passage of a Senate bill on January 31, 1912.[188] Lenroot began her career there in 1915, eventually attending the New York School of Social Work. She then returned to the Children's Bureau, at which point she became Assistant Director of the Social Service Division, providing information to the League of Nations on matters of international maternal and child health; she also participated in Hoover's American Child Health Association, a subdivision of his American Relief Administration.[189]

In 1922, she became Assistant Chief of the Bureau and co-authored an extensive report on juvenile delinquency. Her work in this area was based on her conviction that when the normal life of children broke down and their needs were neglected by the community, both the children and the community paid a price. She published an extensive study in 1925 with Emma Lundberg entitled "Juvenile Courts at Work: A Study of the Organization and Methods of Ten Courts" which meticulously detailed the entire court process, and included a section called "Study of the Child."[190] Lenroot, concerned primarily with the underlying causes of delinquency and how to prevent the resulting cost of child crime to the children themselves and the community, wrote that "when all the facts that a social investigator can gain about the child, his family, his

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[184] Katharine Lenroot's father appears to have changed the course of his educational ambitions, but not those for his career after the birth of Katharine and her sister. For example, instead of attending university as he had originally planned, he obtained his law credentials by studying on his own while working to support his family, providing a strong role model for Katharine. Herbert F. Margulies, *Senator Lenroot of Wisconsin: A Political Biography, 1900-1929* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1977), 15.
[185] Ibid., vi-x.
[186] Ibid., 87-88, 91.
[187] Ibid., 186.
[188] Lindenmeyer, 26.
[189] *Encyclopedia of Social Work.* 18th edition, vol. 2, 932.
[190] Note that this portion of the report provides detailed information including charts. See Katharine F. Lenroot and Emma O. Lundberg, *Juvenile Courts at Work: A Study of the Organization and Methods of Ten Courts* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1925), 94-108.

home, his school, his recreation, and his companionships…the court is still far from knowing the kind of child it has to deal with." Claiming that courts often had little to no information on what caused the delinquency, she recommended studying the child—"his physical condition, his mental capacities, his personality, and the driving forces of his conduct."[191] Her use of the masculine throughout the report masks the fact that the study investigated both boys and girls, but her prescriptions for dealing with delinquency for boys and girls were the same, including remedial education and strict discipline.[192] This report led to conferences which established juvenile court standards, and gained Lenroot a new level of recognition for her work with children and families.

By 1934, Lenroot had worked for the Bureau for nineteen years. She had traveled extensively both in and outside the US, all the while advancing the Bureau's notion that children of deserving mothers—mothers who conformed to the Bureau's definitions—should be provided with some type of assistance in order to assure their proper care and to keep them out of the juvenile court system. She became Chief of the Bureau that year, having been chosen over her friend and colleague Martha Eliot.[193] One year later, women's historian Kriste Lindenmeyer notes that she "quietly complained" when the Bureau lost responsibility for the Aid for Dependent Children program; this trend would continue and, by 1940, Lenroot found herself "resigned" to accepting that the Bureau would share responsibility for child welfare with "several federal agencies."[194]

It is important to note that the ADC program maintained strict guidelines for eligibility that did not rely on economic status alone. Social historian Ruth Sidel notes that even though support for "some kind of public aid to mothers and children" had increased, state and local officials "had the right to conduct an investigation into the character of the mother" before she could qualify for aid.[195] Prior relief programs, such as the ones that provided milk to mothers in Europe during the late nineteenth century, had also used investigations and home visits; however, these had been used to determine whether or not the aid was being properly distributed, and provided education to help mothers rather than disqualifying them from receiving aid. The role of the father was another key difference in US and European programs.

While European programs often provided assistance to mothers when a father was absent, this was not always a requirement for families requesting aid. The US version, however, required that fathers remain out of the home in order that mothers and children could obtain assistance. This notion, which coincides with Lenroot's own conclusions about the place of mother and father within the family, continued to be a provision of ADC programs for three decades. The result was that white widows became the largest group of ADC recipients, as they comprised the most deserving group since the head of

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[191] Ibid., 94.

[192] Lenroot and Lundberg reported on several U.S. cities, including Denver, St. Louis, Buffalo, San Francisco, New Orleans, and Boston. In a section titled "Methods of dealing with problem children" they note that "maladjustment or misconduct varied greatly" and that various methods were used to deal with this behavior, including assigning "special officers" to conduct "special work" with the children (234); making "regular and frequent visits to schools" (235); holding "conferences with the children and their parents" (237); and establishing "special schools" (238). See Lenroot and Lundberg, 216-23.

[193] Lindenmeyer, 182.

[194] Ibid., 208.

[195] Ruth Sidel, *Women and Children Last: The Plight of Poor Women in Affluent America* (New York: Penguin Books, 1992), 82-83.

household had no chance of returning.[196] As Sidel points out, it is important to note that this program, once removed from the Children's Bureau, became part of an overall US social policy that Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward claim regulated the behavior of the poor.[197] Piven and Cloward write that relief policies tend to be cyclical, "liberal or restrictive depending on the problems of regulation in the larger society with which the government must contend" but that they almost always contributed to maintaining a social status quo.[198]

After 1940, Lenroot turned her attentions to children whose lives were being affected by the war in Europe in an attempt to breathe new life into the Bureau. An opportunity arose when the Bureau's director of the Delinquency Division and Representative to the League of Nations Advisory Committee on Social Questions, Elsa Castendyck, reported after a visit to Switzerland, France, Holland and Great Britain that a "need of the US offering some form of help, either financially or actual hospitality to these children" existed.[199] As a result, the United States Committee for the Care of European Children (CCEC) was formed on June 9, 1940.[200] This allowed Lenroot, via the Children's Bureau, to provide aid for European children. At the same time, Lenroot faced the question of how to best care for children in the US during the war, and Kriste Lindenmeyer writes that "The Children's Bureau had its greatest impact during the war" with its Emergency Maternity and Infant Care Program.[201]

Where the Bureau failed mothers and children, however, was in the provision of child care for working mothers. The Bureau announced that "mothers of preschool children and especially of those under two years of age should not be encouraged to seek employment; children of these ages should in general be cared for by their mothers."[202] Mother's absence, they claimed, disrupted normal family life and created serious problems in the care of children. Having always believed in a connection between the absence of mothers and problems in children, Lenroot's stance for the Bureau on government sponsored child care seems to have led to the further erosion of the Bureau as women turned their backs on its services and found their own way. [203]

Once the war ended the Bureau lost numerous of its functions to other U. S. agencies.[204] The Bureau had, however, functioned as a participant in discussions regarding international child welfare as early as 1939.[205] It can be concluded therefore that Lenroot, who had served as an advisor to the League of Nations on child welfare

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[196] Ibid., 82-83.
[197] Ibid., 84.
[198] See Piven and Cloward, *Regulating the Poor*, xvii, 80-177, 123-145.
[199] Lindenmeyer, 210.
[200] Ibid., 210.
[201] Ibid., 237.
[202] From "Standards for Day Care of Children of Working Mothers" issued by the U.S. Children's Bureau, as quoted in Lindenmeyer, 219.
[203] Lindenmeyer notes that the first provisions made for child care fell under the Works Progress Administration's Lanham Act, not the Children's Bureau (217); she also notes that the Children's Bureau's stance on childcare was that "wives should not work for wages if their husbands had jobs" (217) and, along with the Women's Bureau, condemned this "growing practice" of wives working outside the home, insisting instead that mothers of small children remain with them at home (218). Lindenmeyer, 217-218. .
[204] Lindenmeyer writes that the Reorganization Act of 1945 allowed for major changes in the Children's Bureau's responsibilities after 1946. Lindenmeyer, 250.
[205] Ibid., 247.

issues and participated in several Pan-American conferences, would be a logical choice to represent the US on the Executive Board of the ICEF. In 1947 at the age of 56, she attended her first ICEF meetings, and her experiences with the Bureau became evident immediately. Entering this realm older and more experienced, she always presented herself as the complete professional woman. Photographs show her in a dark suit, her white hair styled neatly and always away from her face, exposing her clear gaze and set jaw. She did not smile in these photographs, perhaps preferring to appear authoritative and strong. She had the undeniable look of one determined, and she used the ICEF as a vehicle, to uphold the principles she had participated in establishing at the Children's Bureau.

By the time the Executive Board met on January 13, 1947, Maurice Pate presided alongside Rajchman in his new capacity as Executive Director, having been approved unanimously by the Board. Only nine members attended, including Rajchman, and they met this time in Washington, D.C at the US Children's Bureau. Pate had unofficially established his office in Washington, having been given space on Connecticut Avenue and a part-time secretary.[206] Rajchman called the meeting to order, and then presented a Provisional Agenda. It included further discussion of the ICEF's work plan, as well as an increasingly pressing issue, how and where the ICEF would obtain enough funds to operate.

Minutes from this meeting further outline the ICEF's plan of work, noting that "There should be a strict order of priority; the first, child feeding, and the second, medical care, and the third other subjects, such as fellowships and training of personnel."[207] Other delegates, taking advantage of the malleability they perceived in establishing the ICEF's work plan, suggested adding other responsibilities that would further widen its scope. The delegate from the Soviet Union, Mr. Fenov, suggested that clothing should be one of the principle items provided by the ICEF. He stated that "the proportion, for instance, for food $400 million and clothing $40 million to me is not quite appropriate. It may be good for southern countries like Greece or Italy, but for countries with severe winters, clothing and footwear are very important indeed."[208] Pate and Rajchman both responded, noting that overcoats had been of great value after World War I, and that clothing supplies would vary from country to country. The ICEF did provide clothing and sewing materials, but this never became a major portion of its expenditures.

The delegate from the United Kingdom, Mr. Alexander, brought another new item to the discussion. He began by saying "I wouldn't want to indulge an argument, but there are countries with terrific pressure of population which might be glad to see that pressure eased. Emigration of adults is a ticklish problem, but of young people might be something which could be undertaken to the advantage of everyone concerned." He went on to say that one way of solving the problem of hungry children residing in orphanages would be to "encourage these orphans to be adopted by countries where conditions of life would, in fact, be considerably easier…I feel sure there would be people in a number of countries who would be quite prepared to adopt children on a very large scale."[209]

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[206] Pantaleoni Interview, 6.
[207] E/ICEF/5, *Summary Record of the Third Meeting held in Washington, D.C.(Children's Bureau)13 January 1947*, 2.
[208] E/ICEF/5, 21.
[209] E/ICEF/5, 25-26.

Rajchman, swift and to the point, said that "any suggestions of this type will be welcome for study," but the ICEF, with its mandate already underway, did not discuss migration or adoption programs again, and they never became part of the ICEF's original work plan.

What bothered all of them the most, however, was not the kind of work the ICEF would do; that, they understood. It was how they would fund the programs they already planned to undertake, as well as establish a system of funding that would ensure their long-term visions as well. Most of the Third Meeting was spent discussing funding, and the eight delegates, Rajchman and Pate, considered how the ICEF, with only a meager sum from UNRRA, would be able to help the thousands of children in Europe and China they knew needed immediate assistance.

From the start, the UN made it clear that it would not make any appropriations for the ICEF, stating that "The effective operation of the Fund is dependent upon the financial resources which are put at its disposal." The ICEF had, it reasoned, been given a generous donation from UNRRA, and did not truly qualify for UN funds due to its temporary and emergency status. Therefore, the General Assembly expressed "the earnest hope that governments, voluntary agencies, and private individuals will give the Fund generous support."[210] Rajchman noted that the Assembly had already made an appeal to governments, but that the ICEF would have to rely on its grant from UNRRA, and on contributions from governments, voluntary agencies and private individuals—in that order.

This statement became the topic of much debate. The delegate from the United Kingdom, Mr. Alexander, vociferously expressed his disappointment in the progress being made toward obtaining funds. "I am sorry if, on the first occasion I speak…I appear to be a little lukewarm and throw some cold water, but I am afraid it is cold water I have brought here with me," he began. "…[M]y government feels…the second source of funds which can be obtained would be voluntary contributions, and the third source—and I do put it third—is governmental assistance."[211] Many believed, as did Alexander, that governments would not or could not commit funds to the ICEF's cause, but Rajchman probably had little intention of following the General Assembly guidelines established for collecting funds anyway. Indeed, Martha Eliot recalled that Rajchman had his own plan for funding the ICEF based on a private charity model not unlike the one used by the Rockefeller Foundation.

"Dr. Rajchman…did not want the money at the disposal of UNICEF to be collected on a [UN] formula from all the countries," she claimed.[212] If Rajchman could successfully arrange funding in this way, then the ICEF could remain outside the UN budget altogether and exert total control of its expenditures. It therefore became crucial from the start for the ICEF to obtain donations from wherever it could, regardless of the General Assembly's mandate.

Rajchman and Pate, using lessons learned from Hoover's CRB and ARA days, determined that donations would be obtained in two ways. First, any government, organization or individual could donate money or supplies directly to the ICEF. These contributions would be placed into a general fund, and would support the organization's operations. Second, the ICEF would require that governments apply for assistance and

[210] E/ICEF/5, 3.
[211] J.A.C.C. Alexander as quoted in E/ICEF/5, 5-6.
[212] Eliot Interview, 189.

be approved by a vote of the Executive Board. Governments who did not contribute to their own aid programs, whether through providing money, supplies, or staff, would not be approved, and contributions from approved countries would be used only to fund the programs established there.

Hoover had used this model extensively during his tenure as the Director-General of the ARA, which not only ensured its solvency, but held to the principle that governments were ultimately responsible for their own programs. Hoover had, from the beginning, viewed relief as a business; indeed, Russian historian Bertrand Patenaude writes of Hoover's efforts to provide corn to Soviet Russia during the famine it experienced during the early 1920s that "So much the better if a humanitarian operation abroad made good economic sense at home."[213] Hoover took pride in efficiency, and required, when possible, that governments make matching contributions.[214] Hoover's A.R.A. operations collected, according to historian H. H. Fisher, "$11, 357, 325.13" toward its relief efforts in "Gold Funds of the Russian republics," and obtained another "$4,374,893.28" from the "sales in Russia to Affiliated Relief and Other Organizations."[215] Hoover associates Frank Surface and Raymond Bland noted also that "subsidies" to the A.R.A. from governments receiving aid included "donations of commodities for the child-feeding programs in their own countries" as well as "services and facilities" though the latter had not been included in the final total of $14,652,432.21 collected from a dozen Central European countries.[216] This approach, if implemented, was expected to keep the ICEF from going broke as well; however, when the ICEF staff began to seek contributions in 1947, they found that although many supported their cause, few would help to fund it.

In June, 1947, Pate submitted his report of that month's meeting of the Executive Board, which immediately addressed the issue of funding for the ICEF. He notes that "During his recent visit to Europe, Dr. Ludwik Rajchman, your Chairman, conferred with several governments, and it is expected that at least five or six…will make contributions."[217] When The Executive Board met again in October of that year, funding again remained one of its most pressing items for discussion. Submitted again by Pate, the report notes that the "initial contribution of $15,000,000 from the United States, the $5,000,000 contribution of Canada" seemed virtually inevitable.[218] He went on to list several more governments that had at least pledged funds, including Luxembourg and

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[213] Bertrand M. Patenaude, "Herbert Hoover's Brush with Bolshevism" (Washington, D.C.: The Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1992), 4.
[214] Bertrand M. Patenaude and H.H. Fisher have both written about Hoover's years with the ARA and the ways in which Hoover funded his relief organizations. In addition, two of Hoover's associates, Frank Surface and Raymond Bland, published an extensive compilation of the work of Hoover's various aid organizations from 1914 to 1924, including financial reports. See Patenaude; H.H. Fisher, *The Famine in Soviet Russia, 1919-1923: The Operations of the American Relief Administration* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1927), especially chapters VI, XIII and XIV; and Frank M. Surface and Raymond L. Bland, *American Food in the World War and Reconstruction Period: Operations of the Organizations under the Direction of Herbert Hoover, 1914-1924* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1931).
[215] Fisher, Appendix B, 553.
[216] Surface and Bland, 144.
[217] E/ICEF/17, *Director's Report to the Seventh Meeting of the Executive Board,* 3.
[218] E/ICEF/25, *Report of the Executive Director to the 10th Meeting of the Executive Board held at Lake Success, New York 29 September-1 October 1947*, 4.

Australia, and wrote that the Norwegian government "which has already contributed cod liver oil," might be counted on as well.[219]

Maurice Pate noted a year earlier that, after having been at work "only four days…it seems to me in getting this work underway that the most important and large support that we should look for is a contribution from the American Government." [220] He made this statement because he knew that the US government had not reallocated its UNRRA budget elsewhere, and hoped he could persuade Congress to give a sizeable portion of it to the ICEF. He requested a grant of forty million dollars, firmly convinced it was a fair and reasonable amount. Members of Congress, officials at the State Department, and the Bureau of the Budget thought otherwise, and began to raise questions, putting the request in jeopardy.

Martha Eliot, who had worked closely with members of the staff of the Bureau of the Budget while administering grants-in-aid, discovered in April "that the Bureau of the Budget was really making trouble about any kind of appropriation. I knew we had to have it. So the first task I took on for UNICEF was getting the money for them from Congress. I remember one day…a warm day in April in Washington…sitting on the bench somewhere outside the State Department, which was housed in the Executive Office Building, and talking with two men from the Bureau of the Budget, both of whom I knew." Eliot could only recall one of their names—Geoffrey May—who had worked with her on a project for the War Department in 1941.[221]

The two men argued with Eliot about the appropriation. She then told them about her upcoming trip to Europe for the ICEF, and that it needed money. "I told them the United States really had to put some money up—that was all there was to it! And how much would they go for. We finally agreed that if UNICEF would reduce its request to $15 million, unmatched, they would go along." The discussion then turned to the rest of the initial request for $40 million, and the issue of matching contributions arose. Eliot, who wanted to be sure the ICEF received its full appropriation, pushed for as lenient a matching formula as possible. "I said…let us suppose that initially other countries put up only 250 dollars. Is that all I'm going to get out of the United States?... Finally, they agreed that the first $15 million would be granted to UNICEF without any conditions whatsoever. But thereafter for any additional monies UNICEF would have to show that a certain ratio had been contributed by other countries."[222]

Eliot, who had been told the ICEF would receive all of UNRRA's residual funds, left for Europe satisfied she had done well; she would not find out until much later that "that was not correct…from the very beginning…UNICEF was very troubled because they got their money from UNRRA in dribbles and drabbles…they had to struggle continually to get from UNRRA what they felt was their right according to the arrangements for the creation of UNICEF. But UNRRA was also giving money to WHO."[223]

The official histories regarding the initial US contribution to the ICEF credit Herbert Hoover with persuading the US Congress to grant an appropriation. It is clear,

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[219] E/ICEF/25, 4.
[220] E/ICEF/5, 15.
[221] Eliot Interview, 214.
[222] Eliot Interview, 214-215
[223] Eliot Interview, 215.

however, that without Eliot's efforts, Hoover, Pate and Rajchman might never have seen that appropriation disbursed.

While other governments were being wooed, individuals presented alternate methods for funding the plan. One man came forth, presenting his idea to the Executive Board on Friday, February 7, 1947 at their meeting in Lake Success. A delegate from Norway, Ording, suggested that every individual could contribute the equivalent of one day's wages for relief purposes. It would then be placed in a 'world community chest' with a large portion assigned to the ICEF.[224] Helenka Pantaleoni remembered Ording's visit to the ICEF Board meeting. He "got up…and made a speech. He thought that every single day laborer, or everybody who earned a salary all over the world, would be delighted to give one day of his efforts…it was enthusiastically received in one of those rare occasions when the whole meeting broke out into applause." Unfortunately, the enthusiasm for Ording's plan ended when the meeting did. "It was too difficult to implement, I suppose," remembered Pantaleoni. "There's always a 'how to' angle." [225]

She remembered another suggestion made by Linn Sheffey, an early member of Pantaleoni's American Committee for UNICEF. Sheffey suggested that "returning passengers from foreign countries put their foreign coins into a special envelope, mail it to UNICEF, whereupon UNICEF would change the currency into dollars." Sheffey had calculated that the ICEF could collect millions of dollars a year that way, but her idea, too, never came to fruition. "Millions of ideas, and so far, few have worked out," remembered Pantaleoni.[226]

By late February, 1947, two months after its first meeting, the ICEF drafted a report on its projected expenses which would, once approved by the Board, be submitted to the Fourth Session of the Economic and Social Council. It stated that "the Executive Board has considered the urgent needs of children in Europe and the Far East….[and] estimates that some 30,000,000 children in Europe alone and an equal, if not greater, number in the Far East are today in urgent need of supplementary aid." It first recommended providing a "supplementary mid-day meal of approximately 700 calories" at a cost of "6 cents a day or $20.00 a year." In addition to this meal, the ICEF would provide "clothing, medical supplies or equipment for children's institutions." The report also included a "Tentative Breakdown of Expenditures by ICEF per $1,000,000 contributed to its Funds," allocating the largest portion, $678,000 to "Milk and supplementary fats." The ICEF estimated that it could provide assistance to 85,000 children for that amount.

In addition to the financial information it provided, the report made clear that the ICEF had received very little funding to date, and reminded the Economic and Social Council that "in the discussions leading to the establishment of the fund, it was constantly emphasized that it would be both derogatory to the prestige of the United Nations and also a waste of effort and administrative money to let the Fund start operating with too small a sum to allow an effective contribution to the problem…The Executive Board has

[224] E/ICEF/7*, Summary Record of the Third Meeting Lake Success New York 7 February 1947,* 4, 6.
[225] Pantaleoni Interview, 130.
[226] Pantaleoni Interview, 130-31.

decided that it would not be proper to start the Fund's operations until assurances are obtained of sufficient financial support."[227]

This statement was meant as a clear signal to the Economic and Social Council to intercede on the ICEF's behalf and to help it obtain funds. UNRRA had notified the ICEF early in 1947 that its original funding commitment had recently changed. When UNRRA General Counsel Alfred Davidson spoke to the Executive Board on January 31, he stated that "The United States has laid before the Central Committee of UNRRA a proposal which will involve a change in our programme and which would, in effect, increase the financial burdens of UNRRA, with the result that the possibility of transferring UNRRA funds will be substantially diminished."[228] Adelaide Sinclair later described the scene. "I remember at one of the first Board meetings…a young man with a rather sharp face came in and walked over to Rajchman and bent over the back of his chair and whispered something in his ear and Rajchman said, 'Well, you'll have to tell them'…Well, this was the legal counsel of UNRRA whose name happened to be Al Davidson."[229]

Sinclair also recalled that the ICEF Board understood it could not rely on the United States and UNRRA, and that it would need to establish other reliable sources of income.[230] "There were a lot of other campaigns because conditions were pretty bad for a long time…we got some good people on our Committee [Canadian Committee for UNICEF]" but she noted that competition from other philanthropic organizations often turned fierce, and she recounted one incident between fundraisers for the ICEF and the Save the Children Fund.[231] "The Save the Children had their headquarters in Europe and they'd been active long before UNICEF was ever thought of. The best people entered the Save the Children's Fund and did things in style…[but] they were simply horrified when they got a letter from the head saying that you must put this UNICEF fund-raising out of business—it will be a great threat to us…nothing about doing more for children or anything like that."[232]

Helenka Pantaleoni recalled similar incidents in the U.S. "[W]hen steps were taken to organize the Children's Fund, the various private organizations, national organizations, started piling down to Washington…The hundreds of organizations in this country, the church ones, for example, collecting for their beneficiaries…felt threatened. They were afraid [the ICEF] would cut across their efforts and spoil their own fund-raising."[233] Charles Taft, brother of Senator Robert Taft, was at that time in charge of coordinating all voluntary fundraising in the US, and had to arrive at a solution that would satisfy each of the organizations. In the end, a campaign known as the "AOA-UNAC" collected funds, then divided them among the ICEF and various other organizations. Pantaleoni recalled that "the campaign was not a success in this country."[234]

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[227] E/ICEF/10, *Provisional Report of Programme and Estimate of Expenses 1947 to be Submitted to the Fourth Session of the Economic and Social Council*, 4.
[228] E/ICEF/5, 9.
[229] Sinclair Interview, 3-4.
[230] Sinclair Interview, 4.
[231] Sinclair Interview, 5.
[232] Sinclair Interview, 6.
[233] Pantaleoni Interview, 7.
[234] Pantaleoni Interview, 7.

By February, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Greece and Poland had already requested aid from the ICEF. Its total expenditures had been about $4,000, and these had been for administrative costs for the Board.[235] It had heard a report from Dr. A.P. Meiklejohn on the deteriorating conditions he had witnessed on a recent trip to Europe. He warned that although life in Europe appeared normal on the surface, "in many places civilization is now worn very thin."[236] He went on to warn that "In this setting a new generation of European children is growing up. They need desperately now, food, clothing, the means to learn, and proper care from adequately trained personnel."[237] If these were not received, claimed Meiklejohn, "My own belief is that unless standards of child life in Europe improve very soon the outlook for Europe and ultimately the world in general, is dreadful."[238] By March, Pate again reminded the Board that "UNRRA activities in European countries [will] soon come to an end and there [will] be an immediate need for food stuff in these countries…in [my] opinion, help from governments should be asked and voluntary organizations should be contacted."[239] Finally, in June, Secretary-General Lie stepped in and issued an appeal for funds.

In his address which was presented to the Seventh Meeting of the Executive Board "on his behalf," Lie proclaimed "a most important and welcome event has occurred. The Congress of the United States has authorized a contribution of Fifteen Million Dollars to the Fund with a promise of a further Twenty-five Million Dollars if the Fund raises about Thirty Million Dollars from other Governments."[240] He then noted that he hoped other contributions would "shortly be forthcoming," as he would be "transmitting a renewed appeal" for their cooperation that day.[241] The U.S. had issued a grant-in-aid to the ICEF through House Joint Resolution 153, voted on by the House of Representatives and the Senate on May 21, and signed into law by President Harry Truman on May 31.[242] Pate, in his report to the Board regarding this momentous event, spelled out the conditions for receiving the funds, which followed exactly the agreements Martha Eliot had negotiated in April. The ICEF would receive an initial $15,000,000, but would have to obtain $43.00 or its equivalent for every successive $57.00 provided by the U.S.[243] Pate's report moved immediately to the ICEF's plan of work, and never mentioned Eliot's contribution to obtaining financing.

Now, the ICEF could actually begin its operations. Never mind that the funds had not yet been delivered; with $15,000,000, it could be used in part "for the procurement of milk…[from the] …United States."[244] Pate's excitement at the prospect of being able to begin the work of providing aid is apparent, and he notes that "this would be the opportune time for procurement [of milk since] the United States provides the main

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[235] E/ICEF 10, 6.
[236] E/ICEF/12, *Statement Made Before the Fourth Meeting of the Executive Board of the International Children's Emergency Fund by Dr. A.P. Meiklejohn, Senior Consultant in Nutrition, European Office, UNRRA, Lake Success, New York, 24 February 1947*, 5.
[237] E/ICEF/12, 12.
[238] E/ICEF/12, 12.
[239] E/ICEF/16, *Summary Report of the Fourth Meeting*, 2.
[240] E/ICEF/18, *Statement of the Secretary-General of the United Nations Delivered on His Behalf at the Seventh Meeting of the Executive Board of the ICEF 17 June 1947*, 1.
[241] E/ICEF/18, 1.
[242] E/ICEF/17, 1.
[243] E/ICEF/17, 2.
[244] E/ICEF/17, 2.

source of milk products, and the present is the height of the flush production period of milk in the United States."[245] He had already drawn up an agreement "in the form of a contract" to be signed by the ICEF and assisted countries, and noted that additional grants from "Canada, Australia and New Zealand…are shortly expected."[246]

Pate's report ends with the statement, "Since the last meeting of the Executive Board, the Central Committee of UNRRA has made a grant of $100,000 to the funds of the ICEF, which will be adequate to cover all our administration expenses until the first Government contribution becomes available."[247] Despite a much smaller contribution than had originally been expected from its original benefactor, UNRRA, the ICEF plowed forward with the first priority of its plan of work, to provide food to the children of Europe and Asia.

[245] E/ICEF/17, 2.
[246] E/ICEF/17, 3.
[247] E/ICEF/17, 5.

Chapter Five
Food

By the time the ICEF received Pate's news about the grant from the US government in the summer of 1947, the UN had added Afghanistan, Iceland, Sweden and Siam, bringing its total number of members to fifty-five.[248] It operated out of Lake Success, New York, and listed the ICEF as a Special Body under the supervision of the Economic and Social Council.[249] The ICEF, having circumvented the established approval process for UN agencies, was "the only special body thus far established...[and would] be utilized for the benefit of children and adolescents of countries which were victims of aggression…for child health purposes generally; and to safeguard the health of expectant and nursing mothers."[250] Pate and the others were anxious to begin living up to these expectations, and focused on the priority in its plan of work, to provide food aid.

The first order of business had to be ensuring no gaps occurred in the food and medical assistance provided to children in Europe after UNRRA made its last shipments in the spring of 1947.[251] Another UN organization with permanent status had the same goal, however, which required that the two form an immediate working relationship. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), established during the war as part of Roosevelt's vision for a postwar international organization, decided to ensure that a period of acute shortage did not exist between the end of UNRRA's shipments and the resumption of normal food production in Europe. Historian Gove Hambidge writes in *The Story of FAO* that the organization was "born out of the idea of freedom from want" as well as the "need for peace," which he describes as "interdependent" in the goal to ensure the "welfare of producers and the welfare of consumers"[252] Such a gap would surely result in overwhelming starvation, and the FAO, which deemed agricultural production that which most "deeply concerns the well being of men and nations," poised itself to prevent this from happening.[253]

The FAO had been suggested first in 1942 by F.L. McDougall, an economic advisor who participated in the Australian delegation to the earlier incarnation of the United Nations established during World War II.[254] He proposed an organization for food and agriculture as a first step in the creation of a world-wide agency for the preservation of peace, envisioning it playing a major role in achieving full employment and in raising the standard of living the world over since, as Hambidge writes, "McDougall pointed out that at least 60 percent of the world's workers are engaged in farming"[255]

As envisioned by McDougall, the organization would have three broad functions. First, if would collect, compile and interpret statistical data relating to food consumption;

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[248] United Nations Publication Sales No.: 1947.I12, *The Structure of the United Nations [1947]*, 1.
[249] *The Structure of the United Nations [1947]*, 22.
[250] *The Structure of the United Nations [1947]*, 23.
[251] In its report to the Economic and Social Council concerning UNICEF operations from 1946 to 1950, the organization reported not only on its mission to provide for children and their mothers, but also the pressing need to act in 1946 as UNRRA would no longer be providing this type of aid. E/ICEF/160, 3.
[252] Gove Hambidge, *The Story of FAO* (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1955)54-55.
[253] Ibid., 58.
[254] Ibid., 48-49.
[255] Ibid., 49.

second, it would organize a world service around the sciences affecting agriculture; and third, it would provide technical guidance and help to less industrialized countries by employing agriculture experts to promote agriculture education.[256] It would not function as a relief organization; rather, it would determine what needs existed, and then provide the scientific and technical assistance required to allow local people to resolve the issues themselves. He put forth his ideas in a document entitled "Draft Memorandum on a United Nations Program for Freedom from Want of Food" published in Washington, D.C. in October, 1942, which eventually made its way into the hands of First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt. She invited McDougall to lunch, and stated she wanted his ideas put before the President.[257]

McDougall had the opportunity to present his ideas to Franklin Roosevelt during an informal dinner at the White House. During this dinner, Roosevelt discussed his desire to establish a cooperative organization that would be a successor to the League of Nations, and would be made up of myriad nations. McDougall, who noted that food would be the first major issue such an organization would be faced with after the war, suggested it as a logical starting point for its plan of work. According to Hambidge, Roosevelt listened politely, but "gave no indication that he favored the proposals."[258]

No one from the Roosevelt administration contacted McDougall after their initial meeting to discuss his plan further. He subsequently published "International Aspects of Postwar Food and Agriculture" in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, but did not anticipate any action to create an agriculture organization until after the war ended. Believing the issue had been tabled, he was surprised to read in a newspaper article that Roosevelt would convene a conference in Hot Springs, Virginia in May, 1943, to discuss global food and agriculture issues.[259]

Just as McDougall had suggested, the Hot Springs conference "dealt with the most basic of the biological, social and economic problems of mankind—the provision of food for life and health."[260] Forty-five countries sent delegates to the conference with the understanding that they were participating in an event of "unusual significance."[261] They discussed all aspects of food production and consumption, and found themselves in agreement on most topics. Disagreements arose primarily over issues of supply and demand, especially when a proposal had the potential to raise prices for the food importing industrialized countries. They focused primarily on actual food consumption, nutrition requirements, how to increase production to meet these demands, and how to better distribute available food. The conference resulted in thirty-three recommendations and three reports on production, consumption and distribution, and much of what it established echoed the prior work of the League of Nations.[262] Based on this framework, the delegates established an Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture to begin planning for a permanent organization.

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[256] Ibid., 49.
[257] Ibid.
[258] Ibid.
[259] Hambidge notes that McDougall wrote the article "late in 1942," implying that its publication came after his meeting with President and Mrs. Roosevelt. Hambidge, 48-49.
[260] Ibid., 50.
[261] Ibid.
[262] Ibid.

The Interim Commission headquartered in a private house in Washington, D.C., "carefully and painstakingly prepared" a work plan for the FAO during 1943.[263] Motivated by the feeling that nations must work together to "prevent future conflicts" and by the belief that science could lead humanity to a new era of abundance, the Commission drafted a constitution that would officially create the FAO.[264] The constitution's preamble stated that the FAO would "promote the common welfare by …raising levels of nutrition…[improving] the efficiency of the production and distribution of all food and agricultural products…, [and] bettering the conditions of rural populations."[265] The Committee decided the organization would act primarily in an advisory capacity, and would act as necessary to promote its stated plan of work. The US would be the largest contributor to the annual budget, providing twenty-five percent of the $5 million required to run the organization, with other member nations contributing smaller percentages based on their capabilities.[266]

With its plan of work and budget established, the Committee decided that the original membership of the organization should consist of the forty-five nations that attended Hot Springs. New members could be added by a two-thirds vote. The organization would meet at least once a year to determine policy, approve the budget, and appoint a Director-General. The Committee included the constitution in its first report, which was submitted to governments for their consideration. Called *The Work of FAO*, it stated that, in order to establish the FAO, approval from twenty countries would be required.[267] Once received, these nations would be the first to attend an international conference to create the new organization.

Its twenty acceptances received, the Commission scheduled the first FAO conference for October 16, 1945. Forty-four governments established this new co-operative, making it the first of the new United Nations agencies. They accepted the constitution prepared by the Interim Commission, as well as its plan of work. The FAO was to establish its headquarters in Washington, D.C., and to consider recommendations from experts in the fields of "agriculture, forestry, fishery, nutrition, and economics." The conference ended with a speech by L.B. Pearson, who had been elected Conference Chairman. He stated that "if we should…bring social progress in line with scientific development…then the work we have done at Quebec will have made a worthy and permanent contribution to man's long effort to move upward from the jungle of hatred, suspicion, and death." McDougall, who had been hired as Special Adviser to the Director-General, had seen his vision realized after all, and helped begin the work of feeding the world. McDougall would, over the course of the next few months, compile the first World Food Survey for the FAO. Published on July 5, 1946, it became a crucial source of information not only for the FAO, but for the ICEF as well.[268]

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[263] Ibid., 52.
[264] Ibid.
[265] Ibid., 53.
[266] The United Kingdom was the next largest contributor at 15%, followed by the USSR, China, France, Canada, India, Brazil and Australia. The remaining countries contributed much smaller percentages, some as little as one half of one percent. Hambidge, 53.
[267] United Nations Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture, *The Work of FAO* (Washington, D.C, August 20, 1945).
[268] Hambidge, 59-62.

The World Food Survey, which consists of a mere thirty-nine pages, succinctly presented its findings on the prewar food situation and the required levels of nutrition to ensure good health, both at the time of its printing and in the future. It also established the percentage changes required in the world food supply needed to meet nutritional targets by 1950, and then projected the additional increases that would be required by 1960.[269] Noting that "there is much starvation…in the world," the survey claimed that "facts and figures are needed if the nations are to attempt to do away with famine and malnutrition—an attempt to which they are pledged through the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations."[270] The survey identified Central America, Asia, South America and Africa as the areas with the greatest deficiency before the war. It cautioned that "poor nutrition is associated with high death rates and a low expectation of life, high mortality in infancy and early childhood and among women during the childbearing years." It also "increased susceptibility to many diseases such as tuberculosis."[271] The solution to the problem, according to the survey, would be to increase individual productivity of subsistence farmers, a task they believed could be greatly affected by the help and guidance of the FAO.

The survey concludes with the statement that ensuring an adequate world food supply "requires a kind of planning and organization…which neither producers nor nations acting by themselves can carry out," and recommended establishing a World Food Board to handle these tasks. Upholding the first point of its original plan of work, the Survey had complied and interpreted data necessary to proceed to its next two points, organizing a world service for improving agriculture, and providing technical assistance to countries in need.[272]

Both the FAO and the ICEF had indicated their organizations would fill the void left by the cessation of UNRRA relief aid, and questions regarding duplication of efforts that might take place between them arose almost immediately despite their different modes of operation.[273] Members of the Economic and Social Council raised concerns early in 1947, which prompted representatives of the FAO to begin attending ICEF Executive Board Meetings.[274] Both organizations realized the importance of fashioning a complementary relationship. During the fifth meeting of the Board held in February, 1947, Rajchman set this collaboration in motion.

Rajchman called upon Mr. Ezekiel, the FAO representative, to make a statement during this meeting concerning collaboration between the Fund and the FAO. Ezekiel

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[269] Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, *World Food Survey* (Washington, D.C., July 5, 1946).
[270] *World Food Survey*, 5.
[271] *World Food Survey*, 8.
[272] *World Food Survey*, 30.
[273] Early in 1947, the Economic and Social Council raised concerns over the duplication of efforts among UNICEF, FAO and WHO but chose not to intervene. Because there is no evidence of further concern on the part of the Council, it appears that the agencies reached acceptable compromises to continue to work together. See for example E/ICEF/14, *Summary Report of the Fifth Meeting, 28 February 1947*; E/ICEF/23, Annex 3, *Report of FAO-WHO Committee on Child Nutrition (to advise ICEF), 23-26 July, 1947*; E/ICEF/129, *Report of the Executive Director to the 93rd Meeting of the Programme Committee to be held on 20 October 1949, New York City*.
[274] Two representatives of the FAO attended the ICEF Executive Board meeting for the first time on February 24, 1947. E/ICEF/13, *Summary Record of the Fourth Meeting, Lake Success, New York 24 February 1947*, 1.

expressed “sympathy and desire to cooperate to the fullest possible extent with the ICEF.” He noted that "the Fund's objective was closely connected with FAO's basic interest in higher nutrition levels, the promotion of food programmes for underprivileged groups, and the development of the agricultural production of food." He also stated that the World Food Survey, conducted the previous summer, had made suggestions on how to increase levels of agricultural production to meet post war levels, and that the FAO could send missions to various countries to study agricultural issues.[275] The other FAO representative present at the meeting, Miss Ritchie, stated that "the Nutrition Division of the FAO was particularly interested in the work of the Fund" and “would cooperate in establishing an international technical advisory group for children's meals.”[276]

Thus the relationship between the ICEF and the FAO began cordially and only improved over time. This can be directly attributed to two factors: one, that the ICEF and the FAO were not competing for funds, having established very different bases for their operations; and two, that the ICEF's goals complemented those of the FAO, making cooperation easier because of the total lack of competition. Since the FAO had never envisioned itself as a provider of aid, preferring instead to be an advisory body, it willingly shared its information with the ICEF which would be the distribution arm of food aid for children and mothers. Both organizations combined their efforts to create effective child feeding programs using the information and personnel they had at their disposal.

Martha Eliot had disclosed the results of her survey coincidentally with the grant-in-aid the ICEF had obtained from the US government in June, 1947. During the next month, the ICEF received a copy of a report compiled jointly by the FAO and the United Nations World Health Organization Interim Commission on the state of Child Nutrition, which focused on “War-stricken Countries of Europe and in China” in 1947.[277]

The report, created "To advise ICEF," illustrates the immediate effort between the ICEF and the FAO to work cooperatively. It included detailed summaries of the FAO’s study of child and maternal nutrition, concluding that a lack of protein and calories constituted the “primary nutritional deficiency.” It also prescribed the means for providing adequate supplements to specialized groups by offering a variety of foods. The report segregated aid recipients into specific groups in order to take into account the often vastly different nutritional needs of pregnant and lactating mothers, infants, toddlers, school age children and adolescents. It also noted the differences found in the needs of adolescent girls and boys.[278] The report concluded by stating that

> There can be no more important objective than the salvaging of damaged child life and the building of strong and healthy men and women who can play a full part in the reconstruction of a devastated world. The world cannot hope for a better future unless it looks after its children… [and] international action to promote the well-being of

[275] Statement made by FAO representative to the Executive Board of the ICEF on February 28, 1947. E/ICEF/14, 2.
[276] E/ICEF/14, 3.
[277] E/ICEF/23, Annex 3, 31.
[278] See E/ICEF/23, 5-7; 34-42.

> mothers and children will, moreover, foster a spirit of friendship and cooperation between nations.[279]

Clearly, the Fund's objectives in no way overlapped with the efforts of the FAO, and the two organizations seemed to be in complete agreement over their respective roles in combating world hunger. Each had an interest in supporting "higher nutrition levels, the promotion of food programmes for under-privileged groups, and the development of agricultural production of food" and they could achieve these goals without duplicating work.[280] The FAO also noted that it would help to set up an international advisory group "for children's meals" in conjunction with both the ICEF and WHO.[281] These were of great importance to the ICEF, whose still precarious budget status made any assistance that would help it realize its eventual goal of feeding children worldwide welcome.

With the help of the FAO, its World Food Survey, and its study of the nutritional needs of children and mothers, the ICEF further legitimated the critical need for food aid. Questions remained, however, as to the actual number of children and mothers who would require assistance, how the aid would be distributed, and what type of food aid would be available for distribution. The ICEF turned first to data collected by UNRRA, to try and discern an initial number of recipients.

By the end of 1946, UNRRA had created an estimate of the number of children, nursing mothers and pregnant women requiring aid in the urban areas only of countries liberated by the Allied forces. In addition, the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, or OFFRO, had identified "250,000 vagabond children reported to be moving about in Yugoslavia," as well as statistical information on Norway, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Czechoslovakia and Poland.[282] Reports separated mothers and child populations into specific groups, including children aged 0-4, 5-9, and 10-14, children under one, and pregnant women. The introduction to the tables for each nation noted that "children under one year are listed instead of the number of nursing mothers as it is generally assumed in census work that children of this age are nursing."[283]

A mother's importance factored heavily in these conclusions, and her almost exclusive role in ensuring the survival of a child began immediately after birth. This was further supported by studies conducted in England from 1899 to 1911 that noted infant mortality could be directly linked to improper infant feeding, which most often meant any method other than breastfeeding.[284] Social welfare historian Deborah Dwork's

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[279] E/ICEF/23, 45.
[280] E/ICEF/14, 2.
[281] E/ICEF/14, 3.
[282] Letter from J.H. Hildring, Major General, Chief, Civil Affairs Division, War Department, to the Honorable Herbert H. Lehman, Director, Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, 27 August 1943; Memorandum and Report from David Weintraub to Mr. Lithgow Osborne, Department of State, Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, May 21, 1943. National Archives, Maryland Facility. Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, General Subject File 1942-1943, Record Group 169, File Location 169.5.
[283] Weintraub Memorandum and Report, 2.
[284] Deborah Dwork writes that great concern existed over the fitness of British men for military service as well as the declining birth rate and high rates of infant mortality, all of which indicated in their nineteenth century context that Britain could be facing national decline. This was an issue that led to closer examinations of the reasons for infant mortality. See Deborah Dwork, *War is Good for Babies and Other*

examination of infant feeding programs in England during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries posits that most studies concluded that milk other than that provided by its mother was likely to be contaminated; Dwork points to an article published in *The Journal of Hygiene* in 1903, which claims that infants fed with substances other than breast milk were "much more likely to suffer [and die] from diarrhea than those who receive the food nature intended for them."[285] In contrast, programs begun in France at the same time that provided sterilized milk to mothers for infant feeding to supplement breast feeding and the "results were truly wonderful."[286] Instead of the higher than usual death rate found among bottle-fed infants, babies fed through these *gouttes de lait*, or milk depots, gained weight and thrived.[287] Set up partially in response to France's depopulation concerns,[288] this practice became widely used in both urban and rural areas, and received funding from both government and private sources.[289] Mothers had therefore become crucial to the survival of their children, but statistically invisible. What mattered most was not how many mothers England or France could boast, but the number of healthy, thriving infants who survived their first few years of life, thereby mitigating fears about the health of the nation based on depopulation concerns. Reports used to determine the number of individuals who would require aid from the ICEF easily relied on these notions, that mothers and children comprised an inextricably linked and therefore homogenous group.

The statement made in the US report regarding the view of children's reliance on their mothers, especially in the first year of life, combined with traditions established in earlier child feeding programs, reinforced the ICEF's claim that children could not survive without the care of a mother. This meant that mothers required the ICEF's care to support them in their role as the primary source of nutrition and guardian of the health of children, and could thus be included in the ICEF's recipient population.

UNRRA's statistics proved to be less useful than the ICEF had hoped. The ICEF needed more accurate, up to date numbers in order to make the best use of its resources to provide the kind of nutritional supplements recommended by the FAO, and therefore came to rely on reports from individual governments making applications to the

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Young Children: A History of the Infant and Child Welfare Movement in England, 1898-1918 (London: Tavistock Publications, 1987) , 20, 23, 26, 52.

[285]An early twentieth century study concluded that infant feeding played a critical role in the survival of a child, and that breast milk was best, since much of the cow's milk and evaporated milk provided to infants contained bacteria and other contaminants that led to infant illness and death. Additional studies provided staggering statistics when correlating infant mortality rate and breast feeding, one of which noted that infants fed with anything other than breast milk were those most at risk to die. Analysis by H. Meredith Richards, in the *Journal of Hygiene* (1903) in Dwork, 29.

[286] Ibid., 98-99.

[287]Dwork points to the work of Pierre Budin during his tenure as Chef de Service at the Charité Hospital in Paris, where he established infant clinics. She notes that, even though he focused on breast feeding as the primary food source, his program provided sterilized cow's milk as well which often caused mothers who began his program as breast feeders to cease breast feeding in favor of the sterilized milk. His work caused an appreciable drop in infant death rates. Another practitioner, Dr. Leon Dufour, was the first to set up *gouttes de lait*, which Dwork notes became a popular term for places providing maternal and infant care as well as supplies of sterilized milk for infant feeding. See Dwork, 98-101.

[288] Like their British counterparts, the French feared that the combination of a declining birth rate and an increasing infant mortality rate would relegate France to a lesser place in the hierarchy of nations. Dwork, 94-95.

[289] Ibid., 101.

ICEF for aid. Having already received its initial spate of applications, the ICEF began to make plans for the distribution of food aid.

Pate spearheaded the food aid efforts which he based, according to Helenka Pantaleoni, "on the old Hoover model."[290] Hoover, who continued to remain outside the ICEF, bequeathed his methods for organizing, collecting payments and distributing aid established during the ARA to the ICEF's food programs. It should be noted that, like the ARA before it, the ICEF had agreed to distribute clothing as a part of its food aid program, but clothing distribution never achieved the level of success of food aid in either organization. ARA historian H. H. Fisher notes that in 1922, the ARA faced many challenges in its attempts to provide clothing packages to Soviet institutions and individuals, since "clothing packages had to be adaptable."[291] For example, the ARA program in Russia during the early 1920s provided packages containing the components to make clothing, including woolen cloth, muslin, needles, thread, and buttons, and it sold each package for $27.50 US.[292] This type of aid also relied on the assumption that someone possessed the skills to make clothing once they had the package. In the end, Fisher notes that "though in no way comparable with the food remittance operation, the Clothing Remittances were a useful supplement to the other departments of relief."[293] Food, on the other hand, posed no such challenges, given its acceptability "to both sexes of all ages and sizes."[294] Food aid, therefore, became the primary component of the ARA's distribution focus, a trend that continued with the ICEF.

Food distribution under the Hoover model relied heavily on creating districts based on a country's already-existing infrastructure of roads, rail lines and public facilities.[295] Each district had several food remittance delivery stations that took advantage of sites such as schools and post offices, and supplemental meals for children were most often provided through a school feeding program, "the teacher serving as kitchen manager."[296] These programs constituted Hoover's most successful work with the ARA; when examining the statistics of the total number of individuals fed through the ARA's programs, the number of children fed is always greater that the number of adults.[297]

While distributing food assistance to children through schools had been in existence in the early 1900's, Hoover's method, perhaps influenced by the loss of his own mother and his need to rely on others for survival, redefined the role of mothers in distributing aid.[298] Early school meal programs, which grew out of the infant health

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[290] Pantaleoni Interview, 23.
[291] Fisher, 424.
[292] Ibid.
[293] Ibid., 425.
[294] Ibid., 424.
[295] In Fisher, see especially Chapter VII, "The Russian Transport Crisis"; Chapter IX, "Distributing the Corn"; Chapter X, "Skirmishes on the Home Front"; and Chapter XVI, "The Last Days," all of which provide information regarding aid distribution and the use of infrastructure.
[296] Fisher, 101; see also 94, 306, as well as the RIGA agreement between the ARA and the Soviet Republic which clarifies who will be fed through the ARA's programs, included in Fisher, 507.
[297] Fisher provides a series of statistical charts for the numbers of persons fed through ARA programs in Russia; for each month and location, two numbers are provided, the total number of children fed, and the total number of adults fed. Fisher, 556-57.
[298] Pat Thane writes that the provision of meals via schools was formalized in the Education (Provision of Meals) Act of 1906 which, though financed through voluntary contributions, did not penalize poor children

movement, were not designed to relieve mothers of the primary responsibility of caring for their children. According to Deborah Dwork, programs established in the early 20th century expanded the role of women in public health by providing employment in women-identified occupations as "school nurses, infant health visitors, and general health visitors."[299] These programs, however, focused more on "education and the maintenance of health itself" rather than on usurping the mother's role in the life of her child.[300] Indeed, frequent home visits from health workers placed mothers under scrutiny for the care of all of their children whether in school or not.[301] Under the ARA and the ICEF, however, the follow up visits were eliminated since most food distribution occurred "through group feeding," perhaps removing mothers from the indignity of official scrutiny, but usurping them of their responsibility for feeding their school aged children.[302] Instead of retaining primary responsibility for caring for their children's needs, mothers found themselves eligible to receive food aid but only in conjunction with their children. Relieved of the role to portion out food, mothers found themselves in an increasingly dependent role. Mother's role, therefore, received less consideration under the ICEF's programs than it had in state-run social welfare programs, which historian Susan Pedersen notes have been viewed by feminist theorists as having been "deeply structured along gender lines, distributing rights-based entitlements to men for both themselves and for their wives and children and providing lesser, means-tested assistance to women only in the absence of men"[303] while still allowing mothers to tend to their children and distribute aid as they saw fit. The ICEF, then, may have adopted this method of providing assistance to children and their mothers in an attempt to ensure both groups had a better chance at becoming full participants in the new world which was emerging after World War II. It seems more likely, however, that this method of dispensing food aid conformed more to Hoover's model. Highly efficient, it nevertheless increased and reinforced a woman's sole identification with her reproductive capacity and mother's role as a dependent, of either the children's wage earning father or another primary provider.

School meal programs appealed to the ICEF mostly because they ensured that aid would reach its intended recipients, and because they conformed to the ICEF's commitment to partner with local institutions and agencies to provide assistance. The premises behind choosing this method, however, received little consideration. Problems resulted from assumptions that rural children had not suffered nearly as much as their urban counterparts. In his report to the Executive Committee, Dr. Meiklejohn clearly stated that "…the total child population up to eighteen years, is about forty million with one and a half million pregnant mothers. Naturally not all of these are now in need of

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whose parents could not afford to make a contribution. This act, according to Thane, was the first time schools became an instrument of public welfare. It was followed by a second act in 1914 which was funded by a subsidy from the Exchequer. This subsequent act provided meals based on an assessment of a child's health and also was not contingent on parental income. Thane, 75-76.

[299] Dwork, 204.

[300] Ibid., 206.

[301] Ibid., 204-6.

[302] UNICEF's Programme Committee discussed the merits of distribution, and agreed that group feeding seemed most efficient; they did, however, acknowledge "practical difficulties in some instances" and referred the matter to the Executive Board for further discussion and debate. E/ICEF/23, 5.

[303] Pedersen, 10.

relief, because a substantial portion live in self-sufficient farming communities," implying that rural areas that had engaged in farming prior to the war had experienced little disruption, and needed less help than urban communities.[304] This attitude persisted despite the fact that the FAO's Food Survey had indicated a "…destruction of dairy herds during the war…[and a current] shortage of feedstuffs for livestock." In addition, the FAO projected that "the 1947 crop, expected to be poor, would affect the feeding of livestock" as well as the human population.[305] The ICEF's aid recipient, then, became identified as one who lived in an urban area.

Ideological shifts away from placing primary responsibility for the well being of a child solely on a parent had occurred as well, providing the ICEF with further justification to establish itself as the primary provider for needy children and mothers.[306] Pat Thane reports that, during the 1870's, the notion that children were the responsibility of their families changed to the belief that children should be protected from the rigors of the adult world, educated and assisted by morally good adults other than their parents.[307] The ICEF assumed this role, thereby relieving mothers of the full responsibility to ensure children received the assistance the ICEF provided. This also illustrates why the ICEF created such a critical role for itself in supporting the well-being of children.

Having established its preferred method for distributing food aid despite its flaws, the ICEF faced its next problem: deciding what type of food aid it would be able to provide. The FAO's study recommended providing an increased number of calories and a variety of foods, and it hoped the ICEF's food aid could prevent a crisis in maternal and child health in Europe by "perpetuating feeding schemes."[308] The FAO declared "consumption of any available foods containing carbohydrates, fats and proteins" could quickly restore the health of a nursing mother, while "cereals [and] potatoes" could serve as an economical source of calories in an emergency. Since relatively cheap foods could satisfy fat and carbohydrate requirements, it proposed that "the more expensive foods which are of value chiefly as a source of protein" should be provided so the body would not use its precious protein stores for energy instead of for repairing tissues.[309] Its list of acceptable proteins included skim milk, dried and canned fish, and canned meat.

Minerals and vitamins, too, constituted a critical part of the supplemental diet to be provided. Martha Eliot remembered that "the countries all wanted this, and we worked out the plans as to how the vitamins would be provided in cod liver oil. Cod liver oil became a staple article for UNICEF to send," especially to Eastern European countries.[310] The FAO had also endorsed providing cod liver oil as well as whole milk products, calcium salts, green vegetables, and tomatoes to both mothers and children to ensure they received the required vitamins.

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[304] E/ICEF/12, 1.
[305] E/ICEF/14, 2.
[306] Thane writes that social investigation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century led to a "…greater understanding of the complex causes of poverty," among them temporary unemployment and chronic underemployment, leading to the conclusions that even the worst forms of poverty were "…not self inflicted." Thane, 38.
[307] Thane, 42.
[308] E/ICEF/23, 33.
[309] E/ICEF/23, 34-35.
[310] Eliot Interview, 205.

Faced with the challenge of having far less financial capacity than necessary to provide such a variety of foods, the ICEF began to search for the most efficient means of providing the fats, proteins, carbohydrates, vitamins and minerals deemed necessary to sustain life. The FAO had concluded that in lieu of providing a variety of foods, "much can be achieved by the careful and well-organized expenditure of money and effort on the feeding and care of necessitous mothers and children."[311] What food product, the ICEF mused, could meet the most needs and be efficiently distributed? They found their answer in milk.

Cow's milk, according to the FAO, met at least some of the nutritional needs of mothers and children of all ages. It provided protein, vitamins, and fats, and contributed substantially to an individual's calorie intake in its whole form. Despite earlier concerns over its safe use in feeding young children, developments in sterilizing milk for human consumption had erased virtually all concerns over its potability. In fact, a memorandum regarding rations for infants, children and pregnant and nursing mothers from William M. Schmidt, M.D., dated September 10, 1943 noted that only one can of condensed milk could be provided each week to individuals in the relief program, and that this should be given to "infants (other than those breast-fed)" and that "older children and pregnant and nursing mothers should be allowed sufficient quantities of food (other than milk) from the general stock."[312]

A U.S. National Research Council study entitled "The Role of Milk in American Culture," conducted in 1943, examined this phenomenon further and explains in part why the ICEF embraced milk as its primary food aid product.[313] Used by UNRRA, it assisted in dispelling any worries about using milk as a dietary supplement for infants, since concerns still existed over its safety as a replacement for breast milk. The study endeavored to uncover a general pattern in milk consumption among children, women and men in the US that would provide clues for changing any prevailing negative attitudes.[314] The study also included a cultural history of milk consumption, and reveals how the prescribed roles of children, women and men in a family context were reinforced through the ICEF's use of milk as its primary form of food aid.

Natalie A. Joffe, a Technical Assistant for the Committee on Food Habits at the National Research Council, researched and wrote Part A of the study. It traced the origins of milk to central Asia or the Near East, noting that milk arrived in the colonial U.S. in the form of dairying. Most other milking animals were eliminated in favor of the cow, by 1943, a practice "entrenched in our economy."[315] So entrenched, in fact, that the term milk, which Joffe noted could be applied to "any mammary secretion," had by the 1940s, taken on a "very definite connotation in… [U.S.] culture. Specifically, it is whole cow's milk, fresh, pasteurized, white, fluid and cold."[316]

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[311] E/ICEF/23, 45.
[312] Memorandum from William M. Schmidt, M.D., regarding the Rations for Infants, Children and Pregnant and Nursing Mothers in Relief Programs, September 10, 1943. National Archives, Maryland Facility, Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, General Subject File 1942-1943, Record Group 169, File Location 169.5.
[313] Patricia Woodward, Natalie F. Joffe, Marjorie Janis and Eva Shippee, *The Role of Milk in American Culture* (Washington, D.C.: Committee on Food Habits, National Research Council, 1943).
[314] Woodward et. al., 1-2.
[315] Ibid., 3.
[316] Ibid.

Joffe had keen perceptions regarding the deep social and emotional connections between women, children and milk. She presented information that explains a great deal about programs such as the ICEF's that provided milk as their principle form of food relief. In particular, her treatise regarding the changing perceptions of women's breasts—a part of the body that, according to Joffe, belonged either to infants or husbands—explains an overall decline in breastfeeding by American women, allowing cow's milk to supplant breast milk as an ideal food for infants.[317] She wrote,

> Milk is now regarded by a great many people as the perfect infant food…However, this emphasis has arisen gradually and is a shift in affect (emotional response) from human milk to cow's milk. Until comparatively recent times all babies in this country were nursed, and when the child could not be fed in this way, it often was regarded as a real tragedy. Because of this emphasis, the breasts of an adult woman had little sexual connotation.[318]

She noted that first generation immigrant mothers were much more likely to practice breast feeding than their counterparts born in the US; however, as a woman had more children and lived longer in the US, she became less inclined to breast feed. She attributed this shift to the changing role of the female breast, claiming that in "societies where the human breast is outside the realm of consideration as a love object for the adult male" women used no other feeding methods for infants. However, she was quick to point out that "Quite the contrary is now true in most strata of American society," where "the quickening changes in the tempo of American life and the widening opportunities for women's activities." The female breast was "no longer considered primarily an organ of nutrition, 'child's property.' The desirability of a firm, full bosom has become of great importance in this society…The female breast has become more and more an object of sexual adoration, 'man's property.'"[319]

Joffe pointed out that despite the changing role of women's breasts, nutritional authorities did not consider cow's milk a perfect food for babies. It lacked vitamin C, they said, and did not contain the necessary nutrients in proper balance to ensure a baby thrived. Joffe also presented other reasons why, despite the advice and counsel of experts, that many persisted in the belief that cow's milk constituted a perfect food for infants and children. These included milk's color, which many believed indicated its purity, and its connection with the word 'pasteurization,' which endowed milk with the fundamental premise of being germ free and thus more healthy. Less good for babies and only partially required for the health of most other groups, she concluded ironically that "the pregnant woman or nursing mother benefits by a high intake of milk as part of her regular diet…[and make up a group] for whom milk is considered essential."[320]

Having established milk facts in Part A, Part B of the study correlated the results of surveys taken by a broad group of individuals in order to find out how they felt about

[317] Ibid., 10.
[318] Ibid., 9-10.
[319] Ibid.
[320] Ibid., 14.

milk, especially their attitudes toward a possible milk shortage. Children mentioned milk as a snack, and some claimed it had "almost magical properties"; one respondent stated that "If less milk were available, I think a good deal of people would be sick and die. Also if milk was harder to get those children would die, and if all children grew up sickly or died, what kind of world would this be?"[321]

These attitudes prevailed not only among children, but with adults as well. The researchers found adults hard pressed to come up with a substitute for milk in the case of a shortage, as they did not know what foods could take its place. Teachers, they found, had overwhelmingly used their role as an adult authority figure to stress the importance of milk consumption to their students, and, in the end, it became apparent that milk had achieved the status of "a perfect food" among US children and adults; "there is no substitute for milk and we can't get along with less."[322]

Pate immediately embraced providing milk for children, and it became the one food item that defined ICEF food aid during its early years. It not only enjoyed almost universal appeal in public opinion—a fact that Pate must have understood would cast the ICEF in a positive light and help it gain support for its food programs—it was available in abundant supply in the US. Helenka Pantaleoni remembered that "masses of milk was sent over [to Europe]."[323]

Martha Eliot recalled that, in order to efficiently package and ship this milk, the ICEF relied on a milk drying process that had been perfected prior to the war in the US. Milk was sprayed onto large, heated rollers that removed the liquid and pulverized the resulting solid in a simultaneous process, creating a powder. This skim milk powder contained the necessary proteins and vitamins required by children and mothers, did not spoil in the transportation process, and could be immediately reconstituted with a minimal amount of water.[324] More importantly, the US had an abundant supply, as it had been produced in mass quantities for use during the war for the Allied troops. Powdered milk provided an almost perfect solution for everyone involved, but Eliot raised a caution. "Skimmed milk carried all the calcium from milk which was needed, but it didn't have the fats, and therefore the vitamin A which ordinarily comes in milk was limited."[325] Even with this limitation, skimmed milk conformed to Hoover's efficient funding and distribution models, met the basic nutritional requirements as established by the FAO and the ICEF, and could be easily distributed to children and mothers through already existing institutions. Its biggest drawback, an unappetizing flavor, vexed the Board for a brief time—what could make this powdered milk more appealing to children? Pate, who personally tasted the milk once it had been returned to its liquid form, came up with the solution: he tried adding cocoa to the milk powder.[326] From that point on, producers added cocoa to the powdered milk supplied by the ICEF.

Pantaleoni remembered that, despite its rather unenthusiastic position on the ICEF, the US government made sure to let all concerned know that it had provided the powdered milk being distributed by the ICEF. "When we sent the dried skimmed milk,

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[321] Ibid., 19.
[322] Ibid., 31.
[323] Pantaleoni Interview, 13.
[324] Balinska notes that "…Americans had perfected a method of pulverizing milk…" which left it "…very rich in proteins and vitamins…" and "…easy to ship and still easier to convert [to liquid]." Balinska, 210.
[325] Eliot Interview, 204.
[326] Balinska, 206.

there were big letters all over those drums saying 'Gift of the United States People,' so this did make propaganda for the United States…except it gave a little bit unbalanced picture of the situation."[327]

By September, 1947, the ICEF had created plans of operation for eight countries.[328] The Board, which by now had established a Programme Committee to oversee the administration of individual national programs, reported that "In general, assistance was to be given through group feeding…whole milk was to be furnished only to children up to 1 year old…[and] The assistance furnished would be increased to the extent that shipping costs were borne by the recipient country."[329] It therefore maintained its work plan, adhered to the recommendation of the FAO regarding infants, and remained true to its commitment of supporting self help. By October, its overall operating budget had increased with the addition of funds from Canada, France and Norway, and by March of 1948, the Board had decided to establish permanent missions to China, the Southwest Pacific and South America in order to expand its programs to these areas as well.[330] The Report of the Survey Mission to the Far East (Other than China) resulted in recommendations for eleven additional countries and, by the following year, recommendations had been made for both China and for nations in Latin America.[331]

After disbursing its initial milk shipments, the ICEF conducted its own survey of children, parents, and teachers in Europe regarding their opinions concerning extra milk and other rations to school children in order to ascertain the effectiveness of its programs. The actual survey results do not survive; but that the ICEF conducted the survey at all demonstrates the primary importance of milk in the ICEF's food programs.

The survey, presented to the Board in August 1948, began with questions for children. The first three questions, filled in by an ICEF worker prior to handing the actual survey to the child, required the child to provide its age, its sex, and the "Profession of the father."[332] The child then answered a series of queries regarding the number of brothers and sisters living in the home, how much they liked milk as a snack, and why they thought milk was good for their health. Several assumptions inherent in the survey included the notion that children in Europe viewed milk in the same way as children in the U.S., and, more importantly, that mother, not mentioned but implied, remained at home to care for her children.

Parents, too, had their own survey, and it also began with three questions—the Profession of the father, the ages of all children living in the home, and the number of rooms in the house. These questions clearly established individual eligibility for the ICEF's programs, and helped it compile statistical data on the number of children and mothers requiring ICEF assistance. The survey went on to inquire about what 'parents'—essentially, the mother—thought about milk as a snack, how much milk a child should drink, and who should pay for any supplemental snacks or meals provided

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[327] Pantaleoni Interview, 17.
[328] These countries were Austria, Greece, Italy, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Finland and Hungary. E/ICEF/23, 1.
[329] E/ICEF/23, 5.
[330] E/ICEF/25, 4-5.
[331] E/ICEF/72, *Report of the Survey Mission to the Far East (Other Than China)*, 2.
[332] E/ICEF/77, *Report of the Session of the Medical Sub-Committee Held at Paris UNICEF Headquarters 9-10 August 1948*, 22.

by a school feeding program. The part of the survey intended for teachers remained the most benign in terms of its gendered perceptions. It only asked six questions, most of them concerning how much time, if any, should be taken from the school day to feed children.

Having collected information regarding the number of eligible participants and their opinions of its school feeding programs, the ICEF made adjustments to reach its specified clientele. This survey provides irrefutable proof that food aid programs were intended to rely on an idealized, Western idea of post-war families, one that specified the proper roles of father as supplier, mother as care-taker, and children as recipients. The ICEF had also begun to define its role in this Westernized ideal. With men absent from their families or unable to provide for their children, the ICEF confidently assumed the place of surrogate father. The ICEF concluded that when children had milk and a mother to ensure smooth operations, everything would be fine.[333]

Armed with the results of its survey by December, 1948, the Programme Committee began to study "Factors Affecting the General Milk Situation" and had summarized the plans for updating its feeding operations in at least twelve European countries by the following February.[334] The Board also produced a report entitled "Summarized Plans of Feeding Operations in Europe" that noted "UNICEF supplies are matched" and provided statistical information on the "principal categories of beneficiaries in the…feeding plans."[335] By March, reports noted that "A child food unit…[which] consists of 240 calories daily for a period of six months of milk, and fats and cocoa" could be reallocated as necessary to ensure the proper feeding of the child, pregnant mother and nursing mother population.[336] Throughout 1949, the ICEF continued to expand its food aid programs, and eventually installed them in regions of the world not affected by the war—a development Rajchman seems to have planned for when writing his charter. By 1950, Pate reported that the ICEF had shipped "more than 30,000 tons of supplies valued at more than $9,000,000.00…The bulk of the tonnage …resulted from the shipment of dried skim milk."[337]

For decades afterward, the ICEF became identified almost exclusively as the organization that provided milk to poor children the world over.[338] Countless photographs pictured smiling children holding tin cups above their heads about to receive milk, the magic elixir of life, from the ICEF, their benevolent provider. Pate, with the Hoover model to guide him, had catapulted the ICEF toward resolving the problem of helping to abate hunger on an international level. This success inspired Hoover to write the following poem in 1959 after having spent years studying what hunger could do to children and to nations:

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[333] Sheila Tacon interviewed by Jennifer Morris, October 16, 1998.

[334] Countries included Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. See E/ICEF/88, *Report and Recommendations of the UNICEF-FAO Panel of Dairy Experts*; E/ICEF/10A, *Summarized Plans of Feeding Operations in Europe,* 1.

[335] E/ICEF/10A, 3, 20.

[336] E/ICEF/107, *Compilation of Major UNICEF Policies*. 4.

[337] E/ICEF/155, 9.

[338] Ritchie Calder wrote in 1962 that an infant boy in Thailand whose mother had died in childbirth regained his health through "…careful milk-dieting…" administered by UNICEF. Ritchie Calder, "Growing up with UNICEF," *Public Affairs Pamphlet No. 330* (New York: Public Affairs Committee, 1962), 2.

I am the stalking aftermath of all wars.
Pestilence is my companion.
Tumult and Revolution arise around my feet.
We kill more than all of the guns.
I breed fears and hates that bring man to more wars,
From me comes no peace to mankind.
My legacy is to the children of famine—
Stunted bodies and twisted minds.[339]

Its dedication to eradicating child hunger earned the ICEF a reputation for being one of the best-known and least controversial UN operations. In addition, its dedication to preserving the Western ideal of the family helped to keep U.S. criticism of its programs to a minimum, particularly until the mid-1950s during its early operations in Europe. While Pate worked to ensure the ICEF could eliminate hunger, Rajchman began establishing the foundation for programs that would attempt to eliminate disease.

[339] Hoover, *An American Epic*, vii.

Chapter Six
Diseases

While Pate established the ICEF's food programs, Rajchman focused his energies on what he knew best—contagious and epidemic diseases. Milk programs, he knew, would provide immediate relief to the millions of children and mothers, but his experiences had taught him they needed more. He therefore became obsessed with using two recently developed drugs to treat the post-war European population. Penicillin and the Calmette-Guerin Bacillus vaccine, or BCG, an anti-tuberculin vaccine, available in significant amounts for the first time, promised to change the course of health care for children and mothers treated through ICEF medical programs. Choosing the treatments led to the choice of diseases the ICEF would treat. BCG would be used to prevent the spread of tuberculosis, while penicillin would be used to treat the rapidly growing number of cases of syphilis in the mother and child population. Rajchman, who had for years believed disease could be wiped out worldwide by implementing aggressive prevention and treatment programs, began to hope this goal could be reached through the ICEF.

While at the Pasteur Institute, Rajchman seems to have realized that the way in which Pasteur's discoveries had been conveyed could have other applications. In theory, information radiated outward from its point of origin then expanded, gaining international acceptance as it progressed.[340] Science historian Bruno Latour supports this notion, stating that "To convince someone that an experiment has succeeded, that a technique is effective…there must be more than one actor." He goes on to note that "If, to explain the "diffusion" of Pasteur's ideas, we had nothing more than the force of Pasteur and his collaborators, those ideas would never have left the walls of the Ecole Normale laboratory…An idea…never moves on its own accord." [341] Rajchman likely became convinced that this model could have a practical application in immunology, creating a process through which individuals across the globe could effectively be treated for and immunized against contagious diseases. Proof of his commitment to this notion during his tenure as Health Director for the League of Nations is evident in his ambitious attempts to include as many countries as possible in the League's health programs. That he did not achieve his goals through the League of Nations did not deter Rajchman, however, for in 1946 a new vehicle for treating disease on a global scale emerged. Having obtained the means to procure penicillin and BCG, thought to be effective new weapons in the war against disease, he and the ICEF quietly planned a war of their own.

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[340] Bruno Latour examines the rapid diffusion of the research and findings in Pasteur's laboratory, noting that "…in no other scientific or technical innovation has there been so short a route between fundamental research and its rapid, far-reaching application."(8) By reviewing three publications from the period, Latour documents "…the network of associations that slowly made up the Pasteurian world" (12) and explains that though initial ideas may generate from an individual or a lab, a "…multitude of people is necessary to diffuse the discoveries made… " (14) See Bruno Latour, *The Pasteurization of France* trans. Alan Sheridan and John Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), 8, 12, 14, 15-16.

[341] Latour, 14-15. Donald Stokes discusses the tensions between scientific experiment and applied use in the context of the twentieth century U.S., noting that the widely accepted notion regarding the movement of ideas up to and after World War II relied on the notion that information moved outward in a series of stages, the first being basic research, the last being development and application. See Donald E. Stokes, *Pasteur's Quadrant: Basic Science and Technological Innovation* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 3, 5, 7, 10-11.

He had two primary goals. The program would combat the spread of tuberculosis by cooperating with international efforts already under way, and would, with penicillin, attempt to deal the fatal blow to syphilis, a disease that had plagued Western Europe for over 500 years.

Eradicating widespread syphilis and tuberculosis, both of which had been epidemic prior to 1939, was complicated by the lack of governmental infrastructures in many countries after the war which left countless individuals without access to even the most basic types of health care. Choosing these two diseases, however, proved easy for Rajchman and the other members of the Board. BCG had been extremely effective in preventing individuals from contracting tuberculosis, and syphilis could be effectively treated with a course of penicillin treatments—the first real syphilis cure.[342] Rajchman's eventual announcement that the ICEF planned to "eradicate diseases, especially the fight against venereal diseases and tuberculosis" clearly illustrates his bold ambitions; it also created an immediate need for the ICEF to collaborate with the UN's World Health Organization (WHO).[343]

Talk of forming a United Nations health organization modeled after the Health Section of the League of Nations began in earnest during the summer of 1946. Dr. Henry Van Zile Hyde recalled that up to "1945, there was very little interest in what was going on in health; it was a sideline." By the time the UN convened its conference in San Francisco, however, health professionals, concerned about the omission of any reference to matters of health in the original draft of the UN charter, "got together and decided something should be included in the Charter on health. They introduced a resolution, but found that it was too late by the time they got around to introducing it, but that a declaration could be introduced." This declaration led to the insertion of health "as one of the ways which there could be a specialized agency."[344] But as a specialized agency, the proposed health organization would be subjected to the UN's approval process, which meant establishing an interim commission, drafting a resolution, receiving acceptance from a specified number of member nations, then awaiting final approval from the General Assembly—the very process the FAO had carefully planned for and the ICEF had avoided.

The Economic and Social Council took the first steps when it convened the International Health Conference on February 15, 1946. Martha Eliot recalled that "…ECOSOC, in a meeting on the 15th of February, 1946, did adopt a resolution recommending that an international conference be called…they established a technical preparatory committee."[345] Though Eliot had "…no specific relationship with this interim commission," Hyde worked on the first draft of its constitution in his capacity as a member of the staff of the US Surgeon General's office, participating later as a member of the Committee that convened in March. He served as Secretary for the drafting committee, and recalled that his primary contribution to the document "was taking the 'whereas' out of it."[346]

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[342] J.D. Oriel, *The Scars of Venus: A History of Venereology* (London: Springer-Verlag, 1994), 98-99.
[343] E/ICEF/33, *Consultation Concerning the Proposal of the French Government to Establish an International Children's Centre in Paris. Summary Record of Consultation, Lake Success, New York, 26 September 1947,* 2.
[344] Hyde Interview, 15, 27.
[345] Eliot Interview, 182.
[346] Eliot Interview, 183; Hyde Interview, 25.

The document drafted in Paris received unanimous approval after slight revisions from the delegates to the International Health Conference held in Flushing Meadows, New York in June and July, 1946.[347] Martha Eliot attended the conference as the vice-chairman of the delegation from the United States, one of sixty-four nations at the meeting.[348] The conference established the general outline of the plan of work for the health organization, and required that twenty-six nations accept the constitution before it could come into being and hold world health assemblies.[349]

Of special concern to Eliot was the inclusion of specific language regarding maternal and child health and welfare, and she fought to have this included in the WHO constitution. "The draft constitution had a section in its preamble which drew attention to the importance of the 'healthy development of the child.'" For some reason, this item was objected to by some of the US delegation, a problem she attributed to the "basic problem between the Children's Bureau and the Public Health Service." She noted that the final wording, presented in a speech made by Canadian delegate Dr. Brock Chisholm "at my urging," was changed to read "the ability to live harmoniously in a changing total environment is essential to the healthy development of the child. I accomplished through Dr. Chisholm what I wanted!"[350]

Eliot did not stop there. She and Chisholm collaborated again to insist that the statement of functions of the organization include reference to maternal and child heath. The wording that resulted, "To promote maternal and child health and welfare," Eliot pointed out, included the reference to welfare because of her efforts. " It was I who put in 'and welfare'…Because I knew that many countries thought of welfare as including health…other countries, like the United States, separated them."[351]

Having achieved her primary goals to include maternal and child health concerns in the constitution of WHO, Eliot had also succeeded in placing the ICEF and WHO in direct competition for control over matters of child health. They would also battle over funds from the waning UNRRA, and would establish a relationship that required all of the cooperation but had none of the cordiality that the ICEF and the FAO enjoyed. Eliot pointed out that providing funds to WHO caused UNRRA to limit its contribution to the ICEF, eventually reducing its original pledge.[352] When asked whether or not a way could have been found to avoid the duplication in child health by the WHO and the ICEF, Eliot mused, "Well, if the language in the two constitutions…had been more specific or if there had been an explanation of the fact that each of these organizations was to be enabled to do child health, but that they should work it out together…We should remind ourselves that the overlap in the field of child health was not extensive or serious. So it was a matter of finding a way to solve this problem."[353]

Unfortunately, the ICEF and WHO had great difficulty in resolving these issues. From their first meeting in 1947, friction existed between them. The former insisted that it had a special responsibility to provide medical care to children and mothers, while the latter insisted that the Fund had been created uniquely for supplying food in an

[347] Hyde Interview, 31; Eliot Interview, 182.
[348] Eliot Interview, 182-183.
[349] Eliot Interview, 183.
[350] Eliot Interview, 184-185.
[351] Eliot Interview, 185.
[352] Eliot Interview, 215.
[353] Eliot Interview, 216.

emergency situation, and lacked the competence to undertake medical programs. At the Fourth Meeting of the ICEF Board, attended by Dr. Calderon, the Interim Commissioner of WHO, Rajchman stated that correspondence between the ICEF and WHO concerning a study of milk available for children and adolescents, monographs regarding the condition of children in countries affected by the war, and the training of medical and public health personnel had begun. He also noted that UNRRA had transferred "to WHO $1,500,000 to continue UNRRA medical activities, including the granting of study fellowships, in 1947."[354]

After Rajchman's comments, he introduced Calderon, who stated that "in the absence of the Executive Secretary of his Organization, he was unable to make statements of detail." Instead, he noted that WHO was sympathetic to the purposes of the Fund, and wished to support it, since "problems of children, especially of the youngest, were essentially problems of public health." He further stated that, at that time, he could not say what portion of a $500,000 grant for training fellowships could be allotted to the ICEF.[355] In complete contrast to the first presentation of the FAO, Calderon seems to have wanted to make clear that WHO would dictate to rather than cooperate with the ICEF.

That the Interim Commission participated in the Report on Child Nutrition prepared in conjunction with the FAO did little to warm relations between the two organizations, as WHO representatives considered their information a generous gift to the ICEF. Then Rajchman, who opened discussions on the proposal to establish a Children's Center in Paris for the study of medical issues at the October 1947 Board Meeting, unleashed a new wave of animosities. It appeared to WHO delegates that he was proposing an entirely new health organization that would focus on child health issues exclusively, thereby encroaching further on WHO's territory.

Co-sponsored by the French government, the main tasks of the Children's Center "would be international teaching and surveys, both of which are needed [to combat] the widespread shortage of medical personnel." The Center would be international in character, and would not limit its activities to any particular territory. Dr. Forrest, representing WHO at this meeting, "had some questions to put concerning the proposed Center." He expressed concern over the lack of precision in defining the Center's field, and noted that it did not seem to fit any category of international agency with which he was familiar. Would it be an international governmental agency or an international non-governmental agency? He concluded that since the League of Nations was concerned with the problems of Child Health before WHO was organized, and since WHO was taking over the functions formerly performed by the League of Nations, "the problems of child health are within the scope of the WHO."[356] Rajchman, a consummate diplomat, recognized the blow he had just struck. He calmly stated that" the representatives of the ICEF would make a statement in reply after the representatives of the other agencies" present at the meeting "had presented their views." It quickly became apparent that the other agencies felt "the French Government should be commended for its efforts in the interest of the problems of children," and that it could count on their cooperation. For the

[354] E/ICEF/13, 12.
[355] E/ICEF/13, 12.
[356] E/ICEF/33, 2-3.

rest of 1947, personnel of the ICEF and WHO eyed each other suspiciously, waiting to see who would make the next move.

Neither had to wait long. On January 29, 1948, WHO held a meeting of its Committee on Relations, and presented its new proposals regarding collaboration with the ICEF. France, Switzerland and Denmark had all made fellowship grants to the ICEF, over which WHO had been given control for distribution. The report stated that the fellowships could only be used to train ICEF personnel "in BCG work to be held in Denmark and other proposals in the field of fellowships are under consideration." It further stated that allocations would be made on the basis of "a number of factors," all at the discretion of WHO, including the allocations already made for food and the losses of medical personnel in the country concerned.[357]

WHO may have taken this narrow position, offering training only in tuberculosis prevention, partly because of Rajchman's insistence that maternal and child tuberculosis qualified as a post war emergency and therefore belonged to the ICEF. Tuberculosis, or TB, is caused by bacteria called *Mycobacterium tuberculosis*. TB is spread through the air from person to person when an infected individual coughs or sneezes; it settles primarily in the lungs, but can infect other parts of the body including the kidneys, spine and brain. Once the bacteria enter the body of a host through the mouth or nose, the most common form of transmission, it may take several weeks or longer before any symptoms appear, making TB more dangerous due to its invisibility during its most contagious stages.

As with most infectious diseases, TB usually spreads rapidly among members of a family whose most vulnerable members-usually babies, small children, and the elderly-constitute the highest overall number of fatalities. Once symptoms begin to present, they can include a persistent cough, pain in the chest, fever, loss of weight, night sweats and coughing up blood or phlegm-all of which appear only after the immune system of the host has been weakened.[358] The ICEF, in conjunction with the Danish Red Cross, wanted to augment tuberculosis vaccination programs already under way in parts of Europe to prevent the spread of this disease, often fatal to children in particular.

WHO, which had included this same type of health activity in its original mandate, often found its staff at odds with both the Red Cross and the ICEF. This situation was further exacerbated by the fact that, until WHO's constitution had been approved by the required number of countries and by the General Assembly, it had little choice but to accept the situation. Rajchman persisted in his quest to make the ICEF an integral part of the tuberculosis campaign. When WHO finally received its mandate in April, 1948, it became more willing to discuss the matter, the concern over its approval having been lifted.

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[357] WHO.IC/R/44/Rev. 3, Annexes 2 and 3, *Committee on Relations: Co-Operation with United Nations, Relations with UNICEF*.

[358] Evolving descriptions of the symptoms of tuberculosis can be found in a wide range of publications as well as on the World Wide Web. See for example: Addison Porter Dutcher, *Pulmonary Tuberculosis: its Pathology, Nature, Symptoms, Diagnosis, Prognosis, Causes, Hygiene, and Medical Treatment* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1875); Allen Kramer Kraus, *Environment and Resistance in Tuberculosis: a Presentation of the Environment and Resistance and Their Relation to the Pathology, Diagnosis, Symptoms and Treatment of Tuberculosis* (Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins Co., 1923); and L. Randol Barker, John R. Burton, Phillip D. Zieve, eds. and Thomas E. Finucane, assoc. ed., *Principles of Ambulatory Medicine* (Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins Co., 1998).

Eliot recalled that both the ICEF and WHO had planned to meet in Geneva in June, 1948. She remembered that "it was a good time for the two organizations to find out how they could work together."[359] Rajchman, who had been operating behind the scenes, ultimately convinced WHO that the ICEF could extend the European programs across the globe, greatly reducing the number of tuberculosis cases worldwide. His persistence paid off, and opposition within WHO eventually subsided. Due to Rajchman's efforts, the ICEF had tested thirty million children and provided BCG vaccinations on four continents by 1951.[360]

The ICEF's records indicate that little debate took place over choosing tuberculosis as one of its primary targets, or over how to manage the tuberculosis prevention program. The ICEF, having accepted a country's application for assistance, would determine its need for the BCG vaccine, then provide whatever the country needed to implement the program. This included the vaccine, medical supplies, and medical personnel when necessary. It may also seem odd that the ICEF virtually ignored typhus, since it still constituted the worst epidemic worldwide in the years directly following World War II; however, typhus had been dealt with through international cooperation prior to World War II while little effort had been made to coordinate tuberculosis control. Despite the fact that the scientific and medical communities never firmly concluded that the BCG vaccine proved effective, the ICEF saw its use as the opportunity to establish international cooperation and produce impressive results on a large scale. It also could justify its choice because tuberculosis had spread rapidly during the war years, making it an important epidemic in its own right.

While Eliot conducted her survey of Europe for the ICEF in early 1947, she noted that "When I went into the hospitals, as I did in each place, I found many children with tuberculosis. I'd never seen so much, rows of infants and young children in hospital wards, emaciated, dull, lifeless. I'd never seen so much tuberculosis…many died of what was known as miliary tuberculosis, that is scattered like seed throughout the body." She noted that since immunization against tuberculosis had already been developed at the National Institute for the Study of Tuberculosis in Denmark, the Danish Red Cross in conjunction with the Norwegian and Swedish branches had already established groups of technical workers to go to war devastated countries and set up clinics.[361] It was this network that Rajchman tapped into in order to realize his goals for the ICEF.

The February, 1948 report of the Sub-Committee on Medical Projects indicates that the ICEF had begun the process of collaborating with the already existing movement to combat the spread of tuberculosis. Training facilities had been provided by both France and Switzerland for ICEF medical personnel, and "Dr. Holm…described the training program in tuberculosis work, which had been going forward in Denmark."[362] Holm offered the ICEF access to training facilities run by the Danish government to train "twenty-five students at one time for a three-months course," and went on to report to the sub-committee on Denmark's experience in testing for and treating tuberculosis.[363] This report also includes information on the treatment of "normal children" and "deficient

[359] Eliot Interview, 218.
[360] Balinska, 213-214.
[361] Eliot Interview, 196.
[362] E/ICEF/43, *Report of the Sub-Committee on Medical Projects,* 19.
[363] E/ICEF/43, 19.

children" with those in the deficient category possessing some physiological or mental deficiency, or being "illegitimate, delinquent, neglected or abandoned."[364] That the ICEF included these children in its treatment programs indicates that its commitment to providing aid to all children was being upheld. And, in keeping with its agreements with governments to participate alongside the ICEF in relief efforts, a report by Dr. H.F. Hemholz and Dr. J. M .Latsky notes that the "emergency measure" of testing and treatment being carried out in conjunction with the Danish Red Cross acting for its Norwegian and Swiss Associates, countries would be expected to "develop a comprehensive anti-tuberculosis programme" of their own.[365]

Providing treatment for children and their mothers suffering from tuberculosis constituted only one-half of Rajchman's aggressive maternal and child health program. Treating children and mothers for syphilis would allow it to radically influence the disease's effects on mothers and children in Europe. It faced one primary obstacle, however, in taking on this project: children and mothers with syphilis had long been deemed degenerates, entirely unworthy of treatment, and it would be difficult to overcome prejudices to gain support for such a program. Nevertheless, the ICEF went forward with plans to undertake a broad anti-syphilis program at the end of 1947. Poland inaugurated the first campaign, and the ICEF made the bold decision to provide treatment for children and mothers only—"the government was to treat everybody else."[366]

Rajchman's decision to exclude men from ICEF anti-syphilis programs reveals that he clearly understood the great gender chasm that had always existed in syphilis prevention and treatment programs. That he inadvertently excluded women without children, however, showed that he had not found a way to overcome all of the obstacles to ensuring the female population received treatment. Syphilis, upon its debut in Europe, spread so rapidly that it constituted an immediate health crisis.

Practitioners attempting to stem the tide of syphilis outbreaks looked for its unique symptoms to determine a course of treatment, and descriptions of these can be found in a variety of publications including physician John Bacot's 1829 prescription for identification and treatment to those available today via the world wide web.[367] A sexually transmitted disease, syphilis infections are caused by a bacterium called *Treponema pallidum*. Evan Thomas, a professor of clinical medicine at New York University College of Medicine who published his treatise on syphilis in 1949, notes that "T. pallid dwell habitually only in human beings and cannot thrive outside the body" therefore making "the contact of moist surfaces" a necessity for spreading the microorganism.[368] Though transmission through sexual contact is the most common

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[364] E/ICEF/43, Annex 10, 47.

[365] E/ICEF/78, *Report on Nutrition and Health Aspects in Six UNICEF Countries in Europe by Dr. H. F. Helmholz and Dr. J.M. Latsky*, 17.

[366] Balinska, 209.

[367] See for the evolving descriptions of the symptoms of syphilis John Bacot, *A Treatise on Syphilis: In which the History, Symptoms, and Method of Treating Every Form of that Disease, are Fully Considered* (London: Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown and Green, 1829); Andre Blanzaco, *VD: Facts You Should Know* (New York: Lothrop, Lee & Shepard Co., 1970); Marjorie Little, *Sexually Transmitted Diseases* (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1991); Lisa Marr, *Sexually Transmitted Diseases: A Physician Tells You What You Need to Know* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).

[368] Evan W. Thomas, *Syphilis: Its Course and Management* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1949), 4.

form of transmission, the bacterium can also be spread through contact with compromised skin on other parts of the body, especially where the skin is torn or otherwise vulnerable.

The initial infection causes a sore; the bacteria, however, continue to move throughout the body, damaging many organs over time. Thomas warned that "Once the microorganisms have penetrated the mucous membrane or skin, it is doubtful that prophylactic measures are of much value" and his description of experiments which tracked the rate at which the infection spread throughout the body indicated that "The incubation period of the chancre, the primary lesion of syphilis, is said to lie between 10 and 90 days."[369] Physician Harry Wilmer, in his prescriptive missive entitled *Corky the Killer: A Story of Syphilis* warns that the chancre, a "local reaction" to the bacterium on an infected person's skin, does not exhibit the full extent of the infection "-far from it!"[370] However, the chancre may be painless and may occur inside the body; the infected person might not notice it, making any sex partner of that infected individual vulnerable to contracting syphilis. Most commonly, these sores occur on parts of the body which have been exposed to the infected partner's chancre, such as the penis, vulva, or vagina, but can also appear on or around the mouth and nose. *Syphilis and Public Health*, published in 1918, illustrates in graphic terms the risks of ignoring the chancre and provides a variety of "Methods Whereby the Treponema Pallidum Gains Access to the Healthy Body." Of primary concern is the fact that the chancre is "extraordinarily rich in its treponema content" and requires "careful daily inspection" to prevent the disease from spreading; regardless, "sexual intercourse frequently occurs while one of the parties suffers from a highly infectious chancre;" the author appeared shocked to discover that his patients "admitted intercourse many times after they knew of the appearance of a sore."[371] If not treated during the primary stage, then an infection may advance to the secondary stage.

According to Wilmer, Corky the Killer and his army of "Spirochetes are washed up in various organs of the body." The advancing troops "have a schedule of sabotage mapped out" which, after completing "a very short acute stage" will "Five to 8 weeks later try to produce rash, sores in mouth, fever, sore throat, loss of hair."[372] The rash, which appears primarily on the palms and soles, may in some instances erupt all over the body. Thomas claims, however, that "the secondary lesions of syphilis are not destructive, and they heal without scar formation."[373] Regardless, he cautions that since "the signs and symptoms of secondary syphilis [are] diverse" and can include mild fever, fatigue, headache, sore throat, patchy hair loss, and swollen lymph glands, that "treponemes are undoubtedly seeded intermittently into the blood stream from many foci of infection during this stage."[374] The signs of secondary syphilis appear to last anywhere from 2 months to 2 years, but often lead to the onset of the tertiary stage of the disease.

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[369] Thomas, 5-6.
[370] Harry A. Wilmer, *Corky the Killer: A Story of Syphilis* (New York: American Social Hygiene Association, 1945), 8.
[371] Edward B. Vedder, *Syphilis and Public Health* (Philadelphia: Lea and Febiger, 1918), 110-111.
[372] Wilmer, 16.
[373] Thomas, 9.
[374] See Ibid., 8-10.

Syphilis can, according to Thomas, enter a latent phase that is "asymptomatic" and can only be diagnosed by a blood test.[375] He writes that this period may result in one of three outcomes: "(1) It may persist as such throughout the life of the infected individual; (2) it may result in the development of signs and symptoms of late syphilis; (3) it may terminate with the spontaneous cure of the infection."[376] If the disease moves into the final stage, though, the lesions can become both "destructive" and "chronic."[377] Bone damage, brain damage, and organ damage can all result from a long-term syphilis infection, which can in turn be passed on to any children conceived by parents infected with the bacterium.

Pregnant women with untreated, active syphilis are likely to pass the infection to their unborn children. Physician Oscar Daniel Meyer cautioned that numerous complications could occur in conception, pregnancy and childbirth if "the father or mother gave a history of syphilis."[378] Women infected with syphilis are in more "danger of abortion" and "subject to the pitiable miscarriage" or may produce an infant who will "die after birth or within two years."[379] Thomas writes wistfully "that on the day a syphilitic child is born its trouble begins, in handicaps both mental and physical."[380] Some infants with congenital syphilis present symptoms at birth, while others do not present until 2 weeks to 3 months of age. Infant symptoms mirror those of adults-including skin ulcers, rashes, fever-but infants also evidence a variety of physical deformities as well, a result of contracting the infection in the womb. Older children and teenagers may eventually develop symptoms of late-stage syphilis, including damage to their bones, teeth, eyes, ears, and brains.

Syphilis bacteria frequently invade the nervous system, resulting in what Wilmer describes as "progressive paralysis of the insane."[381] A sometimes serious disorder of the nervous system, it can take up to twenty years to develop but results in confusion, memory loss, headache, stiff neck, and fever that result from an inflammation of the lining of the brain. Additionally, if blood vessels are affected, seizures and stroke symptoms, including numbness, weakness, or visual problems, may also develop.[382]

Because the infection could be readily detected in its early stages, pre-modern syphilis treatments often emerged as an uneasy combination of cure and moral advocacy and focused primarily on dealing with what could be seen, or the physical manifestations of the illness.[383] Fifteenth-century medical practitioners frequently concluded that, once the outward signs of the infection disappeared, the patient had been cured.[384]

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[375] Ibid., 15.
[376] Ibid., 17.
[377] Ibid., 22.
[378] Oscar Daniel Meyer, *That Degenerate Spirochete* (New York: Vantage Press, 1952), 77.
[379] Ibid., 78.
[380] Ibid., 84.
[381] Wilmer, 50.
[382] See, for example, Bacot, Blanzaco, Little and Marr.
[383] In their attempts to stem the tide of syphilis during the Medieval and Early Modern periods, medical practitioners often concentrated their efforts on eliminating the painful chancres that could cover the entire body. Some conjectured that the disappearance of the sores did not render a patient cured since many individuals still experienced deteriorating health after their sores vanished. See Thomas, chapters 5 and 7; Oriel, 81-82.
[384] Oriel provides a variety of descriptions of diseases thought to be syphilis as well as the methods for treating them, all of which relied on outward manifestations of the disease, see for example 1-10 and 45-46.

Consequently, a variety of treatments made their debuts throughout the centuries, each one surviving only as long as it took scientists to discount it in favor of the next, none of which stopped the spread of the disease.[385] Europe suffered with rampant syphilis until the 1920s, when a real 'cure' finally made its appearance. It was not until the 1940s, however, that this cure became available on a more widespread basis.

Alexander Fleming's development of penicillin as a powerful antibiotic drug during the second decade of the twentieth century thrilled those toiling in anti-syphilis campaigns invested in finding a cure. Fleming discovered that injecting an infected person with several doses of penicillin effectively inactivated the disease, thereby preventing it from being spread to any other individuals with whom the patient had sexual contact. Fleming's early research indicated that, once dormant, the symptoms associated with syphilis seemed to be banished permanently. Though not an actual cure, since the disease remained dormant in the body permanently, anti-syphilis campaigns embraced Fleming's treatment with vigor.[386] These programs, however, faced one seemingly insurmountable issue. The technology to produce penicillin in mass quantities did not become available for almost twenty years; therefore, its early use to thwart syphilis remained, by necessity, experimental, applied only for rigidly defined emergency cases. This made it impossible to produce a notable reduction in the number of active cases until the 1940s.[387] Regardless of these early obstacles, penicillin's powerful effects on adult syphilis in particular exponentially increased the sense of urgency as well as hope in public health organizations dedicated to its elimination.

Despite all evidence of penicillin's power to eradicate syphilis in an infected individual, public health and social welfare programs continued to isolate individuals to blame for the spread of syphilis. This practice continued for two reasons: one, its practical application could, in theory, afford infected persons the capacity to receive the medical attention necessary to cure them; and two, it clearly identified infected individuals to the rest of the community, marking them as threats to the public health to be avoided judiciously.

These attitudes consistently reinforced gender biases regarding syphilis. The primary group blamed for the spread of syphilis in any community was exclusively females in the sex trades. Mary Spongberg writes that women had been the sole focus of

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[385] During the fifteenth century, bleeding and purging produced negligible results and most often led to the death of the patient rather than to his or her cure. The limitation of these methods led to the development of another cure, guaiacum, a liquid or lozenge derived from the guaiacum tree, which seemed promising. It diminished the pain of the headaches and sores associated with syphilis, but recurring sores evidenced that it did nothing to cure the disease. In the sixteenth century, Paracelsus discovered that mercury given in small doses yielded positive results, so it quickly became the primary 'cure' for syphilis until well into the eighteenth century. Unbeknownst to Paracelsus and others, however, mercury, like guaiacum, only alleviated the symptoms by numbing the part of the brain that reacts to pain. It not only failed to bring about a cure, but also often caused a condition known as "Mad Hatter's Disease," the result of mercury poisoning. In the nineteenth century, bismuth and arsenicals, which worked in a similar manner to mercury, also produced limited results. See Oriel, 81-86.

[386] Oriel, 97-99.

[387] Oriel writes that even though Joseph Lister had evidence in 1870 that penicillin could act as an antibacterial, it was not until the 1930s that its curative properties had been confirmed and a method for producing penicillin was developed; even then, large-scale production of penicillin was not available in Britain. A series of manufacturing developments undertaken in the United States helped to accelerate the penicillin production process by 1945. Oriel, 97-98.

many anti-venereal disease programs from as early as the fifteenth century in Europe, beginning with the branding of prostitutes on the cheek with a hot iron in Aberdeen in 1497 to the passage of the Contagious Diseases Acts in the nineteenth century.[388] Even in the twentieth century, prescriptions that emerged regarding the proper behavior for females specifically, and for males by default, determined public policy and cultural attitudes.[389] These standards most often kept wives, who often contracted the disease from their husbands, from seeking treatment at all due to the humiliating effect it would have on their status in the community. The case of the Danish author Isak Dinesen is particularly illustrative. It reveals the gender biases imbedded in dealing with syphilis, and demonstrates even respectable women's overwhelming fears regarding what the disease would do to them as well as the horrors they experienced in seeking and receiving treatment.

Karen Blixen, who used the pen name Isak Dinesen, contracted syphilis in 1915 while living in Nairobi, less than one year after her marriage to Bror Blixen. While on a hunting trip, she developed a severe headache, swollen glands, and a rash that erupted on the palms of her hands and the soles of her feet.[390] The local doctor diagnosed her condition as syphilis, and no one doubted her husband had been the source of contagion.[391] While being treated in Nairobi, she contracted blood poisoning from the prescribed treatment of mercury injections, and became increasingly ill. When it became apparent her health would not improve, she returned to Europe in the hope of receiving a more effective treatment.[392] She therefore booked passage, an almost impossible task due to the wars raging along her route, and arrived in Paris a very sick woman.

Dinesen's experiences in Paris reveal a great deal about how women suffering from syphilis perceived themselves, and how doctors handled their treatment. Almost immediately upon her arrival, she ran into a cousin who reacted with surprise at seeing her in Europe. Anxious to avoid any questions, she explained that she had stopped in Paris on her way to visit her family in Denmark. This, of course, had not been her plan, but in order to conceal her real purpose, she was forced to write her mother and to her husband's mother, eventually making her way to Denmark.[393] Adding to her concerns over what her family might discover, the specialist she consulted treated her brusquely and indicated that she probably would not survive the disease. He recommended she seek treatment in England or Switzerland, and had no more to do with her.

Dinesen's story only worsens. She took the Paris physician's advice, and went to Switzerland where she also found no relief. Frantic that she would die, she headed for Denmark, confided in her mother, and immediately consulted Dr. Carl Rasch, a venereologist, in Copenhagen. Rasch, known for his draconian approach to the disease, used injections of arsenic known as Salversan to try and cure her. His cure, designed to kill the syphilis, proved brutal. Given in conjunction with bismuth, the treatments caused

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[388] Mary Spongberg, *Feminizing Venereal Disease: The Body of the Prostitute in Nineteenth-Century Medical Discourse* (New York: New York University Press, 1997), 1, 6-7; see also chapters 1, 2, and 3.
[389] See, for example, Roger Davidson, "The Culture of Compulsion: Venereal Disease, Sexuality and the State in Twentieth-Century Scotland." In *Sexual Cultures in Europe: Themes in Sexuality*, Franz X. Eder, Lesley A. Hall and Gert Hekma, eds. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 58-68.
[390] Linda Donelson, *Out of Isak Dinesen: Karen Blixen's Untold Story* (Iowa City: Coulsong, 1995), 68.
[391] Ibid., 68.
[392] Ibid., 69.
[393] Ibid., 69-70.

Dinesen to suffer a multitude of side effects including headache, severe weight loss, and "burning sensations in her hands and feet."[394]

After spending several months in a private hospital claiming to have suffered nervous exhaustion, Rasch tested Dinesen and pronounced her cured in 1916. She returned to Denmark in 1925 and, after obtaining a negative test result, never consulted Rasch again. Dinesen never believed she had been cured, however, and continued to seek treatment for syphilis related ailments for the rest of her life. She even resorted to having pain fibers in her spine cut in order to alleviate chronic pain she always attributed to syphilis.[395]

Because of her position in society, Dinesen had access to treatment and privacy, but found little comfort in these advantages once she had been diagnosed with the "unmentionable disease." A letter to her brother in 1926 reveals her bittersweet position, when she writes "the world being as it is, it was worth having syphilis to become a 'Baroness.'"[396] She had gained social position, but still experienced the same fears as women in all other social classes regarding what syphilis could do to her body as well as to her reputation.

By the time Dinesen contracted syphilis, women's bodies had became objects of great debate. This helps to explain Dinesen's reticence in telling anyone she had syphilis, and made middle and working-class women even less inclined to seek treatment from public programs. Most anti-venereal disease programs in Western Europe encouraged women to seek treatment despite prescriptions regarding female sexuality, adopting a less harsh attitude toward their sex practices in favor of reducing the number of active cases in the population. Nevertheless, most women seldom took advantage of the availability of treatment, fearing the already existing and well-ingrained social reprisals far more than the disease itself.

Men's relationship to syphilis developed quite differently from that of women's, a fact understood clearly by Rajchman. Virile, sexually aggressive males, even if physically satisfied through marriage, were assumed to seek sexual partners elsewhere.[397] Unable and not expected to restrain himself, the man became the passive and unwitting victim of syphilis, causing him great personal suffering and distress.[398] There is, of course, an inherent paradox in this assessment; surely men, so aggressive and virile, could not be victims as well. Nevertheless, this notion aligned with classic characterizations of men and loose women. A man unable to resist his urges or the sexual advances of women fell prey, and always at great personal cost to himself.

Men, of whatever class afflicted with syphilis, almost always sought out and received treatment, and several important factors influenced this trend. The price paid by women for 'illicit' sexual behavior did not in any way parallel those of men, as men faced few if any reprisals from society for their sexual behavior. The gendered nature of the medical profession, too, guaranteed that doctors providing treatment were overwhelmingly male, a fact that deterred many women, but not men, from seeking help. Finally, and most importantly, doctors provided cures to their male patients without

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[394] Ibid., 71.
[395] Ibid., 74, 218-219, 339-340.
[396] Ibid., 276.
[397] Spongberg, 10.
[398] See Spongberg, 1-10; Davidson, 66-67.

passing judgment because of society's willingness to accept that males must express their sexuality to remain healthy and sexually satisfied.[399]

Advances made in understanding how diseases spread played a major role in shifting perceptions about syphilis, in particular the discovery that men as well as women could transmit the disease to a sexual partner. This forced anti-syphilis campaigns of all sorts to emphasize that men, too, bore responsibility for the spread of the disease. Studies concluded that men could pass the disease on to women, and to any subsequent children the couple produced. They placed the moral responsibility for infecting children, now portrayed as innocent victims instead of degenerate offspring, on fathers as well as mothers.[400] Regardless of the conclusive proof provided, skeptics still clung to the notion that women remained primarily to blame. Information regarding men's role in the spread of syphilis did, however, have one unanticipated and remarkable effect. Begun in the early twentieth century and firmly entrenched by the mid- 1940s, it allowed for the image of syphilitic mothers and children to change from one of disdain to one of pity.[401] Rajchman understood the implications of this series of events, and made his global announcement that the ICEF would treat these syphilis victims exclusively.

It should be noted that single and childless women over the age of eighteen remained a dangerous group, unworthy of treatment, as those with syphilis were assumed to be sex workers. According to prescriptive literature produced in the middle of the twentieth century, these women preyed on innocent men. By this time, however, the mythology of syphilis had narrowed this group considerably to soldiers and sailors living abroad who had little or no understanding of foreign cultures. Pamphlets produced during the 1940s and 50s therefore targeted young men in the military, often away from home for the first time and ill-prepared for encounters with 'foreign' women. The authors cautioned men about the dangers of having sexual intercourse with seemingly 'nice' girls they met, since one never knew where a single girl had been before. In addition, physicians began to challenge prevailing moral and social ideas regarding syphilis with their newly acquired scientific and medical knowledge, claiming the importance of revealing "secrets concerning these diseases" so that "the layman…[could recognize]…its signs and symptoms."[402]

When its anti-syphilis campaign began in 1946, the ICEF faced daunting challenges. According to statistics gathered from the field, 57,320 cases of endemic syphilis had been registered in Europe during the years prior to 1941. By 1948, estimates for those "infected during the war" exceeded 200,000, excluding new cases of congenital or acquired syphilis in children.[403] These initial estimates reflect the ICEF's intended population and identify specific groups, including mothers, expectant mothers and children up to the age of 18 as well as "women with fresh infections;" all other women and men are excluded.[404] That penicillin remained in short supply forced the ICEF to modify its desire to use penicillin exclusively to treat syphilis patients. It instead provided "one course of penicillin treatment…[to be completed with] bismuth therapy," a

[399] Davidson, 67; see also Spongberg, 63-65.
[400] See Spongberg, chapters 8 and 9; Oriel, chapter 5.
[401] See Wilmer, 42, 44, 46, 48; Vedder, 18-22, 72-75, 136, 202, 205-208.
[402] Meyer, 31, 35.
[403] E/ICEF/68 Add. 2, *Number of Syphilis Cases to be Treated by Penicillin*.
[404] E/ICEF/68 Add. 2.

treatment that had little chance of curing the disease.[405] From the start, the program often fell short of UNICEF's goal to deal with the "urgent problem…to ensure the survival of children…[and] millions of adults" who had emerged from the war "less fit to meet the grave problems of the day."[406]

The ICEF's second challenge arose when it became apparent that no two countries viewed an anti-venereal disease program in the same way, and applications from individual countries evidence this lack of standardization. Having had its original application returned because it included men in the number of individuals requiring treatment, Poland asked to receive a penicillin allotment in 1948 sufficient to treat a total of approximately 32,000 cases of infant and maternal syphilis exclusively.[407] Obviously pleased with Poland's change of heart, a report by the ICEF's Programme Committee published in October of that year noted that

> As regards Poland, the Expert Committee on V.D. of WHO noted with satisfaction that the UNICEF/WHO Joint Committee, the Programme Committee and the Executive Board of UNICEF took action on a request from the Polish Government for assistance on the pre-natal and infantile phase of the over-all anti-syphilis programme of that country. The Committee notes that the possibility of obtaining assistance represented a considerable stimulae in the preparation for, and the initiation of this campaign.[408]

After reviewing these first applications, the ICEF realized it must establish a standard procedure for application, review and acceptance. Reports on these early efforts to standardize participation in the anti-syphilis campaign indicate the ICEF's goal to confine treatment to children and their mothers was being met. A 1948 presentation by Dr. H. F. Helmholz and Dr. J. M. Latsky on "Nutritional and Health Aspects in Six UNICEF Countries in Europe" recognized these results, and stated that "The interest of UNICEF is in particular the prevention of congenital syphilis by treatment of the pregnant mother, that forms a logical part of any campaign of eradication."[409]

As Western Europe's recovery from the effects of the war progressed and new aid arrived in conjunction with the Marshall Plan, countries such as France and Finland requested fewer and fewer apportionments.[410] The years 1948-49, however, displayed a marked increase in the number of countries in Eastern Europe included on the roll of

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[405] E/ICEF/68 Add. 2 Annex IV, *Treatment of Endemic Syphilis by Penicillin*.
[406] E/ICEF/160*,* 3.
[407] E/ICEF/W.3 Annex K, *Poland: Summary of Needs.*
[408] E/ICEF/W.31, *Statement on Anti-Syphilis Campaign,* 2.
[409]E/ICEF/78, 18.
[410] A report from the UNICEF Programme Committee in October, 1949, noted that France and Finland had notified the Programme Committee that they would be removing themselves from the roll of countries receiving food aid. E/ICEF/W.72, *Recommendation of Executive Director on Unutilized Portion of Hungarian UNICEF Allocation Following Closure of Hungarian Mission*, 1.

participants.[411] These countries, influenced by the newly established Communist governments under which they now operated, included men as a part of the total case population requiring treatment. Eastern European countries attempting to receive ICEF assistance also revealed the often dichotomous nature of the ICEF's anti-syphilis policy, which collided with and ultimately overrode the intentions of public health officials in Eastern Europe attempting to treat syphilis more broadly than the ICEF prescribed.

Yugoslavia provides a clear example of the ways in which policies and intentions clashed. When it applied for assistance in 1947, Yugoslavia's report noted that cases of endemic syphilis totaled about 100,000.[412] Dr. P. Gregoric, President of Yugoslavia's Public Health Protection Committee, clearly included males in his total as a part of the overall plan to "[liquidate] endemic syphilis and to combat sporadic syphilis" by utilizing aid from the ICEF.[413] In order to receive assistance, however, Dr. Gregoric and his committee had to make modifications to their application and focus their efforts on UNICEF's intended population of children and mothers, which they must have done relatively quickly. This is apparent in a 1951 report from the Executive Director to provide Yugoslavia with "$40,000 from the European area allocation for penicillin and laboratory supplies to aid the continuation of the Government's campaign against endemic syphilis." [414] According to this report, "the largest percentages of infected active cases were among children…[and] pregnant women," and Yugoslavia was commended for having tested "1,033,000" persons and for treating "nearly 72,000" by late August, 1951.[415] Yugoslavia had, as the ICEF requested with its first application, treated children and mothers exclusively with the supplies it received from the ICEF which led to the commendation that "The impact of this programme has gone beyond merely the finding and treatment of mothers and children infected with syphilis…It is thus having immediate effect not only in terms of the disease itself, but also on the total health problems of the people."[416] Other countries, such as Hungary and Albania, also received instructions to concentrate their anti-venereal disease campaigns on curing "expectant and nursing mothers and infants."[417] Bulgaria even went so far as to provide painstaking detail regarding the precise dose of penicillin to be provided to children according to age and weight in order to receive its ICEF approval.[418]

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[411] Yugoslavia, Romania, Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia began to receive UNICEF aid after 1948. See E/ICEF/68 Add. 2 Annex IV, 6 July 1948, *Supplement to the National Plan to Combat Syphilis Among Pregnant Women and Children Under 18 Years of Age in Bulgaria; Romania; General Remarks and Conditions of the V.D. Campaign in Slovakia; Plans for a General V.D. Control Campaign in the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia; Memorandum from Dr. Tibor Bielek, Chief Public Health Inspector, to Dr. Pierre Descoeudres, Chief of UNICEF Mission to Hungary, 5 February 1948;* E/ICEF/W.3 Annex K, *Poland: Summary of Need.;*

[412] E/ICEF/68 Add. 2 Annex IV, *Programme of the Campaign Against Endemic Syphilis in Yugoslavia*, 38.

[413] E/ICEF/68 Add. 2 Annex IV, *Letter from Dr. P. Gregoric to Dr. D. Adler, Chief of UNICEF Mission in Belgrade, 9 June 1948.*

[414] E/ICEF/R.246, *Recommendation of Executive Director for an Allocation to Yugoslavia to Extend the Campaign Against Endemic Syphilis*, 1.

[415] E/ICEF/R.246, 2-3.

[416] E/ICEF/R.246, 3.

[417] E/ICEF/68 Add. 2 Annex IV*, Memorandum from Dr. Tibor Bielek, Chief Public Health Inspector, to Dr. Pierre Descoeudres, Chief of UNICEF Mission to Hungary, 5 February 1948*.

[418] E/ICEF/68 Add. 2 Annex IV, *Supplement to the National Plan to Combat Syphilis Among Pregnant Women and Children Under 18 Year of Age in Bulgaria.*

The ICEF's insistence that supplies be used only to treat mothers and children as well as the ways in which this affected the overall goal to eliminate syphilis paints a rather unflattering picture. Limited supplies and personnel, and the commitment to first serve the needs of children provide a partial explanation for the program's lack of success; regardless, this does seem to run counter to the ICEF's pledge to assist any person deemed necessary to the survival and well being of a child. By 1949, results of the ICEF's programs showed little progress in combating the spread of syphilis. A report that year noted "the development of programmes and projects have been subject to some delay…due to procurement difficulties." It went on to predict that "The year 1950 should consolidate the gains of the programme[s] launched in 1949: the requests in terms of penicillin and supplies are now being studied by WHO."[419]

The syphilis programs, flawed from the beginning because of lack of penicillin to treat cases and a focus that excluded others spreading the disease, brings the choice to undertake such an aggressive campaign into question. The TB prevention program as a whole yielded much more dramatic results, since it could prevent children and mothers from contracting the disease, while the anti-syphilis program failed to make even incremental changes. Martha Eliot remembered that when she visited Europe in 1947, "there was also much venereal disease…some in the children, but the mothers—the pregnant and nursing mothers…many were infected." She inquired about the children as well as the mothers, but noted that "they were the most critical members of the family, if the family was going to be held together." Perhaps this is one of the primary motivations for the ICEF's campaign—not only to treat children, but also to treat mothers, whether expecting or not, so that they could continue to perform their function, ensuring the ICEF could play its role as provider.[420]

Rajchman, undoubtedly the single most influential person in creating and subsequently directing UNICEF's health campaigns, had drawn on all of his past experiences to make it a success; however, the overall success of the programs, in the end, was limited. It is evident that from the beginning of his career, Rajchman's focus never existed within local or national boundaries. He saw well beyond all borders, and consistently worked to develop public health programs that would be applicable everywhere, regardless of class, national or geographic boundaries. Myriad diseases, including typhus, polio, syphilis, dysentery and tuberculosis, had raced through Europe during the twentieth century, and Rajchman had, by 1946, already faced daunting challenges in efforts to curb their effects. Lack of supplies, war-devastated infrastructures, and feuding national governments made combating the common enemy of disease seem impossible, but, by the end of 1949, Rajchman had, through the ICEF, managed to provide food and medical care to thousands of children and mothers in Europe. In characteristic fashion, he had faced down every challenge in order to ensure that younger generations would have the chance to recover from the damage done by World War II. As 1950 approached, the ICEF, by now referring to itself as "UNICEF," faced yet another challenge as it prepared to fight for permanent UN status. As he mused over strategies, Rajchman felt confident that this, too, could be surmounted. He hoped that before the end of 1950, the General Assembly would grant the ICEF permanent

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[419] E/ICEF/W.76, *Recommendations of the Executive Director Regarding the Use of Anti-Syphilis Allocations,* 2.
[420] Eliot Interview, 196.

status as a UN organ, guaranteeing its programs could be continued and expanded. He did not realize, however, that his association with the ICEF would prove a liability and would, without warning, come to a swift and permanent end.

Chapter Seven
1950, The Watershed Year

The Department of Public Information Research Section of the United Nations began to publish yearly reports entitled *The Structure of the United Nations* in 1947, which provided information about its membership, its organization, and what functions each body or agency performed. Each report looked much like the one that preceded it, with only slight changes to categories such as membership and the changing composition of committees.[421] Additionally in 1949, New York University published its first *Annual Review of United Nations Affairs* as part of its graduate program of studies in United Nations and World Affairs.[422] This increase in public interest in the work of the UN caused a demand for information regarding the organization, and the number of films, pamphlets, reports and books produced increased from 1945 to 1949 to meet this demand.

In addition to its other duties, the UN had begun construction on a new headquarters in Manhattan by October 24, 1949. It had estimated the cost of constructing this new site at $65 million dollars, and would finally have all its functions on one continent. Before the completion of its headquarters in Manhattan, the UN continued its work in various temporary locations, with the General Assembly meeting in London from February 10 to February 14, 1946, then in Flushing, New York from October 23 to December 15, 1946. The Security Council began meeting on January 17, 1946 in London. Later, it moved to New York, using Hunter College, the Henry Hudson Hotel and the interim Headquarters at Lake Success for its meetings. The Economic and Social Council met first in London, then at Hunter College during the first months of 1946.

Plans for construction approved, the 270 residential tenants were relocated at United Nations expense, the meat packers and bargemen departed, and the existing buildings were demolished. The construction contract was awarded in January 1949 to a combination of four large New York building firms. Nineteen months later, on 21 August 1950, the Secretariat workers moved into their new offices. A cornerstone was laid at a dedication ceremony on October 24, 1949 by Secretary-General Trygvie Lie in the presence of the President of the United States. The inscription on the cornerstone is "United Nations" in the five official languages used in 1949 (Chinese, English, French, Spanish, and Russian) with the date in Roman numerals.[423]

By 1950, The ICEF, too, had accomplished a great deal. It had increased its annual operating budget from approximately $50 million US dollars to over $150 million dollars. No longer solely dependent on the United States for funds, it received contributions from fifty-nine countries as well as from its own fundraising efforts. It provided relief assistance to children and mothers in sixty-four countries on four continents, and managed programs which now included supplementary feeding, clothing distribution, tuberculosis vaccination, providing milk production equipment, maternal

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[421] See for example *The Structure of the United Nations, 1949* (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, Research Section, 1949).

[422] Clyde Eagleton, ed., *Annual Review of United Nations Affairs* (New York: New York University Press, 1949).

[423] For information on the construction of the United Nations Headquarters in New York, New York, see "Milestones in United Nations History" www.un.org, 5 February 1997 and http://www.un.org/geninfo/faq/factsheets/thestoryofunitednationsheadquarters/pdf, 2002.

and child health care programs, insect control, and anti-yaws, bejel and syphilis treatment campaigns.[424] It had established working relationships with six UN agencies and countless Non-governmental agencies.[425] These achievements had not come without cost, and the years leading up to 1950 had been marked with grand successes as well as dismal failures.

Helenka Pantaleoni recalled that UNICEF had enjoyed wide appeal outside the U.S. since its founding, but had not been able to achieve this same sentiment within the U.S. Having founded the United States Committee for UNICEF on December 23, 1947, Pantaleoni remembered the trials UNICEF faced when trying to obtain funds from the US government, since funding "depends on the whim of the State Department and Congress," as well as private donations.[426]

Pantaleoni claimed, "I don't think they took it very seriously…Then the isolationists and the crackpots, the rabid ones, started attacking UNICEF."[427] Private donations, too, did not materialize as quickly as had been hoped. UNICEF had been forced to share its charitable donations with various other organizations, and its attempts to hire professional fund raisers resulted in spending "two million dollars to raise half a million dollars for UNICEF."[428] Two new methods for raising funds, however, would not only improve UNICEF's bottom line, but would succeed in educating the public about its cause.

In 1948, Reverend Clyde and Mary Emma Anderson had asked the children in their church to collect money instead of candy on Halloween to help charities during World War II. In 1950, Clyde, who had become the editor for a Presbyterian publication aimed at junior-high school groups, had been searching for ideas for his publication. Mary Emma found his answer when, walking through Philadelphia, she noticed a cow. Thinking it odd that a cow would be wandering the streets of Philadelphia, she followed it to a booth situated outside Wanamakers Department Store, where she discovered the cow was the famous Elsie, and was collecting donations for UNICEF's milk-feeding programs. Mary Emma returned home that evening and mentioned the events to her husband, then suggested that he encourage children to collect funds for UNICEF as they had for charity during the war, on Halloween. Clyde agreed, and promoted the idea through his publication. That Halloween, the Allison's three children collected money for UNICEF, and a new fundraising tradition began.[429]

Pate had been encouraged by his staff to provide funds for Allison to publish his article more widely. Realizing UNICEF's budget could not be stretched to accommodate this request, Pate did what became a habit, according to Pantaleoni; "He put his hand in his own pocket and gave…the money."[430] By the early 1950s, the project had grown so

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[424] E/ICEF/160, 32, 34-37.
[425] UNICEF had relationships with the United Nations Department of Social Affairs, The Division of Technical Assistance, WHO, the FAO, the ILO and UNESCO. It also worked with the Red Cross in several countries, the Don Suisse pour les Victimes de la Guerre, and Aide Suisse à l'Europe in addition to other voluntary agencies. E/ICEF/160, 24-25.
[426] Pantaleoni Interview, 8.
[427] Pantaleoni Interview, 8.
[428] Pantaleoni Interview, 7.
[429] Pantaleoni Interview, 26-27 and Spiegelman and UNICEF, 113-115.
[430] Pantaleoni Interview, 27.

large that Pate assigned it to the United States Committee for UNICEF, which had already been administering another fundraising project.

This project, the sale of greeting cards, had begun when a young girl named Jitka Samkova from the Czech Republic composed a drawing on the theme 'happiness and peace.' Her teacher sent it to the UNICEF office in Prague, and it was chosen to be reproduced as a poster to publicize UNICEF. The drawing, which depicts five young girls dancing around a maypole under a smiling sun, made its way to UNICEF's New York offices, and, in 1949, they decided to turn the drawing into a year-end greeting card.[431]

At first, only a few thousand cards were published, and were available only to UNICEF and UN employees. The cards received so much acclaim that the UNICEF staff urged Pate to issue similar cards annually. Pate, concerned that such a venture might seem too commercial, agreed to print the cards but only if their sale did not result in a profit. He felt the cards would be better used to raise public awareness—"so UNICEF's name would become known." The Board approved the project, and a new venture that began in 1949 as an educational tool became one of UNICEF's most well-received fundraising activities.[432]

In addition to its fight for funding, UNICEF also dealt with "elements in the Department of State which frankly didn't want UNICEF to continue." These individuals had determined that the emergency in Europe had ended, and that "those countries should get back on their own feet." Pantaleoni remembered that many individuals were "…very—hostile is too strong a word, but [they] wanted the fund to close up early in its history." Indeed, Pantaleoni stated that "…there were a great many elements in the State Department who couldn't understand why the World Health Organization didn't take over UNICEF's functions."[433]

This response from the U.S. State Department came primarily because Rajchman insisted on working with Communist countries, relationships the US continually tried to eliminate. Pantaleoni stated that the U.S. government viewed UNICEF as an arm of foreign policy, and became particularly insistent on preventing UNICEF aid from being distributed in Soviet Bloc nations. On one occasion, Pantaleoni recalled that when the U.S. allocation for UNICEF was in danger of "…being skipped," she resorted to some Cold War politics of her own. She went to members of the committee, and showed then an article regarding a conference for the benefit of childhood being held in the USSR. "The article stated that the USSR had invited sixty governments, all of whom came, and it really looked as if they wanted to start another UNICEF. I took that clipping… I can't remember who it was, Senator Wiley, some people like that in Washington—who sort of scratched their heads and said, oh my goodness. We were going to miss the boat. They promised to support a contribution."[434] This incident demonstrates clearly that UNICEF had become a forum for dealing with Cold War issues, and reveals that the U.S. intended to defeat and eliminate any communist influence anywhere—even within the UN.

Ludwig Rajchman, designated the Polish representative to UNICEF by the newly formed Communist government, turned sixty-nine in 1950. He had survived political

[431] Spiegelman and UNICEF, 136.
[432] Spiegelman and UNICEF, 136-137.
[433] Pantaleoni Interview, 15-16
[434] Pantaleoni Interview, 19.

unrest in Poland during his childhood, watched two wars tear his family and the world apart, and battled epidemics that swept through Europe in the twentieth century. He orchestrated some of the most important relief efforts ever undertaken, and created an organization in the cooperative atmosphere after World War II that he assured would be impervious to politics and would, he hoped, become a permanent part of the United Nations. In the highly politically charged atmosphere of the postwar United States, however, Rajchman found himself increasingly the focus of accusations and investigations. In the end, his commitment to ignoring politics in order to achieve his goal of providing relief assistance to everyone in need conspired to expel him permanently not only from UNICEF, but from the United States as well.

Before Rajchman's untimely and unforeseen departure from UNICEF, he made sure it would be almost impossible for the UN to justify dissolution of the organization in three ways. By creating strong ties with other UN agencies, helping Pate establish administrative offices and relief programs around world, and relying on the universal appeal of children, Rajchman ensured UNICEF's continuation. It received tacit approval from the General Assembly as early as 1948 to continue its activities beyond 1950 when the General Assembly passed Resolution 215 (III). This resolution noted the "widespread response to the United Nations Appeal for Children, the large number of countries which have co-operated …and the support…from non-governmental organizations" and claimed that caring for children in the aftermath of war had revealed the specific needs of children elsewhere.[435] It agreed to continue the United Nations Appeal for Children to benefit children of all countries, and charged the "United Nations International Emergency Children's Fund with special responsibility for meeting emergency needs of children in many parts of the world."[436] Having established itself as something far greater than a temporary relief agency, UNICEF virtually guaranteed dependence on its continued operations.

Rajchman's efforts to combine rather than duplicate the efforts of the FAO and WHO had created a need that made terminating UNICEF's activities difficult. All three organizations had, by 1948, come to rely on the other for information, and thereafter they frequently exchanged staff members in order to provide training.

That UNICEF and WHO in particular had been able to establish this air of cooperation given their initial tensions and rivalries is important. The FAO, more willing to work with UNICEF from the start, infrequently asserted its right to claim exclusivity over relief programs.[437] WHO, on the other hand, maintained its sole right to provide aid on numerous occasions. WHO officials, probably fearing Rajchman's formidable will and reputation, became nervous that he would use UNICEF as a platform to establish a rival health organization, causing the two to battle for territory. Rajchman's intentions did not seem to have included such a plan, however; he had been able to establish his

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[435] E/ICEF/160, 29-30.

[436] General Assembly Resolution 215 (III) entitled "Extension during 1949 of the United Nations Appeal for Children" submitted 8 December 1948 to ensure UNICEF's continued funding, and General Assembly Resolution 318 (IV) entitled "United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund" submitted 2 December 1949 both state that the need to continue providing relief for children is urgent. E/ICEF/160, 29-30.

[437] This report provides for UNICEF to maintain its broad scope, but narrowly defines its activities within that scope to child feeding and maternal and child health care; the FAO had always demonstrated a willingness to work with UNICEF to achieve the best results in child feeding. E/ICEF/178, 2-3.

anti-tuberculosis and anti-syphilis campaigns because of their focus on children and mothers in spite of WHO's efforts to keep UNICEF out of the medical aid arena. Regardless, John Charnow writes that WHO's Expert Committee did succeed in setting parameters "considerably narrower than the wide scope authorized by the Board" as a result of its recommendations, which he rather scathingly notes led to "relatively small budgets, few skilled staff, and the often ineffective use of the money and staff which were available."[438]

Rajchman's plan to expand UNICEF's operations around the world also conspired to make it permanent. How could the world be saved by healthy children if UNICEF, dedicated to combating "under-nourishment and nutritional and social diseases…rampant among children and adolescents," limit its programs to post-war Europe?[439] For these reasons, Rajchman and Pate quietly established administrative offices around the globe. Making UNICEF's efforts indispensable to children suffering from the effects of aggression, it set out to combat"…the age-old problem of poverty" in developing nations as well.[440]

This pursuit countered the original goals of UNICEF, which had been granted permission to provide assistance only to countries affected by World War II. Having subdued objections over sending aid to former 'enemies' such as Germany and Japan, UNICEF used its mission in China to expand its operations in the region, establishing a large presence in South East Asia by 1947.[441] In July 1948, the Report of the Survey Mission to the Far East (Other Than China) provided information about morbidity rates, specific diseases and recommended programs for disease prevention and cure, which could only have helped UNICEF to make the decision to expand its operations in the region, especially in light of the information received on ten new countries, among them India, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Singapore.[442] True to its commitment to aid children, the Board approved requests for aid and established a Regional Office for the Far East that could more readily oversee the proposed operations.

By August, 1948, it became clear that UNICEF would almost certainly achieve its goal of providing assistance all over the world. Additional recommendations to expand into Lebanon, Syria, and Israel, as well as providing aid to Palestinian refugees, again received swift approval from the Executive Committee.[443] Latin America appealed to UNICEF as well. Having been untouched by war, UNICEF considered its applications under a newly articulated policy to assist with development, and began considering programs for Latin America in early 1949.[444]

In addition to its new proviso to provide aid for development, other significant shifts in UNICEF aid provision began to take place as well. "The winds of change were

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[438] CF/HST/080, *History of UNICEF* (Unpublished) by John Charnow (1964-1965), 44.
[439] E/ICEF/160, 3.
[440] "Fifty Years For Children," www.unicef.org/sow96/50years.htm (accessed 21 September 1998).
[441] See Maggie Black, *Children First: The Story of UNICEF, Past and Present* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), xiii, 7, 8-9.
[442] E/ICEF/72, 1-2.
[443] See E/ICEF/74, *Statement of Needs of Refugee Children and Mothers in the Middle East*, Annex1, Annex 2, Annex 4.
[444] E/ICEF/89, *Report of the Executive Director to the 71st Meeting of the Programme Committee to be Held at Lake Success, 20 January 1949,* 1.

to blow away most of the remaining colonial order in Africa and the Caribbean."[445] Pate, using Hoover's model to broaden UNICEF's geographic scope, continued to create administrative offices and missions around the globe.

While UNICEF's fate remained uncertain to those looking in, no one inside ever questioned its quest for stability and permanence. By "adding development objectives to its humanitarian approach" in 1948, UNICEF had another justification for expanding its activities.[446] In addition, embracing development helped UNICEF keep pace with shifts in UN policy at the end of the 1940s. This allowed it to become involved in planning for developing nations as a part of establishing its aid programs, and UNICEF pursued unlimited geographic expansion as 1950 approached.

Its focus on development and planning, rather than on specific populations and conditions of war, changed the way UNICEF approached the role of children in individual countries as well. Instead of needing help to recover from war to participate in the revival of their nations, children became vital to the development of new nations.[447] It must be noted that citizenship—"long presumed to be male" and defined by the state—had always rested on the private support of family, home and women, and UNICEF did nothing to dispel this standard when it began providing assistance to developing countries.[448] It responded instead by establishing national health programs in newly independent areas supported by a network of local UNICEF auxiliaries, a tactic used often in Hoover's programs. This conformed to UNICEF's new direction while maintaining its institutional identity as a primary provider.

Moving UNICEF's operation into developing countries had an unanticipated effect, however; it caused a fundamental shift away from food aid in favor of medical programs as the need to prove its impact on child health increased.[449] This alteration can be viewed in two ways. First, Rajchman used the life-threatening impacts of disease on the child population outside Europe as justification. He identified yaws, tuberculosis and syphilis as epidemics whose effects could be greatly diminished world-wide through the life-saving efforts of UNICEF health programs. Second, it illustrates UNICEF's willingness to abandon more 'self-help' oriented projects in favor of those that could be more readily quantified. By providing numeric evidence of its effect on the child population, easily recorded over the short term, it could present a stronger case to the General Assembly for continuing its operations. Finally, relying on a constituency of children ensured that objections to UNICEF would have to be very carefully presented; no one would be bold enough to refuse aid to "Children, sometimes with their families, sometimes alone…the most vulnerable, least able to speak for themselves and the most pathetic mirror of what wars can do to the innocent."[450]

Mr. E.D. Marris, Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Education, U.K., voiced these same sentiments regarding the hallowed place of children when he made an address to the Executive Committee in 1947. He praised UNICEF, claiming "I am most deeply impressed with the initiative taken by the United Nations to help children…This is a time

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[445] "Fifty Years For Children," 2.
[446] CF/HST/MON/1989-002, 3.
[447] CF/HST/MON/1989-002, 3.
[448] Jan Jindy Pettman, "Globalization and the Gendered Politics of Citizenship," in *Women, Citizenship and Difference,* Nira Yuval-Davis and Pnina Werbner, eds. (New York: Zed Books, 1999), 207.
[449] CF/HST/MON/1989-002, 44.
[450] Hazzard, 1.

for faith and I believe that despite all our troubles, the elementary human desire to protect and cherish mother and child is one of the greatest unities through which, God willing, we may build the new world."[451] Marris's statement, in addition to underscoring the universal appeal of children and its high praise for the organization, reveals two key premises on which UNICEF's leaders not only kept WHO at bay, but continued and expanded its work at the end of the 1940s as it took steps to become a permanent U.N. organization.

UNICEF had relied heavily on Marris's notion that an elementary human desire existed to protect and cherish mother and child. It vividly illustrated the critical importance of maintaining a traditional image of mothers, essential to the well-being of their children. As UNICEF made plans in 1948 to appeal its temporary status, it relied more and more on the notion that "bringing relief to the continuing emergency needs for children," defined more broadly now to include refugees and children living in developing nations, justified future operations.[452] At the same time, however, the term 'mother' appears less and less frequently in UNICEF documents, her only functions now implicitly linked to the children UNICEF intended to save.

Relationships, results and redirection did a great deal for UNICEF's campaign for permanent UN status. Who received aid remained paramount, however, and UNICEF insisted that the work to assist children should go on undisturbed. A report issued by "…a sub-committee of the Third Committee" laid the initial foundation by stating that

> The children of Europe and China were not only deprived of food for several cruel years but lived in a state of constant terror, witnesses of the massacre of civilians and of the horrors of scientific warfare, and exposed to the progressive lowering of standards of social conduct. The urgent problem facing the United Nations is how to ensure the survival of these children…The hope of the world rests in the coming generation…Attention is naturally being concentrated on urban children, some five million [in number]…[453]

It recounted the deplorable conditions under which children in both Europe and Asia lived, describing in detail how shortages of food, medical care and "children's institutions" had caused "under-nourishment and nutritional and social diseases…rampant among children and adolescents."[454]

Maggie Black, a former UNICEF employee and author of its two published histories, noted that topics of interest to the entire world have a tendency to go rapidly in and out of fashion, but the one subject that remains universally in the news is children.[455] They have, over time, become a group who, because of their status, deserve consideration in their own right. This, combined with changes in social welfare thought in the mid-

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[451] E/ICEF/22*, Statement made to the 9th Meeting of the Executive Board of the ICEF by Mr. E. D. Marris, Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Education, U.K., on 19 June 1947*, 10.
[452] General Assembly Resolution 214 (III). In E/ICEF/160, 29.
[453] E/ICEF/160, 3.
[454] E/ICEF/160, 3.
[455] Black, 3.

twentieth century, made an organization like UNICEF both possible and viable for the long term.

Throughout its brief existence, UNICEF had achieved a great deal. It had also made itself indispensable to children and mothers the world over, as well as to other UN agencies that required its assistance. This remarkable state of affairs could be attributed largely to the work of Rajchman, whose association with UNICEF ceased abruptly at the end of 1950. Events associated with the intensifying Cold War led Rajchman to resign his position as Chairman of the Executive Board of UNICEF, and eventually kept him from ever returning to the US.

As the Soviet Union expanded its reach in Central and Eastern Europe, UNICEF programs there became the subject of intense scrutiny and suspicion. Communist governments imposed severe restrictions on the movement of UNICEF employees, who also experienced increased violence as they attempted to perform their assigned tasks. Questions arose about the proper use and allocation of UNICEF supplies there as well. When Alfred Davidson, head of UNICEF's European operations, went to Albania to investigate disruptions in the distribution of UNICEF provisions, he found that the government had given UNICEF aid to soldiers.[456] These events caused the Board to consider whether or not they should continue providing aid to Eastern Bloc countries. Rajchman made it clear he wished to continue cooperating with these new governments. He found himself in the minority, and the Executive Committee had ceased operations in several countries by 1950.[457]

UNICEF therefore found itself embroiled in Cold War politics. The Soviet Union and its satellites shunned its aid, while the United States, having forged a strictly anti-communist agenda, wanted to halt UNICEF aid to all Communist countries. UNICEF, at Rajchman's urging, maintained that aid should be provided to the millions of children and mothers still suffering the effects of World War II, no matter what part of the world they inhabited. Charles Egger, a colleague of Rajchman's, explained that during this volatile political time, the "doctrinaire extremists won out, and many who had supported UNICEF had to suffer the consequences by being shunned [or] dismissed."[458] By 1949, it became clear that Rajchman was well on his way to becoming one of UNICEF's most visible liabilities.

On August 5, 1949, Rajchman received a letter from his friend Richard Hewyard that jokingly recounted a recent statement made by Senator Patrick McCarran accusing Rajchman of being a Communist.[459] McCarran, a Senator from Nevada and Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, had been one of UNRRA's detractors, more recently rising to prominence as a key member of the recently created House Un-American Activities Commission (HUAC).[460] Created during the period between 1946 and 1947, HUAC, part of the Permanent Subcommittee for Investigations (PSI), had originally been

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[456] Balinska, 219.

[457] Most of UNICEF's program allocations had been redirected in 1950 to align with its commitment to assist with development. Countries such as the Dominican Republic, Iraq, India, Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia, Korea, Pakistan, and several others had become its focus. E/ICEF/159, *Report of the Executive Board on its 70-73rd Meetings Held 27-28 November 1950,* 1-2.

[458] Charles Egger in Balinska, 220.

[459] Balinska, 220-221.

[460] Ellen Schrecker, *The Age of McCarthyism: A Brief History with Documents* (New York: Bedford Books, 1994), 47.

intended to continue the work begun by Harry Truman to uncover "fraud and profiteering on government military contracts."[461] It was through this vehicle that Senator Joseph McCarthy launched his blazing search for Communists in the US.

McCarthy believed that Communism constituted a vicious form of government, and posed a threat to democratic societies everywhere—views not unlike those held by one of Rajchman's oldest collaborators, Herbert Hoover.[462] A chasm existed in their actual positions, however. While Hoover believed that Communism limited the freedoms of an individual where it existed as a form of government, McCarthy maintained Communism constituted a particularly odious form of evil, and could, if allowed to exist unchecked in the United States, bring about the downfall of the government and the nation.[463]

McCarthy's one-man anti-Communist crusade, officially launched during a speech made to the Ohio County Republican Women's Club in Wheeling, West Virginia on February 9, 1950, identified the core cause for the meteoric rise of Communism. Instead of some superior strength possessed by the Soviet Union, this phenomenon had occurred because "of the traitorous actions of those who have been treated so well by this Nation…who have had the finest home, the finest college educations, and the finest jobs in Government we can give"—men serving in the United States Department of State who had been selling out the nation to the Communists.[464]

McCarthy did not crusade against communism alone, and his focus did not remain solely on the US government. Lawrence Timbers, a decorated World War II veteran who ran a small printing business in Seattle, Washington, took up McCarthy's cause. He focused his attention on the UN, attempting to expose its subversive elements. "I think he sort of saw himself as a great patriot, who was going to save his country from these wicked foreigners…and he flooded the country with anti-UNICEF literature," recalled Pantaleoni. In addition, a "Polish Catholic priest" in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, "was taken in…they did us a great deal of harm."[465]

Pantaleoni also recalled the first UNICEF casualties to the McCarthy investigations. "There are other women, several who were extremely able, who ran into this cloud of the McCarthy thing. As far as I can tell, very unjustly. Their departures were made easy, simply I think because of the insistence of the US government." She claimed that the entire UN found itself in a "terribly hard position," noting that they "didn't want anything to reflect on the integrity of their organization." [466] Rajchman would fall prey to these investigations as well, taking a strong position on how to deal with delegates from two Chinas. Insisting that UNICEF provide assistance to all children, he refused to expel delegates representing Taiwan and Beijing when they arrived at UNICEF's Executive Meeting in early 1950, both claiming to represent the real China.[467]

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[461] Arthur Herman, *Joseph McCarthy: Reexamining the Life and Legacy of America's Most Hated Senator* (New York: The Free Press, 2000), 44.
[462] Herman, 81.
[463] Ibid., 96-99.
[464] Ibid., 97, and McCarthy as quoted in Herman, 99.
[465] Pantaleoni Interview, 63.
[466] Pantaleoni Interview, 94.
[467] Balinska, 220-222.

It was his adherence to this ideal that Balinska claims compromised Rajchman's position in UNICEF, and he turned over his duties as chairman to Adelaide Sinclair, the delegate from Canada, in 1950.[468] Sinclair noted that during his time with UNICEF, Rajchman had remained committed to preventing the distress of children, whatever he had to do to achieve that end. "He was perfectly right about that, but not everybody was prepared to listen to him and to do the kind of thing he wanted."[469] His UNICEF career ended, Rajchman returned to France, where he became involved in the International Children's Center in Paris, inaugurated on January 19, 1950.[470] Living in post-war France, where historian John Young notes the political atmosphere had become warmer to open relations with the Soviet Union also provided him with the opportunity to eventually rekindle relationships with Eastern European countries in general and Poland in particular.[471] This relationship was delayed, however, when the communist government in Poland revoked his diplomatic passport in 1950, leaving him without a country until they restored it in 1956.[472] In spite of all he had experienced, Rajchman remained committed to UNICEF's projects and mission until his death in 1965, but would never again be able to exert the kind of monumental change in the lives of mothers and children he had accomplished when he led UNICEF as the Chairman of its Executive Board. For all of his contributions and distinctions, it is curious that later accounts of UNICEF's early years exclude him almost universally. Hoover, too, relegated Rajchman to a bit role in the creation of UNICEF; Balinska notes that, in his *American Epic, Volume V*, he claimed that the organization came about due to his work, and mentions Rajchman only as UNICEF's first Chairman, and as a person who had become acquainted with Pate during World War I.[473]

Rajchman was, in the end, the 'godfather' of UNICEF, and created an atmosphere of hope for needy children and mothers on a global scale. Because of his demand that UNICEF care for anyone vital to the survival and well-being of a child, UNICEF later provided assistance to both mothers and fathers as it entered developing countries, and persisted in upholding the notion that all children would be provided aid "on the basis of need without discrimination because of race, creed, nationality status, or political belief."[474] Rajchman, a product of both his experiences and his time, perpetuated many of the traditional sex roles prescribed by Western society; however, his commitment to overlooking all other traditional boundaries indicates that he, more than any other

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[468] Ibid., 223.
[469] Sinclair Interview, 1.
[470] Balinska, 224-226.
[471] John Young argues that France's foreign policy underwent a major transformation in the years between 1944 and 1949, due largely to the fact that its President, Charles de Gaulle, viewed France as a bridge between Washington and Moscow. Convinced the United States and Great Britain did not understand France's post-war concerns, de Gaulle had decided to maintain cordial relations with the Soviet Union in order to restore France to its position as a world leader, both politically and economically. By 1949, influenced by both internal and external conditions, de Gaulle made the decision to enter the Atlantic Alliance with the U.S and Great Britain; France remained, however, a very different participant, and maintained that it would not succumb to pressures from its partners to sever ties with the Soviets, who France viewed above all as a potential safeguard against the future rise of a strong German state. See Young, *France, the Cold War and the Western Alliance, 1944-1949*.
[472] Balinska, 227.
[473] Hoover as quoted in Balinska, 231.
[474] HIST/45/Rev.1, *Main Trends in UNICEF's Policy: 1947-1980* by Charles A. Egger (January 1986), 1.

participant in UNICEF until well into the 1990s, cared less about maintaining images and more about providing for basic human needs.

Chapter Eight
Ensuring Permanence

Concurrent with Rajchman's handover of the Chairmanship of UNICEF to Adelaide Sinclair at the end of 1950, the General Assembly approved Resolution 417 (V) which allowed the organization to continue its operations until 1953. The Resolution, entitled "Continuing Needs of Children: United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund," recognized "the necessity for continued action to relieve the suffering of children, particularly in underdeveloped countries…," and provided UNICEF with assurances that, by 1953, it would become a permanent UN agency.[475] Virginia Hazzard, a former UNICEF employee, wrote in her examination of UNICEF that the resolution achieved two ends which launched UNICEF on the next part of its journey. First, it directed UNICEF to assist children in developing nations which "covered just about everything and did turn the spotlight on the Third World." Second, it urged member states to improve their child welfare services, and asked UNICEF to help governments meet both the short and long range needs of children, allowing it to expand beyond its emergency parameters.[476]

With its extension in place and its mandate broadened, UNICEF proceeded into 1951 a very different organization in many ways. With Rajchman gone and Adelaide Sinclair installed as Chairman of the Executive Board, Pate became both the driving and stabilizing force. The Board itself continued to change members, with big names like Rajchman and Eleanor Roosevelt having moved on to other work, leaving other less well known representatives to take their seats. Sinclair recalled that "we had these "giants" on the Board who made such an important contribution in their own personal right [at first]…there were four or five or six of these giants. Then there seemed to be a gradual movement away from such people."[477] This departure was due in part because by 1951, UNICEF enjoyed world-wide support for its programs, and had been able to establish a sound financial foundation. It had not, however, received final approval to operate beyond 1953, and still faced heavy criticism from the US government. It therefore entered into what UN official Julia Henderson characterized as a "crisis about its future."[478]

UN agencies either did not support the continuation of UNICEF's programs, or remained silent. "There was no doubt WHO was delighted with this position [to close down UNICEF]…we felt very protective of UNICEF and felt it should be continued in a permanent form," recalled Henderson, who worked with UNICEF in her capacity as the head of the UN's Social Welfare Division. Other UN agencies, too, secretly disagreed with the proposed permanence of UNICEF. UNICEF employee John Charnow claimed that "the agencies were no friends of ours," despite the fact that he felt they could have been "natural allies and partners."[479] Margaret Gann, who worked in UNICEF's mission in Asia, remembered the combative atmosphere this uncertainty created. She recalled that when WHO, FAO or UNESCO representatives arrived to teach training courses, they

[475] E/ICEF/160, 30-31.
[476] Hazzard, 4.
[477] Sinclair Interview, 12.
[478] Henderson Interview, 3.
[479] Henderson Interview, 4-5.

often came in "with a halo around their heads. What the agency people said was right and so many times UNICEF people weren't prepared or were too innocent to fight with them. But I have fought with technical agency representatives, and I won, too." Her boss, Sam Keeny, had issues as well, and dealt with them in much the same manner as Gann. "I have heard Sam say to a WHO representative, 'I created your job and I can abolish it too.'"[480]

The US government also became vocal about its desire to end UNICEF, particularly after an exchange between US delegate Eleanor Roosevelt and Pakistan's delegate Ahmed Bokhari. The two faced off during a meeting of the UN's Social, Cultural and Humanitarian Committee on October 6, 1950, a day eyewitnesses called "unforgettable." Bokhari, serving as vice-chairman of the committee, listened intently as Roosevelt spoke about the future of UNICEF. "He waited until Mrs. Roosevelt spoke…[she] proposed the dissolution of UNICEF as it was and reorienting it into a more technical body."[481] Roosevelt asked that UNICEF's activities for children be parceled out to WHO, FAO and other UN agencies. After she was seated, Bokhari rose, claiming that he was stepping down from his role as chairman to address the group as the delegate from Pakistan. He began, "I have the greatest respect for my distinguished colleague, Mrs. Roosevelt, but listening to her, I felt as though I was at the funeral of the International Children's Emergency Fund." Shocked by photos of emaciated European children, he claimed he and his Asian colleagues had been no less shocked to realize the children in their countries were no better off. "You were willing to help postwar needy children in Europe, but now you're not willing to come through for the equally needy children of the developing world?"[482]

"There was great silence in the hall," recalled Helenka Pantaleoni. "Mrs. Roosevelt blanched, the blood ran out of her face." Pantaleoni called Bokhari's action brilliant and eloquently delivered, noting that in put the US "on the mat." He made it clear that while the emergency in Europe may have been over by 1950, children in Asia lived in a state of continual emergency. "This is what happened that famous day at Lake Success. Interesting."[483]

Despite this blow to the US position on UNICEF within the UN, the US government's position changed little. Proposed UNICEF aid to any Communist country, whether in the Soviet Block or not, remained a particularly sore point. Having been concerned that the USSR would begin its own UNICEF in 1950, the US approved its allotment to UNICEF to ensure it continued and could function as an arm of US foreign policy; however, in the three years that followed, US funding became so tenuous that Pantaleoni put her US Committee for UNICEF "in mothballs" and formed the Citizens Committee for UNICEF, a lobbying group that "used to telephone people all over the country to have them express support for UNICEF." She and her colleagues spent the years between 1951 and 1953 engaged in these efforts. Finally, in 1953 "things were enough solidified that we could dust off the US Committee again."[484] Her Citizens

[480] Margaret Gann interview by John Charnow, November 21, 1983. Accessed at UNICEF Archives, 9.
[481] Pantaleoni Interview, 16-17.
[482] Ahmed Shah Bokhari as quoted in Spiegelman and UNICEF, 66.
[483] Pantaleoni Interview, 17.
[484] Pantaleoni Interview, 22.

Committee faced several daunting challenges in its quest, however, including an end-run around UNICEF funding attempted by Congressman John Bell Williams in 1952.

Pantaleoni remembered Williams as an isolationist who had always criticized UNICEF. In this instance, he used his position to try and quash the Committee's efforts to support UNICEF's request for funding before Congress. "The Citizens Committee…were all set for hearings…in order to testify for UNICEF, but Williams called [the] meeting at one a.m., when everybody was asleep, so the Citizens Committee wasn't represented." Williams, having eliminated any opposition, "really went to it, cutting out the UNICEF contribution completely." The contribution was finally restored, but according to Pantaleoni, "there were very hazardous times" when it appeared the US intended to abandon UNICEF altogether.[485]

The Communist specter that continued to hover over UNICEF permeated even its greeting card efforts. "Bizarre things happen which are hard to believe," recalled Pantaleoni. "Some very conservative friend of Maurice Pate's called him up and asked why the cards were imprinted in red, when red was a Communist color?" Pate, concerned over the criticism, took it very seriously—he did not want to damage UNICEF's reputation, and made the decision to put the project on hold. "He'd rather almost scrap the whole thing than run the risk of having it considered Communist," said Pantaleoni. She remembered that the volunteers working on the project, reduced to tears and screaming, feared this one comment would end the entire campaign. "We finally had to say, 'Well, Maurice, Santa Claus's suit is red!'" Absolutely bizarre."[486]

How, then, did UNICEF weather the storm from 1950 to 1953, and manage to achieve permanent status as a UN agency? One answer can be found in the way it shifted its focus from long term social policy and social welfare oriented programs—those under the rubric of self help—to programs concerned with development and oriented primarily toward issues of health. By the early 1950s, Pate decided that social programs "were fuzzy long-term stuff which didn't have much bearing on the work of UNICEF," and he steered it in another direction. Henderson stated that "priorities were clearly in the health field and therefore the relationship with WHO was more important [to countries receiving aid]," a situation UNICEF addressed by focusing on health programs of its own.[487] Martha Eliot, who served as the US representative to UNICEF during this period, kept close watch over its maternal and child health programs and supported this new direction. She still believed that "in the end, countries should, you see, do it themselves," but worked with both UNICEF and WHO to establish training programs for midwives and for health care workers who would be providing maternal and child health care.[488]

Combating new diseases in new regions such as yaws presented UNICEF with the opportunity to expand its medical programs beyond the original tuberculosis and anti-syphilis campaigns and reach more children. In his report on increasing its allocation to the Philippines, Pate noted that "An estimated 8% of the rural population…suffers from yaws…[and] it has been reported that 70% of the yaws cases consist of children under 11

[485] Pantaleoni Interview, 22-23.
[486] Pantaleoni Interview, 30.
[487] Henderson Interview, 5.
[488] Eliot Interview, 206.

years of age."[489] Gann noted that these new medical programs used "quantitative targets" which helped to make the results of UNICEF's work difficult to dispute. Reporting an actual number of people who had received medication not only helped UNICEF demonstrate the effects of its work, but helped it uncover flaws in its programs as well. She recalled that "hidden in that one figure…were so many variables that could have gone wrong, and if a target wasn't accomplished then we had to track down what they were, what had gone wrong…if you got that many children vaccinated or injected, or fed with milk, then all these other essential steps were being accomplished."[490]

By redirecting its focus in maternal and child health to medical programs while continuing its feeding programs, UNICEF's message began to have more impact. The problem of how to spread this message even more widely still persisted. Pantaleoni, who extricated the US Committee for UNICEF from its "quasi-relationship" with the US State Department in 1952, received chilly receptions from the "big names" Pate asked her to contact to chair the committee. "The populations hardly knew the UN existed, let alone UNICEF." She noted that the US Committee's primary responsibility was to educate Americans, and she realized the importance of her task while attending a UNICEF meeting in Paris. "UNICEF was very dependent on the United States government contribution. The United States government contribution in a democracy was very dependent on the response of the people…if the people don't respond, the Congress won't respond…So I thought it was extremely important to build a solid situation for UNICEF in the United States."[491]

Her mission clear, Pantaleoni returned to the US and eventually involved other organizations in her quest to support UNICEF. She noted that the League of Women Voters became one of the most powerful supporters of the greeting card project, and agreed to launch it using its own facilities to spread the word and collect orders.[492] The US effort proved so successful that other countries eventually used its model to establish their own campaigns which were managed by the individual country committees. During the 1950s the campaign received another boost when Nora Edmunds, the first director of the campaign, decided to approach Raoul Dufy in 1952 to create and donate an original design to UNICEF. His donation prompted other artists to follow suit, and the next year, Henri Matisse submitted a design. Marc Chagall, Pablo Picasso, Salvador Dali, Georgia O'Keefe, Joan Miro, Paul Klee and Wassily Kandinsky were among the renowned painters who lent their talents to aid the greeting card campaign.[493] Pantaleoni lamented that the cost of the campaign was "terrific…in fact, so costly that we sometimes ask ourselves how long we can continue…[but] many people are tripped into interest, you know, just by getting a card. They will say, What is this organization? What does it do? Often, in a roundabout way, they become ardent fans of UNICEF just by getting a card."[494]

While the greeting card campaign increased interest in UNICEF, a chance meeting on a plane in 1953 between Pate and actor Danny Kaye led to even more

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[489] E/ICEF/R.130, *Recommendation of the Executive Director for an Additional Apportionment to the Philippines,* 1.
[490] Gann Interview, 4.
[491] Pantaleoni Interview, 21-22, 25-26.
[492] Pantaleoni Interview, 28.
[493] Spiegelman and UNICEF, 136-145.
[494] Pantaleoni Interview, 31.

publicity for the organization. This meeting resulted in the creation of the position of Goodwill Ambassador, an honorary post which forged the first relationship between celebrities and international organizations. Kaye recalled this meeting as one that "could easily make a Hollywood movie." He boarded his flight from London to the US, and the plane took off without incident. Kaye had fallen asleep, but was awakened suddenly by a crew member saying, "you'd better wake up Mr. Kaye, we may have to ditch!" The plane's propeller had ceased to operate, and Kaye remembered walking up and down the aisle of the plane, "asking everybody to take off his shoes and to tie the life raft to his wrist in case we had to plunge into the water." He praised the pilot for his "good maneuvering" in both avoiding the loss of a wing when the propeller fell off the plane and for landing safely in Ireland at Shannon Airport. Once in Ireland, the passengers deplaned, then caught another flight to the US.[495] Pantaleoni, who heard the story from Pate, recalled that "there was a terrible moment [on the flight]. Maurice told me he saw Danny and asked him to sing. I don't think Danny sang, but those were sort of the first words that Maurice [exchanged with Kaye.]"[496]

It was in the next part of the journey that Kaye remembered, "Sitting next to me on that second plane was a man named Maurice Pate…Maurice Pate was tall and stately, an imposing figure with silver hair and a quiet yet warm manner. He had spent half his life helping the world's unfortunate children, and he began explaining to me what UNICEF's work was." Six months later, Pate invited Kaye to lunch at the UN when he read that Kaye was about to take a trip around the world. "You know," Pate began, "people are having a lot of trouble identifying UNICEF. If you would stop at some of our installations and then come back and go on the radio or write a magazine article, it would help us a great deal." Kaye promised to do more than that—he promised to make a documentary.[497]

Kaye kept his promise. He obtained the necessary equipment, and a pledge from Paramount pictures to underwrite his expenses. All proceeds from the film would be donated to UNICEF. The UN appointed Kaye ambassador-at-large, and charged him with "making known the needs of children throughout the world." The resulting film, called "Assignment: Children," opened in 1955 and was eventually translated into nineteen languages.[498] Pantaleoni claimed that Kaye, a Pan-like figure, found himself followed by children everywhere, and this appeal, captured on film, made a lasting impression on the General Assembly. Pantaleoni served as mistress of ceremonies for the showing, which afforded her the opportunity to meet Kaye for the first time. She recalled that "He deeply cares. He's wonderful with children. He just has a special language with them, and they respond to him. He's extraordinary."[499] Kaye became the first of many ambassadors, including Peter Ustinov, Liv Ullman, Tetsuko Kuroyanagi and Audrey Hepburn, all of whom gave their time and energy to bring attention to the cause of maintaining and increasing UNICEF's visibility.[500]

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[495] Spiegelman and UNICEF, 86.
[496] Pantaleoni Interview, 81.
[497] Spiegelman and UNICEF , 86.
[498] Spiegelman and UNICEF, 86-87.
[499] Pantaleoni Interview, 82.
[500] Spiegelman and UNICEF, 92-107.

Greeting cards and Goodwill Ambassadors helped to further UNICEF's cause to achieve permanent UN status. UNICEF also published pamphlets which presented its new work in Africa, Asia and Latin America as part of an effort to help "those children [who], generally speaking, have far less than their fair chance from the very outset of life."[501] The pamphlets included more photographs than text, and depicted everything from rows of smiling children about to drink their daily UNICEF cup of milk to the contents of a midwifery kit. Mothers and children line up for medical care, and female volunteers serve supplementary meals to school children over captions claiming "powdered milk from UNICEF has provided the incentive for establishing school-feeding programs." The pamphlets also included a map to illustrate UNICEF's work as a "world cooperative."[502]

Information regarding campaigns against malaria through the use of DDT included photographs of a "sprayer at work," as well as a classroom full of children in India being instructed on how to avoid the disease using a giant model of a mosquito.[503] Similar depictions of other medical campaigns appeared as well, including heart-wrenching photos of miserable infants covered in the painful sores that occurred with a yaws infection. The same children, photographed after receiving medical attention, appear happier and sore-free.[504]

Through its various publicity endeavors, UNICEF began to appear more like an organization engaged in professional fundraising. Within the UN, reports on its progress began to be presented in a more formal manner, and included the all-important quantifiable result. By 1953, the Executive Board had adopted a strict protocol for its meetings. Pate had become the chief administrator of UNICEF, and provided his progress reports to the Board complete with a table of contents and page numbers. These reports were merely presented, and no longer included transcripts of lively and often caustic discussions between delegates such as those that had taken place when UNICEF had been attempting to establish itself as an organization. Though little had changed regarding its institutional image, the way it went about its work had changed drastically. It still relied on needy children and mothers for its purpose, as well as on Hoover's model to expand its programs. The content of these programs, no longer focused on self-help, relied on racking up numbers in order to demonstrate results. That these programs had been carried out in developing countries created a close alliance between UNICEF and its recipients, and in 1953, they became UNICEF's most vocal supporters.

In March, 1953, the Board met to discuss the future of UNICEF, stressing several features of the organization that would be especially significant to its future. First, UNICEF constituted the only agency in the UN primarily concerned with children—a feature Rajchman had stressed prior to his departure. Second, its programs had proved to be successful in both the short and long term at very little cost. Third, UNICEF had established an effective constitutional structure and an economic administration. Fourth, it attracted resources that would have otherwise been unavailable if no special agency for

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[501] *UNICEF, A Pictorial Record: For All the World's Children* New York: United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, August, 1952), 4.
[502] *UNICEF Pictorial Record*, 13, 6-17.
[503] *UNICEF Pictorial Record*, 22-23.
[504] *UNICEF Pictorial Record*, 25.

children existed. Finally, UNICEF's activities provided one of the best vehicles for promoting the UN as a whole.

These issues, debated in the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly during that same year, proved persuasive. By October, the General Assembly unanimously decided to grant UNICEF its permanent status, and approved Resolution 802 (VII). At the same time, it reaffirmed the broader operating terms under which the fund had been granted an extension in 1950, and dropped "International Emergency" from its name.[505]

1953 marked a new beginning for UNICEF. Government contributions increased, and programming changes reflected its commitment to long-range measures, noting that "the Board favours aid for programmes which give results on the basis of low per caput costs, which are within the capabilities of the country to continue after the initial period of international aid, and with set local organizational patterns capable of being duplicated and extended elsewhere in the country."[506] Having achieved permanent status, UNICEF could move forward with the knowledge that its programs, no longer based on the need to react to an emergency, could establish maternal and child health and welfare services that would remain in place for the long term.

Virginia Hazzard wrote that "it seems unbelievable now that anyone could have doubted the need to keep alive and nurture a UN agency devoted to helping governments preserve in good condition their most valuable investment for the future—children;" but, until 1953, this was the case.[507] What is even more unbelievable is the story of how this agency created itself, crafted its image, and managed to survive despite the odds. Based on the idea that children and their mothers require the care of a primary provider, UNICEF came to life as the father to the world's children, and every individual who participated in its functions supported and perpetuated that image in order to obtain funding, establish programs, and ensure its approval as a permanent UN agency. As UNICEF moved into the next decade, it would find that its image, while useful in developed countries for obtaining funding and maintaining support, did not always fit the developing nations it tried to assist.

[505] Charnow, *History of UNICEF* (Unpublished), 25.
[506] Charnow, *History of UNICEF* (Unpublished), excerpt from E/ICEF/226, 25.
[507] Hazzard, 4.

Conclusion

Once UNICEF committed to becoming a permanent part of the UN, it began to fashion itself after organizations already claiming that status. Reports from the Board had initially been filled with actual debates between delegates regarding everything from providing toys to facilitating the adoption of orphaned children. UNICEF had adopted rules of procedure in 1947 then revised them in 1948, but these rules failed to filter out individual voices that became part of the permanent record of the organization as it mounted its campaign for permanent status. By 1953, these reports had slowly evolved into sterile, bland reports full of statistics and results instead of the colorful personalities of its administrators. After achieving permanence, the only voice heard was that of Maurice Pate, who thereafter set the direction for the organization until 1965.

Pate proclaimed that as a UN agency, the organization would become involved with development, a direction that would parallel that of the UN as a whole. "Emphasis is being put on extension of services of MCH [maternal and child health] services to new areas in countries which have not yet developed national coverage, rather than on aid for the elaboration of services already covered." The goal in these cases, he posited, would be to assure at least elementary health care services could be provided as widely as possible while at the same time offering supervision and trained personnel to raise medical standards. He noted that this latter provision would be especially important in ensuring prevention of diseases prevailed, guaranteeing that "more permanent schemes become an actuality."[508]

UNICEF's transformation excluded other voices as well. Its stereotypical prescriptions for women, men, girls and boys persisted. Almost four decades passed before dissonant voices raising questions regarding the chasm between UNICEF's prescription and the reality of people's lives were heard, and it took even longer to make the challenges into program changes. Evidence of the persistence of these images can be seen in official documents throughout the 1950s, which provide a paucity of evidence that people had actually interacted to reach the resulting statistical conclusions. As early as March, 1949, the Report of the Meeting of the Subcommittee on Medical Projects held in Paris provided progress reports on BCG, the anti-VD campaign, the anti-Malaria campaign, training, and the programs being planned for Palestine and China focused exclusively on children.[509] Women now existed only in relation to their reproductive role. It put forth a breakdown of the "main study periods, each of them related to one special aspect of child care," that existed in a child's life and enumerated specific medical skills required in order to ensure their proper management. The inclusion of the pre-natal, neo-natal and post-natal periods is evidence that, by 1949, UNICEF had all but fused mothers and children together by categorizing pregnancy and childbirth as functions of child care.[510]

During the 1960s, UNICEF's shift in focus away from emergency aid and self-help programs toward long-term health programs in developing nations focused intently on the child and reports rarely mentioned mothers at all. A 1951 summary of

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[508] CF/HST/MON/1989-002, 45-46.
[509] E/ICEF/111, *Report of the Meeting of the Sub-Committee on Medical Projects Held on 5 March 1949, Paris*, 1.
[510] E/ICEF/111, 19.

policies and practices established this standard, and reported that UNICEF would, if necessary, seek advice from other sources regarding "child and family" welfare; and, while mentions of child health and child welfare programs abound, mothers are conspicuously absent.[511] Even Katharine Lenroot, a champion of maternal and child health and welfare programs, fell into step. She prepared a report in 1961 entitled *United Nations Aid to the Developing Countries for Extending and Improving Their Services for Children and Youth*.[512] While she mentions that "In 1960, over 56 million children and mothers benefited from the principal UNICEF-aided projects," she quickly moves to concerns over the "gaps and weaknesses in the whole range of United Nations programs for children," and only mentions mothers once more, this time as a group in need of proper prenatal care to ensure the birth of healthy children.[513] A new trend ensued during the mid-1960s, however, that would restore women's presence in UNICEF. This time, it would be as health care providers in woman-identified roles such as midwives and teachers.

Pate stated in 1965 that "the welfare of children and the advancement of women are inextricably bound together," and UNICEF, he noted, had therefore become deeply involved in the advancement of women. "Women play a dual role in UNICEF-assisted projects" Pate claimed, noting that their education and cooperation would be essential if UNICEF's projects were to have their long-range impact. UNICEF would give young women "a new outlook for a career in a socially useful occupation," and would provide them with training that would "inevitably carry over into their own family life." While Pate's statement makes it clear UNICEF had realized its programs were not working as anticipated in several regions of the developing world, these failures were attributed not to differences in culture, but to the lack of proper education and training of women according to the traditional Western model.[514]

UNICEF historian Maggie Black writes that the coming of second-wave feminism in the 1970s led to real changes in the ways UNICEF considered women. She writes that "the movement for women's rights…concerned itself with…women from a very different perspective." Women, refusing to be defined in terms of their domestic and childbearing roles, demanded equality with men instead. These women turned to UNICEF for help, but it changed its course slowly due to directions already charted for organization and programs.[515] The "Declaration of the Rights of the Child" and international concerns over ensuring child relief caused it to focus on health, nutrition, education, community development and social welfare, and UNICEF continued to identify women primarily in their role as mothers.[516] UNICEF did acknowledge in 1978 that "the integration of women in the process of development" had become essential, but determined that, once integrated, a woman could return to traditional roles and "improve nutrition, which because of its impact on health can reduce the load on health services."[517]

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[511] E/ICEF/168, *Summary of UNICEF Policies and Practices,* 32, 34.
[512]Katharine F. Lenroot, *United Nations Aid to the Developing Countries for Extending and Improving Their Services for Children and Youth* (20 April 1961).
[513] Lenroot, *United Nations Aid to the Developing Countries*, 7-8.
[514] CF/HST/MON/1989-002, 58.
[515] Black, 184-85.
[516] HIST/50, 2-4.
[517] HIST 46, 1.

As the 1970s progressed, UNICEF due to its increased presence in rural areas of developing countries that had no infrastructure did come to rely on women in new ways. It increasingly depended on women's clubs, mother's clubs and community centers to distribute relief assistance and training since the traditional school feeding programs found in the West did not exist.[518] Women also took on primary roles in training other women to become local health care providers. They also became the "barefoot midwives" and "barefoot teachers" who provided for a community's basic needs.[519] Therefore, UNICEF had begun to identify women as having roles in addition to that of mother. Awareness of the wide range of responsibilities managed by mothers evolved slowly, however, and though it took UNICEF until the end of the 1970s to acknowledge women beyond their "socially delegated" roles, many of its programs that appeared traditional on the surface accomplished much more.[520] Virginia Hazzard writes that mothercraft and homecraft programs in Africa provided "an acceptable activity that women could do together and in which they would frequently be supported, and even encouraged by their husbands." She notes that these programs significantly decreased the illiteracy rate for women in Africa, and increased their participation in community affairs.[521] Because no permanent UN organization for women existed, they looked to UNICEF, the one organization that had recognized them in any capacity, for help.

In the end, Maggie Black's contention that the women's movement caused changes for women receiving aid from UNICEF is less convincing than the fact that programs in developing countries were not succeeding. Training women in midwifery required trainees in Afghanistan to be transported on "a bus with blackened windows so the girls couldn't look out and nobody would look in on them" due to threats made against their lives. Family planning programs in Asia, according to Margaret Gann, took an "over-timid approach" due to their focus on women only. UNICEF's program relied on the use of the IUD, "difficult devices that had to be inserted." Henderson noted that the UN as a whole "never even tried to find out" how to deal with the male population. She also noted that income generation programs for women "were very bad." Run on a "charity basis," Henderson claimed they were "all done by rich women of the town who went out like Lady Bountifuls and taught poor women to crochet or embroider or knit, always the same things, and there was tremendous problems of marketing the stuff" because there was little demand for the goods produced.[522] Real change occurred when UNICEF could no longer ignore that the varied roles required of women, especially in developing countries, made their programs less appealing and successful than they had been in the Western world.

UNICEF's Board found it harder not to redirect its focus after the first UN conference for women, held in 1975. This conference signaled a new awareness in UN policy, and by the end of the Decade for Women, provided UNICEF with the impetus for making adjustments in its commitments to women. The three Programs of Action produced by the conferences in Mexico City, Copenhagen and Nairobi illustrated the

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[518] E/ICEF/608/Add.9, *General Progress Report of the Executive Director: The First Twenty-Five Years of UNICEF: A Summary of Policy Evolution,* 6, 8.
[519] Black, 12.
[520] Ibid., 183.
[521] Hazzard, 17.
[522] Gann Interview, 7, 11-12, 13.

need for a change in perception of women's roles all over the world. This helped to dispel the notion that women played little if any role in the family economy, bringing down the rubric based on the traditional middle class Western family model.

By the 1980s, UNICEF acknowledged that women in many parts of the developing world undertook almost every task related to the growing and processing of food, helping to dispel the notion that "women in…communities in Africa, Asia and Latin America had not been perceived as making any significant contribution to the family economy."[523] Women performed household maintenance, manufactured clothing, baskets and mats, and sometimes engaged in commerce, often selling surplus food goods at informal markets. UNICEF had finally realized that compartmentalizing the work of women into the category of mothers created an artificial identity. Any attempts to help mothers without taking into account the full range of their responsibilities would result in failing to help both mother and child in the end.

By 1990, the growing knowledge that gender operated as a fundamental organizing principle in society could not be avoided within UNICEF. Having already acknowledged the special needs of the girl child, UNICEF established a new commitment to elevate the status of women in general. Under the direction of its first female Executive Director, Carol Bellamy, who assumed this position in 1995, child development usurped child survival as the organization's primary cause. This has allowed UNICEF to participate in the intellectual, psychological and emotional development of children of both sexes equally while acknowledging the value of parents and community to a child's overall wellbeing.[524]

Today, UNICEF has come under fire for being "anti-family" and "anti-child" for assisting WHO in its attempts to rescue women refugees from the hands of captors women claimed had sexually molested them. Raped repeatedly by enemy soldiers, these women have been given basic health care in an attempt to ensure their survival. This often included providing RU-486, which caused the Catholic Church to discontinue its yearly contribution to UNICEF, and caused others to claim UNICEF had become the possession of radical feminists interested only in furthering their own agenda.

From the start, UNICEF has faced criticism for its programs regardless of the fact that, without them, countless children and mothers would have died. While it did not always keep pace with the cultures and societies it attempted to help, UNICEF did not undertake its mission in an attempt to constrict individual family roles. Instead, it used the roles accepted by benefactor nations in the West in order to ensure its survival as an organization, then found it difficult to change these roles once programs had been built around them. Like the UN as a whole, UNICEF cannot escape the prevailing attitudes and trends present at any given time, and can do no more than UN members and its supporters will allow.

[523] Black, 186-187.
[524] Black, 214.

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