

## **ABSTRACT**

### **GLOBALIZATION:**

The Structural Changes of the Hungarian Sport life after the Communist  
Regime

**BY**

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The purpose of this work is to gain an understanding of the process of globalization and to address the possible consequences of globalization in Hungary and how the Hungarian society is reacting to these changes. Another purpose of the present work is to interpret the influence of globalization on post-communist Hungary concerning the changes in its sport life. This paper provides general information about the most discussed ideas regarding globalization. For a better understanding of the recent political, economic and cultural situation of Hungary, the history of the country's last century is outlined. In addition, certain aspects of Hungary's sport life is introduced regarding the political eras, economic circumstances, and societal structures in the transition period between the communist and the post-communist periods, and Hungary's accommodation to the process of Europeanization.

**GLOBALIZATION:**  
**THE STRUCTURAL CHANGES OF THE HUNGARIAN SPORT LIFE AFTER**  
**THE COMMUNIST REGIME**

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I dedicate this work to my parents who encouraged my studies and supported me emotionally, despite the fact, that they missed my presence so much.

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# INTRODUCTION

Scaling the highest mountains, traversing the most difficult terrain, exploring the depths of the sea and skimming across the oceans, soaring through the skies and descending into deep valley gorges, tunnelling far into the interior of the earth and shaping its exterior with both natural and artificial surfaces and structures, sportsmen and sportswomen straddle the globe, and the sportization of the planet seemingly knows *no bounds*.

Maguire, *Global Sport*, 1999 (Italics added)

In the last few decades of human history, we could be the eyewitnesses to the emergence of an accelerated technical development concerning almost all-industrial products. This technical development greatly influences our everyday life and the structures of our societies. Nowadays, we have faster and more reliable cars and airplanes than ever before. Moreover, mainly because of the improved computer and telecommunication technology, we can get to know information about the happenings on the other side of the world within a few seconds. That is, communication has become faster, a milestone of improvement, and a significant part of our life. As Martin-Barbero (1999) writes, “Without communication there is no development” (p. 352).

The globalization process is speeded up by technical development (Herman, 2000). In addition, the term ‘globalization’ has become global itself (Maguire, 1999) and global studies, especially globalization studies have become something of a bandwagon today (Friedman, 1994). The popularity of this topic shows the importance and currency of this phenomenon.

The influence of globalization or Americanization or Westernization (more on this later) can easily be seen in the case of post-communist countries. Communist regimes left Eastern European countries with bloated and inefficient industries that suffered from decades of neglect, outdated technology, heavy debt, and environmental problems (Energy Information Administration). As the communist political system vanished and the borders of the post-Soviet countries became open, foreign firms

immediately wanted to insert their presence in their markets. Eastern and Middle Europe under central planning was virtually closed to foreign investors. Although direct foreign investment has increased in these areas, inflows remain modest. Direct foreign investment has been slow to materialize due to continuing macroeconomic instability and insufficient institutional reforms. To date, most foreign investment has been through joint ventures.

Each country has a unique socioeconomic context, causing variation in the transition process across all countries in the region. Different ownership structures are emerging under different privatization schemes. Reform has continued, even in the face of economic decline and decreasing production, since the fall of communism and the beginning of efforts to move to market economies. Only now are these countries beginning to recover economically, spurred by exports and increasing domestic demand. Some of these countries tried to attract foreign businesses by creating temporary tax discounts. For instance, in Hungary, the foreign franchises were exempted from tax in the first five years of the operation and afterwards they had to pay only 60 percent of the total tax for the next five years (this policy was the creation of the first freely elected government right after the communist epoch). But there was a contradiction in terms of temporary tax discounts: On the one hand, it was worth building a factory for a foreign company, but on the other hand, this policy did not become popular because it helped the exploitation of Hungary and Hungarians<sup>1</sup>. Therefore, as the outcome of this disposition, the party which created it was not re-elected. Anyway, it was an important step for Hungary to be placed into the mainstream of globalization and the European economy again, although it was not popular at all.

### **Question of Hungary**

In the case of Hungary, it is difficult to define the proper approach in terms of analyzing data from a globalization perspective because the society is complex and contradictory per se. It means that at this stage of the research I cannot state for sure which way(s) the globalization process is taking shape in Hungary. In addition, it cannot be asserted which type(s) of local responses to globalization is being formed in



Hungary at the present time. Therefore, the main purpose of this paper is to address the possible consequences of globalization in Hungary and how the Hungarian society is reacting to these changes. Moreover, another important purpose of the present work is to interpret the influence of globalization on post-communist Hungary concerning the changes in sport life. How has the sport of post-communist Hungary changed and how have the different factors (e. g.: economy and politics) influenced it since the new democratic political system replaced the old communist one. Those changes would be depicted the best if the situation of sport during the communist period was compared to the present condition of sport in Hungary. In order to reach my goal in terms of introducing and explaining the different conditions and circumstances of sport life in Hungary during and after the communist epoch, I am going to analyze the past and present conditions focusing on the financial metamorphosis of sport organizations in Hungary. According to my perspective, these changes have been directing Hungary and the Hungarian sport life toward the capitalist way of organizing their structures. Because of the popularity of soccer in Europe and in Hungary, most of my examples derive from this sport activity.

The importance and relevance of this paper is demonstrated by the fact that there are just a few papers published on this topic. To explain the lack of critical scientific works concerning Hungarian sport life and its relation to first world countries, a clear understanding of the intellectual oppression of the Hungarian white-collar strata is necessary. One of the biggest disadvantages of the communist regime was the neglect and suppression of the critical view of itself. All of the scholars were supervised and controlled by the communist party. In other words, they were told what to say and what to do. Scholars were only allowed to criticize the capitalist political economies of other nation-states. The communist party, in a sense, forced them into the role of “organic intellectuals” and to add a scholarly voice to the official ideology. Most of the papers, which were written under the supervision of the communist regime, did not realistically evaluate the Hungarian situation. Therefore, those papers were not acknowledged worldwide. There is, then, a scientific lacuna created in the Hungarian sport literature. This space demands objective, critical and multidisciplinary research to be filled.

### **The structure of this work**

The first chapter, review of the literature, introduces the basic globalization theories and debates, and the responses of societies to globalization. This literature is well-known and often discussed nowadays. This section also defines globalization and explains what I mean when I use the term.

The second chapter provides a brief historical overview of the last hundred years of Hungary and background information to help readers understand the present conditions of Hungary in terms of politics, economy and society. Also, it raises the question of the Magyar national identity and argues that this identity may have become distorted because of the plethora of interactions Hungary has had with neighboring countries and in which Hungary was mostly in a subservient position.

The third chapter depicts the impact of the USSR on Hungary, taking into consideration its intention of total political, economic, and ideological oppression and final annexation. It also focuses on the moral values and structural changes in the sport of Hungary.

The fourth chapter of this paper introduces the influence of globalization on post-communist Hungary concerning the changes in its sport life. How has the sport of post-communist Hungary changed and how have the different factors (e.g., economy, politics) influenced it since the new democratic political system replaced the old communist politics and Hungary stepped on the way of Europeanization. In this chapter I intended to analyze the impact of globalization on Hungarian sport through soccer. However I did not receive the expected outcome because of the difficulty of the data collecting procedure. I will further discuss this issue in the conclusion.

The fifth chapter summarizes the relationship between globalization and Hungary. That is, I shall suggest which globalization theories may apply to the present circumstances of Hungary and offer some possible future tendencies in Hungarian sport life based upon the changes that have occurred the past decade. Also, this chapter contains the limitations of this study and some suggestion for future research.

# CHAPTER 1

## OVERVIEW OF THE GLOBALIZATION LITERATURE

In spite of the fact that the term ‘Globalization’ and the phenomenon that globalization stands for has become quite popular and widely discussed only in the last couple of decades, the globalization processes are viewed here as being long-term processes that have occurred unevenly across all areas of the planet (Maguire, 1999). Globalization is a historical process, the result of human innovation and technological progress (IMF Staff, 2000). Globalization is quite a complex process. It has industrial, economic, sociological, cultural, and political aspects (Herman, 2000). According to Roudometof & Robertson (1995), globalization constitutes a process of mutual interaction among different power networks over a long period of time. It refers to the increasing integration of economies around the world, particularly through trade and financial flows, i.e. it is a process through which a global economy is being formed, an economy that would be less and less concerned with national barriers (Harvey & Saint-Germain, 2001). The term sometimes also refers to the moving of people (labor) and knowledge (technology) across international borders. Moreover, in the first part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the politicians also recognized that a common forum (UN<sup>2</sup>) was necessary for discussing global problems (Herman, 2000). This reinforces the fact that globalization is not a phenomenon of only the last few decades.

I understand globalization as a long-term process which started a long-long time ago and in the last few decades its development has become faster as a side effect of rapid technical development. Furthermore, according to my interpretation of globalization, it is quite as old as humankind is and as any technique develops the desire of people to conquer or to globalize more land increases, as well. New inventions of humankind were/are mostly used by military forces so as to possess larger territory and more fortune. Generally speaking, innovations are supposed to make our life easier in order to have more effective work and more free time but when we possess some kind of technical innovations we do not only use them for their main purposes, i.e. to make our life more convenient. An example could be the development of navies in the countries of the southern part of Europe around 1450-1550. At that

time the inventions concerning traveling by ship were used to discover and mainly to conquer lands. The explorers did not care too much about the indigenous populations. They wanted gold, spices, and slaves for free. At the same time, they brought their own culture with them and planted it in the foreign land and in the minds of the native people.

The main debate concerning the influence of globalization on societies is whether this process leads to cultural homogenization or trans- or multiculturalism? Will we have one common culture to follow, which is the dominant nation's culture (homogeneous) or we will have large variety of cultures mixed and living together (heterogeneous - multicultural)? Maybe we will have to live in a transcultural (a common culture containing some part of any kind of culture) future together on the Earth.

Globalization can be seen from many different angles. Therefore, there are negative and positive side effects of globalization.

### **Positive side of globalization**

People crossing national borders recently has become a daily occurrence. As a result of a growing number of sites and opportunities, particularly in large cities around the world, people of different ethnicities, cultures, religions, and values can now meet one another with relative ease (NIRA, 1997). It can be a whirlwind of trade and investment that builds economies and spurs development even in the world's poorest nations. World trade continues to expand faster than overall global economic output, inducing a wave of productivity and efficiency and creating millions of jobs. Even more impressive is the stunning increase in international investment that is building roads, airports and factories in poorer countries (Sutherland, 1998). As a result of the aforementioned facts we can say that globalization can make the rich richer but, on the other hand, it can also make the poor richer, too.

Within the context of modernity and globalization, small nations are not only viable, but help to make the world a more interesting place to live in (Zuzul, 1998). To paraphrase, globalization improves the living conditions of those countries which are in poor financial situations and raises the living standards of the people of second and

third world countries. Therefore, we can say that globalization helps technologies to be improved faster world-wide. Moreover, it makes a larger variety of products available for more and more people. As a side effect of technical development, that is, we can produce more goods during less time and for less money. Globalization lets us get in touch with other nations' cultures and products in a more comfortable and economic way. For instance, to go to a Greek restaurant in order to try Greek food is less expensive than to go to Greece. Furthermore, it is even cheaper if we buy the ingredients of a Greek dish in a large store. This means that more and more people have chance to 'discover' other nations' cultures without the problems and expenses of traveling.

In addition, the Internet "the materialized globalization itself" also makes almost anything available world-wide to anybody who has access to it. Most of the relevant stores and companies already have their home pages where all their products and services can be found. That is, we can order anything from anywhere, if we have Internet access and enough credit on our bankcard. The other interesting feature of the Internet and globalization is that the more people and the more territory involved (have Internet access) in globalization the less expensive and easier it is to get products and services or information.

By the same token, Internet gives us an easier access to sport and sport life. Because of the growing popularity and the above-mentioned features of the Internet, many sport clubs and athletes have their own home pages where we can read about their sport and the athletes' private lives, and can get to know their "secrets". Training methods are also can be found on the Net and we can write e-mails to experts so as to get help concerning coaching problems, nutrition tricks, etc. This kind of impact of globalization on sport allows more people to have greater opportunity to be familiar with different nations' sports. For example, soccer was the most popular sport in Hungary but nowadays basketball has become quite popular among youngsters. This can be seen as an influence of world-wide broadcasts by the NBA via cable channel all around Hungary. Globalization and its instruments, like Internet, computers, mobile phones, etc., provide easier access to more events and makes all kinds of sport more popular.

### **Negative side of globalization – critical globalization theory**

Globalization has been seen as cultural imperialism – domination by one nation over another (Mohammadi, 1999) - or as a part of cultural hegemony because it occurs at the expense of the importing culture and the local population (Yiannakis & Melnick, 2001, pp.443). This means that the world is losing the logic of indigeneness (Smith, 1999). Globalization is a set of forces that produces a complex and irresistible system of world economic, political, and cultural interdependence (Rowe, Lawrence, Miller, & McKay, 1994). Smith (1999) defines the ‘set of forces’ when he writes “ Globalization [is] the concentration of a substantial number of the world’s information and entertainment businesses into a series of huge international companies “ (p. 356.). Although Smith mentions only the information and entertainment businesses, as far as I can see, all the other franchises (‘power networks’) which have some kind of international interest are also parts of the globalization process. They are not only parts of it but they construct the backbone of globalization. Gyorgy (2001) has the same opinion but he believes that anything which is connected with globalization has a negative connotation. He writes that the main vices (of globalization) are the international companies and their self-centered, greedy, irresponsible, and unreasonable desire for profit. Even though Gyorgy (2001) says that globalization is a negative phenomenon, he agrees that this is the result of the impact of the international companies on our everyday life.

The cyanide pollution in Hungary in 2000 would be a perfect example to support the negative aspects of globalization. In early February, the Hungarian news announced an enormous fish kill in the Szamos River on the country's eastern border. A wave of cyanide was moving down the Szamos and into the Tisza, Hungary's second largest river (Meadows, 2000). The pollution derived from a gold mine, which was operated by an Australian company (Esmeralda) and used cyanide heap leach technology<sup>3</sup>. The used cyanide was stored in an above-ground pool held by an earth dam. On January 30 the dam collapsed because rain and snow had filled the pond beyond capacity. Within half of a day, cyanide concentrations in the Szamos reached

150-300 times the safe level. Life in the river was exterminated, from fish to plankton (Meadows, 2000).

This sad fact shows conspicuously that globalization has significantly changed the time/space relation. I would say it has turned it upside-down. As Waters (2001) writes: “In a pre-modern context both time and space were fundamentally linked to a person’s immediate location. The temporal rhythms of everyday life were determined by local diurnal and seasonal cycles. Equally, space was confined to what one immediately could perceive and was measured in relation to one’s home, even if one traveled” (p. 62.). Globalization and its concomitant modernization have liberated time and space. Furthermore, according to Nederveen Pieterse (1995), globalization is associated with the postmodern condition of time-space compression. In this way, it has made it possible for human beings to organize and do different activities across vast temporal and spatial distances. That is, “Time – space distancing<sup>4</sup> and disembedding<sup>5</sup> mean that complex relationships develop between local activities and interactions across distances” (Waters, 2001, p. 62.). This is the only reason why it can happen that an Australian company has property in Romania or an American firm has a factory in Korea. Putting it in a different way, as a corollary of the fast means of transportation, people, and of course, industry have become quite mobile. This caused a kind of deep change in the framework of the world-wide economy. This change manifests itself as foreign companies’ factories are situated on the land of less-developed countries. Because of the cheap labor force, the defective safety restrictions concerning the workers’ life, and the use of dangerous chemicals, well-developed countries’ companies exploit the land and the population of the less-developed countries behind the aegis of support and help. Therefore, we definitely can say that globalization must consist of negative features in terms of the exploitation of less developed countries.

At some point, globalization appears to be having a negative influence on sport life. Because of the easier access to sport materials such as training instructions and techniques and as a consequence of the fast flow of information of the most up-to-date research results on the field of sport, the recent sport life has the potential to be more uniform. Everyone who has access to those pieces of information will get them and

theoretically, all the teams, which can afford to pay for such kind of knowledge, will have the same chance to be the winner. On the other hand, those teams, which do not have enough financial support, will not be able to keep up with the front runners. Therefore, sport and competitions may get too monotonous and regionalized (more on this later) which can make people lose their interest if the final result of a tournament can be calculated easily, i.e., “if too many games end in a draw, that is, without a tension-resolving victory...[and] if, in too many cases, victory is attained rather quickly. In that case, the enjoyable excitement-tension is missing or too short” (Elias & Dunning, 1986, p. 51), which can lead to indifference toward sport because the attractiveness of each product depends on its uncertainty and dramatic value (Davenport, 1969). The owners of sport franchises know that the only way they can sell their products (i.e. the talent and performance of their athletes) is to insure that the sport events’ outcomes are unpredictable and can keep fans in uncertainty.

International sport associations and academic sport associations per se have a kind of uniforming impact on sport. One form of sport (Prolympism<sup>6</sup>) could become the form of sport (Ingham & Lawson, 1999). Following the argument of Ingham & Lawson, (1999, p. 11), institutionalized sport viz. Prolympism can be described in terms of its content, forms, and relations. *Content* refers to techniques that can be seen as the skills that athletes are required to reproduce. *Forms* mean the regulative and constitutive rules of the various sports and the tactics that give sports their shape. *Relations* are read as the ways in which sport is organized in terms of production/consumption. This argument supports the relevance of international governing bodies of sport because without internationally accepted rules we would not be able to manage an international tournament. Different countries need a structured regulation system to be able to compete against each other on the field of sport under equal conditions. This argument also assumes that the contents and forms of sports will become the same. Forms of sports are standardized by international sport associations and the contents of sports are becoming the same as a result of fast information exchange via telecommunication networks and easy access to recent sport-related research and publications (Lawson, calls these knowledgespaces). Thus, the only factor that could be supreme in the determination of the outcome is the talent



of the athletes. Putting it in another way, theoretically, all the teams have the same knowledge in terms of a sport activity (training, preparation) and have to follow the same regulations. In this case, it is likely that the winner is going to be the team that possesses the best set of athletes, i.e. the team that has the biggest budget to buy players. Although, it does not mean that sport is going to be monotonous automatically, the fact that sport has already been standardized increases the likelihood of sport becoming a uniform cultural formation.

Sport, in general, and the financial situation of sport associations in particular are highly dependent on their relationship with the media. Media are the vehicles between the fans and the teams. Conversely, the media also depend on sports because these associations are significant contributors to media's profit. Therefore, it is their common interest and goal to preserve the uncertainty of sport competitions and to provide the proper circumstances (financial and technical) for athletes to be able to perform well and to set up new records. Now one may say that fans will buy tickets and go to see the game no matter what. In the short run, this may be right but in a long run, when all of or most of the final results of matches and sport competitions are predicted easily, the number of the TV onlookers and ticket buyers will go through a substantial decrement. Therefore, they (sport association – media complex) try to prevent sport being one-sided in order to get higher profit (profit maximization) and create a more sellable product. "In order to increase the keenness of playing competition, the first requirement is that each team be a potential winning team" (Davenport, 1969, p. 7). Nevertheless, in spite of their endeavors, predictability has already appeared in sport life. The example of Ayrton Senna's winning series in Formula 1 competitions clearly showed the technical domination of his team. It is also evident that Senna's great talent contributed to his and his team's success but the well-developed technique of his team and Senna's unique driving style were unbeatable together. Senna's success made the Formula 1 race outstanding, but slowly but surely it made the car race monotonous because other competitors had no chance to be winners. In order to create equal chances on the asphalt, the committee of the Formula 1 restricted the power of the engines and the amount of technical improvements in the racing cars which are supposed to increase the speed. Unfortunately, Senna died

(1994) before this disposition really showed its influence on Formula 1-car races but his example illustrates how a sport can be monotonous thanks to the ‘over developed’ technique, which is possessed by that particular team(s) who can afford to pay for it.

Another example to support the previous argument would be the changes in the strategies of the soccer teams of different nations in the recent times. Around 1950s residual regionalist tendencies were evident in terms of the soccer strategies of different nations. At that time, those countries that played an important role in the world of soccer had their very own playing styles which were characteristic to those nations. For example, the English team played WM, the “stopper” center-half; the Hungarian team utilized the deep lying center-forward (a forerunner of the 4-2-4 formation) strategy; the Germans played four-three-three style; the Brazilian team had the four-two-four player arrangement, and the Italian team played a defense-oriented style called Catenaccio. Each of these tendencies influenced different regions. In other words, the Brazilian style was popular and mostly played in Brazil, the Italian style was popular in Southern-Europe, the German style was played in Western-Europe and the English way was mostly favored in England and Scotland. This feature of soccer provided colorful and exciting matches on the field where the final outcome was difficult to predict and the different styles between teams made the soccer events extremely spectacular.

Nowadays there is no real regional variation in the strategy of soccer. In other words, all teams now have an “11 men” format which adjusts depending upon opposition, i.e. the eleven men are picked as the “best” solution to the opposition’s tactics on any given day. Basically, we still can see some technical variation from one team to another but the strategic differences have been reduced, meaning that there is no single playing style characteristic of a particular nation. Therefore, I would argue, that soccer is being made more uniform than it was before. It does not necessarily mean that soccer has turned out to be boring but it has already lost some of its regional particularisms which used to make it exciting in a multi-dimensional way. This impact on soccer is directly related to the influence of the process of globalization, i.e., the easier access to sport related information and the easier flowing of coaches and players from one country to another. In these ways, soccer (and sports in general) has become

less culturally diverse, which in a long run may lead to the point when soccer (or sports in general) loses its most appreciated features.

### **Possible outcomes of globalization**

At the present stage of globalization research, scholars basically distinguish three major possible outcomes of the process of globalization. They are: homogenization (imperialism), heterogenization (multiculturalism) and transculturalism.

#### *Homogenization – monoculturalism*

Globalization can be viewed from a monocultural perspective as a process that erases national, cultural, religious and other differences (Zuzul, 1998). Scholars who believe that the final result of the process of globalization is going to be one homogeneous society talk about Americanization (Robins, 1991), Europeanization, Japanization (Mohammadi, 1999; Smith, 1999; Harvey & Houle, 2001) or sometimes they use the expressions such as CocaColonization and Densification (Yiannakis & Melnick, 2001). These terminologies describe the process of broadcasting the popular – cheap – culture all around the world. So, it does not really matter which expression is used (Americanization, Europeanization, etc.), the final result is going to be the demolition of local cultures and traditions by dominant and powerful societies and cultures – imperialism. We could say that homogenization is not necessarily the spread of American, Japanese or any other cultures but it is the result of the globalization of capital (Guttman, 1991). In other words, homogenization leads to one common culture created by the expansion of capital. If these scholars are right, then Aldous Huxley's prediction in the *Brave New World* will come true, i.e. there are going to be the same people living with the same thoughts, interests, and opinions. This future will be boring and monotonous but this is exactly what capital wants us to have and to be. Jackson & Andrews (1999) summarize this position as follows: If we lose our culture we will lose our identity, our nationality and according to scholars who believe in the

idea of homogenization this is what is waiting for us at the end of the process of globalization.

The monoculturalistic perspective of sport would be that a way of doing sport becomes the way of doing sport. Monoculturalism would lead sport to uniformity through which the contents, forms, and relations of sports become homogenous. The officially accepted and supported ways of sports could be determined by the dominant culture or an international sport organization driven by the dominant culture. In other words, all the athletes who want to participate and to compete in any sport activity, either at the global or the local level, must follow the regulations of the dominant.

In addition, monoculturalism has the connotation of the oppression and elimination of local identities and cultures, thus, it could erase local diversity on the field of sports, too. If the dominant culture decided about or directed the way of doing sports, which would be a global and standardized form, and if it could economically or politically force local identities to follow the common and superior global one it would directly lead to the homogenization of sports. That is to say, monoculturalism could reach the point when a sport-cultural hegemony gains power at the expense of local interests. In other words, sport becomes uniform through monoculturalism that is a negative concomitant of globalization through which it loses its indigenous forms and identities.

#### *Heterogenization – multiculturalism*

The idea of multicultural globalization or cultural diversity is supported by scholars who are called Heterogenizers (Jackson & Andrews, 1999) – they support the idea of the recognition and celebration of every particular local culture. They say that global and local can be only understood in relation to each other. Furthermore, some scholars write that the unity of a nation-state is being dissolved, identity pluralized and a partial mixing of global cultures is occurring. Citizens of different nations are becoming aware of ‘otherness’ and recognizing difference (Maguire, 1999). Therefore, in some globalization accounts, emphasis is placed on the emergence of global diversity (Nederveen Pieterse, 1995). From this point of view, globalization can

be seen as a far less coherent and culturally directed process and occurs as a result of the complex dynamics of political, economic and cultural practices (Maguire, 1999).

The aforementioned standpoint depicts a different picture of globalization, which is not 'Predatory Globalization'<sup>7</sup> (Falk, 1999) but it is rather utopian in the sense of the imagination of all the cultures (or at least a part of them) living together. Nevertheless, human history shows us that it is not quite possible for different cultures to live together in peace for a long time. We do not need to go back far in history to find examples to refute the chance of multiculturalism. Two nations lived together in Czechoslovakia seemingly in peace but as they had the chance to separate they did it. Three different nations (cultures) lived in Yugoslavia and they wanted to be separated but this process was not really silent and peaceful. Hungarians always have had a problem with living together with Gypsies because of cultural differences. So, viewing multiculturalism from a different angle tells us that the heterogenization way of living together does not seem to be a flowering future.

If we understand sport as contents, forms and relations then we can see that sport is mostly not heterogeneous. Sport is on the way of becoming totally homogenous which is primarily the consequence of globalization processes and international sport organizations.

Forms or regulations of sport cannot be heterogeneous. Sport provides an international arena where different nations' athletes can challenge each other within equal, official, and fair circumstances concerning regulations. It is prestigious to win an international championship; therefore, each participant wants to think that they have equal chances to succeed under an internationally created convention framework. In other words, in order to maintain the meritocratic idea of sport we have to keep forms of sport homogenous and equal to all athletes. Otherwise, we would lose the significance of international sport events and some sort of regionalized sport formations would occur employing local rule structures.

Contents or techniques of sport are still slightly heterogeneous but this feature of sport is quickly vanishing. This phenomenon, i.e. the disappearance of local or regional sport techniques, tactics and strategies is the direct consequence of globalization processes. Instead of applying regionally idiosyncratic sport contents,

athletes utilize situation required techniques, tactics, and strategies possessing global – homogeneous - knowledge of them via which sport is not going to preserve its heterogeneous flavor.

Relations or the ways in which sport is organized in terms of production/consumption are still heterogeneous. Each nation-state has its own way of constructing sport consumption and sport has various roles and values attached to it in different countries. That is to say, the relations of sport are the only parts of sport which are still heterogeneous and probably will keep multicultural values until the monocultural forces of globalization take over all indigenous priorities.

### *Transculturalism*

The third possible result of globalization could be transculturalism, i.e. a new transcendent culture or, as Sklair (1991) writes, ‘transnational practices’ which take a variety of cultural forms and gain a degree of relative autonomy on a global level. Transculturalism would sustain the exchange and flow of goods, people, information, knowledge and images (Robertson, 1990). The aforementioned fact suggests that a possible result of globalization will be a way of living in the future where every culture’s footprint can be found. As far as I can see it also has a slight utopian connotation because who would be charged for deciding which part of which culture will be incorporated into the future’s transculture. This ideological approach poses some questions concerning the transcultural future and its governing authorities: Is the governing body of the transcultural future going to be capital itself or a committee which is accepted worldwide? Is the future going to be real transculturalism and might we have chance to live in utopian states<sup>8</sup>? Will capital or a worldwide-accepted committee decide about a common transculture or it is just going to be homogenization under the aegis of transculturalism? I think the above-mentioned questions cannot be answered right now.

My theory about the transcultural future is the following. Picturing a transcultural, i.e. utopian future concerning sport would be an overflow of the importance of the international sport events (e.g.: Olympic Games, World Championships, etc...) over local and national sport happenings and sport

organizations. In this ‘imaginary’ transcultural future the whole world’s sport life would be under the control of an International Committee, which could be the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and all the sport events of every nation would be under the supervision of the IOC. In addition, all the national sport teams would have to follow the rules and regulations of the IOC<sup>9</sup>. At the first sight, it may seem to be a kind of homogenization but the main difference is that while homogenization leads to domination of one nation over other, transculturalism is supposed to be the co-operation and mixture of all the cultures. That is, in a transcultural society or in a transcultural committee, all the different nations and cultures, which are interested in the decision making procedures, would be represented and would have rights to participate in discussions on every issue influencing their future.

As far as I can see and can understand, transculturalism would never happen in the near future. The world is not going in this direction and the idea of transculturalism seems to be a science fiction right now. In human history, several people have tried to make their utopian dreams come true but all of them have failed. An example is what Robert Owen attempted around 1824<sup>10</sup>.

Nowadays, the capitalist form of life and business style dominates, which does not really reinforce charity and humanitarianism. In the sway of capital, the stronger and the richer survive while the weaker and poorer fail. Therefore, as we can see, the future of this kind of society would turn out to be monocultural (domination of one nation’s culture) or multicultural (many nations living together without cultural equilibrium). In summary, I reject the possibility of transculturalism as a form of globalization in the near future and using the words of Ingham and Lawson (1999, p. 2.) my prognostication would be that, if homogenization becomes a reality, then prolympism will be come “the dominant sporting cultural formation on a world scale, [and] other physical cultural formations that embrace alternative sporting practices, meaning systems, and identities will be lost”.

## **Responses to globalization**

Globalization does not proceed in an unmediated fashion. Scholars have pointed to several processes that impede the full-blown effects of the globalization process. They are: glocalization, nationalism, regionalization and hybridization.

### *Glocalization*

Glocalization is usually portrayed as national versus global, where global interests are seen to gain power and advantage at the expense of national and local interests. Glocalization is both the national resistance to and the local adaptation of the foreign cultures and businesses. In other words, glocalization is a global outlook adapted to local conditions (Robertson, 1995).

Homogenization is the domination of one culture over another (Maguire, 1999), which is a part of the local – global nexus. Robertson (1990) writes that through globalization the world is going to be a global village, which is, in fact, a “globalised” area. Furthermore, he describes glocalization as follows: “local assertions against globalizing trends, ...a very idea of locality is sometimes cast as a form of opposition or resistance to the hegemonically global.” (Robertson, 1995, p. 29). It means that local narratives try to resist the process of globalization to preserve their own identity or they try to adapt only a small part of the global culture into a particular local culture. This kind of local resistance or adaptation occurs in four different ways: The local – global nexus involves the resistance of indigenous people toward the dominant global culture, that is, local responses to economic practices, local resistance to ideological processes, local revivals of traditional customs, or local celebrations of diversity (Maguire, 1999). I understand these four perspectives of the local-global nexus as two ways of domination (economic and ideological) and three ways of resistance (cultivating local values, revivals of traditions and celebration of diversity).

*(1) Local responses to economic practices:* This type of resistance appears to be a reaction of local cultures to the economic oppression or control by the globalizing countries; for example, when first world countries try to keep other societies under their economic influence in order to be able to manipulate (direct the increase or decrease of) the industry, and in this way, to reduce the economic and political



influence of that particular country. Responses to this economic suppression could be the protection of domestic products and the domestic franchises against the foreign ones. On the one hand, increasing custom tariffs could prevent overloading the country with foreign goods and strict tax regulations for foreign franchises operating inside of the country could have a similar effect. On the other hand, governmental support for national enterprises could boost domestic productivity. This support could be in the form of tax discounts, loans, or providing free marketing consultation. These reactions, however could lead to some kind of isolation of the country which, in the long run, would destroy the whole business and marketing structure.

The major problem is that those states that are under the economic pressure of first world countries cannot really afford to totally execute these forms of resistance because of the poor shape of their financial situations. Therefore, less industrially developed countries, if they want to survive, have to submit themselves to the will of those states that are in the leading position of the world economy.

*(2) Local resistance to ideological processes:* Ideological and economic oppressions cannot be fully separated. Ideologies should support economy and vice versa. They should go hand in hand in order to help countries achieve their goals faster and easier. Having a good financial situation can reinforce the relevance and sensibility of recent ideologies. But even the best ideology is unable to survive when it is associated with weak economy. Therefore, planting and popularizing a foreign culture in an indigenous population would pre-prepare the area to receive the ideologies, the products and the value systems of foreign cultures into the local ones with the purpose of the final elimination of the domestic culture. This usually happens with the help of the media that broadcast anything if well paid. The essence of this broadcasted message would be as follows: This is how rich we are and this is the way we live, if you want to be one of us you should live like we do.

This ideological selling of a way of life is happening right now in Hungary because the nation wants to join the European Union (EU). In order to be accepted, Hungary has to meet certain criteria in terms of monetary, higher educational, jurisdictional and military issues. As soon as Hungary joins the EU, it is definitely going to lose an important part of its identity (We are losing one of our national

symbols – the money). Hungarian Forint is going to be exchanged to Euro, which is the common money of EU.). On other hand, the economic situation of Hungary will improve, which reinforces the sensibility of the ideology of the existing EU countries against the indigenous one. Therefore, people who cultivate old values and ideologies cannot hold this process back for a long time because of the need for financial help in Hungary.

(3) *Local revivals of traditional customs*: This is usually one form of response to ideological or to cultural oppression. It occurs when the local culture is being neglected and another (a foreign) culture is being celebrated by a significant part of a nation. In this case, local interest groups try to revival old or recently forgotten traditions to make people understand where they belong and to appreciate their own culture and traditions. These endeavors could be the revitalization of old national and religious holidays or national customs that are not popular or not practiced any more. It could involve choosing some part of the history of that nation as a theme of exhibitions, movies or books. The main idea and goal of the local revival of traditional customs is to broadcast as much positive information about the nation as possible and in as many ways (TV, radio, books, movies, internet, magazines, etc...) as possible. This form of resistance has a nationalist connotation, as we shall see.

(4) *Local celebrations of diversity*: Local celebration of diversity is the appreciation of being different. It values variety in people and in cultural formations, and prefers heterogeneity to homogeneity. Thus, this way of resistance supports any kind of otherness that can be utilized against globalization.

As a proof of the idea of glocalization, the local resistance has already occurred. For instance, an old Hun (the lineage of Hungarians) fighting and hunting style has been reinvented in Hungary as a sport activity. This activity, which is a unique combination of archery and horseback riding, has attracted more and more people recently. Approximately two decades ago there were only a few people who started practicing this combination of archery and horseback riding, and making the necessary equipment for this activity following the historical guidelines. Later on, they gathered a few followers, but basically most people remained uninterested in this activity. Around 1995 there was a boom concerning archery. Craftsmen started

copying and making the traditional Hungarian bow, using the ancient technique, and more and more people became familiar with and involved in this horseback riding-archery activity. Nowadays, we have a good chance to come across a traditional Hungarian bow and this activity when we go to a Hungarian fair.

Even though the aforementioned phenomena is seemingly a good example of glocalization, in the way of reinventing national traditions, one may argue that this only involves a couple hundred people and has nothing to do with a major response to globalization. Therefore, we cannot really talk about the resistance of the whole country but of small interest group(s). Besides, this group of people may not have reinvented this horseback riding-archery tradition for any anti-globalization reason. Perhaps, they are/were only interested in this activity and tradition for its sake. Thus, it would be a mistake not to take the above-mentioned possibilities into account when we interpret glocalization related social phenomena.

### *Regionalization*

Regionalization is a part of globalization and refers to the concentration of international economic relations into continental blocs (Lipietz, 1997). In the words of Harvey & Saint-Germain (2001), regionalization means international trade that flows among countries of the same political, economic, and cultural contents would gain in importance compared to other regions of the world. The major theory in terms of regionalization, which depicts how regionalization works as a part of the globalization process, is the dependency/world system theory.

Dependency/world system theory sees the international division of labor<sup>11</sup> as a bipolar system structured around central versus peripheral economies. Labor is divided among functionally defined and geographically distinct parts arranged in a hierarchy of occupational tasks (Wallerstein, 1974). This theory differentiates core, peripheral, and semi-peripheral countries. The core countries are named First World countries that have kept the others in a dependent position to them. It is essentially a structuralist approach to the international division of labor that puts the emphasis on state policies (Harvey & Saint-Germain, 2001). Core states concentrate on higher skill, capital intensive production; they are militarily strong; they appropriate much of the surplus-

value of the whole world economy. Semi-peripheral areas are less dependent on the core than peripheral ones; they have more diversified economies and politically stronger states compared to peripheral countries. Peripheral areas focus on low-skill, labor-intensive production and extraction of raw materials; they have economically and politically weak states (Wallerstein, 1974). In the first centuries of world-system development, Western-Europe and the US constituted the core; Mediterranean- and Middle- Europe are the semi-periphery, and Eastern Europe, the Far East and parts of Asia are perceived as the periphery.

The translation of regionalization into sport life would be the popularity and success of different kinds of sports in different countries or in different continents, the occurrence of which cannot be viewed as random phenomena but is influenced by local geographical, economic and societal conditions. In other words, the emergence of sports on different continents does not happen by chance. Although, the occurrence of a sport does not necessarily mean that the sport is going to be totally integrated or popular in that particular socio-economic structure. Putting it in another way, the emergence of sports in different continents is basically led by globalization but the acceptance and popularity of sports on different continents or in different countries are defined by the local socioeconomic structure and their relation to the process of globalization. That is, a sport may only function as ‘activity’ and not necessarily as ‘culture’. Satterlee (2001) interprets the activity-culture nexus as follows: Activity is what people do, meaning the fact that a large number of people play a sport only means that the activity is popular. Meanwhile, the activity may fail to be a dominant force in the culture per se. Sport culture refers to the cultural atmosphere that surrounds people (hegemonic sport culture); what they follow, “breath, read, discuss, analyze, compare, and historicize, what they talk about at the office water cooler and what comprises a significant quantity of barroom talk” (Markovits & Hellerman, 2001, pp. 9.) For instance, baseball was invented in the USA and it became popular in Japan<sup>12</sup> between the World Wars. Today, baseball in Japan is one of the most heavily attended sporting events in the country. According to MCB (Microsoft's Complete Baseball), where America has one weekly sports paper, Japan has seven dedicated solely to sports and which concentrate mostly on baseball. This shows that the

popularity of Japanese baseball has grown and continues to grow tremendously. The occurrence of baseball in Japan was obviously the concomitant of globalization. However, the fact, that it has become extremely popular since it was introduced, was the outcome of the cultural formation of Japan. To paraphrase, baseball met the idea and culture of sport of Japan and satisfied the needs of the Japanese fans. In addition, I would argue that baseball in Japan does not only function as 'activity', it is not just popular, but also functions as 'sport culture'. And according to my point of view a sport is perfectly integrated into a society when it operates as a part of the culture, which may signal the success of the process of globalization.

Furthermore, it is well-known world wide that football (American football), baseball and basketball are the most popular sports in the United States. But, in Europe soccer, (football) is the number one in the field of sports. This means that the competence of European soccer players is higher than the competence of American athletes and vice versa in terms of American football, for instance. In fact, soccer has a deeper tradition (more fans, more players, more experts, and larger market) and history in Europe than in any other part of the world. Therefore, this continent tries to maintain its privileged position in terms of soccer. Nowadays it has become quite difficult to maintain this idealistic picture of European soccer but to reach this goal European soccer clubs import foreign athletes from all around the world (hybridization). In other words, European clubs can afford to buy players from other regions of the world to remain privileged because the market of soccer is still very lucrative in Europe although the best players might not be Europeans.

In addition, region specific sports, meaning that some of the sports are typically European, Asian, or American are not played and not well-known in other continents. For instance, according to the survey of Van Bottenburg (2001) handball is one of the fifteen most popular sports in many European countries but this sport cannot be found among the fifteen most popular sports in other continents. Also, the same survey points out the fact that some sports, which are well-known in one particular cultural formation, may not be even practiced or known by other societies such as the Austrian Eisschiessen, French Péétanque or Irish Celtic sports.

In a sense, the sport life is as regionalized as the economy and of course, nowadays they are related on a mutual base (as the clubs, mainly first world teams possessing large budgets, attract talented athletes world wide as the countries with well-developed industry do talented engineers or scientists). Thus, the better the economy, the more colorful the sport life is. Nevertheless, regionalization, at some point hinders the process of globalization in a way of not allowing the diffusion of a particular knowledge and rights in order to preserve the political, economic and cultural priority of the leader (first world countries) societies over semi-and peripheral countries. First world countries often use sport to prove their cultural superiority over economically less developed countries. For instance, Dyreson (1998) argues that Americans “worked to cement the links between sport and American political culture” (p.154). That is, when the American athletes were not successful enough at the Olympic Games, the US Olympic Committee (USOC) placed a pressure on the International Olympic Committee (IOC), and questioned IOC’s competence to lead the Olympic Games.

### *Hybridization*

The globalization process has three main implications for national cultures and identities (Maguire & Tuck, 1998). First, it decreases the global importance and influence of local cultures as a result of increasing global integration. Second, it intensifies local identities. This occurs as soon as the influence of globalization has a significant impact on local cultures. It usually turns out to be local resistance to globalization. Third, the competition between the global and the local may result in the pluralization of local societies and cultures meaning, “to create new hybrid identifications in place of declining national identities” (Maguire & Tuck, 1998, p. 106). Nederveen Pieterse (1995), following the idea of Rowe and Shelling (1991), defines hybridization as “the way in which forms become separated from existing practices and recombine with new forms on new practices” (p. 49). Hybrid formations constituted by the interpretations of diverse logics manifest themselves in hybrid sites and spaces. Structural hybridization and the *mélange* of diverse modes of organization

give rise to pluralization of forms of co-operation and competition as well as to novel mixed forms (Nederveen Pieterse, 1995).

Another term to describe this interplay is the creolization<sup>13</sup> of global culture, which refers to the meeting and mixing of meanings from disparate sources in a single place, a situation that has apparently arisen on a global scale only quite recently (Friedman, 1995). Hannerz (1992) defines the notion of creolization as a process where meanings and meaningful forms from different historical sources, originally separated from one another in space, come to mingle extensively. Furthermore, he also writes that the typical context of creolization is a social structure where the bearers of some of these traditions somehow count for more than others as do, consequently, so do their respective traditions. When the term Creole is transferred to the essentialist notion of culture it can only express the idea of mixture of two or more cultures (Friedman, 1995). Basically, both of the terms – hybridization and creolization – stand for the same process and use the same theoretical approach; only their origins are different. The term creolization derives from linguistics, hybridization comes from biology.

Most modern nation-states are cultural hybrids (Maguire & Tuck, 1998) meaning that some kind of amalgamation is represented in every culture. Hybridization of different cultures has become more frequent since the time-space distantiation was changed by globalization. Currently, no country can be isolated, if they want to survive economically. Thus, it is impossible to state that there is a country which has not gone through some kind of a process of hybridization. We come across the signs of hybridization everyday all around the world. For instance, when a local culture incorporates some parts of a different culture or a foreign franchise, the company adapts itself to the local culture and makes changes in its products so as to be accepted more easily and impregnated in the local culture such as the presence of Chinese fast food and take away type restaurants in the United States. These kinds of restaurants reflect the process of hybridization perfectly because they embody the spiciness and variety of Chinese cuisine being embedded in the American lifestyle. Another example would be the adaptation of the American automobile companies' products to the European circumstances. In Europe the roads are narrower, petrol is

more expensive and the distances are smaller than they are in the United States. Therefore, if they wanted to sell their product and to be competitive, they had to get to know the European cultures and redesign the American cars in order to sell them on the European market. These cars are the product of the hybridization process, meaning that an American car with a European design can be seen as a mixture of two or more different cultures weaved together for corporate profit.

Another interesting example of cultural *mélange* is that Germany is the only country where people can buy beer in a McDonald's restaurant. This phenomenon is against the basic principles of the American restaurants because, as far as I know, no kind of alcoholic beverage can be found and bought in any American fast food restaurant.

Sport also has the feature of hybridization. One example is the variety in the nationality of the soccer players in European teams. Most of the Hungarian teams possess a couple foreign players from the surrounding countries, i.e. from Romania, Croatia, Russia, Ukraine. This phenomenon also can be observed in the case of Bundes Liga. The teams which are incorporated in the Bundes Liga have large budgets and are privileged in terms of buying and paying for soccer players. They need good players because of the market value of soccer. As soon as the athletes do not perform well, the number of the spectators decreases, which leads to deficit. The managements of pro teams are highly profit oriented and if they can buy the same quality for less money, they will not hesitate to pay for the talent of athletes coming from second and third world countries. Perhaps, the sport market works like any kind of capitalist market and the players, coming from economically underdeveloped countries, are willing and capable of producing the same quality for less money.

Furthermore, all the strategies, tactics and techniques utilized by athletes, coaches and teams are hybridized. As a consequence of the well-developed telecommunication it is easier to get to know new inventions of sport life. Athletes, from one part of the world can use techniques developed by coaches or scientists from other part of the world and vice versa. It is possible to find the origin of strategies and tactics but, nowadays, most of the teams and individual athletes follow a mixture of them. Nevertheless, we have to take into consideration that one or two foreign players



may not change the strategy of a team but as the number of foreign legionnaires increases, so does the likelihood of the occurrence of a new strategy. For instance, the Chelsea English soccer team has more than 10 foreign players and a foreign coach. This points to the fact that Chelsea plays a very unique (hybrid) strategy in the English Premier League.

The structure and the rules system of the Australian Rules Football reflect the existence of hybrid cultural formations in sport. This sport activity is a mosaic of several other kicking sports. It was originally developed as a game unique to Australia, incorporating elements of rugby with some aspects of Gaelic football. Jaques (1994) argues that Australian football even has roots in ancient Chinese and in Indian sport cultures, as well.

First, this game was created as an off-season activity for cricket players. Therefore, Australian football was established to be more genteel with less risk to life than rugby. In spite of this, the game was played with enthusiasm and it quickly developed into the fast, vigorous, and hard-tackle game (Jaques, 1994). In the second half of the nineteenth-century, Australian football had its very unique and individual rule system created but sometimes hybrid matches occurred such as one in 1876 in Dunedin, New Zealand, where the first half was played according to rugby rules, and the second half according to Victorian Rules<sup>14</sup>. This inconsistency in the sport remained until the emergence of Australian National Football Council (ANFC), which was formed in 1906 to standardize the laws and co-ordinate the development of the game for all of the different leagues and divisions within Australia. Although, ANFC standardized and institutionalized Australian football, the sport activity conserved its hybrid construction of rules and techniques.

Australian Football could be understood as the product of the interaction of settlers with different cultural backgrounds in Australia. Perhaps, immigrants of different nation-states wanted to challenge each other on the field of physical activities but sons of different nations had diverse sport experiences and knowledge. Probably, none of them wanted to give up their national identity and to be in a subservient position, therefore, a unique (hybrid) sport cultural formation occurred.

## *Nationalization*

In order to have a good understanding of nationalization, first I will provide the definition of nation. This is not an easy task because most scholars agree that the concept of nation or nationalism is extraordinarily slippery in the global circumstance (Canovan, 1996). In spite of this, nation can be defined as a membership which is secured through birth ties, shared experiences and geographic boundary. The basic difference between nation and state is that state requires a legal membership (Dunn, 1994).

Nationalism occurs in different formations. Bairner (2001) differentiates between two fundamental types of nationalism: civic (a) and ethnic (b).

a) *Civic nationalism* is thought to have emerged with the creation of nations and nation-states primarily during the nineteenth-century. It celebrates citizenship within particular political entities. In other words, this type of nationalism emphasizes the shared sense of national identity, community and culture, and outsiders can join the nation if they identify with it and adopt its social and cultural characteristics.

Basically, this is an inclusive form of nationalism

b) *Ethnic nationalism* represents the assumptions about the primordial and natural origins of the nation. It is also often bound up with language and race. It is often assumed that the intrusion of ethnic elements and sentiments of collective belonging into the life of the nation breeds intolerance toward other cultures.

Fundamentally, it is an exclusive form of nationalism.

Exclusive nationalism is definitely a negative feature. It contains the overwhelming support of citizens toward their own nation and neglect or hatred against others. In order to separate different nationalist attitudes, we use the term of patriotism, which would be defined as positive emotional ties to a nation without negative or assaultive feelings toward other nations. Despite, patriotism often incorporates exclusive nationalism per se.

According to Bairner's (2001) understanding of nationalism, it is based on birth ties and shared experiences among the members of a certain population or culture. Nevertheless, here I would argue that common experiences are also significant contributors to national identities in a way that they reinforce the strengths of birth ties

and can support or obstruct the impact of new exogenous experiences on national identities.

Birth tie refers to an individual being born in a particular culture and spending significant part of his/her life in that cultural community. Thus, the individual is a member of that culture because s/he has very strong emotional ties to the places of birth. Besides, an individual's relatives belong to that particular culture and this also creates strong networks of interdependency as well as the xenophobic impulse. A culture is a complex structure that incorporates many components. Although, an individual, who was born in a particular culture, does not necessarily like the whole of it, s/he may like and be familiar with most or some part of it (e.g.: traditions, morals, food).

Shared experiences are stories about the past of a nation, constructing national mythologies, and inventing traditions (Bairner, 2001). Sometimes shared experiences (myths) do not have any foundation in reality. Therefore nationalism can be defined as over-reliance on common and shared experiences and this sort of over-identification in national values and beliefs causes assertions of superiority.

Common experiences are those memories that a member of the community has already experienced through the interaction with other people in the same community or culture. Common experiences are usually based on shared experiences and can be supportive or derogatory of the importance of shared experiences. Putting it in a different way, when common experiences verify shared experiences it can increase national feelings and can exaggerate national pride.

Nationalism on the sport field would occur at sport competitions between different nations (e.g.: Germany vs. France) or between sub-nations (e.g.: England vs. Scotland). Sport victory and kudos are often associated with national identity and superiority. A nation's sport success over another can reinforce national pride, superiority, and xenophobic feelings. Also, a nation in an economically privileged position expects sport victories over industrially less developed countries. On the other hand, the sport field can be a possible scene of revenge, where countries with less reliable economies try to show the world that they have the potential to defeat,

literally, anybody. Moreover, they believe if they are able to be the winner on the field of sport, they can achieve the same result in a different scenario.

An example of nationalism would be sumo wrestling in Japan. This sport activity goes far back in history and it is still a significant part of the Japanese sport culture. Sumo wrestling has retained much of its original form, although this fighting style is more than 2000 years old. The Japanese did not keep any written records until the eighth century. Thus, it is impossible to know, aside from legend, exactly when Sumo first developed in Japan.

The early sumo was a *mélange* of wrestling, boxing, and judo. Matches were violent and bloody and there was no structured regulation system (Hall, 1998). Later, around the 1200s, sumo wrestling was implemented as a part of the military training. Around the 1500s, sumo reached a high level of popularity that lasted until the middle of nineteenth-century. In the 1860s, the Japanese culture went through a dramatic cultural reformation. Japan's isolationist policies (*sakoku*) were sundered by Commodore Perry's military intervention. Japan was suddenly dragged onto the stage of worldwide imperialist politics and because of the robust Western influence, many people put away their kimonos and began to wear Western style clothes. Thus, sumo wrestlers found themselves in a difficult situation because of the neglect of the Japanese population. In spite of the critical circumstances, sumo revived itself and regained its popularity and privileged position around 1920. Since then, sumo is one of the most popular sports again and still holds to its religious roots strongly. Perhaps, the popularity of sumo wrestling in Japan is the direct consequence of the fact that people could practice sumo wrestling regardless of their social status and that it was strongly tied to religious rituals. Each wrestler asks for the help of the gods to win the battle. The ring is also blessed by a priest as well before every battle and after, the winner shows no expression of joy or adulation, unlike many other sports.

Foreign wrestlers did not have any significant influence on sumo until 1972. This was the year when a foreigner won the championship (Hall, 1998). Despite of the importance of this victory in sumo, it only broke the idea of Japanese superiority in sumo. It did not change the structure and ritual of this sport activity. If someone wants to be a sumo wrestler then one has to follow the ancient sumo regulations, which are

strongly hierarchic and rigid. In the words of Hall (1998, p. 16), “sumo wrestlers are sumo wrestlers twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year. A wrestler’s behavior, the clothes he wears, and every ritual he performs all have their roots in the past”. All the foreign sumo competitors have to have Japanese given names, which they use when they compete.

Perhaps, these are the reasons why foreign athletes are not eager to participate in sumo competition because one must have an extremely good understanding and acceptance of the Japanese culture in order to be able to live this rigorous and traditional lifestyle. Basically, one has to give up his own national identity, if one wants to participate in sumo wrestling.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **HUNGARY - HISTORICAL BACKGROUND**

#### **National identity**

Literally, we obtain our national identity from birth to death. Each nation is assumed to have a specific identity (Pickering, 2001), which is a part of the culture and explains to the people what it means to belong to that nation. National identity also means that we are conscious about who we are, where we came from, and where our place is in the world. That is, national identity is based in culture, but culture is not equal to national identity - it is far more complex, although, no one can possess national identity without being brought up in that particular culture. On the other hand, being brought up in a culture does not necessarily guarantee the possession of national identity. As it seems, it might be difficult to have a good understanding or definition of national identity. According to the viewpoint of Pickering (2001, p. 89), national belonging and identity “mean that whatever divides people is held to be less significant than what unites them, their common history and destiny, their common land and language. At the same time, what unites people is held to be more significant than whatever divides them from others in other nations.” Thus, national identity is quite dichotomous because it is both unifying and divisive.

My view is that national identity is the interpretation and the understanding of past and common experiences and the present situation of the nation, which can be read individually or en masse. Moreover, a nation's identity is influenced by the perceptions of other nations of it and as the above-mentioned factors change so does a nation's identity. One may argue that the past cannot be changed, therefore that part of national identity is stable. Despite, I would say that the history of a nation is only relatively stable. The events of the past can be viewed in many different ways. Through history we usually receive an individualistic or social class centered interpretation of the past, which highly reflects the political, ideological, and religious situations of the interpreters. It means that some parts of the history can be forgotten, highlighted, re- or misinterpreted. These are responses to novel situations, or which established their own past by quasi-obligatory repetition (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1984)

depending on the needs of the dominant class. To quote Sennett (1996, p. 181): In Louis Kossuth's appeals for a Magyar revolt, the centuries long interaction of Magyars with the Turks, Slavs, and Germans whom history had brought among them is excluded from the account of what is to be Magyar; these historic encounters in fact colored the practice of religion, created a complex cuisine, and altered the structure of the Hungarian language itself. In place of this history, Kossuth preached a version of Magyar culture as if from generation to generation it had been both unchanging and self-sustaining. In other words, Kossuth had to forge the nation together because of certain internal and foreign affairs. He neglected the history and the extremely heterogeneous population of Hungary and revived a Magyar culture which served as a force for holding the nation together.

National identity possesses a force for cohesion that holds a certain group of people - a nation - together and separates it from others with different national identities. Therefore, national identity carries an internal conflict per se. On the one hand, it sustains a nation's existence, its traditions, and its appreciation by its members. On the other hand, national identity may isolate one nation from others and reinforce the significance of borders, which could only be demolished by war. When we try to understand globalization processes from the perspective of nation and national identity, we can easily realize that this recent process is unique. Through globalization the world is going to be united without the need for wars. Globalization merges countries, decreases the importance of borders, nations, and national identities. In other words, we are witnessing an economic process that is basically fulfilling the conquering and unifying desires of several former political and military powers without the actual physical materialization of war. Viewing the example of the EU, the members of this political-economic union are willing to give up some part of their national identities in order to reach a higher economic degree of stability. In other words, via regionalism, if it turns out to be a monoculturalistic process, we lose the significance of national identities, state borders, and traditions.

At this point, it might be interesting to note the field study conducted by Csepeli, Orkeny, and Szekelyi (2000)<sup>15</sup>. They researched how nations view each other in Central Europe. They examined national identity and the main fears of those

Hungarians who live outside of Hungary as the result of the Trianon Treaty. They wanted to find out the most significant fears of Hungarians and Romanians living in Romania. The scholars listed potential sources of fear and asked subjects to rank these factors according to the degree to which they fear them. According to the responses of the subjects, people are well aware of the process of globalization. Both national populations are most worried about economic crisis, poverty, crime, and political instability. Also, they ranked Americanization<sup>16</sup> as the biggest external fear of the Hungarians and Romanians. None of the above mentioned nations want to lose their national identities and they seem to know how to maintain them and how to cope with each other, but they do not quite understand yet what globalization can or will do to them and what they can do against it.

At some point, national identity does not reflect reality concerning a nation's present conditions. Instead, it is functioning as an imaginary picture of the nation created by its citizens so as to preserve their national pride. A nation's identity is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation do not ever know most of their fellow-members, meet them or hear of them, yet in their minds lives the image of their communion (Anderson, 1983, p. 15). Imaginary national identity does not mean that a nation and its identity only exist at an imaginary level and do not have any relation to reality. It only means to associate false allegation - an imaginary or a desired allegory - with an existing nation and its members' identity. Nevertheless, national identity does not necessarily encourage feelings of superiority over members of other nations (Pickering, 2001), which would rather be a feature of nationalism. Often it appears as overdosed self-celebration without exaggerated aversion to other nations.

It is also difficult to realize why and how we maintain our national identity. We certainly want to belong to a group of people and we want to let others know who we are. Nations mainly maintain their national identities through national symbols such as flags, national dresses, anthems, and through language.

The appearance of flags dates far back to history. Their use was necessary in battles when the soldiers of different nations had to distinguish between enemies and friends. This was the main purpose of the creation of flags in the first place, which are



now parts of national identities. For instance, Japanese samurai had a flag – the flag of their shogun - attached to their backs whilst they were fighting on the battlefield. Later on, flags became one of the symbols of nations. However, one has to understand what a flag still symbolizes and what it means in that particular culture. Otherwise, it is not a flag, just a piece of cloth. It gets its connotation as soon as people endow it. That is a flag has certain meaning for people who understand what it represents and whose ancestors created it. Nations' flags are still important parts of national identities.

Another way of showing our nationality is to wear national dresses. At first, they had similar purposes like flags, i.e. to help distinguish militia on the battlefield. Later, they gained a different function that is to attract the attention of the opposite sex and to distinguish people belonging to other nations. But the interesting fact is that although all nation-states have their national flags, not every nation has its national dress. So, we can say that in general the existence of a national dress is less significant than the existence of a national flag. For instance, the United States and England do not have any kind of national dress. I think that smaller nations created national dresses and used them as a sort of anti-colonial reinforcement of their national identities. I would say that those nations that do not have national dresses have never truly been under the oppression of another nation. Therefore, imperialist nations such as the United States and England did not need this kind of extra cohesion to keep people together and form them into a nation. Thus, national dresses, in general, reinforce the function of flags and the awareness of national sameness. Nowadays, the importance of national dresses is decreasing. People do not wear them everyday anymore. First of all, in most of the cases they would not be comfortable or would not meet the requirement of the modern and fast lifestyle. Besides, these types of clothes are made in a certain way, which is rather time consuming and, although I think they could be mass-produced, people would not wear them anyway because fashion is also globally driven. Sometimes, on special occasions such as national holidays or celebrations we take the national dresses out of the wardrobe, dust them, wear them for a day or two, and we put them back to their places for another year. In general, national dresses are not relevant parts of national identities.

We must admit that the language is a main component of a nation's identity. As a famous Hungarian called Zsigmond Szechenyi once said: "A nation lives in its language." I think he was definitely right, and people in Central Europe seem to think this way, too. Referring to the research of Csepeli, et al (2000), the findings show that people living in Romania, Slovakia and Hungary perceive mother tongue (native language) as a very important factor in terms of conservation of national identity. During the history of Hungary, the Hungarian language was close to total abolition several times. For instance, around the 18<sup>th</sup> century the Hungarian language was in a quite rudimentary shape and it was unable to function as tool of communication at a higher level of culture. Mostly, the German language functioned in the higher region of the Hungarian intellectuals. The Hungarian language was used by the populaces in villages, in homesteads, etc. At that time Hungary did not have a cultural center because the more developed cities were inhabited by German settlers. Therefore, the development and an elite form of the Hungarian language could not evolve. This was the time when no one could get on without the knowledge of German and Latin languages. There was only a small group of belles-lettres who believed in the beauty of the Hungarian language and used it. In spite of their beliefs, the Hungarian language was unable to express genteel feelings and poetic thoughts. Thus, they decided to reform the language. The drive behind the language reform was "the national awakening...One of the main goals of the language reform was to have Hungarian as the official language (instead of Latin), the other one was to standardize Hungarian in order to become suitable for the requirements of a standard variety" (Kiss, 1999, p. 67). To paraphrase, language reform was a concomitant of a national awakening through which the national identity was recreated by a small intellectual interest group who did not want to give up their nationality and national culture. Besides, they had the cultural capital, they could return the significance of the language to the life of a nation.

In this chapter, I will argue that the present Magyar identity is only a residual one. Hungarians have lost most of their Magyar national identity and those lost parts might have been replaced with pieces coming from other nations' identities. Perhaps, the only original part that has remained is the resistance against the influence and

oppression of other, politically and economically more influential nations. This aspect of Hungarian national identity, resistance, is a negative national identity. It means that we do not know who we are, but we know for sure who we are not. This negative national identity manifests itself as constant resistant against any kind of foreign interventions. Interestingly, it seems that globalization is taking the last original piece of the Hungarian national identity away, because Hungary seems bent on joining the EU by its own free will. It can be argued that Hungary is willing to relinquish its important national characteristics such as language, borders, and money and put its head into the yoke of the EU in order to reach higher economic standards<sup>17</sup>. As far as I can see, Hungary has lost its ability to cope with its problems and difficulties alone. Since the foundation of the Hungarian state (896), Hungary has been relying on the help and favors of other nations and now it is fishing for another “confederate” who may solve its problems.

In the following part of the chapter, I shall provide a truncated history of Hungary. I will describe the events that happened in Hungary during the last century and which led the country to its current conditions. This description focuses on the changes in political, economic, and societal circumstances in Hungary. Also, I am going to provide historical examples which furnish evidence that the Magyar identity was oppressed, neglected and somehow lost during the given time period. That is, I suggest it is a residual identity.

### **Austro-Hungarian Monarchy**

Hungary, having been ruled by the Habsburgs since the 16th century, was often subjugated and treated much like a colony. In an attempt to regain its freedom as a self-governing country, in 1848, encouraged perhaps by the revolts in Paris, Milan, and Vienna, Hungarian lawmakers and broad sections of the populace asked Ferdinand V to grant specific freedoms for their country. At first, it was acceded, later rejected, and the country rebelled against absolutism as the ruling Habsburg monarchy sought to deprive it of democratic institutions and in effect annex the country into the Austrian empire. Hungarians demanded instead preservation of the institutions, freedom of expression and the leveling of classes: rescind the tax exemption of the

nobility and, in effect, create a universal citizenship by abolishing serfdom. In the meantime, the throne had passed to a very young Franz Joseph, reputedly strongly influenced by his mother Sophie. When these demands were refused and Austria did not accede, Hungary declared itself a republic, elected Lajos Kossuth governor, and took up arms against the Austrian oppression. The ensuing war, which has become known as The Hungarian Liberation Fight of 1848, seemed to be successful until the young Emperor asked for (and received) robust help from Russia, where the Tsar feared the spread of democracy. In mid-1849, the Hungarian armies were crushed and repression was continued. Kossuth went into exile in Turkey with a number of his followers, but the Western world took notice of the heroic struggle and Kossuth became the symbol of freedom. While Austria and Russia demanded his extradition, the Sultan was persuaded by the Western powers to refuse. Kossuth did not give up, but planned to force Austria to respect Hungarian independence. Although, neither the 1848 revolt, nor the planned Western alliances brought success, the cause eventually produced results. After negotiations and compromises, many of the 1848-49 objectives were realized, though Hungary became a partner in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The reorganization of Austria and Hungary was made possible by the *Ausgleich* (Settlement or Compromise) of 1867, a constitutional compromise between Hungarian aspirations for independence and Emperor Francis Joseph's desire for a strong, centralized empire as a source of power after Austria's defeat in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866. The Hungarians agreed to share with Austria not only a common army and a foreign policy, but also common finances (Valiani, 1966) and the continued union of the Austrian and Hungarian crowns in the Hapsburg ruler. The agreement to institute the Dual Monarchy, which was established primarily by the Austrian foreign minister, Count Beust, and two Hungarians, the elder Count Andr ssy and Francis Deak, divided the Hapsburg empire into two states. It was officially designated as “the Kingdom and Lands represented in the Imperial Council” or Cisleithania<sup>18</sup> and it comprised Austria, Bohemia, Moravia, Austrian Silesia, Slovenia, and Austrian Poland. It was to be ruled by the Habsburg monarchs in their capacity as emperors of Austria. The other half of the Dual Monarchy had the name of “Lands of the Hungarian Holy Crown” or Transleithania<sup>19</sup> and it included Hungary,

Transylvania, Croatia, and part of the Dalmatian coast. It was to be ruled by the Hapsburg monarchs in their capacity as kings of Hungary (Deak, 1990). Croatia was given a special status and allowed some autonomy but was subordinated to Transleithania, which also nominated the Croatian governor.

Austria-Hungary was the greatest recent example of a multinational state in Europe and might be one of the first examples of regionalization. However, of the four main nationality groups (Germans, Hungarians, Slavs, and Italians) only the first two received 'full' partnership. It is important to remember that Germans and Hungarians, together constituted only 43 percent of the population. The Slavs were 45 percent and other ethnic groups constituted 12 percent of the total population of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy (Deak, 1990). Basically, Austrians and Hungarians ruled the Dual Monarchy, although, they were not the numerically dominant ethnic groups. However, Hungarians and Austrians possessed a well-developed national identity compared to the other nations that were incorporated in the Dual Monarchy. It kept both of the nations together but distinct from one another, whilst, for instance, the Slavs did not form a coherent nation that could have represented the rights and values of all the Slavic subgroups. Therefore, the two dominant nations could force their nationalistic views on those ethnic groups which did not have a certain and stable idea about their origin or nationality. In other words, many people were still unconscious of their nationality, especially in the less developed eastern provinces despite wild nationalistic agitation in the nineteenth century (Deak, 1990). Seemingly Hungary was an equal partner to Austria in this alliance but with reference to some obvious facts, Hungary and the Hungarian national identity was oppressed by the Hapsburg driven part of the Dual Monarchy. For instance, the joint army mainly was directed by Austrian officers, German was the official language in the public life, and the throne of the Hungarian king (who was from the Habsburg house) was in Vienna.

The Habsburg-held crown of Bohemia was conspicuously omitted in the reorganization. Both Cisleithania and Transleithania elected independent parliaments to deliberate on internal affairs and had independent ministries. A common cabinet, composed of three ministers, dealt with foreign relations, common defense, and common finances. It was responsible to the emperor-king and to the delegations of 60

members each (chosen by the two parliaments), which met to discuss common affairs. The regular armed forces were under unified command and currency was uniform throughout the empire. In the Dual Monarchy the army was the most obvious symbol of unity that was built out of diverse ethnic groups (Stracha, 1983). As noted above, German was the language of command and service and the mother tongue of most of the officers, but it was not the language of instruction or of communication. The Habsburg officers were required and had to learn to speak the language of their men. It was not rare that the soldiers of the Dual Monarchy spoke ten major and score of minor languages (Deak, 1990).

The strength of the Dual Monarchy lay in its vastness, its virtual economic self-sufficiency, and its opportunities for commercial interconnectedness from the Swiss border to the Carpathians. Its weakness was less in its national diversity than in the unequal treatment accorded to its minorities in the spirit of the maxim “Divide and rule.” Of the Slavic elements, the Czechs and Serbs were the most disaffected. The efforts of the Taaffe ministry to satisfy Czech demands failed. The Italian minority was won to the Italian nationalist cause. The Romanians of Transylvania had bitter grievances against their Hungarian masters.

As nationalist movements gained within the empire, they enlarged their demands from cultural autonomy to full independence and ultimately broke up the monarchy. These movements existed not only in the oppressed provinces, but also among Hungarian extremists, who desired total independence, and among Austrian Pan-Germans, who advocated the union of German-speaking Austria with Germany.

The greatest danger to the monarchy probably was Pan-Slavism, spreading from Serbia and encouraged by Russia among the Southern Slavs. Francis Ferdinand apparently had a scheme by which Croatia was to become the nucleus of a third, South Slavic, partner in the monarchy. In 1914, his assassination at Sarajevo defeated this hope and precipitated World War I. Fundamentally, this association was the reason for initiating World War I. However, it is important to note that, prior to the break out of the war, France, Germany, Italy, Austria-Hungary collectively had already doubled the size of their standing armies (Stracha, 1983). This fact obviously represents a common

preparation for war because to maintain a huge army without utilizing it is equal to an economic bankruptcy.

Austria and Hungary early became reconciled with Germany and joined the Three Emperors' League. At the Congress of Berlin (1878) Count Andr ssy, the foreign minister, secured a mandate over Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1879 he entered an alliance with Germany, joined also by Italy in 1882. The formation of the Triple Entente (France, England, Russia) to oppose this alliance led to the tense diplomatic situation that preceded World War I. The foreign policy of Graf von Aehrenthal led to the Bosnian crisis of 1908–9, and the reckless demands that his successor, Graf von Berchtold, made on Serbia after the assassination of Francis Ferdinand helped to precipitate the cataclysm. The internal weakness of the empire became immediately obvious. Czech regiments deserted wholesale from the beginning; Italy and Romania, eying their respective minorities in Austria and Hungary, joined the Allies; Croats and Slovenes, won by Serbian propaganda, joined (1917) in agreement with the Serbs to found a South Slavic state. Abroad, the Czechs under Thomas Masaryk were the best known of several legions fighting on the Allied side, and in the end of 1918, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary proclaimed their independence.

As the aforementioned historical facts show, at the end of the 1800s and at the beginning of the 1900s, the Austro–Hungarian Monarchy had a significant role in the economic and cultural life of Europe. Hungary was in the main economic channels of the European market with a quickly developing industry and an already developed agriculture<sup>20</sup>.

Later on, World War I (mainly its outcome) brought significant changes in the everyday life of Hungary. World War I started in 1914 and, in 1918, Germany and its allies, including the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, lost the war and the monarchy disintegrated. In addition, as a war punishment, the Trianon Treaty in 1920 reduced Hungary's territory by two thirds and the population by one third. Since then, considerable Hungarian minorities have lived in the neighboring countries. The loss of territory and people reduced the political importance of Hungary and impeded its economic development. Despite the loss of a significant part of the territory and the

necessity of restructuring the industry and market of Hungary, the structure of the society basically remained the same.

Between the two World Wars, Hungary tried to catch up with the most developed nations among difficult economic, political and societal circumstances, and to regain its detached territories. Before World War II, Hungary was a rapidly developing country on the way to capitalism. The Hungarian economy and society had most of the features of capitalism. For instance, it had a blossoming stock market, a class society, and a developing industry. But World War II made Hungary a Second World Country.

In 1938-1940 Germany concluded treaties in Munich and Vienna according to which Southern Slovakia and Northern Transylvania were returned to Hungary. In 1940, World War II started and Hungary took up arms on the side of Germany. The war was not as successful as Germany and Hungary expected and, in 1944, the Nazis occupied Hungary because they did not consider Hungary a reliable ally. During the Second World War, the Hungarians suffered grave losses on the Soviet front. At the end of the war, Fascists took over the governing of the country.

### **Soviet annexation**

Prior to the change in the political system in 1990, Hungary was one of the members of the “communist bloc” in middle-Europe. The main reason for Hungary being a communist country was the strong influence and supervision of the Soviet Union (USSR) which started to take a leading political position in this region during the second half of the twentieth century. At the beginning of communism, Hungary seemed only to be ‘slightly’ oppressed by the USSR, but in reality it was a political dependency, an economic interdependency, moreover, a cultural suppression. Therefore, we can say that Hungary was Sovietized from the point of view of politics, economy, and culture.

In 1945, the Soviet Army ‘liberated’ and then occupied Hungary after the Germans. Hungary was offered a ray of hope of eventually being able to establish a free and independent country based on democratic ideas. At the Yalta Conference, the Western allies had granted the USSR the right to occupy the eastern European states.



The Yalta agreement was to maintain an occupation force in the country only until the signing of a peace treaty. Hungary trusted the Western powers and believed that the Soviet occupation was going to be temporary. Although, this occupation was going to be short it did not make the life of the Hungarians easier. The major problems were that no agreement ever specified the size of the Soviet troops that were to be allowed to remain in Hungary. Moreover, to provide proper provision to the Soviet army was the responsibility of the Hungarian government. In a defeated country, at that time when feeding the indigenous population was creating serious difficulties, supplying provisions for such a large military force was not a simple task (Fehervary, 1990). In addition, between the Yalta agreement and the peace treaty more than 300,000 Hungarians were transported to Soviet labor camps in Siberia and almost 100,000 of these never saw Hungary again.

The much-awaited peace treaty signed outside of Paris was directed by an Allied Control Commission (ACC) composed of the victorious powers (Britain, France, the United States, and the USSR) with a Soviet marshal in the leading position. After the peace treaty was finally signed, the Soviet troops gave no signal of further evacuation. It became obvious that the country had to prepare for an extended occupation, but for how long no one could tell (Fehervary, 1990). By this time the size of the Soviet army was reduced by half a million soldiers and the troops which remained as a part of standing occupation, numbering over 100, 000, were accommodated in military barracks.

In 1945 at the hastily held elections, the Communists gained only 17 percent of the votes (this was the beginning of communism in Hungary) but the leader of the ACC ordered the Smallholders' party, who won the elections, to form a coalition with the Communist party. In 1947 the last, relatively free election was followed by the years of Communist control: show trials, executions, forced settlement of hundreds of thousands, imprisonment, harassment, forced industrial development, a drop in living standards, and Stalinist dictatorship. The first step of the Communist party was to eliminate its political opponents. The AVH (State Defense Office) arrested leading members of the Hungarian political community, who were from mainly the Smallholders' party and charged them with conspiracy against the new coalition-led

Republic. After undermining the Smallholders by arresting their leaders, they forced the Social Democratic party into a merger and, in 1948, the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat was complete (Fehervary, 1990). In the same year, the government started to seal the borders of the country and a few years after the 'liberation' of Hungary by the Soviet troops the entire population was in prison (Fehervary, 1990).

In addition, the structure of the society went through a change. The government, according to one of the main ideas of communism, tried to change the multi-class society into a one-class (working class) society. The leaders of the Communist party, Rakosi<sup>21</sup> and his men did not understand the nation's character and subordinated Hungary's interests to those of the USSR. Instead of developing their own socialist society, they brought Stalin's system of terror into the country. During the years between 1949 and 1956 as a consequence of the VIIth Act of 1949<sup>22</sup>, more than 700, 000 citizens were arrested for political reasons in addition to the approximately 200, 000 criminal cases (Fehervary, 1990).

Although, the Communist party ruled the country, Hungary remained anti-Soviet. Therefore the leaders of the Party decided to launch an extensive re-education process for the nation to accept not only Communist ideology but the idea of belonging to the USSR. The first targets of this propaganda were the school and the education system. It became compulsory for educators to enroll in various Marxist courses. From the elementary grades to the universities, the entire curriculum was rewritten. The teaching of Western languages was discontinued. Students were required to take eight years of Russian language courses. Everything related to the Western culture was to be denigrated, distorted or denied. The greatest damage was done via the falsification of history. Texts were rewritten to meet the Marxist principles, and everything noble or glorious about Hungarian history was erased or reinterpreted according to Communist doctrines. It was dictated that students know the details of the lives of Lenin and Stalin than to teach the names and roles of Hungarian historical figures (Fehervary, 1990).

The Communist party followed the ideas of Marx who outlined an anti-religious, workers driven society. Thus, communism ran into a huge wall in Hungary that had been established by religions. Hungary had been Christian since the reign of

the country's first king, Saint Istvan, in 1,000 A.D. After the Communist takeover, the Protestant churches of Hungary were the first to compromise with the office of religious affairs created by Rakosi. In Contrast, the Roman Catholic Church expressed its opinion against the communist suppression of people and was consequently persecuted. Some outstanding leaders of the Catholic Church weakened or broke the authority of the Communist party again and again. They were captured and utilizing fake accusations were sentenced to prison. For instance, Cardinal Jozsef Mindszenty<sup>23</sup> completely neutralized the Party's efforts and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. After Mindszenty's arrest, the Party continued its offensive against the Church.

As a reaction to the above-mentioned endeavor of the communist government, a revolution broke out against Stalinism on the 23<sup>rd</sup> October in 1956. Mainly the younger generation took part in this freedom fight angered by the Stalinist humiliating rule and ritual discipline. On October 23, student demonstrations in downtown Budapest and the unauthorized shooting of demonstrators led to chaos. On the same night, Imre Nagy<sup>24</sup> was appointed prime minister, a position he held for little more than 10 days. One of the main goals of this freedom fight was to get rid of the yoke of the USSR. Because it was the common desire of the Hungarian citizens, Nagy decided to leave the Warsaw Pact and declared neutrality. Seemingly the Soviets were ready and willing to negotiate about withdrawing their troops. On November 3<sup>rd</sup> a Hungarian delegation was supposed to meet with the Soviet army general but it was trapped and arrested in the Soviet military headquarters. One day later, the Soviet army started an attack on Budapest and within a few days destroyed the resistance of rebels. In the meantime, the revolution's leadership was decoupled and Janos Kadar<sup>25</sup> went to the Russian embassy and agreed to create a counter-government. The Kadar government took over the power and was supported by Soviet red army. Kadar, who acquired power with Soviet assistance, promised democratic socialism. On the other hand, he engaged in retaliation and executions. Overall, 20,000 people were killed and an estimated 200,000 fled to the west.

By 1965, the new Kadar system had become consolidated and cautious economic reforms were launched. Living standards were rising and the iron curtain seemed penetrable. This was just superficial. Deep down the roots of the system were

rotting. The borders were closed and the different political, economic, and scientific ideas of the western (non-communist) countries were still excluded.

The unflinching political standpoint of the USSR did not allow liberal democratic ideologies and perspectives to enter Hungary as progressive approaches because, at first, it would have undermined and challenged the ideology of communism. Hungary was forced to follow and copy the soviet party and political system including the form of parliament, as well. Besides, Hungary's decision-making authority in the case of foreign affairs was totally missing. This political situation of Hungary can be described as a dependency and was a manifestation of Soviet imperialism.

Parallel to the political restructuration, the economy was redeveloped as well. This is called "Marxist Exploitation" by Fehervary (1990). The Communist party, following the USSR's interpretation of Marx regarding economic structure, nationalized all production units and energy sources in the country. Through this centralized control over all the resources of the country, the Party attempted to eliminate any capitalist way of organizing business. Besides, Hungary was a member of Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) and had a certain role within this economic union. Because of the high quality agricultural products and arable lands of Hungary, the leaders of the USSR decided to define Hungary's position as a "pantry of the countries of the communist block". Therefore, most of the industrial factories and non-agricultural businesses were moved to other countries' lands. In this way, Hungary's role was defined and an economic interdependency was created in order to make the ties stronger between the countries of the "communist block". The head of the COMECON was the USSR, thus Moscow was to determine the value of all export /import goods. The trade between the Eastern European states and the USSR was structured as follows: All goods exported from the Eastern European states to the USSR were valued according to the worth of similar goods manufactured in the USSR. On the other hand, anything imported by these countries from the USSR was valued according to world market price. Obviously, the world market price was a lot higher than the price of the goods that were produced in the USSR. That is to say, the USSR could earn significant profit only through trading with

the other communist countries. This economic exploitation was quite obvious but the Communist party of Hungary made no effort to argue against it.

I assume the final plan of the USSR was to merge Hungary with it. In order to be a 'perfect' part of the USSR, Hungary should have lost its Magyar culture and a couple of endeavors were made which would have led Hungary to this point. At first, the political and economic systems were restructured and one part of the Soviet army was garrisoned in Hungary. Later on, the educational system was changed and all Hungarian students were required to study the Russian language. The leaders of the USSR were sure that if the Hungarian population spoke in Russian the incorporation would not be a big issue any more because Hungarians would lose a very important part of their national identity. This effort was made so as to suppress Magyar culture and make joining the USSR easier.

### **Europeanization**

Despite the seemingly consolidating Kadar system and the cooperation among COMECON countries, Hungary found itself in an extremely unstable economic situation which required rapid solutions. At the very end of the 1960s, some of the progressive thinkers in the Party launched economic reforms that were supposed to stabilize the washed-out financial circumstances. Also, they had realized that in order to obtain a permanent development in the economy, Hungary had to decrease its political and financial dependency on the USSR that insolently exploited all the COMECON countries. These reforms began to work and the national income rose. Unfortunately, the conservative Party members vetoed the economic innovations that would have lead Hungary to a different relationship with the USSR. During 1972-73 the economic reforms were rescinded. In 1974, Rezso Nyers, who was the father of the economic progress, was dismissed. Fundamentally, there was not a viable solution for the pending financial problems without the elimination of the USSR's impact on Hungary. Therefore, the Party decided to maintain the façade of a strong economy via loans. This strategy in the Hungarian economic policy led to a large increase in the country's deficit, which in turn forced the government to borrow money in order to be able to subsidize state companies (De Boer-Ashworth, 2000).

A significant factor made Hungary's development different from other communist and, later, post-communist countries. Hungary's separation from the communist block started earlier than for instance the Czech Republic's or Poland's, etc. In other words, the process of Europeanization of Hungary already started during the last years of communism. In the 1980s, the government finally admitted that if Hungary wanted to survive financially then it had to build and maintain a good business relationship with the non-communist part of the continent. In 1980-81, small-scale semi-private businesses were encouraged by the government. Even the Hungarian Foreign Minister stated that economic relations with the West should not only be improved but foreign participation should be encouraged (Puja, 1983). In 1982 Hungary became a member of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. By 1985, Hungary developed a private sector and although the government remained socialist its philosophy was closer to Western European socialism than to Soviet communism (De Boer-Ashworth, 2000). In 1987, the banking system was reformed to allow competitive banking rather than having one state-run bank. One year later, personal income and value-added taxes were adopted.

Despite the aforementioned financial reforms, the communist government was unable to stabilize the weak economic situation of Hungary. Most of the Hungarians had to pursue two or sometimes three jobs in order to be able to pay the high utility bills. The party lost control over the people's life and after approximately 40 years of communism, the political transition period began in 1988. The Communist party voluntarily gave up its autocracy as a result of accumulating financial problems. As a consequence, a multi-party, parliamentary democracy came into being in the country. The Soviet army left Hungary. Different foreign enterprises appeared and began to restructure the image of Hungary, and almost all of the Hungarian institutions. Factories emerged from nothing; huge billboards started appearing near the main roads, the amount of all kinds of commercials significantly began to increase in the whole of Hungary, and the life of the people started being turned upside-down (less control by the government but more independence which requires more decision making and more risk-taking responsibilities on the part of individuals).

All Middle and Eastern European countries are undergoing major political and economic structural reforms. Formerly, under strong central government control, they began to decentralize their economies, transforming them through various programs consisting of industrial restructuration and privatization. Former state-owned firms are being internally restructured, shifting from public ownership with state control to various types of private ownership (Energy Information Administration). That is to say, privatization became one of the main profit producing possibilities in Hungary, although, the so-called “shock therapy<sup>26</sup>” has never occurred in Hungary as it did in some other post-communist countries.

Now Hungary is prepared to quickly assimilate new ideas and adapt to the changing European and world political economies. In spite of the political, economic, and cultural marginalization of Hungary during the communist epoch, sufficient of its original values have been conserved and it has again the potential to be a “talented nation... through the commonly held view that, relative to its population, Hungary gave the world the highest number of Olympic champions and Nobel-prize winners, even though the latter won scientific fame when living abroad” (Bali, 2001, p. 252). In other words, Hungary has the potential, in addition, has the chance to be one of the first world countries and to be in the mainstream of the political, economic, and cultural flow of the EU and, through globalization, of the whole world.

In summary, through this brief history of the last hundred years of Hungary, it is obvious that this country has not been without an alliance, an oppressor, or certain political and economic problems that have forced it into various confederacies for a long time. In these relationships, Hungary was in a subservient position and was forced to subordinate its needs and national independence which led to some part of the Magyar national identity being lost. Thus, the present Magyar national identity is a residual of the original one, some part of which vanished during Hungary’s interactions with different countries. For instance, in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy most of the significant political questions were answered in Vienna not in Budapest. Foreign politics and the economy were running under common ministries and the official language was German. After World War I, this alliance broke up and Hungary lost two-thirds of its territory. This was a significant loss for the country and basically

mangled that Magyar national pride which was a part of the Magyar national identity. It resulted in a negative attitude in Hungarians. After losing the war, relevant parts of the country and many Hungarians happened to have a different citizenship without moving to a different region of the world. This led the Hungarian populace into a relatively lethargic state. However, they did not become totally resigned and tried to rebuild the country politically, economically, and culturally. This bitterness concerning the great loss in World War I remained in the air and in the heart of the Hungarians until World War II. This war gave a ray of hope to the Hungarians to regain some of their old territories, thus Hungary took up arms with Germany to fulfill its desires. World War II was a failure, as well. Thousands of Hungarians died on the fronts or were captured by the enemy. On top of everything, close to the end of the war Germany occupied Hungary because Germans had not found Hungary a reliable ally. In 1945 the USSR liberated and occupied Hungary and the Soviet troops remained in the country for almost forty years as “guardian angels”. During this period almost all the Hungarian values, ideas, and endeavors were suppressed and those of the Soviets’ were prioritized. The Soviet way of doing things became the way of doing things. This situation led to the suppression of Hungarian culture with the intention of total annexation of Hungary by the USSR. The poor financial conditions did not let the communists carry out their final goals and Hungary rid itself of the Soviet yoke at the very end of the 1980s. Hungary immediately turned to the EU for help and obviously signaled its intention to join this Western European economic union.

Hungary, sooner or later, will join the EU. To be able to do so, Hungary has to meet certain requirements and adopt most of the economic and political values of the EU. Some criteria of the EU will reduce the national independence and identity of Hungary. In other words, in the future the way of doing things will be the European way. Perhaps, the uniqueness of this process is that it is not forced by any military power but by some sort of economic needs. Although it may have seemed natural that after a long Soviet occupation Hungary would have welcomed the chance to be independent and to regain some part of its original national identity, probably, the decision to join the EU means that financial welfare is much more important than any kind of national feelings or identity. Therefore, if we may perceive Hungary’s joining



the EU as a form of regionalization, then this phenomenon reinforces the statement according to which through the process of globalization some part of the indigenusness of the world will be lost. That is to say, Hungary, instead of redeveloping its own national identity, will be dissolved in the pool of the EU. This is a sacrifice Hungarians are willing or have to do so as to reach higher economic and political standards.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **HUNGARIAN SPORT IN THE COMMUNIST EPOCH**

The communist regime totally restructured Hungary, including its sport. Akin to politics, economy, and society, the Hungarian sport life was remodeled following the political and ideological dictates of the communist party. Sports in general, soccer in particular, were used to cement the basis of the Soviet-developed communist ideologies and to serve the political goals of the Party. People were partially aware of the interconnectedness between the political sphere and sport. However, the depth of this relationship came to light only after the collapse of communism. Perhaps, the communist regime was not the first or the last to use sport or physical exercise in order to increase social control and to validate its value system. In general, politicians are well aware of the fact that sport is a permanent and significant part of most societies regardless of political regimes or economic crises. That is, sport can be used to fulfill political, economic, and ideological purposes. For instance, top athletes are usually popular; sometimes they are perceived as the heroes or heroines of the nation. When a politician wants to increase his/her popularity then he/she may use the association with an athlete to do so. Also, it happens quite often that an athlete runs for an office based on the popularity level he/she has achieved via sport. For example, a famous ex-WWF wrestler, Jesse (the body) Ventura (who could be considered an ex-athlete) is the governor of the State of Minnesota.

Moreover, athletes are in the public eye. Although adults may perceive athletes' behaviors ambiguously, they are definitely the role models of many youngsters. In this way, some ideologies such as hard work, team-work, and gender roles that meet the requirements of the hegemony can be reinforced through sport or particular athletes. Youngsters have the potential to internalize the behavioral patterns of their favorite athletes and try to act in the same way. So sport can be used for the aforementioned purposes because, in the modern world, sport is an important theatre in this struggle over meaning and culture, and in what is a contest for hegemony (Sudgen & Tomlinson, 1998). In addition, sport moves people emotionally; it employs directly or indirectly large numbers of people; in so doing, it uses significant amounts

of scarce resources and leaves its footprint on the environment (Maguire, 1999). Thus, sport, as an organic part of societies cannot avoid the influences of new political and economic systems.

### **The influence of communism on soccer**

Soccer has had an important role in European societies since the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. In Hungary the official career of soccer started with the foundation of the Hungarian Football (Soccer) Association (MLSZ). Since then, football became a relevant part of the society. Soccer is a part of the Hungarian culture and definitely became a subject of national pride and cohesion during the communist regime. At this point one may ask: What is so special about soccer? Why could/can it be used by different political forces to control citizens, to popularize ideas and to achieve societal goals?

Based on the interpretation of the characteristic and functions of soccer by Hadas & Karady (1995), I would respond to the above questions as follows: Soccer, contrary to individual and noble type sports, is a real mass-sport activity. It can construct an alliance between different social classes because it is a relatively inexpensive sport and does not require too much equipment. Its rule system can effortlessly be simplified or modified without losing the meaning and the joy of the game. Thus, soccer can be played at various levels and by various people. In other words, it is a social-class-neutral activity in terms of not being associated with any particular social class but it may create an environment that would express class difference when two teams from different social classes compete. At the same time, because of its features, soccer has the potential to legitimize totalitarian political systems that support spectacular mass demonstrations in order to provide occasions for expressing the emotional harmony between the populace and the regime (Hadas & Karady, 1995). In other words, soccer attracts large numbers of people; its eventful and spectacular manifestation lets people's emotions and minds to be spontaneously and openly expressed. Soccer may become the medium of collective identities. It is a symbolic fight where teams do not only represent two groups of athletes but sometimes two different ideologies or political views.

Soccer games are often much more than simply physical interactions of twenty-two athletes within a defined area and rule system. A soccer game often embodies a fight between two interest groups and winning does not only mean the victory of one team over another, but earns kudos for the ideology represented by the winning team. For example, during communism any event between the Hungarian and the Soviet sport teams was more than a simple match. These games had special connotations for the Hungarian people. Hungary was under the oppression of the USSR and only sport could provide any means through which Hungary, so to speak, could pay-back the USSR for the suppression. This patriotic phenomenon did not only occur in soccer (for instance there were extremely bloody water-polo events between these two nations), but it was the most popular sport and had an impact on a significant part of the Hungarian population. When Hungary won, the victory often gave hope back to the people to be able to eliminate the Soviet power.

Perhaps, large sport events such as soccer matches can be viewed from two different perspectives. On the one hand, they can reinforce and underpin any totalitarian regime's ideologies because in totalitarian societies the distinction between the political institutions and civil society is minimized to the extent that the former seek to infiltrate and influence the contests and conduct of the latter (Sudgen & Tomlinson, 1998). On the other hand, they can offer a possibility for the populace to express their aversion to the current political power. This role of soccer could also be observed in the USSR during communism. This reinforced the similarities between the Soviet and Hungarian way of organizing soccer and politics. In the words of Sudgen & Tomlinson (1998, p. 194), even during the darkest days of Stalin's tyranny, football (soccer) was one of the few public gathering points where privately held resentments were shared and expressed simultaneously as public aspirations. Of course, the regime did not tolerate the anti-communist emotional outbursts without sanctions and sport spectators were not exempt from arrest or persecution. However, the protection of the dense crowd made people braver and more open in terms of expressing their opinions without the direct consequence of imprisonment. Moreover, citizens could freely select the soccer team for which they were rooting. The totalitarian regimes in the communist countries almost determined all parts of civil life but people retained their

right to select a favorite soccer team. In a communist country, the football club you supported was a community to which you yourself had chosen to belong. The regime did not send you to support a club and, perhaps, excepting western sides, you could choose your team. It might be your only chance to choose a community and, as member of that community, you could express yourself as you wished (Kuper, 1994, p. 45-46).

A significant part of the Hungarian population like or are interested in soccer. Generally speaking, people talk about soccer at work, in bars and at home. That is to say, soccer is a permanent and important part of many Hungarians' lives. In Hungary, soccer is the sport that occurs the most frequently in the works of famous writers and film directors. Even the political jargon uses expressions adopted from the terminology of soccer. In addition, instead of playing golf or tennis, politicians play indoor soccer if they want to socialize or to get to know one another. Therefore, the denotations of soccer as mediated to people can influence the way people perceive or form opinions about certain facts. Through this process people have the potential to internalize the desired moral and ideological values of the hegemony.

Soccer was a State affair during the communist regime. This mainly occurred in those nation-states that were marginalized and/or in a subordinate position. These countries used soccer to symbolize their cultural and societal equality to Western cultures. Also, soccer was supposed to represent a symbolic fight between communist and capitalist ideologies. Obviously, the communist countries could not match the Western states' economies therefore they used sport events to prove their ideological superiority. Communist countries put significant energy into developing their sport performance. Sport, similar to other spheres of the society, was centrally driven by a 'win-at-all-cost' ideology. It was not rare that athletes were injured or died during the process of developing a new drug or technique. At the same time, athletes had to be under strict governmental control because they were supposed to represent the country abroad and the Soviet-friendly government did not want any of its athletes to misbehave or defect. To represent the country was a serious issue because athletes did not only compete for their countries but for communism. In other words, the

communist block wanted to show the whole world its superiority over frivolous capitalist societies via the victories of its athletes.

Prior to communism, each soccer team had its unique societal connotation and fans. Soccer teams, similar to the structure of the society, were not religion or class neutral. For instance, Jewish citizens rooted for the MTK<sup>27</sup> and Christians for FTC<sup>28</sup>. Each team represented a certain group of people. It might have been the representation of a religion, a political view, a social class or a region of the country, but soccer teams were always endowed with special meanings. Hungarian soccer could preserve its neutrality from the Party until 1948. In the Rakosi system, after 1950 all the soccer teams were brutally restructured. Their social meanings, connotations, financial and fan bases were taken away and they became the teams of certain ministries or industries (Hadas & Karady, 1995). For example, in the eye of the communist party the FTC seemed the biggest problem but they did not officially want to disband this team and create martyrs, instead they changed its name and replaced its players. A team similar to a nation has its identity which is carried by its name, colors and players. When a team loses these parts of its identity, basically it loses its local social significance. The communist regime divorced all the Hungarian soccer teams from their original identities and clothed them with new, Soviet-friendly ones. Thus, in the case of FTC, at first, the name of the team changed to Elelmezesi Dolgozok Szakszervezete (EDOSZ)<sup>29</sup>. Later, in 1951, the name was modified to Kinizsi<sup>30</sup> and the green and white team colors were changed to red - the color of the communist party – and white. The Party did not only restructure soccer teams but it created new ones by taking away the best players of other teams. This was the way Honved (Soldier) came into existence and it became the favorite team of the communist system (Hadas & Karady, 1995). The naming of the team reflects that it was under the control of the military, which according to Hadas and Karady (1995) was equal to a political program. The calculations of the Party seemed to work out with Honved because it was capable of representing the superiority of communism against the capitalist societies and in this way it could aid in the naturalization of the Party's power. At the same time, this team was supposed to show the mobility of the communist societies. The political leaders were trying to create and maintain a fake-meritocratic society

where, seemingly, everyone had the chance to achieve higher goals and positions if one worked hard and possessed the right abilities regardless of his/her family background. Nevertheless, as it is known, a communist society is a virtual-one-class society, therefore social mobility, which means an individual's chance to move from one class to another within a given society, may not be associated with any communist societal manifestation. In other words, the idea of social mobility presupposes the fact that a society consists of more than one social class and that seemingly did not exist in communist countries. Thus, social mobility is supposed to mean the changes of social status within the same social class.

There were only two ways to get higher on the social ladder. If one wanted to change his/her social status then one had to become a member of the Party and through the machinery of politics could achieve a better life or higher prestige. The other way of changing social position was to become an outstanding athlete. The second method seemed to be more attractive to people because it did not require a high level of education. That is to say, everyone could have changed his/her social position through sport without having a certain school education or degree. For instance, it was accepted that excellent athletes, sometimes without the knowledge of reading and writing were appointed to highly privileged military or political positions. Perhaps, this was the reason why 147,000 soccer players were officially registered in Hungary between 1953 and 1956. (Antal, Sass & Laszlo, 1972).

In addition, each soccer team went through a fundamental alteration in its management. All the soccer teams were subordinated to various communist leaders who were in important political positions. Thus, the communist regime could effectively supervise first hand the proper ideological functioning of all the important soccer teams. This phenomenon first occurred in the capital of Hungary and slowly but surely started to extend to the countryside. Most of the country teams adopted the names and colors of the teams playing in Budapest. Thus, they changed their old, non-communist colors to red and white and their names so that they could be associated with the dominant ideologies of the Party.

The same changes could be observed in the USSR regarding the restructuration of soccer teams. To put it in the right chronological order, those changes happened in

the USSR first then Hungary adopted them as it had done with political, economic and societal issues. Thus, we can see similarities between the way the USSR and Hungary organized their sport life and what sport meant to people in these countries. Similar to the description of Hungarian soccer by Hadas & Karady (1995), Sudgen & Tomlinson (1998) depict the Soviet soccer system in the same era as follows: The most important vehicle for the Soviet sport creed, football was to be the main sporting agent of social change. At the time of rapid population growth, industrialization and urban expansion soccer continued to be viewed by the Soviet authorities as an important stabilizing and transforming influence in a society in a state of flux. Equal importance was attached to the sport's perceived capacity to reinforce the sense of cohesion in the far flung multinational state that the USSR had become. Also, football was viewed as a painless replacement for traditional games and folk festivals which were heavily redolent of the cultural distinctiveness of the old country (p. 186-188). Furthermore, almost all the big clubs were affiliated with and controlled by one or other state institution (political, military, and/or industrial). For instance, Dinamo was the team of the ministry of interior including the KGB and Torpedo was the team of ZIS motor factory. Each team had its Party sponsor who would often go to great lengths to ensure that their favored teams were successful, augmenting a tendency for corruption, and alienating sections of supporters who in the wake of the Stalinist years, become increasingly disaffected with anything associated with the Communist Party and its leaders (p.194). This sort of conspiracy was present in Hungary, as well. The communist system was fundamentally centralized and preferred the centrum to the countryside, which reflected the rank order of the soccer teams in the first division in Hungary. That is to say, in the communist epoch there were fourteen teams in the first division (eight country and six capital teams) and it did not happen too often that a non-Budapest team achieved significant position in the Hungarian soccer championship (See Table 1). Table 1 also depicts how the control of the Party over the outcome of the soccer championship decreased as communism was losing its power in Hungary. Between World War II and the Kadar system the best position a country team could achieve was the fifth place (e.g. Dorog in 1950 and 1955). Later, after the second half of the 1970s Videoton (1975/76) could make it to second place in the championship. In the



1980s, when communism began to lose its power in Hungary and the Party stopped fixing matches, the number of country teams in high positions dramatically increased. For example, Rába ETO (1981/82, 1982/83) won the championship two times in a row. Thus, Table 1 supports the argument according to which the communist regime was following a centralized order and soccer played a relevant function in maintaining the ideological views of the Party.

The above-mentioned facts clearly show how significant sport was for politicians and how their - sport and politics - relationship was interwoven in Hungary during the communist epoch. Besides, the government invested a huge amount of money in building new and renovating old stadiums. This wave first and mainly occurred in the first half of the 1950s when the government renovated most of the stadiums used by the soccer teams participating in the First Division. For instance, during this time period Hungary possessed one of the most modern and equipped stadiums in Europe, the Népstadion. However, I would argue that the major reason of the Party for reconstructing these sport buildings was to be able to incorporate more and more people into soccer through which it could increase its capability of influencing a larger part of the Hungarian society with communist propaganda. Also, the government made a significant effort to maintain a good national team that could represent Hungary abroad and could achieve outstanding results on the international level. In 1954 the cultivation of soccer and the nurturance of the national soccer team backfired on the Party. The Hungarian national soccer team had been quite successful. In 1952 the national team, which was called the “golden team” won the Olympic Games. One year later they defeated the English national team on its home turf, which had never been accomplished by any European team before. This chain of success unexpectedly broke in the final of the 1954 Soccer World Cup when the Hungarian national team lost against West-Germany. This event created an odd situation which is called “boomerang-effect” by Hadas & Karady (1995). The disappointed and furious soccer fans driven by their bitterness over the loss of the national team broke out in the first rebellion against the communist regime. The Party decided to cover up the rebellion instead of taking reprisals against it. This was the first time when soccer slipped out of the control of the government and, for a while, stopped serving the

political goals of the regime. This event was probably one of the premonitory signs of the revolution that broke out in 1956.

Sudgen & Tomlinson (1998) point out an important fact that the end of the USSR and communism in Central and Eastern Europe was basically pre-determined. They reveal two main sources of tensions that probably contributed significantly to the collapse of the USSR. One of the sources was the resistance of the annexed countries within and the could-be-annexed countries around the USSR. These countries wanted to be rid of the yoke of the Soviets and resisted cultivating the moral and ideological values that were represented by the USSR. Therefore, soccer carried a specific symbolism any time a suppressed or annexed country had the chance to play a match against the USSR. Some of these games and teams represented the hopes and dreams of nations. In other words, in the communist bloc, the sport of soccer was mainly used as a part of the resistance movement to break the power of the dominant regime. At the same time, the West wanted to reduce the power and influence of the USSR on international political and sport life. For instance, in international competitions, the democratic countries always wanted the communist ones to lose, and the agreed first target was always the USSR (Sudgen & Tomlinson, 1998). Western countries made several legal and illegal attempts to destroy the illusion of communism and to strengthen the idea of capitalist society. Sudgen & Tomlinson (1998) provide an example that indicates how the West treated the communist countries and primarily the USSR. In 1973, the USSR was scheduled to play against Chile in the stadium at Santiago. The USSR refused to play that game at the pre-selected location because the stadium, only a couple days before, had functioned as a prison camp and interrogation center (Sudgen & Tomlinson, 1998). The main reason for the reluctance of the USSR to participate in that soccer match and recommend a different location was that Pinochet, the dictator of Chile had had communists executed in that stadium. Despite the fact that the USSR cited a precedent, which was the relocation of a game between Northern Ireland and Bulgaria because of religious fights, FIFA remained to be unimpressed and refused the request of the USSR.

That is to say, the USSR found itself in an odd situation because it was continuously going under both internal and external pressures. Soviet politicians could

have foreseen the impact of these problems on communism and on the USSR and could have reduced one of the sources of the tensions. However, I think the way the USSR handled its foreign affairs and made independent countries such as Estonia, Lithuania and Ukraine join the USSR did not help maintain the unity of the USSR and the communist bloc. Finally, these tensions and economic defects demolished the ‘strong bastion’ of communism.

### **Centralized Doping**

Another interesting aspect of the centralized sport life was the drug use of athletes in communist Hungary. Akin to other spheres of life, doping was handled in a unique way in most of the communist countries. At the end of the 1960s, on the international level the illegal drug use of athletes became a general occurrence and the list of forbidden performance enhancing medications started to get longer. To give some examples, in 1968 Yves Mottin, a French cyclist, died shortly after a competition. One year later Jean-Louis Quadri, a French soccer player, died on the playing field. In 1986, Len Bias, an American basketball player, died in his college room due to cocaine overdoses. Moreover, it was well known since the 1956 Olympic Games that Soviet athletes were on steroids in order to increase their performance (Voy & Deeter, 1991). This product later became the preferred doping medication in many of the other communist countries as well. Perhaps the increasing evidence of drug use led to the decision of international sport organizations that officially athletes were/are not allowed to use any material that could illegally increase their performance. Also, international sport committees encouraged drug checks of competitors at national and international levels. Countries participating at the Olympic Games or in world championships began to organize committees that dealt with illegal drug use by athletes. They also had to ratify a doping related law. Despite the effort of the western countries against drugs, Hungary did not have any doping related regulations during the communist rule. However, Szerdahlyi (1998) argues that according to the Hungarian medical law, physicians are not allowed to enhance the performance of athletes if there is a chance for jeopardizing human health. So, despite the absence of drug regulations, physicians or anyone with a medical degree should

not have participated either actively or passively in illegal doping cases. It seemed that some of the physicians did not follow the afore-mentioned regulation because most of the people involved in elite sport in Hungary during communism, such as athletes, coaches, physicians and sport leaders, had the potential to know about drug abuses (Szerdahelyi, 1998). Although, we have to take into account the fact that, in some cases, physicians and coaches were forced to give illegal medications to their athletes if they wanted to keep their positions or to obtain new equipment.

In order to meet the requirements of international sport institutions, the Hungarian government created an organization which was supposed to prevent athletes from using illegal performance enhancing products. However, according to some physicians such as Dr. Szabolcs Szerdahelyi (1998), this committee, instead of prohibiting illegal drug usage, centrally supervised, directed and provided scientific background for doping athletes. This committee apparently did an excellent job because it was rare when Hungarian athletes did not pass the drug test. Actually, doping related issues were one of the responsibilities of the Ministry of Health and these issues were discussed during the meetings of the Orszagos Testeveles- es Sporttudomanyi Hivatal (OTSH)<sup>31</sup>. The pharmacological background research for more effective performance enhancing drugs and the actual medical treatment of athletes happened in a hospital (Sportkorhaz - Sport Hospital) which was reserved for athletes.

In spite of the fact that the doping of the athletes of the communist block was quite obvious (most of the people were amazed by the size and muscle mass of the East-German female athletes), no one wanted to or could do anything about preventing athletes from doping. In his open letter, Dr. Laszlo Pronai (Szerdahelyi, 1998, p. 85-87) points out the pressure put upon coaches and sport physicians under communism. Politicians and the populace expected outstanding results and athletes required their coaches and physicians to provide them every means - legal and/or illegal – to attain them. Thus, sport physicians were pressured from three different directions and if they wanted to keep their positions they had to follow the state-determined requirements. Besides, athletes could obtain the forbidden materials from other sources. So, one of the arguments on the side of legalized doping was that it was better for athletes to

receive medications from a state-driven organization. Despite the central control concerning doping, it caused additional problems since athletes often took extra medication on the side. However, close to the end of communism, the relationship between Hungarian sport organizations and the Ministry of Health was getting weaker as illustrated by the fact that in the 1988 Olympic Games two Hungarian weight lifters failed the drug test (Kalman Csengeri and Andor Szanyi who lost his fourth place that he had achieved in Seoul). This occurrence fundamentally meant the end of the centralized doping in Hungary.

Physicians who were involved in sport during communism admitted that performance enhancing drugs were available for athletes but they had never been forced to use them. In spite of this, athletes very often found themselves in the role of laboratory-rats and had to go through different, sometimes seemingly wishy-washy, procedures, which did not always result the desired outcome. Szerdahelyi (1998) mentions a specific case when physicians tested a certain drug (Stanozolol) on perfectly healthy athletes in the Sport Hospital. They were supposed to research the influence of this medicine on nitrogen metabolism, but instead they examined how fast this drug depletes from the human body. In this way, coaches and athletes got to know when they had to stop taking this drug if they wanted to pass the drug test. A couple of questions might be asked at this point; whether athletes were forced to take drugs and why the government invested a lot of money into medical equipment and experimental procedures if they were not sure that athletes were going to take advantage of the results.

First of all, we know that athletes have the potential to use any means or to take any medication in order to improve their performance. At the same time, as a consequence of the centrally driven sport life in communist countries, top athletes had high social status that usually came with monetary benefits. Perhaps, if athletes desired to keep their social and financial privileges they had to fulfill the requests of the political regime, which may have included taking illegal performance enhancing medications. For instance, Voy & Deeter (1991, p. 141-142) describe the situation of athletes, how they were treated and what kind of extra opportunities they were offered in the Soviet Union through the case of a hypothetical Soviet athlete named Irina.

Because of the strong similarities between the Soviet and Hungarian ways of organizing sport, I think the case of Irina can highlight the odd situation of athletes in communist countries including the Hungarian situation as well.

Irina became involved in sport through the school system and one of Irina's Physical Education teachers noticed her sport talent. After this, Irina was enrolled in a special school, where, in addition to the usual curriculum, she was trained and instructed by the finest Soviet coaches. Later Irina was allowed to enroll in a university where she received an education and continued her training. She was given accommodation, food and a monthly allowance. On top of this, her parents did not have to worry about paying for the education and the training of their daughter because the government took care of the bills. Irina became a world-class athlete and she had the rare opportunity to travel abroad at the expense of the governmentally driven sport organization. After graduating from the university, Irina was appointed to a position that paid well in the government and she could still concentrate a significant part of her time for training. She was given an apartment in Moscow close to the training facilities. When Irina's sport career was over, she was allowed to keep her apartment, job and the government still took care of her. In other words, Irina could achieve and maintain a comfortable life through sport with the support of the state. Probably, if she had not done what the state wanted her to do she would have lost her privileges. I think it would have been quite difficult for her to give up all the privileges and benefits she had earned. Thus, as far as I can see, communist governments had all the necessary inducements in their hands to make athletes use drugs.

After the collapse of communism and tearing down of the Berlin wall, issues concerning drug misuse in sport came to light. Numerous articles and books were published on this issue in the post-communist countries. Despite the retrospective investigations on doping of athletes, basically there is no official document that could prove the existence of centrally organized performance enhancing drug use in Hungary. Sport leaders and physicians found themselves in an uncomfortable position when they were questioned regarding their participation in the centralized doping program. They had to face the unusual features of democracy and actually, they had to answer questions and defend their 'truth'. However, the most shocking facts were

those documentaries that contained interviews with former East-German female athletes who accurately described what they had to do for the gold medal. It was not rare that the overdose of steroids caused an irreversible reaction on the bodies of athletes. In the case of men the symptoms of steroid overdose were not as visible as in the case of women. At that time the most popular steroid was dianabol<sup>32</sup>, which caused decreased sexual desire, shrinkage of the penis and testicles in the case of men, and the occurrence of facial hair, extremely increased muscle mass, and the shrinkage of breasts in the case of women. The above mentioned documentaries depicted the present life of former athletes who had gone through drug programs during their sport careers in the communist era.

For example, in the 1970s, East German officials decided to turn the nation into a superpower — in sports. Fighting the Cold War inside sports stadiums, the country's athletes were expected to win Olympic gold medals at any cost. To insure victory, they began giving performance-enhancing drugs to all competing athletes, including children as young as 10 years old. Athletes were not suspicious because of their young age, besides they trusted their coaches and most of the time athletes were not informed or were misinformed regarding the pills they were supposed to take. Some of the former East German women athletes describe the impact of drugs on their bodies and lives as follows:

“I can't count the number of times I've been in the hospital for gynecological problems and for my heart, which is enlarged because of the steroids,” says Rica Reinisch, a former East German athlete. “My health is a wreck.”

“They didn't treat us like humans,” says Jutta Klass, a former East German athlete, who believes her daughter is virtually blind as a result of the steroids that she herself was given as a promising young swimmer. “We were practically machines. They used us.”

“I've had seven miscarriages,” says Catherine Menschner, another East German former Olympic athlete.

“What they did to us was carried out in an unconscionable manner. I blame the steroids for my deep voice and for my liver tumor,” says Birgit Meineke, a two-time

world champion. “I want to become a grandmother, and I worry I won’t have that opportunity.”<sup>33</sup>

In addition, the effect of steroids is often irreversible, the cure sometimes the physicians suggested and applied on athletes was an operation that changed their gender. It seemed to be a bit odd to compare the individual’s present physical characteristics to those features the individual possessed before the doping regimes. Although, most of the female athletes were originally robust and strong, they definitely had feminine characteristics in terms of muscle mass, body shape and composition. The use of steroids fundamentally restructured the body of these female athletes and gave them the appearance of men. These androgen athletes are the products and one of the victims of the communist regime and its urge to override other nations with a ‘win-at-all-cost’ ideology.

### **A Positive Sport Related Feature of Centralization**

Despite the abuses of the centrally driven sport life during communism, this system had some positive features as well. One of those was the outstandingly well organized sport feeder system. As a result of high central control and supervision in public education, children became a part of sport activities at a very early age. Physical education was a relevant part of the curriculum from the first grade to the end of high school and through the university years. The curriculum was designed by a state organization; therefore it was inflexible and uniform. That is to say, all the (P.E.) teachers in the country had to educate their students in the same way, about the same subjects and skills, and following the same methods. Physical educators were often required to organize so called ‘mass-sport-activities’ in the afternoon for the students with the purpose of selecting talented students. Thus, educational institutes became the basis of the sport feeder system, an outstanding network of school teachers and the coaches of sport clubs.

At the same time, sport and PE had another important function in communist societies. Children spent the first half of their days in educational institutions that could be perceived as hotbeds of communist ideologies. In the afternoon, a significant part of the children participated in various types of sport activities under the



supervision of teachers or coaches who probably further parroted the favored ideological stand points. In this way, students could spend more time under officially organized control. It is important to note that this feeder system worked well because of high quality of physical educator education at the university level. Coaches and PE teachers were mostly former athletes with extensive experience in competitions who could provide professional service and easily select the talented pupils. Moreover, PE, as a major had an important function in schools and people dealing with sport and PE received high social respect. In the words of Voy & Deeter (1991), who describe the Soviet system, coaches were not only former athletes but graduates of a physical education curriculum far superior than those in the United States. The curriculum was four times as long and more in-depth than the U. S. model.

This feeder system worked well in Hungary and perhaps, this was one of the reasons why Hungary could achieve high success at the Olympic Games and other international sport events compared to its size. Obviously, young Hungarians had a good chance to obtain a broad sport background from a very early age regarding the major sports of soccer, track and field, and sometimes, depending on the facility, handball, basketball, and gymnastics. PE teachers were supposed to recognize talented athletes and send them to different sport clubs for try-outs. It seemed to be a good system from the perspective of building and maintaining a healthy life style for kids from a relative early age. However, similar to most of the things in the Sovietized Hungary, one aspect of this feeder system was creating a disadvantageous environment for less able children. As we know, adults and children are different with various physical and mental abilities. The communist party did not seem to realize this and expected all the students to execute all the physical exercises that were written in the curriculum. Therefore, students were often forced to execute certain exercises in order to meet the standards. These events were quite unpleasant for students who did not have at least average physical abilities. The idea of “sound mind and sound body” was booming during communism and students were expected to live this way. It was a shame if a child was unable to execute a physical exercise or task properly. PE teachers used negative reinforcement to motivate students via highlighting their mistakes. It usually led to frustration and prevented some of the kids from liking sport

activities. Therefore, PE classes sometimes stopped serving their original functions, that is to construct and maintain a healthy lifestyle for students and turned out to be highly competitive events with the appreciation of only the best performances.

In addition, athletes were in a privileged position and had the respect of the PE teachers and the other students. It was a significant benefit to be an athlete. Athletes received equipment from the schools and had the chance to travel and compete against other athletes. Thus, athletes learned from an early age that they were favored. They could and were allowed to do things that everyday people did not. Moreover, the salary of a soccer player was many times higher than a factory worker. Sport was attractive because in the communist countries the structure of the societies was not mobile. Although, workers and peasants were not devalued they still did not have the same rights and possibilities as athletes, mainly soccer players, did. Top athletes often received the same treatment as politicians. For instance, athletes could get certain products that were unavailable for others, could talk about politics more freely, and their private affairs were taken care of. In other words, sport was a possible way for poor kids to move up on the social ladder and to be one of the heroes of the nation. Theoretically, there was only one class, the working class, but top athletes belonged to a special social sphere, which had more fortune and freedom than the rest of the population. This might be an explanation why the Hungarian soccer team was quite successful and why it was so desirable to be a soccer player during communism.

Another reason for having outstanding sport results might have been the closed borders and the restriction of the flow of information out of the communist bloc. Even within the communist bloc, it was not rare for some communist countries to not want to give out their secret training methods or drug mixtures to other countries driven by the same ideological power. For example, one of my former professors told me his story of smuggling confidential training materials from East-Germany to Hungary. He took a high risk because at that time smuggling governmentally protected documents was a major crime against the system. This secret-guarding behavior was a peculiarity of the communist countries. It created an almost insulated environment that excluded Western ideologies and globalization.

The government also provided proper facilities for training athletes. Schools specialized for developing athletes had all the most up-to-date and necessary equipment to be successful. Nevertheless, the importance of sport in Hungary during communism could also be seen through the fact that even in the smallest villages, where there were not enough classrooms or teachers for the students, one could find gyms and soccer fields. This imbalanced educational system placed sports and PE in a privileged position to the benefit of the Party, PE teachers, coaches and athletes.

The governmentally supported clubs and sport organizations lost significant money from the state to their budgets as the new political system appeared. That is, they had to restructure themselves and they had to start working as businesses. This has caused numerous problems and scandals in the Hungarian sporting life.

## CHAPTER 4

### POST-COMMUNIST HUNGARIAN SPORT AND GLOBALIZATION

In 1990 not only did a new decade begin in the history of Hungary, but this ten-year period was a milestone in Hungary's political, cultural and economic development. After the elimination of the communist regime, Hungarians had to face new, often unexpected problems and situations. The relationship between the state and its citizens was fundamentally restructured. The impact of the state on people's everyday life started decreasing and autocracy was exchanged to democracy. It was quite hard for most of the people in Hungary to accommodate to the new or reborn habits, rules and ideologies. The forty years of communism had people accustomed to permanent governmental supervision and support. The everyday presence of the governing body in the Hungarian citizens' lives functioned in a way that Foucault described in his Panopticon<sup>34</sup> theory. It says that the major effect of the Panopticon is to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. The arrangement in Panopticon insures that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action; that the perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary; that this architectural apparatus should be a machine for creating and sustaining a power relation independent of the person who exercises it; in short, that the inmates should be caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers. To achieve this, it is at once too much and too little that the prisoner should be constantly observed by an inspector: too little, for what matters is that he knows himself to be observed; too much, because he has no need in fact of being so. This theory has two basic features: Visible and Unverifiable. Visible means that the inmate will constantly have before his eyes the tall outline of the central tower from which he is spied upon. Unverifiable means that the inmate must never know whether he is being looked at any one moment; but he must be sure that he may always be seen. The Panopticon is a machine for dissociating the see/being seen dyad: in the peripheral ring, one is totally seen, without ever seeing; in the central tower, one sees everything without ever being seen (Foucault, 1995, p. 201). In other words, people are aware of the fact that they are

continuously being watched by the authority, but they cannot identify who is watching them or when they are being watched. Therefore, in a society, theoretically, everyone has the potential to be a watcher or to be watched. The only possible difference might be that in a totalitarian society sometimes even the watchtower is unidentifiable.

Among normal societal circumstances, a symbolic watchtower could be the uniform of authority. For instance, the presence of a policeman makes people start to behave more consciously even though the policeman is not there to watch them. However, in the communist countries individuals who were spying on other citizens were not easily identifiable or visible but everyone knew about their existence. In this situation people are highly advised to take into account the regulations concerning any act they are planning to do because of the permanent and indefinable presence of the authority. This leads to a situation where people follow regulations and rules without the actual presence of supervision simply because they are used to being watched all the time.

This system could be reinforced from two sides. On the one hand, it is reinforced from the side of authority which creates regulations and organizes supervising institutions that make citizens follow rules through certain punishments. On the other hand, this system could be reinforced by the citizens who have already had some sort of an interaction with the rule-making authorities. These individuals may reinforce the effectiveness of authority through describing their experiences to other citizens.

In addition, during the years of communism the type of ideas and news that were broadcast to people were carefully selected. This procedure basically provided a pre-digested information bundle that did not place people in the position for critical and individual thinking. In the post-communist era, people stopped receiving uniform and centrally driven information packages. Media regained their freedom and different organs gravitated to different political standpoints. After forty years of censorship, people faced the free media again that further increased their confusion. The palette of media organs increased and so did their political viewpoints. It became quite normal that an event was described in many different ways in various newspapers. People found themselves in a situation where they were not actually told which was right and which was wrong, that is individuals had to make their own decisions regarding

political, economic and moral issues. These issues, instead of the communist ideologies, began to revolve around a Western-type market economy. To paraphrase, at the beginning of the post-communist era of Hungary, people were going through ideological and economic confusion which could be perceived as the transition period from Sovietization to Europeanization.

### **Soccer and globalization**

In the 1990s, financial instability was present in the Hungarian sport sphere as well. Sport clubs lost a significant part of their state support and had to find sponsor organizations in order to maintain their own institutions. This was the beginning of the re-commodification of sport in Hungary. In other words, sport became a product of the market that had to be sold in order to survive. In communism, sport was governmentally supported and driven with ideological functions. Coaches and sport managers did not have to worry about their budgets because sport served governmental purposes and it was willing to spend large amounts of money on sport so as to popularize communist ideologies and keep the system going through sport propaganda. Sport did not have a significant market value and sport clubs did not have to deal with marketing their products which created a monetarily stable situation for the managements. In the post-Soviet period, the political function of sport decreased and sport clubs had to organize their existence without the back up of state money. In Hungary there was no pattern to obtain sponsors and to sell sports. Sport clubs began to learn to manage monetary issues in their own way. It was a mixture of Western and Hungarian ways. This could be understood as the modification of the Western-type sponsor-sport club relationship. That is to say, the globalization driven sport market was redefined in Hungary. This interaction of the local and the global resulted in a hybrid formation of organizing the sport market in Hungary. In this situation, as a result of the interaction of the process of global sportification and Hungary, a new hybrid sport-cultural formation appeared in the country replacing the old declining one. The similarities between the Western and the Hungarian sport sphere in terms of market and sponsors are that sport is a commodity and it has to be sold. Sport can be sold to the audience via various media and it has enormous commercial value. Multi-

national or mammoth companies have a huge interest in investing money in sport because via sport they can reach a large number of potential customers. So, Hungarian sport clubs began to approach international and national investors to obtain monetary support for advertising the name and/or products of the company. This is quite similar to the Western way of organizing sport. All the major Western sport clubs have sponsoring contracts with multinational companies and they advertise the sponsoring company(s) on the jersey of the players and in their home stadiums. For example, Manchester United has had numerous sponsors. The most recent principal sponsor of Manchester United is Vodafone which started supporting the soccer team in 2000. Prior to the sponsoring contract between this soccer team and Vodafone, Manchester United had numerous other contracts with various international companies (e.g., Sharp electronics). Despite the numerous sponsoring organizations, the team preserved its original name and identity. It means that the change of the main sponsor institution does not influence the identity of the actual team. It is only a business contract and it is not supposed to influence the original existence and features of sport teams because the fans root for Manchester United and not for Manchester Vodafone.

As in the United Kingdom, no professional team in the US is named after a primary sponsor. They are named after the location in which they play. However, whereas in the UK, the stadia are named for the locality in which they are situated (e.g., Manchester United's ground is Old Trafford; Leeds United's ground is Elland Road); in the US, stadia are often named for the primary private investor which has contributed to the building of a stadium or which has taken over a large share of its upkeep. To provide an American example, the major sponsor of the Cincinnati Reds' field is the Cinergy Company, therefore it is called the Cinergy field. Nonetheless, the team did not adopt the Cinergy name and it is not to be called the Cinergy Reds or Cincinnati Reds-Cinergy.

In the case of Hungary, the soccer stadia are named after their location and most of them are the property of the state or local governments. For example, the stadium of the Kecskemeti FC soccer team is located near a lake; therefore it is named after that lake (Szektoi Stadium<sup>35</sup>). Furthermore, the stadia of FTC and Debreceni VSC soccer teams are named after their street location and are called Ulloi Uti

Stadium and Olah Gabor Utcai Stadium<sup>36</sup> respectively. This fact further reinforces the existence of a hybrid way of organizing the sport market in Hungary. It means that the naming of the stadia follows the European norms, i.e. the stadia are named after their locations, but the ownership of them in most cases follows the American pattern where the stadia are sometimes private or public. In contrast, in the UK, the stadia are private, belonging to the club.

It might be interesting to notice that sport is popular and a good business either in the US or in EU and these two alliances seem to organize it in a similar way even though there are certain cultural differences. It is not common in Europe that sport buildings are named after the main sponsor organization while it is popular in the US. It means that the market driven process of globalization still must face the local cultural interests, needs and circumstances. Thus, as far as I can see, as a consequence of the interaction of the local and the global, there is going to occur a new hybrid cultural formation which is unique to a continent, country or culture.

This idea is being reinforced by Table 2 (See Appendix) which shows all the first division soccer teams and their rank order participating in the Hungarian National Soccer Championship<sup>37</sup> between 1990 and 1999. In Hungary, the advertisement of the sponsor organizations of sport clubs do not only appear on jerseys or in stadiums but in the name of the actual sport club. That is to say, a soccer team attaches the name of the principal sponsor to its name. For instance, if we choose the team of Vac from Table 2, we can see that in 1990/91 this soccer team still had its original name but in the next season it was already called Vac-Samsung. This team kept its sponsor for five seasons and regained its original name for two seasons. In 1998/99, the name of Vac soccer team changed to Vaz-Zollner, which was another sponsor organization. Table 2 provides many other examples of this type of sport club-sponsor coexistence such as BVSC-Dreher, PMSC-Fordan, DVSC-Epona.

As a consequence of the process of privatization and the unclear regulations regarding sport market, some of the soccer teams became the possessions of companies or private individuals who could afford and had the chance to buy them. In addition, successful businessmen could create their own soccer teams and build their own stadia if they desired. Table 2 shows that teams which did not participate in the



first division during communism, i.e., newly created soccer teams had the potential to join the leading teams under the new political system. The fluctuation of the teams and the teams' positions in the first division reflected an overall financial instability within the Hungarian sport life. For example, Jozsef Stadler<sup>38</sup>, a successful business man, founded a soccer team which had not existed in the Sovietized Hungary. Unfortunately, this individual has been arrested and imprisoned for tax manipulation. His team lost his financial support and could not keep its position in the Professional League. Table 2 shows that his team, the Stadler, participated in the first division soccer championship beginning in the 1994/95 season and held this position until the 1997/98 season when the owner was arrested. It is also interesting to note that during the last two seasons of Stadler in the Professional League there was some sort of financial instability because the owner needed other sponsors to keep his team running. Therefore, in 1996/97 the name of the team changed to Ecker-Stadler and one year later it changed to Illzer-Stadler.

The phenomenon of often changing sponsors was common in the Hungarian sport sphere. This reflects the economic instability of Hungary in the transition period. As a corollary of this transition period, some of the enterprise-related regulations were not quite sophisticated and a few people used these gaps to earn a lot of money quickly. Therefore, during this ten-year period it was quite common that companies appeared and disappeared from one year to the other. Table 2 also shows that many teams kept their sponsors for only one season and then they changed them or tried to survive alone. For instance, Vasas has its original name in the 1992/93 season and it was changed to Vasas-Ilzer one season later. In the 1994/95 season this team was named to Vasas-CV and two seasons later its name changed to Vasas-DH.

Also, FIFA has a globalizing impact on Hungarian soccer. FIFA creates and modifies the rules of soccer world wide and Hungary, just as other FIFA members, has to follow those regulations if Hungary wants to participate in any FIFA organized sport events. Thus, administratively Hungary has to obey by the rules of FIFA but this international soccer organization does not control the way Hungary organizes its soccer related businesses.

Further analysis of Table 2 highlights the fact that in this transition period the influence of the government on soccer decreased and the idea of centralization changed. It means that the ratio of rural to capital soccer teams was much more heterogeneous in terms of rank order than it had been in the Communist era. However, the political function of soccer to a certain degree remained relevant. Some of the politicians who were involved in the political machinery of communism still had the belief that soccer could provide political popularity per se. This was the reason why the leader of the Hungarian Smallholder Party (Jozsef Torgyan) became the manager of the most popular soccer team (FTC) while his party was directing the country in a coalition with the Alliance of Young Democrats. Despite his calculations, this act backfired on him because people had an enormous aversion to anything that made them remember the years of communism.

Another impact of globalization on the Hungarian sport life is the global sport labor migration (Maguire, 1999) which was not present during communism because of the strictly closed state borders. Nowadays, Hungarians can leave the country and find a job in a different country without any concerns of the government putting the rest of their families into acute danger. On the other hand, people from other countries (some of the Eastern European countries' citizens need to have visa) can move to Hungary and pursue a job there, too. That is to say, the country is more open to labor migration than ever before. Naturally, this openness influences the sport sphere, as well. According to Maguire (1999), global sport labor migration occurs at three different levels: within nations, between nations located within the same continents and between nations located on different continents. In the case of Hungary, we can find all three types of migration. It is a common issue that soccer players move from one team to another following the needs of the market within a country. However, this form of migration was present in communism too but it was ideologically- and not market-driven. Also, we can see the signs of immigration of soccer players from the neighboring countries. For instance, it is common for a first division team to have Romanian, Croatian, Slovakian, Yugoslavian or Ukrainian players on its roster. Nevertheless, it might not be expected that Hungary is in the inter-continental flow of athlete migration. However, the facts clearly show that some of the first division teams

have one or two Brazilian players on their rosters (e.g.: FTC, Haladas). This further supports the significance of the process of globalization on the sport sphere of Hungary. The impact of globalization, which is a form of hybridization appears to be positive because coaches have a larger pool of players to choose from and in the long run, it will probably lead to a better performance at the national level. Despite, it is important to state that the presence of foreign players in a team may not reform the style or image of the team but may presuppose a possible future change.

### **Westernized doping**

By virtue of the aforementioned financial instability in Hungary, some of the sport related issues such as the doping question were not prioritized. Sport organizations and teams had to fight for their existence and did not probably have the time or energy to deal with doping related issues. At the same time, there were serious restructurations going on in the management of most of the national sport organizations. Perhaps, the old managements did not want to deal with this issue because they were not sure if they were going to remain in their positions or not. The new managements perhaps wanted to stabilize the financial situation of the Hungarian sport first and the question of a doping related law was not prioritized. However, this is only a speculation; the fact is that the first doping related law was ratified in 1998, more than 8 years after the collapse of the communist regime. It indicates that national sport organizations and the government did not highlight this issue.

In addition, in the second half of the 1990s Hungary finalized its intention of joining the EU. Thus, besides the pressure coming from various international sport organizations, Hungary had to take into consideration the requirements of the EU. Officially, the countries of the EU reject the use of performance enhancing products in sport and they try to organize strict supervision regarding this matter. Therefore, those countries who want to join the EU such as Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland have to accept and support the standpoint of the EU and besides the political, economic and societal requirements they must have a well-structured, modern and Western-type sport agenda. Also, it might be interesting to note that the EU became more directly involved in doping related issues in the second half of the 1990s. In 1998 the

European Council expressed its concern regarding the relevance and seriousness of doping in sport that undermines the sporting ethic and endangers public health, and encouraged the involvement of the commission in working with international sport bodies. The views of the European council were endorsed by the European Parliament in 1999 and by the EU ministers of sport (Houlihan, in press). This probably underlines the relationship between the EU and Hungary, i.e., the ratification of the Hungarian doping law and the anti-doping outburst of the EU happened in the exact same year.

As far as I can understand, during the transition period from Sovietization to Europeanization, the manifestation of any kind of a sport related act is going to be a hybrid sport-cultural formation. Hungary is still not a Western country and the rules of the EU cannot be applied to Hungary's present situation without certain modifications. Therefore, I would argue that this present transition process caused the Hungarian doping law's hybrid formation, which intends to meet the standards of the EU, but takes into consideration the local conditions.

The centrally supervised doping program ended with the communist regime and influenced Hungary's performance at the Olympic Games and in other international sport events. Perhaps, the lack of a governmentally organized drug control reduced the number of medals Hungary achieved at the Olympic Games after communism. Table 3 (See Appendix) illustrates the number of medals Hungarian athletes achieved at the Olympic Games from 1952 to 2000. Graph 1 (See Appendix) represents the data illustrated by Table 3 but provides an easier way to follow the fluctuation of the performance of the Hungarian athletes at the Olympic Games.

Table 3 and Graph 1 also demonstrate the strong interconnectedness between sport achievements and economic changes in Hungary. If we follow the history of Hungary starting from the end of World War II, we can clearly see how the economic and political developments and turmoil impacted the sport performance of Hungarian athletes at the Olympic Games. In Graph 1, the total scores of medals illustrate the parallel between the outcome of the Olympic Games and the changes in Hungary. I speculate that after World War II, which ended quite negatively for the Hungarians, the reconstruction of the country was started and people had ambiguous feelings about

this war. On the one hand, Hungarian citizens started to regain their positive attitudes because the war was finally over but, on the other hand, it was difficult for them to deal with their family, monetary and territorial losses. In 1952, Hungary had high achievement at the Helsinki Olympic Games (total medals: 42). This probably happened because Hungary still had hope in the interventions of Western powers and in the temporary occupation of the USSR. People believed in a better and flourishing future and the economy was developing. Later on, people began to realize the occupation of the Soviet Red Army was not temporary and they lost their trust in the help of Western powers. This manifested in a political turmoil and revolution against the oppressor that may have decreased the outcomes of the next two Olympic Games (Melbourne – total number of medals: 26 and Rome – total number of medals: 21). The next period was the Kadar epoch which started with a slow financial and political consolidation in the 60s and became more rapid in the first half of the 70s. It may explain why Hungary was getting more successful in the next three Olympic Games. To express it with numbers, Hungarian athletes earned 22 medals in Tokyo, 32 medals in Mexico and the peak of the era was Munich where 35 medals were obtained at the Olympic Games. In the second half of the 70s, the hidden economic problems of Hungary started to interfere with people's everyday life and work. Perhaps, this resulted in the weak performance of the Hungarian athletes in Montreal (total number of medals: 22). Four years later, at the Moscow Olympic Games (total number of medals: 32), Hungary had high achievement despite its economic or status standings. This was probably the result of the communist interconnectedness between Hungary and the USSR. In the 80s Hungary tried to separate itself from the domain of the USSR but the latter still had a significant influence on Hungary's political decisions. This was reflected by Hungary's boycott of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games which was supposed to represent the resistance of the communist countries against capitalist imperialism. In 1988, communism was coming close to its end in Hungary and political and economic instability reached their peaks. This may have resulted in a weaker performance at the Seoul Olympic Games (total number of medals: 23). The Barcelona's Olympic event happened after the communist regime and Hungary performed better (total number of medals: 30). Perhaps, this high score was the

corollary of the fact that coaches still had athletes competing from the communist regime and these athletes, under a democratic environment produced good results. At the last two Olympic Games, the performance of Hungary shows a serious decline. That is to say, in Atlanta (total number of medals: 18) and in Sydney (total number of medals: 17), the Olympians of Hungary underachieved compared to past results. These last two Olympic Games have brought the lowest total scores to Hungary since the second London Games. This could be the result of the unstable economic system, the stricter regulations about drug use in the case of athletes and the malfunction of the feeder-system that was developed in the communist era. To paraphrase, the termination of the centrally driven doping system definitely had a visible impact on the performance of the Hungarian athletes. However, it was not the only factor that influenced sport performance. As far as I understand and Graph 3 shows economy was an important contributor to the poor show of the Hungarian athletes at the last two Olympic Games.

I do not think that this situation will be improved unless the economy becomes more stable and the work of coaches and P.E. teachers are appreciated. The financial and social appreciation of the work of P.E. teachers would probably lead to the restoration of the sport feeder system and the stabilization of the economy could provide higher financial security to the sport clubs and athletes, as well. This would obviously lead to better sport performance both at national and international levels without the use of any kind of illegal performance enhancing medication.

### **Sport and Physical Education in the transition period**

With the appearance of the new political system, the status hierarchy was fundamentally restructured and it began to be politically accepted that the Hungarian society was a multi-class one. For this reason, the importance of social status became reevaluated. People formed and belonged to different social classes on the basis of their income, which stopped being standardized by the government. Higher social class meant higher social status, which could be achieved through good financial conditions. That is to say, the structure and the functioning of the Hungarian society became a money-driven, Western type society. As a result, teachers, mainly P.E.

teachers, found themselves in an odd situation because the state did not increase their salaries. This led to a decline in their social status. The situation of P.E. teachers was made even worse because sports also lost their significance. In other words, low salary placed teachers in a low social class with low social status. Besides, P.E. became the major associated with the lowest social status among other majors as a consequence of the decreasing importance of sport in Hungarian society. This financial and social condition of educators reflects a hybrid way of organizing society in Hungary. One part of this organization follows Western-type societies in terms of being structured by social classes and wealth. It means that in Hungary, similar to other multi-class societies, an individual can move from one social class to another depending on his/her financial achievements and naturally people in a higher social class possess higher social and political power, which can lead to the increase of social status. The other part is far from the attitudes of Western-type countries in terms of the social status of the teachers. In Western societies educators are respected and their work is appreciated by the citizens at least at university level. At the same time, their salaries put them in the middle classes. We could speculate which was the first, the social status or the financial benefits that lifted the educators to the middle classes in Western societies. The point is that in Hungary all of the teachers are treated in a different way and they belong to the lower-middle class. It presupposes the development of a social system that only respects monetary achievements and does not appreciate pure intellectual, teaching-related performance. However, we have to take into account the fact that in 2003 the government is planning to drastically improve the payments of educators and it seems that some of these reforms may take action before the end of 2002. Perhaps, the main stimulus of these reforms is the impact of Hungary's strong desire to join the EU.

The new political system inherited huge debts from the communist system and did not intend to raise the salaries of the public servants which probably led to the decline of the teachers' social status. Therefore, some of the teachers who had the courage or were marketable, moved to the private sector in order to be able to support their families and maintain a normal life style. It was also not rare that teachers had to pursue two jobs at the same time so as to meet their financial needs. This phenomenon

is obviously responsible for the decreasing quality of education at elementary, high school and university levels. For instance, when I was completing my P.E. degree at the University of Pecs, one of my gymnastics teachers sold sporting goods and various dietary supplements in order to increase his standard of living. This need for additional income apparently reduced his interest in education. He cared less about his courses and was less prepared.

The migration of the P.E. teachers from the public to the private sector undermined the sport feeder system that was well-organized in communism. At the same time, some of those teachers who, for some reason, did not move to the private sector may have lost their motivation as a result of low salaries. That is to say, highly qualified physical educators left the field of education for higher financial profit and the ones who stayed lost their motivation for teaching because of financial difficulties.

Furthermore, the new democratic system gave more responsibility to teachers. During communism it was normal and accepted by society if a teacher used corporal punishment. People perceived teachers as experts and rarely questioned their acts or decisions. After the collapse of communism, people began to be familiar with their rights and demanded them. Citizens stopped tolerating the aggressive behaviors of some of the educators and, using law enforcement, tried to exert their rights. I remember a case when my high school P.E. teacher was taken to court because of hitting one of his students. The student sued him and he lost his job. This was a precedent that made teachers learn the fact that they had received more responsibility and less control for the same amount of money, which was losing its value any way as a consequence of the high inflation.

To summarize, perhaps due to the low incomes, teachers lost their high social status and some of them began to seek other professions in the hope of better payment. Some of the teachers who stayed lost their motivation and/or had to pursue another job to survive, which influenced their attitudes toward their teaching responsibilities. This phenomenon fully undermined the sport education and feeder system. The networking between coaches and P.E. teachers was vanishing as P.E. teachers were leaving their profession or just could not deal with this extra task any more given their teaching responsibilities and their side jobs. Perhaps, one of the reasons why Hungary's sport



performance is declining was the malfunction of the feeder system, thus, coaches were not provided with enough talented young athletes to select from. Table 3 and Graph 1 (See Appendix) show that at the last two Olympic Games, Hungary's performance, expressed in medals, became unusually low. I think there were other factors contributing to this underachievement but as far as I can see, the lack of talented young athletes and the disappearance of feeder system were significant ones.

There is another section of the sphere of education which produces the features of hybridization in Hungary's present time. This is the change of the curriculum in elementary and high schools. It is not directly related to sport but it is to P.E. due to the changes it has brought to this major. During communism, all the elementary and high schools had to follow the governmentally designed and accepted Central Curriculum. It did not allow teachers to design their own courses and ways of teaching. What and how educators had to teach was centrally directed and supervised. Centralized planning and control were not stimulating individual thinking and were impeding the development of unique courses.

In 1993 the government ratified a new curriculum for schools which is called the National Basic Curriculum (NBC). This curriculum does not define certain and exact methods of teaching, neither does it dictate what educators have to teach or how to organize their courses. It gives a lot of freedom to educators and stimulates their creativity. NBC defines only ten education areas<sup>39</sup> that must be taught in schools but it depends on the school and/or the teachers how a course really manifests the NBC goals. The interesting fact is that according to the result of the 1998 research of the Ministry of Education (web address: <http://www.comenius2000.hu/j427.html>), some of the schools adopted and use the NBC and some of them do not, or a hybrid way of organizing curricula, a mixture of the old Central Curricula and the NBC is present. For instance, this survey shows that some of the schools use different text books for teaching purposes while others keep the old ones. The situation is the same with teaching methods and organizing courses. However, this survey does not differentiate between rural and capitol schools. I think that mainly the capitol schools use the NBC. The rural schools might be more conservative and preserve the old centralized curricula or have created a mixture - hybrid - formation that is unique to the school. In

this present situation I would argue that rural schools will follow suit later and eliminate the old central curriculum totally. Thus, this uneven pattern of development appears to be temporary, a part of the process of Europeanization, in terms of education in Hungary. Furthermore, I think that this general change in education will influence the P.E. and sport education, and this is going to have a significant impact on the perception of the Hungarian society about sport and P.E. It might mean that sport and P.E. can regain their popularity, importance and respect in the Hungarian society.

## **Chapter 5**

### **Conclusion**

In summary, we can say that although Hungary was not an active agent in the globalization process whilst the communists drove the country, globalization has had a significant impact on Hungary since the multi-party political system appeared. The strong political and economic pressure of the USSR highly limited Hungary's marketing possibilities within the COMECON, which was a closed economic alliance. Also, the impermeability of the borders restricted exposure to the ideas and knowledge of non-member countries. By virtue of the aforementioned facts, the globalization process could not influence the way of living in Hungary as it does now.

When communism collapsed and the country's borders were re-opened, all sorts of capitalist products and ideas from various countries entered Hungary. Therefore, in the case of Hungary, we cannot just talk about Americanization, Westernization, or Europeanization. The globalization process seems to be more complex and manifests itself in hybridization during this transition process in Hungary. The impact of the United States and the Western European countries on Hungary's economy, culture, politics and everyday life can be found together and result in complex development all around the country. The cultural and economic influences of the US are significant all around the world but because of the location of Hungary, the pressure of the EU countries is also strong. As far as I can see these two forces are mainly responsible for the changes that have occurred in Hungary since the beginning of the democratic political system. On the other hand, Hungary's geographic location suggests a diverse impact as well. Hungary is located in the middle of Europe and surrounded by seven different countries and cultures, and their influences make the Hungarian culture and life quite heterogeneous. Hungarians living close to the borders often speak two languages (Magyar and that of a neighboring country) and follow other nations' habits. People from neighboring countries with less developed infrastructure and economy often come to Hungary to do shopping and they spend a significant part of their money in the big Hungarian cities or towns close to the border. Thus, the signs of homogenization in Hungary are not relevant because the

society is rather heterogeneous per se. This heterogeneity derives from the location and the history of the country.

All in all, the present Hungarian nation seems to be heterogeneous - multicultural and globalizing - where the phenomenon of glocalization also can be found. The adaptation of foreign cultures as a part of glocalization, which also has hybridizing connotation, means that we build in our culture some components of other cultures but the materialization of these cannot be freely realized because they are transformed and converted by our own culture creating a new and a unique cultural formation and/or a way of doing things.

In addition, Hungarians have revitalized certain traditions but these actions cannot be perceived as forms of resistance. For instance, the former national and religious holidays are assuming a more significant role in the society again. Naturally, the revival of old-time traditions attracts the attention and interest of foreigners who are ready to buy, participate, and get to know some part of Hungarian history. This may be helpful for Hungary's integration to the EU. From this point of view, local resistance against globalization or revivals of old-time customs can have a positive influence on the particular country's budget if indigenous people welcome the flow of foreign tourists and their capital.

At this juncture, it is difficult to define the proper theoretical approach for analyzing the Hungarian response to globalization because the society is complex and contradictory per se. It can be argued that sport globalization as process does not have predetermined outcome. Indeed there can be a variety of outcomes which would conform to the conventional definition of globalization (Houlihan, in press). Right now Hungary seems to be going through the process of hybridization as a result of the local-global interaction. This transition period creates new cultural formations which are unique ways of solving problems and organizing political, cultural and societal matters. However, we have to keep in mind that this transition period may end in a couple of years and the hybrid cultural formations of Hungary might be restructured. In other words, hybridization may only be a temporary stage in the development of Hungary and later on when Hungary becomes a part of an international economic and political alliance, globalization is going to manifest itself in a different way.

At the end of this research, I can see two possible ways for Hungary to enter the future. On the one hand, it is possible that the present hybridized system keeps its existence and, despite joining the EU, Hungary will preserve some of its unique characteristics embedded in the structure of the EU. In this case, hybridization is going to be a permanent process in Hungary that always modifies the rules of the global to meet the requirements of the local. In this way, Hungary would be able to secure some of its traditions and locality longer because the regulations of the global would be modified taking into account the needs and formations of the local.

In the second possible case, the process of hybridization would be only temporary, a part of the transition process from Sovietization to Europeanization and as soon as the transition is over, i.e., Hungary joins the EU, hybridization and the cultural residuals of Hungary will vanish. In other words, taking into consideration the data and the examples mentioned in the Chapter 4, we can say that Hungary is in the process of hybridization as the result of the local-global interaction, which reflects the existence of residuals of the old system and occurrence of the new one at the same time. This might be a temporary phase in the economic, political and cultural development of Hungary and later on, as the impact of the EU increases, the penetration of the process of Europeanization will be deeper. The future of Hungary and the global-local interaction will depend on the flexibility of the EU. Inflexibility will probably result in hybridization being switched to Europeanization. This alliance will decide about how much of their original features and customs its member countries can preserve. I view the EU as an alliance that mainly serves economic and political purposes and thus, I think the first Europeanized spheres of Hungary are going to be economically and politically related. Nevertheless, we know that these two factors have a significant impact on a country's cultural and societal life and development. Therefore, I would argue that culture and society will follow suit after the Europeanization of Hungary's economy and politics.

### **Limitations and shortcomings of this study**

The limitations of this study are grouped into methodological and generalization issues. The methodological shortcomings derive from the approach to

data resources that caused insufficient information on the pre-selected issues. The data collection procedure did not bring the expected result and I could not perform all the analysis I had intended. For instance, I planned to obtain information regarding the ownership of the soccer stadia and teams. It would have been interesting to see if the capitol teams and their stadia were in private hands and the rural ones and their stadia in public possession. However, the data collection procedure was not successful because of non-cooperative data sources. Both the teams and the Hungarian Soccer Association ignored my requests regarding this information. This might have happened because of the existing residuals of the Soviet system in Hungary. People still do not like to give out information about their businesses being afraid of the possible consequences. On the other hand, I might not have received the desired data because of the way I contacted the teams and the league. I used the Internet and e-mail services so as to obtain data regarding my research. One of the problems was that I could not find or gain access to the web sites of all the first division teams. Some do not have a working home page, others were reluctant to answer my e-mails. The Hungarian Soccer Association has a nicely designed and maintained website with all the contact information I needed, but they have never returned any of my e-mails. Perhaps, a different way of collecting data could have been more effective such as gathering data via telephone or visiting the teams personally. Unfortunately, I did not have the resources and chance to execute any of the latter methods. Finally, there has not been relevant globalization and Hungarian sport related work with a sociological perspective published. Thus, I could not rely on archive data stemming from other Hungarian, sport related scientific works.

Despite these shortcomings, I could speculate that some of the capitol teams' grounds have become private and the rural ones may follow suit later. This could have reinforced my assumption concerning a hybrid model of organizing sport in Hungary's recent times.

The other issue is the generalization of the findings regarding the restructuration of Hungarian sport. I mainly used soccer examples to illustrate the global-local interaction in Hungarian sport. While I was unable to research the impact of globalization on the whole Hungarian sport sphere, I think that other forms of sport

are going to come under the same influence and reformation as soccer has due to the same political and economic pressures. Indeed, most sports in Hungary already fall under the preview of international sport federations and could be seen as globalized. It may only be the manner in which they are financed that either hybrid or nationalistic orientations will remain in evidence.

### **Recommendations for future research**

A follow up of the present study could examine the changes of the entire Hungarian sport sphere under the influence of globalization. This could provide examples that derive from various other sport activities and could refute or reinforce the finding of this study concerning hybridization as the main globalizing process in Hungary. In other words, it could illustrate that other parts of the Hungarian sport sphere might develop in the same way as soccer has.

Besides focusing on the change in the sport market, it would be interesting to research how globalization and the free flow of information influences the technical, tactical and strategic development of Hungarian sport and athletes. Also, it would be interesting to know if athletes and coaches use and are familiar with the achievements of the major globalizing nations (e.g., technological development) and if this will have any kind of an impact on the Hungarian sport life. Do the coaches apply foreign ideas without taking into consideration the local circumstances or the process of hybridization as it exists at various levels and in different sectors of sport life in Hungary?

In addition, it would be relevant to re-examine the significance and the level of existence of hybridization in Hungary after a few years after Hungary joins the EU. It could clearly explain the impact of EU on localities and the result could be applicable to other member countries of the EU. Also, there might be a significant difference found between the post-communist EU countries and the founder countries of the EU regarding coping with the presence of globalization and the process of Europeanization.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Cheaper labor forces attracted the foreign firms, too. This made the operation of foreign franchises more economic.

<sup>2</sup> 1945 was the date of the establishment of the United Nations.

<sup>3</sup> A modern procedure that allows even very dilute gold deposits to be extracted from tons of rock economically. The rock is dug, crushed, and piled in heaps, through which cyanide drips to leach out the gold.

<sup>4</sup> Separation of time from space (Giddens, 1990, p. 21).

<sup>5</sup> The “lifting out” of social relations from the local context of interaction and their restructuring across time and space (Giddens, 1990, p. 21).

<sup>6</sup> Prolympism is a globalized form of sport and it contributes to the process of globalization. Prolympism is a sensitizing concept that emphasizes the interpenetration of professional sport and Olympic. Also, it focuses on production and consumption dynamics, including its connections to the global market (Ingham & Lawson, 1999, p. 1).

<sup>7</sup> The characteristic policy vectors of neo-liberalism involve such moves as liberalization, privatization, minimizing economic regulation, rolling back welfare, reducing expenditures on public goods, tightening fiscal discipline, favoring freer flows of capital, strict controls on organized labor, tax reductions, and unrestricted currency repatriation. It is the cumulative adverse effects of these moves on human well-being that accounts for the title *Predatory Globalization* (Falk, 1999).

<sup>8</sup> The Utopian States are in genesis, not contiguous, and not publicized. In these states, artists and musicians flourish. Most families own their own business. Here artisans are



appreciated and make a great living. In these states, good athletes make a good living. Here society is so productive that 'Angels' have time to help others. Citizens respect uniqueness in people and thought. Here some states are completely computer run. In these states, students learn to enjoy study. Here there are no lawyers and police. In these states, there is no punishment; no jails. You can return to Paradise by taking the opposite path that caused man to leave Eden (<http://www.utopianstates.com/>).

<sup>9</sup> This is not totally unrealistic because the national soccer teams have to follow the regulations of the FIFA and Formula 1 car racing teams have to keep to the rules of the Formula 1 committee regardless of their national affiliations.

<sup>10</sup> Robert Owen /1771 – 1858/, an English landlord and factory owner, sailed for America to create a settlement called Harmony in Indiana in 1824. He believed that the New World might provide the right environment for establishing an experimental co-operative community (his vision of the ideal community - a system run on a co-operative basis involving both factories and agriculture). Harmony proved ideally suited to his needs, with agricultural land, small industries and community buildings. Owen's ideas for social reform and co-operative communities was well received in America. He traveled widely, publicizing his scheme and inviting people to join his New Harmony community. Meanwhile, the settlement was left in the care of his son, William. Settlers flocked to New Harmony, but most were unsuited to community life and very few had the necessary skills to farm the land or run small industries. As the settlement became overcrowded, chaos developed. William had to write to his father urging him to send no more settlers.

Eventually, order was restored and the community became organized using a system based entirely on co-operation. This state of affairs did not last long and without continuous guidance from Robert Owen, a feeling of dissatisfaction grew in the community. This resulted in the community splitting into independent but co-operative groups. By 1828 it was clear that Robert Owen's New Harmony model co-operative community experiment had failed. In June that year he handed over the estate to his sons and returned to Britain. Robert Owen had returned home as a poor

man, having sold his shares in New Lanark to finance New Harmony, but his faith in the co-operative ideal remained strong (<http://robert-owen.midwales.com>).

<sup>11</sup> The international division of labor reflects past colonial links that formed the base from which world capitalism developed.

<sup>12</sup> Japanese Baseball has existed in Japan since 1873. Horace Wilson, a professor in Tokyo, is credited with introducing the American game to his students during the Meiji Era (1867-1912). This was the beginning of the assimilation of the Western game which the Japanese named Yakkyu, meaning "field ball." Since then, the game has developed into a popular pastime for the Japanese. During the Meiji restoration, as the Japanese began a process of modernization, they adopted many Western ideas. Western sports started to be introduced at this time, particularly baseball. Despite the Western characteristics of baseball, the Japanese found the one-on-one battle between pitcher and batter similar in psychology to their native sumo and martial arts. It involved split second timing and a special harmony of mental and physical strength. Because of this, the Ministry of Education believed it was good for the national character and encouraged its growth.

After a 1935 North American tour, Dai Nippon was renamed the Giants. Soon other teams were formed. In 1936, Japan took the big step. In April, Japan's first professional "season" began at Koshien Kyujo near Osaka. Six teams, not including the Giants, took part in three Spring tournaments played in Koshien, Narumi Kyujo (in Nagoya) and Takarazuka near Osaka. The Tigers won the spring league with five wins and four losses.

By 1955, the professional game was really growing with the help of television. The Tokyo Giants became the most popular team with nine consecutive Japan championships from 1965-1973. The Giant's Sadahara Oh had 868 home runs in a twenty-two year career (1958-1980), exceeding both Babe Ruth and Hank Aaron in the U.S. The pro baseball's postwar growth in Japan parallels that of their skyrocketing GNP and by the late 1980's it was extremely profitable, drawing nearly twenty million fans a year.

Today, baseball in Japan is one of the most heavily attended sporting events in the country. According to MCB, where America has one weekly sports paper, Japan has seven dedicated solely to sports, which concentrate mostly on baseball. This shows that the popularity of Japanese baseball has grown and continues to grow tremendously. A Japanese writer summed up his country's love for the game by saying, "Baseball is perfect for us, if the Americans hadn't invented it, we would have" (<http://mcel.pacificu.edu/as/students/baseballjapan/bball.html>).

<sup>13</sup> Creolization does have another connotation, which is used in linguistics to describe a situation or sometimes phase in which a secondary and often rudimentary language used to communicate between different groups, either in trade or in colonial situations, becomes assimilated and raised to first language status by a new generation of speakers. The latter incorporates elements of at least two languages which is where the concept of mixture might be introduced. Creolization refers to then to the process whereby pidgins (more rudimentary secondary languages) acquire native speakers with an implied complexification of both grammatical and lexical components (Friedman, 1995).

<sup>14</sup> The rule system of Australian football.

<sup>15</sup> This is quite an interesting research project with important perspectives. It gives a good and an objective view of the recent processes in Hungary and in its neighboring countries concerning national identity and relationships between majorities and minorities. Although, I think that the research does not represent the whole Central Europe and lacks of methodological accuracy.

<sup>16</sup> Although, the authors do not use the word globalization. I see a parallel between Americanization and globalization as a part of my perception of these processes.

<sup>17</sup> Hungary is not the only nation-state which is about to lose significant parts of its national identity. All the countries involved in globalization have the potential to

forfeit some of their cultures and national identities, or as Bairner (2001) writes, as a concomitant of globalization, the importance of national identities is decreasing.

<sup>18</sup> Lain - the land on this side of the Leitha river

<sup>19</sup> Latin - the land on the other side of the Leitha river

<sup>20</sup> The Hungarian agriculture and its products were and are still famous all around Europe and in the neighbor countries.

<sup>21</sup> As a result of the 1945's election Rakosi became the State President. After the elections of 1947, he was appointed to vice Prime Minister and State President. In 1948 he was elected to be the president of the MKP-SZDP (Hungarian Communist Party – Social Democrat Party). In the same year he was appointed to the chief-secretary of the Hungarian Laborers' Party. In 1949, he became the president of the incipient Hungarian Independence Popular Front. In the same year, maintaining all of his functions, Rakosi became the president of the State Defense Committee. In 1952 the diet elected him to be the president of the Cabinet Council. Because of his hardball ambitions, in 1953 the diet made an attempt to eliminate some of his power. Rakosi took all of his positions back in 1956 but could not keep them for a long time because he was unable to cope with the accumulating political problems (both internal and foreign affairs). In the same year, before the revolution, he was removed from his positions as a result of his weakened health and went to the USSR to be cured.

<sup>22</sup> This Act encompassed every imaginable activity which could be considered as a crime against the state. The accusations varied in specifics, but were identical in that all of them were classified as an “activity against the Communist state”. For instance these activities involved: defacement of public property or graffiti, distribution of leaflets or anti-Communist propaganda, spying, sabotage or passing information to foreign powers, possession of arms or ammunition, resistance to land collectivization, and religious instruction of children (Fehervary, 1990).

<sup>23</sup> Jozsef Mindszenty (1892–1975), Hungarian prelate, cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church. He was the bishop of Veszprém during the German occupation of Hungary in World War II. His anti-German attitude led to his imprisonment for several months by the Hungarian puppet government. After the war he was made archbishop of Esztergom and Catholic primate of Hungary, and in 1946 he was raised to the cardinal. A strong opponent of Communism, Mindszenty was arrested by the Hungarian government late in 1948 on the charges of treason and illegal monetary transactions. At a sensational public trial Mindszenty pleaded guilty to most charges. It was widely held that his confession had been obtained by drugging him, because he had disclaimed in advance any confession he might make in case of arrest. The court sentenced him to life imprisonment. Released from prison because of ill-health in 1955, Mindszenty was kept under close watch. During the Hungarian revolution he was freed by rebel forces. When the revolt was crushed, he took refuge in the U.S. legation and thereafter refused to leave Hungary unless the Hungarian government rescinded his conviction and sentence. In 1971, after an agreement between the Vatican and the Hungarian government, Mindszenty left Hungary for the Vatican. Shortly afterward, he settled in Vienna. In 1974, in an effort to improve church relations with Hungary, Pope Paul VI removed him as primate of Hungary.

<sup>24</sup> Imre Nagy was a reformist of the "New Course" that included relaxing the pace of industrialization, allowing peasants to leave collective farms and relaxing police terror. However, when politics in Moscow shifted in 1955, Nagy fell out of favor. He was forced to resign his post and was kicked out of the Communist Party. One year later, an emergency meeting of the party Central Committee on the night of October 23 appointed Nagy prime minister, a position he held for little more than 10 days. During his brief tenure as prime minister during the Hungarian Revolution, Nagy attempted to bring events under control, working within the bounds set by the Soviets while reforming Hungarian politics. He offered amnesty to the demonstrators, abolished the one-party system and thought that he had negotiated the withdrawal of

Soviet troops from Hungary. However, when he realized that he had been deceived by the Soviets, he withdrew Hungary from the Warsaw Pact and declared Hungarian neutrality. The Soviets invaded Budapest on November 4, 1956. Nagy went to the Yugoslav Embassy, where he had been offered protection. Under promise of safe passage, he left the embassy, but the Yugoslav bus was seized by the Soviet military. Five days later, Nagy and his group were flown to Romania. Although Soviet leaders hoped to persuade him to endorse the new government of Janos Kadar, he refused. Nagy was held prisoner for approximately two years. After a secret trial, Nagy was executed on June 16, 1958, at age 62.

<sup>25</sup> Janos Kadar (1912- 1989) was a member of the Hungarian underground during World War II. After the war, he was first party secretary and one of the leading members of the regime. In 1950, while serving as Secretary of the Interior he was arrested for being a "Titoist," and was rehabilitated in 1954. When the Hungarian revolt broke out he was one of the leading anti-Stalinists. However, when Soviet troops marched in, he set up a puppet regime. He remained in his position as the leader of Hungary until 1988.

<sup>26</sup> A rapid transition process through which mass privatization occurs in the hope of significant profit to the transitioning country in order to reduce its debts.

<sup>27</sup> The short form of the name of one of the Hungarian soccer teams, MTK, stands for Magyar Testgyakorlok Kore (Sphere of Hungarian Exercisers).

<sup>28</sup> The short form of the name of one of the Hungarian soccer teams, FTC, stands for Ferencvarosi Torna Club (Gymnastics Club of Ferencvaros).

<sup>29</sup> Victualling Workers' Trade Union

<sup>30</sup> Pál Kinizsi lived in the 15th century. He was a legendary soldier and troop leader and served by the side of Hungary's greatest king, King Matthias.

<sup>31</sup> National Physical Education and Sport Science Institute

<sup>32</sup> Dianabol was a derivative of testosterone designed only to create the anabolic effects of the substance. It was also known as D-bol in gyms and one of the first anabolic-androgen steroids on the sport-doping market (Voy & Deeter, 1991).

<sup>33</sup> This information derives from the web site of ABC News, which is located at [http://abcnews.go.com/onair/2020/2020\\_001013\\_egermanathletes\\_feature.html](http://abcnews.go.com/onair/2020/2020_001013_egermanathletes_feature.html)

<sup>34</sup> The Panopticon was proposed as a model prison by Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), a Utilitarian philosopher and theorist of British legal reform. The Panopticon ("all-seeing") functioned as a round-the-clock surveillance machine. Its design ensured that no prisoner could ever see the 'inspector' who conducted surveillance from the privileged central location within the radial configuration. The prisoner could never know when he was being surveilled-mental uncertainty that in itself would prove to be a crucial instrument of discipline.

<sup>35</sup> This is the Hungarian name of the stadium of the Kecskemeti KF. In the name "Szektoi", 'to' means lake.

<sup>36</sup> Ulloi Street Stadium and Olah Gabor Road Stadium.

<sup>37</sup> The first soccer championship was held in 1901 and was named simply Championship. Between 1916 and 1919 it was called Military Championship. In 1920 it regained its first title until 1927 when it began to be called Professional Championship. This name lasted for only nine seasons and in 1936 was renamed again to National Championship. The title of National Championship was a relatively

permanent one because it was used until 1998 when the Hungarian first division soccer championship was again renamed to Professional Championship. This is the official name of this sport event today.

<sup>38</sup> Jozsef Stadler was an enterprising Hungarian business man who lived in a small town (Akasztó) and redistributed a significant part of his profit to his town and to soccer. He had a stadium built and created a soccer team which carried his name and was called Stadler SC. This team was capable of competing in the first division. In 1998, Stadler was accused of tax evasion and was sentenced to prison and his possessions were confiscated. This basically meant the deterioration of the Stadler SC.

<sup>39</sup> These areas are as follow: Mother tongue and Literature, Foreign language, Mathematics, Men and Society, Men and Nature, Our Earth and Our Environment, Arts, Informatics, Conduct and Practical knowledge, Physical Education and Sport.



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## **APPENDIX**

Table1 Final outcome of the Hungarian National Championships between 1943 and 1990 (Data derive from the work of Hadas & Karady /1995/)

Season	Rank order of the first six teams(1→6)					
1943/44	NAC	Ferencváros	<b>Kolozsvár*</b>	Gamma	Újpest	Újvidék
1944 Fall	Interrupted					
1945 Spring	Újpest	Ferencváros	Csepel	Kispest	Vasas	MTK
1945/46	Újpest	Vasas	Csepel	<b>Szeged</b>	Ferencváros	MTK
1946/47	Újpest	Kispest	Vasas	Ferencváros	MTK	Csepel
1947/48	Csepel	Vasas	Ferencváros	Kispest	Újpest	MTK
1948/49	Ferencváros	MTK	Kispest	Újpest	Csepel	<b>SZAC</b>
1949/50	Honvéd	ÉDOSZ	Textiles	Csepel	Újpest	Vasas
1950 Fall	Honvéd	Textiles	Újpest	Csepel	<b>Dorog</b>	Vasas
1951	Bp. Bástyá	Honvéd	Újpest	Vasas	Csepel	Kinizsi
1952	Honvéd	Bp. Bástyá	Dózsa	Vasas	Csepel	<b>Győr</b>
1953	Vörös	Honvéd	Vasas	Dózsa	Kinizsi	<b>Győr</b>
1954	Honvéd	Vörös Lobogó	Kinizsi	Vasas	Dózsa	<b>Dorog</b>
1955	Honvéd	Vörös Lobogó	Kinizsi	Vasas	<b>Dorog</b>	<b>Salgótarján</b>
1956	Interrupted					
1957 Spring	Vasas	MTK	Ú. Dózsa	FTC	Csepel	<b>Sal BTC</b>
1957/58	MTK	Honvéd	FTC	<b>Tatabánya</b>	Vasas	<b>Sal BTC</b>
1958/59	Csepel	MTK	Honvéd	Vasas	Ú. Dózsa	<b>Tatabánya</b>
1959/60	Ú. Dózsa	FTC	Vasas	MTK	<b>Diósgyőr</b>	<b>Tatabánya</b>
1960/61	Vasas	Ú.Dózsa	MTK	FTC	<b>Sal BTC</b>	<b>SZEAC</b>
1961/62	Vasas	Ú.Dózsa	FTC	<b>Tatabánya</b>	<b>MTK</b>	<b>Dorog</b>
1962/63	FTC	MTK	Ú.Dózsa	<b>Dorog</b>	Honvéd	<b>Győr</b>
1963 Fall	<b>Győr</b>	Honvéd	FTC	<b>Komló</b>	Vasas	Ú.Dózsa
1964	FTC	Honvéd	<b>Tatabánya</b>	<b>Győr</b>	Ú.Dózsa	Vasas
1965	Vasas	FTC	Ú.Dózsa	Honvéd	<b>Győr</b>	<b>Tatabánya</b>
1966	Vasas	FTC	<b>Tatabánya</b>	Ú.Dózsa	<b>Győr</b>	Honvéd



1967	FTC	Ú.Dózsa	<b>Győr</b>	Vasas	<b>Tatabánya</b>	Honvéd
1968	FTC	Ú.Dózsa	Vasas	Honvéd	Csepel	<b>Pécsi Dózsa</b>
1969	Ú.Dózsa	Honvéd	FTC	Vasas	<b>Rába ETO</b>	<b>Pécsi Dózsa</b>
1970 Spring	Ú.Dózsa	FTC	Bp. Honvéd	MTK	Vasas	Csepel
1970/71	Ú.Dózsa	FTC	Vasas	Bp. Honvéd	MTK	Csepel
1971/72	Ú.Dózsa	Bp. Honvéd	<b>Salgótarján</b>	<b>Tatabánya</b>	FTC	Vasas
1972/73	Ú.Dózsa	FTC	Vasas	Bp. Honvéd	<b>Videoton</b>	<b>Zalaegerszeg</b>
1973/74	Ú.Dózsa	FTC	<b>Rába ETO</b>	<b>Videoton</b>	<b>Tatabánya</b>	Bp. Honvéd
1974/75	Ú.Dózsa	Bp. Honvéd	FTC	Csepel	<b>Videoton</b>	Vasas
1975/76	FTC	<b>Videoton</b>	Ú.Dózsa	Bp. Honvéd	Vasas	MTK-VM
1976/77	Vasas	Ú.Dózsa	FTC	Bp. Honvéd	Haladás	<b>Videoton</b>
1977/78	Ú.Dózsa	Bp. Honvéd	MTK	<b>Videoton</b>	Vasas	<b>Diósgyőr</b>
1978/79	Ú.Dózsa	FTC	<b>Diósgyőr</b>	Vasas	Bp. Honvéd	<b>Rába ETO</b>
1979/80	Bp. Honvéd	Ú.Dózsa	Vasas	<b>Videoton</b>	<b>Tatabánya</b>	FTC
1980/81	FTC	<b>Tatabánya</b>	Vasas	<b>Videoton</b>	Bp. Honvéd	<b>Debrecen</b>
1981/82	<b>Rába ETO</b>	FTC	<b>Tatabánya</b>	<b>Videoton</b>	Ú.Dózsa	Bp. Honvéd
1982/83	<b>Rába ETO</b>	FTC	Bp. Honvéd	Csepel	Ú.Dózsa	<b>Tatabánya</b>
1983/84	Bp. Honvéd	<b>Rába ETO</b>	<b>Videoton</b>	Ú.Dózsa	<b>Tatabánya</b>	Vasas
1984/85	Bp. Honvéd	<b>Rába ETO</b>	<b>Videoton</b>	<b>Zalaegerszeg</b>	Vasas	<b>Békéscsaba</b>
1985/86	Bp. Honvéd	<b>Pécs</b>	<b>Rába ETO</b>	<b>Zalaegerszeg</b>	FTC	<b>Videoton</b>
1986/87	MTK	Ú.Dózsa	<b>Tatabánya</b>	Bp. Honvéd	FTC	Vasas
1987/88	Bp. Honvéd	<b>Tatabánya</b>	Ú.Dózsa	<b>Rába ETO</b>	FTC	MTK
1988/89	Bp. Honvéd	FTC	MTK	<b>Videoton</b>	<b>Rába ETO</b>	<b>Tatabánya</b>
1989/90	Ú.Dózsa	MTK	FTC	<b>PVSC</b>	<b>Tatabánya</b>	<b>Veszprem</b>

- The highlighted teams are the rural ones.

Table 2 The rank order of the soccer teams participating in the Hungarian National Championship between 1990 and 1999 (Data derive from <http://index.hu/sport/foci/100ev/>)

1990/91	1991/92	1992/93	1993/94	1994/95
Bp. Honved	Ferencvaros	Kispest HFC	<b>Vac-Samsung</b>	Ferencvaros
Ferencvaros	<b><i>Vac-Samsung</i></b>	<b><i>Vac-Samsung</i></b>	Kispest HFC	<i>UTE-Novabau</i>
<b>Pecsi MSC</b>	Kispest HFC	Ferencváros	<b>Bekescsaba</b>	DVSC
<b>Vac</b>	<b>Siofok</b>	MTK	Ferencvaros	<i>Kispest HFC</i>
<b>Veszprem</b>	MTK	<b>Békéscsaba</b>	<b><i>ETO FC Gyor</i></b>	<b>Békéscsaba</b>
<b>Tatabanya</b>	Vasas	<b><u>Videoton</u></b>	Ujpest	<i>BVSC-Dreher</i>
<b>Siofok</b>	<b><u>Videoton</u></b>	Csepel-Kordax	DVSC	<b><i>PMSC-Fordan</i></b>
<b><u>Videoton</u></b>	Ujpest	<b>Siófok</b>	<i>Csepel-Kordax</i>	<b>Zalaegerszeg</b>
Ujpest	<b>Pecsi MSC</b>	<b><u>Rába ETO</u></b>	<b><i>Parmalt</i></b>	<b><i>Stadler</i></b>
MTK-VM	BVSC	Vasas	<i>Vasas-Ilzer</i>	<i>Vasas-CV</i>
<b><u>Raba ETO</u></b>	<b><u>Raba ETO</u></b>	<b>Pécsi MSC</b>	<b>Pecsi MSC</b>	<b>Gyor</b>
Vasas	<b>Veszprem</b>	BVSC	BVSC	Csepel
<b>Szeged</b>	Haladas	<b>Diósgyőr</b>	<b>Siofok</b>	<b><i>Vác-Samsung</i></b>
DVSC	<b>Diosgyor</b>	Újpest	<b><i>EMDSZ-Sopron</i></b>	<b><i>Parmalat</i></b>
<b>Bekescsaba</b>	<b>Tatabanya</b>	<b>Nyíregyháza</b>	Haladas	<b>Nagykanizsa</b>
<b><u>Volan</u></b>	<b>Zalaegerszeg</b>	<b>Veszprém</b>	MTK	<b><i>EMDSZ-Sopron</i></b>

- The highlighted teams are the rural ones.
- The italicized teams have their names changed
- The underlined words are the names of sponsoring organizations

Table 2 The rank order of the soccer teams participating in the Hungarian National Championship between 1990 and 1999 (Data derive from <http://index.hu/sport/foci/100ev/>)

1995/95	1996/97	1997/98	1998/1999
Ferencváros	MTK	Újpest	<i>MTK Hungária</i>
<i>BVSC-Dreher</i>	Újpest	Ferencváros	Ferencváros
Újpest	Ferencváros	Vasas <u>DH</u>	Újpest
<i>DVSC-Epona</i>	<i>Vasas DH</i>	<b>Gyori <u>ETO</u></b>	<b>Gyori <u>ETO</u></b>
MTK	<i>DVSC-Epona</i>	MTK	<b>Dunaferr</b>
<i>Kispest HFC</i>	BVSC	<i>Vac</i>	Vasas <u>DH</u>
<i>Vasas-CV</i>	<i>Kispest HFC</i>	<b><u>Gázszer</u></b>	<b>Diósgyőr</b>
<i>Csepel</i>	<b><u>Videoton</u></b>	<i>DVSC-Epona</i>	<i>DVSC-Epona</i>
<b><u>Stadler</u></b>	<b>Gyori <u>ETO</u></b>	BVSC	<i>Vac-Zollner</i>
<b>Zalaegerszeg</b>	<b>Haladás</b>	<b>Diósgyőr</b>	<b><u>Gázszer</u></b>
<i>Vac-Samsung</i>	<i>Vac</i>	<b>Siófok</b>	Kispest HFC
Haladás	<b>Siófok</b>	Haladás	<b>Nyíregyháza</b>
<b><u>Parmalat</u></b>	<b>Zalaegerszeg</b>	Kispest HFC	Haladás
<b>Békéscsaba</b>	<b>Békéscsaba</b>	<b>Tiszaújváros</b>	<b>Siófok</b>
<b>Gyori <u>ETO</u></b>	III. ker. TVE	<b><u>Videoton</u></b>	<b><u>Videoton</u></b>
PMFC	<b><u>Ecker-Stadler</u></b>	<b>Békéscsaba</b>	BVSC-Zuglói
	<b>Pécsi MFC</b>	<b><u>Illzer-Stadler</u></b>	<b>Tiszaújváros</b>
	Csepel	Újpest	<i>MTK Hungária</i>

- The highlighted teams are the rural ones.
- The italicized teams have their names changed
- The underlined words are the names of sponsoring organizations

Table 3 Hungary's achievement at the Olympic Games from 1952 to 2000 (Data derive from <http://www.sportforum.hu/olimpia2.asp?c=stat>)

Location	1 <sup>st</sup> PLACE	2 <sup>ND</sup> PLACE	3 <sup>RD</sup> PLACE	Total
Helsinki (1952)	16	10	16	42
Melbourne (1956)	9	10	7	26
Roma (1960)	6	8	7	21
Tokyo (1964)	10	7	5	22
Mexico (1968)	10	10	12	32
Munich (1972)	6	13	16	35
Montreal (1976)	4	5	13	22
Moscow (1980)	7	10	15	32
Los Angeles (1984)*	-	-	-	-
Soul (1988)	11	6	6	23
Barcelona (1992)	11	12	7	30
Atlanta (1996)	7	4	10	18
Sydney (2000)	8	6	3	17

\*Hungary boycotted this Olympic event because of the political pressure of the USSR

Graph 1 Hungary's achievement at the Olympic Games from 1952 to 2000

