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PHILOSOPHY

AUTHENTICITY AS BEING-IN-THE-WORLD (69 pp.)

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Within Heidegger's work *Being and Time*, many scholars have argued that Heidegger's account of authenticity undermines elements of his project that were set out in the first division. One common complaint is that Heidegger's account of authenticity undermines his ability to account for Dasein as being-in-the-world. The concern, according to these scholars, is that the establishing normative force of the world gets stripped away through authenticity, which would lead to a worldless subject. My goal is to challenge these interpretations. I argue that authenticity actually brings into focus characteristics of the world like finitude, rather than creating a separation between subject and world. In doing this, I will lay out what exactly an account of authenticity centered on being-in-the-world looks like to show that it doesn't create problems for Heidegger's project.

AUTHENTICITY AS BEING-IN-THE-WORLD

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by
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Chapter I

Introduction

Few concepts in Heidegger's *Being and Time* have given rise to as much contention in the secondary literature on this work as has the concept of authenticity that Heidegger presents in its pages. Many scholars, such as Hubert Dreyfus and Michael Zimmerman, have argued that authenticity creates problems for Heidegger's project in *Being and Time*; specifically, there is a concern that Heidegger's understanding of authenticity undermines his ability to account for Dasein as necessarily interconnected with the world. This concern has taken on a variety of forms over time, but one of the most long-lasting is the concern that the normative force of the world gets stripped away through the process of achieving authenticity. What this means is that the influence and weight over possibilities given to Dasein by *das Man* gets stripped away somewhere in the process of becoming authentic. This concern is separate from the one that scholars such as Lee Braver have discussed, which is largely oriented around metaphysical questions. Braver puts a heavy focus on questions surrounding whether or not Heidegger undermines a metaphysically anti-realist position through his statements on authenticity. I will address the normative concerns about authenticity rather than any metaphysical concerns about authenticity.¹

¹ I will address Braver at some points in this thesis, but when I do so it will be because the relevant claims are normative in nature rather than metaphysical or when his metaphysical claims impact the normative aspects of authenticity. I believe that Braver makes a number of comments that showcase a subjectivist perspective on this topic, which will be where I focus my response.

My goal in this thesis will be to show that Heidegger does not undermine his commitments to Dasein as being-in-the-world through his discussion of authenticity. In order to do this, I need to lay out some groundwork. This first chapter of this thesis will accomplish a few goals. First, I will explain the basic agreed-upon Heideggerian concepts that will allow for the discussion of which interpretation of authenticity should be accepted. Second, I will outline the overall structure of the thesis to give a clearer idea of my strategy. Finally, I will explain the interpretation from the secondary literature, which I will call the subjectivist account of authenticity. This subjectivist account is supported by Hubert Dreyfus, Michael Zimmerman, and Lee Braver. Understanding the subjectivist account will allow me to show that the subjectivist account is flawed. It also will serve as the basis to begin fleshing out what an intersubjective account of authenticity looks like. Having an exact picture of what intersubjective authenticity looks like will help show that this account is completely compatible with both what Heidegger said and what his project is attempting to accomplish.

1.1 Introductory Concepts

Now to begin with I will define the terminology that informs the debate that this thesis is centered around. First, Dasein is Heidegger's ontological concept for the human condition.² Dasein is born with a particular socio-historical and cultural context, which it cannot be separated from. Along these lines, the "world" for Heidegger includes both.³ This understanding of world as being socio-historical and cultural informs Heidegger's conception of Dasein as being-in-the-world, as Dasein is connected to the socio-historical and cultural conditions that it is the cultural and socio-historical forces that exert their influence on Dasein, as well as the resulting dynamics that emerge as Dasein engages with and responds to these contextual

² Heidegger, Martin. *Being and Time*. (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2010) 7.

³ Heidegger 65

pressures its born into.⁴ Heidegger's understanding of Dasein as being-in-the-world is meant to make Dasein inseparable from the world, even in language. In doing this, he opposes the Cartesian concept of a self that can uncover knowledge about itself or the world in a vacuum separate from the world through solipsistic doubt.

Heidegger's understanding of the world is tied to *das Man*. The socio-historical factors, and the ways in which these factors influence Dasein's life, make up *das Man* for Heidegger. *Das Man* determines Dasein's everyday structures that dictate meanings, values, and norms. When I reference the structural force of *das Man* throughout this thesis, I am referencing these elements of *das Man*. Additionally, *Das Man* is what presents Dasein with its possibilities. In addition to these more-deeply rooted elements of *das Man*, *das Man* also informs a typical everyday way of understanding the world.⁵ Heidegger believes that in this typical everyday mode of being *das Man* conceals elements of the world to Dasein. One example of this concealment arises is idle talk. Heidegger describes idle talk as an ambiguous manner of talking where people discuss in a socially normative way that does not really communicate any significant information.⁶ This allows for a concealment of the world to Dasein through how *das Man* acts in its everyday mode of being.

Beyond *das Man* specifically, Heidegger discusses being-in-the-world as having a tripartite structure. Heidegger says that Dasein has thrownness, projection, and fallenness. Thrownness is the condition of Dasein's being born into the world with pre-existing circumstances, attributes, and constraints that it did not actively choose. It emphasizes the idea that Dasein's initial encounter with the world is shaped by factors beyond its control.

Thrownness is tied to Dasein's past, as it describes the conditions Dasein is born into the world

⁴ Heidegger 53

⁵ Heidegger 123

⁶ Heidegger 159

with.⁷ Projection is Dasein's fundamental and inherent orientation toward possibilities and potentialities, encompassing both reflective and pre-reflective aspects of anticipation. It influences both one's perception of the world and one's choices and actions. Projection is tied to Dasein's future, as it focuses on Dasein's future possibilities and how Dasein engages with them.⁸ Fallenness/Discourse connect with the way Dasein engages with its present. I will explore these two concepts in less detail, as they are contentious in ways that are not relevant to this debate.⁹ Fallenness refers to the fact that Dasein has a way in which it typically falls into a pattern of behavior.¹⁰ For Heidegger, discourse is described as the articulating of intelligibility, but this point is a bit murky.¹¹ The important idea to understand for this project is that discourse/fallenness inform how Dasein engages with its present. More detail on how Dasein engages with its present will be explored in chapter 5. These are the three ecstasies as presented by Heidegger, which offer Dasein's general structuring.

Now that I have laid out the way in which Dasein is structured, I will discuss the concepts of authenticity and inauthenticity. Inauthenticity is the way that Dasein expresses itself most of the time. It is a mode of being characterized by Dasein falling into an everyday set of routines and patterns without honestly engaging with the conditions of the world. It is characterized by avoidant tendencies, which allow Dasein to not face conditions of its existence like finitude.¹² Everything I have discussed thus far would seem to indicate that Heidegger has an intersubjective leaning, as there has been heavy emphasis on the connection between Dasein and

⁷ Heidegger 131-132

⁸ Heidegger 141

⁹ There are some who believe Discourse is the authentic mode of fallenness, while others believe that discourse has both authentic and inauthentic modes. These concepts are contentious, but not in ways that are relevant to the debate that this thesis is centered around.

¹⁰ Heidegger 169

¹¹ Heidegger 155

¹² Heidegger 42

the world. Much of this content comes from Division I of *Being and Time*, which is widely read as supporting an intersubjective account. In contrast to what is said in Division I, many scholars contend that it is in Heidegger's account of authenticity in Division II that a clear subjectivist strain comes into his work. "Subjectivist" in this context refers to the idea of being oriented around a particular subject, which differs from Heidegger's initial portrayal of being-in-the-world, which emphasizes Dasein's interconnectedness. Denis McManus stated the concern well when he said that "Division Two is often seen as committed to notions of identity and selfhood that we have learned – partly by reading Division One – to abandon."¹³ This general backdrop for the debate should be kept in mind as I start to explain the concepts surrounding authenticity in Heidegger. Now, the meaning of much of what is said about authenticity is the point under contention in this thesis, but I will attempt to lay out the basics for understanding the subject in a neutral manner so the framework for the debate can be understood.

The first concept to understand when discussing authenticity is angst. Angst is the initial process Dasein goes through where it begins to face what it would mean to be authentic. It is characterized by Dasein beginning to face the conditions of its existence. Angst arises first on the path to authenticity.¹⁴ Anticipatory resoluteness is the second part. Heidegger combines two concepts into one cohesive whole, those concepts being anticipation and resoluteness: anticipation refers to looking forward at one's possibilities, including one's own death which is when Dasein ceases to have possibilities, while resoluteness refers to a determinedness to face one's possibilities. Together, they refer to determinedly looking forward and facing the possibilities offered to us.¹⁵ Lastly, there is the call of conscience. This is one of the more

¹³ McManus, Denis. *Heidegger, Authenticity and the Self: Themes from Division Two of Being and Time*. (New York, NY: Taylor and Francis, 2014) 1.

¹⁴ Heidegger 181

¹⁵ Heidegger 290

nonintuitive parts of authenticity to explain. The reason I say that is that, according to Heidegger, the call of conscience is silent, but it is nonetheless a summons to Dasein to confront the facts of its existence.¹⁶ This concept will be explored in more detail in chapter five, as most of the contention surrounding authenticity concerns anticipatory resoluteness and angst, so my focus earlier in the thesis will be on those concepts. As I mentioned earlier, each of these are relevant to a different structure of Dasein through a different temporal dimension, since they all involve confronting the facts of Dasein's existence, but the manner in which it is done varies depending on the temporal dimension. Now that I have given the basic groundwork for the debate about what interpretation of authenticity should be accepted, I will lay out the general structure of this thesis.

1.2 Outlining the Thesis

Now I will outline what this thesis will outline chapter by chapter, starting with the second which will explain why the subjectivist interpretation is flawed. This will involve going over how concepts like angst, anticipatory resoluteness, and the call of conscience cannot be accurately interpreted by the subjectivist account. The main claim will be that the language that appears to support a subjectivist account is better understood as being tied to conditions of the world. There are many instances where Heidegger uses a term like individualize to describe authenticity, but I will argue this phrase can be misleading, as Heidegger repeatedly emphasizes how Dasein is individualized in a sense that connects it to the world.¹⁷ Additionally, there is discussion of *das Man* being wrenched away, but I will argue that this is only true in a qualified sense. There are certain illusions offered by *das Man* in its everyday mode of being that Dasein is wrenched away from, but as I will argue this does not change anything about the structures of

¹⁶ Heidegger 259

¹⁷ A few examples of this are: Heidegger 182, 184, 252, and 253.

meaning offered by *das Man*. In addition to these linguistic issues, there is also a view that authenticity introduces a voluntarist strand that amounts to subjectivism. I will argue that this view also goes against the clear trend in the text of *Being and Time* where Heidegger tries to explain how authenticity is about connecting us to the world, rather than standing above it. This is a brief overview, but this should give a general idea of what I am attempting to accomplish in chapter two. When I get to chapter 2, I will expound upon these points in greater detail.

In order to explain what I ultimately hope to show with this project I will give a general overview of my understanding of authenticity here. My primary goal in this thesis will be to justify this understanding of authenticity. The first topic to discuss is angst, which is when Dasein first begins to become aware of its finitude. This is how Dasein comes to understand the limitations that it is placed under because of its finitude, but also how it is falsely constrained by the illusions of *das Man*. The limitations concern the fact that Dasein is constrained by its being thrown into finite circumstances and always having to choose one possibility or another; the finite nature of Dasein's world restricts it in this way. When Heidegger references the illusions of *das Man*, he is referring to ideas like idle talk or how *das Man* frames death. Escaping the illusions of *das Man* would allow Dasein to separate itself from *das Man* in some sense, while maintaining the structures of meaning offered by *das Man*. This model of angst impacts Dasein's understanding of both its death and the possibilities offered to it, as it comes to understand the finite and particular situation that it is thrown into. This is how Dasein comes to understand its facticity. In angst, Dasein understands the conditions of its existence, which then leads it to face its future.

Authentic Dasein faces its future with anticipatory resoluteness. Now that Dasein has an understanding of the possibilities offered to it outside of the way that the illusions of *das Man*

restrict it, Dasein has the ability to face these possibilities in a head on manner. Now that Dasein understands its facticity, it has a fuller understanding of what possibilities are actually available to it. This is to say that Dasein is able to ready itself to face its possibilities in a head on manner with the understanding of how its facticity informs its possibilities. This includes the possibility of its death, which is one that Heidegger gives special attention to, as it is Dasein's ownmost possibility. The openness offered from anticipatory resoluteness allows Dasein to hear the call of conscience. This is how authentic Dasein engages with its future.

Heidegger's discussion of the call of conscience introduces a large amount of terminology that can be difficult to parse, but the basic idea is that the call of conscience brings forward the idea that Dasein is guilty, in the Heideggerian sense. Guilty in the Heideggerian sense means that it is constantly choosing specific possibilities and nullifying others. Additionally, Dasein has always already made certain choices, which informs and limits the choices Dasein can currently make. This is inevitable given that Dasein essentially projects and is thrown. Dasein can only heed the call of conscience once the illusions of *das Man* are silenced, which is why the call of conscience is silent. The call can only be heeded once Dasein has separated itself from the typical everyday way of understanding the world, because this everyday way of understanding the world conceals how and why Dasein chooses what it does. Once Dasein is free of the illusions of *das Man* it can face the fact that it is guilty in a head on manner, which is the effect of the call of conscience when Dasein is authentic. This gives a brief sense of these concepts, but they will be explored in more depth throughout the thesis.

In the most basic terms, authenticity is Dasein escaping the illusions of *das Man* to face the facts of its existence in a head-on manner. Escaping the illusions of *das Man* does not mean stripping away the structures of meaning that are offered by *das Man*, but rather escaping the

typical everyday mode of understanding the world as presented by *das Man*. Dasein's possibilities are inherently tied to *das Man*, so a process oriented around Dasein coming to terms with the facts of its existence (including what possibilities are offered to it) can not be one in which Dasein is actually being separated from the world. Heidegger regularly emphasizes that these processes maintain Dasein's nature as being-in-the-world, which is part of what I will attempt to establish here. This is a very brief overview of my position on authenticity, which I will attempt to justify in this thesis. These different aspects will be explored in chapters three, four, and five. This all will allow me to give a full account of what intersubjective authenticity would look like, which I believe has been missing from previous discussions of the subject, even from scholars who hold similar positions to mine.¹⁸ I will additionally showcase that intersubjective authenticity is completely compatible with Heidegger's work in *Being and Time*. Finally, chapter six is the conclusion, which will summarize the findings of this project. There I aim to showcase how my main goals have been accomplished.

Overall, my main goal will be to establish an understanding of authenticity that focuses on Dasein's connection to the world rather than on severing that connection. For instance, the fact that Dasein is a finite being with a finite number of possibilities given to it is a fact about the world it exists in. Dasein has a tendency to avoid these facts through everyday routines and idle talk, but they are always lurking beneath the surface. The way I understand authenticity is that it is about facing these facts of its world head on without its natural avoidant tendencies. If authenticity is about honestly engaging with the facts of the world that Dasein is born into, then

¹⁸ There are figures who have written about authenticity that have accounts which are roughly similar to mine, most prominently Charles Guignon, though it is hard to know if we agree on the specifics of what this view would entail. The reason I say this is from what I have seen these figures lack a complete account of what intersubjective authenticity would look like. In contrast, figures like Hubert Dreyfus or Michael Zimmerman have very robust accounts of subjectivist authenticity. This greater picture of intersubjective authenticity is part of what I aim to accomplish in this project.

it is hard for me to see why this would introduce the problems that the subjectivist account believes exist in Heidegger's account of authenticity. No part of this understanding would introduce a "true self" that has to be uncovered, or involve severing a connection to the world. This would just involve changing how Dasein engages with the world, which is perfectly compatible with Dasein as being-in-the-world. There are many more complexities to Heidegger's understanding of authenticity, which I will explain throughout this thesis, but my goal will be to establish that an interpretation of authenticity like this should be the one that is adopted.

1.3 Introducing the Subjectivist Account

The concern of the subjectivist account is that authenticity produces a particularized subject that loses its connection to the world in the process. More specifically, the primary concerns amongst scholars generally arise with the concepts of angst and anticipatory resoluteness, which both Hubert Dreyfus and Michael Zimmerman view as creating problems for Heidegger's intersubjective account of Dasein. The fact that these concepts are the most contentious makes sense as it is the main place where Heidegger uses much of the language that sounds like it would involve separating Dasein from the world. They are also in the second division of *Being and Time*, which is much messier and more contentious than the first division. I will discuss the complaints brought forward by Dreyfus and Zimmerman to showcase the subjectivist account. Additionally, I will discuss Lee Braver's perspective. I will focus on the fact that Braver believes that authenticity is about uncovering a true self covered by the world and avoid the other metaphysical questions that Braver is focused on. Braver ties these concerns to angst, but his angle of critique is slightly different than someone like Dreyfus'. Analyzing each of these figures' views will give a sense of what the subjectivist understanding of authenticity looks like.

Hubert Dreyfus is mostly concerned with angst undermining Heidegger's project. According to Dreyfus, angst leaves Dasein "totally without a world and unable to act." Additionally, angst reveals "the truth about Dasein's nothingness and meaninglessness."¹⁹ He believes there are quotes from Heidegger to support this, which will be explored in more detail later, but this sort of description indicates a separation from *das Man*, as *das Man* is the source of meaning for Dasein. Dreyfus also ties angst to this lack of meaning when he says that "the anxious Dasein can still see that there is a whole system of roles and equipment that can be used by anyone, but, just for that very reason, this system has no essential relation to it."²⁰ This is Dreyfus' reason to support a claim like this, but it further shows that Dreyfus believes that the structures of meaning offered by *das Man* are stripped away through angst.

If Dasein is "totally without a world" within angst, then Dasein no longer seems to be a being-in-the-world; at least not while it experiences angst. If angst reveals the nothingness and meaninglessness of Dasein, then this seems to be proof of Dasein losing its structures of meaning in angst. Dreyfus' interpretation of angst goes as far as to say that "all differentiations are revealed... to be totally indifferent, and so all equally meaningless,"²¹ which would showcase a strong separation from *das Man*, as the structures of value from *das Man* would be completely lost when in angst. This would not just mean some separation, but that traditional structures of meaning are completely stripped away in angst. This understanding of angst would be an issue for Heidegger's project, because the stronger the separation from *das Man*, the more of a problem for Heidegger's project there is because of his commitment to Dasein being understood as being-in-the-world.

¹⁹ Dreyfus, Hubert L. *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I*. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991) 194 & 334.

²⁰ Dreyfus 180

²¹ Dreyfus 331

Michael Zimmerman has some overlapping concerns. For example, Zimmerman describes angst as “disclos[ing] one’s own death [which] individualizes Dasein and tears it away from the soothing clutches of [*das Man*].”²² However, Zimmerman generally puts more focus on anticipatory resoluteness being the point of concern. Zimmerman centers his concerns around voluntarism, which is not a term he explicitly defines, but that seems to be referring to the strength of Dasein’s will. The idea being that if *Being and Time* has this voluntarist strand, then it contains content that views Dasein as standing above the forces of the world through its strength of will. Zimmerman explicitly endorses a voluntarist reading of *Being and Time* when he writes that, “*Being and Time* uses voluntaristic language to describe Dasein’s resolve to disclose its own mortality.”²³ This shows that Zimmerman endorses a subjectivist account of authenticity, because of his voluntarist reading of *Being and Time*. Now I will explore his justification for this belief in more detail.

Zimmerman says, “the voluntaristic or willful strain in resoluteness appears in the idea of “wanting-to-have-a-conscience” (Gewissenhabenwollen). Such voluntarism is characteristic of the subjectivism which Heidegger hoped to transcend.”²⁴ Zimmerman does not explicitly say what about “wanting-to-have-a-conscience” introduces subjectivism, but I believe that he is concerned with the idea that this involves a courageous overcoming of the circumstances from the world.²⁵ I believe when he refers to this idea of a willful strain, or voluntarism, he is talking

²² Zimmerman, Michael E. “A Comparison of Nietzsche’s Overman and Heidegger’s Authentic Self.” *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 14, no. 2 (1976) 220.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1976.tb01280.x>.

²³ Zimmerman, Michael E. *Eclipse of the Self: The Development of Heidegger’s Concept of Authenticity*. (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1986) 41.

²⁴ Zimmerman 76

²⁵ Switching between the language of voluntarism and subjectivism should be fine here, as Zimmerman explicitly says that voluntarism is a form of subjectivism and that Heidegger later became aware of this fact. He says, “Heidegger had still not [yet] adequately dealt with the fact that voluntarism, too, is a kind of subjectivism. For several years he continued to maintain that courageous resoluteness is a necessary element in any new disclosure of Being” (Zimmerman

about situations where someone's will allows them to overcome the circumstances of their history or culture to be resolute. The reason I say this is he seems to tie these points together in other quotes. Zimmerman says that "Heidegger had still not [yet] adequately dealt with the fact that voluntarism, too, is a kind of subjectivism. For several years he continued to maintain that courageous resoluteness is a necessary element in any new disclosure of Being."²⁶ In addition to this, he says elsewhere that "at times Heidegger seems to say that if Dasein wills courageously enough, the truth will be revealed."²⁷ If anticipatory resoluteness creates a form of voluntarism that allows Dasein to separate itself from the restraints of culture and history to face the conditions of its world this would create a problem for Heidegger, as Dasein is meant to be inseparable from its world.²⁸

To demonstrate why these two hold this view of authenticity, I think it is important to pull out some quotes from *Being and Time* that are likely what lead them to take a subjectivist interpretation of these concepts. In the case of angst, I believe that quotes like the following are what are generally being referenced by Zimmerman and Dreyfus. Heidegger describes angst by saying that "the totality of relevance discovered within the world of things at hand and

XXI). Voluntarism and subjectivism are different concepts, but in this context the concerns largely overlap for both, so strictly delineating between them is not important.

²⁶ Zimmerman XXI

²⁷ Zimmerman 41

²⁸ This is not necessarily relevant to Zimmerman's main argument about *Being and Time*, but I find it curious that Zimmerman ties Heidegger's views on resoluteness to his involvement with the Nazis. Zimmerman says, "In Chapter Six I contend that Heidegger began to minimize the voluntaristic aspect of authenticity partly because he recognized the hubris he displayed in supposing that—by his own resoluteness—he could influence the direction of National Socialism, which he supported in 1933-34" (XXIV). The connection between Heidegger's political views and resoluteness would give further motivation to Zimmerman's view. Without diving too deeply into this issue, I do not see an obvious reason why such a connection should be drawn. However, I consider this largely a moot point as I believe his interpretation of resoluteness is wrong in such a way that it will not be relevant to argue on this particular point. I note this mostly because I think it could be seen as a potentially motivating factor for Zimmerman's view and I found it slightly odd, but addressing this point in too much detail would take me well outside of the scope of this thesis.

objectively present is completely without importance. It collapses into itself. The world has the character of complete insignificance.”²⁹ This seems to discuss the structures of the world being drained away. Additionally, Heidegger says that “[angst] individualizes and thus discloses Dasein as ‘solus ipse.’”³⁰ It is worth saying that Heidegger says that he does not view this existential solipsism as putting Dasein into a worldless vacuum, but still, Heidegger’s description of Dasein being individualized and facing an existential solipsism could lead to some subjectivism being injected even if Heidegger meant to avoid it. Heidegger often uses language like individualize to describe what happens in angst, which is strange if he means for being-in-the-world to maintain through angst. In terms of anticipatory resoluteness, Heidegger says, “resoluteness means letting oneself be summoned out of one’s lostness in [*das Man*].”³¹ Quotes like this seem to indicate that resoluteness is about overcoming *das Man* to face the conditions of existence, which would involve separating from *das Man* to some degree. Given that *das Man* is part of Dasein’s world, they cannot be separated, which makes the idea that Dasein could pull itself away from *das Man* problematic. This offers some textual backing for this account, which explains why many scholars believe that authenticity introduces some kind of subjectivism in either angst or anticipatory resoluteness.

I briefly mentioned Lee Braver earlier, and while his focus is somewhat different than these other two, I do believe that he is also in favor of a subjectivist understanding of authenticity.³² Braver believes that what happens through authenticity is that a real or true version of Dasein is uncovered, through authenticity. Braver references quotes from Heidegger when he says that “once the covering content has drained away, we can grasp what we are and become it

²⁹ Heidegger 180.

³⁰ Heidegger 182

³¹ Heidegger 286

³² One reason to believe this is that he explicitly disagrees with Charles Guignon’s understanding of authenticity, which seems to be an intersubjective account of authenticity. Braver 212

resolutely, that is, with excellence.”³³ This understanding of authenticity aligns with a relatively traditional understanding of the concept of authenticity, as it would center around showing one’s true self. Braver makes this point explicit when he says, “Unfortunately, his fidelity to a deep, true structure of the self in authenticity compromises the potential of these discoveries in his early work.” He also describes the distinction as a “true Dasein/superficial one-self distinction.”³⁴ This all indicates that there is some real subject buried in the world that is uncovered by becoming authentic.

To support this perspective Braver writes that while “drained of content, since during these times our roles have no meaning and do not involve us, we have nothing but the formal structure of our existence or pure Dasein to cling to: ‘[Angst] leaves us hanging because it induces the slipping away of beings as a whole. . . . Where there is nothing to hold onto, pure Da-sein is all that is still there.’”³⁵ The quote Braver cites here comes from another early Heidegger work, but there are quotes with weaker language that parallel this one in *Being and Time*. For instance, Heidegger says, “The totality of relevance discovered within the world of things at hand and objectively present is completely without importance. It collapses into itself. The world has the character of complete insignificance.”³⁶ If what happens during authenticity is that structures of the world get drained away and a true Dasein is revealed, then this would be a problem for Heidegger, as the world and Dasein could sever their connection given the right circumstances. Braver does note that Heidegger seems to at points endorse an intersubjective understanding of authenticity; as Braver says, “This interpretation of the self as completely defined by societal structures would be... the complete immersion of the self into the world

³³ Braver, Lee, *A Thing of This World: A History of Continental Anti-Realism*. (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 220.

³⁴ Braver 221

³⁵ Braver 220

³⁶ Heidegger 180

without remainder.”³⁷ However, he says that “Heidegger does not maintain this position in his early work.”³⁸ So while Heidegger may seem to endorse an intersubjective account of authenticity at points, according to Braver, early Heidegger ultimately undermines his intersubjective position.

One way of tying this all together into a full account of authenticity would look something like the following. Dasein begins by facing its finitude in angst and through this process the structures of the world begin to strip away allowing an authentic subject to begin emerging. Dasein through its resolute force of will faces the facts about its existence head on. Once this has happened Dasein can begin to hear the call of conscience as Dasein has emerged from its fallen nature and now has the language in discourse to hear its call. This is roughly the subjectivist picture. This is a strongly put version of the subjectivist account, as some may say that the ways in which the separation between the Dasein and the world occurs is more minute. Additionally, not all subjectivist authors would accept all aspects of this. Some scholars just emphasize one aspect of authenticity creating problems, as opposed to all of them. However, put together they form an account that looks something like this, and this general type of view is the one I will be objecting to throughout this thesis. Additionally, all three authors I discuss view this as a problem for Heidegger in some way or another. Now that the subjectivist account has been made clear, I will begin to address why I believe this account ultimately fails to properly account for what Heidegger said in *Being and Time*.

³⁷ Braver 212

³⁸ Braver 212

Chapter II

Addressing the Subjectivist Account

In this chapter, my main goal will be to establish that a subjectivist interpretation of authenticity is incompatible with what Heidegger says in *Being and Time*. In order to do this, I will go over each of the subjectivist complaints that I brought up in Section 1.3. The first concern that I will discuss is from Braver who believes that authenticity is a process in which an authentic self emerges as the structures of the world are taken away. The second complaint I will address has a number of overlapping issues. One version of this complaint is brought forward by Dreyfus who believes that Dasein loses its structures of meaning and value given to it by *das Man* in angst. Alongside this, I will address Braver's concern that there is a stripping away of the world in angst. In addition to that, I will address a specific form of this complaint that Braver discusses which focuses on the wrenching away of *das Man* from Dasein. Lastly, I will discuss the concern from Zimmerman that anticipatory resoluteness introduces voluntarism, which ultimately is a form of subjectivism. I will attempt to address these criticisms without saying anything about why I endorse an intersubjective account. This chapter is only attempting to establish that a subjectivist account cannot be correct. After all, it could still be that what Heidegger said was just self-contradictory in some way, even if a subjectivist reading is not correct. In this chapter, I am simply attempting to establish that based on what Heidegger says in *Being and Time* a subjectivist account cannot be correct.

2.1 Addressing the Individuation of Dasein

First, I will address one aspect of Braver's concern. In order to contextualize this concern a bit, I want to note that Braver does seem to acknowledge competing interpretations of authenticity that emphasize the same evidence as I plan to. Braver quotes Charles Guignon as saying: "Far from being an autonomous and isolated subject, the self is pictured as the 'Anyone' (das Man), a 'crossing point' of cultural systems unfolding through history. To be human, in Heidegger's view, is to be a place-holder in a network of internal relations, constituted by a public language, of the communal world into which Dasein is thrown."³⁹ However, Braver says that Heidegger fails to be consistent in this position in his early work. Braver says, "This interpretation of the self as completely defined by societal structures would [amount to] the complete immersion of the self into the world without remainder... However, Heidegger does not maintain this position in his early work."⁴⁰ This shows how Braver understands the reasoning for an intersubjective account of authenticity, but ultimately feels that the account is undermined by early Heidegger. Braver seems to be of the mindset that Heidegger is somewhat inconsistent on authenticity in his early work.

Braver ultimately believes that Heidegger attempts to account for authenticity in an intersubjective manner, but fails to maintain this intersubjective position. Braver, for example, writes that "once the covering content has drained away, we can grasp what we are and become it resolutely, that is, with excellence."⁴¹ He also frames authentic Dasein as true Dasein as opposed to the superficial Man-self.⁴² Braver does note that this process only temporarily removes Dasein

³⁹ Braver 212

⁴⁰ Braver 212

⁴¹ Braver 220

⁴² It is worth noting that I believe that Heidegger would disagree with the idea that authenticity is about a true version of Dasein emerging, but I will say more on this in later chapters. For present purposes, it is enough to show that the way in which Braver imagines this true self emerging cannot be correct.

from the world on his account, as he says “Now it is very important that... even when it has achieved authenticity Dasein has nowhere else to go but back to society, the world, and das Man (roughly the average inherited background intelligibility of society) for the content to live a life and be a self.”⁴³ This, however, does not change the overarching concern of Braver, which is that the process of authenticity separates Dasein from the world to uncover its true self. I will start addressing Braver by addressing this concern that angst leads to the emergence of a world-independent subject.

I will first show that this interpretation of angst cannot be correct by looking at what Heidegger said in the text. Heidegger writes that “[angst] individualizes and thus discloses Dasein as *solus ipse*. This existential solipsism, however, is so far from transposing an isolated subject-thing into the harmless vacuum of a worldless occurrence that it brings Dasein in an extreme sense precisely before its world as world, and thus itself before itself as being-in-the-world.”⁴⁴ Additionally, he says that “Dasein is individuated, but *as* being-in-the-world.”⁴⁵ On the one hand, it is easy to see how these quotes could lead someone to endorse a subjectivist reading. For instance, it is nonintuitive to describe a process that connects you to the world as individualizing or as inducing an existential solipsism. On the other hand, in cases where language like this is used Heidegger attempts to make clear that he believes that this individuation actually connects us to the forces of the world. Regardless of how we understand what Heidegger is saying, it is clear that he cannot mean the process is stripping away the world to allow a subject to emerge, as he is clear that Dasein is more connected to the world in authenticity. That is to say that Heidegger clearly sees authenticity as deepening our connection to the world, even when he uses terms that appear to support a subjectivist reading. For instance,

⁴³ Braver 219

⁴⁴ Heidegger 182

⁴⁵ Heidegger 182-183

when Heidegger uses the terms like individuate he makes it clear that this individuation should not be understood as creating an isolated subject in a wordless vacuum which he emphasizes by claiming that this process individuates Dasein *as* being-in-the-world. These quotes still require further analysis, as it is still up for debate what Heidegger means when he uses terms like individuate or individualize, but it should be clear that he does not mean that a world-independent subject emerges. In nearly every instance that Heidegger used terminology like this he makes sure to emphasize that Dasein remains as being-in-the-world. I quoted him doing this twice above, but there are far more examples. For example, Heidegger writes, “[Angst] individuates Dasein to its ownmost being-in-the-world which, as understanding, projects itself essentially upon possibilities”⁴⁶ and he also writes that “as the nonrelational possibility, death individualizes, but only, as the insuperable possibility, in order to make Dasein as being-with understand the potentialities-of-being of others.”⁴⁷ Heidegger likely emphasizes how individuation or individualizing connects us to the world is likely because he is aware that the language he chose to use could be misinterpreted as supporting subjectivism, so he attempts to caveat out those concerns. There are other passages that need to be addressed to fully rule out a stripping away of the world, but this concern that a world-independent subject is the end of authenticity cannot be correct.

Now I will specifically address the concern from Braver that the world, rather than others or society, gets stripped away through angst. Dreyfus has effectively the same concern as well, so it is not just Braver’s view that this is a problem. The general concern was put well by Dreyfus when he said that angst leaves Dasein “totally without a world and unable to act.”⁴⁸ Braver says something similar when he writes that “drained of content, since during these times our roles

⁴⁶ Heidegger 182

⁴⁷ Heidegger 253

⁴⁸ Dreyfus 194

have no meaning and do not involve us, we have nothing but the formal structure of our existence or pure Dasein to cling to.”⁴⁹ These concerns center around the idea that the structures of Dasein’s world are stripped away through angst. Braver is not the only one with a concern like this. Dreyfus has effectively the same concern surrounding this issue.

This concern arises in large part because of quotes from Heidegger like this: “The totality of relevance discovered within the world of things at hand and objectively present is completely without importance. It collapses into itself. The world has the character of complete insignificance.”⁵⁰ There is a reading of this, which would seem to indicate that *Dasein* loses the structures of the world given to it by *das Man*, as the world loses the meaning and significance imbued to it in that way. This reading would seem to show that *Dasein* is severing its connection to the world through angst. The problem with many quotes like the one above is that if you look at the surrounding text Heidegger clarifies that this is not what he means. For instance, Heidegger says on the next page that “the utter insignificance which makes itself known in the nothing and nowhere does not signify the absence of world, but means that innerworldly beings in themselves are so completely unimportant that, on the basis of this insignificance of what is innerworldly, the world in its worldliness is all that obtrudes itself.”⁵¹ Based on this, it should be clear that the world is not stripped away when Heidegger says the world is all that obtrudes itself. This should make it clear that Heidegger cannot mean that the world is absent in authenticity, as Heidegger seems to tie the insignificance to the world obtruding, rather than stripping the structures of meaning from Dasein.

One potential response to this concern is that Heidegger may be attempting to fight the subjectivist account of authenticity, but that he ultimately undermines this effort somewhere else

⁴⁹ Braver 220

⁵⁰ Heidegger 180

⁵¹ Heidegger 181

in the text. Braver says something like this explicitly as referenced previously when he said, “This interpretation of the self as completely defined by societal structures would [amount to] the complete immersion of the self into the world without remainder... However, Heidegger does not maintain this position in his early work.”⁵² The idea being that while Heidegger may attempt to move towards an intersubjective account of authenticity he ultimately undermines this point. This cannot be what Heidegger means, however, given the qualifications he makes in the passages I quoted above⁵³ This should address another concern brought forth by Braver, though there is still one concern of Braver’s I believe it is important to address.

I want to address the further concern from Braver about anticipation wrenching us from the clutches of *das Man*. Braver quotes Heidegger as saying:

“In the anticipatory revealing of this potentiality-for-Being, Dasein discloses itself in the Being of the entity so revealed—namely, to exist. Anticipation turns out to be the possibility of understanding one’s ownmost and uttermost potentiality-for-Being—that is to say, the possibility of authentic existence. The ontological constitution of such existence must be made visible by setting forth the concrete structure of anticipation of death. . . . Here it can become manifest to Dasein that in this distinctive possibility of its own self, it has been wrenched away from [*das Man*]”⁵⁴

Here Heidegger clearly seems to say that Dasein is wrenched away from *das Man*. If *das Man* is what gives Dasein its structures of meaning and the possibilities afforded to it, then it is unclear how Dasein could be wrenched away from it and not have the structures of its world stripped away. Heidegger, however, also addresses the concerns brought forth with this quote, albeit in a more indirect manner than the other quotes I reference above. Later in this same chapter Heidegger claims that “as the nonrelational possibility, death individualizes, but only, as the insuperable possibility, in order to make Dasein as being-with understand the

⁵² Braver 212

⁵³ For quick reference, those quotes were: Heidegger 182, 182-183, 182, 253, and 181

⁵⁴ Braver 219

potentialities-of-being of others."⁵⁵ Here Heidegger seems to emphasize that death individualizes us in some sense, but that sense Dasein is still being-with, which emphasizes the social embeddedness of Dasein. This makes this passage challenging to parse as he describes *das Man* being wrenched away, but in the same section he is still emphasizing Dasein's social embeddedness.

How then do we parse these quotes? It is important to note that the concern here should specifically be that the structures of meaning given to Dasein by *das Man* are taken away through authenticity, not just any activity of *das Man*, as not all activities of *das Man* are relevant to Dasein's connection to the world. Given this, Heidegger gives reason to think that in the wrenching away of *das Man* he is not referring to the structures of meaning given to Dasein or anything like that. He is more specific than that later in this same chapter. In giving his findings about being-toward-death, Heidegger says, "What is characteristic about authentic, existentially projected being-toward-death can thus be summarized as follows: *anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the Man-self, and brings it face to face with the possibility to be itself, primarily unsupported by concern that takes care, but to be itself in the passionate anxious freedom toward death, which is free of the illusions of [das Man], factual, and certain of itself.*"⁵⁶ Here Heidegger is more specific that Dasein is free of the illusions of *das Man*, rather than generally wrenched away from it. This should be less controversial, as Dasein can obviously be freed of activities like idle talk, which are methods to avoid facing reality that arise from *das Man*. Braver presumably is not concerned with the idea that Dasein can be freed from the illusions of *das Man*, but rather is concerned that the structural force of *das Man* is removed.

⁵⁵ Heidegger 253

⁵⁶ Heidegger 255

Based on what Heidegger says here, there is no reason to believe that the structural force is taken away, especially because Heidegger still attempts to emphasize Dasein's interconnectedness in this same section. Again, more needs to be addressed with these quotes, but this should show that the *das Man* is not wrenched away in the sense that would be relevant for the subjectivists, as the structures of meaning and the world can maintain while Dasein is wrenched away from the escapist tendencies of *das Man*. The idea is that Dasein changes how it is involved with these meaning-making structures, not that these structures go away in authenticity. There is nothing about avoiding a typical everyday pattern of escapist tendencies that would undermine Dasein's connection to its meaning-making structures given to it by the world. This is why Dasein is not wrenched away from *das Man* in a sense that entails a subjectivist account of authenticity in *Being and Time*.

This should offer a solution to the various concerns related to either the emergence of a subject or the stripping away of the world. While Heidegger often uses language that is odd for someone attempting to avoid an individual subject without a world, he does try and make it clear that this odd language should not be read as him endorsing anything like subjectivism. It would not make sense for Heidegger to emphasize our connection to the world over and over again when discussing authenticity, if he meant for the process to take the world away from Dasein. At minimum, his insistence on authenticity connecting us to the world requires an explanation, which cannot be given by a subjectivist account. The most that could be said is that Heidegger contradicts himself in his descriptions here, not that he is positively endorsing either the emergence of a world-independent subject or the stripping away of the world from Dasein. I will in the coming chapters make the case that what Heidegger says is comprehensible, but for now

this resolves one of the two major categories of criticism brought forward by the subjectivist writers.

2.2 The Voluntarist Strand in Anticipatory Resoluteness

Now, I will address the concern brought forth by Zimmerman that anticipatory resoluteness introduces a form of voluntarism that amounts to subjectivism. Given Zimmerman's understanding of voluntarism, I believe that he is correct to say that if Heidegger introduced this type of voluntarism, it would amount to a form of subjectivism.⁵⁷ As Zimmerman said, "at times Heidegger seems to say that if Dasein wills courageously enough, the truth will be revealed."⁵⁸ If Dasein has a will so strong that it allows Dasein to stand independently against the forces of the world to reveal the truth, then Dasein is not necessarily interconnected with the world, as it can stand above the pressures from the world. Dasein would have the capacity to overcome the structures of the world to do as it desires, which is clearly a form of subjectivism. However, I still take issue with what Zimmerman says, as I do not believe that Heidegger introduces voluntarism in Zimmerman's sense anywhere in *Being and Time*. In fact, I read him as being directly opposed to this idea in a number of places.

To begin, it is also worth saying here that Heidegger clearly views anticipatory resoluteness as something connecting us to the world. He says, "As *authentic being a self*, resoluteness does not detach Dasein from its world, nor does it isolate it as free floating ego. How could it, if resoluteness as authentic disclosedness is, after all, nothing other than

⁵⁷ What we are discussing with voluntarism is a specific level of control over Dasein's will. There are also interesting discussions to be had about what degree of control would constitute subjectivism. I do not plan to discuss this problem in detail, as the level of control Zimmerman endorses (voluntarism) clearly would amount to subjectivism, and I am responding to his concern specifically. However, it is worth noting that at least some level of control could plausibly be acceptable for Heidegger, even if Zimmerman's voluntarism exceeds what makes sense given Heidegger's commitments.

⁵⁸ Zimmerman 41

authentically being-in-the-world? Resoluteness brings the self right into its being together with things at hand, actually taking care of them, and pushes it toward concerned being-with with the others.”⁵⁹ This quote demonstrates that Heidegger views anticipatory resoluteness as connecting us to the world, however, it also starts to address Zimmerman’s claims that Heidegger unknowingly introduced voluntarism through anticipatory resoluteness. Heidegger says here that authentic resoluteness pushes us towards the conditions of our world, rather than away from them. Specifically, he says that authentic resoluteness “pushes [Dasein] toward concerned being-with with the others”, which seems to demonstrate that resoluteness is not about willing oneself against the forces of the world. This should address the broader idea that authentic resoluteness introduces subjectivism, but Zimmerman also has a more specific concern.

Zimmerman at some points calls specific attention to wanting-to-have-a-conscience, as being where Heidegger unknowingly introduced subjectivism. Zimmerman does acknowledge a quote from Heidegger later on in his career which interprets “wanting-to-have-a-conscience” in a non-subjectivist manner, but he says that this reinterpretation does not align with what Heidegger actually said in *Being and Time*.⁶⁰ This is a fair request, but I believe that Heidegger’s later interpretation does directly align with what is said in *Being and Time*.⁶¹ Zimmerman quotes Heidegger as saying the following:

Knowing that remains a willing, and willing that remains a knowing, is the existing human being's entrance to and compliance with the unconcealment of Being. The

⁵⁹ Heidegger 285

⁶⁰ Zimmerman 76

⁶¹ It is of note that the quote referenced by Zimmerman is from *The Origin of the Work of Art*, which is generally associated with later Heidegger’s work. This makes Zimmerman’s skepticism of Heidegger’s later interpretation even more logical, as many people believe Heidegger underwent a significant change in thought called *die Kehre* between *Being and Time* and when this later work was written. I will not address the degree to which there is actually a change in Heidegger’s work, which is a point of contention in the secondary literature, but that context is of note when referencing this quote.

resoluteness intended in *Being and Time* is not the deliberate action of a subject, but the opening up of human being, out of its captivity in that which is, to the openness of Being. However, in existence, man does not proceed from some inside to some outside; rather, the nature of Existenz is out-standing standing-within the essential sunderance of the clearing of beings. Neither in the creation mentioned nor in the willing mentioned now do we think of the performance or act of a subject striving toward himself as his self-set goal.

This interpretation from Heidegger nine years after *Being and Time* claims that when he mentions willing, he did not refer to a performance or act in which one uses their force of will to achieve their goal of becoming an authentic self. My goal now will be to establish that this later Heidegger quote is correct in his interpretation of what earlier Heidegger was saying in *Being and Time*.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger says that “wanting-to-have-a-conscience signifies the readiness for the summons to one's ownmost being-guilty that always already determined factical Dasein before any factical indebtedness and after that indebtedness has been settled.”⁶² This quote reads the “wanting” in wanting-to-have-a-conscience as a readiness for the summons of the call of conscience. This seems to align with what later Heidegger says, as he frames this process as an opening up, rather than as a voluntaristic will that allows one to stand against the world. There is more that has to be unpacked in this quote, especially as this is an area where Heidegger can be particularly murky. However, I do not see how what Heidegger says here necessarily entails a voluntaristic strain, especially given that Heidegger later attempted to clarify that he did not view this process as having a voluntaristic strain at all. A readiness to face a summons does not showcase any kind of voluntarism, or at least any kind that Zimmerman would be concerned about. Given this is what Heidegger means by wanting-to-have-a-conscience, I believe Zimmerman's interpretation cannot be correct.

⁶² Heidegger 294

A voluntarist reading of *Being and Time* cannot be correct, because it goes against what Heidegger says in the text, as Heidegger repeatedly attempts to clarify the point that he understands this process as one of being more connected to the world. He also stated on multiple occasions that when he uses language like “wanting” he is referring to a readiness to face summons, not a striving to become an authentic self or to achieve the conditions of authenticity. Heidegger is not always clear with his language, but it should be clear at this point that he sees authenticity as further linking us to the world, rather than dragging us out of it. In addition, he was aware of concerns that he could be read as introducing a form of will that allows you to stand above the world, so he attempted to clarify, both in *Being and Time* and later in his career, that he is referring to readiness or willingness to face the summons of the call of conscience. This resolves the second major category of criticism brought forward by the subjectivist writers.

This is why a subjectivist account of authenticity is ultimately flawed. It does not align with what Heidegger said in the text, as Heidegger repeatedly emphasizes authenticity as connecting Dasein to the world. If these processes are really about connecting us with the world, as Heidegger says they are, then the idea that they should be read as creating an emergent subject or stripping away the world from the subject does not make sense. This same point also applies to anticipatory resoluteness. What I have said so far does not establish that an intersubjective account should be adopted. It only establishes that a subjectivist account cannot be correct. After all, it could still be that what Heidegger said was just self-contradictory in some way, even if a subjectivist reading is not correct. It may also be that Heidegger was so unclear that it makes coming to an understanding of authenticity impossible. I believe that there is a way of making sense of what Heidegger said, which is why I will now attempt to show why an intersubjective account of authenticity should be endorsed. This will begin with showing why angst should be

read in an intersubjective manner, which will establish what authentic thrownness in Dasein looks like.

Chapter III

Authenticity and Thrownness

In this chapter, I will discuss authentic Dasein and thrownness. Understanding authentic thrownness will mean understanding angst, as angst is the response Dasein has to its thrownness. This will also be where I positively account for what Heidegger says about angst, which I left as an open question in chapter two. My goal will be to establish a reading of angst that emphasizes finitude and Dasein's beginning to face the facts of the world that it lives in. First, I will explain the way that Heidegger uses terms like "individualize" and "individuate", which I briefly discussed in the last chapter. Next, I will explain what Heidegger means when he speaks of Dasein being drained of content. Lastly, I will explain in more detail what, exactly, angst looks like for Heidegger. Overall, I will attempt to establish an understanding of angst that focuses on Dasein facing its finitude rather than Dasein being separated from its world.

Prior to this, I will give a brief overview of my account of angst in order to give the reader an idea of the contention of this chapter in advance. According to my understanding, angst is the process of Dasein facing the fact that it is finite. Through this process, Dasein escapes falling into a typical everyday pattern of behavior, as this is what allows Dasein to get a clearer view of what the conditions of its existence are. This creates a distance from *das Man* in some sense, but only insofar as *das Man* informs the typical escapist patterns of Dasein in its everyday mode of being. This distance from *das Man* allows Dasein to see the fact that the world only offers so many possibilities to Dasein and eventually all of Dasein's possibilities are locked out through death. Angst brings Dasein's particular situation in the world into focus and allows

Dasein to begin to face the conditions of its existence. I will justify this account throughout the chapter, and I will close the chapter with a larger example in which I describe angst. This should help to clarify any points which may seem unclear through the earlier partial developments I give throughout the chapter.

3.1 The Individuation of Dasein

An obvious starting point here is to make sense of what Heidegger means when he uses terms like “individuate” or “individualize”. I established that Heidegger was using these terms unconventionally, or at least did not mean to refer to an independent subject with these terms, but now my goal will be to establish a specific understanding of what Heidegger means. Before I lay out my positive account, we should remember that Heidegger repeatedly says Dasein is individualized as being-in-the-world. This means that whatever our reading of individuation is, it should be a process that connects to the world in some way. I believe that this connection to the world lies in the fact that Dasein begins to face the facts of its world in angst. Specifically, there is a focus on Dasein’s finite nature, specific possibilities, and death. I will attempt to establish this understanding below.

What I argue Heidegger means by individuation or individualizing in these quotes is that Dasein narrows its orientation towards its own particular finite situation in the world. Dasein is considering the limitations of its possibilities within the context of its world. Dasein’s analysis of its possibilities are still grounded by the framework given to Dasein by *das Man*, but Dasein is facing the fact that it has a finite set of possibilities and is beginning to wrestle with this. It also is beginning to understand the impact of death on its possibilities. This understanding would explain why Heidegger says in his description of angst that “what crowds in upon us [in angst] is not this or that, nor is it everything objectively present together as a sum, but the possibility of

things at hand in general, that is, the world itself.”⁶³ In this section Heidegger describes how the possibilities offered to Dasein appear through its angst. This ties in with the fact that angst reveals Dasein’s finite nature to itself. By finite, I mean that there are a limited set of possibilities presented to Dasein, and these possibilities are always firmly capped by death.

Heidegger makes this connection explicit in other sections of *Being and Time* as well, such as when Heidegger writes,

Angst individuates Dasein to its ownmost being-in-the-world which, as understanding, projects itself essentially upon possibilities. Thus along with that for which it is anxious, angst discloses Dasein as being-possible, and indeed as what can be individualized in Individuation of its own accord. Angst reveals in Dasein its being toward its ownmost potentiality of being, that is, being free for the freedom of choosing and grasping itself.⁶⁴

There are two important aspects of what Heidegger says here. The first is that the quote is clearly oriented towards Dasein facing its particular possibilities. Dasein is projecting itself onto particular possibilities and in the process locking itself out from other possibilities that it foregoes.⁶⁵ This contributes to the fact that Dasein always exists in a finite manner. In addition, Heidegger also connects this discussion to death, which makes sense if the idea of angst is a concern over Dasein’s finitude. Dasein’s finitude is a condition of the world that it lives in. Dasein also has a finite set of possibilities that are only offered to it alone. Therefore, if Dasein is individualized only in the sense that it develops a concern that is focused towards the individual possibilities offered to it, including death, then this would avoid the concerns of the subjectivist account. This is because Dasein would clearly become further connected to its world through this process of individuation, so the subjectivist concern that Dasein becomes an individual subject would be avoided.

⁶³ Heidegger 181

⁶⁴ Heidegger 182

⁶⁵ I will expand on this point in Section 3.3, as there are further points I want to emphasize that are not relevant to explaining individuation.

This would mean that in individuation Dasein becomes oriented towards the finite nature of its existence. It is also where Dasein becomes concerned with the finite nature of its possibilities, because Dasein is thrown there are only certain possibilities afforded to it. Dasein only has a particular set of possibilities, but it still has a vast array of possibilities. What I mean by this is that, despite the fact that Dasein has a finite limit on what possibilities exist for it, Dasein still has many options available to it. Despite the fact that there is a range of possibilities, if Dasein acts naturally it falls into certain patterns of behavior unless something interferes in its life. It individuates in the sense that angst is particularized to Dasein's possibilities and finite nature. I will discuss authentic Dasein's forward-looking mode in the next chapter, but it is important now to understand how thrownness relates to Dasein's possibilities here. Dasein's past informs the fact that Dasein is offered a finite set of possibilities and how we engage with our possibilities in a forward-looking manner is a separate question that will be explored next chapter. What thrownness shows is the limits and constraints on Dasein's possibilities that arise from the conditions of its existence, which is interconnected with its world. If the account is focused on the finitude of Dasein, then the language surrounding terms like individuation or individualize is just counterintuitive, not something that undermines Heidegger's account of angst. Now that I have explained the process of individuation, I will explore what exactly is meant by draining of content.

3.2 The Draining of Dasein

There is one other problem that should be explored in clear detail, which is the concern that Dasein is drained of content. As I stated above, Heidegger claims that this loss in significance does not lead to Dasein losing the structures of *das Man*, but it still may not be clear how this could be otherwise despite what Heidegger claims. However, if you read Heidegger as

meaning that Dasein becomes aware of its finitude, which makes the world lose significance, then this problem of Dasein being drained of content also goes away. To explain why I believe this, recall this quote from Heidegger: “The totality of relevance discovered within the world of things at hand and objectively present is completely without importance. It collapses into itself. The world has the character of complete insignificance.”⁶⁶ A quote like this seems challenging to account for in a manner that maintains the world’s force over Dasein until one takes into account the fact that on the next page Heidegger says that “the utter insignificance that makes itself known in the nothing and nowhere does not signify the absence of world, but means that innerworldly beings in themselves are so completely unimportant that, on the basis of this *insignificance* of what is innerworldly, the world is all that obtrudes itself in its worldliness.”⁶⁷ This shows that whatever draining occurs is actually strengthening our relationship to the world, rather than dragging us out of it. Now that I have shown that this draining of content really connects us to the world, I will now attempt to showcase what exactly is being drained and how it connects us to the world more thoroughly by more extensively quoting Heidegger.

When discussing this topic in more depth Heidegger writes that:

What crowds in upon us is not this or that, nor is it everything objectively present together as a sum, but the *possibility* of things at hand in general, that is, the world itself. When angst has subsided, in our everyday way of talking we are accustomed to say “it was really nothing.” This way of talking, indeed, gets at *what* it was ontically. Everyday discourse aims at taking care of things at hand and talking about them. That about which angst is anxious is none of the innerworldly things at hand. But this not any thing at hand, which is all that everyday, circumspect discourse understands, is not completely nothing. The nothing of handiness is grounded in the primordial “something,” in the *world*. The world, however, ontologically belongs essentially to the being of Dasein as being-in-the-world. So if what angst is about exposes nothing, that is, the world as such, this means that that about which angst is anxious is being-in-the-world itself. Being anxious discloses, primordially and directly, the world as world. It is not the case that initially we deliberately look away from innerworldly beings and think only of the world

⁶⁶ Heidegger 180

⁶⁷ Heidegger 181

about which angst arises, but angst as a mode of attunement first discloses the *world as world*.⁶⁸

In these quotes, Heidegger is describing the experience of aimlessness that many people feel.

One is losing the traditional structure they have to navigate the world, but this is not meant to be understood as literally losing all structures of meaning; Heidegger says, “in what [angst] is about, the ‘it is nothing and nowhere’ becomes manifest.”⁶⁹ This passage is describing a sense of nihilism regarding the world, which makes more sense than the structural force of the world being drained away.⁷⁰ This understanding also makes sense of the fact that Heidegger views angst as the world obtruding itself in its worldliness. Given that the nature of the world is finite, by being presented with our finitude in angst Dasein is faced directly with facts about the world and its place in it. The finite nature of what Dasein is appears to it more clearly, which makes the “worldliness” of the world appear more clearly to us. Heidegger repeatedly emphasizes throughout pages 180, 181, and 182 that angst is truly connecting Dasein to the world more thoroughly, so what Heidegger is saying here cannot possibly be that the structures of meaning given by the world are drained away.

On this understanding, what is being drained away, in fact, are the avoidant structures of *das Man* that allow us to avoid facing the conditions of the world as they are. Of course, how we come to understand these conditions is connected to the structures of meaning given by *das Man*. In order for Dasein to understand its finitude, it must understand what the options are afforded to it by the world it lives in. I referenced this earlier in connection to wrenching away of *das Man*, but Heidegger also connects angst to the illusions of *das Man* when he says that “what is characteristic about authentic, existentially projected being-toward-death can thus be

⁶⁸ Heidegger 181

⁶⁹ Heidegger 181

⁷⁰ I use nihilism here to refer to a feeling that the typical day-to-day activities in one’s life are meaningless.

summarized as follows: [for Dasein to] be itself in the passionate anxious freedom toward death, which is free of the illusions of [*das Man*], factual, and certain of itself.”⁷¹ In this quote, Heidegger connects the idea of angst to being free of such illusion here. This supports that these illusions of *das Man* are the structures that Heidegger believes are being drained, which allows Dasein to engage with the facts of its world more clearly, not that the structures of meaning that Dasein must have to understand the world are being drained.

3.3 Explaining Angst

Now that I have addressed the concerns surrounding angst as a concept and posited what an intersubjective account of angst looks like, I will clarify and expand upon a few points, then lay out an exact account of what angst is. One point that was not relevant to the subjectivist criticism, but is relevant to understanding angst are quotes like the following from Heidegger: “Thus angst takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, falling prey, in terms of the "world" and the public way of being interpreted.”⁷² This showcases that part of angst is understanding itself beyond its public interpretation. What is meant here is that Dasein has a public facing external version of itself that does not always line up with its internalized conception of self. Both of these are informed by the world, but one is artificial and used to cover up aspects of Dasein’s existence. At minimum, angst shows Dasein that there is something beyond the public self. The second point here is one that I did address previously, but is worth further emphasis. A major part of angst is Dasein’s coming to face the possibilities offered to it by the world. Understanding this means understanding both the fact that Dasein is finite, but also that Dasein has a range of possibilities offered to it. Now that I have made these clarifications, I will explain the process of angst in a more comprehensive manner.

⁷¹ Heidegger 253

⁷² Heidegger 181

Dasein in its everyday mode of inauthentic existence covers up facts about its existence, like its finitude. The illusions of *das Man* help in this process as they are designed to hide the facts of Dasein's existence to itself. One example of this, which I will explore in more detail throughout this section is how *das Man* typically frames death. Heidegger says that "in such talk, death is understood as an indeterminate something which first has to show up from somewhere, but right now is *not yet present for oneself*, and is thus no threat."⁷³ These illusions create an ambiguity and impersonal nature to the facts of Dasein's existence, such that Dasein cannot clearly see the conditions of its existence. *Das Man's* illusions hide the fact that Dasein lives within a finite set of conditions with finite possibilities.

Angst begins with Dasein going through a process where it becomes aware that it is a finite being with finite possibilities in life. In order to understand this, the illusions of *das Man* must be stripped away, as *das Man* has a tendency to cover up the conditions of Dasein's world. Once this happens Dasein can begin to understand its particular place in the world without illusions, which includes both a new level of understanding over its finitude, but also a better understanding of what the world offers to it. This is why Heidegger at some points ties freedom and angst, as it is not merely about Dasein being limited. For example, now that Dasein can develop an understanding of itself outside of the public self, it has more possibilities available to it, a point that Heidegger makes when he says that "losing itself in the publicness of [*das Man*] and its idle talk, *it fails to hear* its own self in listening to the Man-self."⁷⁴ In angst, Dasein has the awareness of paths outside of its everyday mode of being where it has a tendency to fall into the path of least resistance. None of these elements of angst involve transcending the world,

⁷³ Heidegger 243

⁷⁴ Heidegger 261

however, in order to showcase this point more clearly, I will give a more detailed example of what exactly this process looks like.

In angst, Dasein is first made aware of the fact that it is a finite being in some sense. We could imagine, for example, that this happens because someone faces a serious health condition that pulls them out of the soothing clutches of *das Man*.⁷⁵ This health condition may then cause them to become aware of many facts about the world they live in, causing Dasein to consider the possibilities of its life more seriously. Of course, the set of these possibilities are given to Dasein by the world. For instance, someone born in poverty in Africa will likely live a very different life than someone born in upper-middle-class America. Whatever the possibilities offered by the world, though, angst offers Dasein the chance to consider them more deeply.

Now we can go back to a particular case of Dasein facing a serious health condition. How might the individual facing a serious health condition respond to its finitude?. For instance, if this person was told from birth that they must become a doctor, then without interference one will be pushed towards that path. They may think that their only real path in life is to become a doctor. Dasein has paths that it is predisposed to follow, unless something happens to make it change course; only a very narrow set of Dasein's possibilities appear to it as genuine possibilities when it is fallen. However, there are other things that someone could do that are still within Dasein's range of possibilities, even if it is currently falling into specific possibilities. It may be that this doctor has the ability to get a different job as a graphic designer that would make them happier, even if being a doctor appears to be the only option for them. Additionally, it may be that its health condition allows it to maintain this job even with a health condition, as it can

⁷⁵ Heidegger briefly mentions in a footnote that *The Death of Ivan Ilyich* by Leo Tolstoy is a good example of how the understanding of death through *das Man*'s illusions can collapse, which is why I chose a situation roughly parallel (H. 254). It is worth saying that this singular footnote does not do justice to how seemingly influential this work is for Heidegger.

work from home. There is a range of possibilities that are being constrained because it is predisposed to fall into a set of regular everyday patterns of behavior without much thought based on the socio-cultural pressures in their life and how they have been habituated. The possibilities presented to one will also continue narrowing over time until they eventually die and no longer have any possibilities, as one stops having opportunities afforded to them when they stop existing. For instance, it may be that the doctor we are talking about could become a graphic designer at age 20, but no longer has the ability to develop the necessary skill to change careers like that at age 65, especially if their health condition worsens. When Dasein becomes aware of the finite nature of its possibilities it results in angst.

This is a general picture of what angst means under this account. Dasein's concern over its finite nature is angst. Angst in this sense does not undermine Heidegger's broader work within *Being and Time*. The finite possibilities are all given to Dasein by the world, and even Dasein's mode of analysis is given to it by the world. Therefore, on this reading, the focus is on being-in-the-world as Heidegger said; it is not about divorcing Dasein from the world. Rather angst brings the world to the forefront of Heidegger's account of authenticity. Nothing about this account pushes a subjectivist understanding of authenticity. It does the opposite, in fact, as it brings aspects of Dasein and its relation to the world to the forefront of the account. Now that I have addressed what authentic thrownness looks like, I will address authentic projection and anticipatory resoluteness.

Chapter IV

Authenticity and Projection

In this chapter, I will discuss authentic projection. This will largely be focused on explicating what authentic anticipatory resoluteness looks like and responding to concerns raised in chapter two. I have already shown why the critiques offered cannot inform a subjectivist account, but now I will show how the points of concern raised by authors like Braver and Zimmerman can be adequately accounted for in a positive manner by the intersubjective account of authenticity. I would like to note here that this chapter covers similar sorts of issues to the previous chapter, but there are notable differences in how the illusions of *das Man* are unveiled in anticipatory resoluteness as compared to angst, which inform the differences. With that caveat, the first criticism that I will respond to is Braver's concern surrounding Dasein being wrenched away from *das Man*. My response here will follow a similar line of reasoning to much of what I said about angst, but with a different context to address the concern as it specifically relates to anticipatory resoluteness. The other criticism I will respond to is Zimmerman's idea that there are quotes from Heidegger that indicate a voluntarist strand in anticipatory resoluteness. I will respond to these two remaining criticisms before fully explicating my account of anticipatory resoluteness.

Before I respond to criticisms, I want to give a rough picture of my account at the offset to help clarify what I will be arguing for. I will ultimately argue that we should understand anticipatory resoluteness as a readiness to face the possibilities offered by the world in a head on manner, which requires an understanding of what possibilities are offered to Dasein by the world. As I argued in the last chapter, death individualizes us and brings forth our particularized possibilities. By particularized or particular possibilities, I mean the specific possibilities that are available to one, as this is the sense in which Dasein is individualized. Death individualizes because death is Dasein's ownmost possibility and this means death locks Dasein out of all other possibilities. This understanding of how Dasein will continually lock itself out of possibilities, until it has no more possibilities, can explain why death draws Dasein's attention to its particular possibilities. Once Dasein has an understanding of its particularized possibilities, it can begin to have a readiness to face the possibilities offered to Dasein by the world. This is the account of anticipatory resoluteness which I will attempt to justify in this chapter.

4.1 Wrenching Away of *das Man*

Braver's main source for the criticism that anticipatory resoluteness wrenches away Dasein from *das Man* is when Heidegger writes:

In the anticipatory revealing of this potentiality-for-Being, Dasein discloses itself in the Being of the entity so revealed—namely, to exist. Anticipation turns out to be the possibility of understanding one's ownmost and uttermost potentiality-for-Being—that is to say, the possibility of authentic existence. The ontological constitution of such existence must be made visible by setting forth the concrete structure of anticipation of death. . . . Here it can become manifest to Dasein that in this distinctive possibility of its own self, it has been wrenched away from [*das Man*]⁷⁶

As I mentioned earlier, Heidegger says something that seemingly offers some context to this quote later in the chapter when he says, “As the nonrelational possibility, death individualizes, but only, as the insuperable possibility, in order to make Dasein as being-with understand the

⁷⁶ Braver 219

potentialities-of-being of others."⁷⁷ There are a few points of note here that I will be addressing. The first is Heidegger is describing being individualized by death. The second is that he discusses *das Man* being wrenched away in anticipation. The final point is Heidegger's emphasis that this process "make[s] Dasein as being-with understand the potentialities-of-being of others."⁷⁸ I will start by addressing the first two points, as they can be addressed by simply expanding upon what I said in chapter 3.

I have already argued that when Heidegger is describing individuation, he describes the process of Dasein developing a focus towards its particular condition in the world and the possibilities offered to it. In addition, I have argued that when Heidegger describes *das Man* being stripped away from Dasein, he is specifically describing the process of the illusions of *das Man* being stripped away. I stand by this interpretation, but the evidence for this point in the context of anticipatory resoluteness is even stronger. Heidegger says:

The analysis of "one dies" reveals unambiguously the kind of being of everyday being toward death. In such talk, death is understood as an indeterminate something which first has to show up from somewhere, but right now is *not yet present for oneself*, and is thus no threat. "One dies" spreads the opinion that death, so to speak, strikes [*das Man*]. The public interpretation of Dasein says that "one dies," because in this way everyone can convince him/herself that in no case is it I myself, for this one is no one. "Dying" is leveled down to an event which does concern Dasein, but which belongs to no one in particular. If idle talk is always ambiguous, so is this way of talking about death. Dying, which is essentially and irreplaceably mine, is distorted into a publicly occurring event which [*das Man*] encounters.⁷⁹

Heidegger is describing how in Dasein's everyday mode of being, death is an impersonal phenomenon. Death happens to one, but it does not happen to me in particular. Heidegger is describing how *das Man* creates a false sense that death is not a possibility for itself, which is one of the illusions of *das Man*. Heidegger directly compares this with idle talk as he says, "If

⁷⁷ Heidegger 253

⁷⁸ Heidegger 253

⁷⁹ Heidegger 243

idle talk is always ambiguous, so is this way of talking about death.”⁸⁰ This indicates how this type of discussion of death constitutes the same sort of illusion by *das Man* as is offered by idle talk. What changes in anticipation is not that all structures of meaning are stripped away from *das Man*, but rather that Dasein accepts its possibilities as its own. Braver references Heidegger saying this: “Here it can become manifest to Dasein that in this distinctive possibility of its own self, it has been wrenched away from [*das Man*].”⁸¹ One obvious reading of this quote is that Dasein is separated from the illusions of how *das Man* typically frames death. This is supported by Heidegger’s claim that “as the nonrelational possibility, death individualizes, but only, as the insuperable possibility.”⁸² This claim emphasizes Dasein’s facing its ownmost possibility and understanding it as such. This offers a response to some of the complaints surrounding the wrenching of *das Man* and the individualizing done by death, but there is still the previously mentioned third point that must be addressed.

This third point is made when Heidegger says that “as the nonrelational possibility, death individualizes, but only, as the insuperable possibility, in order to make Dasein as being-with understand the potentialities-of-being of others.”⁸³ This quote seems to favor an intersubjective account, but it is not obvious on face what the quote is getting at. Heidegger gives as a reason for the claim that “because anticipation of the insuperable possibility also disclosed all the possibilities lying before it, this anticipation includes the possibility of taking the *whole* of Dasein in advance in an existentiell way, that is, the possibility of existing as a *whole potentiality-of-being*.”⁸⁴ What Heidegger is saying here is that in anticipation of death, all other possibilities available to Dasein are disclosed to it. Dasein has become aware of the fact that the

⁸⁰ Heidegger 243

⁸¹ Braver 219

⁸² Heidegger 253

⁸³ Heidegger 253

⁸⁴ Heidegger 253

typical patterns of behavior that it falls into are not the only options available to it. Dasein has its other possibilities disclosed to it. This starts to unpack the quote, but this still does not show what about this process “make[s] Dasein as being-with understand the potentialities-of-being of others.”⁸⁵ This point is important, but I will elaborate on it in the next section, as some of Heidegger’s claims about resoluteness will make his meaning here clearer.

One final point I would like to make here before concluding this section is that this starts to show how angst and anticipatory resoluteness are interconnected. Dasein has always already chosen some number of possibilities, which now informs what possibilities appear to Dasein in a forward-looking manner. Additionally, in angst, Dasein has possibilities open up to it outside of the typical everyday possibilities that it falls into, which allows Dasein to more fully explore all of its options through its anticipation. This point will be fully explored in chapter 5, as that is when I will have fully explained the different elements of authenticity, which will allow me to show exactly how all the different elements are connected. However, this should offer a preliminary understanding of the connection. Now that I have established this broader context, I will focus back on resolving the concerns of Braver.

This offers an understanding of anticipatory resoluteness that addresses Braver’s concern that *das Man* is wrenched away in anticipation. While the reasoning in this section parallels much of what was said in section 3.1, the quotes in this section offer even stronger evidence favoring the intersubjective interpretation of authenticity. Heidegger makes the point even clearer that when he uses a term like individualize he is referring to the particularized possibilities of Dasein rather than anything like a separation between Dasein and the world. Heidegger also offers further evidence that he views this process as strengthening Dasein’s connection to the world rather than weakening it, as he emphasizes the fact that the process of “make[s] Dasein as

⁸⁵ Heidegger 253

being-with understand the potentialities-of-being of others."⁸⁶ This offers a solution to one of the primary complaints I discussed in chapter 2, but there is still another point that needs to be addressed before giving a fuller account of anticipatory resoluteness. This is the concern from Zimmerman that anticipatory resoluteness leads to a kind of voluntarism.

4.2 The Voluntarist Strand in Anticipatory Resoluteness

While I have made arguments as to why I believe Heidegger's account of anticipatory resoluteness does not entail a voluntaristic position, I still have to explain how an intersubjective account would address the quotes of concern. For example, one of the quotes I referenced earlier was: "As *authentic being a self*, resoluteness does not detach Dasein from its world, nor does it isolate it as free floating ego. How could it, if resoluteness as authentic disclosedness is, after all, nothing other than *authentically being-in-the-world*? Resoluteness brings the self right into its being together with things at hand, actually taking care of them, and pushes it toward concerned being-with with the others."⁸⁷ This relates to what was said earlier about anticipation, but here Heidegger gives a clearer explanation to the connection between Dasein as being-with others and anticipatory resoluteness. Heidegger says that:

Now, in resoluteness the most primordial truth of Dasein has been reached, because it is *authentic*. The discoveredness of things at hand and objectively present is grounded in the discoveredness of the world; for if the actual totality of relevance of things at hand is to be freed, this requires a preunderstanding of significance. In understanding significance, Dasein taking care of things is circumspectly referred to the things encountered at hand. The understanding of significance as the disclosedness of the actual world is again grounded in the understanding of the for-the-sake-of-which, to which discovering of the totality of relevance goes back. In seeking shelter, sustenance, and livelihood, we do so for-the-sake-of the constant possibilities of Dasein that are near to it; upon these, this being which is concerned about its being has always already projected itself. Thrown into its "there," Dasein is always factually dependent on a definite "world"—its "world." At the same time those closest factual projects are guided by the lostness in [*das Man*] taking care of things... Authentic disclosedness then modifies equiprimordially the discoveredness of "world" grounded in it and the disclosedness of being-with with others.

⁸⁶ Heidegger 253

⁸⁷ Heidegger 285

The "world" at hand does not become different as far as "content," the circle of the others is not exchanged for a new one, and yet the being toward things at hand which understands and takes care of things, and the concerned being-with others is now defined in terms of their ownmost potentiality-of-being-a-self.⁸⁸

This quote is jargon heavy and somewhat opaque, but Heidegger does expand on the association between anticipatory resoluteness and Dasein connecting with its world.⁸⁹ Near the end of the quote, Heidegger summarizes his overarching point in the clearest manner. Heidegger says the "content" of the world does not change and that the circle of others does not change; rather he says that as Dasein authentically understands its world, it develops a clearer understanding of the potentiality of the others. This makes sense, as Dasein needs to understand its world in order to understand the possibilities offered to it. This includes the way in which others impact our possibilities and that one impacts the possibilities of others. This is why Heidegger connects the uncovering of the world to the uncovering of things at hand. In order for Dasein to truly understand the things at hand, Dasein must truly understand the world that it exists within. This is the brief explanation of the quoted passage, but this is enough to show clearly that he intends for what he says to be read in an intersubjective fashion.

This shows how an intersubjective account of anticipatory resoluteness would account for quotes that seemed as though they implied a type of voluntarism. Heidegger clearly emphasizes how Dasein's nature as being-with becomes clearer to it in anticipatory resoluteness. This is because as Dasein develops an understanding of the possibilities offered to it outside of the illusions of *das Man*, it must develop a stronger understanding of the world it exists within.

⁸⁸ Heidegger 284-285

⁸⁹ This quote also offers further proof that my reading of Dasein being drained of content is correct as Heidegger says "At the same time those closest factual projects are guided by the lostness in [*das Man*] taking care of things" (Heidegger 285). He says that one is summoned from this state in resoluteness. I avoid noting this above, both because it is not relevant to the point I am trying to make here and it starts to get into ideas involving the call of conscience which I will address in chapter 5. I figured that it was worth a brief mention though.

Based on this, the structures of meaning offered by *das Man* and the facticity of Dasein's world limit what possibilities are available to Dasein. This offers a response to some of the criticisms surrounding an intersubjective account, but now I will attempt to fully explain what exactly anticipatory resoluteness is.

4.3. Explaining Authentic Anticipatory Resoluteness

Now that I have discussed some of the contentious quotes surrounding anticipatory resoluteness, I can begin to give a fuller picture of what the concept would look like from an intersubjective framework. The first point to note is that Heidegger emphasizes awareness of Dasein's ownmost possibility opening up Dasein to other possibilities that it was previously unaware of. The second point that Heidegger emphasizes is that this process strengthens Dasein's connection to its world. I have begun to explain both of these points in the context of addressing other concerns, but now I will attempt to bring the bigger picture together.⁹⁰

In order to do this, I will explain both anticipation and resoluteness, then I will explain what they mean in conjunction. Firstly, there is anticipation which Heidegger describes when he says that "anticipation shows itself as the possibility of understanding one's ownmost and extreme potentiality-of-being, that is, as the possibility of authentic existence."⁹¹ Additionally, Heidegger writes that "terminologically, we shall formulate this being toward possibility as anticipation of this possibility."⁹² This means that anticipation means Dasein understanding and looking towards the possibilities offered to it. One of these passages puts specific emphasis on death, as much of what Heidegger says about authenticity is tied to death, but it is not

⁹⁰ There are elements of anticipatory resoluteness that are significantly tied to the call of conscience which I will focus on explaining in the next chapter. Specifically, I am referring to things like wanting-to-have-a-conscience and other similar elements that do not fully make sense without a broader understanding of the call of conscience.

⁹¹ Heidegger 252

⁹² Heidegger 251

exclusively about that. Part of authenticity is anticipating death, but anticipation is broader, as is shown in Heidegger's explanation of the term.

Heidegger describes resoluteness when he says that "in resoluteness, Dasein is concerned with its ownmost potentiality-of-being that, as thrown, can project itself only upon definite, factual possibilities. Resolution does not escape from "reality," but first discovers what is factually possible in such a way that it grasps it as it is possible as one's ownmost potentiality-of-being in [*das Man*]." ⁹³ In addition to this, Heidegger says:

Resoluteness "exists" only as a resolution that projects itself understandingly. But to what does Dasein resolve itself in resoluteness? On what is it to resolve? Only the resolution itself can answer this. It would be a complete misunderstanding of the phenomenon of resoluteness if one were to believe that it is simply a matter of receptively taking up possibilities presented and suggested. *Resolution is precisely the disclosive projection and determination of the actual factual possibility.* The *indefiniteness* that characterizes every factually projected potentiality-of-being of Dasein *belongs* necessarily to resoluteness. Resoluteness is certain of itself only in a resolution. But the *existentiell indefiniteness* of resoluteness never makes itself definite except in a resolution; it nevertheless has its *existential definiteness*. ⁹⁴

This shows that resoluteness is about Dasein resolving to face its future. It is not about resolving for a specific possibility, but rather resolving to face its possibilities. There is particular focus placed on Dasein resolutely facing its ownmost potentiality. There is also reason to read this specifically in a manner that indicates a readiness or openness for Dasein to face its possibilities rather than a willing against the pressures of the world. I briefly referenced a quote to make this point in chapter 2, which I will also briefly reference now: "Wanting to have a conscience becomes a readiness for [angst]." ⁹⁵ Resoluteness is inherently interconnected with wanting-to-have-a-conscience, which makes the fact that Heidegger uses a term like readiness in this context odd if he viewed resoluteness as a type of willing in the traditional sense. Given this

⁹³ Heidegger 286

⁹⁴ Heidegger 285-286

⁹⁵ Heidegger 283

context, resoluteness seems to mean something like a readiness of Dasein to face the possibilities offered to it by the world with particular focus on death. This offers a brief picture of resoluteness as Heidegger presents it, which will allow me to explain what exactly anticipatory resoluteness is.

Now that these two concepts have been explained independently, I will show what they mean when Heidegger puts them together. One way in which Heidegger draws this connection is when he says that “anticipation disclosed [the] possibility [Dasein’s ownmost] as possibility. Thus, resoluteness becomes a primordial being toward the ownmost potentiality-of-being of Dasein only as anticipatory. Resoluteness understands the “can” of its potentiality-for-being-guilty only when it “qualifies” itself as being-toward-death.”⁹⁶ What Heidegger is saying here is that anticipation discloses the possibility of death to Dasein, which allows resoluteness to become a primordial being towards death. Heidegger also ties anticipatory resoluteness to the concept of being-guilty. This starts to tie into what Heidegger says about the call of conscience, so I will delay focusing on this concept until then. What is important to know about anticipatory resoluteness to set up my discussion of the call of conscience is that when Dasein is being resolute it becomes open to the summons of the call of conscience. Heidegger explicitly says this when he says “the summons can be understood in the mode of resoluteness.”⁹⁷ This should show some of the conceptual connection to the call of conscience, even if many of the specifics will be clarified in the next chapter.

Going back to explicating anticipatory resoluteness, Heidegger seems to be claiming that anticipatory resoluteness is something like a readiness to face the possibilities of the world in a “head-on” manner. This would make sense of why Heidegger seems to spend so much time

⁹⁶ Heidegger 293

⁹⁷ Heidegger 285

emphasizing the fact that authenticity should be understood as connecting us to the world. In addition, anticipatory resoluteness opens Dasein up to the call of conscience, which I will explore in more detail in the next chapter. Both of these showcase that anticipatory resoluteness is about an openness or readiness to face something, whether it is the summons or the possibilities offered to Dasein. This is also the way in which authentic Dasein projects onto possibilities, but it does so through this mode of anticipatory resoluteness, which allows more possibilities to appear as available to Dasein. This account of anticipatory resoluteness should show what authentic projection looks like according to Heidegger.

This offers an account of anticipatory resoluteness that does not undermine Heidegger's account of Dasein as being-in-the-world. While there are some quotes that seem to show Heidegger undermining the connection between Dasein and its world, ultimately, he makes it clear that these processes truly strengthen Dasein's connection to the world. Anticipatory resoluteness is about an openness or readiness to face the possibilities offered by the world in a head on manner, which means understanding what possibilities are offered to Dasein by the world. Dasein no longer obscures the world to itself, but instead the possibilities given to Dasein by the world are clearly shown. This is clearly in line with an intersubjective account, as anticipatory resoluteness is about strengthening Dasein's connection to the world. Now that angst and anticipatory resoluteness have been explained in intersubjective terms, we can understand the past and future elements of authentic Dasein. Next, I will explore authentic fallenness and discourse through the context of the call of conscience.

Chapter V

Authenticity and Fallenness/Discourse

Now that I have argued for an intersubjective interpretation of the thrownness and projection of Dasein, I will now discuss the present-day aspects of Dasein. This chapter will be organized in a different manner than the previous two as I have responded to the primary criticisms of intersubjective accounts of authenticity brought forth by proponents of the subjectivist account. This means that I do not have to respond to criticism in the same manner that I previously did. I will begin this chapter by explaining concepts related to the call of conscience. This will start with explaining the concept of wanting-to-have-a-conscience, which I delayed elaborating upon the previous chapter. Next, I will explain the call of conscience and how it ties into the understanding of authenticity I have established in the previous chapters. After that, I will give a more overarching account of the call of conscience to tie everything together. Ultimately, this will lay the groundwork to discuss how the different elements of authenticity are interconnected, which I will do at the end of this chapter.

5.1 Explaining Wanting-to-Have-a-Conscience and Being-Guilty

Wanting-to-have-a-conscience initially comes up within Heidegger's discussion of previous concepts like angst and anticipatory resoluteness. This is because angst and anticipatory resoluteness are what allow Dasein to want-to-have-conscience. Heidegger explicitly makes that connection when he says that

The disclosedness of Dasein in wanting-to-have-a-conscience is thus constituted by the attunement of [angst], by understanding as projecting oneself upon one's ownmost being-guilty, and by discourse as reticence. The eminent, authentic disclosedness attested in Dasein itself by its conscience—the reticent projecting oneself upon one's ownmost being-guilty which is ready for [angst]—we call resoluteness.⁹⁸

This connection operates in a few different ways. First, angst and anticipatory resoluteness create the openness that allows Dasein to ready itself for its summons. Heidegger says,

“Wanting-to-have-a-conscience signifies the readiness for the summons to one's ownmost being-guilty that always already determined factual Dasein before any factual indebtedness and after that indebtedness has been settled.”⁹⁹ As I argued earlier, wanting in this context should be understood as a readiness to face its summons, rather than wanting in the sense of a voluntaristic willing. Even with this understanding, there are still two concepts that require explication. The first is the being-guilty and the second is the summons. I will explain being-guilty in this section, which will then allow me to give a clearer explanation of wanting-to-have-a-conscience.

Additionally, I will offer a brief account of the summons here to offer context for my usage of the term, but it will not be until section 5.2 that I give a full account of the summons.

Briefly, the summons is a call for Dasein to face the fact that it is guilty. Guilty here is used in a non-traditional way. Heidegger says that “thus we define the formal existential idea of "guilty" as being-the-ground for a being which is determined by a not—that is, being-the-ground of a nullity”¹⁰⁰ This introduces more jargon, but it does give a concise definition, as Heidegger says that guilt is being-the-ground of a nullity. Heidegger ties these terms to Dasein being a thrown project, as this is what he describes as the ground nullity. Heidegger describes these terms in the following manner:

⁹⁸ Heidegger 284

⁹⁹ Heidegger 294

¹⁰⁰ Heidegger 272

Being *a self*, Dasein, *as self*, is the thrown being... Dasein is not itself the ground of its being, because the ground first arises from its own project, but as a self, it is the being of its ground... Existing, Dasein is its ground, that is, in such a way that it understands itself in terms of possibilities and, thus understanding itself, is thrown being. But this means that, as a potentiality-of-being, it always stands in one possibility or another; it is constantly not other possibilities and has relinquished them in its existentiell project. As thrown, the project is not only determined by the nullity of being the ground but is itself as project essentially null... This nullity belongs to the being-free of Dasein for its existentiell possibilities. But freedom is only in the choice of the one, that is, in bearing the fact of not having chosen and not being able also to choose the others.¹⁰¹

This quote is saying that nullity exists because Dasein is constantly nullifying possibilities when it makes a decision. As a finite being, when it makes decisions it is locked out of certain possibilities and it projects onto others. Every time Dasein projects onto one possibility it nullifies all other possibilities offered to it. Additionally, Dasein has already nullified certain possibilities that were given to it, because it is thrown. Alongside this, because Dasein is thrown, the finite conditions of Dasein have already ruled out a number of possibilities for it. The finite conditions of Dasein's world also nullify possibilities for Dasein, because Dasein is thrown. This is essentially the sort of being that Dasein is as it is thrown and projects, which is why Heidegger ties the concept of Dasein's guilt to its existing as thrown project.¹⁰² When guilt is defined explicitly as "being-the-ground of a nullity", then it makes sense that he would say that Dasein is essentially guilty.¹⁰³ Dasein is in essence the sort of thing that must nullify all the possibilities that it does not project onto, because it is thrown into the world as a finite thing. Additionally, it also always already made a number of decisions, which also makes certain options null for Dasein. This should give some explanation of being-guilty, which will give some context for

¹⁰¹ Heidegger 273

¹⁰² The grammar here seems slightly odd, but this is what Heidegger uses. He uses this grammar on page 273 of *Being and Time*.

¹⁰³ Heidegger 272

what wanting-to-have-a-conscience is. The only part that may still be unclear at this point is understanding the summons, which I will explain in the next section.

5.2 Explaining the Summons and the Call of Conscience

As stated previously in 5.1, the summons calls Dasein to face the fact that it is guilty. The fact that Dasein is guilty should be clearer now, but this does not explain the mechanics of Dasein being summoned. Heidegger says that “the call of conscience has the character of summoning Dasein to its ownmost potentiality-of-being-a-self, by summoning it to its ownmost quality of being-guilty.”¹⁰⁴ This means that the call of conscience summons Dasein to face its guilt, but this does not explain how the call of conscience summons Dasein. Heidegger says that:

In the summons, Dasein gives itself to understand its ownmost potentiality-of-being. Thus this calling is a keeping silent. The discourse of conscience never comes to utterance. Conscience only calls silently, that is, the call comes from the soundlessness of uncanniness and calls Dasein thus summoned back to the stillness of itself, and calls it to become still. Wanting to have a conscience thus understands this silent discourse appropriately only in reticence. It takes the words away from the commonsense idle chatter of [*das Man*].¹⁰⁵

This is saying that the call is silent, but there is still more to explain here outside of that. The call is silent in the sense that it silences the everyday idle talk of *das Man*. It is only once separated from the illusions of *das Man* that Dasein can properly understand its guilt. This is because typically *das Man* allows Dasein to hide its true nature from itself. One perfect example of this is how *das Man* talks about death.

I referenced this earlier in 4.1, but Heidegger says:

The analysis of "one dies" reveals unambiguously the kind of being of everyday being toward death. In such talk, death is understood as an indeterminate something which first has to show up from somewhere, but right now is *not yet present for oneself*, and is thus no threat. "One dies" spreads the opinion that death, so to speak, strikes [*das Man*]. The public interpretation of Dasein says that "one dies," because in this way everyone can

¹⁰⁴ Heidegger 259

¹⁰⁵ Heidegger 283-284

convince him/herself that in no case is it I myself, for this one is no one. "Dying" is leveled down to an event which does concern Dasein, but which belongs to no one in particular. If idle talk is always ambiguous, so is this way of talking about death. Dying, which is essentially and irreplaceably mine, is distorted into a publicly occurring event which [*das Man*] encounters.¹⁰⁶

This shows how the typical everyday way in which *das Man* discusses death does not allow Dasein to face its death. This is because there is always something non-specific and general about the way in which *das Man* typically discusses death. If one will die, then I do not need to worry that I will die. This covering up is not unique to death, and it is only when Dasein understands its nature as thrown project that it can even begin to address its guilt. Heidegger makes this connection very explicitly when he says that "care, the being of Dasein, thus means, as thrown project: being the (null) ground of a nullity. And that means that Dasein as such is guilty if our formal existential definition of guilt as being-the-ground of a nullity is valid."¹⁰⁷ Dasein's nature is what makes it guilty, but it cannot be aware of this within the illusions of *das Man*. This is why the call of conscience summons Dasein by silencing the chatter of *das Man*. This still leaves the question of what Dasein is summoned to do. Heidegger says, "And to what is one summoned? To one's own self."¹⁰⁸ Heidegger is clear that one is summoned to oneself, but this still does not really explain what is happening. I will now explore this concept in more depth.

Heidegger goes more in depth when he says that:

The Man-self is summoned to the self. However, this is not the self that can become an "object" for itself on which to pass judgment, not the self that unrestrainedly dissects its "inner life" with excited curiosity, and not the self that stares "analytically" at states of the soul and their backgrounds. The summons of the self in the Man-self does not force it inwards upon itself so that it can close itself off from the "external world." The call

¹⁰⁶ Heidegger 243

¹⁰⁷ Heidegger 273-274

¹⁰⁸ Heidegger 262

passes over all this and disperses it, so as to summon solely the self which is in no other way than being-in-the-world.¹⁰⁹

This point is further drawn out when Heidegger says: “We must remember that when we designate conscience as a call, this call is a summons to the Man-self in its self. As this summons, it is the summons of the self to its potentiality-of-being-a-self, and thus calls Dasein forth to its possibilities.”¹¹⁰ These quotes communicate multiple points, but one major point is that the call is to the Man-self. The Man-self is called to its potentiality-of-being-a-self and to the possibilities offered to it by the world. These quotes once again emphasize that Dasein remains as being-in-the-world, but now that the illusions of *das Man* have been silenced, Dasein can come to understand what it is. Dasein is essentially guilty, which is why the call of conscience tells Dasein that it is guilty.

Now that I have offered an explanation of the call of conscience, I will clarify the aspects of wanting-to-have-a-conscience, which previously were somewhat unclear. Now that it is clearer what the summons is, I should be able to clarify what Heidegger means when he says: “Wanting-to-have-a-conscience signifies the readiness for the summons to one's ownmost being-guilty that always already determined factual Dasein before any factual indebtedness and after that indebtedness has been settled.”¹¹¹ When Dasein is in the mode of wanting-to-have-a-conscience, it shows that it is ready to face its summons. Summons, in this context, means that the illusory talk of *das Man* is silenced, so that Dasein can face the facts of its condition outside of the illusions of *das Man*. This should clarify most of what Heidegger

¹⁰⁹ Heidegger 263

¹¹⁰ Heidegger 264

¹¹¹ Heidegger 294

says about the call of conscience.¹¹² Following this, I would also like to show how this ties in with other aspects of authentic Dasein that I will discuss now.

5.3 Connecting the Call of Conscience to Other Aspects of Authenticity

I briefly referenced the connection between resoluteness and the call of conscience, but here I will expound both of these connections here. As discussed in chapter 3, angst as a mood has a disclosive character. Angst, on my definition, is the mood through which Dasein develops an initial understanding of its finitude. This allows Dasein to resolutely face the possibilities offered to it. As discussed in Chapter 4, Dasein always projects onto certain possibilities and not others. Dasein can only do this authentically when it understands at root that it is guilty. On the other hand, resoluteness is the mode in which Dasein projects onto its possibilities. In order to authentically project onto one's ownmost being-guilty, Dasein must be resolute. The readiness and openness created by these two aspects of authenticity are what open Dasein to wanting-to-have-a-conscience, which allows Dasein to hear the call of conscience. This shows how the different aspects of authenticity are interconnected. They all work together to sever Dasein from the illusions of *das Man*, which allows Dasein to face the facts of its existence in a head-on manner. This shows how the different elements of authenticity connect with what is said about the call of conscience. Now that I have given a brief overview of the connection between the call of conscience and the other elements of authenticity, I will attempt to give a fuller account of exactly how these elements of authenticity are interconnected with one another.

In order to show the interconnection I claim above I will show where Heidegger directly connects the concepts in the manner I describe. Starting with angst, Heidegger says, “[Angst]

¹¹² One example of a controversial topic is the relationship between discourse and authenticity. Some scholars think that there are both authentic and inauthentic modes of discourse. Some think that fallenness is the inauthentic version of discourse. This topic is not particularly relevant to anything I say here, so I will skip over it, as resolving that debate has no apparent import over the one explored in this thesis.

reveals in Dasein its being toward its ownmost potentiality of being, that is, being free for the freedom of choosing and grasping itself. [Angst] brings Dasein before its being free for..., the authenticity of its being as possibility which it always already is.”¹¹³ This shows how angst discloses elements of its existence such that it can want-to-have-conscience. Additionally, this shows that angst reveals Dasein’s guilt to itself, as through angst Dasein comes to understand its nature as thrown project. This openness is what allows Dasein to face the facts of its existence, and it is what allows Dasein to face its guilt in the call. Heidegger also makes this connection concrete with resoluteness. Heidegger also connects resoluteness in with the other elements of authenticity when he says that “the eminent, authentic disclosedness attested in Dasein itself by its conscience—the reticent projecting oneself upon one’s ownmost being-guilty which is ready for [angst]—we call resoluteness.”¹¹⁴ I referenced this quote previously in this section, but it very explicitly draws the connection between Dasein’s guilt, angst, and resoluteness. This ties Dasein’s projection with its thrownness, as once Dasein’s projects upon its guilt it can face the openness of angst in manner without fleeing, as is typical for Dasein in its everyday mode. Finally, I will show quotes centered around the call of conscience, which also showcase the connection I describe here.

The connection between Dasein’s authentic projection, angst, and the call of conscience is also made explicit when Heidegger says that “the call attuned by [angst] first makes possible for Dasein its project upon its ownmost potentiality-of-being.”¹¹⁵ The call is attuned by angst, which then allows for Dasein to project onto its ownmost potentiality-of-being. This makes sense given that, on my view, angst is what opens Dasein up to the conditions of its world, so it is only through angst that Dasein can face its guilt and death. This also ties Dasein’s authentic projection

¹¹³ Heidegger 182

¹¹⁴ Heidegger 284

¹¹⁵ Heidegger 266

to the openness created by angst, as it is the call that allows Dasein to project onto its ownmost potentiality-of-being. This shows how all these concepts are interconnected, as should be made clear by these quotes from Heidegger, and now I will give a clearer and final explanation as to exactly how they interconnect.

Angst is what creates the openness necessary to face the conditions of its existence, which allows Dasein to more seriously consider the facts of its conditions, including its future possibilities and Dasein's guilt. The call of conscience is only possible given the openness created through Dasein's angst. This allows Dasein to face its guilt, which is part of what makes it authentic. Additionally, Dasein is seriously able to reflect upon what possibilities are genuine for it, which is only possible given angst. This allows Dasein to anticipate its possibilities resolutely. Dasein's projection also informs its guilt, which also connects to the call of conscience. This shows how these concepts interconnect, creating a stronger basis for the intersubjective account.

In this chapter, I have accomplished two main points. First, this chapter offers an understanding of the call of conscience, which should not create issues for an intersubjective account of authenticity. Heidegger's discussion of the call of conscience may be trickier to parse than other areas of *Being and Time*, but it is far less contentious in the secondary literature surrounding how to interpret authenticity in a more overarching sense. I have not seen any subjectivist accounts that really make a focal point out of the call of conscience. Still, it is important to establish an understanding of the call of conscience, as this makes it so that I can show how the different elements of authenticity tie together with one another. According to my account, the call of conscience silences the idle chatter of das Man, so Dasein can face its true nature as an essentially guilty being. This introduces a lot of jargon, but it does nothing to

undermine Heidegger's project, as even here Heidegger emphasizes that Dasein remains being-in-the-world, even when Dasein is summoned to face its guilt.

The second point I clarified was showing the ways in which the different elements of authenticity are interconnected. Angst creates the openness for Dasein to face the facts of its conditions. This includes both Dasein's possibilities and its guilt, amongst other things. This widening of Dasein's understanding of its possibilities allows Dasein to silence the illusory talk of *das Man* and hear the call of conscience. The call informs Dasein of its guilt, which is a product of Dasein being thrown project. This understanding also requires Dasein to have an understanding of its projection. Angst creates the openness required for Dasein to face its possibilities, so then Dasein can anticipate its possibilities and resolve to face them. Dasein does this knowing its guilt, which ties Dasein's projection back to the call of conscience. Now that I have given a relatively full account of intersubjective authenticity, I will conclude this project with some remarks to attempt to tie everything together.

Chapter VI

Conclusion

6.1 Recapping the Subjectivist Account and Intersubjective Authenticity

To recap, the subjectivist account of authenticity claims that there are some elements of authenticity that undermine Heidegger's commitment to Dasein as being-in-the-world. The exact nature of the claims varies, but all of the versions discussed here argue that authenticity separates the world from Dasein to allow for the emergence of an authentic subject. Different authors focused on different aspects of authenticity. For example, Dreyfus was particularly concerned with the idea that angst stripped away the subject's world, whereas Zimmerman believed that anticipatory resoluteness was the primary concern, because it allowed too much voluntarism into Heidegger's account. Braver believed that both angst and anticipatory resoluteness led to the emergence of a world-independent subject, as they led to *das Man* being wrenched away from Dasein. This is the general concern from the subjectivist account. As I have shown throughout this thesis, an intersubjective account of authenticity does not lead to any of these problems. I will briefly recap my account of authenticity to show exactly why none of these problems emerge.

My account of authenticity discusses three interrelated components: angst, anticipatory resoluteness, and the call of conscience. The components tie into Dasein's relation to time, as they represent how Dasein relates to its past, future, and present. These foundational elements of authenticity are widely understood in this way, but it is more in the specific details of what these elements entail that determines where the intersubjective account differs from the subjectivist

account. Starting with the past-oriented part of Dasein, angst is a process in which Dasein begins to understand the finite nature of its existence. Dasein is born in a particular situation, which means that there are hard limits on what Dasein can do. Dasein is constantly ruling out certain possibilities and selecting others. Dasein's possibilities offered to it continue to shrink over time until all possibilities are closed off to it by death. In order to come to understand the facts of its existence, Dasein must escape the way the *das Man* typically frames issues like death. There is a typical everyday way of talking about topics like death that puts distance between Dasein and its particular death. Angst is how Dasein can become aware of these facts about its existence, which inform how Dasein understands its future possibilities.

This leads to anticipatory resoluteness, which is how Dasein engages with its future when it is authentic. Given that Dasein is born into finite circumstances, again, there are hard limits on what possibilities are offered to it. Now that Dasein understands its facticity, it has a fuller understanding of what possibilities are actually available to it. This allows Dasein to ready itself to face its possibilities in a head on manner with an understanding of how the facts of its existence impact its possibilities. This includes the possibility of its death, which is one that Heidegger gives special attention to, as it is Dasein's ownmost possibility. This readiness to face the possibilities offered to it shows how authentic Dasein orients itself towards its future. The openness offered from anticipatory resoluteness allows Dasein to hear the call of conscience, which leads Dasein to face its summons.

Dasein as thrown project comes together to inform the present-oriented aspects of authentic Dasein, which are seen through the call of conscience. The call of conscience is

informed by Dasein's guilt. Dasein is essentially guilty in the sense that it is constantly nullifying certain possibilities while projecting onto others. This comes along with Dasein's nature as thrown project. The call of conscience silences the illusions of *das Man*, which allows Dasein to come to an understanding of its nature and world outside of the everyday mode of understanding offered by *das Man*. The call can only be heeded once Dasein has separated itself from the typical everyday way of understanding the world, because this everyday way of understanding the world conceals the true nature of things. In its everyday mode of existence, issues become impersonal and vague, which makes them difficult to face. Heidegger discusses this with concepts like idle talk and with how *das Man* typically frames death. Once Dasein is free of the illusions of *das Man* it can face the fact that it is guilty in a head on manner, which is what the call of conscience is telling Dasein. This is how Dasein engages with its present when it is authentic.

These elements of authenticity all interconnect with one another. The conditions that Dasein is born into impact what possibilities are offered to it. Dasein can only project onto one possibility at a time, because it is born into finite circumstances. Dasein is born with a limited number of possibilities offered to it, and it is always narrowing its pool of possibilities through its projection onto certain possibilities and not others. The fact that Dasein is the sort of being that is thrown into finite conditions and that it projects onto possibilities in this finite context is what makes Dasein guilty, which ties angst, anticipatory resoluteness and the call of conscience all together. These different elements of authenticity are all also focused on Dasein uncovering the finite conditions of its existence and facing these conditions of its world, which gives these elements of authenticity an overlap in terms of what they aim to do. This briefly recaps the intersubjective account of authenticity which I have argued for throughout this thesis, including

how the different elements of authenticity interact with one another. Under this interpretation of authenticity, authenticity is about facing the conditions of one's being-in-the-world in a head-on manner, rather than the emergence of a world-independent self.

If authenticity is largely about Dasein facing the conditions of its world in a head-on manner, then it is hard to see how this would weaken Dasein's relation to the world. In order to face the world that one exists in, it is necessary to engage with and understand that world. It would be impossible for Dasein to face the conditions of its world by running away into a solipsistic void, because this would undermine Dasein's ability to truly understand and face the conditions of its world. This is why Heidegger emphasizes authenticity as being a process that connects Dasein to the world, despite some language that may appear otherwise. This process cannot separate Dasein from the world, because it is the process of Dasein coming to understand and face the conditions of its existence, which are necessarily tied to its world. This is also why the subjectivist account cannot ultimately be correct, as the subjectivist account believes that Dasein is separated from the world through authenticity, whereas authenticity is actually about connecting the subject to its world.

6.2 Concluding Remarks

In this thesis, I have shown why the subjectivist model of authenticity is not viable. While a number of Heidegger scholars endorse this interpretation, the subjectivist model ultimately fails to line up with the text of *Being and Time* in fairly substantial ways. While Heidegger does sometimes use language that is intuitively seen as separating Dasein from the world, he also regularly clarifies that the sense in which he uses this sort of language should not be read as separating Dasein from the world. In fact, Heidegger says repeatedly that Dasein's relation to the world is strengthened through authenticity. He says on more than one occasion

that it is the illusions of *das Man* that are stripped away. There is nowhere in *Being and Time* where he positively indicates that he views the normative force of *das Man* as being stripped away in authenticity. These are just some of the reasons why the subjectivist account ultimately cannot be successful.

The second important aspect of my thesis is that it established a clear interpretation of what intersubjective authenticity looks like in *Being and Time*. There are other scholars that have endorsed a view approximating mine, like Charles Guignon, but their accounts arise from being critical of subjectivist accounts. There has been very little work put into explicating an intersubjective account of authenticity, especially as compared to the subjectivist accounts. This thesis begins to bridge this gap by offering a full account of what intersubjective authenticity looks like. By offering a view of authenticity that focuses on Dasein's relation to its world, this account offers a view that is more compatible with Heidegger's project in *Being and Time*, and one that is more compatible with what Heidegger says in *Being and Time*. This solves one problem for Heidegger's project in *Being and Time*, though there are other related issues in the secondary literature of *Being and Time* which a thesis like this lays the groundwork for.

For example, I briefly mentioned in some footnotes that I would avoid discussing exactly how fallenness and discourse tie into authenticity. This is a somewhat murky topic that was outside of the scope of this debate, as the ways in which discourse and fallenness are unclear is not in ways that are typically read as supporting evidence for either a subjectivist or intersubjective account. For example, it is unclear whether fallenness has an authentic mode, or if discourse is the authentic mode of fallenness. Heidegger seems to suggest that discourse has inauthentic modes as seen through idle talk, but also potentially that fallenness has authentic modes as well. There is a general lack of clarity surrounding these concepts, but there is no

obvious connection between the concerns of this thesis and the issues I describe here. However, it is an area that impacts Heidegger's account of authenticity, so if someone wanted to offer a fuller account of authenticity, then it would include answers to the way that discourse and fallenness relate to authenticity. Another area where further exploration could be done is in the degree to which Lee Braver is correct in his assessment that Heidegger's understanding of authenticity undermines the position of metaphysical antirealism, or at least the elements of metaphysical antirealism that Braver believes are undermined by Heidegger's account of authenticity. With a clear account of what exactly authenticity is; exploring the degree to which Heidegger undermines metaphysical commitments would be far clearer, if he undermines them at all. These are all potential jumping off points from having a fuller account of authenticity like this, as they tie in to similar issues.

To conclude, this thesis has shown why a subjectivist interpretation of authenticity in *Being and Time* does not work. In its place, I have offered an intersubjective account of authenticity, which fleshes out elements of the literature which were previously underexplored. This involved going over each element of authenticity. First to show why the subjectivist account does not adequately account for what Heidegger says in *Being and Time*, then to show how these different elements would fit in with an intersubjective account. The main point that I established through this process was: Given that authenticity is about Dasein facing the conditions of its world in a head-on manner, the subjectivist interpretation cannot be correct. In order to establish this point, I also fleshed out what an intersubjective interpretation of authenticity would look like. This style of interpretation leads to an understanding of authenticity that is both more compatible with what Heidegger said in *Being and Time* and what Heidegger's project in *Being*

and Time was. This is why an intersubjective interpretation of authenticity in *Being and Time* should be endorsed.

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