

POLITICS FROM THE PULPIT:
A CRITICAL TEST OF ELITE CUES IN AMERICAN POLITICS

A dissertation submitted
to Kent State University in partial
fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

by

Jason M. Adkins

August 2018

© Copyright

All rights reserved

A dissertation written by

Jason M. Adkins

B.S., Utah Valley University, 2008

M.A., East Stroudsburg University of Pennsylvania, 2012

Ph.D., Kent State University, 2018

Approved by

Ryan L. Claassen, Chair, Doctoral Dissertation Committee

Michael J. Ensley, Member, Doctoral Dissertation Committee

Anthony D. Molina, Member, Doctoral Dissertation Committee

J. Quin Monson, Member, Doctoral Dissertation Committee

Manfred H.M. van Dulmen, Member, Doctoral Dissertation Committee

Accepted by

Andrew S. Barnes, Chair, Department of Political Science

James L. Blank, Dean, College of Arts and Sciences

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS	III
LIST OF FIGURES	V
LIST OF TABLES	VI
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	VII
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.....	1
HOW RELIGION AND POLITICS INTERTWINE.....	2
CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO STUDYING RELIGION AND POLITICS	3
WHY HIERARCHAL DIFFERENCES MATTERS	7
INITIAL QUESTIONS AND RESEARCH FINDINGS	9
CHAPTER 2: CASE SELECTION.....	13
PARISH POLITICS: EFFORTS BY CATHOLIC CLERGY TO INFLUENCE PARISHIONERS	25
OBEDIENCE AND FREEDOM: POLITICAL INFLUENCE WITHIN THE SOUTHERN BAPTIST CONVENTION	26
CLASSES, QUORUMS, AND TALKS: POLITICAL CUES WITHIN THE LDS CHURCH	28
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN	32
CONTENT ANALYSIS OF STATEMENTS MADE BY NATIONAL RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND DENOMINATIONS	34
ANALYSIS OF EXISTING SURVEY DATA.....	36
POLITICAL ATTITUDES SURVEY	37
ORGANIZATION OF DISSERTATION	39
CHAPTER 4: HOW RELIGIOUS ELITES DEPLOY CODED POLITICAL CUES	41
DO RELIGION AND POLITICS MIX?.....	43
POLITICAL CUES FROM SELECTED DENOMINATIONS	47
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION	53
CONCLUSION	56
CHAPTER 5: WHEN INDIVIDUALS SUPPORT OR OPPOSE RELIGIOUS ELITES..	58
HOW RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS MIX RELIGION AND POLITICS	61
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION AUTONOMY AND POLITICAL CUES.....	63
TESTING THE EFFECTS OF HIERARCHAL DIFFERENCES ON POLITICAL ATTITUDES.....	64
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION.....	77
CONCLUSION	85
CHAPTER 6: A SURVEY EXPERIMENT ON ELITE CUES	88
WHY RELIGIOUS ELITES PREACH POLITICS	90
ANALYZING POLITICAL CUES FROM RELIGIOUS ELITES.....	95
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION.....	101
CONCLUSION	108
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION	111

RESEARCH GOALS.....	115
REFERENCES.....	118
APPENDIX: 2017 POLITICAL ATTITUDES SURVEY	127

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 5.1: Predicted probabilities for opposing religious organization policies on abortion	82
Figure 5.2: Predicted probabilities for opposing religious organization policies on immigration, income inequality, and same-sex marriage	86
Figure 6.1: Predicted probabilities for Catholic political cues	104
Figure 6.2: Predicted probabilities for LDS political cues.....	108

LIST OF TABLES

Table 4.1: List of topic codes created for content analysis	52
Table 4.2: Percentage of elite communications that contain political cues	53
Table 5.1: Support/oppose religious organization stance on abortion for any reason.....	68
Table 5.2: Support/oppose religious organization stance on abortion due to rape.....	68
Table 5.3: Support/oppose religious organization stance on abortion when health of mother is at risk.....	68
Table 5.4: Support/oppose religious organization stance on immigration.....	68
Table 5.5: Support/oppose religious organization stance on whether government should address income inequality.....	69
Table 5.6: Support/oppose religious organization stance on same-sex marriage.....	69
Table 5.7: Percentage of individuals who support or oppose religious organization policies	70
Table 5.8: Financial autonomy of selected denominations	72
Table 5.9: Logistic regression results for opposing religious organization policies on abortion.	79
Table 5.10: Logistic regression results for opposing religious organization policies on immigration, income inequality, and same-sex marriage	83
Table 6.1: Regression coefficients for Catholic political cues	102
Table 6.2: Regression coefficients for LDS political cues.....	106

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

When people say getting a doctorate takes over your life, it is easy to laugh it off. However, my experience from classwork, developing a prospecting, carrying out research, and writing a dissertation, suggests that is all true, even when not accounting for time working as graduate assistant hours, writing conference papers, and teaching. With all of these responsibilities, there are many people whose love, friendship, and professionalism carried me through.

First of all, my wife Amanda has been the one who has had to work harder than me through this time. She took care of the children, worked, and completed a bachelor's degree while I was working on my coursework. Without her love and patience, I would never have been able to get this far. My children, Liam, Harrison, Molly, and Evelyn have sacrificed in order for me to complete my studies. At times, I felt I was an absentee father because of my time spent working, but they never complained about my absence and have shown unconditional love towards me. My parents, Karl Adkins and Kathleen Patterson, have provided much in the way of helping quench my thirst for knowledge. I was never wanting for books or other educational material, starting when I was a toddler, and they always encouraged me to strive for more. My stepmother Judy Adkins Robinette has been a cheerleader for me as I undertook and continued graduate school. My grandmother, Virginia Freeney, has also been a staunch advocate for my education. I also want to thank my late grandfather, Frank C. Freeney Jr. Although deceased for more than 20 years, he has been an inspiration for me in academia as I seek to follow his footsteps in academia

Many others have helped me professionally along the way. First and foremost is what my chair, Ryan Claasse, has done to encourage me to do what he thinks would set me up for a great

career. He has challenged me to go beyond my original plans. I also presume his recommendations have been invaluable to me working in academia. Others on my committee have also provided great advice. Michael Ensley helped teach some of the methodological skills I would need to be a successful researcher. Anthony Molina has given me great advice on how to navigate academia while raising children. Quin Monson, the outside member of my committee, helped provide the spark needed to field an original survey experiment and provide advice on how to study members of the LDS Church. Casey Boyd-Swan was generous in including me on her General Social Survey restricted data license, which saved me several hundred dollars. There are several professors I want to thank from East Stroudsburg University of Pennsylvania, where I received my master's degree in political science. Adam McGlynn, Jeffrey Weber, and Michael Gray, who each encouraged me to pursue a doctorate. Others in the field, such as Laura Olson and Paul Djupe, have also encouraged me at various times, and I am grateful for their help.

I also wish to thank fellow graduate students (now graduates) who have encouraged me along the way. Dominic Wells helped me in many ways in being a friend, a shoulder to cry on, and a study partner. Nicolas Anspach and Gorana Draguljić adopted me as one of their own while still working on their dissertations while at Temple University. They have been invaluable in their friendship in the four years I have known them. Their fellow Temple alumni, Jay Jennings and Meghan Rubado, have also welcomed me as one of their own. I once again owe a debt of gratitude to everyone for their support.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

“The Church does not engage in politics; its members belong to the political parties at their own pleasure. ... They are not asked, much less required, to vote this way or that,”

– Joseph F. Smith, President of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints

Religion seemingly plays an important role in the lives of Americans, as approximately 60 percent of Americans report they attend religious services on at least a monthly basis.¹ With most Americans placing some value on religion, how religious belief and practices affect political attitudes and voting behavior remains an oft-studied topic by scholars. Scholars, however, are split into two camps regarding this analysis. One camp focuses on the beliefs and practices of the individual (Green 2007; Guth et al. 2006; Guth, Green, and Smidt 2002; Kellstedt et al. 1996; Leege and Kellstedt 1993), while the second camp analyzes how practices and norms within religious congregations affects political attitudes and voting behavior (Adkins et al. 2013; Brewer, Kersh, and Peterson 2003; Djupe and Gilbert 2008; Jelen 2003; Olson 2000; Putnam and Campbell 2010).

Existing research finds much in the way of how religious traditions are politically distinct, whether those are Catholics, mainstream Protestants, evangelical Protestants, black Protestants, Mormons, and others (D. E. Campbell, Green, and Monson 2014; Green 2007; Putnam and Campbell 2010; G. A. Smith 2008; Guth et al. 2006; Guth, Green, and Smidt 2002; Olson 2000; Leege and Kellstedt 1993). This distinctiveness indicate that some religious groups,

¹ Pew Research Center, “U.S. Public Becoming Less Religious,” 3 November 2015, http://www.pewforum.org/files/2015/11/201.11.03_RLS_II_full_report.pdf

such as evangelical Protestants and Mormons, are more conservative and tend to vote Republican in greater numbers than members of other religious groups. Other religious traditions, such as mainline Protestants, tend to have more political diversity within their ranks (e.g. Episcopal Church and the United Methodist Church) or swing liberal (e.g. United Church of Christ). Studies within religious congregations indicate that politics is intertwined with religious teachings in diverse ways, but how remains a question (Djupe and Gilbert 2008; G. A. Smith 2008; Brewer, Kersh, and Peterson 2003; D. E. Campbell and Monson 2003; Olson 2000).

Although these two camps complement one another in many ways, research investigating individuals consistently finds that religious persons are politically distinctive (e.g. mainly conservative) while research investigating politics within religious congregations typically finds very little explicit political discussion. There is a solution to this paradox. What if political messages in religious settings tend to be coded? What if religious leaders use “reverse God talk?” If “God Talk” is describes the use of coded messages by politicians that are only recognized as having religious content by co-religionists (e.g. (Djupe and Calfano 2013), the reverse God talk scenario I propose refers to coded messages delivered by religious leaders that congregants would connect to political action, but which would appear to be innocuous to many outsiders.

Through a content analysis of historical archives of statements issued by religious organizations and their leaders, my research regarding the frequency and content of political cues advances the current state of the literature regarding how elites influence voters. In addition, I address whether and/or how often religious leaders engage in reverse God talk. I also utilized existing survey data to determine how differences among religious organizations and a community’s level of political heterogeneity may account for whether individuals support or

oppose their religious group's stance on various issues. Finally, I fielded an original survey experiment to test how effective political cues from religious organizations and their respective leaders are in influencing political attitudes and behavior.

How Religion and Politics Intertwine

National and local religious leaders are influential in affecting the political attitudes, opinions, and behavior of members of their organizations. Religious leaders are influential not only because they are day-to-day administrators of their congregations, but are also looked upon to provide guidance on doctrinal matters (Djupe and Gilbert 2008, 2003; Jelen 2003; Guth et al. 2006, 1997; R. Huckfeldt, Plutzer, and Sprague 1993; Welch et al. 1993; Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988). In applying this to the formation of political attitudes and subsequent voting behavior, some religious leaders seek to connect their denomination's religious doctrine to how their respective congregants should view and act on political issues (D. E. Campbell, Green, and Monson 2014; Djupe and Gilbert 2008; G. A. Smith 2008; Brewer, Kersh, and Peterson 2003). It is apparent from the literature that religious leaders attempt to influence their congregations regarding political matters. However, the frequency and content of those cues, whether cues are "coded" to be understood only by members of congregations, and how those cues may be received by members of congregations remains a puzzle for scholars.

With most Americans attending religious services on at least a monthly basis, the frequency and content of political cues made by religious leaders continues to be a salient topic for scholars because this elite influence can affect public opinion, which, in turn, can affect public policy. The rise of the Christian Right in the late 1970s and into the 1980s led to religious leaders facing increased scrutiny regarding the influence they could wield. However, it is important to be clear the efforts of the Christian Right are different than outright politicking in

from the pulpit. Because of the influence of the Christian Right in developing strategies to get members of various Christian religious organizations to support various conservative politicians and policies, there is an assumption those efforts mean religious organizations and their leaders deliver explicit political instruction to their members. That link is understandable as studies have indicated those who attend church more frequently are more likely to vote for Republican presidential candidates (Olson and Green 2006; Guth et al. 2006; Guth, Green, and Smidt 2002; Guth et al. 1997; Smidt 2004; Vinson and Guth 2003; Green et al. 1996). Those who attend more frequently are also in position to hear more cues and be favorable to political messages coming from their leaders, as frequent attendance could be correlated with approval of such cues.

A 2010 Gallup Poll further illustrates how religious affiliation may affect political attitudes and potential voting behavior. According to the survey, 59 percent of Mormons (members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints) indicated they are politically conservative, while 46 percent of Protestants and other Christians, and 39 percent of Catholics indicated they are conservative.² Data from the General Social Survey from 1972-2014 indicates members of religious groups, in general, are also more extreme in their conservative political beliefs, along with data suggesting those who attend worship services more frequently are more conservative, as well ((T. W. Smith et al. n.d.). Those who attend more frequently are also in position to hear more cues and be favorable to political messages coming from their leaders, as frequent attendance could be correlated with approval of such cues.

Contemporary Approaches to Studying Religion and Politics

² Frank Newport, “Mormons Most Conservative Major Religious Group in U.S.,” *Gallup*, 11 January, 2010.

Methodological and theoretical differences have emerged in how scholars have analyzed how members of various religious denominations differ regarding their political attitudes and behavior. One group, which studies the characteristics of individuals instead of looking at how religious groups operate, utilize surveys with a large nationally representative sample of respondents. These surveys are used to analyze differences and establish correlations between individual religious beliefs, such as believing the Bible is the literal word of God, and attitudes and behavior on a variety of economic and social/moral issues (Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2014; Putnam and Campbell 2010; Beyerlein and Chaves 2003; Guth et al. 2006; Guth, Green, and Smidt 2002; Guth et al. 1997; Smidt 2004; Scheufele, Nisbet, and Brossard 2003; Green et al. 1996; Kellstedt et al. 1996; R. Huckfeldt et al. 1995; R. Huckfeldt, Plutzer, and Sprague 1993; Leege and Kellstedt 1993; Welch et al. 1993; Jelen and Wilcox 1992). These studies also tend to group religious organizations into broad categories, such as Catholics, mainline Protestants, evangelical Protestants, members of other religious traditions, and those who are non-religious (the “nones”), as scholars argue sample sizes for specific denominations are too small to determine statistical significance (Steensland et al. 2000; Kellstedt et al. 1996; Leege and Kellstedt 1993). Green et al. (1996) and Guth et al. (2006) suggest behavior within denominations can also be divided into fundamentalist, traditionalist, and modernist camps, which helps deepen our understanding that members cannot be painted with a broad brush.

A second group of scholars have focused on studying behavior that takes place within religious congregations. These studies include surveying, observing, and interviewing individual congregations to determine how differences of how local congregations are structured affects political attitudes and behaviors (Glazier 2015; Djupe and Calfano 2013; Friesen and Wagner 2012; Smidt and Schaap 2009; Djupe and Gilbert 2008, 2003; G. A. Smith 2008; Fox 2006;

Brewer, Kersh, and Peterson 2003; Jelen 2003; D. E. Campbell and Monson 2003; Smidt et al. 2003; Olson 2000; O. P. Smith 2000; Byrnes 1991; Beatty and Walter 1989). These scholars use a variety of methodologies in addressing how local congregational contexts affect political attitudes (Glazier 2015; D. E. Campbell, Green, and Monson 2014; Djupe and Calfano 2013; Smidt and Schaap 2009; Djupe and Gilbert 2008, 2003; Fox 2006; Jelen 2003; Smidt et al. 2003; Beatty and Walter 1989). Other scholars rely on interviews or participant observation to determine these differences (Fox 2006; G. A. Smith 2008; Brewer, Kersh, and Peterson 2003; Olson 2000; O. P. Smith 2000; Harris 1999; Byrnes 1991). An even smaller set have analyzed how religious belief affects political attitudes using experiments (D. E. Campbell, Green, and Monson 2014; Adkins et al. 2013; Djupe and Calfano 2013) or focus group sessions (Friesen and Wagner 2012). D. E. Campbell, Green, and Monson (2014, 141–42) indicate the results of their experiment suggest political cues by LDS religious leaders are effective only if the leaders are unified on an issue and the message is delivered by the highest religious leader(s) of those organizations.

Existing literature regarding how political cues from religious leaders and members of congregations affect political attitudes and behavior is limited due to their focus on a small amount of denominations or religious traditions. Guth et al. (1997) surveyed religious leaders of eight Protestant denominations and claim the roots of the Christian Right can be traced to leaders with a traditionalist theological orientation seeking to push back against those with modernist orientations. Djupe and Gilbert (2008) utilize surveys to illustrate how religious organizations affect the political attitudes of their members by surveying local leaders and members of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of America and the Episcopal Church, and establishing correlations between the attitudes of those leaders and of their congregants. Djupe and Gilbert

(2008) claim religious leaders are constrained in many ways, as congregants may not wish to mix politics and religion, have different political ideologies than their religious leaders, or are ill-informed to receive and accept cues. Smidt and Schaap (2009) surveyed religious leaders from one mainline and one evangelical Protestant denomination, and suggest religious leaders who are from more liberal religious tradition are more likely to deliver political cues, and also indicate a number of contextual factors related to a member of a clergy's relationship with their congregations helps explain the frequency and depth of political cue-giving. Djupe and Olson (2007, 7) acknowledged the limitations of developing broad theory by examining the two mainline Protestant denominations that Djupe and Gilbert surveyed (2008, 2003).

Beyerlein and Chaves (2003, 242) surveyed religious leaders of several denominations and found that mainline Protestant denominations are more likely to have political discussion groups and allow candidates to speak at church-sponsored events. Their findings also indicate evangelical Protestant congregations are more likely to distribute voter guides, black Protestant congregations are more likely to engage in voter registration and get-out-the-vote efforts, and Catholic congregations are more likely to organize protests (Beyerlein and Chaves 2003, 242). However, questions remain regarding the source of why some denominations, even within religious traditions, are more likely or reluctant to engage in overt political activity.

Other methodologies are also limited due to constraints such as the sheer amount of data that can be collected via interviews and historical archives, and the ability to conduct research that is not limited to small geographic areas. Harris (1999) traced political activism within black Protestant churches by interpreting historical archival data, and determined those churches are heavily engaged in civil rights issues. Putnam and Campbell (2010) utilized survey data and interviews of a limited number of congregations to establish that the gulf between those who are

religious and those who are not believers is widening, but the gulf in political attitudes and behaviors among the religious is shrinking as religious identity is becoming more fluid. Olson (2000) examined political attitudes of religious leaders in Milwaukee, Wis., using interviews and U.S. Census tract data to argue that religious leaders are most politically active in poorer areas within inner cities. As the study was confined to religious leaders in one metropolitan area in the Midwest, generalizability is an issue. Olson (2000, 137) also suggests the reliability and validity of her interviews are subject to scrutiny, as she states that getting the same religious leaders to offer up similar answers may be difficult.

Scholars have also utilized survey experiments to test the causal link between cues from elites and the effectiveness of those cues have on recipients. Djupe and Calfano (2013) found respondents who are religious pick up on “coded” religious messages in hypothetical statements made by politicians. Djupe and Calfano’s (2013) experiments also indicate religious voters are reluctant to support atheist candidates, inclusive religious cues lead to liberal attitudes and exclusive religious cues lead to conservative attitudes on various issues, and there are limitations to outside religious leaders’ influence on believers. Adkins et al. (2013) embedded treatments in the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election survey and find religious leaders are more influential when they deliver political cues on cultural issues, and those cues have a greater effect on those with less political knowledge. D. E. Campbell, Green, and Monson (2014, 150) tested the acceptance of political cues made by LDS Church leaders that indicated Mormons who place higher value on the authority of their religious leaders are more likely to respond to explicit political cues made by those leaders.

Why Hierarchical Differences Matter

In researching how religious denominations differ in how political cues are delivered, the structure of individual denominations is overlooked. For example, some organizations are highly centralized, such as The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS Church). Others can be considered to have moderate centralization and autonomy, such as the Roman Catholic Church, the Episcopal Church, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, and the United Methodist Church (Berry 2012; Rademacher, Weber, and McNeill Jr. 2007). Finally, some organizations allow for a large amount of autonomy for local congregations such as the Southern Baptist Convention and other Baptist organizations, along with many non-denominational churches that are not affiliated with a parent organization, or if affiliated, only in a limited fashion (Farnsley II 1994).

Hierarchal differences among religious organizations can mean many things. One definition is who appoints leaders of local congregations. In the LDS Church, for example, officials at the church's headquarters in Salt Lake City, Utah, have ultimate authority over local leadership and are involved in naming leaders of local congregations (bishops or branch presidents). Within others, such as the Roman Catholic Church, Episcopal Church, or United Methodist Church, regional organizations or leaders appoints leaders of local congregations. In organizations with a large amount of local autonomy, a congregation chooses its leaders, or individuals can start their own local congregation and recruit members.

Hierarchy also plays a role in financial matters. In some religious organizations, local autonomy is limited (e.g. LDS Church) as congregations do not develop their own budgets, can approve building capital projects, hold title to property, and or have control over monetary donations. In moderate autonomy environments, which can be found in the Roman Catholic Church and Episcopal Church, for example, the diocese has authority to develop budgets and

controls donations but send a portion of their proceeds to the general organization's leadership to support their operations. In high autonomy environments, such as various Baptist organizations or non-denominational churches, the local congregation has control over budgets and owns title to their building.

These hierarchal differences also extend into how people are being taught religious doctrine at the local level. For example, the LDS Church develops curriculum for adult and youth classes that are standardized. There is some opportunity for veering off the curriculum as local leaders ask people from the congregation to speak in weekly religious services, and those speakers can develop their own speeches without oversight from others. However, Sunday School-type lessons are from lesson manuals and lessons are delivered to members on a defined schedule. In other organizations, there may be standardized material developed at the church-wide level, but regional organizations may develop their own curriculum. In other cases, no standardized material may be available, and teachers are free to develop their own lessons under the guidance of local leaders. These differences are important as my analysis of General Social Survey data found hierarchal differences matter in determining if people support or oppose their religious organization on various political issues.

Initial Questions and Research Findings

As mentioned previously, this dissertation bridges the gap between what religious elites talk about and if it matters in swaying political attitudes and opinions. The first task was analyzing statements and speeches from various religious organizations and leaders to determine how frequent do they deliver political cues, are these messages coded (reverse God talk), and which issues do they address. I find that religious organizations and their leaders focus heavily on helping the less fortunate and giving service to others.

In tackling these questions, I analyzed statements made by religious elites from the Roman Catholic Church, Southern Baptist Convention, and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. The rationale for selecting these three cases is discussed in Chapter 2. Through a content analysis of more than 10,000 documents, I find the three selected religious organizations prioritize helping the poor and providing service in their statements. Roman Catholic leaders prioritize economic issues and issues such as war more than they focus on social issues such as abortion and same-sex marriage. When they do speak out, they deliver explicit political cues sparingly, with coded political cues outnumbering explicit political cues by approximately a 9-to-1 ratio.

Southern Baptist and LDS religious elites prioritize helping the poor and providing service, as do their Catholic colleagues. However, these two organizations and elites who deliver political cues on their behalf are also more willing to discuss social issues, such as same-sex marriage, alcohol and drug use, and influence from entertainment sources compared to Catholic leaders. One split emerges, though, in that Southern Baptist elites are more apt to deliver explicit cues compared to both LDS and Catholic elites. This is not surprising, as the Southern Baptist Convention has issued resolutions calling for a boycott of The Walt Disney Company and criticized President Clinton for his sexual behavior related to his impeachment. Conversely, LDS leaders are rather reluctant to deliver explicit political cues, as such cues are only made in about 1 percent or less of their cues on a given topic. This indicates religious elites from those three organizations often utilize reverse God talk when they seek to deliver political cues.

In Chapter 5, I analyze General Social Survey data to determine how hierarchal differences among several Christian religious organizations matter in whether individuals support or oppose their respective religious organizations' stances on a range of issues. I

leveraged the results from the content analysis results to determine which issues are salient among religious elites. One interesting finding that emerged is that there is support for the notion that hierarchical differences matter regarding supporting various political stances religious organizations take on diverse issues. Members of religious organizations where the central leadership have more control over local congregations are more likely to oppose their denomination on a range of issues. As expected, frequency of religious service attendance matters as those who attend more often are more likely to support their organization's policies.

I also test whether length of religious sermons and general worship services may factor into whether individuals support or oppose their denomination. I generally find that longer sermons lead to individuals being more likely to support the policies of their respective religious organization, with longer worship services having an opposite effect. Finally, I test how the outside political environment may matter. Increased vote share for Republican presidential candidates at the state and county level leads to a higher probability of opposing denominational policies.

Finally, I leverage the results of the content analysis to field an original survey experiment (2017 Political Attitudes Survey) to test how effective political cues are from religious elites among those who identify with that religious group, as well as those who identify with other religious groups and those who do not identify with a religious group (the "nones"). I find that both coded and explicit political cues from these elites are not effective among members of those groups. I also find there is "backlash" among co-religionists and the "nones" to these cues that leads individuals in those groups that received a political cue from a religious leader possessing political attitudes that goes against the intent of the cue compared to individuals who did not receive a cue.

This dissertation provides further insight into what religious organizations and religious elites do to try to sway their members regarding various political issues. From there, this leads into increased understanding how differences among religious organizations and the outside political environment matter in how individuals may process political cues from religious elites. The results provide further insight in the effectiveness of political cues on individual attitudes, and also how these cues may affect those who are not members of the target audience. This research also provides additional avenues of future research into the effectiveness of political communication by religious leaders.

CHAPTER 2: CASE SELECTION

The specific denominations I examine in detail are the Roman Catholic Church, Southern Baptist Convention, and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS Church). The three denominations were chosen as their hierarchal structure and worship services differ in various ways. Differences in leadership structure and how worship services are conducted among religious organizations also appear to have an effect of the frequency and content of political cues, whether they are reverse God talk or explicit, offered within worship services. Legee (1992, 200) claims that in denominations where local leadership have greater autonomy, those local leaders develop “followers” who are more likely to be influenced by political cues. Welch et al. (1993, 248–49) suggest differences in hierarchal structure matters as evangelical Protestants are more likely to place authority in their local leaders than Roman Catholics and mainline Protestant denominations with strong national leadership. Scheufele, Nisbet, and Brossard (2003, 305) argue that members of evangelical Protestant denominations, which tend to place more authority in local leadership than national organizations, are exposed to more political cues than Catholics and mainline Protestants. Evangelical Protestant congregations also have a greater tendency to have more political heterogeneity than Catholic or mainstream Protestant congregations (Scheufele, Nisbet, and Brossard 2003, 304–5). As the organizational structure and format of worship services differ among the denominations I selected, I was able to test whether and how hierarchy and the structure of worship services matter regarding the frequency and content of political cues that are delivered. I also determined whether religious

leaders deliver political cues through “coded” messages, which are cues that outsiders may struggle to fully understand.

In separating out hierarchical differences among denominations, the Roman Catholic Church provides an example of a denomination with a highly structured worship service. A typical Catholic Mass has little variation among parishes, except for the homily (sermon) priests or bishops deliver. The Roman Catholic Church also gives local dioceses and parishes considerable autonomy in several matters. Doctrinal decisions are centralized at church headquarters at the Vatican, while Catholic orders (Dominicans, Franciscans, Jesuits, etc.) and local dioceses have leeway in administrative affairs such as constructing new church buildings, staffing various parishes, and in handling finances. Individual dioceses and parishes also hold title to church buildings and land (Berry 2012; Rademacher, Weber, and McNeill Jr. 2007, 118). Local parishes are funded through offerings and fundraisers, while dioceses are funded through a “tax” assessed on local parishes and annual Bishop’s Appeal fundraising campaigns (Piderit and Morey 2008, 221). The Vatican appoints bishops who lead dioceses, but the selection, ordination, and assignment of priests are handled at the diocesan level (Reilly and Chalmers 2014, 144; Stark and McCann 1993, 116). Local parishes in the U.S. are also responsible for raising funds for the Vatican, which is accomplished through the “Peter’s Pence” that is an additional offering that occurs once a year during Mass (Piderit and Morey 2008, 221). Catholics are also relatively free to attend whatever congregation they wish to attend. While Catholics are technically assigned parishes, they are not bound to attend their local parish, as permission is routinely granted for Catholics to receive sacraments (ordinances) in other parishes (Steinfels 2003, 105–6).

The Southern Baptist Convention is a denomination that can be categorized as giving local congregations a large amount of autonomy and has a relatively unstructured worship service. Unlike most other denominations, the Southern Baptist Convention serves as an organization of statewide conventions and individual churches, and its hierarchal structure is relatively uncommon among other denominations (Farnsley II 1994, 3). At its highest levels, the Southern Baptist Convention issues resolutions on various issues that are voted in annual conventions. How resolutions filter down to local congregations is still unexplored, as congregations are relatively free to obey or disregard resolutions. The Southern Baptist Convention has little control regarding the operation of individual churches, with the exception of having the power to sanction individual churches whose teachings are not in harmony with the national convention organization

The LDS Church is considered highly centralized as all doctrinal and many day-to-day administrative decisions are made at the church's headquarters in Salt Lake City, Utah. The LDS Church's First Presidency and Quorum of the Twelve Apostles have final authority over all matter pertaining to church doctrine and administrative matters. For example, all bishops and branch presidents (leaders of local congregations) are approved by leaders in Salt Lake City. The LDS Church's Corporation of the First Presidency holds the title to all buildings and land, budgets and funds for all congregations are approved and held by church headquarters, and all tithing and other contributions are sent to church headquarters in Salt Lake City.³ Mormons are also assigned to a specific congregation to attend, known as either a ward or branch within the

³ While no information is publicly available concerning how LDS Church finances is handled, posts in various threads on the LDS Tech Forum "Local Unit Finance" message board state that all funds in local unit bank accounts are routinely transferred to church headquarters, <https://tech.lds.org/forum/>.

church, that is based on geographic location. With few exceptions, members are unable to choose a congregation based on personal preferences.

The local organization and worship service in the LDS Church is also unique in many ways. The LDS Church utilizes a lay clergy, with the exception of top leadership based in Salt Lake City. The worship service is also a paradox to the church's highly centralized nature in that most worship services consists of two or three sermons by members of congregations. These sermons offer a chance for members of local congregations to deliver political cues. Local church leaders also speak during these services at various times throughout the year. A typical LDS worship service also extends past a one-hour traditional worship service common in other Christian denominations, with members expected to attend an hour-long Sunday School class and then attend an hour-long Priesthood class (for males aged 12 and over), Relief Society (for adult females), or Young Women's (for women aged 12-18).

Additional justification for selecting these denominations is that they are three of the four largest religious organizations in the United States. The Roman Catholic Church is the largest denomination in the United States with 59 million adherents, the Southern Baptist Convention is the second-largest denomination with 19 million members, and Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints is the fifth-largest denomination with 6.6 million members in the United States.⁴ The Roman Catholic Church remains an important group to study because approximately 18 percent of Americans identify as Catholic.⁵ The Southern Baptist Church is a salient case as many Southern Baptist leaders backed greater political mobilization efforts starting in the late 1970s and into the 1980s, and was one of the major religious organizations to take an active role during

⁴ Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies, "U.S. Religion Census 2010: Summary Findings," http://www.rcms2010.org/press_release/ACP%2020120501.pdf

⁵ Estimation obtained by dividing number of Catholics by current U.S. population.

the rise of the Christian Right in American politics (Green, Rozell, and Wilcox 2003; Vinson and Guth 2003; O. P. Smith 2000; Martin 1996). The LDS Church is a salient case as the church has a history of involvement in political issues that includes support for ballot measures to ban same-sex marriage, opposing the Equal Rights Amendment during the ratification process in the 1970s and 1980s, opposing gambling, and opposing legalization of marijuana (D. E. Campbell and Monson 2003).

Besides probing on the question of reverse God talk (coded political cues political elites may deliver, I also analyze how cues made by elites within the Roman Catholic Church, Southern Baptist Convention, and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints may differ based on the issue at hand. As previously stated, scholars tend to confine themselves to one geographic area or focus on differences in political attitudes and behavior based on broad classification schemes. Additionally, scholars have mainly studied how political cues in a worship environment affect political attitudes and behavior through surveying or interviewing religious leaders and congregants. My research broadens our understanding regarding reverse God talk made by religious leaders through an analysis of statements made by those denominations and by their top leadership. This research also examines if and/or how religious leaders utilize “coded” messages embedded in statements to preach politics to their members. An advantage of my approach is that it offers a comparison across three major Christian organizations in the U.S. with different doctrinal beliefs and organizational structures.

Influencing Church Members Through Political Cues

Two broad theories have been developed regarding how political cues might influence voters. The Columbia school (sociological), whose research was led by Berelson, Lazarus, and McPhee (1954), suggest individual political attitudes are developed through associations with

friends, family, and members of the community. In addition, people prefer associations with those who confirm our existing biases. The Michigan model (psychological), developed by A. Campbell et al. (1960), claim individuals develop political attitudes from family, but add short-term forces also determine vote choice, party identification, and political ideology. These short-term forces include one's attitudes towards domestic and foreign policy issues, and how an individual is faring in the economic conditions at the present time.

The effect of elite influence in the Michigan model is limited. Zaller (1992) indicated elites have the ability to shape public opinion, which is conditional according to one's ability to receive and accept cues. According to Zaller (1992), less informed individuals are more susceptible to elite cues, while highly informed individuals are less susceptible to messages that conflict with their pre-existing attitudes.

In the religion and politics literature, there is also a divide, which was discussed previously regarding how individuals characteristics and attitudes matter (Green et al. 1996; Legee and Kellstedt 1993), and others who claim congregational forces matter more in determining political attitudes (Djupe and Gilbert 2008). What occurs within local religious congregations has drawn the attention of scholars because of the amount of time congregants spend in worship services and participating in other activities that are organized by religious groups. My research seeks to blend the two approaches by suggesting both play a significant role than the "either/or" paradigm that is predominant in the field.

The addition of the reverse God talk concept to the literature helps broaden our understanding of how religious leaders attempt to deliver political cues to members of religious organizations and what the effect of those cues may be. Religious leaders utilize reverse God talk because their audiences may be more receptive to their messages. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady

(1995, 369) claim religious organizations “serve as the locus for requests for involvement” and are uniquely positioned in American society for like-minded individuals to connect with one another. Djupe and Gilbert (2006), Alford et. al (2011) and McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook (2001) argue religious organizations help members build skills, and members put more time into their religious organization to serve the needs of that organization and its members. Mutz (2006) suggests members of religious organizations reinforce fellow congregants’ political attitudes. Djupe and Grant (2001, 304) claim “spillover” from religious belief to political activism occurs as religious leaders encourage their members to “live their religion” on a day-to-day basis. However, Scheufele, Nisbet, and Brossard (2003) claim through their analysis of the 2000 American National Election Survey that religious networks are not as influential as secular social networks of which individuals may be a part of.

In determining how reverse God talk translates into political action, various individual components are thought to play a large role in why members of religious organizations hold certain political attitudes and opinions compared to others. Religiosity, which is a concept that captures an individual’s religious activity and belief, is salient in determining how membership in a religious body influences the political attitudes and behavior. (L. E. Smith and Olson 2013; Putnam and Campbell 2010; G. A. Smith 2008; Green 2007; Green et al. 1996; Olson and Green 2006). L E. Smith and Olson (2013, 292) define activity as to how a respondent prioritizes and spends time practicing their religion, whether through religious service attendance or time spent in prayer. Members of religious organizations who regularly participate in their religion share ideas and information, and leaders also present cues to their congregations in an overt or subliminal manner. This approach is associated with the three Bs (believing, behaving, and

belonging) that suggests individual belief shapes political attitudes and opinions more so than what any activities that may occur within a particular denomination.

The acceptance and effective of reverse God talk by members of religious organizations can be shaped by the norms and practices of individual religious organizations, or even norms practices that local congregations within religious organization develop. A combination of messages from elites and socialization from fellow congregants influence the political attitudes of members of religious organizations (Guth et al. 2006; Layman 2001). The norm within various religious organizations suggest political cue-giving, whether from reverse God talk or more explicit cues, is not a rare occurrence (Brewer, Kersh, and Peterson 2003; Guth, Green, and Smidt 2002; Guth et al. 1997; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Gilbert 1993; Jelen 1991; Beatty and Walter 1989). Religious elites deliver these cues and congregants accept them because of well-accepted attitudes and opinions that religious belief is not only about theoretical concerns of the afterlife, but also should factor in how individuals behave from day-to-day (Snell 2014; G. A. Smith 2008; Djupe and Gilbert 2008, 13; Crawford and Olson 2001; Gilbert 1993; R. Huckfeldt, Plutzer, and Sprague 1993; Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988, 545; Lenski 1961; E. Q. Campbell and Pettigrew 1959). The influence of political cue-giving from religious leaders and fellow congregants appears be stronger in communities where religious groups operate in “hostile environments” where denominations may feel oppressed by those who are not members of the congregation (D. E. Campbell, Green, and Monson 2014; Djupe and Gilbert 2008, 13; Finke and Stark 2005; McGreevy 1996; Moore 1986; Finifter 1974).

The acceptance of political cues delivered by religious leaders (either reverse God talk or explicit) varies among religious organizations. Scholars have suggested the effect of political cues delivered by religious leaders is highly contextualized based upon numerous factors. Djupe

and Calfano (2013) claim the influence of religious leaders on the political attitudes and behavior of their congregants is limited among those who are most fervent in their beliefs, while indicators of belief such as frequency of worship service attendance are not accurate predictors of how well cues from religious leaders are received. Djupe and Gilbert (2008) indicate members of religious organizations are more amiable to listening to political cues from their own leaders as the doctrine of their organization diverges from those of other religious organizations in the area. Other variables Djupe and Gilbert (2008) argue need to be considered in measuring the effectiveness of political cues by religious leaders are the organization structure of denominations and how autonomous a local church is compared to the national organization, which may offer leeway to religious leaders regarding what type of political activity leaders of local congregations might engage in.

Evangelical Protestant groups have received much attention due to the rise of the “Religious Right” in the 1970s and 1980s. Part of the reason why political cue giving from evangelical Protestant leaders has drawn the attention of scholars and the media is that those political cues may more effective than political cues delivered by religious leaders in other organizations. Welch et al. (1993, 249) claim evangelical Protestants are more receptive to political cues offered by religious leaders as evangelicals collectively invest their own leaders with moral authority, while mainline Protestants and Catholics do not heed cues from religious leaders to that extent as those organizations stress individual political action over collective political action. D. E. Campbell (2004) argues evangelical Protestant leaders exert more influence compared to other leaders in other denominations because evangelical Protestant denominations ask more of their members regarding their day-to-day lives compared to other denominations. Jelen (2003, 601) suggests the results of his national survey of Catholic priests

indicate clergy are reluctant to be “out of step” with members of a parish on social issues such as abortion and same-sex marriage, but are more likely to advocate against the prevailing attitudes of parish members in supporting greater government involvement in economic issues.

It is also possible previous research has overlooked the effect of political cues within worship environments because reverse God talk is often coded. In building off of Djupe and Calfano’s (2013, 46) “God talk” paradigm, the manner of how religious leaders and congregants weave political cues into sermons and other communications inside local religious congregations is salient. These code words would be picked up on by those who are in tune with religious themes, and also aware of politics. This is not to say those outside a religious group may be completely unaware of political cue-giving taking place, but religious leaders within these groups utilize specific language that I argue builds off of previous explicit political cues. In essence, to avoid making constant explicit cues, religious leaders utilize God talk because of concerns over possibly losing tax-exempt status, tolerance for explicit cues within religious organizations, and even concerns from religious leaders who may worry that the effectiveness of political cues may weaken if they constantly engage in explicit political cue-giving in worship environments.

Reverse God talk varies in its subtlety. Examples of code words include self-sufficiency, “sanctity of life and of the family,” “God is testing us,” “come to Zion,” among others. LDS Church leaders often use self-sufficiency regarding social welfare programs and the need to avoid government welfare. Many religious leaders speak out about “traditional families,” which is a code word that has evolved. Originally, it referred to two-parent families, but the term morphed in the late 1990s to speak out against same-sex unions. Reverse God talk does not utilize explicit cues in to the extent they tell their members how to vote. Instead, these cues build

off previously delivered explicit cues, which have given congregants concrete political instructions (D. E. Campbell, Green, and Layman 2011). Congregants connect the coded cues to what issue positions they should take or whom to vote for, as voters often use heuristics from elites as mental shortcuts (Djupe and Calfano 2013, 46; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 51; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). Partially refuting earlier work, Djupe and Calfano (2013, 46) suggest voters do not need to possess much information that helps voters determine why coded cues are relevant. This counters Converse's (1964, 236–37) argument that suggests voters needs to have some cognition in linking these cues to groups. Unlike previous research that sought to identify coded religious messages made by political actors, my research seeks to identify how coded political messages made within worship services affects the political behavior and attitudes of congregants.

In seeking out correlations among variables measuring religious belief, and political attitudes and behavior, scholars have advocated for different approaches to account for institutional differences and differences among clergy. G. A. Smith (2008, 63) claims that by adding variables to indicate the ideology of clergy, as he did in his survey of Catholic priests, strong correlations can be made between a clergy's partisan attitudes and the beliefs of their congregants on a variety of issues. Smidt et al. (2003) contend several factors, which include tenure of clergy and size of congregation, affect whether mainline Protestant leaders are politically active and seek to influence congregants. Smidt et al. (2003), who surveyed leaders of several Protestant denominations, also argue most mainline Protestant leaders express a desire to be more politically active than they are. Glazier (2015), through her surveys of members of various religious congregations in Little Rock, Ark., indicates there is a correlation between the ability of congregants to understand and follow through on political cues delivered by religious

leaders to a congregant's overall level of interest in politics. Snell (2014), who utilized several national surveys and gathered his own survey data, claims members of religious congregations enforce social norms and this behavior accounts for the similarity of political beliefs among members of congregations.

Within the Roman Catholic, Southern Baptist Convention, and LDS Church, institutional contexts may affect the frequency and content of reverse God talk and explicit political cues. Members of the Roman Catholic Church have short opportunities to receive political cues in a worship service setting and attempts by national clergy to influence church members may be limited. Activist wings within the Catholic Church exist on the conservative and liberal ends of the political spectrum. Political advocacy sponsored by the hierarchy within the Roman Catholic Church is led by efforts of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, whose members consist of all bishops in the United States. Through its official magazine, *Origins*, and website, which are available to the general public, the USCCB routinely published articles supporting or opposing various political issues.

Members of Southern Baptist congregations often have one main pastor, with some congregations having assistant pastors, who deliver sermons during worship services. The influence of national religious leaders on rank-and-file Southern Baptists may be small, depending how much attention leaders and members of local congregations pay to resolutions approved by the Southern Baptist Convention and other communications coming from the national organization. The influence of the highest echelons of leadership in the LDS Church is high, as the First Presidency and Quorum of the Twelve Apostles are considered "prophets, seers, and revelators" by the faithful. These leaders also have ample opportunity to communicate with the membership of the church through the twice-annual General Conference where leaders

deliver sermons, and church members are expected to either attend in person, watch the proceedings via satellite feed in local LDS buildings, or access the proceedings at home via the Internet or through church-owned BYUtv, which is available on cable and satellite TV platforms. The LDS Church also communicates with members directly through its website, issuing statements that are read in worship services, and through the LDS Church's periodicals. The breadth and depth of direct communication made by the LDS Church's top leadership to its members all over the world is relatively unique compared to other denominations. The structure of an LDS worship service where local church leaders and members of the congregation take turns delivering sermons, as well as the three-hour length of those meetings also provides many opportunities for cues to be delivered compared to other denominations.

Parish Politics: Efforts by Catholic Clergy to Influence Parishioners

Political cues delivered by Catholic clergy, either reverse God talk or explicit, can be delivered in a variety of ways. First, the Pope publishes encyclicals, which are letters sent throughout the church outlining the Pope's view on the topic of his choosing. Some are devoted to strictly doctrinal and theological matters, but other encyclicals address economic and social issues that are salient to Catholics. In the United States, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops routinely releases statements regarding various political matters and publishes magazines, the most prominent being *Origins*.

Locally, the bishop of the local diocese or parish priest have opportunities to deliver homilies (short sermons) during Mass. Unlike many other Christian denominations, Catholics are not regularly expected to attend other services in addition to a main worship service, which may limit the opportunity for Catholics to receive political cues on a weekly basis. However, many dioceses maintain websites and some publish newspapers that may contain political cues meant

for a Catholic audience. Catholic parishes also distribute voting guides that outline issues Catholics should consider, with the caveat these voting guides generally refrain from endorsing specific parties or candidates (G. A. Smith 2008, 134).

G. A. Smith (2008) suggested Catholic priests are not timid when it comes to delivering cues, in his interviews conducted with priests in nine parishes. Priests draw upon the Bible and what is happening in the community for inspiration on what topics to address (G. A. Smith 2008, 86, 92). The potential impact of political cues from Catholic clergy is dependent on the pre-existing attitudes of parishioners, along with their willingness to accept cues that may go against those pre-existing attitudes (G. A. Smith 2008, 86). Catholic clergy also may not be unified in their cue-giving, as there are many seminaries that prospective clergy go to receive training, with each seminary potentially prioritizing different issues (G. A. Smith 2008). These differences also mean the Catholics may be more prone to hear conflicting political cues, due to the diversity of professional training within the Catholic clergy.

Obedience and Freedom: Political Influence Within the Southern Baptist Convention

Unlike many other denominations, Southern Baptists are unique in many ways concerning its administrative and hierarchical structure. The Southern Baptist Convention is not a traditional denomination compared to others, as the national organization is an umbrella organization made up of state convention organizations and individual churches that places a high value on the autonomy of local churches. While the Southern Baptist Convention has guidelines that set out the process for churches to be admitted to membership, including not ordaining women as clergy or solemnizing same-sex marriages, the national body does not have much power over local church operations. Local churches own title to property and ordain their

own clergy. All tithes and offerings stay within the local church, with the Southern Baptist Convention assessing fees on its member churches to finance the national organization.

As local churches possess a large amount of autonomy, the potential of political cues made within worship services can vary from congregation to congregation. Southern Baptist churches were reluctant to get involved in politics until the 1920s when discord emerged between fundamentalist and moderate factions (O. P. Smith 2000, 34). Moderates supported efforts to integrate notions of scientific reasoning into Southern Baptist doctrine that included more-favorable attitudes towards evolution, while fundamentalists vehemently opposed those attempts to integrate scientific reasoning with Biblical teachings. An uneasy truce emerged between the camps, as national leaders steered clear of political controversies until the late 1970s (O. P. Smith 2000, 46–48). With the start of the Reagan presidency, the fundamentalist camp was able to gain control of the Southern Baptist Convention, with moderate churches joining other Baptist organizations (O. P. Smith 2000, 54). Fundamentalists were not leery of using the national organization and local churches to deliver political cues to adherents (O. P. Smith 2000, 144). While Southern Baptists have been able to organize themselves politically by establishing political action committees such as Moral Majority, producing television and radio programming, and distributing voter guides, the frequency of and content of political cues delivered over the pulpit in individual congregations during worship services is unclear.

A cursory look at resolutions passed by the Southern Baptist Convention in recent years indicate its highest echelons of leadership favor policy positions on social issues the Christian Right as a whole traditionally supports including opposing abortion, same-sex marriage, gambling, and pornography. The Southern Baptist Convention also supports some social justice issues including protecting human rights, ending global hunger, and stopping sex trafficking.

Turning to local churches, it is logical to assume clergy would speak about the need to comfort and assist those in need, as that doctrine is found in accounts of Jesus Christ's teachings in the New Testament of the Bible, but one cannot easily infer they deliver political cues during sermons or in Sunday School/Bible Study that address issues such as abortion or same-sex marriage. There are anecdotes of Southern Baptist clergy delivering partisan sermons, but it is unclear how widespread explicit political cues are being offered inside churches.⁶

Other attempts by evangelical Protestant organizations to deliver political cues include producing voting guides for congregations. One voter guide campaign by the Christian Coalition published 30 million guides in the 1994 midterm election, with the results leading to Republicans winning a majority of seats in the House of Representatives for the first time in 40 years, and produced 45 million more guides for the 1996 presidential and congressional elections (Vinson and Guth 2003, 29; Utter and Storey 2001, 8; Regnerus, Sikkink, and Smith 1999, 1377; Fowler and Hertzke 1995). While those guides did not directly endorse candidates, they provided "grades" and "scores" regarding how the Christian Coalition leadership perceived candidates' positions and voting record on various issues. However, on-the-ground research measuring the frequency and content of political cues delivered in sermons or elsewhere within the church has only been conducted on a limited scale (Brewer, Kersh, and Peterson 2003).

Classes, Quorums, and Talks: Political Cues within the LDS Church

Historically, the LDS Church was more involved in partisan politics in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, that included more direct political cues made by national and local leaders. D. E. Campbell, Green, and Monson (2014) describe how early LDS Church leaders,

⁶ Suzanne Sataline, Amy Merrick, Leslie Eaton, Rhonda Rundle, and Easha Anand, "Partisan Sunday Sermons Test Federal Tax Laws," *Wall Street Journal*, 29 September, 2008.

mobilized Mormons to vote for certain candidates in local and state elections. There are also unverified anecdotes that LDS Church bishops would assign one half of a congregation as Republicans and the other half as Democrats when the Utah-only People's Party, which was comprised mainly of Mormons, dissolved in 1891. The rationale behind these purported random political party assignments LDS Church leaders encouraged Mormons within Utah to join one of the two main national parties as part of a bid for statehood (Bowman 2012, 155; Alexander 1986, 7).

The highest echelon of leaders within LDS Church, which include the First Presidency and the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles, have a history delivering political cues at national church meetings. Notable examples include former LDS Church president Ezra Taft Benson, who served as Secretary of Agriculture during the Eisenhower administration while simultaneously serving as a member of the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles.⁷ Benson was also a prominent supporter of the ultra-conservative John Birch Society, and his addresses to Mormons during the LDS Church's twice-annual General Conference were sometimes peppered with overt political cues.⁸ The LDS Church's involvement in non-partisan issue-based politics is more widely known. Church leadership has been involved in few select "moral" issues such as liquor reform in Utah, the Equal Right Amendment ratification battle, opposing installation of MX Missile units in Utah during the 1980s, legalizing pari-mutuel betting in Utah, and same-sex marriage referendums held in several states. Mauss (1984, 447) suggests LDS leaders make clear

⁷ The Quorum of the Twelve Apostles is the second-highest body in the LDS Church, with its authority just below the First Presidency, which consists of the Church's president and two assistants.

⁸ Ezra Taft Benson, "A Witness and a Warning," 149th Semiannual General Conference of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 6 October, 1979; Ezra Taft Benson, "Watchmen, Warn the Wicked," 143rd Annual General Conference of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 6 April 1973.

delineations between partisan issues, where the LDS Church declared itself neutral, and “moral” issues where LDS Church leaders are more direct in attempting to influence Mormons. D. E. Campbell, Green, and Monson (2014, 157) argue Mormons are heavily receptive to specific cues from LDS Church leaders because direct calls to action are infrequent.

In recent years, though, there has been a lack of overt partisanship exhibited by members of the First Presidency and Quorum of the Twelve Apostle. The LDS Church frequently restates its stance of political neutrality in not endorsing candidates or political parties, while also noting the use of church buildings and membership lists for political use is prohibited.⁹ Despite this official stance of political neutrality, political cues can be found in addresses by LDS Church leaders regarding economic or moral issues, such as when D. Todd Christofferson, a member of the LDS Church’s Quorum of Twelve Apostles, recently cautioned against seeking the help government to solve one’s problems.¹⁰

Local leaders within the LDS Church have been less restrained by delivering more overt partisan political cues from the pulpit to advocate for conservative principles and attack Democrats. One such example took place in early 2013 when a stake president, a lay leader who oversees several congregations, in suburban Salt Lake City delivered a strikingly overt sermon on political matters. His sermon included comments regarding the White House “cover up” of the government response to the 2012 terrorist attack in Benghazi, Libya, that resulted in the death of the U.S. Ambassador; criticized tax policy; and criticized voters who “spoke loudly and

⁹ Official statement provided at <http://www.mormonnewsroom.org/official-statement/political-neutrality>.

¹⁰ D. Todd Christofferson, “Free Forever, to Act for Themselves,” 184th Semiannual General Conference of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 4 October, 2015.

clearly” for “choosing socialism over capitalism” and for favoring entitlements.¹¹ An LDS bishop in California expressed concern in a November 2014 blog post regarding Sen. Harry Reid being able to enter Mormon temples because he perceived Reid supports policies that goes against LDS teachings.¹² I have also witnessed local LDS leaders, in sermons delivered during worship services, criticizing politicians for advocating liberal policies. While some scholars believe partisan messages are rare (D. E. Campbell, Green, and Monson 2014; Welch et al. 1993), there is evidence to assume leaders and other members send coded and explicit political cues through sermons and in various lessons made in Sunday School and other classes during a worship service. Political cues from the top leadership in the LDS Church have also been delivered in the church’s twice-annual General Conference where statements have been made regarding the erosion of the traditional family, increased secularization of society, and comments on increased dependence on government assistance.

¹¹ Peggy Fletcher Stack, “Mormon Stake President Gets Political at Church, Laments Election Results,” *Salt Lake Tribune*, 21 February 2013.

¹² Mark Paredes, “Good riddance to Harry Reid, the Mormon Senate leader,” *Jewish Journal*, 5 November, 2014.

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN

I first seek to explain if the frequency and content of political cues from religious elites differ across religious organizations and issue areas. The specific religious organizations that will be studied are the Roman Catholic Church, Southern Baptist Convention, and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. As mentioned previously, the hierarchal structure of religious organizations appears to predict the potential effects of political cues delivered by religious leaders. For instance, in the Roman Catholic and LDS churches, members of those organizations instill more authority in the Pope and President of the LDS Church, respectively, compared to local Catholic parish priests and LDS ward bishops. Members of evangelical Protestant denominations, however, invest more authority in leaders of local congregations compared to the general leadership of the organization. Through an extensive content analysis of statements made by those organizations and their leadership, I answer lingering questions regarding the frequency and content of those cues, as well as explore how issues that are emphasized may differ across various religious organizations.

Second, I analyzed General Social Survey data in determining how differences related to hierarchal differences among religious organizations and the opportunity religious elites have to communicate with rank-and-file members of their respective organizations affects the political attitudes and behavior of congregants. Based on the results of the content analysis, it is expected religious organizations differ in which issues they prioritize. Thus, Catholic leaders may focus on different political issues than Southern Baptist and LDS leaders, and vice-versa. There should

also be variation on the effectiveness of political cues made by those religious elites based on hierarchical difference among various religious organizations. Religious organizations where congregants invest more authority in its general leadership should be more predisposed to be influenced by those leaders, while the general leadership in religious organizations where local leaders are invested with more authority should have less influence. Survey data will also help address the limits religious leaders may face in delivering political cues due to the structure of worship services, such as length of sermons and worship services, or external factors, such as the level of political heterogeneity outside congregational environments. Finally, I fielded a survey experiment to determine the effectiveness of political cues made by the religious organizations and their leaders. The results of the content analysis will inform my survey experiment as I ask questions on salient issues that religious organizations tend to focus on based on how frequent those issues are mentioned during my content analysis of statements and sermons made by religious organizations and their general leadership.

Content analysis of statements issued by religious organizations and sermons by those organizations' general leadership will provide robust data regarding how those organizations attempt to influence their members. The results of the analysis of existing survey data help determine how the opportunity for religious organizations to deliver political cues may affect political attitudes and behavior, while controlling for other variables such as differences in structure among religious organizations, political heterogeneity of a community, frequency of religious service attendance, party identification, political ideology, education, gender, race, and marital status.

Content Analysis of Statements Made by National Religious Leaders and Denominations

The first step from my research was analyzing archival records to determine the frequency and content of political cues delivered by the Roman Catholic Church, Southern Baptist Convention, and LDS Church, and their top leaders. I analyzed resolutions approved by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, papal encyclicals, and statements made by Catholic cardinals and bishops that are published in *Origins* magazine, which is an official publication of the USCCB and published 47 times per year. A main benefit of utilizing *Origins* is that it includes papal encyclicals, which are statements made by the Pope on an issue he chooses, and statements released by the USCCB. Analysis of statements made by Southern Baptist leaders consisted of resolutions approved by the Southern Baptist Convention during its annual meetings and content in *SBC Life*, which is published by the Executive Council of the Southern Baptist Convention five times per year, and *The Baptist Program*, which ceased publishing in 1993. Analysis of statements made by LDS leaders included sermons delivered in the church's twice-annual General Conference that is broadcast around the world, which are Mormons expected to watch or listen to, as regular worship services are not held during General Conference. Additional LDS records included periodic letters sent out to local congregations by the First Presidency that are read over the pulpit in weekly worship services and press releases issued by the LDS Church.

I analyzed statements made by the Roman Catholic Church, Southern Baptist Convention, and LDS Church and their leaders from 1985 to the present. Starting at 1985 was prudent, considering the sheer amount of data generated by leaders of the Roman Catholic Church and LDS Church. The analysis of *SBC Life* magazine started with issues from 1993, when the magazine was first published, while analysis of *The Baptist Program* consisted of

issues published from 1985-1993. This time range was chosen as it captured changes in political dynamics within the Roman Catholic, Southern Baptist, and LDS churches, and how those leaders may have attempted to influence rank-and-file members in response to salient political issues during the past 30 years.

The coding scheme for archival data was initially developed in a deductive manner as I first outlined the main issues each of the religious organizations tend to focus on. I searched through various news sources to determine which issues Roman Catholic, Southern Baptist, and LDS leaders were addressing. Despite the thoroughness of the initial list of codes, the initial coding scheme was not sufficient as new information not revealed by previous research emerged during the course of my content analysis, which is consistent with what others scholars conducting content analysis research have found (DeWalt and DeWalt 2010, 185). Besides identifying political issues being addresses, the coding scheme also included a measure that identified if political cues were overtly partisan or not (expressly supporting a political candidate or party), identification of the religious organization, and the leadership position of an individual making the statement. The key measure (whether cue was explicitly partisan or not) gets at the heart of “reverse God talk.” If a cue mentioned an issue and made a call to action or references a particular politician or political party, I coded the cue as being explicit. If the cue mentioned an issue without a call to action or reference to a politician or political party, the cue was identified as being “coded.” As data collection proceeded, I developed further codes in an inductive manner based on the further issues found through the analysis. I then reanalyzed documents I previously coded to account for these new codes. This process is similar to DeWalt and DeWalt’s (2010, 183–84) terminology of indexing in referring to *a priori* codes and coding to refer to development of codes while analyzing the data.

One hinderance to the work is that I was the only one who coded data. I did not employ any other coders due to lack of financial resources, as well as the training required to identify political issues in religious statements. The content analysis required knowledge of religious terminology employed by leaders of various religious organizations, along with being able to pick up on subtle political cues these religious organizations and their general leadership issue, which may not be apparent to those unfamiliar with religious terminology.

The content analysis I undertook was empirical in nature, and I analyzed and interpreted the data using NVivo. I then leveraged the results from the content analysis to design appropriate treatments for specific policy areas for the Political Attitudes Survey I fielded in the spring of 2017. Specifically, I looked what issues are most salient for Catholics, Southern Baptist, and LDS leaders, and testing the effects of political cues made by those leaders on members of their respective denominations regarding attitudes related to those policy areas. The content analysis added also provided a reference base in analyzing General Social Survey data where I chose salient political issues based on the results of my research.

Analysis of Existing Survey Data

Besides observing for the frequency and content of political cues made by religious leaders, I also analyzed how those cues affect political attitudes and behavior. Utilizing data from the General Social Survey from 2000-2014, I was able to determine the political attitudes of respondents from various religious organizations. In my analysis, I chose to forego traditional categorization by religious tradition, and instead utilized specific denominations in my regression models. The rationale for this is members of some religious denominations, such as members of the LDS Church, are usually placed in the “Other religion” category. I pooled data across several

survey waves in order to obtain enough observations in each denomination to determine statistical significance.

General Social Survey data allowed for analysis on a wide variety of economic, moral, and social issues while being able to control for variables related to religious belief that such as frequency of religious service attendance. The General Social Survey also include standard demographic controls such as gender, income, education, race, and marital status. The GSS has measured political attitudes on issues ranging from abortion, same-sex marriage, divorce laws, and immigration for several waves. GSS data also allowed me to determine if differences in political attitudes exist due to party identification and political ideology. The breadth of the issues asked in the GSS also allowed me to select issue areas that religious organizations and their leaders prioritize, which I determined in through my content analysis.

Political Attitudes Survey

In analyzing the effects of political cues delivered by religious organizations and their leaders, survey experiments provide an ideal test of how the effectiveness of political cues may differ depending on which religious organization is delivering the political cue and the policy issue the cue focuses on. Experiments as an ideal way to test causal mechanisms, as experiments can isolate what causes an independent variable to affect a dependent variable (Druckman et al. 2006; Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder 1982). The ability to test hypotheses in a cost-effective manner is also a reason why researchers employ experiments (McDermott 2002). Experiments also provides a manner to connect theory to practice, as scholars are able to directly test if theories hold water.

Example of this include Gerber and Donald Green's (2000) work in testing the effectiveness of various techniques to political campaigns use to get people to the polls. With the

experiment, they were able to show door-to-door canvassing was more effective than telephone or direct mail efforts. The field experiment was useful in that participants were able to receive just one of the selected treatments, with the researchers able to determine which treatment worked or not. They also put theory into action by being able to test various hypotheses regarding the tools campaigns have at their disposal to get voters out to the polls.

Several scholars have utilized survey experiments in testing the effectiveness of political cues by political and religious elites (D. E. Campbell, Green, and Monson 2014; Djupe and Calfano 2013; McKeown and Carlson 1987). D. E. Campbell, Green, and Monson (2014, 148–58) employed a survey experiment where the only surveyed Mormons. In their experiment, respondents were asked their opinion on an issue. A control group was presented with a statement outlining simple arguments for or against a proposed policy, a “general” treatment group received a statement outlining the LDS Church’s broad stance on an issue without providing a source, and an “explicit” treatment group was presented a quote from the LDS Church’s First Presidency. Djupe and Calfano (2013) utilized survey experiments in testing the effects of cues on various respondents. Their experiments ranged from using Knowledge Network panels to surveying college students. McKeown and Carlson (1987) tested how political cues from the USCCB and the Rev. Billy Graham (a prominent Southern Baptist preacher) affect political attitudes.

My survey experiment follows the format that D. E. Campbell, Green, and Monson’s (2014) utilized. Similar to their survey experiment, I employed a control group, a coded treatment group providing a general stance on an issue delivered by a religious organization or a leader, and an explicit treatment group that displayed a more explicit stance on an issue that was issued by a religious organization or one of their leaders. One benefit of using a survey

experiment was the ability to tailor separate political cues to those identifying as Catholic, Southern Baptist, or Mormon, using specific language and statements from each of those religious organizations. Based on content analysis of political cues delivered by religious denominations and leaders, I selected salient political issues where Catholic, Southern Baptist, and LDS leaders have delivered specific statements with unambiguous policy positions. From an analysis of statements issues by the Catholic, Southern Baptist, and LDS denominations, political cues involve issues ranging from climate change, immigration, protection for LGBTQ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer rights, marijuana legalization, and religious freedom). Respondents were also asked how frequently they attend religious services, as well as standard demographic questions.

Organization of Dissertation

Analysis of the frequency and content of political cues made by leaders and fellow members of religious organizations, which potentially includes coded political messages, and the effects of those cues on political attitudes and behavior consisted of three empirical chapters. The first empirical chapter (Chapter 4) is a content historical documents that seeks to understand how Roman Catholic, Southern Baptist, and LDS Church leaders attempt to influence their congregants regarding political issues, whether those cues are “coded,” and how those attempts to deliver cues may have changed over time. For the second empirical chapter (Chapter 5), I analyzed General Social Survey data from 2000-2014 to determine how organizational differences among religious organizations are associated with differences in political attitudes and behavior on salient issues identified in my content analysis of documents from the Roman Catholic Church, Southern Baptist Convention, and LDS Church. The third empirical chapter (Chapter 6) is an analysis of an original survey experiment (2017 Political Attitudes Survey) to

determine the effects of political cues made by religious leaders from the Roman Catholic Church, Southern Baptist Convention, and LDS Church. The issues that were selected for the survey experiment were informed by my findings from the content analysis chapter. Finally, a conclusion (Chapter 7) provides an overall analysis of the results and offers a window regarding how the effects of political cues made by religious leaders may be explored in subsequent research.

CHAPTER 4: HOW RELIGIOUS ELITES DEPLOY CODED POLITICAL CUES

“I would never say somebody had to vote for anybody. That would be terrible. I haven't said that.” – Pat Robertson, founder of the Christian Broadcasting Network

Religious groups have long been involved in shaping political discourse in the United States. The extent of this involvement has generally been focused on “moral” issues that may not directly correlate with partisan politics. Many of these moral issues include “blue laws” that prohibited businesses from operating on Sunday, prohibition of alcohol, and gambling (Andersen 2013, 116; Lucas 1971). In the past 50 years, religious groups have been involved in moral issues that also divide the populace on partisan lines, such as abortion, rights for homosexuals that include same-sex marriage, and transgender rights. These more-recent debates play a role in shaping and influencing partisan politics in the United States. The scope of this involvement is often debatable, and leaders of religious organizations are often cautious in how direct their political appeals are, which is why they employ coded language. Such caution stems from the Johnson Amendment of 1965, a feature of the U.S. income tax code that prohibits non-profit organizations from endorsing political candidates. Religious leaders are also concerned about offending members or potential members of their congregations or respective organizations (Djupe and Gilbert 2008; Husser 2012). Despite the U.S. government prohibition on partisan political activity, religious denominations test these guidelines as they seek to influence their members to engage in political behavior that aligns with a religious organization’s interests and beliefs. As Jerry Falwell stated: “I am indeed considered to be dangerous to liberals, feminists,

abortionists, and homosexuals, but not to Bible-believing Christians...this time preaching would not be enough...[it] was my duty as a Christian to apply the truths of Scripture to every act of government” (Dowland 2015, 123).

How often do religious groups engage in political activity with their members? That question is difficult to answer. As Beyerlin and Chaves (2003) found, political activity means different things to different congregations. Some organize voter registration drives, some publish voter guides, some invite politicians to speak, and others have local religious leaders speak about political matters. On top of that, factors within individual congregations lead to differences within a denomination (Djupe and Gilbert 2008). If direct political communication occurs within a congregation, it appears to be a rare event (Brewer, Kersh, and Peterson 2003). Despite the plethora of research regarding political activity in a religious environment, much research consists of analyzing communications at the congregational level by focusing on what local leaders say or do (Glazier 2015; D. E. Campbell, Green, and Monson 2014; Djupe and Calfano 2013; Friesen and Wagner 2012; Smidt and Schaap 2009; Djupe and Gilbert 2008, 2003; G. A. Smith 2008; Fox 2006; Brewer, Kersh, and Peterson 2003; Jelen 2003; D. E. Campbell and Monson 2003; Smidt et al. 2003; Olson 2000; O. P. Smith 2000; Byrnes 1991; Beatty and Walter 1989). Instead of focusing on local congregations, my focus is on communications issued by religious organizations and the top leadership of those groups.

Religious organizations differ in how they prioritize social or political issues, thus the content of these communications matters. Some groups are more prone to providing political cues in their communications with members, with some of those cues being more partisan in certain denominations than others. The issues areas that organizations focus on also vary. As part of determining the potential frequency and content of political cues that religious organizations

deliver, I am flipping Djupe and Calfano's work (2013) on elite cues. They found political elites deliver coded religious messages, which is known as "God talk." I flip the equation with reverse God talk that measures whether religious leaders deliver "coded" political messages. Members of religious congregations have to decipher these coded political cues to determine how certain policy stances connect to partisan politics. (Djupe and Calfano 2013, 46; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 51; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). The implication of this is that these statements will escape the notice many non-adherents, or at least those not familiar with the particular vernacular of a religious organization, who would not pick up on the specific language religious leaders of various religious group employ in communicating to their members.

Do Religion and Politics Mix?

In approaching how religious denominations intervene in political matters, a "black box" still exists in determining how religion affects political attitudes. Previous research indicates religion can have a significant effect on one's political attitudes. Glazier (2013) finds members of religious organizations that believe God has a specific plan for humanity have more hawkish foreign policy attitudes. Catholics are more likely to protest than members of other Christian religious groups (Beyerlein and Chaves 2003). Mormons are apt to be swayed by statements made by the church's First Presidency on issues such as alcohol legislation and gambling (D. E. Campbell, Green, and Monson 2014; D. E. Campbell and Monson 2003). Even with these findings, broadly applicable theory regarding the influence of religious elites is still a "Holy Grail" to be found. Religious organization differ in belief and practice, and also differ regarding the nature and extent of political activity that may be deemed acceptable by leaders and congregants.

Even within individuals religious groups, significant differences exist among members on issues such as belief regarding the nature of God, whether the Bible is the literal word of God or just inspiring stories, or how one invests authority in religious leaders. Individual members of religious groups also differ regarding how religiously observant they are, such as frequency of religious service attendance, frequency of prayer, or reading the Bible on a regular basis. These factors are commonly referred to as the three Bs (belonging, believing, and behaving) and differentiate how different aspects of religion affect one's political attitudes (Guth et al. 2006; Beyerlein and Chaves 2003; Guth, Green, and Smidt 2002; Guth et al. 1997; Smidt 2004; Scheufele, Nisbet, and Brossard 2003; Welch et al. 1993; Jelen and Wilcox 1992). Other scholars diverge by suggesting what takes place within individual congregations has a significant effect on political attitudes (Putnam and Campbell 2010; Calfano 2009; Djupe and Gilbert 2008; Piderit and Morey 2008; Djupe and Gilbert 2003; Jelen 2003; Smidt et al. 2003; Olson 2000; R. R. Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; R. Huckfeldt et al. 1995; R. Huckfeldt, Plutzer, and Sprague 1993; Welch et al. 1993; Jelen and Wilcox 1992; Legee 1988; Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988). This type of analysis is natural as the local congregation is the primary venue where most members of religious congregations interact with a religious group. The local congregation is where members of religious organizations may hear political cues from their local leaders and talk politics with fellow members. Several of these scholars argue that instead of religious belief or practice being the primary driver of political attitudes, the political environment within a religious organization, itself helps explain political attitudes (Djupe and Gilbert 2008; Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988). My research extends this by focusing on how the centralized leadership of religious organizations tries to influence their respective members. I seek to determine how differences among religious organizations, such as how they are organized, how religious services are conducted, and how

the outside political composition of a community may affect how members support or oppose political stances of their respective religious organization. While what happens within local congregations is important, additional questions remain regarding influence of religious elites at the highest levels of leadership., especially in regarding to how those elites try to influence political attitudes and whether that influence matters.

Focusing on the local congregational environment may miss a few key aspects regarding how religious leaders seek to influence members of their organizations. Leaders of local congregations may or may not have autonomy in the operation of their congregation and might be limited in which topics they can address. The general leadership of a religious organization may try to communicate with their members directly instead of communication through local leaders. Religious organizations also differ how organizational and congregational leaders communicate with rank-and-file members. Some groups communicate regularly through meetings that are broadcast worldwide. Other groups rely on conventions or other meetings held at regular intervals where decisions related to doctrine and political involvement are made. Leaders of religious organizations may also try to communicate with their members through periodicals, an organization's official website, social media channels, or through broadcast media.

Religious groups approach politics in diverse ways. Evangelical Protestant congregations are more likely to distribute voter guides, black Protestant congregations are more likely to engage in voter registration and get-out-the-vote efforts, and Catholic congregations are more likely to organize protests (Beyerlein and Chaves 2003, 242). Other religious groups may limit their political activity to registering voters, host informational meetings and debates, and providing informational voting guides to their members that state the stances of various

candidates, but do not offer endorsements. Individual religious leaders also provide more explicit political cues as they personally endorse candidates to maintain an appearance that their denomination, itself, is politically neutral.

The potential effects of political cues are important as the public are generally uninformed regarding politics and often lack an “ideological foundation” for their attitudes and opinions (Adkins et al. 2013, 236; A. Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Popkin 1994). Social groups, such as religious organizations, provide heuristics, or “intellectual shortcuts” to their members that allow for individuals to possess attitudes on complicated political issues without fulling understanding them. Various scholars contend social groups have a strong influence in shaping the political attitudes of their members (Conover 1984; Nicholson 2011; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Wilcox 1990). The religious commitment of individual members of an organization may also affect potential political influence of religious leaders. Existing research suggests members who are more committed to a religious group are more prone to be influenced by their religious leaders, while members who are less committed in their faith and devotion may be less susceptible to influence (Adkins et al. 2013, 239; Green 2007; Green et al. 1996; Layman 2001). The effect of political cues from religious leaders may be lessened if the recipient already has formed an opinion or is informed regarding a policy area (Adkins et al. 2013, 240; Druckman et al. 2006; Lupia 1994; Nicholson 2011). Recipients of political cues in religious environments also might be “turned off” if cues go against their existing beliefs (Djupe and Gilbert 2008). Despite potential opposition from members of their congregations, religious leaders are more likely to deliver political cues when their beliefs are different than their congregations (Djupe and Gilbert 2008, 71, 2003, 2002).

Communication from religious elites at the highest levels of a religious organization service as proxy for communication of religious elites down to the congregational level. Even if members of congregations do not directly read, watch, or listen to communication from leaders of various religious groups, they feel its effects as communications from higher levels of leadership trickle down through the hierarchy to congregations. While not the focus of my research, studies of how religious leaders of individual congregations affect the formation of political attitudes are important as many political cues received by members of a religious group will be delivered by local leaders and fellow members of a congregations. Religious groups are dissimilar, though, in how political matters are addressed. Some of these differences stem from the organizational structure of a particular organization, while other differences can be tied to how worship services are structured and other activities that may take place where a congregation meets.

Political Cues from Selected Denominations

In analyzing political cues from religious groups, I have selected three of the largest denominations in the United States: The Roman Catholic Church, the Southern Baptist Convention, and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS Church). The Roman Catholic Church is the largest denomination in the United States with 59 million adherents, the Southern Baptist Convention is the second-largest denomination with 19 million members, and Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints is the fifth-largest denomination and one of the fastest growing, with 6.6 million members in the United States.¹³ With that size comes the

¹³ Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies, "U.S. Religion Census 2010: Summary Findings," http://www.rcms2010.org/press_release/ACP%2020120501.pdf. Mormon Newsroom, "Facts and Statistics," <https://www.mormonnewsroom.org/facts-and-statistics/country/united-states>

potential to influence policy-making, as the three organizations are vocal in several public policy debates in the past several years. Their involvement ranges from issues such as abortion, bioethics, gambling, pornography, same-sex marriage, and religious freedom. The Southern Baptist Convention and LDS Church also wield influence in areas where there is a high concentration of members, such as the South for Southern Baptists and the Intermountain West for the LDS Church (D. E. Campbell and Monson 2003; Green, Rozell, and Wilcox 2003; O. P. Smith 2000). Besides their size and political activity, these organizations were also selected as there is variation in how these religious groups communicate with their members.

Religious elites from these denominations communicate with their members in various ways. The Roman Catholic Church, either through the pope, various organizations within the Vatican, or the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops generally does not communicate directly to individual Catholics (G. A. Smith 2008, 253). Instead, most communication is mediated by individual bishops and priests, who are in a “better position” to communicate with individual members (G. A. Smith 2008, 36; Zachman 2008). The Southern Baptist Convention works around the traditional autonomy of individual churches to communicate with individual members of congregations through official periodicals and websites that issue political cues on a daily basis (Kell and Camp 2001, 2). The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, which is led by a president, his two counselors, and a Quorum of Twelve Apostles that the faithful believe to be a “prophets, seers, and revelators,” communicates directly to its members through a twice-yearly General Conference that is broadcast live to church buildings, available through the Internet, or many cable and satellite systems.¹⁴ The LDS Church also regularly issues statements

¹⁴ LDS Church. “Divine Revelation in Modern Times.” *Mormon Newsroom*. 12 Dec. 2011. Available at <https://www.mormonnewsroom.org/article/divine-revelation-modern-times>.

on its website and issues letters regarding policy matters that local leaders read over the pulpit. The three organizations have also developed their own news agencies that publish magazines and newspapers, as well as operate websites whose audience is the general membership.

Through analysis of statements made by these religious groups and their general leadership, my research regarding the frequency and content of political cues made by these religious leaders will advance current scholarship regarding how religious elites influence their members. I analyzed various periodicals, statements made by religious leaders, and various news releases outlining an organization's stance on political issues in determining the frequency and content of political cues made by the Roman Catholic Church, Southern Baptist Convention, and LDS Church, and their top leaders from 1985-2016. This time range captures efforts by the Roman Catholic Church, Southern Baptist Convention, and LDS Church in influencing rank-and-file members in response to salient political issues during the past 30 years. These years covered events including the last several years of the Cold War and the resulting aftermath; renewed conflict in the Middle East with the Gulf War and post 9/11 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; and issues such as abortion, the economy, the environment, and same-sex marriage where the three denominations have sought to influence their members regarding their political attitudes to varying degrees.

For the Roman Catholic Church, these statements encompass papal encyclicals and bulls, statements issued by the Vatican, and statements and pastoral letters made by Catholic cardinals, bishops, and priests that are published in *Origins* magazine, which is a weekly publication of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. The total number of articles from the Roman Catholic Church contained in *Origins* magazine was 6,541. *Origins* is available to everyone via subscription, but its audience is clearly Catholic leaders, as the magazine does not contain

advertising, or any illustrations or photographs. It is a comprehensive resource containing messages from Catholic elites, such as articles authored by the Pope, officials in the Vatican, and various cardinals and bishops based in the U.S. Every papal visit outside Italy receives extensive coverage and all papal encyclicals are translated into English. It is also notable for including messages from various perspectives, including addressing disputes regarding Catholic doctrine with statements religious leaders and other parties supporting or opposing Catholic policy.

Analysis of political statements made by the Southern Baptist Convention comprises resolutions approved by the Southern Baptist Convention during its annual meetings, articles published in the bi-monthly *SBC Life*, which is published by the Executive Council of the Southern Baptist Convention, and *The Baptist Program*, which was a monthly magazine published by the Southern Baptist Convention that stopped publication in 1993. The total number of Southern Baptist Convention articles and resolutions analyzed was 1,350. *SBC Life* is aimed at leaders of individual Southern Baptist congregations, as it includes information regarding administrative tasks and various programs to that aid missionary work of various congregations. Despite its target audience of leaders of local congregations, *SBC Life* is available for free online, and it also contains resolutions from the annual meetings of the Southern Baptist Convention, and thus represents issues Southern Baptist elites want the general membership to pay attention to and provides the organization's stance on various issues.

Analysis of political cues by LDS Church leaders included sermons (referred to as talks within the LDS Church) delivered by the church's leaders in its twice-annual General Conference that is broadcast around the world, in addition to statements released by the LDS Church's First Presidency regarding its stance on various political issues that are published in *LDS Church News*, a weekly publication, and on its official website. The total number of LDS

sermons from its twice-annual General Conference and other statements issued by the church was 2,367. Altogether, 10,258 articles, resolutions, statements, and sermons were coded. Members of the church are expected to watch General Conference or read articles in the church's *Ensign* and *Liahona* magazines that reprint General Conference addresses verbatim. General Conference addresses also feature heavily into the church's curriculum for Priesthood and Relief Society classes, which are sex-segregated classes held as part of religious services. Statements from the First Presidency are also featured prominently on the church's website. It is clear the leaders in the highest echelons of the church's hierarchy aim for their cues to be read, watched, or listened to by the general membership.

The coding scheme for the content analysis was initially developed in a deductive manner. I searched through news archives to determine which issues religious organizations addressed in public forums. For instance, it is well-established that the Catholic Church, Southern Baptist Convention, and LDS Church have opposed abortion and same-sex marriage. I created codes based on issues such as that where it is well-established that some communications have taken place regarding those issues. Other issues the Catholic Church, for instance, has focused on include peace, thus a code was created for that. Additional codes were then developed as more themes were uncovered, with articles reanalyzed to determine if new codes are applicable, which is known as a directed approach (DeWalt and DeWalt 2010, 183–84; Hsieh and Shannon 2005, 1281–83). Besides a political theme, I coded as to whether the message included a conservative or liberal value. Conservative values would be related to opposing abortion, opposing same-sex marriage, support for capitalism. Liberal values are values related to calling for government regulation, such as Catholic leaders mentioning collective bargaining

rights, increased funding for welfare programs or schools, or addressing climate change through government action, etc. A complete list of codes is found in Table 4.1

Table 4.1: List of topic codes created for content analysis

Abortion	Gambling	Peace
Alcohol-drug use	Helping poor-service	Persecution
American imperialism	Homosexuality-gender identity	Pornography
Bioethics	Immigration	Racial equality
Capital punishment	Immorality	Religious freedom
Civil rights	Income inequality-greed	Same-sex marriage
Effects of media	Male roles	Self-sufficiency
Environment	Obedience to church leaders	Separation from society
Female roles	Occult-Satanic	Tolerance
Foreign policy	Opposition to other religious groups	Traditional family

In addition to various issues that the three religious groups discuss, the existence of reverse God talk was accounted for. I determined if the author, speaker, or religious organization is making an explicit call to action when discussing political issues. Explicit calls to action include providing guidance on which candidate to vote for or how to vote on a ballot measure, calls to contact lawmakers, and calls for donations to support a political cause, and calls for organized protest such as street demonstrations or boycotts. For example, Bishop Kevin J. Farrell of Dallas Diocese and Bishop Kevin W. Vann of the Fort Worth, Texas, Diocese, of the Catholic Church issued a joint statement published in the Oct. 23, 2006, edition of *Origins* magazine discussing abortion in the context of the 2006 midterm election. Farrell and Vann wrote: “To vote for a candidate who supports the intrinsic evil of abortion or ‘abortion rights’ when there is a morally acceptable alternative would be to cooperate in the evil – and therefore morally impermissible.” Such an article would be coded for “abortion” as it mentioned abortion. It also would be coded as an explicit political action because it called for voters, in this case Catholic voters, to not vote for candidates who supported legal abortion. An example of a coded message

would be many references to respect for life throughout *Origins* articles that may refer to abortion, euthanasia, or even call for firearms regulations, depending on the context.

Other examples can be found throughout the various articles being coded. The LDS Church released a statement on its website on Oct. 16, 2016, urging Mormons in Arizona, California, and Nevada “to let their voices be heard in opposition to the legalization of recreational marijuana.” The same statement also asked Mormon voters in Colorado to vote against a ballot measure that sought to legalize assisted suicide. That article would be coded for abortion and suicide-euthanasia, as well as be coded as an explicit political message as LDS leaders are making a call to action.

Results and Discussion

The results presented in Table 4.2 are divided by denomination with the percentage of sources that have that code, percentage of sources where an explicit political cue exists regarding that topic, and the percentage of explicit political cues related to a topic compared to the total number of sources pertaining to that topic. Explicit political cues include calling for organizing and protesting, what the organization’s stances are regarding ballot measures, and supporting or criticizing specific parties and politicians. As indicated in Table 4.2, the results include only the top 10 issues per denomination.

Table 4.2: Percentage of elite communications that contain political cues

<u>Topic</u>	<u>% containing political message</u>	<u>% containing explicit call to action</u>	<u>% of explicit political cues made vs. all cues</u>
<u>Catholic</u>			
Helping poor-service	42.98	4.66	10.84
Tolerance	25.47	1.35	5.3
Peace	17.08	1.91	11.18
Foreign policy	14.74	1.82	12.35
Income inequality-greed	11.44	1.33	11.63
Traditional family	11.08	1.9	17.15
Abortion	10.84	4.11	4.11

Racial equality	7.51	1.04	1.04
Religious freedom	7.45	1.91	25.64
<u>Southern Baptist</u>			
Helping poor-service	23.85	0.52	2.18
Immorality	13.7	1.19	8.69
Homosexuality-gender identity	13.63	2.89	21.20
Religious freedom	12.22	2.07	16.94
Persecution	11.19	1.19	10.63
Traditional family	11.11	0.52	4.68
Abortion	10.81	2.3	21.28
Separation from society	8.74	0.96	10.98
Media influence	8.59	0.52	6.05
Racial equality	6.44	0.3	4.66
<u>LDS</u>			
Helping poor-service	48.46	0.17	0.35
Traditional family	24.33	0.3	1.23
Satanic influence	22.73	0.21	0.92
Separation from society	13.48	0.08	0.59
Immorality	10.56	0.21	1.99
Persecution	9.93	0.04	0.40
Media influence	7.39	0.04	0.54
Alcohol-drug use	7.27	0.13	1.79
Self-sufficiency	6.63	0.08	1.21
Pornography	5.53	0.08	1.45

The main findings from the results indicate all three organizations prioritize helping the poor and serving others, as they are the top cues given in each. After that, the issues each denomination prioritizes differs, as well as how explicit or implicit their political cues are. LDS leaders are more hesitant to deliver explicit political calls to action when discussing issues that involve public policy. Catholic and Southern Baptist leaders, on the other hand, deliver more explicit calls to political action when they do speak out.

Catholic leaders, for instance, are not as concerned about sexual issues compared to Southern Baptist or LDS leaders. Instead, Catholic leaders focus on social justice issues, such as helping the poor, supporting peace efforts, combating economic inequality, and promoting

tolerance of others. The only hot-button social issue that has been at the forefront of Catholic elite communications has been abortion. Issues such as same-sex marriage or immorality, in general, are among the top priorities for Catholic elites. Other issues where Southern Baptist leaders deliver more explicit political cues rather than mentioning an issue are address religious freedom and separation from society.

Southern Baptist and LDS leaders speak out more on social issues relating to sexuality and abortion. Homosexuality-gender identity is a topic where Southern Baptist leaders not only speak out on, but also deliver explicit political cues in approximately 21 percent of the total number of cues on the issues. Southern Baptists are also prone to speaking out regarding abortion, and when they do, leaders deliver explicit political cues in approximately 21 percent of the cues on the issues. LDS leaders are not hesitant to speak out on political issues, as Table 4.2 indicates, but they are wary of giving explicit political cues to church members. Besides helping the poor, LDS leaders focus on traditional families, which include opposing divorce, and also speaking out against the influence of Satan. However, explicit political cues are rare and make just 1 percent of less of the total number of cues on those issues. Separation from society is another subject that LDS leaders focus on, which is not surprising considering LDS history of settling in Utah in the mid-nineteenth century to escape persecution. Speaking out against immorality, which is generally referring to sex outside of marriage, is also an issue that LDS leaders prioritize in a general context, but do not make calls for political action related to this. This is unlike the Southern Baptist Convention, which called for a boycott of Disney because of its supposed support for “immoral lifestyles” such as supporting homosexuality in its movies and TV shows.

The ideology of political cues from Catholic, Southern Baptist, and LDS leaders largely favors conservative positions, even though the helping the poor is a common subject. However, many of these articles do not call for government help in such cases to address the need. In coding this theme, an article had to clearly side with a conservative or liberal position, and not include cues that would support both a conservative and liberal position. Dozens of articles contained both liberal and conservative cues, as the author, or denomination, addressed several issues, such as abortion and the need for government action to support the poor. The end result is that an overall sense of the ideological leanings of one of the three denominations is still established, as articles coded as both conservative or liberal would not affect the overall conservative-vs.-liberal balance.

Catholic leaders explicitly favored just conservative positions in approximately 4 percent of the articles analyzed, while liberal positions were explicitly favored in approximately 1 percent of articles analyzed. LDS leaders spoke out in favor of explicitly conservative political positions in approximately 11 percent of the articles analyzed, with liberal positions being supported in only 7 articles out of 2,367 articles. Southern Baptist leaders clearly favored conservative positions in approximately 7 percent of the articles analyzed and favored liberal positions in only 7 out of 1,350 articles.

Conclusion

The results paint a mixed picture, as Roman Catholic, Southern Baptist, and LDS leaders prioritize some issues, such as helping the poor, same-sex marriage, homosexuality-gender identity, sexual morality, and traditional families in roughly the same frequency when comparing each organization's messages to their members. There is a clear split, though, in other issues, such as abortion, bioethics, civil rights, effects of media, environmentalism, immigration, income

inequality, and world peace. What is clear is that despite obvious differences related to the structure of their respective organizations, Southern Baptist and LDS leaders prioritize helping the poor, but also prioritize sexual morality issues. Roman Catholic leaders, on the other hand, exhibit greater diversity regarding the issues they focus on, which include civil rights, environmental issues, and world peace.

What these results indicate is that Roman Catholic and Southern Baptist leaders are more willing to call for direct political action than their LDS counterparts. There are several reasons for why that could be the case. As Djupe and Gilbert (2008, 72) have found, religious leaders are not hesitant to speak out on political issues, and will venture into “hot-button topics” such as abortion and same-sex marriage. Djupe and Gilbert (2002, 598) also found that religious leaders from the Episcopal Church and Evangelical Lutheran Church in America have “publicly taken a stand on a political issue, and about half have taken a stand on an issue while preaching.” Brewer et al. (2003) find some political communication occurs, mainly related to social justice, and also find direct calls to political action tend to occur in evangelical congregations compared to mainline Protestant or Catholic congregations. Moving forward, the policy areas these organizations and their leaders focus on will serve as a guide in analyzing General Social Survey data regarding how differences in how denominations are organized and conduct religious services affects political attitudes. The results also provide a base for questions to ask in an original survey experiment to see if cues from leaders of these denominations are effective in swaying political attitudes on the salient issues determined through the content analysis.

CHAPTER 5: WHEN INDIVIDUALS SUPPORT OR OPPOSE RELIGIOUS ELITES

“When we hear that 54 percent of American Catholics voted for President Obama last November and that this somehow shows a sea change in their social thinking, we can reasonably ask, ‘How many of them practice their faith on a regular basis?’” – Archbishop Charles F. Caput, Archdiocese of Denver

Roman Catholic leaders have expressed concern regarding how the political attitudes of rank-and-file Catholics are not necessarily matching up with stances the organization has taken. Catholic leaders are not alone in expressing this concern. Leaders of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, which is the fourth-largest denomination in the United States have had to address members who oppose church teachings regarding same-sex marriage. In that instance. Elder D. Todd Christofferson, a member of the LDS Church’s Quorum of the Twelve Apostles that is the second-highest leadership tier in the church, stated in a 2015 interview that dissent is OK in some instance. Christofferson said. “In our view, it doesn't really become a problem unless someone is out attacking the church and its leaders – if that's a deliberate and persistent effort and trying to get others to follow them, trying to draw others away, trying to pull people, if you will, out of the church or away from its teachings and doctrines.”¹⁵

Much has been spoken and written regarding the influence of religion into political matters. Implied in these critiques is authors and speakers tend to assume voters who are members of religious groups are steadfast in their support of policy positions their respective

¹⁵ Peggy Fletcher Stack, “Mormons free to back gay marriage on social media, LDS apostle reiterates,” *Salt Lake Tribune*, 17 March, 2015.

religious groups support. This image of religious groups hammering home political instructions from the pulpit also comes from public actions of these religious groups Catholic Church's regular place paper crucifixes on church grounds symbolizing grave sites that illustrate the number of fetuses aborted in a given time frame.

A mixed picture emerges of the effect religion has on politics. On one hand, religious leaders are discussing the lack of obedience to church leaders, while on the other, the general public perceives members of various denominations as essentially robots doing the bidding of church leaders. The question becomes which characterization is more accurate? Scholars have found that frequency of religious service attendance correlates with conservative voting patterns (Olson and Green 2006; Guth et al. 2006; Guth, Green, and Smidt 2002; Guth et al. 1997; Smidt 2004; Vinson and Guth 2003; Green et al. 1996). However, the contextual environment within religious organizations also matters (Putnam and Campbell 2010; Calfano 2009; Djupe and Gilbert 2008, 2003; Jelen 2003; Smidt et al. 2003; Olson 2000; R. R. Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; R. Huckfeldt et al. 1995; R. Huckfeldt, Plutzer, and Sprague 1993; Welch et al. 1993; Jelen and Wilcox 1992; Legee 1988; Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988). These contextual environments boil down to the political attitudes of individuals in congregations, which can affect receptiveness to cues from religious leaders. Other contextual environments include group norms regarding religious leaders providing political cues and how congregants discuss politics amongst themselves (Putnam and Campbell 2010; Djupe and Gilbert 2008).

I argue frequency of attending religious services only accounts for some of the reasons why people reject political cues from religious leaders. Instead, there are structural differences among religious groups and outside political factors that account for why people reject political cues from their religious leaders. I also suggest that a religious organization's structure,

autonomy in financial matters, and the political environment of a member of a religious group's respective community also explain why members of various denominations support or oppose policy positions of their respective religious organization.

Survey data further illustrates how members of various religious organization adhere (or not) to the teachings of their religious leaders. For instance, the 2014 Pew Research Center's Religious Landscape Study indicates a sizable percentage of those who affiliate with a particular religious tradition oppose their faith's stance on abortion.¹⁶ That survey indicates 48 percent of Catholics surveyed support legal abortion in most cases. Even within more conservative traditions such as evangelical Protestant denominations, or LDS Church, a quarter to a third of respondents support legal abortion in most situations.

Same-sex marriage is another issue where church members deviate from the policy positions of their respective denominations. Public support of same-sex marriage has risen steadily in the past 15 years. This has occurred even as religious denominations, including the Catholic Church, Southern Baptist Convention, and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, have been vocal in their opposition of same-sex marriage. Despite this opposition, support for same-sex marriage among members of various religious traditions has steadily increased.¹⁷ In 2001, 40 percent of Catholics supported same-sex marriage, with the percentage jumping to 67 percent in 2017. The percentage of white evangelical Protestants that support same-sex marriage has increased from 13 percent in 2001 to 35 percent in 2017. Support for

¹⁶ Data from the 2014 Pew Research Center's Religious Landscape Study can be found at <http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/views-about-abortion/>.

¹⁷ A year-to-year breakdown of how attitudes towards same-sex marriage have changed since 2001 is available at <http://www.pewforum.org/fact-sheet/changing-attitudes-on-gay-marriage/>.

same-sex marriage among Americans in general increased from 35 percent to 57 percent during the same time period.

How Religious Organizations Mix Religion and Politics

Scholars have indicated one's level of religiosity, which is a concept that captures an individual's religious activity and belief, is salient in determining how membership in a religious body influences the political attitudes and behavior. (L. E. Smith and Olson 2013; Putnam and Campbell 2010; G. A. Smith 2008; Green 2007; Green et al. 1996; Olson and Green 2006). Smith and Olson (L. E. Smith and Olson 2013) define activity as to how a respondent prioritizes and spends time practicing their religion, whether through religious service attendance or time spent in prayer. Members of religious groups who regularly participate in their religion share ideas and information. Leaders of these congregations also present cues to their members in an overt or subliminal manner.

Other scholars suggest a combination of messages from elites and socialization from fellow congregants influence the political attitudes of members of religious organizations (Guth et al. 2006; Layman 2001). The notion that political cues are delivered in a religious environment is well supported (Brewer, Kersh, and Peterson 2003; Guth, Green, and Smidt 2002; Guth et al. 1997; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Gilbert 1993; Jelen 1991; Beatty and Walter 1989). Several scholars suggest that religious leaders deliver political cues within their congregations due to a belief that religious organizations should instill certain beliefs and practices in its members that translate into day-to-day actions (Snell 2014; G. A. Smith 2008; Djupe and Gilbert 2008, 13; Crawford and Olson 2001; Gilbert 1993; R. Huckfeldt, Plutzer, and Sprague 1993; Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988, 545; Lenski 1961; E. Q. Campbell and Pettigrew 1959). The influence of clergy and fellow church members appears to be stronger in communities where

religious groups operate in “hostile environments” where religious organizations may feel oppressed by those who are not members of the congregation (D. E. Campbell, Green, and Monson 2014; Djupe and Gilbert 2008, 13; Finke and Stark 2005; McGreevy 1996; Moore 1986; Finifter 1974).

Scholars have suggested the effect of political cues delivered by religious leaders is highly contextualized based upon numerous factors. Djupe and Calfano (2013) claim the influence of religious leaders on political attitudes and behavior of their congregants is limited among those who are most fervent in their beliefs, while indicators of belief such as frequency of worship service attendance, are not predictors of how well cues from religious leaders are received. Djupe and Gilbert (2008) indicate churchgoers are more amiable to listening to political cues as the doctrine of their respective religious group diverges from those of other churches in the area. Other variables that Djupe and Gilbert (2008) argue need to be considered in measuring the effectiveness of political cues by religious leaders are the organizational structure of religious groups and how autonomous a local congregation is compared to the national organization. These measures may offer additional insight into what type of political activity local religious leaders might engage in.

Welch et al. (1993, 249) argue evangelical Protestants are more receptive to political cues offered by religious leaders because they believe their leaders have authority to govern their lives. Alternatively, mainline Protestants and Catholics do not heed cues from religious leaders to that extent as those organizations stress individual political action over collective political action. Jelen (2003, 601) indicates religious leaders are reluctant to disagree with members of their congregants on hot-button social issues such as abortion and same-sex marriage. However, they are also more likely to go against the predominant attitudes of members of their

congregation on economic issues. How members of various religious denominations participate in their congregations may also play a role in the effectiveness of cues by elite religious leaders. D. E. Campbell (2004) suggests evangelical Protestant leaders have more influence than leaders of other denominations because they ask more of their members in participating in activities besides religious services and ask for specific changes in behavior that relate to day-to-day life such as how families should be organized and media consumption habits.

Religious Organization Autonomy and Political Cues

Differences in how religious services are conducted and the leadership structure within religious groups also appear to have an effect of the frequency and content of political cues offered within worship services. Legee (1992, 200) argues that leaders of congregations in religious groups with more local autonomy are more likely to develop “followers” who are susceptible to political cues. Scheufele, Nisbet, and Brossard (2003, 305) contend members of evangelical Protestant denominations are exposed to more political cues than Catholics and mainline Protestant denominations because of evangelical Protestant preferences for greater in-group contact. Evangelical Protestant congregations are also more homogenous regarding political party affiliation and political ideology within local congregations than Catholic or mainline Protestant congregations (Scheufele, Nisbet, and Brossard 2003, 304–5).

As discussed previously in Chapter 2, the Roman Catholic Church provides an example of a religious organization with a highly structured worship service. A typical Catholic Mass has little variation among parishes, except for the homily (sermon) priests or bishops deliver. Doctrinal decisions are centralized at church headquarters at the Vatican, while Catholic orders (Dominicans, Franciscans, Jesuits, etc.) and local dioceses have leeway in administrative affairs such as building new churches, staffing various parishes, and in handling finances.

The Southern Baptist Convention is a denomination that can be categorized as giving local congregations a large amount of autonomy and has a relatively unstructured worship service. Unlike most other denominations, the Southern Baptist Convention serves as an organization of individual churches, and its hierarchal structure is relatively uncommon among other religious groups (Farnsley II 1994, 3). At its leadership highest levels, the Southern Baptist Convention issues resolutions on many matters that are voted in annual meetings. How resolutions and other matters filter down from the central leadership to local congregations is still unexplored.

The LDS Church is considered highly centralized as all doctrinal and many day-to-day administrative decisions are made at the church's headquarters in Salt Lake City, Utah. The LDS Church's First Presidency and Quorum of the Twelve Apostles have final authority over all matters pertaining to church doctrine and administrative matters. For example, all bishops and branch presidents (leaders of local congregations) are approved by leaders in Salt Lake City. The LDS Church's Corporation of the First Presidency holds the title to all buildings and land, budgets and funds for all congregations are approved and held by church headquarters, and all tithing and other contributions are deposited to bank accounts controlled church headquarters in Salt Lake City.

Testing the Effects of Hierarchal Differences on Political Attitudes

In testing how denominational differences matter, I analyze General Social Survey data from 2000-2014. I start with the year 2000 as every issue I am using as a dependent variable had a question asked in every GSS wave since that time, with the exception of immigration and same-sex marriage, which was asked starting with the 2004 wave. I limited my sample to members of 13 Christian religious organizations (Roman Catholic Church, Southern Baptist

Convention, United Methodist Church, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Church of God in Christ, National Baptist Convention U.S.A., Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, National Baptist Convention of America, Assemblies of God, Presbyterian Church U.S.A., Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, Episcopal Church, and the United Church of Christ). These organizations represent many of the largest Christian religious organizations in the U.S. and represent a mix of mainline Protestant, evangelical Protestant, and black Protestant denominations.

The issues I selected to be analyzed were decided based on my content analysis that was discussed in Chapter 4. In my content analysis, I determined which issues the Roman Catholic Church, the Southern Baptist Church, and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints prioritized, especially in recent years. Abortion has been a salient issue for both the Roman Catholic Church and Southern Baptist Church since the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the right of women to have an abortion in the landmark 1973 *Roe vs. Wade* case. While immigration was not a high-priority issue for much of the time-period covered in that analysis (1985-2016), it emerged as a much-discussed topic in the mid-2000s to the present. Same-sex marriage started receiving attention from religious organizations in the early 2000s as states either legalized same-sex marriage or other states pass laws or constitutional amendments prohibiting same-sex marriage. Income inequality is an issue that many religious groups address, including the Roman Catholic Church in discussions on how to best help the poor across America, either through government programs or through charitable efforts. The leaders within the Southern Baptist Convention and LDS Church have also discussed income inequality, with a focus on private organizations helping individuals instead of people relying on government for aid.

The following are the General Social Survey questions asked to respondents regarding these issues:

Abortion

Please tell me whether or not you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion if. . .

The woman wants it for any reason?

She became pregnant as a result of rape?

The woman's own health is seriously endangered by the pregnancy?

Yes

No

Same-sex marriage

Do you agree or disagree? Homosexual couples should have the right to marry one another.

Strongly agree

Agree

Neither agree nor disagree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

Can't choose

No answer

Not applicable

Immigration

Do you think the number of immigrants to America nowadays should be...

Increased a lot

Increased a little

Remain the same as it is

Reduced a little

Reduced a lot

Income inequality

Some people think that the government in Washington ought to reduce the income differences between the rich and the poor, perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy families or by giving income assistance to the poor. Others think that the government should not concern itself with reducing this income difference between the rich and the poor. Here is a card with a scale from 1 to 7. Think of a score of 1 as meaning that the government ought to reduce the income differences between rich and poor, and a score of 7 meaning that the government should not concern itself with reducing income differences. What score between 1 and 7 comes closest to the way you feel?

From the six GSS questions on these topics, I constructed dichotomous variables measuring whether individual support or oppose their respective religious organization's policy positions based on their responses. The policy positions of the 13 religious organizations on abortion and same-sex marriage were mainly identified from reports issued by Pew Research Center, with additional analysis of official websites of religious organizations and news articles to determine positions not found in Pew Research Center reports.¹⁸ For immigration and income inequality, a religious organization's policy stance was identified by analyzing policy positions issued on their respective websites or determining stances based news articles.

The measures I developed do not directly ask whether individuals support or oppose their denomination's policies. Instead, the measure addresses how respondents' attitudes may be congruent to their denomination or whether they are dissimilar. Those who are neutral, which apply to immigration and income inequality, were coded as being opposed. The variables related to abortion had only yes/no options. The rationale behind this is that many religious groups generally do not believe in neutrality when it comes to moral positions. Religious groups take stances for a reason, which is to provide cues to their members to hold certain attitudes. While being a moot point as the GSS did not ask respondents whether they directly support or oppose the policy stances of their respective religious organizations, asking such questions could also lead to biased results. Questions fashioned in that manner could prime respondents to answer in differently than directly asking them regarding their attitudes. Tables 5.1 through 5.6 list the

¹⁸ Pew's reports on religious group stances on abortion and same-sex marriage can be found at <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/01/22/american-religious-groups-vary-widely-in-their-views-of-abortion/> and <http://www.pewforum.org/2012/12/07/religious-groups-official-positions-on-same-sex-marriage/>.

positions of the religious organizations the sample regarding abortion, immigration, income inequality, and same-sex marriage.

Table 5.1: Support/oppose religious organization stance on abortion for any reason

Support	Oppose
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America	Assemblies of God
Presbyterian Church (USA)	Church of God in Christ
United Church of Christ	The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
	Episcopal Church
	Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod
	National Baptist Convention of America
	National Baptist Convention, U.S.A.
	Roman Catholic Church
	Southern Baptist Convention
	United Methodist Church

Table 5.2: Support/oppose religious organization stance on abortion due to rape

Support	Oppose
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints	Assemblies of God
Episcopal Church	Church of God in Christ
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America	Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod
Presbyterian Church (USA)	National Baptist Convention of America
United Church of Christ	National Baptist Convention, U.S.A.
United Methodist Church	Roman Catholic Church
	Southern Baptist Convention

Table 5.3: Support/oppose religious organization stance on abortion when health of mother is at risk

Support	Oppose
Assemblies of God	Church of God in Christ
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints	Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod
Episcopal Church	National Baptist Convention of America
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America	National Baptist Convention, U.S.A.
Presbyterian Church (USA)	Roman Catholic Church
United Church of Christ	Southern Baptist Convention
United Methodist Church	

Table 5.4: Support/oppose religious organization stance on immigration

Support	Oppose
Church of God in Christ	Assemblies of God
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints	Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod
Episcopal Church	Southern Baptist Convention

Evangelical Lutheran Church in America
National Baptist Convention of America
National Baptist Convention, U.S.A.
Presbyterian Church (USA)
Roman Catholic Church
United Church of Christ
United Methodist Church

Table 5.5: Support/oppose religious organization stance on whether government should address income inequality

Support	Oppose
Church of God in Christ	Assemblies of God
Episcopal Church	Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America	Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod
National Baptist Convention of America	Southern Baptist Convention
National Baptist Convention, U.S.A.	
Presbyterian Church (USA)	
Roman Catholic Church	
United Church of Christ	
United Methodist Church	

Table 5.6: Support/oppose religious organization stance on same-sex marriage

Support	Oppose
Assemblies of God	Church of God in Christ
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints	Episcopal Church (before 2012)
Episcopal Church (since 2012)	Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (before 2009)
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (since 2009)	Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod
Presbyterian Church (USA)	National Baptist Convention of America
United Church of Christ	National Baptist Convention, U.S.A.
United Methodist Church	Roman Catholic Church
	Southern Baptist Convention

Table 5.7 lists the total number and percentage of those in the sample who support or oppose the policy stances of their respective religious organization on these issues. As the tables indicate, most individuals support the stances of their particular religious group regarding abortion for any reason. However, most individuals deviate from their religious group in cases of abortion due to rape or incest, abortion when the life of the mother is endangered, immigration

issues, same-sex marriage, and government involvement to address income inequality. As indicated, a majority of respondents (64 percent) only support their denomination regarding abortion for any reason. However, a majority of respondents clearly disagree (abortion due to rape and when health of mother is endangered) or neutral (immigration, income inequality, and same-sex marriage where respondents with no opinion were coded as being opposed) do not support their denomination's stances.

Table 5.7: Percentage of individuals who support or oppose denomination policies

	Abortion			Immigration	Income inequality	Same-sex marriage
	Any reason	Rape	Health of mother			
Support	2,815 (64.12%)	1,775 (40.98%)	1,443 (33.11%)	664 (22.44%)	2,038 (43.49%)	1,590 (46.94%)
Oppose	1,565 (36.51%)	2,556 (59.02%)	2,897 (66.42%)	2,295 (77.56%)	2,648 (56.51%)	1,797 (53.06%)
Total	4,380	4,331	4,331	2,959	4,686	3,387

Scholars have argued worship service attendance serves as a proxy for religious commitment (L. E. Smith and Olson 2013; Putnam and Campbell 2010; G. A. Smith 2008; Green 2007; Green et al. 1996; Olson and Green 2006). A measure of worship service attendance serves also serves as a proxy to measure exposure to political cues by religious leaders. I predict those who are exposed to more political cues from their religious leaders would be more likely to possess political attitudes that are in line with the policy stances of their respective religious denominations. These differences are important as Roman Catholics and Mormons tend to invest low authority in local religious leaders, such as the parish priest or bishop of an LDS ward, compared to higher church offices such as bishop or cardinal, for Catholics, or apostles and members of the First Presidency for Mormons. Southern Baptists, on the other hand, consider the local church the primary unit, and as previously mentioned, members of Baptist congregations

invest a greater amount of authority in their local pastor(s) compared to leaders of the Southern Baptist Convention.

My first hypothesis tests how worship service attendance affects respondents' attitudes on a variety of political and social issues. Respondents who attend religious services more frequently will be more likely to support policy positions of their respective religious organization. The effect of exposure to political cues due to frequency of worship service attendance leads to the following hypothesis.

Worship service attendance hypothesis: Individuals who attend worship services more frequently will be more likely to hold political attitudes that are in line with their respective religious organization's policy positions compared to those who attend religious services less frequently.

How congregations are organized may also affect the political attitudes of members of congregations. Some religious organizations do not give the local congregations much autonomy compared to other religious organizations. For example, the LDS Church develops budgets for each congregation. All tithes and other offerings are passed on to bank accounts under the control of church headquarters instead of congregations or regional authorities, and the central organization holds title to all church property. In comparison, the Catholic Church can be characterized as a denomination with moderate autonomy. The diocese appoints parish priests, dioceses keep most of contributions, and each diocese holds title to church property, with the central organization in the Vatican adopting a hands-off approach regarding finances and day-to-day operations. Southern Baptist congregations can be characterized as having high local autonomy as each congregation has the power to appoint its leaders, each local congregation has holds the title for its property, and local congregations have control over finances with little interference from the Southern Baptist Convention or state-based organizations.

In addition, leadership of some religious organizations make a more concerted effort to communicate directly with their members compared to the top leadership of other religious organizations. This can give the top leadership of some denominations greater influence over members of their respective denomination compared to other denominations. This is linked to local autonomy because some religious organizations, such as the LDS Church do not expect, nor condone, local leaders outlining their own policy positions that may be inconsistent with the religious organization's own stances. Thus, local leaders in some religious organizations are constrained in their ability to influence their congregants.

To measure how religious organizations may wield control over local congregations, a variable measuring financial autonomy was created and has three values. Centralized control has a value of 1, regional control has a value of 2, and local control with a value of 3. The LDS Church is unique in that it is the only religious organization in the sample where the highest leadership body controls local finances. In other cases, it is a mix of regional or local control. Table 5.8 provides a list of denominations categorized by the level of financial autonomy the religious organization gives to local congregations. A variable measuring how leaders are appointed was also considered, however, the measure was highly correlated with financial autonomy and dropped from all models.

Table 5.8: Financial autonomy of selected religious organizations

National/general control	Regional control	Local control
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints	Catholic Church	Assemblies of God
	Church of God in Christ	Evangelical Lutheran Church in America
	Episcopal Church	Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod
	United Methodist Church	National Baptist Convention of America
		National Baptist Convention U.S.A.

It is expected that as local autonomy of a congregation decreases, which conversely indicates the general/regional leadership of a religious organization has greater influence regarding its member, members of these denominations will hold political attitudes that are consistent with the policy stances of their respective religious organization. Differences in how religious organizations control local congregations leads to the hierarchal hypothesis.

Hierarchal hypothesis: As autonomy within a local congregation decreases and control by a central religious organization increases, members of those congregations will be more likely to hold political attitudes that are in line with their respective religious organization's policy positions.

The structure of local religious services also is believed to have an effect on political attitudes. For example, the LDS Church, despite its centralized nature, allows more opportunity to deliver political cues based on the structure and length of a worship service compared to many other denominations. A traditional worship service has anywhere from two to four sermons delivered by local leaders, who are lay leaders, and fellow church members. In other religious groups, such as Southern Baptists, sermons in local congregations can last approximately one hour in duration. In Catholic worship services, homilies (sermons) can range from 10 to 45 minutes in duration, with shorter homilies providing a narrower window to deliver political cues. A typical Catholic service does not include Sunday School, while many Protestant denominations offer Sunday School classes before or after a main worship service. A typical LDS service lasts three hours, which includes a worship service, Sunday School, and age-divided and sex-segregated classes where teachers teach a lesson, with congregants having an opportunity to participate throughout those classes.

If members of a congregation have an increased opportunity to receive political cues in local congregations, individuals should have political attitudes that are in line with the policy stances of their respective religious organization. This assumption differs from the frequency of worship service attendance hypothesis in one key aspect. Those who attend worship services more frequently may still differ on how often they are exposed to political cues in their local worship services based on denominational norms, such as length of worship services and length of sermons.

Testing the effects of the opportunity to deliver political cues necessitates utilizing both the General Social Survey and the National Congregations Study that was conducted in 1998, 2006, and 2012. The National Congregations Study included variables that measure length of sermons that are merged with General Social Survey data. I took the average length of sermons and religious services for each of the 13 denominations I am focusing on from the National Congregations Study and merged that with GSS data. This tests how opportunities for members of local congregations to receive political cues affects political attitudes on various issues, while controlling for religiosity, political ideology, and demographic variables. Potential effects regarding the opportunity for leaders of congregations to deliver political cues leads to the worship service opportunity hypothesis.

Political cue opportunity hypothesis: As the opportunity for religious leaders of local congregations to deliver political cues increases, members of those congregations will be more likely to hold political attitudes that are in line with their respective religious organization's policy positions.

Finally, the political heterogeneity of individual religious congregations should be considered in determining how likely members of congregations are willing to support or oppose the policies of denomination. Steensland et al. (2000) suggest evangelical Protestant churches have an expectation that their members support their religious group's policies to a much greater

extent than mainline Protestant denominations. Evangelical Protestant denominations also tend to discuss politics more frequently than non-evangelical denominations, especially in a more polarized environment (Neiheisel and Djupe 2008; Olson and Cadge 2002). There is an argument that political cues from religious leaders may drive congregants away if they do not agree with those cues (Husser 2012). Religious leaders also may be hesitant to deliver cues to congregants if religious leaders are aware of the disparity between their political beliefs and the political beliefs of congregants because that disparity weakens the effectiveness of political cues (Djupe and Gilbert 2008, 123).

Wald, Owen, and Hill (1988, 538–39) suggest religious congregations may be politically homogenous institutions. Further research indicates political homogeneity is conditioned on the amount of exposure to political cues from sources outside the congregation (Wald, Owen, and Hill 1990). Congregants who receive limited political cues from sources outside their congregations are more likely to be members of politically homogenous congregations compared to those who receive and accept political cues from outsiders. It is my expectation that members of individual congregations will be more receptive to cues from their respective religious group in a more politically heterogeneous community, as national campaigns tend to focus more on battleground states, and the political environment becomes more heightened.

To measure the heterogeneity of a community an individual is located in, the percentage vote-share of the Republican candidate was used at the county and state level where the respondent was located. In the case of survey waves falling in midterm years, the percentage of votes for the Republican candidate in the presidential election held after that particular midterm year is used. Political heterogeneity of a community, in general, is difficult to measure. However, measuring support for Democratic or Republican candidates in an election is relatively easy to

measure at the county level and can serve as a proxy for the depth of political heterogeneity in a community. By measuring the percentage difference in support between Democratic and Republican presidential candidates at the county and state level, it can serve as a proxy for the level of political heterogeneity in a community.

In counties where the percentage difference between Democratic and Republican presidential candidates is small, a community is more politically heterogenous compared to counties where there is a greater percentage difference between the two major-party presidential candidates. In essence, the predicted probabilities, when graphed, should look like a “V” as the highest probability for supporting the political positions of one’s religious organization should be highest when there is roughly an even split between Democratic and Republican presidential candidates and lowest towards both extremes.

Whether political heterogeneity in a community effects whether individuals support or oppose the political positions of a religious group they may be a member of leads to the political heterogeneity hypothesis. To determine how precisely political heterogeneity affects supporting or opposing policy stances of a respective religious organization, predicted probabilities of the logistic regression results will be presented in several graphs. These graphs will illustrate how political heterogeneity affects how respondents support or oppose denominational policies if they live in counties or states with low amount of Republican support, high amount of Republican support, or whether support for Republican presidential candidates is roughly even with Democratic presidential candidates.

Political heterogeneity hypothesis: Members of religious organizations are more likely to support the policy positions of their respective religious group if their local congregations are in communities that are politically heterogenous compared to communities that are less polarized.

In testing these hypothesis, logistic regression will be used as the dependent variables are all dichotomous. The independent variables of interest will be frequency of religious service attendance, financial autonomy, length of sermon, length of religious service, and the percentage of Republican presidential vote by county and state. Control variables are standard demographic controls including age, sex, level of education, race, party identification, and political ideology.

Results and Discussion

The results from the models that test if respondents support or oppose the policy stances of their religious organization on various abortion measures leads to expected results, as indicated in Table 5.9. The worship service attendance hypothesis is supported as frequency of religious service attendance leads a higher probability of supporting denominational politics across all three models. The hierarchal hypothesis is supported across all three abortion models. The results indicate respondents who are members of religious organizations where the religious organization has little control of the finances of local congregations are more likely to oppose the policy positions of their respective religious group. The effect is most pronounced regarding abortion when health of the mother is endangered, as respondents are more likely to oppose their denomination on that policy compared to abortion for any reason and abortion when pregnancy was caused by rape. These results have the potential of indicating local religious leaders or other influences within congregations could be influential compared to the influence of a centralized religious organization's leadership. However, the data available in the GSS dataset does not allow for directly testing those effects.

Length of sermon and length of religious services have split results. Respondents have a lower probability of opposing the policies of their respective religious organization on abortion for any reason if they are members of religious organizations with shorter sermons. Interestingly,

though, longer sermon times leads to a higher probability of opposing the policy stance of their respective religious organization regarding abortion due to rape and abortion when the health of the mother is endangered. Length of overall religious services, which may include Sunday School or similar meetings, leads to an opposite effect for all three models than length of religious sermons. Longer religious services lead to a higher probability of opposing one's religious organization regarding abortion for any reason, but a higher probability of supporting the policies of one's religious organization related to abortion due to rape and when the health of the mother is endangered. As expected, several demographic controls are statistically significant. Party identification and ideology matters, as respondents with a greater affinity for the Republican Party or identify as conservative are more likely to support the abortion stances of their respective religious organization in all three abortion models. However, the effect is less than the independent variables that capture the four hypotheses.

Female are less likely to support their religious organization's policies on abortion due to rape and abortion when the health of the mother is endangered, with the results statistically significant. While not statistically significant, females are more likely to support their religious organization's policies regarding abortion for any reason. Older individuals are more likely to oppose their religious organization's policies on abortion due to rape and abortion when the health of the mother is endangered, with the results statistically significant. Similar to the results for females, older individuals have a higher probability of supporting their religious organization's policies on abortion for any reason.

Higher levels of education lead to a statistically significant higher probability of opposing a religious organization's policies on abortion for any reason. Marriage status is only statistically significant for divorced respondents who more likely to oppose their religious organization's

policies on abortion, for any reason and due to rape, compared to married respondents. Race also plays a role in supporting or opposing a religious organization's policies regarding abortion. Those identifying as "Other" have a greater probability of supporting a religious organization's policies regarding abortion for any reason, but a lower probability of supporting a religious organization's policies on abortion when the health of the mother is endangered.

Table 5.9: Logistic regression results for opposing religious organization policies on abortion

Variables	Abortion (any reason)	Abortion (rape)	Abortion (health of mother)
Frequency of religious service attendance	-0.18*** (0.014)	-0.098*** (0.014)	-0.050*** (0.015)
Financial autonomy	0.17* (0.095)	0.50*** (0.100)	1.22*** (0.13)
Length of sermon	-0.028*** (0.0077)	0.048*** (0.0099)	0.050*** (0.011)
Length of religious service	0.0039 (0.0049)	-0.074*** (0.0075)	-0.099*** (0.0083)
% Republican presidential vote – state	-0.0075 (0.0048)	-0.019*** (0.0048)	-0.024*** (0.0051)
% Republican presidential vote – county	-0.011*** (0.0031)	-0.0015 (0.0031)	-0.0058* (0.0033)
Republican	-0.053*** (0.020)	-0.070*** (0.019)	-0.095*** (0.020)
Conservative	-0.19*** (0.029)	-0.10*** (0.028)	-0.051* (0.030)
Age	0.0026 (0.0024)	-0.011*** (0.0023)	-0.015*** (0.0025)
Female	0.025 (0.071)	-0.12* (0.069)	-0.12* (0.075)
Education	0.12*** (0.012)	0.013 (0.011)	-0.016 (0.012)
Marital status			
Divorced	0.34*** (0.10)	0.33*** (0.10)	0.17 (0.11)
Never married	0.011 (0.096)	0.10 (0.096)	0.042 (0.11)
Widowed	-0.26* (0.14)	0.065 (0.12)	-0.028 (0.13)


Separated	-0.11 (0.21)	0.13 (0.21)	0.35 (0.24)
Race			
Black	-0.019 (0.14)	0.16 (0.15)	0.16 (0.16)
Other	-0.34*** (0.12)	-0.18 (0.11)	0.31** (0.13)
Constant	0.10 (0.41)	5.80*** (0.52)	6.90*** (0.57)
Observations	4,220	4,173	4,174
Pseudo R-squared	0.092	0.082	0.13

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The political heterogeneity of one's community has an effect as respondents who live in counties and states with a higher percentage of votes going towards the Republican presidential candidate are more likely to support their religious organization's politics on abortion. The results are statistically significant for Republican candidate presidential vote share at the state level for abortion due to rape or when health of mother is endangered. The results are statistically significant regarding abortion for any reason for the county-level Republican presidential vote share.

Predicted probabilities of the effects of political heterogeneity yield expected results, as indicated in Figure 5.1. As the vote share for Republican presidential candidates at the county- and state-level increases, respondents have a lower probability of opposing their religious organization's policy stances on abortion. The only model where the effect is relatively small is political heterogeneity at the county level in the abortion when pregnancy is caused by rape model. The results indicate political heterogeneity plays a role, but in a different manner than hypothesized. Instead, it functions similarly to party identification and ideology as conservatives and Republicans are more inclined to support religious leaders than liberals and Democrats (Lakoff 2010; Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009; Haidt and Graham 2007).

Figure 5.1: Predicted probabilities for opposing a religious organization's policies on abortion



Note: Error bars represent 95 percent (two-tailed) confidence intervals.

As the results in Table 5.10 indicate, the worship service attendance hypothesis is supported when analyzing immigration, income inequality, and same-sex marriage attitudes. As frequency of religious services increases, the probability of opposing the policy stances of one's religious group across all three models decreases and is statistically significant. Unlike attitudes towards abortion, the hierarchical hypothesis is supported when analyzing attitudes on immigration and same-sex marriages. Respondents who are members of religious organizations where the organization has greater control of finances have a higher probability of supporting policies on immigration and same-sex marriage, with the results also statistically significant.

The political cue opportunity hypothesis also is supported in several of the models. Members of religious groups where local congregations have longer average sermon times are more likely to support the policy stances of their respective religious group on immigration and same-sex marriage, with the results statistically significant. The results are also statistically significant and have the expected sign regarding income inequality and same-sex marriage when considering the overall length of religious services. However, the sign of the coefficient is opposite than expected, and opposite than length of sermon) for immigration regarding length of religious service, but it is statistically significant.

Party identification and ideology have interesting results as Republican and conservative respondents are more likely to oppose their respecting religious organization on immigration and income-inequality policy. The results are statistically significant for Republicans on immigration and income inequality, and conservatives on income inequality. This is consistent with Mockabee, Wald, and Leege's findings (2012) that suggest the notion that the religious are uniformly Republican and/or conservative is inaccurate. Instead, the results suggest Republicans and/or conservatives who are members of religious groups may heed cues on morality issues, but heed cues from political elites regarding social justice issues such as immigration and income inequality. Republicans and conservatives are more likely to support their respective religious organization regarding same-sex marriage positions, with the coefficients statistically significant.

Females are statistically significant to be more likely to oppose the policy stances of their religious group on immigration and same-sex marriage. The results are surprising regarding immigration as most respondents belong to religious organizations that are more likely to support more-liberal policies on immigration. Older individuals are more likely to oppose their denomination regarding income inequality, while support same-sex marriage stances. Blacks are

more likely to oppose the income inequality policy stances of their respective religious organization compared to whites, with the results statistically significant. Respondents identifying other than white or black are more likely to support the immigration policy positions of their respective religious group, which is not surprising as most respondents belong to religious organizations that support more-liberal policies on immigration. Education is only statistically significant regarding same-sex marriage, as respondents with higher levels of education are more likely to oppose the same-sex marriage policy stances of their respective religious organization.

Table 5.10: Logistic regression results for opposing religious organization policies on immigration, income inequality, and same-sex marriage

Variables	Immigration	Income inequality	Same-sex marriage
Frequency of religious service attendance	-0.051** (0.023)	-0.026** (0.013)	-0.15*** (0.018)
Financial autonomy	-0.92*** (0.14)	0.049 (0.078)	-0.41*** (0.12)
Length of sermon	-0.12*** (0.013)	0.011 (0.0067)	-0.014 (0.014)
Length of religious service	0.023** (0.0092)	-0.017*** (0.0043)	-0.023** (0.010)
% Republican presidential vote – state	-0.00076 (0.0077)	0.0020 (0.0043)	-0.0066 (0.0060)
% Republican presidential vote – county	0.0073 (0.0049)	-0.0027 (0.0028)	-0.0080** (0.0039)
Republican	0.029 (0.033)	0.13*** (0.018)	-0.12*** (0.025)
Conservative	0.18*** (0.049)	0.11*** (0.025)	-0.27*** (0.037)
Age	0.0030 (0.0040)	0.0065*** (0.0022)	-0.028*** (0.0031)
Female	0.21* (0.12)	-0.049 (0.063)	0.43*** (0.090)
Education	0.016 (0.018)	0.017 (0.010)	0.073*** (0.014)
Marital status			
Divorced	-0.12	-0.11	0.23*


	(0.16)	(0.091)	(0.13)
Never married	0.20	0.0032	0.17
	(0.17)	(0.086)	(0.13)
Widowed	-0.33	0.032	0.46***
	(0.21)	(0.12)	(0.16)
Separated	-0.35	-0.32*	0.37
	(0.33)	(0.18)	(0.27)
Race			
Black	0.045	0.60***	-0.16
	(0.22)	(0.13)	(0.18)
Other	-0.69***	-0.15	-0.33**
	(0.18)	(0.10)	(0.14)
Constant	2.94***	-0.29	5.97***
	(0.72)	(0.37)	(0.71)
Observations	2,417	4,522	2,786
Pseudo R-squared	0.20	0.028	0.17

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Political heterogeneity at the county and state level has a statistically significant effect for income inequality and same-sex marriage. When looking at predicted probabilities, some interesting contradictions occur, as indicated in Figure 5.2. For income inequality, increased vote share for the Republican presidential candidate at the state level leads to a higher probability of opposing the policy stance of an individual's religious organization, while increased vote share at the county level leads to the opposite effect. Higher vote share for Republican presidential candidates leads to a higher probability of opposing immigration policy stances. These results indicate individuals in congregations, especially in more Republican areas, are cross-pressured and cues from religious leaders are ineffective in these areas where there are clear differences in one's in the policy stances of one's religious organization compared to competing political cues outside their denominational/congregational network. For same-sex marriage, the trend is similar to abortion where individuals in more Republican communities and states have a lower probability of opposing the policy stances of their respective religious group.

Figure 5.1: Logistic regression results for opposing religious organization policies on immigration, income inequality, and same-sex marriage



Note: Error bars represent 95 percent (two-tailed) confidence intervals.

Conclusion

As the results suggest, the main factor in determining whether individuals support their religious group's positions on social positions is tied to frequency of attendance at worship services. This is not surprising, as members who attend more are generally more inclined to support their particular religious group in the first place. These individuals are also exposed to more messages due to their frequency of attending worship services. This coincides with the results how length of worship services is a positive predictor of supporting a religious organization's policies. The divergence between social issues such as abortion and same-sex marriage compared to income or immigration is also supported by previous research. Mockabee,

Welch, and Legee (2012) suggested this split existed among the religious. Evangelical groups tend to focus more on morality issues, which suggests members of those organizations will be more likely to support the broader stance of the church. Similarly, mainstream Protestant denominations are more focused on issues related to immigration and financial matters, while evangelical Protestant denominations adopt a more hands' off approach regarding those issues. Overall, this suggests the notion that those who attend religious services more frequently are generally more conservative is inaccurate in some ways. What tends to skew the results to suggest conservatism among those who attend more frequently is that a large proportion of those who attend more frequently tend to belong to more conservative religious organizations, such as evangelical Christian denominations or the LDS Church, while the numbers who attend mainstream Protestant denominations tends to be low.

What remains a puzzle is why there is a divergence among the models regarding financial autonomy. All congregations in a religious organization are generally expected to financially support the regional and general leadership of their respective organizations. With some organizations, these contributions are assessments based on overall revenue a particular congregation generates, while the congregation has control of their budget. In others, a regional body or general denomination controls the budget. Finally, in considering the outside political environment, individuals who live in communities that favor Republicans are more likely to heed political cues from their respective religious organization. This holds when controlling for party identification and ideology. In any case, it does appear that an outside political environment has some influence.

The prevailing theme that comes out of these results are three-fold. First is that attending religious services matters. For religious leaders who wonder why those who identify with their

religion might not heed counsel on policy measures, they can be assured that those sitting in the pews on a weekly basis generally are more likely to support their religious group's stances on various public policy issues. Second is that organizational structure matters. For those religious groups who believe obedience from individual members is necessary, consider how the religious organization is structured. It seems obvious that religious organization with a more democratic structure will have a greater proportion of members with diverse political attitudes. Individuals in states and counties where the Republican presidential vote share is high are more likely to support the political position of their respective religious organization. These results may indicate a political homogeneity may go hand-in-hand with heeding political cues from their religious group, at least for individuals living in more Republican areas.

CHAPTER 6: A SURVEY EXPERIMENT ON ELITE CUES

“When the Prophet speaks...the debate is over,” – Elaine A. Cannon, General President of the Young Women of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints

Various surveys indicate Americans know little about how American politics functions (Ginsberg et al. 2016). One side effect of this phenomenon is that Americans tend to “rely on trusted experts and political elites to form their opinions on political issues without having to work through the details of those issues themselves” (Gilens and Murakawa 2002, 15). Elite cues come in different forms. Politicians, celebrities, and business leaders are just a few of many groups that could be considered “elite.” The term “elite” can also be used to describe religious leaders, especially leaders of various religious organizations, whether those are leaders of worldwide religious organization, regional leaders, or leaders of congregations.

In considering who is a religious elites, there are various offices or positions that could make a claim as being “elite.” For example, leaders within the Roman Catholic Church include the pope, cardinals, and bishops who lead either the entire church in the case of the pope, or internal church organizations or regional divisions in the case of cardinals and bishops. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS Church) has a president, his two counselors and 12 apostles who serve as that organization’s highest leaders, with church members considering those 15 leaders as “prophets, seers, and revelators,” For evangelical Christians, where many local congregations are independent in many respects from a central organization, elites can include ministers such as Billy Graham, Pat Robertson, Joel Osteen, etc., who do not

lead religious organizations, but have hundreds of thousands of supporters who have donated money to their respective organizations and/or attended events. However, leaders of organizations such as the Southern Baptist Convention can be considered elites who have influence over a wide swath of congregations and individual members.

These elites do more than espouse religious messages. Religious elites from the Catholic Church, Southern Baptist Convention, and LDS Church speak out on political matters with relative frequency. These leaders utilize reverse God talk, which are coded political cues that only the members of particular religious organization generally understand and decipher on a regular basis, to sway members of their organizations. Despite the frequency of political cues, direct calls to political action, however, are quite low. The reasons for this have been outlined previously, which include U.S. laws that prohibit religious organizations from making explicit partisan political endorsements, as well as religious leaders who worry about potential backlash from their congregants by bringing politics to the pews.

Questions persist regarding the effectiveness of political cues from religious elites. My previous analysis of General Social Survey data confirms the political distinctiveness of people of faith, but also indicates that, while some members of religious organizations support the policy stances of the churches they attend, many others express positions in opposition to that of their respective religious group. Statements by religious leaders might matter, as opposition could be much higher in the absence of statement. However, it is difficult to assess the impact of statements by religious elites with much precision in survey data and establish causal links between cues and subsequent political attitudes and behavior. In this chapter, I go further by using the experimental method to test how political cues, both explicit and coded, from Roman Catholic and LDS leaders affect political attitudes.

Why Religious Elites Preach Politics

Previous research has indicated elites have an influence on political attitudes and opinions. In other words, even if we do not think elites have complete control, they shape political discourse and action. Zaller (1960, 35) and, Delli-Carpini and Keeter (1996) indicate elite influence, including that of religious leaders, has a strong potential to shape political attitudes. This coincides with earlier research from the “Columbia School” that indicates political attitudes are shaped by sociological influences including family, friends, co-workers, and also fellow members of religious congregations (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954). Zaller (1992), as well as Delli-Carpini and Keeter (1996), indicate elite influence, which includes religious leaders, has a strong potential to shape political attitudes.

Members of religious congregations are influenced in political matters for various reasons. While many religious organizations focus on life “after death,” members of religious organizations also want guidance in how to conduct their everyday lives (Djupe and Gilbert 2008; Smidt 2004; Djupe and Gilbert 2003; Jelen 2003; Guth et al. 1997; R. Huckfeldt, Plutzer, and Sprague 1993; Welch et al. 1993; Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988). Politics becomes a natural extension of day-to-day life, where decisions made by elected and non-elected officials affects others. Some religious leaders also see this connection and seek to tie in religious doctrine to political behavior (D. E. Campbell, Green, and Monson 2014; Djupe and Gilbert 2008; G. A. Smith 2008; Brewer, Kersh, and Peterson 2003). Djupe and Grant (2001, 304) also find religious elites have an impact as a “spillover” effect occurs in encouraging members to “live their religion.”

Outright partisan political advocacy by religious leaders and organizations is prohibited by the U.S. government as part of the Johnson Amendment that was enshrined into law in 1965.

However, there are many legal gray areas in which religious leaders can operate. Recent moves by the Trump administration have attempted to weaken the Johnson Amendment through both executive action and legislation. In April 2017, Trump issued an executive order directing the Internal Revenue Service to develop new tax regulations that would allow religious organizations to be more active in political affairs.¹⁹ However, attempts to repeal the Johnson Amendment in the 2017 tax reform bill failed. Examples of how the religious organizations skirt the Johnson Amendment include publishing voting guides that indicate how partisan elected officials vote on matters such as abortion, gay marriage, school choice, etc. (G. A. Smith 2008, 134; Vinson and Guth 2003, 29; Utter and Storey 2001, 8; Regnerus, Sikkink, and Smith 1999, 1377; Fowler and Hertzke 1995). Such guides are similar to scorecards organizations such as the National Rifle Association and Planned Parenthood, among many others, put out, highlighting voting records of elected officials.

Religious groups will also speak out on non-partisan issues such as abortion, same-sex marriage, and school funding.²⁰ For instance, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops strongly supports publicly funded school voucher programs that enable children to attend Catholic schools.²¹ Roman Catholic bishops have issued public statements to deny communion to elected officials who support abortion rights, which sends a signal to Catholics they disapprove of abortion.²² The Southern Baptist Convention passes several resolutions at its

¹⁹ John Wagner and Sarah Pulliam Bailey, “Trump signs order seeking to allow churches to engage in more political activity,” *Washington Post*, 4 May, 2017.

²⁰ Non-partisan in a sense that religious organizations will generally advocate for an issue instead of a candidate or political party.

²¹ Several statements from Catholic bishops around the country supporting publicly funded school voucher programs can be found at <http://www.usccb.org/beliefs-and-teachings/how-we-teach/catholic-education/public-policy/index.cfm>

²² Ian Urbina, “Kennedy Discouraged from Communion By Bishop,” *New York Times*, 22 Nov. 2009.

annual meetings, which are not binding on individual congregations, regarding the religious organization's position on non-partisan political issues (Ammerman 2007; O. P. Smith 2000; Dillon 1995). The fourth-largest religious organization in the U.S., the LDS Church, also attempts to influence members in political matters. While pledging political neutrality on partisan politics, LDS Church leaders have instructed members which way to vote on initiatives and referendums regarding issues ranging from liberalization of alcohol laws, euthanasia, gambling, legalization of marijuana for recreational use, and same-sex marriage (D. E. Campbell, Green, and Monson 2014; D. E. Campbell and Monson 2007, 2003; Mauss 1984).

While religious leaders involve themselves in political matters, questions remain of the effectiveness of these elite cues. Existing work of the influence of religious leaders is scarce. McKeown and Carlson (1987) were one of the first to examine the effectiveness of political cues by religious leaders. They used a pastoral letter from the United States Conference on Catholic Bishops that addressed foreign and domestic policy matters. Their experiment utilized a control group that did not receive a cue, a treatment group that received the cue that attributed the source to U.S. Catholic bishops, and another treatment group that were presented with the same letter that was attributed to the recently deceased Rev. Billy Graham. Their results indicated cues did not have an effect on political attitudes.

Djupe and Gilbert (2008) argued the effectiveness of cues depends on many factors. One of which is issue saliency in that issues need to be important to individual members of the congregation for them to consider it and become advocates themselves (Krosnick 1990). Other factors that shape influence including the political composition of congregations and opportunities to discuss politics in a congregational environment. Djupe and Gilbert's findings

came from surveying Episcopal and Evangelical Lutheran Church in American congregations that separated attitudes of local leaders and rank-and-file congregants.

Cue from religious leaders, though, have been found to be effective in certain circumstances. Adkins et al. (2013) found strong correlations between religious-based cues compared to secular cues on a host of issues. Their experiment used treatment groups where one group received a cue from a religious leader and the secular treatment group received a cue that specifically mentioned “non-religious leaders.” The text of the treatment was identical with the exception of switching out who was issuing the cues, such as “Most Catholic leaders”, “Most evangelical backers,” and “non-religious leaders” (Adkins et al. 2013, 243–44). A downside to this approach is it lacks specificity and does not use language produced by religious organizations.

Positive affect towards religious elites may account for the effectiveness of cues (Mulligan 2006). The findings suggest that those “who esteemed” Pope John Paul II were more likely to oppose abortion and the death penalty compared to Catholics with more negative feelings towards the pope (2006, 740). Other scholars have found political cues from elites effective in some areas, such as immigration (Nteta and Wallsten 2012). They found exposure to religious elite cues led to more-tolerant attitudes towards increasing immigration, allowing non-citizens to serve in the military, and giving those non-citizens a pathway to citizenship.

G. A. Smith (2008) provided an extensive study of nine Catholic parishes to show the diversity of political cues local priests deliver to Catholics. Part of his argument is that Catholic priests have diverse views and training, since priests attend seminaries throughout the country, and the political composition of congregations is also diverse. With that context, individual Catholics may not be receptive to dissonant political cues that deviate from existing political

attitudes. However, G.A. Smith does not address how the effects of cues from Catholic priests on rank-and-file Catholics. Catholics also receive political cues from their local bishop, who like their parish priests, may have different political views than bishops from other dioceses.

Campbell, Monson, and Green (2014) conducted an original survey experiment to determine if LDS leaders are effective in swaying the political attitudes of rank-and-file Mormons. LDS are unique in many respects in that the president of the LDS Church is considered a living prophet with sole authority to receive revelation on behalf of the church as a whole. The president along with two assistants (called counselors) form the First Presidency and all official messages on behalf of the church are approved by that body. Campbell, Monson, and Green (2014, 153) indicate Mormons are influenced by messages from the LDS Church. In their experiment, they asked Mormons their attitudes on gambling, immigration, and non-discrimination laws that protect LGBT individuals. A control group did not receive any cue, one treatment group were presented with a message outlining general principle on that given issue before respondents were asked regarding their attitudes on that issue, and a second treatment group received a specific message regarding the LDS Church's position on that issue before respondents were asked a question regarding their attitudes.

There is also a question of whether cues from religious elites can have an opposite-than-intended effect. Djupe, Lewis, and Jelen (2016) fielded a survey experiment to determine whether elites (political candidates or religious leaders) were more effective at swaying respondents. Their findings show political cues from religious leaders on religious freedom increase tolerance on other rights-based issues. In essence, cues from religious elites backfire on cue-givers. Djupe and Calfano (2013) utilized survey experiments to show how religion influences political attitudes by highlighting how politicians use coded religious messages ("God

talk”) to garner support. They found God talk is effective at garnering support from evangelical Protestants because politicians covertly signal they “are one of them” through the use of carefully constructed language.

Analyzing Political Cues from Religious Elites

In following the lead of Campbell, Green, and Monson (2014), who conducted the *Peculiar People* Survey to study Mormon political attitudes, I designed an original survey experiment was designed to test the effects of political cues made by Catholic and LDS leaders on political attitudes. Survey experiments are ideal in that they are able to test isolate causality and help bridge the gap between theory and real-world behavior (Druckman et al. 2006; Gerber and Green 2000; Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder 1982). Originally, the survey was going to test the effectiveness of political cues by Southern Baptist leaders, but the number of evangelical Protestants in the sample was extremely small to determine statistical significance. As stated previously, these three religious organizations were decided on because they are three of the four largest religious organization in the United States, the organization deliver political cues on a regular basis, and they also have diverse organizational structures. The LDS Church is heavily centralized where most financial decisions and leadership decisions are made by the First Presidency and the Quorum of Twelve Apostles. All financial contributions collected in individual congregations are also sent to LDS Church headquarters in Salt Lake City, Utah. The Catholic Church is decentralized compared to the LDS Church as Catholic bishops have a large degree of authority over individual parishes, while the Vatican generally does not involve itself in administrative matters at the diocese level. The Southern Baptist Convention represent a heavily decentralized organization as each congregation is autonomous with full control over its

finances, property, and leadership, with the central organization having authority regarding membership of congregations into the organization.

The 2017 Political Attitudes Survey was fielded to students recruited from political science courses at Brigham Young University, Kent State University, Utah Valley University, and York College (Pa.). Students were provided extra credit or course credit for completing the survey. Out of 727 students who took the survey, 322 students attended Kent State University, 217 attended Brigham Young University, 55 students attended York College, and 38 students attended Utah Valley University. Ninety-five respondents did not identify which university they attended. One weakness of the survey is that it did not capture a sufficient number of Southern Baptists or evangelical Protestants, in general, to be able to provide meaningful analysis. However, 269 respondents identified as LDS and 116 as Roman Catholic, which provide a sufficient sample for analysis regarding the influence of Roman Catholic and LDS leaders.

Respondents were asked a series of questions on several matters ranging from admitting refugees into the U.S. based on religious identification, climate change, immigration, legalization of marijuana, religious freedom for business owners related to providing services same-sex customers, and transgender bathrooms. These topics were selected to reflect trends found during my analysis of political cues delivered by religious elites from the Catholic Church, LDS Church, and Southern Baptist Convention. While an longitudinal analysis was not presented in Chapter 4 where the results of the content analysis are presented, these issues represent hot-button issues these organizations tended to focus on in recent years. Saliency of a particular issue is important as respondents to public opinion surveys tend to answer with whatever is most salient to them at that moment (Zaller 1992, 62).

Respondents were asked questions about these various issues based on the religious preference they selected. These issue-based questions were selected based on recent statements by religious elites within the Catholic Church and LDS Church. LDS respondents were asked regarding their attitudes towards marijuana legalization, religious freedom for business owners in accommodating LGBT customers, and admitting refugees into the U.S. based on religion. Catholic respondents were asked questions regarding climate change, immigration, and transgender bathrooms. Baptist respondents were also presented with cues, but only 18 respondents identified with an evangelical denomination.

Respondents were randomly placed into a control group and one of two treatment groups for each question. Each respondent was asked their religious affiliation and based on those responses, they were asked questions related to issues those organizations addressed. In addition, the treatment groups received political cues delivered by organizations or leaders of those organizations. For example, Catholic respondents were presented with questions outlining their attitudes on issues Catholic leaders delivered statements on, and likewise for Baptists and Mormons. Respondents in control groups were not presented with any message from religious elites regarding that issue. Respondents in one treatment group (coded treatment) were presented with a statement from religious leaders outlining that respective organization's principles on a given issue, without providing a clear yes-or-no stance.

Respondents in the second treatment group (explicit treatment) were presented with a statement from religious leaders with a specific political cue regarding that issue. These explicit cues represented a more direct cue than those in the coded treatment group received. The presence of political cues from elites also could lead to responses that are more consistent with the stances of a particular religious group (Charters and Newcomb 1952). While there is a

concern that such cues may skew the results, the overall goal of cue-giving is changing attitudes.

The following is a list of questions and cues presented to respondents.

Climate Change

Which of these statements about the Earth's temperature comes closest to your view?

1. The Earth is getting warmer mostly because of human activity, such as burning fossil fuels
2. The Earth is getting warmer mostly because of natural patterns in the Earth's environment
3. There is no solid evidence that the Earth is getting warmer

Coded treatment: In response to the debate regarding global warming, Pope Francis wrote the following: "Humanity is called to recognize the need for changes of lifestyle, production and consumption in order to combat this warming."

Explicit treatment: In response to the debate regarding global warming, Pope Francis said the following: "Global warming continues, due in part to human activity: 2015 was the warmest year on record, and 2016 will likely be warmer still. This is leading to ever more severe droughts, floods, fires and extreme weather events. Climate change is also contributing to the heart-rending refugee crisis. The world's poor, though least responsible for climate change, are most vulnerable and already suffering its impact."

Immigration

Thinking about the issue of immigration, how important of a goal is it to build a wall along the U.S.-Mexico border to stem the flow of undocumented immigrants?

1. Very important
2. Somewhat important
3. Not too important
4. Not all important

Coded treatment: In response to the debate regarding immigration, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops issued the following: "We call upon all people of good will, but Catholics especially, to welcome the newcomers in their neighborhoods and schools, in their places of work and worship, with heartfelt hospitality, openness, and eagerness both to help and to learn from our brothers and sisters of whatever religion, ethnicity, or background."

Explicit treatment: In response to the debate regarding immigration, Pope Francis said the following: "A person who thinks only of building walls, wherever it may be, and not of building bridges is not Christian. This is not in the Gospel."

Transgender restrooms

Which of the following best matches your position on the use of public restrooms by transgender individuals?

1. Allowed to use the public restrooms of the gender with which they currently identify
2. Required to use the public restrooms of the gender they were born into

Coded treatment: The Catechism of the Catholic Church includes the following passage regarding gender identity: “By creating the human being man and woman, God gives personal dignity equally to the one and the other.”

Explicit treatment: In response to the debate regarding gender identity, Pope Francis issued the following regarding the Catholic Church’s position: “Beyond the understandable difficulties that individuals may experience, the young need to be helped to accept their own body as it was created, for ‘thinking that we enjoy absolute power over our own bodies turns, often subtly, into thinking that we enjoy absolute power over creation.’”

Marijuana legalization

Regarding legalization of marijuana for adults, which of the following best matches your position?

1. Legalization for personal and medicinal use
2. Legalization only for medicinal use
3. Opposed to personal and medicinal legalization

Coded treatment: In response to the debate regarding legalization of marijuana, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints issued the following: “Drug abuse is at epidemic proportions, and the dangers of marijuana to public health are well documented. Recent studies have shed light particularly on the risks marijuana use poses to brain development in youth. The accessibility of recreational marijuana in the home is also a danger to children.”

Explicit treatment: In response to the debate regarding legalization of marijuana, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints issued the following: “We urge Church members to let their voices be heard in opposition to the legalization of recreational marijuana.”

Refugee admissions based on religion

Which of the following do you think is the best approach for the U.S. to take with refugees from the Middle East?

1. Increase number of refugees from the Middle East resettled into the U.S. without any religious screening
2. Increase number of refugees from the Middle East resettled into the U.S. without any religious screening
3. Decrease number of Christian and Muslim refugees resettled into the U.S.

4. Decrease number of Christian refugees and do not accept any Muslim refugees to be resettled into the U.S.
5. Do not accept any refugees from the Middle East into the U.S.

Coded treatment: In response to the debate regarding admitting refugees from the Middle East into the United States, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints issued the following: “We remind Latter-day Saints throughout the world that one of the fundamental principles of the restored gospel of Jesus Christ is to ‘impart of your substance to the poor, every man according to that which he hath, ... administering to their relief, both spiritually and temporally, according to their wants.’”

Explicit treatment: In response to the debate regarding admitting refugees from the Middle East into the United States, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints issued the following statement quoting an 1841 City of Nauvoo ordinance: “Be it ordained by the City Council of the City of Nauvoo, that the Catholics, Presbyterians, Methodists, Baptists, Latter-day Saints, Quakers, Episcopalians, Universalists, Unitarians, Mohammedans [Muslims], and all other religious sects and denominations whatever, shall have free toleration, and equal privileges in this city.”

Religious freedom

How much, if at all, do you sympathize with businesses regarding laws and regulations requiring them to offer services that may go against their religious beliefs. to same-sex couples just as they would to all other customers?

1. A lot
2. Some
3. Not much
4. Not at all

Coded treatment: In response to the debate regarding religious freedom, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints issued the following: “Freedom of religion is a basic principle of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and a fundamental human right. Moral agency, the ability to choose right from wrong and to act for ourselves, is essential to God’s plan of salvation.”

Explicit treatment: In response to the debate on religious freedom, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints issued the following: “Religious freedom embraces not only the right to freely worship but also to speak and act based on one’s religious beliefs. In a modern revelation, the Lord states that just laws should be ‘maintained for the rights and protection of all flesh ... [t]hat every man may act ... according to the moral agency which I have given unto him, that every man may be accountable for his own sins in the day of judgment.’”

The ordered logistical regression and logistical regression models were separated into two models per issue.²³ The first model for each issue addresses includes only the treatment variable as an independent variable. In testing how effective political cues from religious leaders are, I created two placebo groups. One dummy variable separates out co-religionists, or those who identify with a religious group that is not the religious organization that religious leaders seek to target with their political cues. A second dummy variable identifies those who do not identify with any religion. The objective of these models is determining how political cues affect those who identify with different religions and the “nones” who do not identify with any religious group.

Results and Discussion

Results from the survey experiment indicate political cues from religious elites offer a mixed bag in terms of effectiveness. Regression coefficients in Table 6.1 indicates the effectiveness of elite cues for Catholic respondents. The coded treatment in the treatment-only model leads to a higher probability of indicating climate change exists and is caused by humans, with the coded treatment being statistically significant. In the model with controls for co-religionists and the “nones” included, the effect for Catholics is still statistically significant and larger with a coefficient of 1.06. For co-religionists, Catholic cues are also effective as the coefficient for the coded treatment group is 0.62 compared to a coefficient of 0.46 for the control group of co-religionists. While not statistically significant, the explicit treatment for the “nones” moved attitudes as intended as the coefficient for that group is 1.79 compared to a coefficient of 1.51 for the “nones” in the control group.

²³ The question regarding attitudes on transgender individuals use of restrooms was the only survey question with a binary response, and the lone logistic regression model.

Table 6.1: Regression coefficients for Catholic political cues

Variables	Climate change		Immigration		Transgender	
	(Treatment)	(Controls)	(Treatment)	(Controls)	(Treatment)	(Controls)
Coded treatment	0.36*	1.34**	-0.33*	-0.61	0.089	0.49
	(0.22)	(0.55)	(0.19)	(0.43)	(0.26)	(0.55)
Explicit treatment	0.036	0.69	-0.22	0.18	-0.091	0.26
	(0.21)	(0.51)	(0.19)	(0.46)	(0.26)	(0.54)
Co-religionists	—	0.46	—	0.23	—	0.59
		(0.37)		(0.35)		(0.47)
Coded treatment * Co-religionists	—	-1.18*	—	0.58	—	-0.53
		(0.61)		(0.49)		(0.64)
Explicit treatment * Co-religionists	—	-0.84	—	-0.32	—	-0.21
		(0.57)		(0.51)		(0.64)
Nones	—	1.51**	—	2.72***	—	-0.61
		(0.63)		(0.79)		(0.77)
Coded treatment * Nones	—	-1.10	—	-1.74*	—	-0.28
		(0.99)		(0.94)		(1.03)
Explicit treatment * Nones	—	-0.41	—	-1.98**	—	—
		(0.96)		(0.97)		
/cut1	-2.98***	-2.53***	-2.84***	-2.47***	—	—
	(0.23)	(0.37)	(0.20)	(0.34)	—	—
/cut2	-0.74***	-0.26	-1.37***	-0.97***	—	—
	(0.15)	(0.33)	(0.15)	(0.32)	—	—
/cut3	—	—	-0.41***	0.016	—	—
			(0.14)	(0.31)	—	—
Constant	—	—	—	—	-0.36*	-0.69*
					(0.19)	(0.41)
Observations	607	607	636	636	363	345
Pseudo R ²	0.0037	0.026	0.0023	0.025	0.00098	0.017

Notes: Ordinal logistic regression for climate change and immigration models. Logistic regression for transgender restrooms model.

Standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1


Political cues from Catholic leaders on immigration lead to split results among Catholic respondents, but backlash among co-religionists and the “nones.” The coded treatment is statistically significant in the treatment-only model. While not statistically significant, Catholics who received the coded treatment have a higher probability of believing a border wall with

Mexico is necessary, which goes against the intended effect of the cue. This indicates the cue is not effective. However, the explicit treatment has the opposite effect on Catholics who received the explicit treatment as they have a higher probability of holding attitudes that a border wall with Mexico is unnecessary. For the “nones,” the cue that is both statistically and substantially significant for those who received either the coded or explicit treatments in moving attitudes towards believing a border wall is necessary, which indicates a backlash effect is present. For “nones” who receive the coded treatment, the coefficient is 0.37 while the coefficient for “nones” in the control group was 2.72. The cue also elicited backlash for those in the explicit treatment group as the coefficient for the “nones” is 0.92 compared to the control group coefficient of 2.72. None of the coefficients for co-religionists are statistically significant. The coefficient for co-religionists who did not receive a cue is 0.23, while the coefficient for co-religionists who received a coded cue is 0.2, which is a very small indication backlash against the cue is present. For co-religionists who received an explicit cue, the coefficient is 0.09, that also indicates slight backlash regarding the cue from Catholic leaders compared to the control group of co-religionists.

The effect of political cues by religious elites regarding transgender individuals using public restrooms is not statistically significant in either model. While not statistically significant, the treatments lead to a higher probability among Catholics to support attitudes that transgender individuals should use the restroom of the sex they were born with. There is a backlash effect among co-religionists to the Catholic cue, at least those who received the coded cue. For co-religionists who received the coded treatment, the coefficient is 0.55, which is slightly lower than control group coefficient of 0.59 for those who received the coded treatment. The coefficient for co-religionists who received the explicit treatment was 0.64, which indicates the explicit

treatment appears to be effective at persuading co-religionists. The coded treatment is slightly effective among “nones” as the coefficient is -0.4 compared to the control group of “nones” with coefficient of -0.61. The explicit treatment among the “nones” was excluded from the model due to multicollinearity issues.

Figure 6.1: Predicted probabilities for Catholic political cues



Notes: Error bars represent 90 percent confidence intervals (two-tailed). Predicted probabilities for climate change are believing climate change is caused by humans. Predicted probabilities for immigration are those who believe a border wall is unnecessary. Predicted probabilities for transgender use of restrooms is based on probability of holding attitude that transgender individuals should use the restroom of the gender they identify with (“nones” excluded due to collinearity).

For LDS political cues, the effects are not particularly effective to members of the target religious group. As indicated in Table 6.2, treatment effects are not statistically significant for the models with controls addressing attitudes towards marijuana legalization, admitting refugees in the U.S., and religious freedom for those who identify as LDS. Regarding marijuana, the

results indicate those received the coded treatment in the treatment-only model were more likely to support legalization, which goes against the intended effect of the cue. When LDS are considered in the model with co-religionists and the “nones” separated out, the results are split as those in the coded group are more likely to support legalization and those in the explicit group are more likely to oppose legalization. For co-religionists, who are already more likely to hold attitudes supporting legalization compared to LDS respondents, the coded treatment has a slight backlash effect, as the coefficient for those who received the coded treatment is -2.3 compared to a coefficient of -2.11 for “nones” in the control group. For the “nones,” a backlash effect is present for those who received the coded cue, as the coefficient is -3.69 compared to -2.91 for “nones” in the control group. However, the explicit treatment for “nones” in the explicit group is slightly effective towards shifting attitudes towards opposing legalization as the coefficient is -2.73 compared to -2.91 for the “nones” in the control group.

Cue from LDS leaders are not effective among LDS respondents regarding attitudes towards refugees, as the those in both treatment groups are less likely to support admitting refugees into the U.S. regardless of religious belief. For the refugee model, the only variable that was statistically significant was the explicit treatment for the “nones” The results for both the general and explicit treatment groups indicate a backlash effect is present. The coefficient for the “nones” who received a coded cue is -0.18 compared to the coefficient of 0.59 for “nones” in the control group, which indicates a backlash effect is present. For the “nones” who received the explicit treatment, the backlash effect is larger with a coefficient of -1.38. While not statistically significant, LDS political cues leads to a slight change among co-religionists in supporting admitting refugees without regard to religious belief. These results are in line with the intent of the cue. The coefficient of co-religionists in the control group is -1.20, while the calculated

coefficient for co-religionists who received the coded treatment is -0.88. For co-religionists who received the explicit treatment, the coefficient is -1.09 compared to a control group coefficient of -1.2, which indicates LDS cues lead to supporting increased admission of refugees without regard to religious status among co-religionists.

Regarding religious freedom, none of the treatments were statistically significant in either the treatment-only model or the model with controls for co-religionists and the “nones” included. This suggests LDS cues regarding religious freedom, at least regarding accommodating business owners accommodating homosexual couples, are not effective. There are statistically significant differences for co-religionists and the “nones” in the control group compared to LDS respondents in the control group, which indicates those groups are less sympathetic to business owners regarding religious freedom issues. The coefficient for co-religionists in the control group is -1.09 while the coefficient for co-religionist for those who received the coded treatment is -1.32, which indicates a slight backlash effect. The coefficient for co-religionists in the explicit group is -1.15, which indicates a slight backlash effect compared to co-religionists in the control group. The effectiveness of cues for the “nones” is unclear as the coefficient for the “nones” who received a coded cue is -1.69 compared to the coefficient of -1.72 for “nones” in the control group, which indicates the cue is slightly effective. However, the coefficient for “nones” who received an explicit cue is -1.88, which indicates a slight backlash effect.

Table 6.2: Regression coefficients for LDS political cues

Variables	Marijuana		Refugees		Religious freedom	
	(Treatment)	(Controls)	(Treatment)	(Controls)	(Treatment)	(Controls)
Coded treatment	-0.41** (0.19)	-0.30 (0.31)	0.071 (0.27)	-0.00068 (0.39)	0.17 (0.21)	0.39 (0.28)
Explicit treatment	-0.038 (0.19)	0.29 (0.29)	-0.21 (0.26)	-0.16 (0.38)	0.00050 (0.20)	0.072 (0.28)
Co-religionists	—	-2.11*** (0.31)	—	-1.20*** (0.41)	—	-1.09*** (0.33)

Coded treatment * Co-religionists	—	0.011	—	0.32	—	-0.62
		(0.43)		(0.57)		(0.47)
Explicit treatment * Co-religionists	—	-0.51	—	0.27	—	-0.13
		(0.42)		(0.56)		(0.46)
Nones	—	-2.91***	—	0.59	—	-1.72***
		(0.55)		(0.81)		(0.47)
Coded treatment * Nones	—	-0.48	—	-0.77	—	-0.55
		(0.85)		(1.03)		(0.76)
Explicit treatment * Nones	—	-0.11	—	-1.81*	—	-0.031
		(0.73)		(1.05)		(0.66)
/cut1	0.20	-1.60***	-2.52***	-2.99***	-0.84***	-1.53***
	(0.13)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.33)	(0.16)	(0.22)
/cut2	1.78***	0.99***	-2.30***	-2.76***	0.12	-0.43**
	(0.16)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.32)	(0.15)	(0.20)
/cut3			-1.21***	-1.63***	1.31***	0.90***
			(0.20)	(0.29)	(0.17)	(0.21)
/cut4			-0.84***	-1.24***	—	—
			(0.19)	(0.28)	—	—
Observations	627	627	397	397	450	450
Pseudo R ²	0.0048	0.17	0.0017	0.031	0.00071	0.061


Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure 6.2 illustrates the divide more closely. Interestingly, the cues have a slight, albeit not statistically significant effect, on both co-religionists to LDS and the “nones.” Co-religionists who received both the coded and explicit treatments are more likely to hold attitudes supporting marijuana legalization compared to co-religionists who did not receive the treatment. The “nones” who received the coded treatment also had a higher probability of holding attitudes supporting marijuana legalization compared to “nones” in the control group.

Cues regarding admitting refugees into the U.S. regardless of religious belief did not have any substantive effect on those who identify as LDS. There was backlash with co-religionists and the “nones,” as both groups who received the treatments were less likely to hold an attitude the U.S. needed to admit more refugees without religious screening. Regarding religious freedom,

the coded and explicit treatments had a moderate substantive effect on LDS respondents in they had a slightly higher probability of having more sympathy with business owners in objecting to accommodating same-sex couples due to their religious beliefs. There was a backlash effect for co-religionists and the “nones” in those who received either treatment had a slightly lower probability of sympathizing with business owners in accommodating same-sex couples due to religious freedom concerns.

Figure 6.2: Predicted probabilities for LDS political cues



Notes: Error bars represent 90 percent confidence intervals (two-tailed). Predicted probabilities for marijuana legalization are for supporting legalization for both recreational and medicinal uses. Predicted probabilities for refugees is for increasing number of refugees from the Middle East resettled into the U.S. without any religious screening. Predicted probabilities for religious freedom are those who are very sympathetic to business owners in accommodating same-sex couples who are customers.

Conclusion

The results of the survey experiment indicates that political cues from religious elites are not particularly effective among the faithful and can spark backlash among those who are not members of those particular religious organizations. There are also questions of when political cues are effective. For Catholic cues, the only cue that showed effectiveness in the survey experiment was regarding climate change. Cues addressing immigration and transgender issues, which also cross-pressure partisans as the immigration cue leads liberal compared to the transgender cue leaning conservative, sparked backlash among both co-religionists and the “nones.” Why climate change was an effective cue is that it did not address how to treat groups of people. The two other Catholic cues addressed the plights of immigrants and transgender individuals, but also may personally affect people as some may fear immigrants or transgender individuals using a woman’s restroom. Pres. Trump, for example, has spoken out numerous times about regarding his undocumented immigrants commit crimes at a higher rate than citizens or documented immigrants. The transgender “bathroom bills” have stoked fear among some that criminals would claim to be a gender in order to commit crimes in restrooms. Climate change does not elicit fears of others compared to the other two issues, which may be a reason Catholic cues resonate.

All three political cues from LDS leaders suffered a backlash effect. The only issue where LDS leaders were able to have an intended effect from non-LDS was among co-religionists regarding refugees. That backlash is not surprising due to longstanding issues many co-religionists and “nones” have with the LDS Church. During my content analysis research outlined in chapter 4, there were several instances of Catholic leaders speaking out against “sects” such as the LDS Church. There are also many evangelicals who do not consider the LDS Church a Christian Church, which was brought up during Mitt Romney’s presidential campaigns.

For the “nones,” the backlash is not surprising. The LDS Church received criticism for its work organizing support for two ballot initiatives in California banning same-sex marriage, Proposition 22 in 2000 and Proposition 8 in 2008.

There are also a few items to consider regarding the survey sample. The Catholic and LDS samples also differ in that no LDS respondents reported never going to religious services, while nearly 20 percent of Catholics reported never attending. At the higher end of religious service attendance, the difference is even starker as 80 percent of LDS respondents reported going to religious services on a weekly basis with only 10 percent of Catholic respondents reporting doing so. Further research using a more representative sample of both Catholic and LDS populations, as well as being able to survey enough Southern Baptists would be beneficial in extending the research conducted thus far. Surveying just college students may also be problematic in that more educated people may also be able to resist elite cues to a greater extent than those with less education (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Zaller 1992; McGuire 1968)

One item that also needs a more study is how negative affect towards religious groups might lead to individuals responding in an opposite manner than the intent of the cue. One example that can be seen in the “real world” is the LDS Church’s stance on Proposition 8 in 2008. The LDS Church strongly supported the ballot initiative that would have defined marriage as between one man and one woman. If cues from Proposition 8 led to more people supporting same-sex marriage, this could cause LDS leaders to give pause, or even withdraw from political cue-giving if there could be significant backlash. While backlash within religious organizations has been considered, there is many questions regarding backlash from outsiders yet to be answered (Welch et al. 1993).

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

“Religious people do not always adopt the political cues given to them in church. That's just not how it works.” – Gregory Smith, Pew Research Center

The aim of this dissertation was to illustrate the extent to which religious elites utilize reverse God talk in delivering political cues to members of their respective religious organization, how organization differences among religious groups affect whether individuals accept or reject such cues, and whether those cues are effective and whether they spark backlash. As much of the previous work regarding political cues by religious leaders focuses on what happens within local congregations, this project extends this to analyze what leaders in the highest levels of a religious organization do to sway their members. However, much is still left to be explored within religious groups and within individual congregations to determine how factors such as religious group norms, opportunities to discuss politics with congregants, and outside factors facilitate or hinder the effectiveness of cues (Djupe and Gilbert 2008; Finifter 1974).

The results of my content analysis of statements delivered by religious leaders from the Roman Catholic Church, Southern Baptist Convention, and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints indicates cue-giving is extensive, but much of it is in the form of “reverse God talk” or coded political language that many outsiders would have trouble connecting the dots to specific political action. Despite the relative lack of explicit political cues, some religious organizations are more apt to deliver explicit political cues compared to others. For example, a

top issue where Catholic issues are most direct in their messages is regarding religious freedom, where leaders call for some type of political action in nearly 25 percent of their communications.

The Southern Baptist Convention has the highest frequency of political cues where a call to action is issued as part of a political cue, but even then, only a quarter of political cues on given issues contain that call to action. Conversely, nearly a three-quarters of communications made by leaders are coded, which indicates reverse God talk is at work. LDS leaders engage in the most reverse God talk, as LDS leaders rarely issue a call to action. LDS leaders issue a call to action in only 2 percent, at most, of cues those leaders issue, or in other words, 98 percent of political cues consist of reverse God talk.

The volume of such cues may explain the difference among the three. The Southern Baptist Convention issued the least amount of overall communications with approximately 1,300 sources, while the Catholic Church issued more than 6,500 communication and LDS Church leaders issued approximately 2,500 communications. One theory as to why Southern Baptist leaders were more direct in their cues was the limited number of cues they deliver. Political cues need to pack a punch and not many communications could be nuanced, as there would be a potential that the general membership may not completely understand the cues. On the other hand, due to the sheer volume of cues, Catholic leaders could be more focused in their approach, especially as the Catholic Church tolerates a range of opinions on various issues, and also publishes content from those opposed to various leaders, as my analysis found. LDS leaders utilized repetition of messages as a tactic as well, especially in its semi-annual General Conferences where the same types of themes were hammered home to members. As discussed before, the LDS Church is more centralized, so that members may understand subtle cues

because they hear similar language week in and week out in regular religious services and classes, which are based on curriculum provided by church headquarters in Salt Lake City.

Based on the results of the content analysis, I analyzed how organizational different and political behavior within a community affect whether individuals support or oppose the political stances of their respective religious organization. Analysis of General Social Survey data indicates organizations that allow local congregations to have more autonomy regarding financial affairs leads to a higher probability that individuals opposing one's religious group on abortion and income inequality. However, greater autonomy for congregations led to a higher probability of supporting one's religious organization's policies on immigration and same-sex marriage. One reason this split occurs is that abortion and sexual morality is a topic that religious leaders at a local level might not prioritize to the same extent that the general leadership of a religious organization would compared to economic issues such as immigration and income inequality.

As expected, religious service attendance plays a significant role in whether an individual will support or oppose political stances of their religious group. Those who attend more frequently are more likely to support their religious group. For religious groups that want to exert greater influence over their members, getting them out to services appears to be a way for those leaders to make sure political cues stick. On top of religious service attendance, the results also indicated that the length of sermons and the overall length of a religious service plays a role in whether members of religious organizations support or oppose political stances of their respective religious organization. Longer sermons lead to a higher probability of opposing one's religious group across a variety of issues, but the opposite effect occurs on others. The overall length of religious services has an opposite effect in many cases from length of sermon, which

means shorter length of religious services leads to a higher probability of supporting one's religious group. The casual mechanism behind that discrepancy is a bit unclear, but one possibility is that outside of sermons, political cues within a religious service may be limited. Instead, content of religious services in general, which may include Sunday School, Bible Study, or other lessons and/or training, might shy away from political issues and focus more on individual issues, such as self-improvement and how to help others.

Unsurprisingly, the outside political environment matters as well. Those who live in more Republican areas, as indicated by vote share for Republican presidential candidates at the state and county level, leads to a lower probability of opposing one's religious group on abortion, income inequality (county level), and same-sex marriage, while leading to a higher probability of opposing one's religious organization on immigration and income inequality (state level).

Members of religious organizations do not uniformly support or oppose the political stances of their respective religious organization, as my results indicated there is substantial pushback among conservatives and Republicans towards social justice issues such as immigration and income inequality. In other words, conservatives and Republicans will oppose the political stances of their respective organization on those social justice issues, which goes against conventional thinking that individuals with identifying to the right of the political spectrum will stand behind their religious group.

Testing the effectiveness of political cues from religious elites yields results that indicate those cues are ineffective, at best, and could spark backlash. Cues from Catholic leaders are partially effective, as cues lead respondents to holding attitudes consistent with the cue on some issues such as climate change. Cues from Catholic leaders have an opposite effect on issues such as immigration and transgender rights. There is also a backlash effect present regarding Catholic

and LDS cues from individuals who do not identify with those respective religious organizations, as those cues lead to those individuals holding attitudes in an opposite direction of the cue's intended effect. This could, or maybe should, give religious leaders pause in determining what the overall goals of cue-giving might be. Religious elites have to determine if it more important to instill homogeneity among the faithful regarding certain political issues or aim to promote policy changes by trying to "convert" co-religionists and the "nones" to their policy preferences through other mechanisms.

Research Goals

One immediate need in continuing this research is fielding another wave of the Political Attitudes Survey. The first wave of the study contained less than 20 evangelical Protestants, and as the scope of the dissertation addresses cues made by Southern Baptist leaders, this needs to be addressed in future research. To do so is a challenge as such as study needs to be fielded in area where there are many Southern Baptists. Fielding the survey at colleges and universities strongly affiliated with the Southern Baptist Convention is a potential solution, but there is hesitation among Institutional Review Boards at those institutions to field surveys on issues administrators and faculty might find as going against their doctrine, such as asking questions on attitudes towards same-sex marriage and transgender individuals.

A potential solution to this is fielding the survey to more than just college students. However, such a study comes at a high cost, as getting a sample of around 500 individuals from certain demographic groups can cost range in the tens of thousands of dollars. Despite the potential cost, fielding the survey among a more representative sample can help illustrate the effectiveness of political cues from religious elites. There might be differences regarding age or education that cannot be determined from the Political Attitudes Survey. An added benefit is the

potential to test cues from other religious groups, such as mainline Protestant denominations that include the Episcopal Church, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), and the United Methodist Church.

There is also a need to determine how much of a factor congregational cues and contexts play in influencing political attitudes and behavior versus the effect religious group leaders have on members of their organizations. As Djupe and Gilbert argue (2008), what leaders of local congregations say may matter, but congregational/ religious group norms also determine if and when local religious leaders deliver political cues. In addition to testing the political influence of religious leaders in their surveys of Episcopal Church and Evangelical Lutheran Church in American congregations and their respective leaders, Djupe and Gilbert (2008) also sought to develop a framework for testing this influence within other religious organizations. Additional surveys using this framework has not been conducted, though. One of the reasons is scope and funding. Fielding surveys to targeted congregations would encompass much of the research agenda of any scholar. In addition, limited funding available to field such surveys make such research cost prohibitive. Finally, there would be a need to develop relationships with religious leaders in order to successfully fielding surveys to specific congregations. While doable, such relationships may take time to develop, and some congregations, especially within certain religious groups may not allow researchers to field surveys.

Also relevant is the impact of the “nones” on political cues. As I have illustrated with the results of my survey experiment, religious organizations experience backlash from those who are not members regarding their statements on salient political issues. Who opposes these religious organizations is important, especially as religious organizations work together in many areas, such as helping the poor, advocating for religious freedom, and politically mobilizing their

members regarding abortion and what they consider “moral” issues. Whether religious organizations suffer backlash from those who identify with other religious organizations or from those who do not profess any religious belief is a worthy question to pursue.

In general, this dissertation illustrates that the issue of religious God talk made by religious leaders is complex. Religious organizations differ on their approach, and the impact of the cue-giving also differs. Even as my results show cue-giving is ineffective, this analysis is limited. More needs to be done on a wide variety of issues, including political issues that seem to align with the religious goals of many organizations such as helping the less fortunate and providing service to others. Broadening the scope of my research could determine what are the limits of political cue-giving, especially if it comes in the form of reverse God talk. Other questions include how the limits differ among religious organizations and are there also differences within religious groups on the effectiveness of cues. Who are most prone to respond positively to cues and is that similar among religious organizations. The dissertation is just a step to addressing the effective of political cue-giving by religious leaders, but hopefully provides a guide to future work in the area.

REFERENCES

- Adkins, Todd, Geoffrey C. Layman, David E. Campbell, and John C. Green. 2013. "Religious Group Cues and Citizen Policy Attitudes in the United States." *Politics and Religion* 6(2): 235–63.
- Alexander, Thomas G. 1986. *Mormonism in Transition: A History of the Latter-Day Saints, 1890-1930*. Urbana and Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press.
- Alford, John R. et al. 2011. "The Politics of Mate Choice." *Journal of Politics* 73(2): 362–79.
- Ammerman, Nancy T. 2007. *Everyday Religion: Observing Modern Religious Lives*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Andersen, Lisa M. F. 2013. *The Politics of Prohibition: American Governance and the Prohibition Party, 1869-1933*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Beatty, Kathleen Murphy, and Oliver Walter. 1989. "A Group Theory of Religion and Politics: The Clergy as Group Leaders." *Western Political Quarterly* 42(1): 129–46.
- Berelson, Bernard R., Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee. 1954. *Voting*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Berry, Jason. 2012. *Render Unto Rome: The Secret Life of Money in the Catholic Church*. New York: Broadway Paperbacks.
- Beyerlein, Kraig, and Mark Chaves. 2003. "The Political Activities of Religious Congregations in the United States." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*: 229–246.
- Bowman, Matthew. 2012. *The Mormon People: The Making of an American Faith*. New York: Random House.
- Brewer, Mark D., Rogan Kersh, and R. Eric Peterson. 2003. "Assessing Conventional Wisdom about Religion and Politics: A Preliminary View from the Pews." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 42(1): 125–36.
- Byrnes, Timothy A. 1991. *Catholic Bishops in American Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Calfano, Brian Robert. 2009. "Choosing Constituent Cues: Reference Group Influence on Clergy Political Speech." *Social Science Quarterly* 90(1): 88–102.
- Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Campbell, David E. 2004. "Acts of Faith: Churches and Political Engagement." *Political Behavior* 26(2): 155–180.

- Campbell, David E., John C. Green, and Geoffrey C. Layman. 2011. "The Party Faithful: Partisan Images, Candidate Religion, and the Electoral Impact of Party Identification." *American Journal of Political Science* 55(1): 42–58.
- Campbell, David E., John C. Green, and J. Quin Monson. 2014. *Seeking the Promised Land: Mormons and American Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Campbell, David E., and J. Quin Monson. 2003. "Following the Leader? Mormon Voting on Ballot Propositions." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 42(4): 605–619.
- . 2007. "Dry Kindling: A Political Profile of American Mormons." In *From Pews to Polling Places: Faith and Politics in the American Religious Mosaic*, ed. J. Matthew Wilson. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 105–130.
- Campbell, Ernest Q., and Thomas F. Pettigrew. 1959. *Christians In Racial Crisis: A Study Of Little Rock's Ministry*. Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press.
- Charters, W.W., and Theodore M. Newcomb. 1952. "Some Attitudinal Effects of Experimentally Increased Salience of Group Membership." In *Readings in Social Psychology*, eds. G.E. Swanson, Theodore M. Newcomb, and E.L. Hartley. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 415–20.
- Conover, Pamela J. 1984. "The Influence of Group Identifications on Political Perception and Evaluation." *Journal of Politics* 46(3): 760–85.
- Converse, Philip E. 1964. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics." In *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. David E. Apter. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 206–61.
- Crawford, Sue E. S., and Laura R. Olson, eds. 2001. *Christian Clergy in American Politics*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Delli Carpini, Michael X., and Scott Keeter. 1996. *What Americans Know about Politics and Why It Matters*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- DeWalt, Kathleen M., and Billie R. DeWalt. 2010. *Participant Observation: A Guide for Fieldworkers*. 2nd edition. Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press.
- Dillon, Michele. 1995. "Religion and Culture in Tension: The Abortion Discourses of the U. S. Catholic Bishops and the Southern Baptist Convention." *Religion and American Culture: A Journal of Interpretation* 5(2): 159–80.
- Djupe, Paul A., and Brian R. Calfano. 2013. *God Talk: Experimenting With the Religious Causes of Public Opinion*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Djupe, Paul A., and Christopher P. Gilbert. 2002. "The Political Voice of Clergy." *Journal of Politics* 64(2): 596–609.

- . 2003. *The Prophetic Pulpit: Clergy, Churches, and Communities in American Politics*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.
- . 2006. "The Resourceful Believer: Generating Civic Skills in Church." *Journal of Politics* 68(1): 116–127.
- . 2008. *The Political Influence of Churches*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Djupe, Paul A., and J. Tobin Grant. 2001. "Religious Institutions and Political Participation in America." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 40(2): 303–314.
- Djupe, Paul A., Andrew R. Lewis, and Ted G. Jelen. 2016. "Rights, Reflection, and Reciprocity: Implications of the Same-Sex Marriage Debate for Tolerance and the Political Process." *Politics and Religion* 9(3): 630–48.
- Djupe, Paul A., and Laura R. Olson. 2007. "Toward a Fuller Understanding of Religion and Politics." In *Religious Interest in Community Conflict: Beyond the Culture Wars*, eds. Paul A. Djupe and Laura R. Olson. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press.
- Dowland, Seth. 2015. *Family Values and the Rise of the Christian Right*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Druckman, James N., Donald P. Green, James H. Kuklinski, and Arthur Lupia. 2006. "The Growth and Development of Experimental Research in Political Science." *American Political Science Review* 100(4): 627–635.
- Farnsley II, Arthur Emery. 1994. *Southern Baptist Politics: Authority and Power in the Restructuring of an American Denomination*. University Park, PA: Penn State Press.
- Finifter, Ada. 1974. "The Friendship Group as a Protective Environment for Political Deviants." *American Political Science Review* 68(2): 607–25.
- Finke, Roger, and Rodney Stark. 2005. *The Churching of America, 1776-2005: Winners and Losers in Our Religious Economy*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Fowler, Robert Booth, and Allen D. Hertzke. 1995. *Religion and Politics in America: Faith, Culture, and Strategic Choices*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Fox, Jeffrey C. 2006. *Latter-Day Political Views*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Friesen, Amanda, and Michael W. Wagner. 2012. "Beyond the 'Three Bs': How American Christians Approach Faith and Politics." *Politics and Religion* 5(2): 224–52.
- Gerber, Alan S., and Donald P. Green. 2000. "The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment." *American Political Science Review* 94(3): 653–63.

- Gilbert, Christopher P. 1993. *The Impact of Churches on Political Behavior: An Empirical Study*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Gilens, Martin, and Naomi Murakawa. 2002. "Elite Cues and Political Decision-Making." In *Research in Micropolitics*, eds. Michael X. Delli Carpini, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Y. Shapiro. Amsterdam: JAI, 15–49.
- Ginsberg, Benjamin, Theodore J. Lowi, Caroline J. Tolbert, and Margaret Weir. 2016. *We the People*. 12th edition. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Glazier, Rebecca A. 2013. "Divine Direction: How Providential Religious Beliefs Shape Foreign Policy Attitudes." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 9(2): 127–42.
- . 2015. "Bridging Religion and Politics: The Impact of Providential Religious Beliefs on Political Activity." *Politics and Religion* 8(3): 458–487.
- Graham, Jesse, Jonathan Haidt, and Brian A. Nosek. 2009. "Liberals and Conservatives Rely on Different Sets of Moral Foundations." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 96(5): 1029–46.
- Green, John C. 2007. *The Faith Factor: How Religion Influences American Elections*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Green, John C., James L. Guth, Corwin E. Smidt, and Lyman A. Kellstedt. 1996. *Religion and the Culture Wars: Dispatches from the Front*. Rowman & Littlefield.
- Green, John C., Mark J. Rozell, and Clyde Wilcox, eds. 2003. *The Christian Right in American Politics: Marching to the Millennium*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
- Guth, James L., John C. Green, and Corwin E. Smidt. 2002. "A Distant Thunder? Religious Mobilization in the 2000 Elections." In *Interest Group Politics*, eds. Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 161–84.
- Guth, James L., John C. Green, Corwin E. Smidt, and Lyman A. Kellstedt. 1997. *The Bully Pulpit: The Politics of Protestant Clergy*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.
- Guth, James L., Lyman A. Kellstedt, Corwin E. Smidt, and John C. Green. 2006. "Religious Influences in the 2004 Presidential Election." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 36(2): 223–41.
- Haidt, Jonathan, and Jesse Graham. 2007. "When Morality Opposes Justice: Conservatives Have Moral Intuitions That Liberals May Not Recognize." *Social Justice Research* 20(1): 98–116.
- Harris, Fredrick C. 1999. *Something Within: Religion in African-American Political Activism*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Hsieh, Hsiu-Fang, and Sarah E. Shannon. 2005. "Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis." *Qualitative Health Research* 15(9): 1277–88.
- Huckfeldt, R. Robert, and John Sprague. 1995. *Citizens, Politics and Social Communication: Information and Influence in an Election Campaign*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Huckfeldt, Robert, Paul Allen Beck, Russell J. Dalton, and Jeffrey Levine. 1995. "Political Environments, Cohesive Social Groups, and the Communication of Public Opinion." *American Journal of Political Science* 39(4): 1025–54.
- Huckfeldt, Robert, Eric Plutzer, and John Sprague. 1993. "Alternative Contexts of Political Behavior: Churches, Neighborhoods, and Individuals." *Journal of Politics* 55(2): 365–81.
- Husser, Jason A. 2012. "Religion and Polarization in American Politics." Ph.D. diss. Vanderbilt University.
- Iyengar, Shanto, Mark D. Peters, and Donald R. Kinder. 1982. "Experimental Demonstrations of the 'Not-So-Minimal' Consequences of Television News Programs." *American Political Science Review* 76(4): 848–58.
- Jelen, Ted G. 1991. *The Political Mobilization of Religious Beliefs*. New York: Praeger.
- . 2003. "Catholic Priests and the Political Order: The Political Behavior of Catholic Pastors." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 42(4): 591–604.
- Jelen, Ted G., and Clyde Wilcox. 1992. "The Effects of Religious Self-Identification on Support for the New Christian Right: An Analysis of Political Activists." *Social Science Journal* 29(2): 199–210.
- Kell, Carl L., and L. Raymond Camp. 2001. *In the Name of the Father: The Rhetoric of the New Southern Baptist Convention*. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press.
- Kellstedt, Lyman A., John C. Green, James L. Guth, and Corwin E. Smidt. 1996. "Grasping the Essentials: The Social Embodiment of Religion and Political Behavior." In *Religion and the Culture Wars: Dispatches from the Front*, ed. John C. Green. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 174–92.
- Krosnick, Jon A. 1990. "Government Policy and Citizen Passion: A Study of Issue Publics in Contemporary America." *Political Behavior* 12(1): 59–92.
- Lakoff, George. 2010. *Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think*. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Layman, Geoffrey. 2001. *The Great Divide*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Leege, David C. 1988. "Catholics and the Civic Order: Parish Participation, Politics, and Civic Participation." *The Review of Politics* 50(4): 704–36.

- . 1992. "Coalitions, Cues, Strategic Politics, and the Staying Power of the Religious Right, or Why Political Scientists Ought to Pay Attention to Cultural Politics." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 25(2): 198–204.
- Leege, David C., and Lyman A. Kellstedt, eds. 1993. *Rediscovering the Religious Factor in American Politics*. New York: M.E. Sharpe.
- Lenski, Gerhard. 1961. *The Religious Factor: A Sociologist's Inquiry*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- Lucas, John A. 1971. "The Unholy Experiment—Professional Baseball's Struggle Against Pennsylvania Sunday Blue Laws 1926-1934." *Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies* 38(2): 163–75.
- Lupia, Arthur. 1994. "Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections." *American Political Science Review* 88(1): 63–76.
- Martin, William. 1996. *With God On Our Side*. New York: Broadway Books.
- Mauss, Arnold L. 1984. "Sociological Perspectives on the Mormon Subculture." *Annual Review of Sociology* 10: 437–60.
- McDermott, Rose. 2002. "EXPERIMENTAL METHODS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE." *Annual Review of Political Science* 5(1): 31–61.
- McGreevy, John T. 1996. *Parish Boundaries: The Catholic Encounter with Race in the Twentieth-Century Urban North*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- McGuire, William J. 1968. "Personality and Susceptibility to Social Influence." In *Handbook of Personality Theory and Research*, eds. Edgar F. Borgatta and William M. Lambert. Chicago: Rand McNally.
- Mckeown, Bruce, and James M. Carlson. 1987. "An Experimental Study of the Influence of Religious Elites on Public Opinion." *Political Communication* 4(2): 93–102.
- McPherson, Miller, Lynn Smith-Lovin, and James M. Cook. 2001. "Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks." *Annual Review of Sociology* 27: 415–444.
- Mockabee, Stephen T., Kenneth D. Wald, and David C. Leege. 2012. "In Search of a Religious Left: Reexamining Religiosity." In *Improving Public Opinion Surveys: Interdisciplinary Innovation and the American National Election Studies*, eds. John H. Aldrich and Kathleen M. McGraw. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 278–300.
- Moore, R. Laurence. 1986. *Religious Outsiders and the Making of Americans*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Mulligan, Kenneth. 2006. "Pope John Paul II and Catholic Opinion Toward the Death Penalty and Abortion." *Social Science Quarterly* 87(3): 739–53.
- Mutz, Diana C. 2006. *Hearing the Other Side*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Neiheisel, Jacob R., and Paul A. Djupe. 2008. "Intra-Organizational Constraints on Churches' Public Witness." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 47(3): 427–41.
- Nicholson, Stephen P. 2011. "Dominating Cues and the Limits of Elite Influence." *Journal of Politics* 73(4): 1165–77.
- Nteta, Tatishe M., and Kevin J. Wallsten. 2012. "Preaching to the Choir? Religious Leaders and American Opinion on Immigration Reform." *Social Science Quarterly* 93(4): 891–910.
- Olson, Laura R. 2000. *Filled With Spirit and Power: Protestant Clergy in Politics*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Olson, Laura R., and Wendy Cadge. 2002. "Talking about Homosexuality: The Views of Mainline Protestant Clergy." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 41(1): 153–67.
- Olson, Laura R., and John C. Green. 2006. "The Religion Gap." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 39(3): 455–459.
- Piderit, John J., and Melanie M. Morey. 2008. *Renewing Parish Culture: Building for a Catholic Future*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Popkin, Samuel L. 1994. *The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Putnam, Robert D., and David E. Campbell. 2010. *American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Rademacher, William J., John S. Weber, and David McNeill Jr. 2007. *Understanding Today's Catholic Parish*. New London, CT: Twenty-Third Publications.
- Regnerus, Mark D., David Sikkink, and Christian Smith. 1999. "Voting with the Christian Right: Contextual and Individual Patterns of Electoral Influence." *Social Forces* 77(4): 1375–1401.
- Reilly, James T., and Margaret S. P. Chalmers. 2014. *The Clergy Sex Abuse Crisis and the Legal Responses*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Scheufele, Dietram A., Matthew C. Nisbet, and Dominique Brossard. 2003. "Pathways to Political Participation? Religion, Communication Contexts, and Mass Media." *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 15(3): 300–324.

- Smidt, Corwin E. et al. 2003. "The Political Attitudes and Activities of Mainline Protestant Clergy in the Election of 2000: A Study of Six Denominations." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 42(4): 515–32.
- . 2004. *Pulpit and Politics: Clergy in American Politics at the Advent of the Millennium*. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press.
- Smidt, Corwin E., and Brian Schaap. 2009. "Public Worship and Public Engagement: Pastoral Cues within the Context of Worship Services." *Review of Religious Research* 50(4): 441–62.
- Smith, Gregory Allen. 2008. *Politics in the Parish: The Political Influence of Catholic Priests*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
- Smith, Lauren E., and Laura R. Olson. 2013. "Attitudes about Socio-Moral Issues among Religious and Secular Youth." *Politikologiya religiya/Politics and Religion* 2: 305–6.
- Smith, Oran P. 2000. *Rise of Baptist Republicanism*. New York: New York University Press.
- Smith, Tom W., Peter Marsden, Michael Hout, and Kim. *General Social Surveys, 1972-2014 [Machine-Readable Data File]*.
- Snell, Steven. 2014. "The Social Influence of Religious Congregations on Political Behavior." Ph.D. diss. Princeton University.
- Sniderman, Paul M., Richard A. Brody, and Richard A. Tetlock. 1991. *Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Stark, Rodney, and James C. McCann. 1993. "Market Forces and Catholic Commitment: Exploring the New Paradigm." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 32(2): 111–24.
- Steensland, Brian et al. 2000. "The Measure of American Religion: Toward Improving the State of the Art." *Social Forces* 79(1): 291–318.
- Steinfels, Peter. 2003. *A People Adrift: The Crisis of the Roman Catholic Church in America*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Utter, Glenn H., and John Woodrow Storey. 2001. *The Religious Right: A Reference Handbook*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO.
- Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Vinson, C. Danielle, and James L. Guth. 2003. "Advance and Retreat in the Palmetto State: Assessing the Religious Right in South Carolina." In *The Christian Right in American Politics: Marching to the Millennium*, eds. John C. Green, Mark J. Rozell, and Clyde Wilcox. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 21–40.

- Wald, Kenneth D., and Allison Calhoun-Brown. 2014. *Religion and Politics in the United States*. Seventh Edition. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Wald, Kenneth D., Dennis E. Owen, and Samuel S. Hill Jr. 1988. "Churches as Political Communities." *American Political Science Review* 82(2): 531–48.
- . 1990. "Political Cohesion in Churches." *Journal of Politics* 52(1): 197–215.
- Welch, Michael R., David C. Leege, Kenneth D. Wald, and Lyman A. Kellstedt. 1993. "Are the Sheep Herding the Shepherds? Cue Perceptions, Congregational Responses, and Political Communication Responses." In *Rediscovering the Religious Factor in American Politics*, eds. David C. Leege and Lyman A. Kellstedt. Armonk, NY: Routledge, 235–54.
- Wilcox, Clyde. 1990. "Religion and Politics among White Evangelicals: The Impact of Religious Variables on Political Attitudes." *Review of Religious Research* 32(1): 27–42.
- Zachman, Randall C., ed. 2008. *John Calvin and Roman Catholicism: Critique and Engagement, Then and Now*. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic.
- Zaller, John R. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

APPENDIX: 2017 POLITICAL ATTITUDES SURVEY

Note: Questions 1-4 as they addressed informed consent for the study.

Q5 Some people seem to think about what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, some of the time, only now and then, or hardly at all?

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q5

Range: [1,4] Units: 1
Unique values: 4 Missing .: 38/727

Tabulation: Freq.	Numeric	Label
318	1	Most of the time
254	2	Some of the time
89	3	Only now and then
28	4	Hardly at all
38	.	

Q6 Do you consider yourself Catholic, Protestant, LDS/Mormon, Jewish, Muslim, or something else?

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q6

Range: [1,7] Units: 1
Unique values: 7 Missing .: 42/727

Tabulation: Freq.	Numeric	Label
116	1	Catholic
56	2	Protestant
269	3	LDS/Mormon
8	4	Jewish
10	5	Muslim
135	6	Other
91	7	None
42	.	

Q7 What church or denomination is that?

Type: Numeric (double)

Label: Q7

Range: [1,10]

Units: 1

Unique values: 9

Missing .: 632/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	14	1	Baptist
	1	2	Episcopalian
	12	3	Lutheran
	15	4	Methodist
	8	5	Presbyterian
	2	6	Assembly of God
	2	7	Pentecostal
	8	8	United Church of Christ
	33	10	Non-denominational
	632	.	

Q8 Is the your church affiliated with the Southern Baptist Convention?

Type: Numeric (double)

Label: Q8

Range: [-8,2]

Units: 1

Unique values: 3

Missing .: 713/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	9	-8	Not sure
	1	1	Yes
	4	2	No
	713	.	

Q9 Apart from weddings, baptisms, and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services?

Type: Numeric (double)

Label: Q9

Range: [1,5]

Units: 1

Unique values: 5

Missing .: 44/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	143	1	Never
	150	2	A few times a year
	66	3	Once or twice a month
	52	4	Almost every week
	272	5	Every week
	44	.	

Q10 Apart from weddings and funerals, about how often do you pray?

Type: Numeric (double)

Label: Q10

Range: [-8,4]

Units: 1

Unique values: 5

Missing .: 46/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	69	-8	Not sure
	240	1	Several times per day
	82	2	Once a day
	126	3	A few times a week
	164	4	Never
	46	.	

Q11 Which of these statements comes closest to describing your feelings about the Bible?

Type: Numeric (double)

Label: Q11

Range: [-8,3]

Units: 1

Unique values: 4

Missing .: 46/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	58	-8	Not sure
	54	1	The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word.
	421	2	The Bible is the word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally,

148 3 The Bible is a book written by
 46 men and is not the word of God.
 .

Q12 How would you consider religion to be an important part of your life?

Type: Numeric (double)
 Label: Q12

Range: [-8,4] Units: 1
 Unique values: 5 Missing .: 46/727

Tabulation: Freq. Numeric Label
 34 -8 Not sure
 128 1 Religion is not important
 116 2 Somewhat important
 134 3 Quite important
 269 4 A great deal of guidance
 46 .

Q13_1 (Control group) We would now like to ask you about your feelings on the following statements. Choose the position on the scale that comes closest to your view, where a value of 1 means "Does not describe me very well" and a values of 5 means "Describes me very well."

I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other person's" point of view.

Type: Numeric (double)
 Label: Q13_1, but 3 nonmissing values are not labeled

Range: [1,5] Units: 1
 Unique values: 5 Missing .: 505/727

Tabulation: Freq. Numeric Label
 64 1 Not me
 95 2
 38 3
 20 4
 5 5 Me
 505 .

Q13_2 (Control group) We would now like to ask you about your feelings on the following statements. Choose the position on the scale that comes closest to your view, where a value of 1 means "Does not describe me very well" and a value of 5 means "Describes me very well."

I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision.

Type: Numeric (double)

Label: Q13_2, but 3 nonmissing values are not labeled

Range: [1,5]

Units: 1

Unique values: 5

Missing .: 505/727

Tabulation: Freq. Numeric Label

4	1	Not me
10	2	
34	3	
92	4	
82	5	Me
505	.	

Q13_3 (Control group) We would now like to ask you about your feelings on the following statements. Choose the position on the scale that comes closest to your view, where a value of 1 means "Does not describe me very well" and a value of 5 means "Describes me very well."

I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their perspective.

Type: Numeric (double)

Label: Q13_3, but 3 nonmissing values are not labeled

Range: [1,5]

Units: 1

Unique values: 5

Missing .: 505/727

Tabulation: Freq. Numeric Label

3	1	Not me
13	2	
42	3	
98	4	
66	5	Me
505	.	

Q13_4 (Control group) We would now like to ask you about your feelings on the following statements. Choose the position on the scale that comes closest to your view, where a value of 1 means "Does not describe me very well" and a value of 5 means "Describes me very well."

If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other people's arguments.

Type: Numeric (double)

Label: Q13_4, but 3 nonmissing values are not labeled

Range: [1,5] Units: 1
Unique values: 5 Missing .: 505/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	32	1	Not me
	78	2	
	66	3	
	20	4	
	26	5	Me
	505	.	

Q13_5 (Control group) We would now like to ask you about your feelings on the following statements. Choose the position on the scale that comes closest to your view, where a value of 1 means "Does not describe me very well" and a value of 5 means "Describes me very well."

I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both.

Type: Numeric (double)

Label: Q13_5, but 3 nonmissing values are not labeled

Range: [1,5] Units: 1
Unique values: 5 Missing .: 505/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	4	1	Not me
	16	2	
	41	3	
	82	4	
	79	5	Me
	505	.	

Q13_6 (Control group) We would now like to ask you about your feelings on the following statements. Choose the position on the scale that comes closest to your view, where a value of 1 means "Does not describe me very well" and a value of 5 means "Describes me very well."

When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in that person's shoes" for a while.

Type: Numeric (double)

Label: Q13_6, but 3 nonmissing values are not labeled

Range: [1,5] Units: 1
Unique values: 5 Missing .: 505/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	7	1	Not me
	35	2	
	67	3	
	74	4	
	39	5	Me
	505	.	

Q13_7 (Control group) We would now like to ask you about your feelings on the following statements. Choose the position on the scale that comes closest to your view, where a value of 1 means "Does not describe me very well" and a value of 5 means "Describes me very well."

Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place.

Type: Numeric (double)

Label: Q13_7, but 3 nonmissing values are not labeled

Range: [1,5] Units: 1
Unique values: 5 Missing .: 505/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	5	1	Not me
	30	2	
	53	3	
	86	4	
	48	5	Me
	505	.	

Q14 (Control group) In today's media marketplace, there are many different kinds of networks with different kinds of news shows or other programs that people might like to watch. For

example, some people might like to watch a show from PBS, and others might like to watch a show from FOX News. If you had to pick, which of the following would you most like to watch? (Even if you typically use some other media for news, please indicate which of these you like most.)

Type: Numeric (double)

Label: Q14

Range: [1,7] Units: 1
Unique values: 7 Missing .: 503/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
26	1	A show from PBS like The News Hour	
34	2	A show from FOX News like The O'Reilly Factor	
11	3	A show from MSNBC like The Rachel Maddow Show	
58	4	A show from CNN like Anderson Cooper 360	
43	5	A local news show on an ABC, NBC, or CBS local channel	
23	6	A local news show on a FOX local channel	
29	7	I don't know, I rarely consume news	
503	.		

Q17_First_Click

Timing - First Click

Type: Numeric (double)

Range: [0,18644.122] Units: .001
Unique values: 126 Missing .: 498/727

mean: 109.26
std. dev: 1243.7

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	0	0	2.395	12.618	57.171

Q17_Last_Click

Timing - Last Click

Type: Numeric (double)	
Range: [0,18708.119]	Units: .001
Unique values: 127	Missing .: 498/727
mean: 133.859	
std. dev: 1253.88	
percentiles:	10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
	0 0 4.033 53.912 98.903

Q17_Page_Submit	Timing - Page Submit
-----------------	----------------------

Type: Numeric (double)	
Range: [2.142,18746.517]	Units: .001
Unique values: 229	Missing .: 498/727
mean: 208.012	
std. dev: 1297.14	
percentiles:	10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
	6.597 47.257 60.82 101.432 156.591

Q17_Click_Count	Timing - Click Count
-----------------	----------------------

Type: Numeric (double)	
Range: [0,18]	Units: 1
Unique values: 15	Missing .: 498/727
mean: 1.8952	
std. dev: 2.9835	
percentiles:	10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
	0 0 1 3 5

Q18 (Democratic protestor attacked by Republican) Would you consider the incident in the video a very serious, somewhat serious, or not at all serious offense?

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q18

Range: [1,2] Units: 1
Unique values: 2 Missing .: 509/727

Tabulation: Freq. Numeric Label
 160 1 Very serious
 58 2 Somewhat serious
 509 .

Q19 (Democratic protestor attacked) Some people feel that incidents, such as the one described in the video, will become more frequent given the current political climate. Do you think that the number of these incidents will be more frequent, less frequent, or stay about the same?

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q19

Range: [1,3] Units: 1
Unique values: 3 Missing .: 510/727

Tabulation: Freq. Numeric Label
 152 1 More frequent
 55 2 Less frequent
 10 3 Stay about the same
 510 .

Q20 (Democratic protestor attacked) Some people think the government should place further restrictions on protests to prevent incidents such as the one illustrated in the video. Do you agree or disagree?

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q20

Range: [1,4] Units: 1
Unique values: 4 Missing .: 509/727

Tabulation: Freq. Numeric Label
 25 1 Strongly agree
 77 2 Somewhat agree

65	3	Somewhat disagree
51	4	Strongly disagree
509	.	

Q21_1 (Democratic protestor attacked) We would now like to ask you about your feelings on the following statements. Choose the position on the scale that comes closest to your view, where a value of 1 means "Does not describe me very well" and a value of 5 means "Describes me very well."

I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other person's" point of view.

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q21_1, but 3 nonmissing values are not labeled

Range: [1,5]	Units: 1
Unique values: 5	Missing .: 512/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	73	1	Not me
	80	2	
	44	3	
	15	4	
	3	5	Me
	512	.	

Q21_2 (Democratic protestor attacked) We would now like to ask you about your feelings on the following statements. Choose the position on the scale that comes closest to your view, where a value of 1 means "Does not describe me very well" and a value of 5 means "Describes me very well."

I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision.-----

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q21_2, but 3 nonmissing values are not labeled

Range: [1,5]	Units: 1
Unique values: 5	Missing .: 512/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	4	1	Not me
	12	2	
	38	3	

83	4
78	5 Me
512	.

Q21_3 (Democratic protestor attacked) We would now like to ask you about your feelings on the following statements. Choose the position on the scale that comes closest to your view, where a value of 1 means "Does not describe me very well" and a value of 5 means "Describes me very well."

I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their perspective.

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q21_3, but 3 nonmissing values are not labeled

Range: [1,5]	Units: 1
Unique values: 5	Missing .: 512/727

Tabulation: Freq.	Numeric	Label
4	1	Not me
7	2	
37	3	
85	4	
82	5	Me
512	.	

Q21_4 (Democratic protestor attacked) We would now like to ask you about your feelings on the following statements. Choose the position on the scale that comes closest to your view, where a value of 1 means "Does not describe me very well" and a value of 5 means "Describes me very well."

If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other people's arguments.

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q21_4, but 3 nonmissing values are not labeled

Range: [1,5]	Units: 1
Unique values: 5	Missing .: 512/727

Tabulation: Freq.	Numeric	Label
50	1	Not me

70	2
57	3
26	4
12	5 Me
512	.

Q21_5 (Democratic protestor attacked) We would now like to ask you about your feelings on the following statements. Choose the position on the scale that comes closest to your view, where a value of 1 means "Does not describe me very well" and a value of 5 means "Describes me very well."

I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both.

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q21_5, but 3 nonmissing values are not labeled

Range: [1,5]	Units: 1
Unique values: 5	Missing .: 512/727

Tabulation: Freq. Numeric Label		
2	1	Not me
15	2	
33	3	
80	4	
85	5	Me
512	.	

Q21_6 (Democratic protestor attacked) We would now like to ask you about your feelings on the following statements. Choose the position on the scale that comes closest to your view, where a value of 1 means "Does not describe me very well" and a value of 5 means "Describes me very well."

When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in that person's shoes" for a while.

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q21_6, but 3 nonmissing values are not labeled

Range: [1,5]	Units: 1
Unique values: 5	Missing .: 512/727

Tabulation: Freq. Numeric Label		
8	1	Not me

35	2
61	3
71	4
40	5 Me
512	.

Q21_7 (Democratic protestor attacked) We would now like to ask you about your feelings on the following statements. Choose the position on the scale that comes closest to your view, where a value of 1 means "Does not describe me very well" and a value of 5 means "Describes me very well."

Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place.

Type: Numeric (double)

Label: Q21_7, but 3 nonmissing values are not labeled

Range: [1,5]	Units: 1
Unique values: 5	Missing .: 512/727

Tabulation: Freq. Numeric Label		
5	1	Not me
27	2	
57	3	
73	4	
53	5	Me
512	.	

Q22 (Democratic protestor attacked) In today's media marketplace, there are many different kinds of networks with di

Type: Numeric (double)

Label: Q22

Range: [1,7]	Units: 1
Unique values: 7	Missing .: 512/727

Tabulation: Freq. Numeric Label		
21	1	A show from PBS like The News Hour
28	2	A show from FOX News like The O'Reilly Factor
11	3	A show from MSNBC like The

	Rachel Maddow Show
61	4 A show from CNN like Anderson Cooper 360
41	5 A local news show on an ABC, NBC, or CBS local channel
19	6 A local news show on a FOX local channel
34	7 I don't know, I rarely consume news
512	.

Q25_First_Click

Timing - First Click

Type: Numeric (double)

Range: [0,23781.131]	Units: .001
Unique values: 134	Missing .: 497/727

mean: 129.495
std. dev: 1580.75

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	0	0	2.889	13.968	32.1275

Q25_Last_Click

Timing - Last Click

Type: Numeric (double)

Range: [0,23781.131]	Units: .001
Unique values: 134	Missing .: 497/727

mean: 260.903
std. dev: 1928.47

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	0	0	10.4265	51.645	96.745

Q25_Page_Submit

Timing - Page Submit

Type: Numeric (double)

Range: [1.835,23817.802] Units: .001
Unique values: 230 Missing .: 497/727

mean: 337.882
std. dev: 1976.38

percentiles: 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
7.999 45.232 58.154 82.991 135.65

Q25_Click_Count

Timing - Click Count

Type: Numeric (double)

Range: [0,23] Units: 1
Unique values: 15 Missing .: 497/727

mean: 1.94348
std. dev: 2.94214

percentiles: 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
0 0 1 3 5

Q26 (Republican protestor attacked) Would you consider the incident in the video a very serious, somewhat serious, or not at all serious offense?

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q26

Range: [1,2] Units: 1
Unique values: 2 Missing .: 506/727

Tabulation: Freq. Numeric Label
146 1 Very serious
75 2 Somewhat serious
506 .

Q27 (Republican protestor attacked) Some people feel that incidents, such as the one described in the video, will become more frequent given the current political climate. Do you think that the number of these incidents will be more frequent, less frequent, or stay about the same?

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q27

Range: [1,3] Units: 1
Unique values: 3 Missing .: 506/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	160	1	More frequent
	48	2	Less frequent
	13	3	Stay about the same
	506	.	

Q28 (Republican protestor attacked) Some people think the government should place further restrictions on protests to prevent incidents such as the one illustrated in the video. Do you agree or disagree?

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q28

Range: [1,4] Units: 1
Unique values: 4 Missing .: 506/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	20	1	Strongly agree
	87	2	Somewhat agree
	58	3	Somewhat disagree
	56	4	Strongly disagree
	506	.	

Q29_1 (Republican protestor attacked) We would now like to ask you about your feelings on the following statements. Choose the position on the scale that comes closest to your view, where a value of 1 means "Does not describe me very well" and a value of 5 means "Describes me very well. "

I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other person's" point of view.

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q29_1, but 3 nonmissing values are not labeled

Range: [1,5] Units: 1
Unique values: 5 Missing .: 508/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	76	1	Not me
	88	2	
	37	3	
	13	4	
	5	5	Me
	508	.	

Q29_2 (Republican protestor attacked) We would now like to ask you about your feelings on the following statements. Choose the position on the scale that comes closest to your view, where a value of 1 means "Does not describe me very well" and a value of 5 means "Describes me very well. "

I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision.

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q29_2, but 3 nonmissing values are not labeled

Range: [1,5] Units: 1
Unique values: 5 Missing .: 508/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	3	1	Not me
	11	2	
	39	3	
	79	4	
	87	5	Me
	508	.	

Q29_3 (Republican protestor attacked) We would now like to ask you about your feelings on the following statements. Choose the position on the scale that comes closest to your view, where a value of 1 means "Does not describe me very well" and a value of 5 means "Describes me very well. "

I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their perspective.

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q29_3, but 3 nonmissing values are not labeled

Range: [1,5] Units: 1
Unique values: 5 Missing .: 508/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	3	1	Not me
	19	2	
	39	3	
	75	4	
	83	5	Me
	508	.	

Q29_4 (Republican protestor attacked) We would now like to ask you about your feelings on the following statements. Choose the position on the scale that comes closest to your view, where a value of 1 means "Does not describe me very well" and a value of 5 means "Describes me very well. "

If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other people's arguments.

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q29_4, but 3 nonmissing values are not labeled

Range: [1,5] Units: 1
Unique values: 5 Missing .: 508/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	33	1	Not me
	70	2	
	61	3	
	32	4	
	23	5	Me
	508	.	

Q29_5 (Republican protestor attacked) We would now like to ask you about your feelings on the following statements. Choose the position on the scale that comes closest to your view, where a value of 1 means "Does not describe me very well" and a value of 5 means "Describes me very well. "

I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both.

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q29_5, but 3 nonmissing values are not labeled

Range: [1,5] Units: 1
Unique values: 5 Missing .: 508/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
3	1	Not me	
13	2		
40	3		
79	4		
84	5	Me	
508	.		

Q29_6 (Republican protestor attacked) We would now like to ask you about your feelings on the following statements. Choose the position on the scale that comes closest to your view, where a value of 1 means "Does not describe me very well" and a value of 5 means "Describes me very well. "

When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in that person's shoes" for a while.

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q29_6, but 3 nonmissing values are not labeled

Range: [1,5] Units: 1
Unique values: 5 Missing .: 508/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
5	1	Not me	
46	2		
69	3		
56	4		
43	5	Me	
508	.		

Q29_7 (Republican protestor attacked) We would now like to ask you about your feelings on the following statements. Choose the position on the scale that comes closest to your view, where a value of 1 means "Does not describe me very well" and a value of 5 means "Describes me very well. "

Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place.

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q29_7, but 3 nonmissing values are not labeled

Range: [1,5] Units: 1
Unique values: 5 Missing .: 508/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
4	1	Not me	
27	2		
64	3		
72	4		
52	5	Me	
508	.		

Q30 (Republican protestor attacked) In today's media marketplace, there are many different kinds of networks with different kinds of news shows or other programs that people might like to watch. For example, some people might like to watch a show from PBS, and others might like to watch a show from FOX News. If you had to pick, which of the following would you most like to watch? (Even if you typically use some other media for news, please indicate which of these you like most.)

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q30

Range: [1,7] Units: 1
Unique values: 7 Missing .: 507/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
28	1	A show from PBS like The News Hour	
36	2	A show from FOX News like The O'Reilly Factor	
6	3	A show from MSNBC like The Rachel Maddow Show	
47	4	A show from CNN like Anderson Cooper 360	
46	5	A local news show on an ABC, NBC, or CBS local channel	
19	6	A local news show on a FOX local channel	
38	7	I don't know, I rarely consume news	
507	.		

Q32_1 How would you rate the Republican party? - Please select a value between 0 and 100

Type: Numeric (double)

Range: [0,100] Units: 1
Unique values: 91 Missing .: 95/727

mean: 49.0396
std. dev: 29.517

percentiles: 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
 10 20 51 76.5 85

Q33_1 How would you rate the Democratic party? - Please select a value between 0 and 100

Type: Numeric (double)

Range: [0,100] Units: 1
Unique values: 89 Missing .: 94/727

mean: 48.5956
std. dev: 26.3167

percentiles: 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
 10 30 50 70 81

Q34 (Climate change control) Which of these statements about the Earth's temperature comes closest to your view?

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q34

Range: [-9,3] Units: 1
Unique values: 4 Missing .: 508/727

Tabulation: Freq. Numeric Label

17	-9	Not sure
137	1	The Earth is getting warmer mostly because of human activity, such as burning fossil fuels
55	2	The Earth is getting warmer mostly because of natural patterns in the Earth's environment

10 3 There is no solid evidence that
the Earth is getting warmer
508 .

Q36 (Catholic climate change coded treatment) Which of these statements about the Earth's temperature comes closest to your views?

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q36

Range: [-8,3] Units: 1
Unique values: 4 Missing .: 510/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	13	-8	Not sure
	153	1	The Earth is getting warmer mostly because of human activity, such as burning fossil fuels
	45	2	The Earth is getting warmer mostly because of natural patterns in the Earth's environment
	6	3	There is no solid evidence that the Earth is getting warmer
	510	.	

Q38 (Catholic climate change explicit treatment) Which of these statements about the Earth's temperature comes closest to your views?

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q38

Range: [-8,3] Units: 1
Unique values: 4 Missing .: 507/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	19	-8	Not sure
	138	1	The Earth is getting warmer mostly because of human activity, such as burning fossil fuels
	53	2	The Earth is getting warmer mostly because of natural patterns in the Earth's environment

10 3 There is no solid evidence that
the Earth is getting warmer
507 .

Q39 (Transgender control) Which of the following best matches your position on the use of public restrooms by transgender individuals?

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q39

Range: [-8,2] Units: 1
Unique values: 3 Missing .: 582/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	28	-8	Not sure
	69	1	Allowed to use the public restrooms of the gender with which they currently identify
	48	2	Required to use the public restrooms of the gender they were born into
	582	.	

Q41(Catholic coded treatment) Which of the following best matches your position on the use of public restrooms by transgender individuals?

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q41

Range: [-8,2] Units: 1
Unique values: 3 Missing .: 584/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	18	-8	Not sure
	71	1	Allowed to use the public restrooms of the gender with which they currently identify
	54	2	Required to use the public restrooms of the gender they were born into
	584	.	

Q43 (Catholic transgender explicit treatment) Which of the following best matches your position on the use of public restrooms by transgender individuals?

Type: Numeric (double)

Label: Q43

Range: [-8,2]

Units: 1

Unique values: 3

Missing .: 586/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	20	-8	Not sure
	74	1	Allowed to use the public restrooms of the gender with which they currently identify
	47	2	Required to use the public restrooms of the gender they were born into
	586	.	

Q45 (Baptist transgender coded treatment) Which of the following best matches your position on the use of public restrooms by transgender individuals?

Type: Numeric (double)

Label: Q45

Range: [-8,2]

Units: 1

Unique values: 3

Missing .: 619/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	20	-8	Not sure
	52	1	Allowed to use the public restrooms of the gender with which they currently identify
	36	2	Required to use the public restrooms of the gender they were born into
	619	.	

Q47 (Baptist transgender explicit treatment) Which of the following best matches your position on the use of public restrooms by transgender individuals?

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q47

Range: [-8,2] Units: 1
Unique values: 3 Missing .: 617/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	17	-8	Not sure
	46	1	Allowed to use the public restrooms of the gender with which they currently identify
	47	2	Required to use the public restrooms of the gender they were born into
	617	.	

Q48 (Immigration control) Thinking about the issue of immigration, how important of a goal is it to build a wall along the U.S.-Mexico border to stem the flow of undocumented immigrants?

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q48

Range: [-8,4] Units: 1
Unique values: 5 Missing .: 510/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	6	-8	Not sure
	11	1	Very important
	33	2	Somewhat important
	40	3	Not too important
	127	4	Not at all important
	510	.	

Q50 (Catholic immigration coded treatment) Thinking about the issue of immigration, how important of a goal is it to build a wall along the U.S.-Mexico border to stem the flow of undocumented immigrants?

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q50

Range: [-8,4] Units: 1

Unique values: 5

Missing .: 509/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	8	-8	Not sure
	13	1	Very important
	39	2	Somewhat important
	52	3	Not too important
	106	4	Not at all important
	509	.	

Q52 (Catholic immigration explicit treatment) Thinking about the issue of immigration, how important of a goal is it to build a wall along the U.S.-Mexico border to stem the flow of undocumented immigrants?

Type: Numeric (double)

Label: Q52

Range: [-8,4]

Units: 1

Unique values: 5

Missing .: 509/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	3	-8	Not sure
	18	1	Very important
	36	2	Somewhat important
	41	3	Not too important
	120	4	Not at all important
	509	.	

Q53 (Refugee control) Which of the following do you think is the best approach for the U.S. to take with refugees from the Middle East?

Type: Numeric (double)

Label: Q53

Range: [-8,5]

Units: 1

Unique values: 6

Missing .: 567/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	31	-8	Not sure
	91	1	Increase number of refugees from the Middle East resettled into the U.S. without

4	2	Increase number of Christian refugees from Middle East resettled into U.S., but
23	3	Decrease number of Christian and Muslim refugees resettled into the U.S.
2	4	Decrease number of Christian refugees and do not accept any Muslim refugees to b
9	5	Do not accept any refugees from the Middle East into the U.S.
567	.	

Q55 (LDS refugee coded treatment) Which of the following do you think is the best approach for the U.S. to take with refugees from the Middle East?

Type: Numeric (double)

Label: Q55

Range: [-8,5] Units: 1
Unique values: 6 Missing .: 564/727

Tabulation: Freq. Numeric Label

24	-8	Not sure
99	1	Increase number of refugees from the Middle East resettled into the U.S. without
13	2	Increase number of Christian refugees from Middle East resettled into U.S., but
13	3	Decrease number of Christian and Muslim refugees resettled into the U.S.
1	4	Decrease number of Christian refugees and do not accept any Muslim refugees to b
13	5	Do not accept any refugees from the Middle East into the U.S.
564	.	

Q57 (LDS refugee explicit treatment) Which of the following do you think is the best approach for the U.S. to take with refugees from the Middle East?

Type: Numeric (double)

Label: Q57

Range: [-8,5]

Units: 1

Unique values: 6

Missing .: 564/727

Tabulation: Freq. Numeric Label

34	-8	Not sure
83	1	Increase number of refugees from the Middle East resettled into the U.S. without
12	2	Increase number of Christian refugees from Middle East resettled into U.S., but
21	3	Decrease number of Christian and Muslim refugees resettled into the U.S.
4	4	Decrease number of Christian refugees and do not accept any Muslim refugees to b
9	5	Do not accept any refugees from the Middle East into the U.S.
564	.	

Q59 (Baptist refugee coded treatment) Which of the following do you think is the best approach for the U.S. to take with refugees from the Middle East?

Type: Numeric (double)

Label: Q59

Range: [-8,5]

Units: 1

Unique values: 6

Missing .: 648/727

Tabulation: Freq. Numeric Label

13	-8	Not sure
40	1	Increase number of refugees from the Middle East resettled into the U.S. without
5	2	Increase number of Christian refugees from Middle East resettled into U.S., but
10	3	Decrease number of Christian and Muslim refugees resettled into

	the U.S.
4	4 Decrease number of Christian refugees and do not accept any Muslim refugees to b
7	5 Do not accept any refugees from the Middle East into the U.S.
648	.

Q61 (Baptist refugee explicit treatment) Which of the following do you think is the best approach for the U.S. to take with refugees from the Middle East?

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q61

Range: [-8,5]	Units: 1
Unique values: 6	Missing .: 645/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	13	-8	Not sure
	39	1	Increase number of refugees from the Middle East resettled into the U.S. without
	5	2	Increase number of Christian refugees from Middle East resettled into U.S., but
	16	3	Decrease number of Christian and Muslim refugees resettled into the U.S.
	2	4	Decrease number of Christian refugees and do not accept any Muslim refugees to b
	7	5	Do not accept any refugees from the Middle East into the U.S.
	645	.	

Q62 (Religious control) How much, if at all, do you sympathize with businesses regarding laws and regulations requiring them to offer services that may go against their religious beliefs. to same-sex couples just as they would to all other customers?

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q62

Range: [-8,4] Units: 1
Unique values: 5 Missing .: 569/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	15	-8	Not sure
	25	1	A lot
	43	2	Some
	36	3	Not much
	39	4	Not at all
	569	.	

Q64 (LDS religious coded treatment) How much, if at all, do you sympathize with businesses regarding laws and regulations requiring them to offer services that may go against their religious beliefs. to same-sex couples just as they would to all other customers?

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q64

Range: [-8,4] Units: 1
Unique values: 5 Missing .: 565/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	10	-8	Not sure
	42	1	A lot
	37	2	Some
	26	3	Not much
	47	4	Not at all
	565	.	

Q66 (LDS religious explicit treatment) How much, if at all, do you sympathize with businesses regarding laws and regulations requiring them to offer services that may go against their religious beliefs. to same-sex couples just as they would to all other customers?

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q66

Range: [-8,4] Units: 1
Unique values: 5 Missing .: 563/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	9	-8	Not sure
	33	1	A lot

38	2	Some
39	3	Not much
45	4	Not at all
563	.	

Q68 (Baptist religious freedom coded treatment) How much, if at all, do you sympathize with businesses regarding laws and regulations requiring them to offer services that may go against their religious beliefs. to same-sex couples just as they would to all other customers?

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q68

Range: [-8,4]	Units: 1
Unique values: 5	Missing .: 646/727

Tabulation: Freq. Numeric Label		
10	-8	Not sure
12	1	A lot
13	2	Some
11	3	Not much
35	4	Not at all
646	.	

Q70 (Baptist religious freedom explicit treatment) How much, if at all, do you sympathize with businesses regarding laws and regulations requiring them to offer services that may go against their religious beliefs. to same-sex couples just as they would to all other customers?

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q70

Range: [-8,4]	Units: 1
Unique values: 5	Missing .: 646/727

Tabulation: Freq. Numeric Label		
5	-8	Not sure
10	1	A lot
30	2	Some
9	3	Not much
27	4	Not at all
646	.	

Q71 (Marijuana legalization control) Regarding legalization of marijuana for adults, which of the following best matches your position?

Type: Numeric (double)

Label: Q71

Range: [-8,3]

Units: 1

Unique values: 4

Missing .: 513/727

Tabulation: Freq. Numeric Label

9	-8	Not sure
92	1	Legalization for personal and medicinal use
84	2	Legalization only for medicinal use
29	3	Opposed to personal and medicinal legalization
513	.	

Q73 (LDS marijuana legalization coded treatment) Regarding legalization of marijuana for adults, which of the following best matches your position?

Type: Numeric (double)

Label: Q73

Range: [-8,3]

Units: 1

Unique values: 4

Missing .: 511/727

Tabulation: Freq. Numeric Label

6	-8	Not sure
115	1	Legalization for personal and medicinal use
76	2	Legalization only for medicinal use
19	3	Opposed to personal and medicinal legalization
511	.	

Q75 (LDS marijuana legalization explicit treatment) Regarding legalization of marijuana for adults, which of the following best matches your position?

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q75

Range: [-8,3] Units: 1
Unique values: 4 Missing .: 507/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	8	-8	Not sure
	99	1	Legalization for personal and medicinal use
	81	2	Legalization only for medicinal use
	32	3	Opposed to personal and medicinal legalization
	507	.	

Q76 (Baptist religious freedom control) How much, if at all, do you sympathize with those who say businesses should be required to provide services to same-sex couples just as they would to all other customers?

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q76

Range: [1,4] Units: 1
Unique values: 2 Missing .: 722/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	3	1	A lot
	2	4	Not at all
	722	.	

Q77 (Baptist refugee control) Which of the following do you think is the best approach for the U.S. to take with refugees from the Middle East?

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q77

Range: [-8,4] Units: 1
Unique values: 4 Missing .: 722/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	1	-8	Not sure

2	1	Increase number of refugees from the Middle East resettled into the U.S. without
1	2	Increase number of Christian refugees from Middle East resettled into U.S., but
1	4	Do not accept any refugees from the Middle East into the U.S.
722	.	

Q78 (Baptist transgender control) Which of the following best matches your position on the use of public restrooms by transgender individuals?

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q78

Range: [-8,2]	Units: 1
Unique values: 3	Missing .: 722/727

Tabulation: Freq. Numeric Label		
1	-8	Not sure
2	1	Allowed to use the public restrooms of the gender with which they currently iden
2	2	Required to use the public restrooms of the gender they were born into
722	.	

Q79 Which party controls the U.S. House of Representatives?

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q79

Range: [-8,2]	Units: 1
Unique values: 3	Missing .: 79/727

Tabulation: Freq. Numeric Label		
34	-8	Don't know/not sure
598	1	Republican Party
16	2	Democratic Party
79	.	

Q80 Which party controls the U.S. Senate?

Type: Numeric (double)

Label: Q80

Range: [-8,2]

Units: 1

Unique values: 3

Missing .: 78/727

Tabulation: Freq. Numeric Label

43	-8	Don't know/not sure
30	1	Democratic Party
576	2	Republican Party
78	.	

Q81 The Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court is?

Type: Numeric (double)

Label: Q81

Range: [-8,4]

Units: 1

Unique values: 5

Missing .: 78/727

Tabulation: Freq. Numeric Label

168	-8	Don't know/not sure
32	1	Ruth Bader Ginsburg
407	2	John Roberts
15	3	Sonia Sotomayor
27	4	Clarence Thomas
78	.	

Q82 The current Prime Minister of the United Kingdom is?

Type: Numeric (double)

Label: Q82

Range: [-8,4]

Units: 1

Unique values: 5

Missing .: 77/727

Tabulation: Freq. Numeric Label

171	-8	Don't know/not sure
24	1	Tony Blair
51	2	David Cameron
372	3	Theresa May
32	4	Justin Trudeau
77	.	

Q83 Are you male or female?

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q83

Range: [1,2] Units: 1
Unique values: 2 Missing .: 77/727

Tabulation: Freq. Numeric Label
335 1 Male
315 2 Female
77 .

Q84_1 How old are you? - Please enter a numeral (e.g. 21)

Type: Numeric (double)

Range: [13,100004] Units: 1
Unique values: 20 Missing .: 80/727

mean: 175.281
std. dev: 3930.75

percentiles:	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
	18	19	20	22	23

Q85 What race do you consider yourself?

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q85

Range: [1,8] Units: 1
Unique values: 8 Missing .: 80/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	535	1	White
	26	2	Black
	20	3	Hispanic
	9	4	Asian
	1	5	Native American
	7	6	Middle Eastern
	34	7	Mixed
	15	8	Other
	80	.	

Q86 Generally speaking, do you consider yourself a Democrat, Republican, independent, or other?

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q86

Range: [-8,4] Units: 1
Unique values: 5 Missing .: 80/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	37	-8	Not sure
	185	1	Democrat
	246	2	Republican
	154	3	Independent
	25	4	Other
	80	.	

Q87 Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat?

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q87

Range: [1,2] Units: 1
Unique values: 2 Missing .: 542/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	123	1	Strong Democrat
	62	2	Not very strong Democrat
	542	.	

Q88 Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very Republican?

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q88

Range: [1,2] Units: 1
Unique values: 2 Missing .: 482/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	121	1	Strong Republican
	124	2	Not very strong Republican
	482	.	

Q89 Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic party?

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q89

Range: [1,3] Units: 1
Unique values: 3 Missing .: 548/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	66	1	Closer to Republican
	77	2	Closer to Democrat
	36	3	Neither
	548	.	

Q90 Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?

Type: Numeric (double)
Label: Q90

Range: [1,7] Units: 1
Unique values: 7 Missing .: 108/727

Tabulation:	Freq.	Numeric	Label
	46	1	Extremely liberal
	119	2	Liberal
	72	3	Slightly liberal
	117	4	Moderate; middle of the road

93	5 Slightly conservative
151	6 Conservative
21	7 Extremely conservative
108	.