THE STATE-LEVEL DETERMINANTS OF THE UNITED STATES' INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION

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by

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to my wife, Zehra Tuzuner.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

As witnessed in the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States, many innocent people have lost their lives because of international terrorism. The London (July 2005), Madrid (March 2004), and Istanbul (November 2003) terrorist attacks have shown how the bloody face of international terrorism could be seen anywhere and anytime. Recent international terrorism has put pressure on political decision-makers to focus on intelligence failures and intelligence cooperation. Also, many qualitative intelligence studies have been done to address the obstacles and effective factors for improving international intelligence cooperation (Reveron, 2006; Sims, 2006; Cline, 2005; Walsh, 2006; Lefebvre, 2003; Shpiro 2001; Tan & Ramakrishna, 2004; Kean, T. H., L. H. Hamilton, R. Ben-Veniste, B. Kerrey, F. F. Fielding, J. F. Lehman et al., 2004).

These endeavors of political actors and scholars show the importance of studying and understanding international intelligence cooperation. Most of these endeavors seem to focus on the United States' national and international intelligence cooperation. Therefore, the examination of international intelligence cooperation from the perspective of American cases will help in understanding what really matters with international intelligence cooperation.

A number of small-*n* qualitative studies have investigated the facilitators of international intelligence cooperation. Their findings are plausible, but this dissertation

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seeks to test them using large-*n*, quantitative methods. This study tests alternative hypotheses from intelligence literature. The impact of international terrorism on the United States' international intelligence cooperation will be tested while controlling for other factors, such as terrorism itself, military cooperation, regime type, culture, the economy, and the strength of ties to the international community.

To find the state-level determinants of the U.S. international intelligence cooperation, a data set that included characteristics of all 191 states was needed. Because no data were available, a investigation titled "United States International Intelligence Behavior (USIIB) project" was undertaken to quantify the United States' international intelligence cooperative behavior by using event data. In counting the United States' international intelligence cooperative behavior, the machine-coding and reader-system software TABARI (Textual Analysis by Augmented Replacement Instructions) was used (Schrodt, 2006). Multiple sources were reviewed to determine the state-level variables that needed to be controlled. The compilation of different variables from a variety of sources, led to the development of a panel data-set for 191 countries for the period of 2000 to 2006.

This study is a significant contribution to intelligence studies in terms of identifying the state-level determinants of the United States' international intelligence cooperation. The overall findings showed that terrorism variables (both international and domestic) with their different dimensions, such as terrorist incidents, injuries, and fatalities, have a significant explanatory power for the United States' international intelligence cooperation. Likewise, military cooperation variables, economic characteristics, and ties to the international community also showed a positive impact on the United States' international intelligence cooperation. However, regime type and cultural variables produced a negative effect on the United States' international intelligence cooperation.

In this study, a critical review of existing theory and literature on international intelligence cooperation will be discussed in chapter II. Chapter III will explain the collection of intelligence-event data with the USIIB project. Chapter IV will present the research design for understanding of United States' international intelligence cooperative behavior. The findings of the effects of terrorism factors will be discussed in chapter V. Chapter VI includes a discussion of the findings on the impacts of military cooperation, regime type, cultural and economic characteristics, and ties to the international community on the United States' international intelligence cooperation. The last chapter, chapter VII, offers conceptual and methodological contributions of the study and implications for policy and future research.

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CHAPTER II

DETERMINANTS OF INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF EXISTING THEORY AND LITERATURE

Introduction

In this chapter, an overview of the literature on international intelligence cooperation and hypotheses regarding international intelligence cooperation practices by the United States are presented. Realist and liberal theoretical foundations of foreign policy behavior, specifically focusing on how their differing perspectives can be used to explain states' behavior on international cooperation, are discussed first. Next is a discussion of the literature that focuses on international *intelligence* cooperation in particular. That literature is wide-ranging and provides a series of control variables for analysis in the dissertation.

Theories of International Cooperation

Both realist and liberal theories of international cooperation are based on rational foundations (Hasenclever, Mayer, & Rittberger, 1997). However, the two theories have vastly different worldviews on a number of issues; as a result, they have different views on the broad concept of cooperation between states. The main starting point for their differences is their respective beliefs about the nature and roles of state actors. Realists

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assume that states are unitary actors in the international system (Morgenthau, 1973). They further assume that self-interested actors organized in states seek to satisfy their national interest as defined in forms of power (Morgenthau, 1973) and that security is the most important concern for these unitary states (Jervis, 1998). Because there is no international government above states in the anarchic international system, states seek the highest level of security to secure themselves against threat. One way they do this is by cooperating with other states that have similar interests (Jervis, 1998).

Waltz (1979) reinterprets classical realism as structural realism. In his "neorealist" theory, power is not an end but a means (Waltz, 1995). In other words, a state's main concern is security—not power. He goes on to argue that in this anarchic international system, states try to maximize their power and act with balancing behavior (Waltz, 1997). In addition to a unit-level explanation, he argues that a structural explanation is necessary to understand state actors' cooperative behaviors; namely, as the distribution of power changes, the international structure changes (Waltz, 1995).

The anarchic structure also affects the cooperative behavior of states, primarily in the sense that the anarchic international structure limits cooperation among states (Waltz, 1979). Realists argue that there is limited cooperation among states because each self-interested actor needs to secure its country from international threats (Mowle, 2003; Glaser, 1995). Walt (1987) argues that balance of *threat* has greater explanatory power for understanding state cooperative behavior than balance of *power*. In his argument, state actors cooperate in order to secure themselves by balancing behavior against the posed threat (Walt, 1987). Mearsheimer (2001) argues that in order to survive in the self-

help system, hegemonic power is necessary. This hegemonic power brings order in the international system by affecting other states cooperative behavior (Milner, 1992; John Mearsheimer, 2001).

Liberals, on the other hand, assume that state actors are embedded in international and domestic society. Broadly named liberal theory encompasses classic liberalism and, more recently, neoliberal institutionalism. The central assumption of both is that rational actors are good and that they may cooperate under certain conditions (Kegley, 1995a). International cooperation is necessary to make human beings free, to increase peace, and to reduce or eliminate the cost of interdependencies and wars (Zacher & Matthew, 1995).

According to liberals, open contacts exist across countries (Nye, 1988), and through these contacts states are becoming more interdependent economically, militarily, socially, ecologically, culturally, and commercially (Keohane & Nye, 1977; Zacher & Matthew, 1995; Mearsheimer, 1995; Moravcsik, 1997; Rosenau, 1990). These different interdependencies create many common interests for states and help shape state preferences (Kegley, 1995a), Because of these interdependencies and mutual interests, state actors find it beneficial to themselves to help improve other states' welfare, democracy, and security—all of which leads them to cooperate internationally (Keohane, 1984; Zacher & Matthew, 1995; Doyle, 1983). Unlike realists therefore, liberalists assume that changes or developments in the cooperative behavior of states can be explained by the changes in these factors not solely or predominantly by the change in security threats (Nye, 1988; Keohane, 1984; Moravcsik, 1997; Jervis, 1999; Keohane & Nye, 1977).

In summary, because of their different starting assumptions about human nature and its extension on state behaviors, these two theoretical paradigms and the scholars who apply them in their research have different explanations for the cooperative behavior of states. Because realists see states as self-interested actors with the primary goal of increasing their power and autonomy, they tend to explain cooperation among states as a reflexive and rational behavior resulting primarily from the perspective of either the balancing of power or the balancing of threat (Walt 1987; Mearsheimer, 2001; Jervis, 1998; Jervis, 1999; Grieco, 1993). In other words, if a state is alone in this self-help anarchic world, then the only condition that might induce them to cooperate would be a feeling of danger or threat. The liberal starting point, on the other hand, sees states as inextricably tied with one another on a number of levels. So while they, too, might accept the importance of security threats as factors affecting states' likelihood of cooperating with other states, they give equal if not more importance to a variety of other factors, including a country's domestic political structure, its economic structure, its social and cultural ties, its ties to international society, and its military interdependence with other nations (Moravcsik, 1997; Walker & Morton, 2005; Nye, 1988; Keohane & Nye, 1977).

Moreover, while both realist and liberal theories accept that cooperation does indeed occur among states, the two theories have different views on the probability of its occurrence (Baldwin, 1993). According to realists, cooperation is largely an uncommon behavior and, when it occurs, it is only temporary and limited (Stein, 1990). They argue that the international anarchic system of self-help reduces states' willingness to cooperate with each other (Grieco, 1993) and that within such a system, maintaining and achieving cooperation is difficult (Grieco, 1993). Liberals, however, view states' cooperative behavior as a more likely phenomenon (Keohane, 1984; Jervis, 1999; Stein, 1990). According to liberal theory, cooperation can occur quite readily because states have a number of common interests, such as democratic interests and economic interests, rather than only common security threats as a motivation for cooperation (Mowle, 2003).

Because there are differences in the way the two paradigms explain cooperative behavior, there also are debates about which of these theories best explains international cooperation. Grieco (1990), for example, argues that realism can best explain cooperation, noting that realism has been the dominant international-relations theory, especially after the end of World War II. It has been argued, however, that after 1970, realist theory began losing its explanatory power, while liberal theory became dominant, especially between 1995 and 2000 (Walker & Morton, 2005). It seems that as times change, dominant international issues also change; therefore, theoretical explanations must also change. As Walker and Morton (2005) argue, when democratic government, global trade, and international institutions are expanding, liberal explanations increase. Conversely, they point out that when terrorist threats increase, the realists' theoretical arguments will dominate international scientific inquiry.

Because terrorism threats have increased since 2000, but democratic, economic and other liberal issues are still extremely important, what does this mean for one or the other paradigm having greater explanatory power? With respect to this dissertation, what does this mean for their respective explanatory power for understanding U.S. international intelligence cooperation? In the following section, literature from the specific area of intelligence cooperation will be considered. The various studies are viewed in terms of which factors they draw on to explain international intelligence cooperation. First to be discussed are those studies that have a realist agenda (i.e., threatbased, such as with terrorism). Those studies that have a liberal agenda (i.e., interdependence-based, such as with military cooperation, domestic regime types, cultural and economic characteristics, and ties to the international community) will be presented next.

Factors Affecting International Intelligence Cooperation

Terrorism

Within the literature on intelligence and intelligence cooperation, it is important to first note that little research has been done explicitly linking this area to more theoretical discussions in international relations. Likewise, international-relations scholars and theorists have done little to incorporate intelligence-related issues or concepts into their research, a point that has been criticized at times by scholars on both sides (e.g., Andrew, 2004; Der Derian, 1992; Kahn, 2002; Scott & Jackson, 2004). However, among both the limited attempts at the theorizing of intelligence studies and the many descriptive studies about intelligence cooperation, it is not uncommon to find a realist starting point for looking at threats and changes within them to explain cooperative behavior.

Arguably the primary threat facing states these days is terrorism. From a realist perspective, terrorism is a logical and probable incentive for increased intelligence cooperation. All of the primary works attempting to theorize intelligence studies have focused on threats as explanatory factors. In terms of terrorism, the assumption is that international and domestic terrorism matter for international intelligence cooperation (Johnson, 2003b; Scott & Jackson, 2004; Treverton et al., 2006). Johnson (2003b) argues that the core dimensions of intelligence activities, including intelligence cooperative behavior, are changing because of the rising international terrorism threat. Scott and Jackson (2004) claim that the recent significant amount of attention given to international intelligence cooperation has occurred because international terrorism has changed the intelligence cooperation parameters at the international level. Yet a third work has argued that because the states' environments and characteristics are changing, it is important to understand what kinds of limitations state actors have while cooperating with other states (Treverton et al., 2006). They implicitly state that international intelligence cooperation can be studied as a dependent variable and that the changes in the threats, such as international terrorism and domestic terrorism, can be studied as independent variables (Treverton et al., 2006).

The emphasis on threats as explanatory factors for intelligence-cooperation behavior holds true in research from around the world, especially after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. For example, Segell (2004) argues that international terrorism changed the traditional intelligence cooperation existing between European states and the United States. Among the Western countries, Aldrich (2004) focuses on the transatlantic countries. He says that international terrorism has expanded the transatlantic intelligence cooperation after September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks (Aldrich, 2004). Also, it is has been said that intelligence cooperation among European states (Nomikos, 2005; Boyer, 2006; Walsh, 2006; Müller-Wille, 2008), among the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) partner countries (Tan & Ramakrishna, 2004), and among African states has been altered because of changes in the international terrorism threat (International Intelligence Fellow Program, 2006).

According to Lander (2004), the new terrorism threat affecting Western countries more than other countries has changed the Western international intelligence cooperation. Lander goes on to argue that after the Cold War, terrorism emerged as a new threat in the form of national terrorism and later developed increasingly international characteristics. In the United Kingdom, for example, terrorism was linked to Northern Ireland and had a domestic characteristic. Recently, however, terrorism in the United Kingdom has been associated specifically with Al Qaeda members and has taken on an international characteristic. Lander further argues that this new emerging international terrorism has been seen as a common threat by the Western countries and has had a positive effect on intelligence cooperation in the Western world.

In looking at the United States, various scholars have spent a significant amount of time studying U.S. intelligence reform and the paradigm shift in U.S. intelligence after September 11, 2001 (e.g., Steele, 2002; Barger, 2005; Liaropoulos, 2006; Kean et al, 2004; Rovner & Long, 2005; Busch & Weissman, 2005; Schindler, 2005). These scholars believe that international terrorism should matter to the United States in terms of its international intelligence behavior. In other words, international terrorism is an important factor in determining and shaping U.S. cooperative behavior on intelligence.

Other studies have examined the relationship between international terrorism and the United States' international intelligence cooperation and have generally concluded that international terrorism has had a positive effect on increasing the United States' international intelligence cooperation. Winchell (2003), for example, argues that since September 11, there has been a significant increase in the United States' intelligence cooperation with Pakistan. Before September 11, Pakistan's intelligence agency was acting more cooperatively with terrorists in Afghanistan; after September 11, Pakistan put more efforts into changing this situation and presented more cooperative behavior toward the United States. Similarly, Rudner (2004) argues that even though international terrorism has had an impact on the United States' international cooperation before September 11, after that date there was a significant increase in the United States' intelligence cooperation with other countries. Rudner points to increased U.S. intelligence cooperation with approximately 100 countries by the beginning of 2004, arguing that the significant increase is based on the rise in international terrorism, which the United States and other countries accept as a common threat.

Clough (2004) claims that international intelligence cooperation should be analyzed from several perspectives because there are many factors affecting international intelligence cooperation. Among these factors, however, international terrorism is a vital one because it has a significant effect on the increase of international intelligence cooperation. He argues that because international terrorism is seen as a common threat, the United States has extended its intelligence cooperation with European states and other states such as Russia, China, India, Iran, Pakistan, Israel, and all of the Middle and Far Eastern nations. Also drawing on the theme of common threat, Reveron (2008) categorizes the countries with which the United States has intelligence cooperation as traditional intelligence allies, new intelligence allies and nontraditional allies. He argues that these three types of U.S. intelligence relationships are affected by the common threat of international terrorism. Reveron notes that the emergence of international terrorism increased the United States' international cooperative behavior with the other states and thus concludes that the intelligence community has been broadened by the acceptance of international terrorism as a common threat.

While many of the above studies mention the issue of common threat, some studies examining the relationship between international terrorism and the United States' international intelligence cooperation stress the centrality, commonality, and priority of the international terrorism threat and argue that it is precisely the commonness of the international terrorism threat that determines the direction of any cooperative relationship (Richelson, 1990; Dabelko & Dabelko, 1993; Lefebvre, 2003; Skalnes, 2005; International Intelligence Fellow Program, 2006; Boudali, 2006; Nolte, 2008). Generally, the belief is that if terrorism is perceived as a continuing priority threat for the countries, it will have a positive impact on increasing their intelligence cooperative behavior.

Dabelko and Dabelko (1993) argue that changes in the international environment after the Cold War had an impact on the United States' intelligence community's foreign behavior and, like many of the scholars above, Dabelko and Dabelko find terrorism to be one of the security threats affecting states' behavior. They also note the emergce of new security threats, such as resource scarcity and global warming. However, it is implied that these new security threats do not have as great an impact on the intelligence community members' behavior because to have such an impact requires concurrent policy approaches to these issues. In the United States at least, this has not fully materialized. For example, the U.S. intelligence community's operative missions have not yet been restated to include these new security threats (Dabelko & Dabelko, 1993).

Turning to studies focusing on other regions of the world, Skalnes (2005) says that the September 11 terrorist attacks have had an effect on the European Union member states, increasing their intelligence cooperation with the United States. He emphasizes that the key to intelligence cooperation between European Union member states and the United States is that international terrorism is seen as a common threat, noting that even Russia sees international terrorism as a common threat. That is why even with this onetime enemy, there has been an increase in international intelligence cooperation between Russia and Western states. Another nontraditional partner in international intelligence cooperation with the West is North Africa, which also has been shown to have increased its cooperation with the United States in recent years (Boudali 2006). According to the researcher's findings, North African states are more interested in domestic terrorism within their countries than international terrorism; nevertheless, intelligence cooperation between those countries and the United States has increased.

Finally, it should be noted that while it is by far the more common understanding, not all scholars have found or argued that there is a positive relationship between increased terrorism and increased intelligence-cooperation behavior. The United States Defense Intelligence Agency's International Intelligence Fellows program each year discusses the obstacles of international intelligence cooperation among countries on different continents (International Intelligence Fellow Program, 2006). In one of the discussions regarding international intelligence cooperation in African countries, it was found that terrorism does have an impact on the African countries' international intelligence cooperative behavior (International Intelligence Fellow Program, 2006). International terrorism also was stated as a factor for U.S. intelligence cooperation with African states; however, among the five security concerns listed (i.e., governance, natural resources, conflict, terrorism, and health), terrorism was found to be less important among the African countries than the other concerns (International Intelligence Fellow Program, 2006).

Another exception can be found among scholars looking at intelligence failure. There remains a widely held belief that international terrorism affects U.S. intelligence cooperation (Zegart, 2005; Rovner & Long, 2006; Jervis, 2006; Turner, 2004; Davies, 2004; Stempel, 2005), but the discussion revolves around why the U.S. intelligence community failed to adapt to changing threats of international terrorism. The finger is generally pointed at various U.S. national or intelligence community-level factors as blocking positive changes in national- and international-level intelligence cooperation. In other words, these studies in a sense present evidence that the new international terrorism did *not* matter for U.S. national and international cooperation; rather, it was domesticlevel factors that had a greater impact on changing cooperation behaviors and practices or a lack of change within them.

Skalnes (2005) examined the effect of the September 11 terrorist attacks on U.S. foreign policy behavior. He argues that if states are using a kind of linkage strategy (i.e., using threats to link intelligence cooperation to a commitment), intelligence cooperation

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from the United States will decrease. European Union member states and Russia did not use such a linkage strategy against the United States, and the United States has had more intelligence cooperation with both of them (Skalnes, 2005). Skalnes implicitly says that international terrorism may not necessarily increase the United States' intelligence cooperation with other countries suffering from terrorism. An explicit claim along this line comes from Sims (2006), who says that the United States is *less* likely to cooperate with states that are vulnerable to terrorist attacks. The reason is that if this cooperation is somehow publicized, the terrorists will attack states that are vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Increasing the risk of becoming the target of a terrorist attack would make states less likely to cooperate with the United States.

Finally, Nolte (2008) says that until now, terrorism has had a central role in influencing the U.S. intelligence community's structures and behaviors. However, the changing environment will alter the central role of terrorism threats, and room will need to be made for additional security threats from peer and near-peer adversaries. Based on the changes in threats and the information environment and the information revolution, Nolte calls for the intelligence community's structures and activities to be changed by the Barack Obama administration.

The literature on intelligence studies in general and intelligence cooperation in particular appear to show a wide consensus—though not a unanimous one—that there is a positive relationship between terrorism and United States' international intelligence cooperation. The issue warrants further investigation and the statistical testing of the realist-paradigm assumption that threats, in this case terrorism, affect a state's intelligence-cooperation behaviors. Based on these discussions, the following hypotheses were developed for statistical testing.¹

H_{1a} Terrorism: Terror Incidents	The United States is more likely to have intelligence
	cooperation with countries that have more terror
	incidents.
H_{1b} Terrorism: International Terror Incidents	The United States is more likely to have intelligence
	cooperation with countries that have more
	international terror incidents.
H_{1c} Terrorism: Domestic Terror Incidents	The United States is more likely to have intelligence
	cooperation with countries that have more domestic
	terror incidents.

¹ It is argued that terrorism has an impact on international-intelligence cooperation. However, as seen in the literature, terrorism might have domestic and international characteristics. The impact of international terrorism on international-intelligence cooperation is widely discussed. It seems that domestic terrorism's effect on international cooperation is studied rarely. From a liberal perspective, domestic terrorism might have some effects on international-level behavior as do other domestic issues. Therefore it is reasonable to expect that domestic terrorism has a positive effect on international intelligence cooperation. As a result, the need to test terrorism and its different characteristics with different hypotheses arises.

While terrorism is useful in predicting international-intelligence cooperation, this research study sought to determine whether different measurements of terrorism, domestic terrorism, and international terrorism would produce different effects on international-intelligence cooperation. These measurements are (a) the number of terror, domestic terror, and international terror incidents, (b) the number of terror, domestic terror injuries, and (c) the number of terror, domestic terror, and international terror fatalities. This researcher's field experience as an antiterrorism and intelligence executive intuitively suggests that these different measurements of terror incident, these outcomes definitely affect national-intelligence cooperation. It is anticipated that such negative outcomes of terrorism would lead to international-intelligence cooperation.

H _{2a Terrorism: Terror Injuries}	The United States is more likely to have intelligence cooperation with countries that have more terror injuries.
H_{2b} Terrorism: International Terror Injuries	The United States is more likely to have intelligence cooperation with countries that have more international terror injuries.
H_{2c} Terrorism: Domestic Terror Injuries	The United States is more likely to have intelligence cooperation with countries that have more domestic terror injuries.
H _{3a Terrorism: Terror Fatalities}	The United States is more likely to have intelligence cooperation with countries that have more terror fatalities.
H_{3b} Terrorism: International Terror Fatalities	The United States is more likely to have intelligence cooperation with countries that have more international terror fatalities.
H_{3c} Terrorism: Domestic Terror Fatalities	The United States is more likely to have intelligence cooperation with countries that have more domestic terror fatalities

Military Cooperation

In addition to the important effect of terrorism factors, many scholars in the intelligence field have discussed the impact of military factors on the United States' international intelligence cooperation. In the last decades, military factors (e.g., joint military operations) are among the growing number of interdependence-related factors (such factors can be subsumed under the liberal paradigm) that some scholars argue affect international intelligence cooperation.

Lander (2004) looks at intelligence cooperation between the United Kingdom and the United States and finds that recent U.S. joint military operations with the United Kingdom and U.K./U.S. military deployments have increased intelligence cooperation between these countries. During a 2005 discussion between U.S. intelligence-community members and some African countries' international-intelligence fellows about the impediments to and the potential for international intelligence cooperation in Africa, it was clearly shown that U.S.-African military ties in the form of U.S. joint operations and U.S. military deployment in African countries are important factors in the increase of U.S. international intelligence cooperation with African countries (International Intelligence Fellow Program, 2006). Reveron (2006) shows that U.S. joint military operations with foreign countries, such as Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, have had positive effects on U.S. international intelligence cooperation. He also argues that U.S. military deployment in the Asia-Pacific region increased its intelligence cooperation with countries there. Finally, in a study focusing specifically on U.S. special operations and intelligence, Cline (2005) argues that the presence of U.S. special operations forces

abroad increases U.S. international intelligence cooperative behavior with other countries.

Given this implied relationship, it has been recommended that in order to improve intelligence cooperation, military cooperation should be boosted. For example, in an exploration of the effect of the September 11 terrorist attacks on U.S. foreign policy behavior, Skalnes (2005) notes that the United States should increase its military ties with other countries by sharing its military resources in order to increase its intelligence cooperation with other states. These military ties, it is argued, make other states more capable of gathering intelligence in their countries and sharing their intelligence with the United States.

Cooperative activities, even among militaries, can be said to fall generally under the liberal paradigm. It can thus be argued that a liberal factor of U.S. military deployments and U.S. joint military operations abroad will have a positive effect on the United States' international intelligence cooperation. The following hypotheses were developed for statistical testing:

H4 Military Cooperation: US Joint Military Operations	The United States is more likely to have
	intelligence cooperation with countries with
	which it has joint military operations.
H ₅ Military Cooperation: US Military Deployments	The United States is more likely to have
	intelligence cooperation with countries in
	which it has stationed more military
	personnel.

Regime Type

In addition to shared security threats and military cooperation, another factor affecting international intelligence cooperative behavior is the regime type of the countries involved. In one attempt to theorize intelligence studies, it is argued that the international intelligence behavior of democratic countries is significantly different from that of nondemocratic countries (Andrew, 2004). As an example of such differences, Tan and Ramakrishna (2004) focus on how authoritarianism affects international intelligence cooperation. By focusing on intelligence cooperation among ASEAN partner countries, they argue that the nondemocratic characteristic of some member states is preventing the fully efficient functioning of intelligence cooperation. They conclude that in order to have effective intelligence cooperation among South Asian countries, authoritarian-state characteristics should be eliminated. Similarly, Shpiro (2001) looks at the negative effect of nondemocratic characteristics on international intelligence cooperation in the Mediterranean region. While examining intelligence cooperation between NATO member states and Mediterranean states, he argues that nondemocratic states are generally concerned with their internal problems and do not have the capability to cooperate with other countries on intelligence issues. Finally, Sims (2006), focusing on the Unites States' international intelligence cooperation practices, argues that less democratic or nondemocratic countries are not willing to cooperate with democratic countries on intelligence issues because they fear that this cooperative relationship will raise their exposure level in the democratic countries and that eventually the leakage of

shared information will put the nondemocratic countries in politically difficult positions and weaken the political power of their rulers.

On the other hand, not all literature points to the incompatibility of cooperation between states with different styles of domestic political regimes. Rudner (2004) discusses how, after September 11, the United States had a significant increase in its intelligence cooperation with other states, including not only democratic countries but also nondemocratic ones. Based, therefore, on this discussion in the literature of the connection between domestic political regimes and the likelihood for intelligence cooperation, the following hypothesis was developed for statistical testing:

H₆ Regime Type: Democracy

The United States is more likely to have intelligence cooperation with democratic countries than with nondemocratic countries.

Cultural Characteristics

A fourth factor, again tied to principles of liberal theory and often noted as a possible predictor of international intelligence cooperation, is the cultural nature or characteristics of states. In intelligence studies, the importance of considering cultural variables has been attributed to the belief that cultural differences across countries have shaped national intelligence behavior in different ways (Bonthous, 1994; Davies, 2004).

One such cultural-based state characteristic that might affect intelligence cooperative behavior is religion. Tan and Ramakrishna (2004) argue that there is a negative perception about the United States' foreign policy behavior in the Islamic societies of ASEAN partner countries. These Islamic societies see U.S. foreign policy behavior as the manifestation of the Western Christian world against Islam. These negative perceptions not only fuel terrorist activities but also harm effective intelligence cooperation in the region. Similarly, Stempel (2005) argues that after World War II, increasing hatred against Western countries in those states with large Muslim populations made those states less likely to have intelligence cooperation with the United States. Conversely, he points out, the United States has had more intelligence cooperation with a majority of Christian states.

Another characteristic of states that may influence international intelligence cooperation is native language. In his examination of U.S. international intelligence cooperation, Skalnes (2005) shows that the United States has more intelligence cooperation with English-speaking countries. The studies done on the intelligence cooperation among the European Union member countries have a similar argument but from a different angle. It is argued that language is a barrier to intelligence cooperation among European states because not all of these countries use English as a common language (Lander, 2004; Müller-Wille, 2004).

Based on a consideration of studies exploring religious and linguistic affinity and the subsequent assumption that it will lead to increased intelligence cooperation, the following hypotheses were developed for statistical testing:

H_{7 Cultural Characteristic: Muslim} The higher the percentage of a country's population that is Muslim, the less likely the United States will have intelligence cooperation with it. H8 Cultural Characteristic: ChristianThe higher the percentage of a country's population
that is Christian, the more likely the United States
will have intelligence cooperation with it.H9 Cultural Characteristic: English SpeakingThe United States is more likely to have intelligence
cooperation with English-speaking countries.

Economic Characteristics

Yet another factor that has been argued to affect states' intelligence cooperation behavior is a state's economic characteristics. For this reason, the fifth predictor of U.S. international intelligence cooperation in this study is the economic characteristics of states as measured by each country's gross domestic product (GDP) purchasing power parity (PPP) per capita, U.S. foreign aid, and total U.S. trade. The literature, however, offers scant discussion about trade interdependence characteristics of states in intelligence studies, though various economic-related factors are discussed by some scholars looking at intelligence and intelligence cooperation.

In his effort to theorize intelligence studies, Johnson (2003a) proposes that a state's national wealth has a positive effect on its international intelligence cooperation. In other words, the greater the national wealth, the greater the cooperation. This point could be exemplified by cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom. Lander (2004) examined the intelligence cooperation between the United Kingdom and the United States (from the perspective of the United Kingdom) and found that the economic power of the United States is one of the driving factors for that state's

intelligence cooperation. Presumably this is a mutual benefit, as the United States makes available its economic and security resources to the United Kingdom and vice versa.

Sims (2006) also touches on economic matters when he points out that while international cooperation will cost the U.S. government, cooperation with nations of equal or greater wealth can reduce the cost burden. From his findings it can be predicted that states are more likely to cooperate with those states that have a high level of national wealth (Sims, 2006).

Not every state, however, can cooperate with states of equal or greater wealth. Indeed it is quite likely that states will want or need to cooperate with some states of lesser wealth. Shpiro (2001) also looks at the cost of intelligence work in the international arena and how these costs have been increasing in recent years. He argues that countries such as the United States can and should cover the cost of international intelligence activities and have capable personnel to handle international intelligence activities. He argues that in order to increase intelligence cooperation with poor countries—often the potential sources of highly valuable intelligence—those countries that have national wealth and capable personnel should increase their aid to the poorer ones (Shpiro, 2001).

Tan and Ramakrishna (2004) include an economic element in their discussion by noting that the efficient working of intelligence cooperation among ASEAN partner countries is to some extent based on economic help from the United States and Austria. Specifically, the United States funded a training center in the region to support the intelligence cooperation in the South Asia region. Similarly, U.S. intelligence officials have claimed that U.S. foreign aid has been an important factor in increasing international intelligence cooperation among African countries and the United States (International Intelligence Fellow Program, 2006). African intelligence officials agree to some extent, arguing that in order to further increase international intelligence cooperation with African countries, more equipment and aid is needed from wealthy countries. A similar argument has been made with respect to North Africa (Boudali 2006).

The idea that economic factors play a role in affecting intelligence cooperation behavior led to the development of the following hypotheses for statistical testing:

H_{10} Economic Characteristic: GDP PPP Per capita	The higher a country's GDP PPP per capita,
	the more the United States will have
	intelligence cooperation with it.
H ₁₁ Economic Characteristic: US Trade	The more trade occurs between the United
	States and the other countries, the more
	likely the United States will have
	intelligence cooperation with them.
H_{12} Economic Characteristic: Foreign Aid	The United States is more likely have
	intelligence cooperation with countries that

receive higher amounts of U.S. foreign aid.

Ties to the International Community

A final factor seen as affecting international intelligence cooperation is a country's ties to the international community. These ties can be concretely
conceptualized as treaties signed with other nations. Treaties affecting international intelligence cooperation could be those directly related to the issue of intelligence or those connected to other issues, such as security and agriculture. The general assumption is that the presence of security-related treaties is a factor contributing to international intelligence cooperation (Richelson, 1990; Skalnes, 2005; Richelson & Ball, 1990), though at least one study has noted that treaties may have both positive and negative effects on intelligence cooperation (Shpiro, 2001). The different dimensions of the treaties, such as whether they are bilateral or multilateral, might have different effects on international intelligence cooperation. Other studies on Western international intelligence cooperation argue that new treaties in recent years increased Western intelligence cooperation and that additional ones will continue to increase the international intelligence cooperation in Western countries (Segell, 2004; Aldrich, 2004).

In an examination of Western international intelligence cooperation, Lander (2004) argues that Western intelligence cooperation has been maintained a very long time because of treaties on security, intelligence, and other issues between the United Kingdom and various other countries. For example, the UK-USA Treaty, which was signed 60 years ago, enables the United Kingdom and the United States to share signal intelligence efficiently. Because of the treaty's significant role in intelligence cooperation, Lander (2004) argues that new treaties like the UK-USA Treaty will expand intelligence cooperation among key European countries. However, Lefebvre (2003) argues that multilateral treaties have little impact on Western international intelligence cooperation. Rather, he says, new treaties should be in the forms of bilateral treaties in order to increase the intelligence cooperation among Western countries. For another take on this issue, Reveron (2008) argues that both bilateral and multilateral treaties are important but that they are important factors only for the emergence of U.S. traditional *intelligence* cooperation and not other types of cooperation.

In the discussion of central challenges for the E.U. states in the way of enhancing security policies, Pilegaard (2004) and Messervy-Whiting (2004) focus on the difficulties and the strengths of the current intelligence cooperation among the E.U. member states. Messervy-Whiting (2004) argues specifically that defense- and security-related treaties are one of the important driving factors for the present intelligence cooperation among E.U. member states after 2000.

As a concept that can be linked to liberal theory in international relations, a country's international ties, as exemplified by signed treaties, have been deemed important. With this in mind, the following hypothesis was developed for statistical testing:

H_{13 Ties to International Community: US Treaties} The United States is more likely to have intelligence cooperation with countries with which it has more treaties.

Overall, this study's hypotheses will test the impact of terrorism (i.e., terror incidents, international terror incidents, domestic terror incidents, terror injuries, international terror injuries, domestic terror injuries, terror fatalities, international terror fatalities, and domestic terror fatalities), military cooperation (i.e., U.S. joint military operations and U.S. military deployments), regime type (i.e., democracy), cultural characteristics (i.e., Muslim, Christian, and English-speaking), economic characteristics (i.e., GDP and PPP per capita, U.S. trade, and U.S. foreign aid), and ties to the international community (i.e., U.S. treaties) on the United States' international intelligence cooperation practices.

In the following chapter, the data-collection process regarding the United States' intelligence cooperative behavior in the international arena will be discussed.

CHAPTER III

COLLECTING INTELLIGENCE EVENT DATA: UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BEHAVIOR (USIIB) PROJECT

Introduction

This chapter explains how the international intelligence behavior of the United States was quantified through the collection of event data from the USIIB project. The TABARI machine-coding software developed by Schrodt (2006) was used. to extract U.S. international intelligence cooperative and conflictual events with 191 independent states in the world (Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of the Geographer and Global Issues, 2006) from the English wire news agency Agence France Presse (AFP) from January 1, 2000, to December 31, 2006, at the LexisNexis Web site (LexisNexis Universe, 2007).

History of Event-Data Studies

In earlier times, Lasswell's (1936) definition of politics—who gets what, when and how—helped researchers understand interactive events in event-data studies (Alker, 1993, p. 154). Since 1994, however, event-data in terms of international relations has come to be defined as follows (Schrodt & Gerner, 1994, p. 826): the "nominal or ordinal codes recording the interactions between international actors as reported in the open press—break down complex political activities into a sequence of basic building blocks (e.g., comments, visits, grants, rewards, protests, demands, threats, and military engagements)."

Extraction of event data from textual material is a content analysis (Schrodt & Gerner, 1994; Stoll & Subramanian, 2006; Van Atteveldt, Kleinnijenhuis, & Carley, 2006). Event data are very commonly used in quantitative international research methods (King & Lowe, 2003; Schrodt & Gerner, 1994; Reuveny & Kang, 1996; King, 1989; Laurance, 1990). The use of event-data studies increased in the 1960s and 1970s (Gerner, Schrodt, Francisco & Weddle, 1994). Two pioneer studies using event data—WEIS (World Event/Interaction Survey) and COPDAB (Conflict and Peace Data Bank)—were hand-coded rather than machine-coded (Schrodt, Davis, & Weddle, 1994; Schrodt & Gerner, 1994). Hundreds of undergraduate students were used for the coding process (Schrodt, Davis, & Weddle, 1994). It was very expensive, boring and time-consuming (Gerner et al., 1994). Significant amounts of funding for these events data sets came from U.S. governmental agencies (Gerner et al., 1994).

However, the governmental funding ended in the mid-1980s (Gerner et al., 1994; Schrodt, 2006a). Therefore, the number of event-data studies declined (Gerner et al., 1994). Later developments revived international-relations scholars' interest in event datan (Schrodt, 2006a). Machine-readable texts increased, and machine-coding computer programs were developed in the 1990s (Best, Van der Goot, & de Paola, 2005). At the Beginning of the 1990s, Schrodt created KEDS (Kansas Event Data System) machinecoding software (Schrodt and Gerner, 1994). Based on the knowledge of the KEDS machine-coding software, TABARI and VRA (Virtual Research Associates) computer software programs were developed to extract data from easily accessible international wire news (Best, Van der Goot, & de Paola, 2005). These programs traditionally coded the wire news stories' lead sentences (Best, Van der Goot, & de Paola, 2005, p. 436). Machine coding is as reliable as human coding but faster and cheaper (Gerner et al., 1994; Schrodt, 2006a; King & Lowe, 2003; Schrodt, 2003; Schrodt & Gerner, 1994). In large projects, machine coding is superior to human coding (Schrodt, 2003).

Many event-data projects had started to be conducted by machine coding (Schrodt, 2006a). These studies can be classified in a number of ways: global, such as COPDAB (Azar, 1980) and WEIS (McClelland, 1978); domestic, such as IPI (Intranational Political Interactions) [Shellman, 2004]; regional, such as KEDS (Schrodt, Davis & Weddle, 1994); early warning system studies, such as EWAMS (Early Warning and Monitoring System) [Daly & Andriole, 1980]; global terrorism data-set studies, such as ITERATE (International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events) [Shellman, 2008; and domestic terrorism data-set studies, such as PCSTERROR (Project Civil Strife-Terror) [Shellman, 2008]. Generally, event data were used for activities such as policy analysis (Howell, 1983; Laurance, 1990), policy making (Howell, 1983), foreign policy behavior (Gerner et al., 2002; Laurance, 1990), and data- development efforts in international relations (Merritt, Muncaster, & Zinnes, 1993). Such research generally focused on conflictual events rather than cooperative events.

Need for the USIIB Project

As described above, early event-data studies did not engage in intelligence work and thus did not try to map intelligence interactions. They left intelligence cooperation and conflict behaviors in the world unexamined. Data-development efforts in international studies, intelligence-theory development studies, and the testing of the hypotheses cited herein for statistical testing need an intelligence-event data set.

The lack of event data for the United States' political behavior and its international intelligence cooperation is a primary motivation to create a unique event data set for this research study. Because the research unit of analysis is a state and U.S. intelligence interactions with other states in the world were examined, a machine-coded method of extracting event data fit the study perfectly. The event-data project was designed to quantify the international intelligence conflict-cooperation behavior of the United States from 2000 to 2006, thus the USIIB project.

Needed was a reliable and global-level data-set over time on the United States' international intelligence behavior; the event-data method fit the research goals well and was both an affordable and a practical solution. TABARI and its methods of coding wire news leads were ideal for creating an original and huge U.S. international intelligence event data set (Schrodt, 2003). An automated data-development tool and related programs were used to create a data set for testing the hypotheses stated herein. The project required training in how to use the software, the development of search terms for finding relevant machine-readable text, the downloading wire news leads, machine

coding of the leads with coding schemes, and aggregating autocoded events for statistical analysis (Schrodt & Gerner, 1996).

Training for the USIIB Project

The creation of event data with machine-coding systems such as TABARI (noncommercial) and VRA Reader (commercial) have been widely used in the last decade (Best, Van der Goot, & de Paola, 2005). Both products improve the KEDS coding process (Schrodt, 2006a, p. 12). Becoming familiar with the procedures for creating event data through these systems requires extensive training (Schrodt, 2006a).

An inquiry about procedures for conducting an event-data project led to the creation of a short list of persons who might be willing to share their experiences. The first spoken to was Rachel J. Sorrentino. Her doctoral dissertation explores cooperation between homeland states and diaspora by gathering event data with a machine-coding system (Sorrentino, 2003). Her experience was very important because the processes she used were the same ones employed for the current study on international relations. After giving her more information about the study, she shared her general experience with event-data collection process and machine-coding programs. She addressed the importance of framing event-data projects, specifically the actors and the sources. She added that the time frame of the study will determine how long the study will take. Sorrentino also provided the names of other scholars who might be helpful in providing training for using machine-coding programs (personal communication, November 9, 2006).

E-mail communications were used to determine how and where training for creating events data through a machine-coding system might be obtained. One response was from KEDS project data analyst Omur Yilmaz, who was willing to provide training (Kansas Event Data System, 2006). Ongoing personal communication with Yilmaz in November and December 2006 resulted in the decision to receive training on the TABARI machine-coding system at the University of Kansas. Kent State University funded the training, first for an introductory course and a second time for a comprehensive course to conduct the USIIB project. After the training and throughout the project helpful comments were received through e-mail communications from Phillip Schrodt to solve problems that were encountered while using TABARI and related programs.

Choosing a Global Textual Source for the USIIB Project

Many leading event-data projects in the international quantitative studies extracted event data from single source. The WEIS study generated events data through *The New York Times* (McClelland, 1978). IDEA (Integrated Data for Event Analysis) used Reuters wire news leads (Bond, Bond and Abbott, 2002). KEDS used Routers wire news leads (Schrodt, Davis, & Weddle, 1994; Schrodt & Gerner, 1994). The CAMEO (Conflict and Mediation Event Observation) project used AFP wire news leads (Gerner et al., 2002). Schrodt says that the KEDS project stopped using Reuters in 1999 and switched to AFP wire news (Schrodt, 2005). He recognizes that Reuters provides more economic news than AFP does. However, on other subjects, AFP provides more news stories than Reuters (Schrodt, 2005). These machine-readable textual sources report plenty of social and political activities and are great sources for researchers who want to capture the entire picture of human behaviors (Schrodt, Davis, & Weddle, 1994). AFP wire news was chosen as the data source for the current project.

AFP wire news is an unedited textual source (Gerner et al., 2002). AFP wire news is available from LexisNexis (LexisNexis Universe, 2007). AFP is a pioneer in serving as an international news source by having reporters in 129 countries to cover all continents (LexisNexis Academic, 2008). The wide coverage of this textual source helps capture the reality of U.S. intelligence behavior in the world.

Developing Search Terms to Download

Wire News Stories for the USIIB Project

The development of search terms is the most important part of the USIIB project, as they allow the researcher to find relevant AFP wire news leads about U.S. international intelligence behavior. The search terms used for this project must be well-developed and thorough. Otherwise, the project loses its validity by not covering the reality of U.S. international intelligence behavior.

Training (at the University of Kansas) on how to collect events data using a machine-coding system started with searching relevant AFP wire news leads by using U.S. intelligence actors' names. These names were culled from U.S. government's official intelligence Web site and were used to develop search terms (United States Intelligence Community, 2006). Selected from the site were the full and short names of the U.S. intelligence community's members and their supervisory organizations in the executive and legislative branches (see appendix A).

At the LexisNexis Web site, the following selections were made in the order given here:

- 1. Guided News Search
- 2. Step One: Select a News Category
- 3. News Wires
- 4. Step Two: Select a News Source
- 5. Agence France Presse English
- 6. Paste to Search
- 7. Step Three: Enter Search Terms
- 8. Date Range 01/00 and 12/06
- 9. Headline, Leads Paragraph(s), Terms

The search terms selected were meant to find relevant news from the LexisNexis data base. The search terms were then put in the following format:

CIA OR "Central Intelligence Agency" OR FBI OR "Federal Bureau of Investigation" OR DIA OR "Defense Intelligence Agency" OR ...

The next step was to read all of the AFP wire news leads displayed on the on the computer screen. These AFP wire news leads sometimes defined U.S. intelligence actors by names that differed from the official names on the U.S. intelligence official web site. For example, instead of *United States Director of National intelligence*, the name *Intelligence Czar* was used. Subunits of U.S. intelligence actors also are used instead of the agency's name. For example, the *National Clandestine Service*, which is responsible for U.S. human intelligence activities, was used instead of *Central Intelligence Agency*.

Also, sometimes some specific terms, such as *secret prison*, were used to define Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) activities.

These findings prompted the next step: clicking on every U.S. intelligence actor's link on the U.S. intelligence Web site to generate search terms from their offices, units, and job descriptions. After examining these links, a 175-page list of U.S. intelligence actors' offices, bureaus, units, and job descriptions was compiled. From these materials, a list of comprehensive search terms for each U.S. intelligence actors was compiled. The search terms were then categorized for each U.S. intelligence actor.

A significant amount of search terms was created next. For example, there are not only two-search terms for the CIA (i.e., CIA and Central Intelligence Agency). Some of the CIA search terms are presented here in the format used in LexisNexis to search for AFP wire news:

CIA OR "Central Intelligence Agency" OR D/CIA OR "Director of the Central Intelligence Agency" OR DCIA OR DDCIA OR DD/CIA OR "Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency" OR AD/MS OR "Associate Director for Military Support" OR ADCI/MS OR "Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support" OR NCS OR "National Clandestine Service" OR D/NCS OR DD/NCS/CIA OR "Intelligence Community Affairs" OR "National Intelligence Council" OR "National Intelligence Officers" OR "National Intelligence Estimates" OR … All U.S. intelligence actors' search terms were used again and the AFP wire news output was read to determine whether there are additional useful search terms. At the end of this process, it was discovered that using LexisNexis search tips increases the number of AFP wire news items found for display. For every U.S. intelligence actor's search terms, different search tips were used. In the end, some search tips increased the number of AFP wire news brought up for display on the computer screen. For example, instead of *"Secret Prison," "secret w/1 prison!"* was used.

The development of these search terms allowed for coverage of the entire picture of U.S. intelligence behavior in the world. That these search terms helped with downloading AFP wire news leads that captured the reality of U.S. international intelligence interactions. This long process was necessary to find all relevant news stories and resulted in familiarity with U.S. international intelligence behavior by the beginning of the data-collecting process.

Downloading AFP Wire News Leads for the USIIB Project

First, a folder named as *USICdownloads*² was created on the desktop of an Apple Macintosh computer. This folder is necessary because in order to download AFP wire news, relevant software programs and files need to be in this folder.³ Second, the file *www.imput* was created within this folder. Then, the following search terms were entered:

² Any name could be given to this folder. USIC stands for United States Intelligence Community.

³ The content of the *USICdownloads* folder (when all downloads of AFP wire news leads are completed) can be found in appendix B.

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence OR Senate Select Intelligence OR Senate Intelligence OR Intelligence panel or Intelligence committee w/s senate⁴

for the United States Senate Select Intelligence Committee at the Lexis Nexis Web site.⁵ Two hundred sixteen AFP wire news leads were displayed. The first news was selected and its URL (uniform resource locater) copied. That URL is shown here:

http://web.lexisnexis.com/universe/document?_m=73325c3924 f03379322b6858151b999 a&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLzVzzzSkVb& md5=369adbb08338 aceaab543d153daa188e

The URL was pasted on the first line of the *www.imput* file. Then the command ./*run.nexispider* was run for the terminal software program in the Macintosh computer. In the terminal program the file *USIC(01)SSIC* was defined as the location where the program downloads the AFP wire news leads for the United States Senate Select Intelligence Committee.

⁴ These search terms are that only bring up AFP wire news leads from the LexisNexis data base for the United States Senate Select Intelligence Committee. Other search terms were excluded from the data-collection process because their usage did not return any AFP wire news leads.

⁵ Before using U.S. intelligence-behavior search terms, the following selections are done at the LexisNexis Web site: Guided News Search \rightarrow Step One: Select a news Category \rightarrow News Wires \rightarrow Step Two: Select a News Source \rightarrow Agence France Presse-English \rightarrow Paste to Search \rightarrow Step Three: Enter Search Terms \rightarrow Date Range - 01/00 and $12/06 \rightarrow$ Headline, Leads Paragraph(s), Terms.

Finally, the *nexispider.pl* program downloaded the United States Senate Select Intelligence Committee's AFP wire news leads into the folder *USICdownloads* with the following file name: *USIC(01)SSCI.000122-0601108*.⁶

The procedure used for the United States Senate Select Intelligence Committee is applied to the all of the other U.S. intelligence actors to download those AFP wire news leads. A total of 223,111 AFP news wire leads were downloaded in 258 files in the *USICdownloads* folder.

The AFP wire news leads in the 258 files must be in one file and in chronological order to be coded by TABARI (KEDS Project Software, 2003a). First, the *filelist* file was created in the *USICdownloads* folder by using the *ls>filelist* command in the terminal program. All files, except for the 258 files that included AFP wire news leads. Then, the *nexisreverse.pl* program was used to put all AFP wire news leads in chronological order in one file that was named *reverse.output* in the *USICdownloads* folder (KEDS Project Software, 2003a). Finally, the *reverse.output* file name was changed to *USIC.news.text*. The result was machine-readable AFP wire news leads ready to be coded with TABARI. The TABARI software uses a modified WEIS scale to categorize U.S. international intelligence events.

⁶ The *nexispider.pl* program formats AFP wire news leads into TABARI format (KEDS Project Software, 2003). The following is the TABARI format for one of the AFP wire news leads downloaded for the United States Senate Select Intelligence Committee:

⁰¹⁰⁸²⁸ AFPN-0001-01

Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf Tuesday met Bob Graham, chairman of the US Senate select committee on intelligence, to discuss regional security and Afghanistan, the foreign ministry said.

Event Categories for Coding AFP Wire News Leads

TABARI mainly uses WEIS event-coding schemes (Schrodt, 2006). The WEIS scale, developed for a pioneering study in quantitative international relations (Daly & Andriole, 1980, p. 1), has been used frequently and often is cited in the international relations field (Gerner, schrodt, Abu-Jabr & Yilmaz, 2002; Howell, 1983). The WEIS scale has 22 event categories (McClelland, 1978), all of which are nominal ones (Gerner et al., 2002). For this scale, cooperative events range from 1 to 7 and are labeled as yield, comment, consult, approve, promise, grant, and reward, respectively (McClelland, 1978). Neutral events range from 8 to 10 and are labeled as agree, request, and propose, respectively (McClelland, 1978). Conflict events range from 11 to 22 and are labeled as reject, accuse, protest, deny, demand, warn, threaten, demonstration, reduce relations, expel, seize, and force (McClelland, 1978).

Many event data have been generated with the WEIS scale and with its modified version (Gerner et al., 2002). The U.S. intelligence community created EWAMS to generate conflict events data in the world to predict forthcoming crises (Daly & Andriole, 1980). The KEDS project created 12-year event data for the Middle East (Schrodt, Davis, & Weddle, 1994). The PANDA (Protocol for the Assessment of Nonviolent Direct Action) project generated 9- year event data for the entire world (Schrodt, Davis, & Weddle, 1994). IDEA builds on PANDA but also uses the WEIS scale with some additional event categories (Bond, Bond, & Abbott, 2002; Bond, Bond, Jenkins & Taylor, 2003). CREON (Comparative Research on the Events of Nations) foreign policy events data was generated with a revised WEIS scale (Hermann, Hermann, East, Salmore & Brady, 1977).

TABARI recently began to use modified WEIS event categories, namely new CAMEO coding schemes (Gerner et al., 2002; Schrodt, 2006). CAMEO event categories were developed for the analysis of foreign policy interactions (Gerner et al., 2002). In addition to WEIS, CAMEO used some ideas and innovations from PANDA and IDEA (Gerner et al., 2002; Schrodt, Yilmaz, Gerner & Hermrick, 2008). CAMEO converted WEIS nominal event categories into ordinal event categories (Gerner et al., 2002). The CAMEO scale reduced WEIS event categories in 20 (Gerner et al., 2002). The neutral event category is labeled as make public statement and is marked as 1 (Gerner et al., 2002). Cooperative events range from 2 to 8 labeled as appeal, express intent to cooperate, consult, engage in diplomatic cooperation, engage in material cooperation, provide aid, and yield (Gerner et al., 2002). Conflictual events range from 9 to 20 and are labeled as investigate, demand, disapprove, reject, threaten, protest, exhibit military posture, coerce, assault, fight, and attack with weapons of mass destruction (Gerner et al., 2002). For the new CAMEO event codes, weights similar to those that Goldstein (1992) used for WEIS event categories (Gerner et al., 2002). It seems that well-developed CAMEO event categories based on the frequently used WEIS event coding scheme will meet the requirements for examining the foreign policy behavior of the United States as it pertains to intelligence (Shellman, 2008).

Machine Coding of U.S. International Intelligence

Interactions from AFP Wire News Leads

The machine coding for the USIIB project will be discussed in the following order: (a) how TABARI works, (b) fine tuning of dictionaries, (c) autocoding the data set, (d) eliminating duplicate events, and (e) aggregating events in the data set for statistical analysis.

How TABARI Works

TABARI version .0.6.1b32 was used for this research project. TABARI was created as a successor to KEDS machine coding in 2000 (Schrodt, 2006; Gerner et al., 2002; Schrodt, 2006a). Schrodt designed the TABARI computer program to recognize patterns in the short news summaries (Schrodt, 2006, p. 1). Its focus is on the subjectverb-object framework (Schrodt, 2006). This computer program requires information about actors, verbs and phrases from actors, and verb dictionaries (Schrodt, 2006, p. 1).⁷ TABARI uses sparse parsing of sentences to identify the source (for this study, U.S. intelligence actors), the target (for this study, 191 independent states), and verbs and verb patterns of cooperative and conflictual events in the wire news lead sentences (Schrodt, 2006).⁸

⁷Actors are proper nouns that identify the political actors recognized by the TABARI system. Verbs are needed because event-data categories are primarily distinguished by the actions that one actor takes toward another. The verb usually is the most important part of a sentence in determining the event code. Phrases are used to distinguish the different meanings of a verb (e.g., PROMISED TO SEND TROOPS versus PROMISED TO CONSIDER PROPOSAL) and to provide syntactic information on the location of the source and the target within the sentence (Schrodt, 2006, p. 2).

⁸ See appendix E for the parsing of one of the coded AFP wire news leads used in this study.

The TABARI program uses five important files—option, project, text, actor, and verb to generate U.S. international intelligence event data (Schrodt, 2006). All of these files and TABARI should be in one folder before starting the coding process. Therefore, the *USICtabaricoding* folder was created on the desktop of the Apple Macintosh computer. All of these files, along with the TABARI software, are put into the *USICtabaricoding* folder. The files included in this folder are as follows: TABARI.0.6.1b32, USIC.options, USIC.project, USIC.news.text, USIC.actors, and USIC.verbs

The USIC.options options file includes the CAMEO code list for the cooperative and conflictual event types (see appendix C). The USIC.news.text text file includes all downloaded AFP wire news leads (See appendix D) for U.S. international intelligence behavior. The USIC.project project file tells TABARI which files to use during coding.⁹

⁹ The followings are included in the USIC.project file: <actorfile> USIC.actors <verbfile> USIC.verbs <optionsfile> USIC.options <textfile> USIC.news.text

The project file tells TABARI to use actors, verbs, and text files while coding.

The *USIC.actors* actor file includes U.S. intelligence actors and state and substate actors in the world.¹⁰ The actors file also includes all nouns and adjectives, which help TABARI code events correctly. The *USIC.verbs* verb file includes verbs and verb patterns regarding event categories.¹¹

Fine-Tuning the USIIB Dictionaries

The project's actor and verb files were built by using the CAMEO projects' actor and verb files with permission. CAMEO's actor, verb, noun, and adjective dictionaries have been developed over 15 years by the KEDS project (Schrodt, 2006: Schrodt, 2006a). CAMEO's actor dictionary does not contain coding specifically for U.S. intelligence actors. Also, the current project's focus is not the same as focus of the CAMEO project. Thus, U.S. intelligence actors and new verb patterns were added to the verb dictionary to capture intelligence interaction between U.S. intelligence actors and 191 states by fine tuning the process and scrutinizing the downloaded AFP wire news leads.

BEGIN_[---];PAS 9/25/91 - * INVESTIGAT ON_+ [090];MT 28 Feb 2008 - * MISSION_TO_[036];OY 23 Jul 2003 - % * SHARING { INFORMATION | INTELLIGENCE } [064];MT 22 Jan 2008 BEGINS [---];ab 31 Dec 2005 - * VISIT TO_+ [042:043];MT 19 Sep 2007 BELIEVE [---];jw 11/13/91 - * HAD_CONTACT WITH_+ ESPIONAGE [1125];MT 01 Feb 2008

¹⁰ The CAMEO project's actor dictionary was used for this project. During the fine-tuning of the actor dictionary, specific codes created for the U.S. intelligence actors (see Appendix F) were added.

¹¹ The following are some of the verbs and verb patterns in this study's verb dictionary:

Modification of the actor and verb dictionaries allows for a more comprehensive measurement of U.S. international intelligence behavior. These modifications were made in accordance with the rules in the CAMEO codebook (Schrodt & Yilmaz, 2007). TABARI was used to review 22,125 AFP wire news leads to make sure that the dictionaries were correctly coding U.S. international intelligence events. Overall, 1,102 nouns were added to the noun dictionary,¹²162 adjectives were added to the adjective dictionary,¹³ 1,744 verb patterns were added to the verb dictionary,¹⁴ and 2,175 actor names were added to the actor dictionary.¹⁵ When the U.S. intelligence actors' names were added to the dictionary, each name was assigned a specific code recognizable by TABARI.¹⁶ A total of 5,183 modifications were made to the dictionaries. The time needed for this task was five months (made possible by a Dissertation Fellowship Award

¹⁴ The following are examples from the verb dictionary:

% * SHARING { INFORMATION | INTELLIGENCE } [064] ;MT 22 Jan 2008
* VISIT TO + [042:043] ;MT 19 Sep 2007
* HAD_CONTACT WITH + ESPIONAGE [1125] ;MT 01 Feb 2008

¹⁵ The following are examples from the actor dictionary

JOINT_HOUSE_AND_SENATE_INTELLIGENCE_COMMITTEE
[USACONSCI/USACONHCI] ;MT 10 Sep 2007

SENATE_INTELLIGENCE_COMMITTEE [USACONSCI]; MT 03 Sep 2007 SENATE'S INTELLIGENCE COMMITTE [USACONSCI]; MT 03 Sep 2007

¹⁶ See appendix F for the specific generic codes created for the U.S. intelligence actors used in this study.

¹² The following are examples from the noun dictionary: AERIAL_RECONNAISSANCE_JET ;MT 16 Feb 2008 ANTI-DRUG_AID ;MT 20 Feb 2008 INTELLIGENCE_GATHERING ;MT 24 Jun 2007

 ¹³ The following are examples from the adjective dictionary: RECONNAISSANCE ;MT 16 Feb 2008 CONFIDENTIAL ;MT 22 Jan 2008 COOPERATIVE ;MT 14 Feb 2008

from Kent State University). The modifications were needed to establish a comfort level about the accuracy of the dictionaries. The next step was autocoding.

Autocoding the USIIB AFP Wire News Leads

After completion of the fine-tuning process for the project dictionaries, all AFP wire news leads were autocoded in the *USIC.news.text* file. During this process, TABARI read the entire AFP wire news leads in the text file to find cooperative or conflictual events defined in the verb-dictionary file that U.S. intelligence actors take toward the other state actors in the actors-dictionary file and saved all of them as U.S. international intelligence events in the *USIC.2000-06.evts* event file.¹⁷

This process generated 163,239 (a 2,864-page event file) U.S. international intelligence events from 196,177 AFP wire news leads. However, because the AFP wire news leads were downloaded individually for each of the U.S. intelligence actors, some events were duplicates. Also, the events were not in chronological order. Before deleting duplicate events, the U.S. international intelligence events needed to be in chronological order (Schrodt, 2006). The first step was to put the events in the *USIC.2000-06.evts* event

¹⁷ The following are examples of U.S. international intelligence cooperative events from the *USIC.2000-06.evts* event file:

⁰⁶⁰³⁰⁷ USAICMDOT PRK 040 (Consult) BRIEFED NORTH KOREAN ON ILLEGAL FINANCIAL

⁰¹¹⁰¹⁹ USAPRS CHNGOV 030 (Express intent to cooperate) HIS CHINESE COUNTERPART JIANG ZEMIN AND US PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH AGREED WORK TOGETHER

⁰²⁰⁷⁰² USACONSCI SYRGOV 046 (Engage in negotiation) US SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE HELD TALKS WITH BASHAR AL-ASSAD

file in chronological order by using the TextWrangler program. Next, the

One_A_day_Filter program downloaded from the KEDS project Web site was used to eliminate duplicate events in the USIIB project (KEDS Project Software, 2005). The rule used by this program is that "each dyad can have only one event per coding category per day" (KEDS Project Software, 2005). Implementation of this process reduced U.S. international intelligence events from 2,864 pages to 1,751 pages. These valid events will be used during the aggregation process.

Aggregating USIIB Events for Statistical Usage

With the U.S. intelligence events ready for aggregation, the KEDS_Count 3.0b3 version of the KEDS Count Software Program (KEDS Project Software, 2008) was downloaded. This program has a command file with CAMEO weighted-scale values developed from Goldstein (1992) weighted-scale values for WEIS event categories. In this command file, U.S. intelligence actors were defined as the source of intelligence interactions, and 191 states were defined as the target of intelligence interactions.¹⁸ Also in the command file, cooperative events were defined as ranging from 2 to 8, and intelligence conflict events as ranging from 9 to 20 (Gerner et al., 2002).¹⁹ I used the

(Footnote continued on next page.)

¹⁸ The following command was written for Afghanistan and for the other 190 states in the world in the command file of KEDS Count Program:

[[]USAICM* USAPRS* USACON*]/[AFG AFGGOV* AFGMIL] {1_USintelligence_AFG_state}

¹⁹ The following command was written to define which event categories will be U.S. international intelligence cooperative events and which event categories will be U.S. international intelligence conflictual (i.e., noncooperative) events:

KEDS Count program developed by Schrodt (2006) to generate weighted quarterly interval-level data needed for statistical analysis.²⁰

Verification of the USIIB Data Set

So far, an attempt was made to obtain reliable and valid events through a machine-coding process. Still the event data needed to be verified. This was done by examining each dictionary and file used to extract event data from AFP wire news leads. Actor and verb dictionaries were examined from top to bottom and inspected each actor's name, each verb phrase, each noun, and each adjectives. No errors were detected. The event file was checked next, and everything was normal. Finally, the command file in the KEDS Count Program was checked. Command lines were controlled for dyad interactions constructed between U.S. intelligence actors and 191 independent states. These command lines did not omit any intelligence events between actors. Overall, no errors were encountered with the generation of the USIIB events data.

Reliability of the USIIB Event Data

This section provides a brief discussion of the validity and reliability of the USIIB event data. This discussion focuses on the reliability of textual sources, the reliability of

NONCOOPERATION :09* 10* 11* 12* 13* 14* 15* 16* 17* 18* 19* 20*

As seen in appendix C, these values represent the following event categories: 02 - appeal, 03 - express intent to cooperate, 04 - consult, 05 - engage in diplomatic cooperation, 06 - engage in material cooperation, 07 - provide aid, 08 - yield, 09 - investigate, 10 - demand, 11 - disapprove, 12 - reject, 13 - threaten, 14 - protest, 15 - exhibit military posture, 16 - reduce relations, 17 - coerce, 18 - assault, 19 - fight, and 20 - attack with weapons of mass destruction.

²⁰ See appendix G for a generated data example for Afghanistan.

coding schemes, the reliability of machine-coding systems, and intercoder reliability (Schrodt, 2006).

Source Bias (Validity)

Schrodt (2003) argues that international political actors are primarily using textual sources to communicate with each other. He continues, textual sources have the ability to represent reality. He adds that individual researchers who tries to extract cooperative or conflictual events from a source do not have control over textual surces (Schrodt, 2000).

Some scholars have conducted validity tests for textual sources. Schrodt and Gerner (1994) did a test for the KEDS-coded event data for Middle East actors and the United States based on a single wire-news source (Schrodt & Gerner, 1994). Their findings showed that a single textual source significantly covered the foreign policy behaviors of the actors (Schrodt & Gerner, 1994). Another study was conducted to see whether there was a difference between international and local news sources (Gerner et al., 1994). The findings showed that the differences among international news sources (Gerner et al., 1994). Howel and Barnes' (1993) studies that were based on local sources and global news sources show that international wire news is a reliable global textual source for event data studies (p. 53). Also, a comparison study of the WEIS and COPDAB projects shows that single textual sources generate more events than multiple sources (Howell, 1983). These studies present evidence that the usage of a single textual source for the USIIB project does not undermine the validity of the project data set.

Coding-Scheme Reliability

The WEIS scale is frequently used and cited in quantitative international studies (Gerner et al., 2002; Howell, 1983; Daly & Andriole, 1980). As discussed earlier, the WEIS scale, which was created to capture Cold War era international behavior (McClelland, 1978), was improved to cover international political actors' behavior in that decades by adding more event categories. Thus, WEIS-scale reliability has improved.. A comparison study of WEIS and COPDAB shows that WEIS coding schemes generate more events than the competing COPDAB coding scheme (Howell, 1983). Schrodt and Gerner (1994) tested the reliability of the human-coded and machine-coded KEDS project scaled by WEIS for the Middle East, but they found no significant difference between the two coding schemes (p. 1).

Machine-Coding Reliability

Machine coding never gets tired and is not affected by political and cultural bias as can happen with a human coder (Schrodt, 2006; Schrodt & Gerner, 1994). Machine coding does not have an inconsistency problem while applying coding rules in different situations (Leng, 1993, p. 115). Schrodt (2006) made the same argument that machine coding can code the same text in the same way multiple times (Schrodt, 2006; Gerner et al., 1994). Therefore, the stability of machine coding is 100% (Gerner et al., 1994).

King and Lowe (2003) tested the reliability of machine coding and found that it generates events almost as same as with human coders. Concerning the reliability of machine coding, the KEDS and PANDA projects found that comprehensive coding schemes increase the reliability and accuracy of machine coding (Bond, Jenkins, Taylor & Schock, 1997; Schrodt, 2006; Schrodt, Davis, & Weddle, 1994; Schrodt & Gerner, 1994; Gerner et al., 1994). Well-constructed, comprehensive automated coding rules and well-trained coders also can minimize reliability problems with machine-coding systems (Leng, 1993, p. 116). Because the dictionaries used with the current research project were developed by the KEDS project over 15 years, and a significant amount of additions were made to the project's dictionaries, a significant contribution was made to the accuracy and reliability of the machine-coding system.

Intercoder Reliability

Machine-coding systems increase intercoder reliability (Gerner et al., 1994). Because the coding rules and coding dictionaries remain the same over the years, the variance between intercoders is eliminated (Gerner et al., 1994). Rummel's (1979) research on coder reliability shows that the training of coders increases the reliability of the coding, because the coder becomes familiar with the coding rules. With the current research project, careful training from KEDS-project personnel combined with the use of coding rules developed over 15 years by the KEDS project, no significant intercoder reliability problems exist. Because there was only one coder for this research project, variability among coders is not an issue.

The USIIB project fills the gap in data-development efforts in international studies. It also makes a contribution to the theory-development studies in the intelligence field. This project produced a reliable and valid U.S. international intelligence event data set for constructing the dependent variable—U.S. international intelligence cooperation.

Because the actor and verb dictionaries used for the USIIB project for data extraction are available other researchers, this study can be replicated at any time.

CHAPTER IV

RESEARCH DESIGN FOR UNDERSTANDING UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION

Introduction

Collecting event data on U.S. intelligence behavior in the world allowed for the design of a panel data set that includes yearly information on 191 states. This chapter explains in detail the suitable regression models for the analysis of this panel data set, the collection of dependent and independent variables, and the related statistical tests and analyses done to understand the fitness of the models of this study for understanding U.S. international intelligence cooperative behavior.

Unit of Analysis and Regression Model for Count-Dependent Variable

Similar to the study of U.S. international intelligence behavior, information about the variables is gathered for each of the 191 independent states (see appendix H) diplomatically recognized by the United States (Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of the Geographer and Global Issues, 2006). Because information on each variable was collected for the same cross-sectional units (i.e, 191 independent states) and for a period of the seven years (T = 7), from 2000 through 2006, the design of this kind of data set is called a panel data set (Wooldridge, 2003, p. 426). The sample size of this paneldesign data set is 1,337 total observations (see appendix I). Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables.

Table 1

Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Ν	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.
Dependent					
U.S. international intelligence cooperation					
(number of cooperative events)	1,337	12.16	25.94	0	400
Independent					
Terrorism					
Terror incidents (number of incidents)	1,337	13.93	132.45	0	3,968
International terror incidents (number of	1 227	1.20	0.92	0	246
incidents)	1,337	1.28	9.82	0	246
Domestic terror incidents (number of incidents)	1,337	12.65	126.94	0	3,893
l error injuries (number of injuries)	1,337	47.27	516.35	0	1,5299
International terror injuries (number of injuries)	1,337	6.//	62.15	0	1,498
Domestic terror injuries (number of injuries)	1,337	40.50	499.06	0	15,112
Terror fatalities (number of fatalities)	1,337	23.16	321.06	0	9,497
International terror fatalities (number of	1 227	2.26	20.41	0	250
$D_{\text{restrict}} = \int dt $	1,337	2.36	20.41	0	350
Domestic terror fatalities (number of fatalities)	1,337	20.80	310.01	0	9,337
Military cooperation					
US joint military operations (number of					
operations)	1,337	1.45	2.09	0	10
U.S. military deployments (number of personnel in	,				
abroad)	1,337	1607.73	12038.22	0	207,000
Regime-type					
Democracy (1-7 scale of political rights)	1,330	3.37	2.17	1	7
Cultural Muslim (normant of nonvestion)	1 2 2 7	25.22	26 51	0	100
Christian (percent of population)	1,337	25.25	20.04	0	100
English sneeking (dummu)	1,337	30.11	39.04	0	100
English-speaking (duniny)	1,337			0	1
Economic					
GDP PPP per capita ^a (current international					
dollars)	1,330	8.57	1.15	6.18	11.20
U.S. trade (millions of U.S. dollars)	1,337	11,401	43,679.77	0	533,000
U.S. foreign aid (thousands of U.S. dollars)	1.00-	(0.000		c	0.000.11-
	1,337	62,200	275,294.96	0	2,929,113
Ties to international community					
US treaties (number of treaties)	1 337	2.37	4 26	0	73
	-,,	,	=0	•	

^aLog transformation applied on this variable

The dependent variable (U.S. intelligence cooperative events) is a count variable. The standard deviation is 25.94. It is the square root of the variance, and the variance is the square of the standard deviation, meaning that the variance equals 672.88. The negative binomial is for situations of overdispersion in which the variance (672.88) is greater than the mean (12.16). Therefore, the negative binominal regression model is suitable for this panel data-set (Long, 1997; Greene, 2003; Long & Freese, 2006). This panel data-set has 276 zero cases out of 1,337 cases for the dependent variable.

In the STATA statistical software program, the *countfit* command is run to determine which regression models best fit the statistical models presented in Tables 2-13. This test compares the Poisson regression model, the zero-inflated Poisson regression model, the negative binominal regression model, and the zero-inflated binominal regression model. The countfit test is run for each statistical model used in this study. The findings show that the zero-inflated negative binominal regression model is the best model for this study's statistical models and that the negative binominal regression model is the next best fit. Vuong test statistics were used to determine the need for zero-inflated negative binominal regression (DeMaris, 2004). The Vuong test scores are greater than 1.96. This means that the hierarchial linear modeling assumption of normal distribution is not met; therefore, zero-inflated negative binominal regression is needed because of excess zeros in the distribution (DeMaris, 2004). Thus, the appropriate

statistical technique would be the zero-inflated negative binominal regression model²¹ (see Long & Freese, 2006).

Zero-inflated negative binominal regression models have two parts: negative binomial and logistic (i.e., the zero-inflated part). The negative binomial part can be used to predict either the expected count for the dependent variable or the probability of observing a certain count for the dependent variable. On the other hand, the logistic part assumes the existence of two groups to which analyzed observations can belong. The first group is denominated as the always-zero group; that is, by nature, a case that belongs to this group cannot have a nonzero count for its dependent variable (Long & Freese, 2006, p. 399). The second group is the complement of the first group; that is, the alwaysnonzero group (Long & Freese, 2006, p. 399). The function of the logistic part is to predict the probability of being in the always-zero group (Long & Freese, 2006). In this study's context, the always-zero group consists of those countries with which the United States will never have an intelligence cooperative event.²²

²¹ Given the result of the countfit tests in STATA, zero-inflated negative binominal regression is used to run all statistical models for this study. STATA successfully ran zero-inflated regression for the models in Tables 2-5 and Tables 10-12. However, for the other Tables (Tables 6-8, 9, and 13) STATA could not converge the data to run zero-inflated regression. Therefore, negative binominal regression modeling is used for these tables.

²² In zero-inflated negative binomial regression analysis, there are two parts of the analysis output that predict the same dependent variable. Negative binomial distributions have a minimum value constrained to be zero and other values above zero that have an unlimited maximum possible value. Therefore, it is possible to determine the probability of a zero value. It also is possible to determine the relationship of a variable to a range of values. There are two different expected values. Consider that one could obtain such a data set and recode the values greater than 0 as 1, run a logistic regression, and then run a regression on the original values greater than zero. One would not necessarily find the same variables significant. In criminal justice theories, the word *logistic* is referred to as *prevalence* and *count* as *intensity*. This explanation is a bit oversimplified for negative binomial regression, but it gives the general idea. In the *(Footnote continued on next page.)*

Dependent Variable

This study has one dependent variable: U.S. international intelligence cooperation. The United States' international intelligence cooperation was quantified as U.S. international intelligence cooperative events, including the CAMEO cooperative event categories of appeal, express intent to cooperate, consult, engage in diplomatic cooperation, engage in material cooperation, provide aid, and yield.

The USIIB project generated weighted quarterly interval-level data for U.S. international intelligence cooperative events for each of 191 countries and for each year from 2000 through 2006. The quarterly intelligence cooperative events were summed for each, yielding a yearly total for U.S. intelligence cooperative events for 2000 through 2006. The number of U.S. international intelligence cooperative events for each country and for each year was gathered.²³

Independent Variables

Nineteen independent variables were used in this study (i.e., terror incidents, international terror incidents, domestic terror incidents, terror injuries, international terror

negative binomial part, the logit part will always be the opposite sign of the count part. In the logit part, one calculates the probability that a case will be zero given the increasing values of the independent variable, while in the count part one calculates the expected value of the cases given that they may be greater than zero. If the calculation was the probability of 1 rather than zero, then the signs of the logit part would be the same as the signs of the count part. The emphasis is on the zeros because these distributions are characterized by a high frequency of zeros.

²³ Yearly data were constructed for the dependent variable (i.e., U.S. international intelligence cooperation) because some of the independent variables, such as GDP, U.S. military deployment, foreign aid, and democracy, have only yearly information.

injuries, domestic terror injuries, terror fatalities, international terror fatalities, domestic terror fatalities, U.S. joint military operations, U.S. military deployments, democracy, Muslim, Christian, English-speaking, GDP PPP per capita, U.S. trade, U.S. foreign aid, and U.S. treaties). These independent variables are shown in Table 1 with descriptive statistics, which are combinations of primary and secondary data for the characteristics of states derived from different sources.

Terrorism

To capture the different dimensions of the terrorism concept, nine variables were used: terror incidents, international terror incidents, domestic terror incidents, terror injuries, international terror injuries, domestic terror injuries, terror fatalities, international terror fatalities, and domestic terror fatalities.

The online Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB) [http://www.tkb.org; TKB Brochure, 2006] developed by the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT). The TKB is an excellent resource for comprehensive research and data on terrorism (TKB Brochure, 2006). The Web site has built-in tools that allow researchers to create customized reports on international and domestic terrorism (TKB Brochure, 2006, p. 2).

The online built-in tools provide reliable information that was needed to construct the terrorism variables (TKB Brochure, 2006). By using one of the built-in tools, 183page customized reports of incidents, injuries, and fatalities from terrorism, and international terrorism and domestic terrorism by year and by country were created (Terrorist Incidents Reports by Region, 2006). Based on these reports, nine independent terrorism variables were calculated for the number of terror incidents, international terror incidents, domestic terror incidents, terror injuries, international terror injuries, domestic terror fatalities, international terror fatalities, and domestic terror fatalities for each of 191 countries and each year of from 2000 through 2006.

The terror incidents, terror injuries, and terror fatalities variables are highly correlated with each other. Therefore, these variables were entered into the statistical model separately. Also, because the terror incidents are the sum of international terror incidents and domestic terror incidents, these variables were not put in the statistical model together. This also is the case for terror injuries and terror fatalities variables.

In this study, an attempt was made to determine whether or not simplified terrorism variables would result in different statistically significant relationships. By using factor analysis and the data-reduction function in SPSS, a terrorism variable that included the terror incidents, terror injuries, and terror fatalities variables was generated; the international terrorism variable included the international terror incidents, international terror injuries, and international terror fatalities variables; the domestic terrorism variable included the domestic terror incidents, domestic terror injuries, and domestic terror fatalities variables. These variables were used in the statistical models. However, the results are not different from other terrorism variables. Therefore, these variables and their results are not presented in the details of this study.
Military Cooperation

Two military variables were used for this study: U.S. joint military operations and U.S. military deployments. Information about these variables was gathered from various reliable online sources.

U.S. Joint Military Operations. Information about U.S. joint military operations, including the number of military operations the United States conducted with other countries in the world in a year was gathered. To ensure the reliability of the data, a comprehensive list of instances in which the U.S. military was involved in such operations around the world was reviewed. This information was contained in a Congressional Research Service report for the U.S. Congress (Grimmett, 2007). Based on this report and looking specifically at instances between 2000 and 2006, relevant information about U.S. joint military operations with countries was found at www.un.org, www.nato.int, www.mnf-iraq.com, and www.usiraqprocon.org.

At the United Nations Web site, a list of current and past joint military peacekeeping operations (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2008) was reviewed. After careful examination of these peacekeeping operations, it was determined that the United States participated along with other countries in the following operations: United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), and United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) [United Nations Peacekeeping, 2008]. All U.N. peacekeeping operations' monthly summaries of military contributors from 2000 to 2006 were reviewed. The number of peacekeeping operations the United States was involved in together with each individual country in each year was tallied (United Nations Peacekeeping: Facts and Figures, 2008).

The same method was followed at the NATO Web site. It was determined that the United States participated in the following operations: Kosovo Force (KFOR) [NATO Kosovo Force: KFOR Contributing Nations, 2008], Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) [SFOR-Stabilization Force: SFOR Organisation, 2004; History of the NATO-led Stabilization Force, 2008], and International Security Assistance (ISAF) [International Security Assistance Force, 2006; NATO in Afghanistan: Factsheet, 2008; NATO in Afghanistan: Chronology, 2008; ISAF Troop Contributing Nations, 2008]. After careful examination of the contributors to these operations in each year, the number of military operations in which the United States was involved with each individual country in each year was extracted.

To find the contributors to the Multinational Task Force for Iraq (MNFI), two Web sites were examined: Multi-National Force-Iraq (Multi-National Force-Iraq: MNFI Coalition Partners, 2008) and ProCon.org (U.S./Iraq ProCon.org: U.S.-Led Coalition Forces in Iraq, 2008). From this list of contributors and their respective summary statistics, the number of U.S. joint military operations for each country and for each year was calculated. Finally, all of the counts of military operations was summed and a final total count for joint military operations in the world in which the United States and other countries participated were calculated. These scores were for each country and for each year.

U.S. Military Deployments. The U.S. military deployments variable was constructed to measure how many U.S. military personnel were deployed in each country and in each year. The Department of Defense Personnel and Procurement Statistics Web site has a page titled "Department of Defense Active Duty Military Personnel Strengths By Regional Area and By Country (309A)," which reports pertinent statistics for different years. These reports include the total number of U.S. military personnel deployed in particular countries in a particular year (Defense Manpower Data Center, Statistical Informational Analysis Division, 2007). From this information, the total actual numbers for U.S. active military personnel deployed abroad for each country and for each year was determined.

Regime Type

Freedom of political rights and freedom of civil rights are components of democracy. Freedom House, a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization, measures freedom of political rights and civil rights by collecting ordinal-level country ratings data through "Freedom in the World" reports (Freedom House: Publications, 2008). Data on freedom of political rights and civil rights are measured on scales of 1 to 7 (Freedom House, 2007). Lower numbers represent freer countries, and highest numbers represent less free countries (Freedom House, 2007). As is common practice, the scale was inverted to make it more intuitive. Thus, lower numbers represent less free countries and higher numbers represent freer countries.

Next, the STATA statistical software program was used to perform a correlation test. The results showed that freedom of political rights and freedom of civil rights are highly correlated with each other. The correlation coefficient is 0.9366. Because they are highly correlated, scores for freedom of political rights are used in this study.²⁴

Cultural Characteristics

Three cultural variables were used in this study to test cultural-related hypotheses: Muslim, Christian, and English-speaking.

Muslim Faith. The Muslim variable is calculated as a percentage of each country's Muslim population for each year from 2000 to 2006. The data come from the U.S. State Department's annual International Religious Freedom Country Reports (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2008) and the World Fact Books at the CIA Web site (Central Intelligence Agency: Library, Publications, 2008). The CIA World Fact Books were primary sources of information for the Muslim variable. Missing information for the Muslim variable was completed with data from the U.S. State Department's Country Reports.

Christian Faith. The resources used to gather information on the Muslim variable also were used for the Christian variable. The Christian variable was measured as percentage of each country's Christian population for each year from 2000 to 2006. First, the World Fact Books at the CIA Web site (Central Intelligence Agency: Library, Publications, 2008) was used as an

²⁴ Freedom of civil rights also is used in all statistical models instead of freedom of political rights in order to determine whether freedom of civil rights gives different results. The results from this study show similar findings.

information resource. Missing information was gathered from the U.S. State Department's annual International Religious Freedom Country Reports (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2008).

English-Speaking. The CIA's World Fact Book includes each country's official language (Central Intelligence Agency: World Fact Book, 2007). This information was used to construct the English-speaking variable. Each country was coded according to its official language (i.e., English =1; other languages = 0).

Economic Characteristics

Three variables were used in this study to determine the effects of each state's economic characteristics on the dependent variable. These variables are GDP PPP per capita, U.S. trade, and U.S. foreign aid.

GDP PPP per Capita. The GDP PPP per capita variable was constructed from International Monetary Fund Web site. GDP PPP per capita data were collected through World Economic and Financial Surveys (International Monetary Fund, Data and Statistics, 2006). GDP PPP per capita data were downloaded by selecting the following: by country (i.e., country-level data); all countries; gross domestic product based on PPP per capita; GDP current international dollar; date range; start year (i.e., 2000); and end year (i.e., 2006). There was some missing GDP PPP per capita data for 16 countries (International Monetary Fund, Data and Statistics, 2006). The CIA World Fact Book provided GDP PPP per capita data for 15 countries, except for the Holy See (Vatican City) [Central Intelligence Agency: Library, Publications, 2008]. Therefore, the missing data were gathered from the CIA World Fact Book. It was determined, however, that the GDP PPP per capita variable had an outlier problem with the high amount of GDP PPP per capita of Luxemburg. To deal with this outlier problem, log transformation was used in the STATA statistical program, log transformation is used. This log transformation put the outlier value close to the other GDP PPP per capita values.

In addition to GDP PPP per capita, I also I constructed GDP per capita variable from official web page of International Monetary Fund with the same method used for GDP PPP per capita (International Monetary Fund, Data and Statistics, 2006). GDP per capita data were downloaded by selecting the following: by countries (i.e., country-level data), all countries, gross domestic product per capita, current prices U.S. dollars, date range, start year (i.e., 2000), and end year (i.e., 2006). STATA was then used to determine whether the GDP PPP per capita variable and the and the GDP per capita variable were correlated. The results showed that they are highly correlated. The correlation coefficient was 0.95. The correlation was checked again after log transformation was applied to the variables in STATA. The correlation of these variables again was high. The correlation coefficient was 0.9622. Both variables were used separately in statistical models, producing similar significant results. However, GDP per capita did not allow for the running of more models to see how the results would change when the terror variables' outliers were included and excluded. The additional models could not be run because GDP per capita has more missing data than GDP PPP per capita.²⁵ As a result, log-transformed GDP PPP per capita was used for this study.

U.S. Trade. The U.S. Census Bureau Web site provides foreign trade statistics. These data sets include scores for U.S. exports and imports in millions of U.S. dollars for each country

²⁵ All models used in this study also were tried with the GDP per capita variable; however, Iraq and Afghanistan had missing data in the GDP per capita variable. Therefore, statistical models with terror variable outliers could not be run.

and for each year (U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics, 2007). The scores for U.S. exports and imports were summed to construct the U.S. trade variable for each country and for each year.

U.S. Foreign Aid. The U.S. State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (2007) annually prepares country reports on human rights practices for each country, The data can be found at the State Department's Web site. An appendix to the reports, Economic and Security Assistance, includes thousands of U.S. dollar amounts of economic aid to each country for each year (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2007). These data were used to build the U.S. foreign aid variable.

Ties to the International Community

One variable was used in this study to determine U.S. ties to the international community.

U.S. Treaties. The U.S. State Department's Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs (2007) provides reports regarding U.S. bilateral and multilateral treaty actions with each country for each year. The U.S. treaties variable is based on how many multilateral and bilateral treaty actions occurred with the United States in a year by counting treaty actions in the treaty-actions reports on the State Department's Web site (Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs, 2007).

Year Data

In panel design studies, autocorrelation in the statistical model is controlled by "year dummy variable" (Wooldridge, 2003). This study covers a seven-year period; therefore, seven year-variables were created with an SPSS command: 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006 (see appendix J). The year 2000 variable was used as a reference; therefore, it was omitted from the statistical models. Because the year dummies are used to control for autocorrelation problems, their coefficients are not presented in the tables created for this study.

Statistical Analysis

The relationship of the independent variables to U.S. international intelligence cooperation was analyzed with 12 statistical models using zero-inflated negative binominal regression and negative binominal regression in the STATA statistical software program. Variables were included in all of the models used for this study. Those variables are military cooperation, regime type, cultural, economic, and ties to the international community. Only the terrorism variables are put separately in each model because of multicollinearity problems.

Because there have been extreme terror incidents, injuries, and fatalities in Iraq and Afghanistan and because of the presence of a U.S.-led "war on terrorism" campaign in these countries, each analysis was run in two steps: one model with these outlier countries and one model without them. This distinction was made to determine whether deleting Iraq and Afghanistan observations from the panel data set makes any significant difference in the results. For example, the extreme scores for terrorism variables for Iraq make this country an outlier when it is compared to the terrorism scores of other countries in the data set. When the models were run with and without outliers, significant changes in the results of the statistical analysis emerged.²⁶

The heteroscedasticity problem of the panel data set was detected in all of the 12 statistical models used for this study. This problem was corrected using robust standard errors. Diagnostic tests were run to detect multicollinearity problems as well. After the correlated variables were separated, there were no multicollinearity problems in any of the models.

This study's overall findings strongly support both realist- and liberal-based assumptions. These issues will be discussed in separate chapters, chapters V and VI. Chapter V will include all of the findings and a discussion of the realist-based variables (i.e., terrorism). Chapter VI will include the findings and a discussion of the liberal-ba variables (i.e., military cooperation, regime type, cultural and economic characteristic: and ties to the international community).

²⁶ The following process was used. First, Iraq's cases were deleted from the data. The results were significantly changed when compared to the results of the model with Iraq's cases included. Then, Afghanistan's cases are deleted; however, results were not changed when compared to the results of the model without Iraq's cases included.

Second, Afghanistan's cases were deleted from the data. The results were not changed when compared to the results of the model with Afghanistan's cases included. Then, Iraq's cases were deleted, and significant changes were seen in the results when compared to the results of the model without Afghanistan's cases included.

From these results, it can be said that deleting Iraq's extreme scores on terrorism variables causes significant changes in the results. Indeed, this also was the case when scatter plots were run of U.S. intelligence cooperation and all terrorism variables. Iraq clearly was an outlier variable.

CHAPTER V

IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM ON THE UNITED STATES' INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION

Introduction

This chapter presents an interpretation and discussion of the findings about the impact of terrorism on the United States' international intelligence cooperation. Several terrorism factors were studied: terror incidents, international terror incidents, domestic terror incidents, terror injuries, international terror injuries, domestic terror injuries, terror fatalities, international terror fatalities, and domestic terror fatalities. First to be covered is the interpretation of the findings of the 12 statistical models of negative binominal and zero-inflated negative binominal regression models. Next will be a discussion of the results as they pertain to the literature review (see chapter II).

Effects of Terrorism Factors

This section contains the findings of the analyses used to test the hypotheses regarding the effect of terror incidents, terror injuries, and terror fatalities on U.S. international intelligence cooperation.

Terror Incidents

This study has three hypotheses to test the effects of the characteristics of terror incidents on U.S. international intelligence cooperation. These characteristics are terror

incidents (H_{1a}), international terror incidents (H_{1b}), and domestic terror incidents (H_{1c}). The three hypotheses are described as follows:

H_{1a Terror Incidents} The United States is more likely to have intelligence cooperation with countries that have more terror incidents.

H_{1b Terrorism: International Terror Incidents} The United States is more likely to have intelligence cooperation with countries that have more international terror incidents.

H_{1c Terrorism: Domestic Terror Incidents} The United States is more likely to have intelligence cooperation with countries that have more domestic terror incidents.

The results of testing the terror incidents hypothesis (H_{1a}) with negative binominal regression are shown in Table 2. The finding shows that there is no statistically significant relationship between terror incidents and U.S. international intelligence cooperative events, holding all other factors constant. When tested with logistic/inflation regression, the results show that the terror incidents variable has a negative significant relationship with U.S. international intelligence cooperative events, holding all other variables constant (see Table 2). This negative significant effect shows that the *more* terror incidents a country experiences, the *less* likely it is that the country will be among the countries with which the United States will *never* have intelligence cooperation. In

other words, the coefficient means that terror incidents increase the likelihood of cooperation with the United States.

However, when the outliers are excluded from the analysis (see Table 3), there is a statistically significant positive relationship between terror incidents and U.S. international intelligence cooperative events when negative binominal regression is used. As the number of terror incidents increases in a country, the United States' likelihood of engaging in intelligence cooperation with that country also increases. With logistic/inflation regression, a negative significant relationship between terror incidents and U.S. international intelligence cooperative events prevails. The finding means that countries experiencing more terror incidents are less likely to be among the countries with which the United States will never have intelligence cooperation. In short, terror incidents increase the probability that the United States will engage in intelligence cooperation with other countries.

Impact of Terror Incidents on U.S. International Intelligence Cooperation

	Negative binomial		Logistic/inflation			
Variable	В	Robust SE	p > z	В	Robust SE	p > z
Terrorism						
Terror incidents	0.002	0.003	0 464	-1 680	0 785	0.032
(number of incidents)	0.002	0.005	0.404	-1.000	0.705	0.032
Military cooperation						
U.S. joint military operations (number of operations)	0.200	0.020	0.000	-0.031	0.137	0.822
U.S. military deployments (number of personnel abroad)	1.36x10 ⁻⁵	3.25x10 ⁻⁶	0.000	-0.063	0.035	0.075
Regime type						
Democracy	0 175	0.027	0.000	0.129	0.020	0.100
(1-7 scale of political rights)	-0.175	0.027	0.000	-0.128	0.080	0.109
Cultural						
Muslim	-0.007	0.002	0 000	-0.002	0.005	0.652
(percent of population)	-0.007	0.002	0.000	-0.002	0.005	0.032
Christian	-0.011	0.002	0 000	0.011	0.005	0.018
(percent of population)	0.011	0.002	0.000	0.011	0.005	0.010
English-speaking	0.005	0 108	0.962	-0.205	0 460	0.656
(dummy)	0.000	0.100	0.902	0.200	0.100	0.000
Economic						
GDP PPP per capita	0.172	0.045	0.000	-0.510	0.300	0.089
(current international dollars)						
U.S. trade	- 11 10-6	7	0.000	2.05.10-4	5 01 10-4	0.440
(millions of U.S. dollars)	5.41x10°	7.74x10	0.000	-3.85x10	5.01x10 ·	0.442
U.S. foreign aid	7.68x10 ⁻⁷	1.65x10 ⁻⁷	0.001	2.57×10^{-7}	3.85x10 ⁻⁶	0.947
(thousands of 0.5. donars)						
LLS treation						
(number of treaties)	0.031	0.009	0.001	-0.109	0.062	0.080
Constant	-0.046	0.470	0.922	2.647	2.025	0.191
ln alpha	-0.217	0.084	0.010			
Alpha	0.805	0.067				
Wald	921.31	0.007	0.000			
Inflation part log pseudo						
likelihood	-3936.334					
Nonzero observations	1054					
Zero observations	276					
Vuong test	5.52		0.000			

Note: Zero-inflated negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors. No multicollinearity was detected. Statistically significant coefficients (at p > .05 level) in bold, two-tailed test. N = 1,330.

Impact of Terror Incidents on U.S. International Intelligence Cooperation,

without Outliers

	Negative binomial			Logistic/inflation		
Variable	В	Robust SE	p > z	В	Robust SE	p > z
Terrorism						
Terror incidents						
(number of incidents)	0.010	0.002	0.000	-1.582	0.698	0.023
Military cooperation						
U.S. joint military operations						
(number of operations)	0.173	0.017	0.000	-0.067	0.118	0.569
U.S. military deployments		6				
(number of personnel abroad)	2.06x10 ⁻³	3.28x10 ⁻⁶	0.000	-0.066	0.040	0.104
Regime type						
Democracy	0.4=0	0.000	0.000	0.105	0.071	0.070
(1-7 scale of political rights)	-0.179	0.026	0.000	-0.125	0.071	0.078
Cultural Marilina						
(percent of population)	0.008	0.002	0 000	0.002	0.005	0.618
(percent of population)	-0.008	0.002	0.000	-0.002	0.005	0.018
(percent of population)	-0.010	0.002	0 000	0.012	0.005	0.015
English-speaking	-0.010	0.002	0.000	0.012	0.005	0.015
(dummy)	-0.057	0 094	0 547	-0.327	0 392	0 405
Economic	0.007	0.091	0.0 17	0.02,	0.072	0.100
GDP PPP per capita						
(current international dollars)	0.205	0.039	0.000	-0.444	0.253	0.079
U.S. trade						
(millions of U.S. dollars)	4.98x10 ⁻⁶	5.75x10 ⁻⁷	0.000	-3.63×10^{-4}	6.14x10 ⁻⁴	0.555
U.S. foreign aid						
(thousands of U.S. dollars)	5.94x10 ⁻⁷	7.10x10 ⁻⁸	0.000	1.40x10 ⁻⁷	3.74x10 ⁻⁶	0.970
Ties to international community						
U.S. treaties						
(number of treaties)	0.021	0.007	0.001	-0.113	0.061	0.061
Constant	-0.326	0.431	0.450	2.217	1.748	0.205
ln alpha	-0.356	0.106	0.001			
Alpha	0.701	0.074				
Wald	1228.29		0.000			
Inflation part log pseudo likelihood	-3798.47					
Nonzero observations	1040					
Zero observations	276					
Vuong test	5 93		0 000			

Note: Iraq and Afganistan are outliers and are excluded from the analysis. Zero-inflated negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors. No multicollinearity was detected. Statistically significant coefficients (at p > .05 level) in bold, two-tailed test. N = 1,316.

Afterward, two other hypotheses (H_{1b} – international terror incidents and H_{1c} – domestic terror incidents) representing two distinct characteristics of terrorism incidents were tested in a statistical model (see Table 4). Neither international terror incidents nor domestic terror incidents are statistically significant in both negative binominal regression and logistic/inflation regression. However, when the same analysis is run without the outliers (see Table 5), domestic terror incidents become significant. The higher that the domestic terror incidents in a given country become, the more likely the United States will have intelligence cooperation with those countries, holding all other factors constant. In other words, domestic terror incidents increase the likelihood of the U.S. intelligence cooperation with other countries.

Impact of International and Domestic Terror Incidents on U.S. International Intelligence Cooperation

	Negative binomial]	Logistic/inflation		
Variable	В	Robust SE	p > z	В	Robust SE	p > z	
Terrorism							
International terror incidents							
(number of incidents)	0.014	0.017	0.432	-0.742	0.715	0.299	
Domestic terror incidents							
(number of incidents)	0.002	0.003	0.606	-3.701	6.803	0.586	
Military cooperation							
U.S. joint military operations							
(number of operations)	0.201	0.020	0.000	-0.026	0.133	0.846	
U.S. military deployments							
(number of personnel abroad)	1.17x10 ⁻⁵	3.35x10 ⁻⁶	0.000	-0.059	0.030	0.052	
Regime type							
Democracy							
(1-7 scale of political rights)	-0.175	0.027	0.000	-0.122	0.078	0.119	
Cultural							
Muslim							
(percent of population)	-0.007	0.002	0.000	-0.003	0.005	0.550	
Christian							
(percent of population)	-0.011	0.002	0.000	0.010	0.005	0.057	
English-speaking							
(dummy)	0.010	0.108	0.924	-0.205	0.186	0.678	
Economic							
GDP PPP per capita							
(current international dollars)	0.174	0.044	0.000	-0.489	0.273	0.073	
U.S. trade							
(millions of U.S. dollars)	5.45x10 ⁻⁶	7.94x10 ⁻⁷	0.000	-4.42x10 ⁻⁴	4.27x10 ⁻⁴	0.301	
U.S. foreign aid							
(thousands of U.S. dollars)	6.70x10 ⁻⁷	1.56x10 ⁻⁷	0.000	7.92x10 ⁻⁹	3.39x10 ⁻⁶	0.998	
Ties to international community							
U.S. treaties							
(number of treaties)	0.032	0.010	0.001	-0.099	0.063	0.116	
Constant	-0.037	0.464	0.934	2.583	1.866	0.166	
ln alpha	-0.220	0.084	0.008				
Alpha	0.802	0.067					
Wald	916 32		0 000				
Inflation part log pseudo	,10.52						
likelihood	-3934.211						
Nonzero observations	1054						
Zero observations	276						
Vuong test	5 49		0.000				

Note: Zero-inflated negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors. No multicollinearity was detected. Statistically significant coefficients (at p > .05 level) in bold, two-tailed test. N = 1,330.

Impact of International and Domestic Terror Incidents on U.S. International Intelligence Cooperation, without Outliers

	Negative binomial		Logistic/inflation			
Variable	В	Robust SE	p > z	В	Robust SE	p > z
Terrorism						
International terror incidents						
(number of incidents)	0.029	0.020	0.142	-0.736	0.676	0.275
Domestic terror incidents						
(number of incidents)	0.009	0.002	0.000	-2.911	3.400	0.392
Military cooperation						
U.S. joint military operations						
(number of operations)	0.174	0.017	0.000	-0.060	0.117	0.607
U.S. military deployments						
(number of personnel abroad)	2.03x10 ⁻⁵	3.30x10 ⁻⁶	0.000	-0.062	0.034	0.072
Regime type						
Democracy						
(1-7 scale of political rights)	-0.180	0.027	0.000	-0.121	0.071	0.089
Cultural						
Muslim						
(percent of population)	-0.008	0.002	0.000	-0.003	0.005	0.530
Christian						
(percent of population)	-0.010	0.002	0.000	0.011	0.005	0.042
English-speaking						
(dummy)	-0.050	0.094	0.591	-0.304	0.382	0.426
Economic						
GDP PPP per capita						
(current international dollars)	0.200	0.039	0.000	-0.434	0.232	0.061
U.S. trade						
(millions of U.S. dollars)	4.95x10 ⁻⁶	5.74x10 ⁻⁷	0.000	-4.08x10 ⁻⁴	5.14x10 ⁻⁴	0.427
U.S. foreign aid						
(thousands of U.S. dollars)	5.94x10 ⁻⁷	7.10x10 ⁻⁸	0.000	1.40×10^{-7}	3.74×10^{-6}	0.970
Ties to international community						
U.S. treaties						
(number of treaties)	0.022	0.007	0.001	-0.105	0.062	0.088
Constant	-0.280	0.427	0.512	2.218	1.621	0.171
In alpha	0.362	0.105	0.001			
	-0.302	0.103	0.001			
Wald	1167 39	0.075	0.000			
Inflation part log psoudo	1107.57		0.000			
likelihood	-3795.658					
Nonzero observations	1040					
Zero observations	276					
Vuong test	5.97		0.000			

Note: Iraq and Afghanistan are outliers and are excluded from the analysis. Zero-inflated negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors. No multicollinearity was detected. Statistically significant coefficients (at p > .05 level) in bold, twotailed test. N = 1,316.

Terror Injuries

Three hypotheses about the effects of characteristics of terror injuries on U.S. international intelligence cooperation were tested. These characteristics are represented by terror injuries (H_{2a}), international terror injuries (H_{2b}), and domestic terror injuries (H_{2c}).

H_{2a Terror Injuries} The United States is more likely to have intelligence cooperation with countries that have more terror injuries.

H_{2b Terrorism: International Terror Injuries} The United States is more likely to have intelligence cooperation with countries that have more international terror injuries.

H_{2c Terrorism: Domestic Terror Injuries} The United States is more likely to have intelligence cooperation with countries that have more domestic terror injuries.

When terrorism is included in the model as terror injuries (see Tables 6 and 7), a pattern similar to the terror-incident models shown in the negative binominal regression columns in Tables 2 and 3. The terror injuries variable is not significant in the full sample (see Table 6), yet it becomes statistically significant when the same analysis is run without outliers (see Table 7), and the direction of the relationship is positive. It means that the United States is more likely to have intelligence cooperation with countries that

have more terror injuries. In other words, terror injuries increase the likelihood of U. S. intelligence cooperation with other countries.

Impact of Terror Injuries on U.S. International

Intelligence Cooperation

Variable	В	Robust SE	p > z
Terrorism			
Terror injuries			
(number of injuries)	0.001	0.001	0.263
Military cooperation			
U.S. joint military operations			
(number of operations)	0.213	0.017	0.000
U.S. military deployments			
(number of personnel abroad)	9.71x10 ⁻⁶	3.44x10 ⁻⁶	0.005
Regime type			
Democracy			
(1-7 scale of political rights)	-0.173	0.025	0.000
Cultural			
Muslim			
(percent of population)	-0.007	0.002	0.001
Christian			
(percent of population)	-0.012	0.002	0.000
English-speaking			
(dummy)	-0.137	0.110	0.212
Economic			
GDP PPP per capita			
(current international dollars)	0.280	0.040	0.000
U.S. trade		-	
(millions of U.S. dollars)	6.01x10 ⁻⁶	8.87x10 ⁻⁷	0.000
U.S. foreign aid	-	-	
(thousands of U.S. dollars)	8.19x10 ⁻⁷	2.03x10 ⁻⁷	0.000
Ties to international community			
U.S. treaties			
(number of treaties)	0.036	0.009	0.000
Constant	-1.083	0.435	0.013
ln alpha	0.155	0.063	
Alpha	1.168	0.074	
Wald	1155.19		0.000
Log pseudo likelihood	-4016.11		

Note: Negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors. No multicollinearity was detected. Statistically significant coefficients (at p > .05 level) in bold, two-tailed test. N = 1,330.

Impact of Terror Injuries on U.S. International Intelligence Cooperation, without Outliers

interingenee cooperation, without outliers

Variable	В	Robust SE	p > z
Terrorism			
Terror incidents			
(number of incidents)	0.004	0.001	0.000
Military cooperation			
U.S. joint military operations			
(number of operations)	0.197	0.015	0.000
U.S. military deployments			
(number of personnel abroad)	1.92x10 ⁻⁵	3.65x10 ⁻⁶	0.000
Regime type			
Democracy			
(1-7 scale of political rights)	-0.183	0.024	0.000
Cultural			
Muslim			
(percent of population)	-0.008	0.002	0.000
Christian			
(percent of population)	-0.011	0.002	0.000
English-speaking			
(dummy)	-0.252	0.079	0.001
Economic			
GDP PPP per capita			
(current international dollars)	0.317	0.036	0.000
U.S. trade		7	
(millions of U.S. dollars)	5.47x10 ⁻⁰	6.55x10 ⁻⁷	0.000
U.S. foreign aid	7		
(thousands of U.S. dollars)	5.90x10 ⁻⁷	1.19x10 ⁻⁷	0.000
Ties to international community			
U.S. treaties			
(number of treaties)	0.027	0.007	0.000
Constant	-1.449	0.407	0.000
ln alpha	0.200	0.060	
Alpha	1.020	0.065	
Wald	1400.28		0.000
Log pseudo likelihood	-3870.09		

Note: Iraq and Afghanistan are outliers and are excluded from the analysis. Negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors. No multicollinearity was detected. Statistically significant coefficients (at p > .05 level) in bold, two-tailed test. N = 1,316.

When the terror injury is measured separately as international and domestic terror injuries, no statistical relationship exists between these variables and U.S. international intelligence cooperative events (see Table 8). However, when the same model is run without outliers (see Table 9), domestic terror injuries becomes statistically significant. In other words, the United States is more likely to have intelligence cooperation with countries that have more domestic terror injuries. Again, this pattern is similar to the for domestic terror incidents models in Tables 4 and 5. Even though the domestic terror incidents and domestic terror injuries were not significant in the initial analyses, they became significant when the outliers were omitted from the data. Thus, although terrorism is measured differently in both models, terror incidents and terror injuries gave similar results for the with outliers and without-outliers models.

Impact of International and Domestic Terror Injuries on U.S. International Intelligence Cooperation

Variable	В	Robust SE	p > z
Terrorism			
International terror injuries			
(number of injuries)	0.001	0.001	0.282
Domestic terror injuries			
(number of injuries)	0.001	0.001	0.379
Military cooperation			
U.S. joint military operations			
(number of operations)	0.213	0.017	0.000
U.S. military deployments			
(number of personnel abroad)	9.82x10 ⁻⁶	3.18x10 ⁻⁶	0.002
Regime type			
Democracy			
(1-7 scale of political rights)	-0.173	0.025	0.000
Cultural			
Muslim			
(percent of population)	-0.007	0.002	0.001
Christian			
(percent of population)	-0.012	0.002	0.000
English-speaking			
(dummy)	-0.138	0.120	0.251
Economic			
GDP PPP per capita			
(current international dollars)	0.280	0.041	0.000
U.S. trade			
(millions of U.S. dollars)	6.01x10 ⁻⁶	8.75x10 ⁻⁷	0.000
U.S. foreign aid			
(thousands of U.S. dollars)	8.21x10 ⁻⁷	1.77x10 ⁻⁷	0.000
Ties to international community			
U.S. treaties			
(number of treaties)	0.036	0.009	0.000
Constant	-1.086	0.445	0.015
ln alpha	0.155	0.063	
Alpha	1.168	0.074	
Wald	1161.14		0.000
Log pseudo likelihood	-4016.10		

Note: Negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors. No multicollinearity was detected. Statistically significant coefficients (at p > .05 level) in bold, two-tailed test. N = 1,330.

Impact of International and Domestic Terror Injuries on U.S. International Intelligence Cooperation,

without Outliers

Variable	В	Robust SE	p > z
Terrorism			
International terror incidents			
(number of incidents)	0.001	4.95x10 ⁻⁴	0.168
Domestic terror incidents			
(number of incidents)	0.005	0.001	0.000
Military cooperation			
U.S. joint military operations			
(number of operations)	0.196	0.015	0.000
U.S. military deployments			
(number of personnel abroad)	1.93x10 ⁻⁵	3.63x10 ⁻⁶	0.000
Regime type			
Democracy			
(1-7 scale of political rights)	-0.181	0.024	0.000
Cultural			
Muslim			
(percent of population)	-0.008	0.002	0.000
Christian			
(percent of population)	-0.011	0.002	0.000
English-speaking			
(dummy)	-0.281	0.079	0.000
Economic			
GDP PPP per capita			
(current international dollars)	0.321	0.036	0.000
U.S. trade			
(millions of U.S. dollars)	5.49x10 ⁻⁶	6.44x10 ⁻⁷	0.000
U.S. foreign aid			
(thousands of U.S. dollars)	6.60x10 ⁻⁷	1.05x10 ⁻⁷	0.000
Ties to international community			
U.S. treaties			
(number of treaties)	0.027	0.007	0.000
Constant	-1.492	0.408	0.000
ln alpha	0.002	0.062	
Alpha	1.002	0.062	
Wald	1533.07		0.000
Log pseudo likelihood	-3862.37		

Note: Iraq and Afghanistan are outliers and are excluded from the analysis. Negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors. No multicollinearity was detected. Statistically significant coefficients (at p > .05 level) in bold, two-tailed test. N = 1,316.

Terror Fatalities

The characteristics of terror fatalities were tested with three hypotheses to see their effects on U.S. international intelligence cooperation: terror fatalities (H_{3a}), international terror fatalities (H_{3b}), and domestic terror fatalities. These hypotheses are defined as follows:

H _{3a} Terrorism: Terror Fatalities	The United States is more likely to have intelligence
	cooperation with countries that have more terror
	fatalities.
H3b Terrorism [.] International Terror Fatalities	The United States is more likely to have intelligence

Terrorism: International Terror Fatalities The Officed States is more fixery to have interligence cooperation with countries that have more international terror fatalities.

H_{3c Terrorism: Domestic Terror Fatalities} The United States is more likely to have intelligence cooperation with countries that have more domestic terror fatalities.

Negative binomial analysis (see Table 10) suggests a statistically nonsignificant relationship between terror fatalities and U.S. international intelligence cooperation. When the analysis is run without outliers (see Table 11), the negative binominal regression analysis shows a statistically significant positive effect. These findings follow a similar pattern with the same analyses for terror incidents (see Tables 2 and 3) and terror injuries (see Tables 6 and 7). The findings regarding terror fatalities mean that the United States is more likely to have intelligence cooperation with countries that have

more terror fatalities. In short, terror fatalities increase the probability of U.S. intelligence cooperation with other countries.

The logistic/inflation analysis, however, does not show a significant relationship (see Tables 10 and 11) for the terror fatalities variable. This finding suggests that terror fatalities and terror incidents (see Tables 2 and 3) do not follow a similar pattern in logistic/inflation results. In other words, even though as the number of terror incidents in countries where the United States has not had any intelligence cooperation increase, the probability of the United States' not making any intelligence cooperation with those countries decreases; however, there is no such relationship between terror fatalities and U.S. international intelligence cooperation (see Tables 10 and 11). This discrepancy between terror incidents and terror fatalities means that these constructs are measuring different aspects of terrorism. Because the STATA program could not run the logistic/inflation model for terror injuries (the STATA software could not converge the data), it is impossible to know what the result would be with this variable. Although all of these constructs look like very similar variables, they seem to have differential effects on U.S. international intelligence cooperation.

Impact of Terror Fatalities on U.S. International Intelligence Cooperation

	Negative binomial			Logistic/inflation		
Variable	В	Robust SE	p > z	В	Robust SE	p > z
Terrorism						
Terror fatalities						
(number of fatalities)	2.39x10 ⁻⁴	3.33x10 ⁻⁴	0.473	-1.382	0.872	0.113
Military cooperation						
U.S. joint military operations						
(number of operations)	0.209	0.020	0.000	0.025	0.180	0.895
U.S. military deployments						
(number of personnel abroad)	1.49x10 ⁻⁵	3.20x10 ⁻⁶	0.000	-0.074	0.036	0.037
Regime type						
Democracy						
(1-7 scale of political rights)	-0.177	0.028	0.000	-0.141	0.099	0.155
Cultural						
Muslim						
(percent of population)	-0.007	0.002	0.000	-0.002	0.004	0.558
Christian						
(percent of population)	-0.011	0.002	0.000	0.011	0.005	0.018
English-speaking						
(dummy)	0.030	0.106	0.778	-0.024	0.538	0.964
Economic						
GDP PPP per capita						
(current international dollars)	0.166	0.048	0.000	-0.589	0.358	0.100
U.S. trade						
(millions of U.S. dollars)	5.35x10 ⁻⁶	8.15x10 ⁻⁷	0.000	-3.94×10^{-4}	3.59x10 ⁻⁴	0.273
U.S. foreign aid						
(thousands of U.S. dollars)	8.72x10 ⁻⁷	1.10x10 ⁻⁷	0.000	-3.07×10^{-6}	4.84x10 ⁻⁶	0.526
Ties to international community						
U.S. treaties						
(number of treaties)	0.035	0.008	0.000	-0.094	0.061	0.125
Constant	-0.008	0.487	0.986	3.056	2.310	0.186
ln alpha	-0.200	0.085	0.018			
Alpha	0.819	0.069				
Wald	815.49		0.000			
Inflation part log pseudo						
likelihood	-3949.481					
Nonzero observations	1054					
Zero observations	276					
Vuong test	5.34		0.000			

Note: Zero-inflated negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors. No multicollinearity was detected. Statistically significant coefficients (at p > .05 level) in bold, two-tailed test. N = 1,330.

Impact of Terror Fatalities on U.S. International Intelligence Cooperation,

without Outliers

	Negative binomial			Logistic/inflation		
Variable	В	Robust SE	p > z	В	Robust SE	p > z
Terrorism						
Terror Fatalities						
(number of fatalities)	0.008	0.001	0.000	-1.314	0.996	0.187
Military cooperation						
U.S. joint military operations						
(number of operations)	0.187	0.016	0.000	-0.049	0.132	0.711
U.S. military deployments						
(number of personnel abroad)	2.10x10 ⁻⁵	3.68x10 ⁻⁶	0.000	-0.080	0.042	0.056
Regime type						
Democracy						
(1-7 scale of political rights)	-0.184	0.026	0.000	-0.135	0.077	0.081
Cultural						
Muslim						
(percent of population)	-0.009	0.002	0.000	-0.003	0.004	0.469
Christian						
(percent of population)	-0.010	0.002	0.000	0.0123	0.005	0.010
English-speaking						
(dummy)	-0.134	0.087	0.124	-0.324	0.436	0.459
Economic						
GDP PPP per capita						
(current international dollars)	0.234	0.041	0.000	-0.437	0.229	0.056
U.S. trade						
(millions of U.S. dollars)	5.11x10 ⁻⁶	6.18x10 ⁻⁷	0.000	-3.97x10 ⁻⁴	4.32×10^{-4}	0.358
U.S. foreign aid						
(thousands of U.S. dollars)	5.74x10 ⁻⁷	7.76x10 ⁻⁸	0.000	-3.64x10 ⁻⁷	5.39x10 ⁻⁶	0.500
Ties to international community						
U.S. treaties						
(number of treaties)	0.022	0.006	0.000	-0.100	0.059	0.091
Constant	-0.602	0.449	0.179	2.035	1.670	0.223
ln alpha	-0.357	0.105	0.001			
Alpha	0.700	0.074				
Wald	1181.99		0.000			
Inflation part log pseudo						
likelihood	-3799.62					
Nonzero observations	1040					
Zero observations	276					
Vuong test	5.62		0 000			

Note: Iraq and Afganistan are outliers and are excluded from the analysis. Zero-inflated negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors. No multicollinearity was detected. Statistically significant coefficients (at p > .05 level) in bold, two-tailed test. N = 1,316.

When the same model is run by including international terror fatalities and domestic terror fatalities as separate variables rather than as a cumulative terror-fatalities variable, no significant relationship is seen with either the negative binominal regression or the logistic/inflation models with the outliers (see Table 12). Once again, the finding is similar to the analyses for domestic and international terror injuries (see Table 8) and domestic and international terror incidents (see Table 4). When the same model is run without outliers (see Table 13), the computer software could not calculate the logistic/inflation analysis (the STATA software could not converge the data). Thus, it was possible to display only the negative binominal regression analysis. The domestic terror-fatalities variable is statistically significant (see Table 13), which is similar to the domestic-injuries and domestic-incidents variables (see Table 9 and 5, respectively).

However, in contrast to the other models, international terror fatalities appeared to be statistically significant in the model (see Table 13). As the number of international terror fatalities increases, the likelihood of U.S. international intelligence cooperation also increases. This finding is interesting because international terror injuries and international terror incidents did not have a statistically significant impact on U.S. international intelligence cooperative behavior. This finding supports the assertion that terror incidents, terror injuries, and terror fatalities have differential effects on U.S. international intelligence cooperation.

Impact of International and Domestic Terror Fatalities on U.S. International Intelligence Cooperation

	Negative binomial		Logistic/inflation			
Variable	В	Robust SE	p > z	В	Robust SE	p > z
Terrorism						
International terror fatalities						
(number of fatalities)	0.003	0.002	0.084	-2.226	1.765	0.207
Domestic terror fatalities						
(number of fatalities)	1.72x10 ⁻⁴	2.56x10 ⁻⁴	0.500	0.003	0.007	0.703
Military cooperation						
U.S. joint military operations						
(number of operations)	0.207	0.019	0.000	0.006	0.158	0.970
U.S. military deployments						
(number of personnel abroad)	1.32x10 ⁻⁵	2.80x10 ⁻⁶	0.000	-0.092	0.034	0.008
Regime type						
Democracy						
(1-7 scale of political rights)	-0.180	0.028	0.000	-0.140	0.096	0.142
Cultural						
Muslim						
(percent of population)	-0.007	0.002	0.000	-0.002	0.004	0.688
Christian						
(percent of population)	-0.011	0.002	0.000	0.014	0.004	0.002
English-speaking						
(dummy)	0.032	0.106	0.765	-0.045	0.501	0.929
Economic						
GDP PPP per capita						
(current international dollars)	0.172	0.047	0.000	-0.550	0.302	0.069
U.S. trade						
(millions of U.S. dollars)	5.44x10 ⁻⁶	8.29x10 ⁻⁷	0.000	-4.53x10 ⁻⁴	3.04×10^{-4}	0.136
U.S. foreign aid						
(thousands of U S dollars $)$	8.27x10 ⁻⁷	1.14x10 ⁻⁷	0.000	-2.98x10 ⁻⁶	5.00×10^{-6}	0.551
Ties to international community	0.2/110	111 1110	0.000	2.00110	0.000110	0.001
U S treaties						
(number of treaties)	0.035	0.008	0.000	-0.087	0.058	0 134
Constant	-0.061	0.487	0.900	2.586	2.024	0.201
In alpha	-0.204	0.084	0.015			
Alpha	-0.204	0.068	0.015			
Wald	829.10	0.008	0.000			
Inflation part log psoudo	029.10		0.000			
likelihood	-3951 433					
Nonzero observations	1054					
Zero observations	276					
Vuong test	270					
v uong test	5.22		0.000			

Note: Zero-inflated negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors. No multicollinearity was detected. Statistically significant coefficients (at p > .05 level) in bold, two-tailed test. N = 1,330.

Impact of International and Domestic Terror Fatalities on U.S. International Intelligence Cooperation,

without Outliers

Variable	В	Robust SE	p > z
Terrorism			
International terror incidents			
(number of incidents)	0.005	0.002	0.050
Domestic terror incidents			
(number of incidents)	0.010	0.002	0.000
Military cooperation			
U.S. joint military operations			
(number of operations)	0.205	0.015	0.000
U.S. military deployments			
(number of personnel abroad)	1.89x10 ⁻⁵	3.72x10 ⁻⁶	0.000
Regime type			
Democracy			
(1-7 scale of political rights)	-0.175	0.024	0.000
Cultural			
Muslim			
(percent of population)	-0.008	0.002	0.000
Christian			
(percent of population)	-0.012	0.002	0.000
English-speaking			
(dummy)	-0.218	0.079	0.008
Economic			
GDP PPP per capita			
(current international dollars)	0.314	0.037	0.000
U.S. trade			
(millions of U.S. dollars)	5.54x10 ⁻⁶	6.91x10 ⁻⁷	0.000
U.S. foreign aid			
(thousands of U.S. dollars)	6.39x10 ⁻⁷	7.67x10 ⁻⁸	0.000
Ties to international community			
U.S. treaties			
(number of treaties)	0.027	0.007	0.000
Constant	-1.403	0.414	0.001
ln alpha	0.037	0.064	
Alpha	1.037	0.069	
Wald	1502.30	0.007	0.000
Log pseudo likelihood	-3879 33		

Note: Iraq and Afghanistan are outliers and are excluded from the analysis. Negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors. No multicollinearity was detected. Statistically

significant coefficients (at p > .05 level) in bold, two-tailed test. N = 1,316.

After evaluating all the analyses above, one can conclude that running models with and without outliers makes a difference in predicting U.S. international intelligence cooperative behavior. Whereas none of the "with outliers" negative binominal regression models produced significant results for terrorism variables (terror incidents, terror injuries, and terror fatalities), all of the "without outliers" models showed statistically significant results for terrorism variables. Therefore, removing the outliers enhances the models and produces better results.²⁷

When the effects of the terrorism variables were measured separately for domestic and international terrorism, all of the domestic terrorism variables (i.e., domestic terror incidents, domestic terror injuries, and domestic terror fatalities) were statistically significant in the negative binominal regression analyses "without outliers," but none of them were significant in "with outliers" models. However, among the international terrorism variables, only the international terror fatalities variable was statistically significant only in the "without outliers" model (see Table 13). These findings suggest that considering terrorism variables in domestic and international contexts separately improved the understanding of the impact of terrorism on U.S. international intelligence cooperation.

²⁷ The log pseudo likelihood value in each model is improved in the "without outliers" models. This means the models have a better goodness-of-fit when the outliers are not included in the analyses.

Discussion of Findings of Terrorism Factors on U.S. International Intelligence Cooperation

The examination of the impact of terrorism on U.S. international intelligence cooperation has been done with nine terrorism hypotheses in 12 statistical models of negative binominal regression and zero-inflated counts. The majority of the findings strongly support the dominant argument of realist-based assumptions of intelligence studies. The results show that there are significant and positive effects of terrorism, international terrorism, and domestic terrorism on U.S. international intelligence cooperation between 2000 and 2006.

Realists assume that U.S. international cooperation can be explained mainly by security threats (Mearsheimer, 2001; Jervis, 1998; Jervis, 1999; Grieco, 1993). This also holds true for U.S. international intelligence cooperation for the period of 2000 to 2006. This study's data present support for the realist expectation that the threat of international terrorism would be the driving force for U.S. international intelligence cooperative behavior. In other words, the United States' foreign policy behavior is not different from its international intelligence cooperative behavior.

From the realist point of view, it can be said that states cooperate if international terrorism is seen as a common threat (Jervis, 1998). The findings of the current research study support this argument and indicate that the United States has intelligence cooperation with other countries because international terrorism is seen as a common threat. Furthermore, this study's findings present more explanation for the United States'

international intelligence cooperative behavior, showing that international terrorism is seen as a common threat when it results in fatalities.

To determine which factors explain international cooperation, it was proposed that realist- and liberal-based theoretical factors be synthesized (Nye, 1988; Keohane, 1984; Starr, 1995). Because U.S. international intelligence cooperation was measured quantitatively, it was possible to synthesize both theoretical factors from intelligence literature in the same statistical models. The results show that both realist and liberal theoretical factors explain equally the occurrence of U.S. international intelligence cooperation.

These findings will make a significant contribution to the debates between realist and liberal theories of international relations that attempt to explain cooperation among states. Each theory claims that one is better than the other for explaining a state's cooperative behavior (Grieco, 1990; Walker & Morton, 2005). This study's findings do not support only one side; rather, it give support to both sides' claims. For example, the findings support the realist argument that realism is good at explaining cooperation among states (Grieco, 1990). However, the findings do not support Walker and Morton's (2005) argument that since 1970, realist theory has been losing its explanatory power for states' cooperative behavior in the international arena. In other words, the findings contribute to this debate and say that realist theory did not lose its explanatory power for explaining the United States' international intelligence cooperation after 2000.

Realist-based assumptions in intelligence studies argue that the change in international and domestic terrorism matters also with international intelligence

cooperation (Johnson, 2003b; Scott & Jackson, 2004; Treverton, Jones, Boraz & Lipsey, 2006). The intelligence cooperation studies done on European states, African states, and South Asian states (Nomikos, 2005; Boyer, 2006; Walsh, 2006; Müller-Wille, 2008) find the assumed impact on international intelligence cooperation. Furthermore, these data show positive support for this assumption by using data for the United States' intelligence behavior in the international arena.

This study's findings also are support the findings for the Western world intelligence cooperation. Western international intelligence cooperation studies contend that terrorism as an emerging threat after the Cold War has more effects in Western countries (Segell, 2004; Aldrich, 2004). Specifically after September 11, international terrorism has increased the intelligence cooperation among them (Segell, 2004; Aldrich, 2004). Not only international terrorism but also domestic terrorism has had an impact on Western international intelligence cooperation (Lander, 2004). Data from the current study presents supportive evidence for their arguments.²⁸

This study's finding is in line with the intelligence-failure scholars' beliefs that international terrorism should have an impact on the United States' international intelligence cooperation (Zegart, 2005; Rovner & Long, 2006; Jervis, 2006; Turner, 2004; Davies, 2004; Stempel, 2005). However, their argument that international terrorism did not change the United States' international intelligence cooperation is not in line with the findings of the current study because the results showed a relationship between

²⁸ Other countries were deleted from the current study's dataset, which then included only Western countries. Both data sets have similar findings.

international terrorism and the United States' international intelligence cooperation. The intelligence-failure scholars' narrow focus is not enough to understand the United States' international intelligence cooperation. In addition to domestic factors, they should look at international factors.

In addition to U.S. intelligence failure studies, the current study's finding support the belief of some scholars studying U.S. intelligence reform and the paradigm shift after September 11 (Steele, 2002; Barger, 2005; Liaropoulos, 2006; Kean et al., 2004; Rovner & Long, 2005; Busch & Weissman, 2005; Schindler, 2005). They believe that international terrorism should affect U.S. international intelligence behavior (Steele, 2002; Barger, 2005; Liaropoulos, 2006; Kean et al., 2004; Rovner & Long, 2005; Busch & Weissman, 2005; Schindler, 2005).

Other studies focus directly on the relationship of international terrorism to the United States' international intelligence cooperation. Some of these studies find that international terrorism has a positive impact on U.S. international intelligence cooperation (Winchell, 2003; Rudner, 2004; Clough, 2004; Reveron, 2008). This study's results support these earlier study's findings.

These other intelligence studies also contend that international terrorism has a positive impact on U.S. international intelligence cooperation based on the condition that international terrorism should be common, prior, and central (Richelson, 1990; Dabelko and Dabelko, 1993; Lefebvre, 2003; Skalnes, 2005; International Intelligence Fellow Program, 2006; Kennedy Boudali, 2006; Nolte, 2008). It is generally argued that if international terrorism is not a common threat, a prior threat or a central threat, then there
would be negative or limited impact of international terrorism (Richelson, 1990; Dabelko & Dabelko, 1993; Lefebvre, 2003; Skalnes, 2005; International Intelligence Fellow Program, 2006; Kennedy Boudali, 2006; Nolte, 2008). The current study generally supports the argument that there is a positive relationship between international terrorism and U.S. international Intelligence cooperation if international terrorism is common threat. This study's data add to this argument and show that if the international terrorism resulted in fatalities, it is seen as a common threat and has positive effects on U.S. international intelligence cooperation. Otherwise, there is no effect on U.S. international Intelligence cooperation.

However, others contend that the positive impact of international terrorism on the United States' Intelligence cooperation might be negative (Skalnes, 2005; Sims, 2006). The findings of the current study are not in line with these earlier studies. The argument of Skalnes (2005) and Sims (2006) is that the countries suffering from international terrorism are hesitant to cooperate with the United States on the intelligence issue because they fear that their cooperation can be easily exposed because the United States is a democratic country (Sims, 2006). As a result, this cooperation makes the countries more vulnerable as a target for international terrorism (Sims, 2006). This current study's findings are completely opposite to the findings of Sims (2006).

Overall, the data show evidence for the argument that international terrorism matters in international intelligence cooperation in the case of the United States. The evidence also shows that terrorism and domestic terrorism matter for the United States' international intelligence cooperation. Eventually, the current study's findings present

evidence that international terrorism along with terrorism itself and domestic terrorism are a driving force for the United States' international intelligence cooperation.

CHAPTER VI

IMPACT OF MILITARY COOPERATION, REGIME TYPES, CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS, AND TIES TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ON THE UNITED STATES' INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION

Introduction

This chapter presents the findings of the impact of military cooperation, regime type, cultural and economic characteristics, and ties to the international community on the United States' international intelligence cooperation. The findings of the 12 zero-inflated count and negative binominal regression statistical models are presented first. Then, the discussion of these findings compares in detail the findings of the literature.

Findings

In addition to the primary interest in the terrorism variables and their impact on U.S. international intelligence cooperative behavior, other important factors were included; namely, U.S. joint military operations, U.S. military deployments, democracy, Muslim, Christian, English-speaking, GDP PPP per capita, U.S. trade, U.S. foreign aid, and U.S. treaties. All of these variables were used in all of the models, while the terrorism variables were rotated.

Military Cooperation

In this study, the relationship between military cooperation and U.S. international intelligence cooperation also was explored by testing two hypotheses. Each hypothesis is stated as follows:

${ m H}_4$ Military Cooperation: US Joint Military Operations	The United States is more likely to have
	intelligence cooperation with countries with
	which it has joint military operations.
${ m H_{5}}$ Military Cooperation: US Military Deployments	The United States is more likely to have
	intelligence cooperation with countries in
	which it has stationed more military
	personnel

In all of the negative binominal regression models, with or without outliers, both U.S. joint military operations and U.S. military deployments were statistically significant and the direction of the relationship is positive. This finding means that as the number of U.S. joint military operations and U.S. military deployments increases, U.S. international intelligence cooperation also increases. In short, U.S. joint military operations and U.S. military deployments increase the likelihood of cooperation with the United States.

For the logistic/inflation models, which studied the probability of future cooperation among the zero-cooperation group (as opposed to the cooperative behavior examined in the negative binominal regression models), U.S. joint military operations was not significant in any of the models. Therefore, it can say that U.S. joint military

operations do not predict the possibility of future U.S. cooperation with countries with which the United States has had no intelligence cooperation. U.S. military deployments was significant only in the "with outliers" logistic/inflations models (see Tables 4, 10, and 12). Considering the huge U.S. military deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, this finding should be taken cautiously because the significant relationship disappears in the "without outliers" models. Thus, it is not possible to talk about a clear impact of U.S. military deployments on the United States' possible future cooperative behavior with countries with which the United States has had no intelligence cooperation.

Regime Type

Another factor that was considered to have explanatory power for U.S. international intelligence cooperative behavior was regime type in the other countries. This hypothesis is stated as follows:

H_{6 Regime Type: Democracy} The United States is more likely to have intelligence cooperation with democratic countries than with nondemocratic countries.

In all of the negative binominal regression models, democracy is statistically significant and the direction of the relationship is negative. The finding means that as a country's level of democracy increases, the probability of U.S. international intelligence cooperation decreases. In other words, democracy decreases the probability of U.S. intelligence cooperation with other countries. The logistic/inflation models yielded no significant results. Thus, the level of democracy does not have a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of U.S. future international intelligence cooperation.

Cultural Characteristics

The effect of other countries' cultural characteristics on the U.S. international intelligence cooperation was tested with three hypotheses. These hypotheses are stated as follows:

H7 Cultural Characteristic: Muslim	The higher the percentage of a country's population
	that is Muslim, the less likely the United States will
	have intelligence cooperation with it.
H8 Cultural Characteristic: Christian	The higher the percentage of a country's population
	that is Christian, the more likely the United States
	will have intelligence cooperation with it.
${ m H}_9$ Cultural Characteristic: English Speaking	The United States is more likely to have intelligence
	cooperation with English-speaking countries.

In all of the negative binominal regression models, the Muslim and Christian variables were statistically significant and the direction of the relationship was negative. In other words, as the percentage of the Muslim and Christian population increases in other countries, the likelihood of U.S. international intelligence cooperation decreases. This finding is very interesting and important because U.S. international intelligence cooperation decreases as countries become more homogeneous in terms of being Muslim or Christian. Any increase in the percentage of the population belonging to the Muslim or Christian faith decreases U.S. intelligence cooperative behavior. In logistic/inflation models, the Muslim variable was not significant in any of the models. The Christian variable, on the other hand, was statistically significant [except for the logistic/inflation analysis (see Table 4), in which the Christian variable was marginally significant (p = .057)] and the direction of the relationship was positive. Put differently, as the percentage of the Christian population increases, the likelihood of countries being in the group with which the United States will never have international intelligence cooperation increases.

In terms of the English-speaking hypothesis, English-speaking was statistically significant in only three of the "without outliers" negative binominal regression models (see Tables 7, 9, and 13) and was not significant in the rest of the models. The direction of the relationship for the significant results was negative. In other words, U.S. international intelligence cooperation with English-speaking countries is less likely than it is with countries in which other languages are spoken.

In the logistic/inflation models, however, this variable is not significant in any of the analyses. This means that the English-speaking variable has no explanatory power to predicting whether the United States will probably have intelligence cooperation with some of the countries with which the United States has never had international intelligence cooperation.

Economic Characteristics

Economic characteristics were included in this study to determine whether other countries' economic characteristics had an effect on U.S. international intelligence cooperation. The three hypotheses tested are as follows:

H₁₀ Economic Characteristic: GDP PPP Per capita

The higher a country's GDP PPP per capita, the more the United States will have intelligence cooperation with it.

H₁₁ Economic Characteristic: U.S. Trade

The more trade occurs between the United States and the other countries, the more likely the United States will have intelligence cooperation with them.

H₁₂ Economic Characteristic: Foreign Aid

The United States is more likely have intelligence cooperation with countries that receive higher amount of U.S. foreign aid.

In negative binominal regression models, all of the economic characteristics were statistically significant and the direction of the relationship was positive. In other words, U.S. international intelligence cooperation increases as the wealth of the other countries increases when measured in terms of GDP PPP per capita, the amount of U.S. trade with other countries, and the amount of U.S. foreign aid to other countries. In the logistic/inflation models, however, these variables do not have a significant impact on the probability of other countries being in the group with which the United States will never have international intelligence cooperation.

Ties to the International Community

The effect of ties to the international community on U.S. international intelligence cooperation was tested by the following hypothesis:

H ₁₃ Ties to International Community: U.S. Treaties	The United States is more likely to have
	intelligence cooperation with countries with
	which it has more treaties.

The U.S. treaties variable was statistically significant in all negative binominal regression models and the direction of the relationship was positive. This finding means that as the number of treaties that countries sign with the United States increases, U.S. international intelligence cooperation also increases. In the logistic/inflation models, no significant relationship was found between the treaties the countries signed with the United States and the probability of countries being in the group with which the United States will never have international intelligence cooperation.

Overall, negative binominal regression models showed that military cooperation, economic characteristics, and ties to the international community had a significant and positive impact on U.S. international intelligence cooperation. However, regime type and cultural variables had a negative effect on U.S. international intelligence cooperation.

In the logistic/inflation models, only the Christianity variable demonstrated a consistent impact on the probability that a given country would be in the group of countries with which the United States will never have intelligence cooperation. This

logic has not been discussed in the literature and, in this regard, the finding is an important contribution by presenting evidence to predict whether a given country will be in the group of countries with which the United States will never have intelligence cooperation.

Discussion of Findings of Military, Democratic, Cultural, Economic, and International Community Ties Factors

The impact of military cooperation, regime type, cultural and economic characteristics, and ties to the international community on U.S. international intelligence cooperation was examined using negative binominal regression and zero-inflated count models. The majority of these models strongly support the liberal-based arguments in intelligence studies that military cooperation, regime type, cultural and economic characteristics, and ties to international community of states matter for U.S. international intelligence cooperation for the period from 2000 to 2006.

Military Cooperation

The findings support the argument that military cooperation in the form of U.S. military deployments and U.S. joint military operations have a positive effect on the United States' international intelligence cooperation (Clough, 2004; Lander, 2004; International Intelligence Fellow Program, 2006; Reveron, 2006; Cline, 2005; Skalnes, 2005). In other words, military ties are important driving factors for U.S. international intelligence cooperation (Clough, 2004).

Intelligence studies in the literature discussed the effects of U.S. military deployments and U.S. joint military operations in a different context. Lander (2004) examined the intelligence cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom. He found that military cooperation increased the two states' intelligence cooperation (Lander, 2004). A study by the International Intelligence Fellow Program (2006) examined the effects of military cooperation factors (such as U.S. joint operations and U.S. military deployment in African countries) on the United States' intelligence cooperation with African states. The study showed that military cooperation has positive effects on the United States' intelligence cooperation with African states (International Intelligence Fellow Program, 2006). Reveron (2006) examined the United States's international intelligence cooperation. He found that U.S. joint military operations in Europe and U.S. military deployment in the Asia-Pacific region increased the United States' intelligence cooperation with these regions (Reveron, 2006). The current study, in the broader context, showed that military ties are important for understanding the United States' international intelligence cooperation.

Regime Type

By finding a negative impact of the democracy variable on United States' international intelligence cooperation, the current study's data show support for the argument that there is a significant difference between democratic countries and nondemocratic countries in terms of their international intelligence behavior (Andrew, 2004). As this study specifically shows, the United States is more likely to have intelligence cooperation with nondemocratic states. However, this study's findings show that the difference in intelligence cooperative behavior of democratic and nondemocratic states is not as discussed by Tan and Ramakrishna (2004), Shpiro (2001), and Sims (2006). They argue that nondemocratic countries are not willing to cooperate on the intelligence issue; however, current study of the United States presents opposite results (Tan & Ramakrishna, 2004; Shpiro, 2001; and Sims, 2006).

The Current study's findings partially support the findings of Rudner (2004) that the United States has had a significant increase in its intelligence cooperation with both democratic and nondemocratic countries (Rudner, 2004). The current quantitative research study, however, found that the increase in the United States' international intelligence cooperation is more likely with the nondemocratic states.

Cultural Characteristics

The current study's findings support the argument that the religious characteristics of states affect the United States' international intelligence cooperation (Tan & Ramakrishna, 2004; Stempel, 2005). The analysis had two interesting findings, which represent a significant contribution to the discussion of the effects of religion on the United States' international intelligence cooperation. As was expected in the intelligence literature (Tan & Ramakrishna, 2004; Stempel, 2005), it was found that a state's Muslim characteristics have a negative impact on the United States' international intelligence cooperation. However, contrary to the expectation of the intelligence literature (Stempel, 2005), it was found that a state's Christian characteristics have a negative impact on the United States' international intelligence cooperation. In short, not only Muslim countries but also Christian countries have less cooperation with the United States.

Another interesting finding of this study is that a state's English-language characteristics affect the United States' international intelligence cooperation in a negative way. Thus this finding is contrary to the argument that the United States is more likely to cooperate with English-speaking states (Skalnes, 2005). As the current study supports that language is not a barrier (Lander, 2004; Müller-Wille, 2004).

Economic Characteristics

This study found that the United States is more likely to cooperate with wealthy states, which is in line with the proposition of Johnson (2003a) that the national wealth of a state has positive effects on international intelligence cooperation. This study also concurred with the finding of Sims (2006) that states are more likely to cooperate with those states that have a high national wealth and the finding of Lander (2004) that the economic power of the United Kingdom and the United States does matter in the intelligence cooperation between these two countries.

The study's findings also showed that the United States is more likely to cooperate with poor countries to which it provides aid. This finding is in line with other studies that examined the impact of U.S. foreign aid on international intelligence cooperation in different regions—Mediterranean countries (Shpiro, 2001), South Asia (Tan & Ramakrishna, 2004), African countries (International Intelligence Fellow Program, 2006), and North African countries (Kennedy Boudali, 2006). Thus, the finding of the current study clearly shows that U.S. foreign aid is a driving force behind the United States' international intelligence cooperation in the world.

As expected from liberal argument, U.S. trade has a positive effect on the United States' international intelligence cooperation. Because there appear to be no discussions from intelligence studies about the effect of U.S. trade on the international intelligence cooperation, this finding is a pioneer contribution to intelligence studies.

Ties to the International Community

This study's finding that there is a positive effect of U.S. treaties on the United States' international cooperation is in line with the findings of studies by Richelson (1990), Skalnes (2005), Richelson and Ball (1990), Segell (2004), Aldrich (2004), Lander (2004), Reveron (2008), and Messervy-Whiting (2004) that treaties have a positive impact on international intelligence cooperative behavior.

However, the current study's finding of positive effects of treaties on the United States' international intelligence cooperation are partially contrary to studies that argue that the effects of treaties might be in different directions (Richelson, 1990; Shpiro, 2001). In the current study, the positive effects of U.S. treaties with other countries on the United States' international intelligence cooperation were found consistently; therefore, it is possible to conclude that data from the current study produces stronger findings. The study's finding about the positive effects of both U.S. multilateral and bilateral treaties²⁹ on the United States' international intelligence cooperation are constant through all of the models. Both types of treaties have the same impact. This finding appears to be contrary to the claim of Lefebvre (2003) that bilateral treaties have more impact on international intelligence cooperation than do multilateral treaties.

²⁹ The U.S. treaties variable is separated into two variables: U.S. multilateral and U.S. bilateral. All models presented in this study were run with these two variables. The findings show that these two variables produce the same pattern with the U.S. trade variable.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION ON THE UNITED STATES' INTELLIGENCE COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR IN THE WORLD

This study quantified the United States' intelligence behavior in the world in order to discover the state-level determinants of U.S. international intelligence cooperation.

The effects of terrorism on the United States' international intelligence cooperation have been examined in terms of terrorism, international terrorism, and domestic terrorism. These terms are measured as incidents, injuries, and fatalities. The overall findings of the terrorism factors show that terrorism, international terrorism, and domestic terrorism have explanatory power for the United States' international intelligence cooperation.

Like the terrorism variables, the variables representing military cooperation, economic characteristics, and ties to the international community have a positive impact on the United States' international intelligence cooperation. On the other hand, the regime type and cultural variables had a negative effect on the United States' international intelligence cooperation.

This research study and its findings make important contributions to the literature, theory, and policy implications.

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Contributions to the Literature

Besides the general findings discussed above, it is worth mentioning the major contributions of this study to the intelligence literature. These contributions are comprised of both theoretical contributions and methodological contributions as discussed in the following paragraphs.

Theoretical Contributions

Although many types political behavior at the international level was examined by collecting event data, intelligence behavior was left unexamined. This study investigated the international intelligence behavior of the United States. As a result, the USIIB project was undertaken to quantify the United States' international intelligence cooperative behavior with event data. Because the intelligence behavior of states was not measured at the international level before now, this study has achieved a great success at operationalizing intelligence behavior by quantifying the actions of the United States' intelligence actors. Such an outlook made it possible to measure the United States' international intelligence behavior for both cooperative and conflictual events. In this regard, both the operationalization and the quantification of the international intelligence behavior of the United States is a unique contribution to the literature.

When the literature is examined, one can see that terrorism generally was investigated in terms of its international aspect, and domestic terrorism could not find its way into the mainstream terrorism literature. By presenting both international and domestic terrorism variables, this study examined terrorism at two levels. When inferences were to be made at the international level, international terrorism variables were generally put forth; domestic terrorism was generally disregarded. This study introduced terrorism at both levels and examined the impact of each on the United States' international intelligence behavior. This outlook makes a significant contribution to the intelligence literature by quantitatively testing the impact of international and domestic terrorism on the United States' international intelligence behavior.

This study did not see terrorism as a one-dimensional concept. Instead of measuring terrorism in terms of terrorist incidents alone, terror injuries and terror fatalities also were included in the models. Further, these different aspects of terrorism were calculated for domestic and international terrorism. As opposed to the common belief that these different aspects of terrorism would yield similar results, these constructs produced differential effects on U.S. international intelligence behavior. Thus, this study showed that terrorism should be considered as a multidimensional concept. That is, whereas terror incidents demonstrate prevalence of a security threat, terror injuries and terror fatalities show how deep an impact that terrorist incidents make.

Realist and liberal ideas have been traditionally seen as rival approaches to understanding international cooperation among nations. With this study, it was shown that these two approaches can be analyzed in the same analytical model to predict the United States' international intelligence cooperation. In other words, this study shows that synthesizing rival theoretical approaches is possible.

Methodological Contributions

Methodologically, intelligence studies have mainly employed qualitative and, at best, comparative research methodologies. Some scholars have argued that it is highly unlikely that one could develop a data set that includes all countries in the near future that would allow for statistically testing hypotheses and analyzing relationships on intelligence issues (e.g., see Gill, 2007). As a result, other scholars have mentioned the difficulty of developing intelligence theories because there are few data bases for intelligence studies to be able to test and create theory (Johnson, 2007).

This study showed that there are available tools to create an intelligence data set for testing and developing theories. Widely used international relations quantitative research methods (i.e., event data) were employed to quantify the United States' international intelligence cooperative behavior. Creating the event data for the intelligence behavior made it possible for to build a comprehensive data set from diverse sources. In this regard, this methodological approach presented a new way of studying intelligence.

In terms of the statistical technique for the study, the use of zero-inflated negative binomial regression helped to account for the United States' probable future intelligence cooperation with countries with which it does not have cooperation now. Thus, with the zero-inflated approach, the zero-cooperative group was not treated as a homogeneous group; a search was made for possible future cooperation probability with some of the zero-cooperative groups. In other words, a statistical framework for a better understanding of the zero-cooperation group was created by dividing this group into two subgroups: (a) countries with which the United States will never have intelligence cooperation and (b) countries with which the United States does not but might have intelligence cooperation. Without such a framework one would be looking at the zerocooperation group as if this group is *only and homogenously* composed of countries with which the United States will never have intelligence cooperation.

Implications for Policy

Because the findings of this study focus on states' structural characteristics (e.g., GDP, dominant language, presence of U.S. troops, existence of treaties with the United States), they will help us understand the countries with which the United States tends to cooperate. Therefore, this work will be a very helpful guide for policy makers in understanding which factors drive U.S. international intelligence cooperation.

Implications for Future Research

Intelligence studies should repeat this quantitative study for North Atlantic intelligence cooperation, European Union international intelligence cooperation, Western international intelligence cooperation, and South Asian international intelligence cooperation to determine whether the general assumption about the effect of international terrorism on international intelligence cooperation is valid.

This research study, along with its unique contribution of quantifying the United States' international intelligence cooperation, has made other important contributions. Because this is a first attempt at quantifying intelligence behavior, scholars will find ways to improve the methods of quantifying intelligence behavior at both the international and the national level.

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE ACTORS

The following U.S. intelligence actors have been identified from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence Web site (http://www.odni.gov/aboutODNI/who.htm) and the United States Intelligence Community Web site (http://www.intelligence.gov/1-members.shtml and ://www.intelligence.gov/1-relationships.shtml):

- Office of the Director of National Intelligence
- Members of the United States Intelligence Community
 - Air Force Intelligence
 - o Army Intelligence
 - Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
 - o Coast Guard Intelligence
 - Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
 - Department of Energy
 - o Department of Homeland Security
 - o Department of State
 - Department of the Treasury
 - Drug Enforcement Administration
 - Federal Bureau of Investigation
 - o Marine Corps Intelligence
 - National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)
 - National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
 - National Security Agency (NSA)
 - o Navy Intelligence
- Supervisor Organizations of the U.S. Intelligence Community
 - o Executive Branch
 - National Security Council (NSC).

- The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB)
- The President's Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB):
- The Office of Management and Budget (OMB):
- Legislative Branch
 - The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI)
 - House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI)

APPENDIX B

ILLUSTRATION OF DOWNLOADING AFP

WIRE NEWS LEADS FOR THE USIIB PROJECT AND THE INDEX

OF FILES AND PROGRAMS IN THE USICDOWNLOADS FOLDER

filelist filelist.summary nexispider.pl nexisreverse.pl run.nexispider USIC.news.text USIC(00)PRESIDENT.000506-061027 USIC(01)SSCI.000122-061108 USIC(02)HPSCI.000716-061201 USIC(03)NSC.000101-010930 USIC(03)NSC.011001-021031 USIC(03)NSC.021101-030430 USIC(03)NSC.030501-031130 USIC(03)NSC.031201-040531 USIC(03)NSC.040601-041031 USIC(03)NSC.041101-050530 USIC(03)NSC.050602-060331 USIC(03)NSC.060402-061229 USIC(04)PFIAB.000526-061218 USIC(06)OMB.000108-061219 USIC(07)DNI.000101-000731 USIC(07)DNI.000802-010430 USIC(07)DNI.010501-020131 USIC(07)DNI.020201-030331 USIC(07)DNI.030401-040331 USIC(07)DNI.040401-050331 USIC(07)DNI.050401-061231 USIC(08)CIA.000106-001229 USIC(08)CIA.010102-011229 USIC(08)CIA.020101-020831 USIC(08)CIA.020901-020930 USIC(08)CIA.021001-021031 USIC(08)CIA.021101-021231 USIC(08)CIA.030101-030131 USIC(08)CIA.030201-030228

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USIC(20)DOE.040615-040922 USIC(20)DOE.040923-041115 USIC(20)DOE.041116-041222 USIC(20)DOE.041223-050303 USIC(20)DOE.050304-050522 USIC(20)DOE.050523-050802 USIC(20)DOE.050803-051003 USIC(20)DOE.051004-060103 USIC(20)DOE.060104-060228 USIC(20)DOE.060301-060426 USIC(20)DOE.060427-060704 USIC(20)DOE.060705-060921 USIC(20)DOE.060922-061031 USIC(20)DOE.061101-061231 USIC(21)DHS.000102-010930 USIC(21)DHS.011001-011231 USIC(21)DHS.020101-020830 USIC(21)DHS.020902-030331 USIC(21)DHS.030401-031231 USIC(21)DHS.040101-040831 USIC(21)DHS.040901-050731 USIC(21)DHS.050804-061228 USIC(22)DOS.000102-000514 USIC(22)DOS.000515-001014 USIC(22)DOS.001015-010224 USIC(22)DOS.010225-010519 USIC(22)DOS.010520-010831 USIC(22)DOS.010901-011130 USIC(22)DOS.011201-020309 USIC(22)DOS.020310-020504 USIC(22)DOS.020505-020824 USIC(22)DOS.020825-021209 USIC(22)DOS.021210-030207 USIC(22)DOS.030208-030424 USIC(22)DOS.030425-030630 USIC(22)DOS.030701-031031 USIC(22)DOS.031101-040224 USIC(22)DOS.040225-040531 USIC(22)DOS.040601-040930 USIC(22)DOS.041001-041130 USIC(22)DOS.041201-050209 USIC(22)DOS.050210-050531 USIC(22)DOS.050601-051019 USIC(22)DOS.051020-060309 USIC(22)DOS.060310-060727 USIC(22)DOS.060728-061230 USIC(23)DOT.000103-010430 USIC(23)DOT.010501-011130 USIC(23)DOT.011201-020830 USIC(23)DOT.020902-030630 USIC(23)DOT.030701-040831 USIC(23)DOT.040901-050331 USIC(23)DOT.040901-050228 USIC(23)DOT.050401-060228 USIC(23)DOT.060301-061229 www.input

APPENDIX C

CAMEO CODE LIST USED BY THE TABARI PROGRAM

COMPLEX: VERBS[6] NOACTPRIOR EXPLAIN VALID:SOURCE TARGET SET: MATCH = TRUE //

//CAMEO Codelist Version: 0.7b3 (Nov 10, 2003)

//

//01: MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENT

LABEL: 010= Make statement

LABEL: 011= Decline comment

LABEL: 012= Make pessimistic comment

LABEL: 013= Make optimistic comment

LABEL: 014= Consider policy option

LABEL: 015= Acknowledge or claim responsibility

LABEL: 016= Deny responsibility

LABEL: 017= Engage in symbolic act

LABEL: 018= Make empathetic comment

LABEL: 019= Express accord

//

//02: APPEAL

LABEL: 020= Make an appeal or request

LABEL: 021= Appeal for material cooperation

LABEL: 0211= Appeal for economic cooperation

LABEL: 0212= Appeal for military cooperation

LABEL: 022= Appeal for diplomatic cooperation (such as policy support)

LABEL: 023= Appeal for aid

LABEL: 0231= Appeal for economic aid

LABEL: 0232= Appeal for military aid

LABEL: 0233= Appeal for humanitarian aid

LABEL: 0234= Appeal for military protection or peacekeeping

LABEL: 024= Appeal for political reform

LABEL: 0241= Appeal for change in leadership

LABEL: 0242= Appeal for policy change

LABEL: 0243= Appeal for rights

LABEL: 0244= Appeal for change in institutions, regime

LABEL: 025= Appeal for target to yield

LABEL: 0251= Appeal for easing of administrative sanctions

LABEL: 0252= Appeal for easing of popular dissent

LABEL: 0253= Appeal for release of persons or property

LABEL: 0254= Appeal for easing of economic sanctions, boycott, or embargo

LABEL: 0255= Appeal for target to allow international involvement (non-mediation)

LABEL: 0256= Appeal for de-escalation of military engagement

LABEL: 026= Appeal to others to meet or negotiate

LABEL: 027= Appeal to others to settle dispute

LABEL: 028= Appeal to engage mediation

//

//03= EXPRESS INTENT TO COOPERATE

LABEL: 030= Express intent to cooperate

LABEL: 031= Agree to engage in material cooperation

LABEL: 0311= Express intent to cooperate economically

LABEL: 0312= Express intent to cooperate militarily

LABEL: 032= Express intent to engage in diplomatic cooperation (such as policy support)

LABEL: 033= Express intent to provide material aid

LABEL: 0331= Express intent to provide economic aid

LABEL: 0332= Express intent to provide military aid

LABEL: 0333= Express intent to provide humanitarian aid

LABEL: 0334= Express intent to provide military protection or peacekeeping

LABEL: 034= Express intent to bring political reform

LABEL: 0341= Express intent to change leadership

LABEL: 0342= Express intent to change policy

LABEL: 0343= Express intent to provide rights

LABEL: 0344= Express intent to change institutions, regime

LABEL: 035= Express intent to yield

LABEL: 0351= Express intent to ease administrative sanctions

LABEL: 0352= Express intent to ease popular dissent

LABEL: 0353= Express intent to release persons or property

LABEL: 0354= Express intent to ease economic sanctions, boycott, embargo

LABEL: 0355= Express intent to allow international involvement (non-mediation)

LABEL: 0356= Express intent to de-escalate military engagement

LABEL: 036= Express intent to meet or negotiate

LABEL: 037= Express intent to settle dispute

LABEL: 038= Express intent to accept mediation

LABEL: 039= Express intent to mediate

//

//04= CONSULT

LABEL: 040= Consult

LABEL: 041= Discuss by telephone

LABEL: 042= Make a visit

LABEL: 043= Host a visit

LABEL: 044= Meet at a "third" location

LABEL: 045= Engage in mediation

LABEL: 046= Engage in negotiation

//05= ENGAGE IN DIPLOMATIC COOPERATION

LABEL: 050= Engage in diplomatic cooperation

LABEL: 051= Praise or endorse

LABEL: 052= Defend verbally

LABEL: 053= Rally support on behalf of

LABEL: 054= Grant diplomatic recognition

LABEL: 055= Apolgize

LABEL: 056= Forgive

LABEL: 057= Sign formal agreement

//

//06= ENGAGE IN MATERIAL COOPERATION

LABEL: 060= Engage in material cooperation

LABEL: 061= Cooperate economically

LABEL: 062= Cooperate militarily

LABEL: 063= Engage in judicial cooperation

LABEL: 064= Share intelligence or information

//

//07= PROVIDE AID

LABEL: 070= Provide aid

LABEL: 071= Provide economic aid

LABEL: 072= Provide military aid

LABEL: 073= Provide humanitarian aid

LABEL: 074= Provide military protection or peacekeeping

LABEL: 075= Grant asylum

//

//08= YIELD

LABEL: 080= Yield

LABEL: 081= Ease administrative sanctions

LABEL: 0811= Ease restrictions on freedoms of expression

LABEL: 0812= Ease ban on political parties or politicians

LABEL: 0813= Ease curfew

LABEL: 0814= Ease state of emergency or martial law

LABEL: 082= Ease political dissent

LABEL: 083= Accede to requests or demands for political reform

LABEL: 0831= Accede to demands for change in leadership

LABEL: 0832= Accede to demands for change in policy

LABEL: 0833= Accede to demands for rights

LABEL: 0834= Accede to demands for change in institutions, regime

LABEL: 084= Return, release

LABEL: 0841= Return, release person(s)

LABEL: 0842= Return, release property

LABEL: 085= Ease economic sanctions, boycott, embargo

LABEL: 086= Allow international involvement

LABEL: 0861= Receive deployment of peacekeepers

LABEL: 0862= Receive inspectors

LABEL: 0863= Allow delivery of humanitarian aid

LABEL: 087= De-escalate military engagement

LABEL: 0871= Declare truce, ceasefire

LABEL: 0872= Ease military blockade

LABEL: 0873= Demobilize armed forces

LABEL: 0874= Retreat or surrender militarily

//

//09= INVESTIGATE

LABEL: 090= Investigate

LABEL: 091= Investigate crime, corruption

LABEL: 092= Investigate human rights abuses

LABEL: 093= Investigate military action

LABEL: 094= Investigate war crimes

//

//10= DEMAND

LABEL: 100= Demand

LABEL: 101= Demand material cooperation

LABEL: 1011= Demand economic cooperation

LABEL: 1012= Demand military cooperation

LABEL: 102= Demand diplomatic cooperation (such as policy support)

LABEL: 103= Demand aid

LABEL: 1031= Demand economic aid

LABEL: 1032= Demand military aid

LABEL: 1033= Demand humanitarian aid

LABEL: 1034= Demand military protection or peacekeeping

LABEL: 104= Demand political reform

LABEL: 1041= Demand change in leadership

LABEL: 1042= Demand policy change

LABEL: 1043= Demand rights

LABEL: 1044= Demand change in institutions, regime

LABEL: 105= Demand that target yields

LABEL: 1051= Demand easing of adminstrative sanctions

LABEL: 1052= Demand easing of popular dissent

LABEL: 1053= Demand release of persons or property

LABEL: 1054= Demand easing of economic sanctions, boycott, or embargo

LABEL: 1055= Demand that target allows international involvement (non-mediation)

LABEL: 1056= Demand de-escalation of military engagement

LABEL: 106= Demand meeting, negotiation

LABEL: 107= Demand settling of dispute

LABEL: 108= Demand mediation

//

//11= DISAPPROVE

LABEL: 110= Disapprove

LABEL: 111= Criticize or denounce LABEL: 112= Accuse LABEL: 1121= Accuse of crime, corruption LABEL: 1122= Accuse of human rights abuses LABEL: 1123= Accuse of aggression LABEL: 1124= Accuse of war crimes LABEL: 1125= Accuse of espionage, treason LABEL: 113= Rally opposition against LABEL: 114= Complain officially LABEL: 115= Bring lawsuit against // //12= REJECT LABEL: 120= Reject LABEL: 121= Reject material cooperation LABEL: 1211= Reject economic cooperation LABEL: 1212= Reject military cooperation LABEL: 122= Reject request or demand for material aid LABEL: 1221= Reject demand for economic aid LABEL: 1222= Reject demand for military aid LABEL: 1223= Reject demand for humanitarian aid LABEL: 1224= Reject demand for military protection or peacekeeping LABEL: 123= Reject request or demand for political reform LABEL: 1231= Reject demand for change in leadership LABEL: 1232= Reject demand for policy change LABEL: 1233= Reject demand for rights LABEL: 1234= Reject demand for change in institutions, regime LABEL: 124= Decline to yield LABEL: 1241= Decline to ease administrative sanctions LABEL: 1242= Decline to ease popular dissent LABEL: 1243= Decline to release persons or property LABEL: 1244= Decline to ease economic sanctions, boycott, or embargo LABEL: 1245= Decline to allow international involvement (non-mediation) LABEL: 1246= Decline to de-escalate military engagement LABEL: 125= Reject proposal to meet, discuss, negotiate LABEL: 126= Reject mediation LABEL: 127= Reject plan, agreement to settle dispute LABEL: 128= Defy norms, law LABEL: 129= Veto // //13= THREATEN LABEL: 130= Threaten LABEL: 131= Threaten non-force LABEL: 1311= Threaten to reduce or stop aid LABEL: 1312= Threaten to boycott, embargo, or sanction

LABEL: 1313= Threaten to reduce or break relations

LABEL: 132= Threaten with administrative sanctions

LABEL: 1321= Threaten to impose restrictions on freedoms of speech and expression

LABEL: 1322= Threaten to ban political parties or politicians

LABEL: 1323= Threaten to impose curfew

LABEL: 1324= Threaten to impose state of emergency or martial law

LABEL: 133= Threaten with political dissent, protest

LABEL: 134= Threaten to halt negotiations

LABEL: 135= Threaten to halt mediation

LABEL: 136= Threaten to halt (expel or withdraw) international involvement (nonmediation)

LABEL: 137= Threaten with violent repression

LABEL: 138= Threaten to use military force

LABEL: 1381= Threaten blockade

LABEL: 1382= Threaten occupation

LABEL: 1383= Threaten unconventional violence

LABEL: 1384= Threaten conventional attack

LABEL: 1385= Threaten attack with WMD

LABEL: 139= Give ultimatum

//

//14= PROTEST

LABEL: 140= Engage in political dissent

LABEL: 141= Demonstrate or rally

LABEL: 1411= Demonstrate for leadership change

LABEL: 1412= Demonstrate for policy change

LABEL: 1413= Demonstrate for rights

LABEL: 1414= Demonstrate for change in institutions, regime

LABEL: 142= Conduct hunger strike

LABEL: 1421= Conduct hunger strike for leadership change

LABEL: 1422= Conduct hunger strike for policy change

LABEL: 1423= Conduct hunger strike for rights

LABEL: 1424= Conduct hunger strike for change in institutions, regime

LABEL: 143= Conduct strike or boycott

LABEL: 1431= Conduct strike or boycott for change in leadership

LABEL: 1432= Conduct strike or boycott for policy change

LABEL: 1433= Conduct strike or boycott for rights

LABEL: 1434= Conduct strike or boycott for change in institutions, regime

LABEL: 144= Obstruct passage, block

LABEL: 1441= Obstruct passage to demand change in leadership

LABEL: 1442= Obstruct passage to demand policy change

LABEL: 1443= Obstruct passage to demand rights

LABEL: 1444= Ostruct passage to demand change in institutions, regime

LABEL: 145= Protest violently, riot

LABEL: 1451= Engage in violent protest for change in leadership

LABEL: 1452= Engage in violent protest for policy change

LABEL: 1453= Engage in violent protest for rights

LABEL: 1454= Engage in violent protest for change in institutions, regime //

//15= EXHIBIT MILITARY POSTURE

LABEL: 150= Demonstrate military or police power

LABEL: 151= Increase police alert status

LABEL: 152= Increase military alert status

LABEL: 153= Mobilize or increase police power

LABEL: 154= Mobilize or increase armed forces

//

//16= REDUCE RELATIONS

LABEL: 160= Reduce relations

LABEL: 161= Reduce or break diplomatic relations

LABEL: 162= Reduce or stop aid

LABEL: 1621= Reduce or stop economic assistance

LABEL: 1622= Reduce or stop military assistance

LABEL: 1623= Reduce or stop humanitarian assistance

LABEL: 163= Impose embargo, boycott, or sanctions

LABEL: 164= Halt negotiations

LABEL: 165= Halt mediation

LABEL: 166= Expel or withdraw

LABEL: 1661= Expel or withdraw peacekeepers

LABEL: 1662= Expel or withdraw inspectors, observers

LABEL: 1663= Expel or withdraw aid agencies

//

//17= COERCE

LABEL: 170= Coerce

LABEL: 171= Seize or damage property

LABEL: 1711= Confiscate property

LABEL: 1712= Destroy property

LABEL: 172= Impose administrative sanctions

LABEL: 1721= Impose restrictions on freedoms of speech and expression

LABEL: 1722= Ban political parties or politicians

LABEL: 1723= Impose curfew

LABEL: 1724= Impose state of emergency or martial law

LABEL: 173= Arrest, detain, or charge with legal action

LABEL: 174= Expel or deport individuals

LABEL: 175= Use violent repression

//

//18= ASSAULT

LABEL: 180= Use unconventional violence

LABEL: 181= Abduct, hijack

LABEL: 182= Physically assault
LABEL: 1821= Sexually assault

LABEL: 1822= Torture

LABEL: 1823= Kill by physical assault

LABEL: 183= Conduct suicide, car, or other non-military bombing

LABEL: 1831= Carry out suicide bombing

LABEL: 1832= Carry out car bombing

LABEL: 1833= Carry out roadside bombing

LABEL: 184= Use as human shield

LABEL: 185= Attempt to assassinate

LABEL: 186= Assassinate

//

//19= FIGHT

LABEL: 190= Use conventional military force

LABEL: 191= Impose blockade, restrict movement

LABEL: 192= Occupy territory

LABEL: 193= Fight with small arms and light weapons

LABEL: 194= Fight with artillery and tanks

LABEL: 195= Employ aerial weapons

LABEL: 196= Violate ceasefire

//

//20= ATTACK WITH WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

LABEL: 200= Use unconventional mass violence

LABEL: 201= Engage in mass expulsion

LABEL: 202= Engage in mass killings

LABEL: 203= Engage in ethnic cleansing

LABEL: 204= Use weapons of mass destruction

LABEL: 2041= Use chemical, biological, or radiological weapons

LABEL: 2042= Detonate nuclear weapons

~~~~

#### APPENDIX D

### SAMPLING OF AFP WIRE NEWS LEADS

#### FROM USIC.NEWS.TEXT FILES

#### 011017 AFPN-0001-01

US President George W. Bush Wednesday applauded Moscow's decision to close its largest covert military outpost abroad, an electronic listening post near Havana that long irked Washington.

#### 011019 AFPN-0001-01

President George W. Bush said after his first face-to-face meeting with President Jiang Zemin Friday that China and the United States would cooperate in intelligence and stopping terror funds.

#### 030129 AFPN-0007-01

Australia welcomed the announcement by US President George W. Bush in his State of the Union address that more intelligence information would be supplied to the Security Council next week.

#### 050420 AFPN-0001-01

The US Central Intelligence Agency and Spain want to step up the sharing of intelligence on terrorists, Spanish Interior Minister Jose Antonio Alonso said Wednesday.

#### 040104 AFPN-0001-01

The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) provide "essential help" in the capture of a senior commander of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a senior Colombian military official said Sunday.

## 051204 AFPN-0009-01

The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has been granted "full access" to Britain's military airfields to transport terrorist suspects, the Mail on Sunday reported.

#### 051211 AFPN-0002-01

US Central Intelligence Agency chief Porter Goss arrived in Turkey on Sunday for talks with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and intelligence officials.

#### 060924 AFPN-0001-01

The US Central Intelligence Agency paid Pakistan millions of dollars for handing over more than 350 suspected al-Qaeda terrorists to the United

States, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has said, The Times reported on Monday.

001012 AFPN-0002-01

Agents with the US Federal Bureau of Investigation were rushed to Yemen Thursday to assist the CIA and the Defense Department in the investigation into an explosion on board a US Navy vessel that killed at least four people and injured 30.

#### 020314 AFPN-0001-01

US anti-narcotics agents are ready and "anxious" to fly into Afghanistan to help that country eradicate its opium trade, Drug Enforcement Administration chief Asa Hutchinson said Wednesday.

### 021007 AFPN-0001-01

US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) officials met on Monday with their counterparts from Tajikistan and other Central Asian countries to stanch the flow of drugs from neighboring Afghanistan, officials said.

## APPENDIX E

## APPEARANCE OF A CODED AFP WIRE NEWS LEAD

#### IN THE TABARI PROGRAM WITH PARSING

Date: 19 Oct 01Record : AFPN-0002-01US President George W. Bush and his Chinese counterpart Jiang Zemin agreedFriday the two countries would work together in the war against terrorismthrough intelligence cooperation and blocking funds to terror groups.

#### **Coded events:**

011019 USAPRS CHNGOV 030 (Express intent to cooperate) HIS CHINESE COUNTERPART JIANG ZEMIN AND US PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH AGREED WORK TOGETHER

011019 CHNGOV USAPRS 030 (Express intent to cooperate) HIS CHINESE COUNTERPART JIANG ZEMIN AND US PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH AGREED WORK TOGETHER

|    |             | <clause><br/><compnd></compnd></clause> |                                     |
|----|-------------|-----------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 0  | US          | <actor></actor>                         | US PRESIDENT GEORGE W BUSH          |
| 1  | PRESIDENT   | < itrl>                                 | PRESIDENT                           |
| 2  | GEORGE      | <li>litrl&gt;</li>                      | GEORGE                              |
| 3  | W           | <li>litrl&gt;</li>                      | W   W                               |
| 4  | BUSH        | <li>litrl&gt;</li>                      | BUS   BUSH                          |
| 5  | AND         | <conj></conj>                           | AND                                 |
| 6  | HIS         | <actor></actor>                         | HIS CHINESE COUNTERPART JIANG ZEMIN |
| 7  | CHINESE     | <litrl></litrl>                         | CHINESE                             |
| 8  | COUNTERPART | <litrl></litrl>                         | CO   COUNTER   COUNTERPART          |
| 9  | JIANG       | <litrl></litrl>                         | JIANG                               |
| 10 | ZEMIN       | <litrl></litrl>                         | ZEMIN                               |
|    |             |                                         | —                                   |
| 11 | AGREED      | <verb></verb>                           | AGREE                               |
| 12 | FRIDAY      | <noun></noun>                           | FRIDAY                              |
| 13 | THE         | <determ></determ>                       | THE                                 |
| 14 | TWO         | <noun></noun>                           | TWO                                 |
| 15 | COUNTRIES   | <litrl></litrl>                         | CO   COUNTRIES                      |
| 16 | WOULD       | <litrl></litrl>                         | WOULD                               |
| 17 | WORK        | <verb></verb>                           | WORK                                |

Select: N)ext P)arsing M)odify R)ecode A)utocode O)ther Q)uit ->

| 18                               | TOGETHER                                           | <litrl></litrl>                                                                                                                       | TO   TOGETHER_                                                     |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 19                               | IN                                                 | <li>litrl&gt;</li>                                                                                                                    | IN_                                                                |
| 20                               | THE                                                | <determ></determ>                                                                                                                     | THE_                                                               |
| 21                               | WAR                                                | <noun></noun>                                                                                                                         | WAR                                                                |
| 22                               | AGAINST                                            | <li>litrl&gt;</li>                                                                                                                    | AG   AGAIN   AGAINS   AGAINST_                                     |
| 23                               | TERRORISM                                          | <noun></noun>                                                                                                                         | TERRORISM                                                          |
| 24                               | THROUGH                                            | <li>litrl&gt;</li>                                                                                                                    | THROUGH_                                                           |
| 25                               | INTELLIGENCE                                       | <noun></noun>                                                                                                                         | INTELLIGENCE                                                       |
| 26                               | COOPERATION                                        | <noun></noun>                                                                                                                         | COOPERATION                                                        |
|                                  |                                                    |                                                                                                                                       |                                                                    |
|                                  |                                                    |                                                                                                                                       |                                                                    |
| 27                               | AND                                                | <br><conj></conj>                                                                                                                     | AND_                                                               |
| 27                               | AND                                                | <br><conj><br/><clause></clause></conj>                                                                                               | AND_                                                               |
| 27<br>28                         | AND<br>BLOCKING                                    | <br><conj><br/><clause><br/><litrl></litrl></clause></conj>                                                                           | AND_<br>BLOC   BLOCK   BLOCKING_                                   |
| 27<br>28<br>29                   | AND<br>BLOCKING<br>FUNDS                           | <br><conj><br/><clause><br/><litrl><br/><verb></verb></litrl></clause></conj>                                                         | AND_<br>BLOC   BLOCK   BLOCKING_<br>FUND                           |
| 27<br>28<br>29<br>30             | AND<br>BLOCKING<br>FUNDS<br>TO                     | <br><conj><br/><clause><br/><litrl><br/><verb><br/><litrl></litrl></verb></litrl></clause></conj>                                     | AND_<br>BLOC   BLOCK   BLOCKING_<br>FUND<br>TO_                    |
| 27<br>28<br>29<br>30<br>31       | AND<br>BLOCKING<br>FUNDS<br>TO<br>TERROR           | <br><conj><br/><clause><br/><litrl><br/><verb><br/><litrl><br/><noun></noun></litrl></verb></litrl></clause></conj>                   | AND_<br>BLOC   BLOCK   BLOCKING_<br>FUND<br>TO_<br>TERROR          |
| 27<br>28<br>29<br>30<br>31<br>32 | AND<br>BLOCKING<br>FUNDS<br>TO<br>TERROR<br>GROUPS | <br><conj><br/><clause><br/><litrl><br/><verb><br/><litrl><br/><noun><br/><noun></noun></noun></litrl></verb></litrl></clause></conj> | AND_<br>BLOC   BLOCK   BLOCKING_<br>FUND<br>TO_<br>TERROR<br>GROUP |

## APPENDIX F

# UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE ACTORS WITH SPECIFIC CODES

| Code      | Intelligence Actor                                          |
|-----------|-------------------------------------------------------------|
| USAPRS    | Executive Office of the President                           |
| USAPRSNSC | National Security Council (NSC)                             |
| USAPRSIAB | The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) |
| USAPRSIOB | The President's Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB)          |
| USAPRSOMB | The Office of Management and Budget (OMB)                   |
| USACON    | The United States Congressional Intelligence Committee      |
| USACONSCI | The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI)          |
| USAICMHCI | House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI)    |
| USAICM    | The United States Intelligence Community (IC)               |
| USAICMDNI | Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI)       |
| USAICMCIA | Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)                           |
| USAICMFBI | Federal Bureau of Investigation                             |
| USAICMDEA | Drug Enforcement Administration                             |
| USAICMCGI | Coast Guard Intelligence                                    |
| USAICMDOE | Department of Energy                                        |
| USAICMDHS | Department of Homeland Security                             |
| USAICMDOS | Department of State                                         |
| USAICMDOT | Department of the Treasury                                  |
| USAICMDIA | Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)                           |
| USAICMNSA | National Security Agency (NSA)                              |
| USAICMNRO | National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)                        |
| USAICMNGA | National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)               |
| USAICMMCI | Marine Corps Intelligence                                   |
| USAICMNAV | Navy Intelligence                                           |
| USAICMAIR | Air Force Intelligence                                      |
| USAICMARM | Army Intelligence                                           |

*Note*: These are generic codes created according to the rules of the TABARI software program. These codes were added to the actors' dictionary for this study.

## APPENDIX G

# QUARTERLY INTERVAL-LEVEL DATA GENERATED BY THE KEDS COUNT PROGRAM FOR INTELLIGENCE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE ACTORS AND AFGHANISTAN

| Date  | Cooperation | Noncooperation |
|-------|-------------|----------------|
| 01-00 | 1           | 1              |
| 04-00 | 4           | 1              |
| 07-00 | 2           | 1              |
| 10-00 | 0           | 1              |
| 01-01 | 0           | 1              |
| 04-01 | 1           | 0              |
| 07-01 | 23          | 19             |
| 10-01 | 75          | 131            |
| 01-02 | 55          | 22             |
| 04-02 | 17          | 15             |
| 07-02 | 23          | 18             |
| 10-02 | 16          | 13             |
| 01-03 | 12          | 24             |
| 04-03 | 15          | 16             |
| 07-03 | 22          | 18             |
| 10-03 | 17          | 18             |
| 01-04 | 17          | 9              |
| 04-04 | 12          | 5              |
| 07-04 | 11          | 11             |
| 10-04 | 16          | 7              |
| 01-05 | 6           | 6              |
| 04-05 | 18          | 11             |
| 07-05 | 19          | 14             |
| 10-05 | 12          | 9              |
| 01-06 | 10          | 8              |
| 04-06 | 9           | 8              |
| 07-06 | 18          | 4              |
| 10-06 | 5           | 3              |

# APPENDIX H

# COUNTRY NAMES AND GENERIC CODES

# FOR THE TABARI SOFTWARE PROGRAM

| Country                  | Country code |
|--------------------------|--------------|
| Afghanistan              | AFG          |
| Albania                  | ALB          |
| Algeria                  | DZA          |
| Andorra                  | AND          |
| Angola                   | AGO          |
| Antigua and Barbuda      | ATG          |
| Argentina                | ARG          |
| Armenia                  | ARM          |
| Australia                | AUS          |
| Austria                  | AUT          |
| Azerbaijan               | AZE          |
| Bahamas                  | BHS          |
| Bahrain                  | BHR          |
| Bangladesh               | BGD          |
| Barbados                 | BRB          |
| Belarus                  | BLR          |
| Belgium                  | BEL          |
| Belize                   | BLZ          |
| Benin                    | BEN          |
| Bhutan                   | BTN          |
| Bolivia                  | BOL          |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina   | BIH          |
| Botswana                 | BWA          |
| Brazil                   | BRA          |
| Brunei                   | BRN          |
| Bulgaria                 | BGR          |
| Burkina Faso             | BFA          |
| Burma (Myanmar)          | MMR          |
| Burundi                  | BDI          |
| Cambodia                 | KHM          |
| Cameroon                 | CMR          |
| Canada                   | CAN          |
| Cape Verde               | CPV          |
| Central African Republic | CAF          |
| Chad                     | TCD          |
| Chile                    | CHL          |
| China                    | CHN          |
| (continued)              |              |

| Country                      | Country code |
|------------------------------|--------------|
| Colombia                     | COL          |
| Comoros                      | COM          |
| Congo (Brazzaville) Republic |              |
| of the                       | COG          |
| Congo (Kinshasa) Democratic  |              |
| Republic                     | COD          |
| Costa Rica                   | CRI          |
| Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast)  | CIV          |
| Croatia                      | HRV          |
| Cuba                         | CUB          |
| Cyprus                       | CYP          |
| Czech Republic               | CZE          |
| Denmark                      | DNK          |
| Djibouti                     | DJI          |
| Dominica                     | DMA          |
| Dominican Republic           | DOM          |
| Ecuador                      | ECU          |
| Egypt                        | EGY          |
| El Salvador                  | SLV          |
| Equatorial Guinea            | GNQ          |
| Eritrea                      | ERI          |
| Estonia                      | EST          |
| Ethiopia                     | ETH          |
| Fiji                         | FJI          |
| Finland                      | FIN          |
| France                       | FRA          |
| Gabon                        | GAB          |
| Gambia                       | GMB          |
| Georgia                      | GEO          |
| Germany                      | DEU          |
| Ghana                        | GHA          |
| Greece                       | GRC          |
| Grenada                      | GRD          |
| Guatemala                    | GTM          |
| Guinea                       | GIN          |
| Guinea-Bissau                | GNB          |
| Guyana                       | GUY          |
| Haiti                        | HTI          |
| Holy See (Vatican city)      | VAT          |
| Honduras                     | HDN          |
| Hungary                      | HUN          |
| Iceland                      | ISL          |
| India                        | IND          |
| Indonesia                    | IDN          |
| Iran                         | IRN          |
| (continued)                  |              |

| Country                    | Country code |
|----------------------------|--------------|
| Iraq                       | IRQ          |
| Ireland                    | IRL          |
| Israel                     | ISR          |
| Italy                      | ITA          |
| Jamaica                    | JAM          |
| Japan                      | JPN          |
| Jordan                     | JOR          |
| Kazakhstan                 | KAZ          |
| Kenya                      | KEN          |
| Kiribati                   | KIR          |
| Korea, Democratic People's |              |
| Republic of (North)        | PRK          |
| Korea, Republic of (South) | KOR          |
| Kuwait                     | KWT          |
| Kyrgyzstan                 | KGZ          |
| Laos                       | LAO          |
| Latvia                     | LVA          |
| Lebanon                    | LBN          |
| Lesotho                    | LSO          |
| Liberia                    | LBR          |
| Libva                      | LBY          |
| Liechtenstein              | LIE          |
| Lithuania                  | LTU          |
| Luxembourg                 | LUX          |
| Macedonia                  | MKD          |
| Madagascar                 | MDG          |
| Malawi                     | MWI          |
| Malavsia                   | MYS          |
| Maldives                   | MDV          |
| Mali                       | MLI          |
| Malta                      | MLT          |
| Marshall Islands           | MHL          |
| Mauritania                 | MRT          |
| Mauritius                  | MUS          |
| Mexico                     | MEX          |
| Micronesia                 | FSM          |
| Moldova                    | MDA          |
| Monaco                     | MCO          |
| Mongolia                   | MNG          |
| Morocco                    | MAR          |
| Mozambique                 | MOZ          |
| Namihia                    | NAM          |
| Nauru                      | NRU          |
| Nenal                      | NPL          |
| Netherlands                | NLD          |
| (continued)                |              |

| Country               | Country code |
|-----------------------|--------------|
| New Zealand           | NZL          |
| Nicaragua             | NIC          |
| Niger                 | NER          |
| Nigeria               | NGA          |
| Norway                | NOR          |
| Oman                  | OMN          |
| Pakistan              | РАК          |
| Palau                 | PLW          |
| Panama                | PAN          |
| Papua New Guinea      | PNG          |
| Paraguay              | PRY          |
| Peru                  | PFR          |
| Philippines           | РНІ          |
| Poland                | POI          |
| Portugal              | DDT          |
| Ostar                 |              |
| Qalai                 | QAI          |
| Romania               | ROM          |
| Russia                | RUS          |
| Rwanda                | RWA          |
| Saint Kitts and Nevis | KNA          |
| Saint Lucia           | LCA          |
| Saint Vincent and the |              |
| Grenadines            | VCT          |
| Samoa                 | WSM          |
| San Marino            | SMR          |
| Sao Tome and Principe | STP          |
| Saudi Arabia          | SAU          |
| Senegal               | SEN          |
| Seychelles            | SYC          |
| Sierra Leone          | SLE          |
| Mexico                | MEX          |
| Slovakia              | SVK          |
| Slovenia              | SVN          |
| Solomon Islands       | SLB          |
| Somalia               | SOM          |
| South Africa          | ZAF          |
| Spain                 | ESP          |
| Sri Lanka             | LKA          |
| Sudan                 | SDN          |
| Suriname              | SUR          |
| Swaziland             | SWZ          |
| Sweden                | SWE          |
| Switzerland           | CHE          |
| Swrig                 | SVR          |
| Taiman                | JIK          |
| 101117010             |              |

| Country              | Country code |
|----------------------|--------------|
| Tajikistan           | TJK          |
| Tanzania             | TZA          |
| Thailand             | THA          |
| Togo                 | TGO          |
| Tonga                | TON          |
| Trinidad and Tobago  | TTO          |
| Tunisia              | TUN          |
| Turkey               | TUR          |
| Turkmenistan         | TKM          |
| Tuvalu               | TUV          |
| Uganda               | UGA          |
| Ukraine              | UKR          |
| United Arab Emirates | ARE          |
| United Kingdom       | GBR          |
| Uruguay              | URY          |
| Uzbekistan           | UZB          |
| Vanuatu              | VUT          |
| Venezuela            | VEN          |
| Vietnam              | VNM          |
| Yemen                | YEM          |
| Yugoslavia           | YUG          |
| Zambia               | ZMB          |
| Zimbabwe             | ZWE          |

<sup>a</sup>These country names were taken from the U.S. State Department's Web site (http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/4250.htm). <sup>b</sup>These country codes were taken from the CAMEO project's country codes.

# APPENDIX I

# ILLUSTRATIVE SAMPLE OF PANEL-DATA

# FORMAT USED IN THIS STUDY

|      |             |      | U.S. International<br>Intelligence | <b>T</b>         |   |   |   | U.S.     |  |  |
|------|-------------|------|------------------------------------|------------------|---|---|---|----------|--|--|
| Case | Country     | Year | Cooperation                        | Terror Incidents | • | • | • | Treaties |  |  |
| 1    | Afghanistan | 2000 | 7                                  | 0                |   |   |   | 0        |  |  |
| 2    | Afghanistan | 2001 | 99                                 | 3                |   |   |   | 0        |  |  |
| 3    | Afghanistan | 2002 | 111                                | 65               | • | • | • | 5        |  |  |
| 4    | Afghanistan | 2003 | 66                                 | 148              |   |   |   | 3        |  |  |
| 5    | Afghanistan | 2004 | 56                                 | 146              |   |   |   | 6        |  |  |
| 6    | Afghanistan | 2005 | 55                                 | 207              | • | • |   | 12       |  |  |
| 7    | Afghanistan | 2006 | 42                                 | 352              |   |   |   | 18       |  |  |
| 8    | Albania     | 2000 | 6                                  | 0                |   |   |   | 0        |  |  |
| 9    | Albania     | 2001 | 9                                  | 3                | • | • |   | 0        |  |  |
| 10   | Albania     | 2002 | 0                                  | 3                |   |   |   | 1        |  |  |
| 11   | Albania     | 2003 | 5                                  | 1                |   |   |   | 5        |  |  |
| 12   | Albania     | 2004 | 2                                  | 1                | • | • | • | 6        |  |  |
| 13   | Albania     | 2005 | 4                                  | 4                |   |   |   | 2        |  |  |
| 14   | Albania     | 2006 | 2                                  | 0                |   |   |   | 8        |  |  |
| 15   | Algeria     | 2000 | 7                                  | 8                |   | • | • | 2        |  |  |
| 16   | Algeria     | 2001 | 9                                  | 4                |   |   |   | 1        |  |  |
| 17   | Algeria     | 2002 | 6                                  | 5                |   |   |   | 2        |  |  |
| 18   | Algeria     | 2003 | 9                                  | 7                | • | • | • | 0        |  |  |
| 19   | Algeria     | 2004 | 4                                  | 12               |   |   |   | 3        |  |  |
| 20   | Algeria     | 2005 | 4                                  | 15               |   |   |   | 0        |  |  |
| 21   | Algeria     | 2006 | 8                                  | 29               |   | • | • | 4        |  |  |
|      |             |      |                                    |                  |   |   |   |          |  |  |
|      |             |      |                                    |                  |   |   |   |          |  |  |
|      |             |      |                                    |                  |   |   |   |          |  |  |
|      |             |      |                                    |                  |   |   |   |          |  |  |
|      |             |      |                                    |                  |   |   |   |          |  |  |
|      |             |      |                                    |                  | • | • | • |          |  |  |
|      |             | •    | •                                  |                  |   |   |   |          |  |  |
|      |             |      | •                                  |                  | • |   |   |          |  |  |
| 1324 | Zambia      | 2000 | 0                                  | 0                | • | • | • | 0        |  |  |
| 1325 | Zambia      | 2001 | 0                                  | 0                |   |   |   | 0        |  |  |
| 1326 | Zambia      | 2002 | 0                                  | 0                |   |   |   | 0        |  |  |
| 1327 | Zambia      | 2003 | 0                                  | 0                | • | • | • | 2        |  |  |
| 1328 | Zambia      | 2004 | 0                                  | 0                |   |   |   | 1        |  |  |
| 1329 | Zambia      | 2005 | 0                                  | 0                |   |   |   | 3        |  |  |
|      | (continued) |      |                                    |                  |   |   |   |          |  |  |

| Case | Country  | Year | U.S. International<br>Intelligence<br>Cooperation | Terror Incidents | • | U.S.<br>Treaties |
|------|----------|------|---------------------------------------------------|------------------|---|------------------|
| 1330 | Zambia   | 2006 | 1                                                 | 0                |   | 1                |
| 1331 | Zimbabwe | 2000 | 1                                                 | 0                |   | 0                |
| 1332 | Zimbabwe | 2001 | 3                                                 | 0                |   | 0                |
| 1333 | Zimbabwe | 2002 | 3                                                 | 0                |   | 0                |
| 1334 | Zimbabwe | 2003 | 1                                                 | 0                |   | 0                |
| 1335 | Zimbabwe | 2004 | 3                                                 | 0                |   | 2                |
| 1336 | Zimbabwe | 2005 | 1                                                 | 0                |   | 0                |
| 1337 | Zimbabwe | 2006 | 0                                                 | 0                |   | 0                |

## APPENDIX J

## SPSS SYNTAX CODES

COMPUTE yr2000 = 0.

- COMPUTE yr2001 = 0.
- COMPUTE yr2002 = 0.
- COMPUTE yr2003 = 0.
- COMPUTE yr2004 = 0.
- COMPUTE yr2005 = 0.
- COMPUTE yr2006 = 0.
- IF (Year=2000) yr2000 = 1.
- IF (Year=2001) yr2001 = 1.
- IF (Year=2002) yr2002 = 1.
- IF (Year=2003) yr2003 = 1.
- IF (Year=2004) yr2004 = 1.
- IF (Year=2005) yr2005 = 1.
- IF (Year=2006) yr2006 = 1.

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