THE ROLES OF NEGATIVE STEREOTYPES, CALLOUS UNEMOTIONALITY, AND RELIGIOSITY IN THE RELATIONS AMONG EXPOSURE TO ETHNO-POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND BELIEFS SUPPORTING AGGRESSION TOWARDS THE OUTGROUP AMONGST PALESTINIAN AND ISRAELI YOUTH

Brianna Marie McManamon

A Thesis

Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green
State University in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

August 2023

Committee:

Meagan Docherty, Committee Chair

Annette Mahoney

Eric Dubow

ABSTRACT

Meagan Docherty, Committee Chair

The exposure to ethno-political violence is a salient form of violence exposure that impacts youth throughout the world and has been associated with beliefs supporting aggression (Dvir Gvirsman et al., 2016; Huesmann et al., 2017) and negative stereotypes about one's outgroup (Huesmann et al., 1983; Vollhardt, 2009). Thus, the present study aimed to discover whether the association between ethno-political violence and beliefs supporting aggression against one's outgroup might be mediated by the development of negative stereotypes about one's ethno-religious outgroup. The present study also aimed to see whether religiosity and callous unemotionality moderate the hypothesized mediated relationship involving the exposure to ethno-political violence, negative stereotypes about the outgroup, and beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup. Religiosity and callous unemotionality (CU) were included as moderators in the present study due to the centrality of religiosity in the ethno-political conflict being studied (i.e., the Israeli-Palestinian conflict); and due to the extant associations between callous-unemotionality and aggressive beliefs. This study was conducted using data from a larger longitudinal study on the impacts of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on youth entrenched in the conflict. Participants in this study ranged in age from 8-17 years, and data was collected over three years. Results indicated that negative stereotypes about the outgroup did not mediate the association between the exposure to ethno-political violence and beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup. Moreover, neither CU nor religiosity moderated the associations among the exposure to ethno-political violence, negative stereotypes about the outgroup, and beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup. However, some interesting associations were found.

For example, the interaction between negative stereotypes and religiosity was found to predict greater beliefs supporting aggression (I.e., youth who hold negative stereotypes about the outgroup and are higher in religiosity hold greater beliefs in support of aggression against their outgroup. Moreover, the longitudinal direct effect between the exposure to ethno-political violence and beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup was significant in all of the studied models. These results may help to inform the literature on the impacts of the exposure to ethno-political violence by revealing certain variables that may exacerbate the impacts of this exposure.

This thesis is dedicated to my mother, Joanne, and my father, Brian. Thank you both so much for your endless support.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Meagan Docherty, my advisor, for helping me to prepare this manuscript with numerous ideas for improvement, detailed comments, and countless Zoom meetings. I would also like to acknowledge Dr. Eric Dubow, and Dr. Annette Mahoney, committee members for my thesis, for your ideas that helped to improve the manuscript. Lastly, I would like to thank my family (Brendan, Mom, Dad, Holly, Poppa, and Nic) for always pushing me to keep going, and giving me a space to rest and relax whenever I needed it.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Youth throughout the world are too often exposed to violence through the physical proximity to as well as the constant media coverage of violence (UNICEF, 2021). Exposure to violence is a widespread and pressing problem for youth and can occur in many different forms, such as through exposure to family violence, school violence, interpersonal violence, community/neighborhood violence, ethno-political violence, and media violence. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), about half (44%) of teens in the U.S. have been exposed to violence in the previous 12 months before being asked (CDC, 2018). Moreover, according to the World Health Organization (WHO), it is estimated that, globally, up to 1 billion children aged 2-17 years have experienced physical, sexual, or emotional violence or neglect in the past year (WHO, 2020).

The constant and continued exposure to violence experienced by youth in our society is concerning, beyond the direct physical consequences of being exposed to violence (e.g., the potential for injury). Indeed, a multitude of studies with youth and adults have linked the exposure to violence to serious negative behavioral and mental health outcomes, such as substance use (Fick & Thomas, 1995; Kliewer & Zaharakis, 2013; Löfving-Gupta et al., 2018), depression (Busby et al., 2013; Gorman-Smith & Tolan, 1998; Nöthling et al., 2019), anxiety (Busby et al., 2013; Hardaway et al., 2014; Shulman et al., 2021), impaired academic functioning (Busby et al., 2013; Hardaway et al., 2014; Overstreet & Braun, 1999), post-traumatic stress symptoms (Leshem et al., 2016; Nöthling et al., 2019; Paxton et al., 2004), beliefs in support of aggression (Boxer et al., 2008; Guerra et al., 2003; Huesmann et al., 2017; McMahon et al., 2009; Shahinfar et al., 2001; Zhu et al., 2020), and actual aggression (Busby et al., 2013; Coleman & Farrell, 2021; DuRant et al., 1994; Gorman-Smith & Tolan, 1998; Shulman et al.,

2021). Of the aforementioned negative consequences, the risk for the development of beliefs supporting aggression is important to examine, due to the potential for these beliefs to lead one to cause harm to oneself and others (Huesmann & Guerra, 1997). The association between exposure to violence and beliefs supporting aggression has been identified among youth specifically; indeed, in a study conducted by Boxer and colleagues (2008), greater levels of exposure to violence, crime, and low-level aggression were significantly related to greater levels of beliefs supporting aggression in a sample of 35 adolescents enrolled in an after-school program in an inner-city neighborhood of a large Southern city. Moreover, in a study conducted by Farrell and colleagues (2022) that examined the associations among exposure to violence, beliefs supporting aggression, and engagement in physical aggression among a sample of primarily African American middle school students, the exposure to community violence was significantly and positively associated with beliefs supporting both proactive and reactive aggression, over time. While links between youth's exposure to violence and beliefs supporting aggression have been established (e.g., Boxer et al., 2008; Farrell et al., 2022; Guerra et al., 2003; Huesmann et al., 2017; McMahon et al., 2009; Shahinfar et al., 2001; Zhu et al., 2020), the mechanism by which exposure to violence relates to the acceptance of aggression has not yet been fully accounted for. Moreover, the studies mentioned above did not look at exposure to violence, over time, predicting increases in beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup specifically.

It is important to examine how beliefs in support of aggression develop, given that these beliefs are highly predictive of aggressive behavior (Huesmann & Guerra, 1997; Lim & Ang, 2009). Thus, determining how these beliefs develop will aid in identifying youth who may be at a greater risk of engaging in aggressive behaviors.

Exposure to Ethno-Political Violence

The exposure to ethno-political violence is a particularly salient form of violence exposure that impacts youth throughout the world and has been associated with many of the harmful outcomes listed above (e.g., beliefs supporting aggression; Dvir Gvirsman et al., 2016; Huesmann et al., 2017). Ethno-political violence is described as conflict between groups that contorts relations and beliefs between the groups who are in conflict with one another. In the case of the present study, this would refer to Israeli Jewish individuals and Arab Palestinian individuals. Indeed, ethno-political conflicts bring attention to ethnic and religious differences. As a result, the perceptions of the other group involved in the conflict are altered (Ellis, 2006). Exposure to ethno-political violence in particular is a common experience for youth in some areas of the world, as evidenced by the approximately 160 million children worldwide that live in high-intensity conflict zones (War Child Holland, 2021). Indeed, over 400 million children live in countries affected by war conflict and violence (UNICEF, 2012). The consequences of this violence are pressing, as "Over half of all civilians killed by… war are children. And there has been a three-fold rise in verified attacks on children since 2010 — an average of 45 violations a day" (UNICEF, 2012). Devastatingly, during the last 10 years it is estimated that approximately 10 million children have been killed as a result of war-related violence (Garreau, 2017).

Exposure to ethno-political violence may impact youth differently than exposure to other forms of violence, as the ethno-political nature of the violence may be seen as more relevant to the ethnic or religious identities of the youth who are viewing or being directly impacted by the violence (Huesmann et al., 1983; Vollhardt, 2009). The ethno-political nature of the violence could influence how the youth interpret what they are seeing in the media, for example, who is

responsible for perpetrating the violence (Vollhardt, 2009). Also, the ethno-political nature of the violence could influence how the viewers identify with the victims of violence, and how they perceive the relevant ethnic groups in the conflict in terms of stereotypes and prejudices (e.g., a viewer of violence could identify with a victim of violence based upon shared ethnicity and subsequently develop negative stereotypes about the perpetrator of that violence; Dubow et al., 2008; Huesmann et al., 2012; Huesmann et al., 2008). Upon developing these negative stereotypes about the outgroup, the individual may go on to develop beliefs in support of aggression toward the outgroup (Saleem et al., 2016) due to their negative views of outgroup members. Given the possible increased likelihood of endorsing beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup due to the negative stereotypes that may arise from the exposure to ethno-political violence, it is important to examine the association between exposure to ethno-political violence and beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup, in order to determine the mechanism by which exposure to ethno-political violence leads to these beliefs amongst youth. Indeed, it seems to be the case that after being exposed to ethno-political violence, one may identify with the victim of violence based upon some shared ethno-religious characteristic, which elicits negative stereotypes about the outgroup. These negative stereotypes, in turn, may increase the likelihood that one will develop aggressive beliefs toward their outgroup.

The Israel-Palestine Conflict

One specific and particularly entrenched conflict that has affected the lives of hundreds of thousands of youths is the Israel-Palestine conflict. The Israel-Palestine conflict can be characterized as an ethno-political conflict, as the groups involved in the conflict are divided upon ethnic (i.e., Israeli Arab, Israeli Jewish, and Palestinian) and religious (i.e., Muslim, Jewish, and Christian) lines (Council on Foreign Relations, 2021). This conflict has been raging since the

mid-20th century when the United Nations adopted the Partition plan, which served to divide the British-controlled region of Palestine into Arab and Jewish States (Council on Foreign Relations, 2021). Following this initial partition, the state of Israel was created and the first Arab-Israeli war began in 1948. This war lasted for approximately one year, culminating in Israel's victory and the displacement of around 750,000 Palestinian individuals. Following the end of this war, the aforementioned disputed territory was divided into 3 areas: the State of Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. Over the next 30 years, a series of conflicts took place between Israel and neighboring Egypt, Syria, and Jordan during which the disputed territories (e.g., the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) changed hands between these states. Eventually, peace accords were signed and the conflict between Israel and Egypt ended in 1979. While the conflict between Israel and its neighboring countries seemed to have halted, Palestine was still struggling with questions of independence. This led to an uprising of Palestinian citizens against the Israeli government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip regions that began in December of 1987 and ended in September of 1993. This uprising was known as the first intifada. In 1993, the Oslo accords were drawn up to mediate the conflict, and these accords set up a framework for Palestinians to govern themselves in the disputed areas. Two years later, the accords were expanded and required the withdrawal of the Israeli government from 6 cities and 450 towns in the West Bank. Despite these requirements, Palestinian citizens remained disillusioned with Israel's presence and control in the West Bank. As a response, in 2000, Palestinians launched the second intifada; and Israel responded by constructing a wall around the West Bank.

In the following 15 years, Israel and Palestine were intermittently engaged in conflict, where thousands of lives were lost on both sides, separated by periods of peace. Specifically, in the fairly recent 50-day war that occurred in 2014, 2,324 lives were lost. The Israel-Palestine

conflict is characterized by continued disputes over territory and independence, violence and aggression on both sides, and the displacement of Palestinian individuals (Council on Foreign Relations, 2021). This conflict has been ongoing over the last few decades and since 1987, it is estimated that it has claimed over 14,000 lives, with 87% of them being Palestinian (The Economist, 2021). Moreover, this conflict has been and continues to be televised in the news media and has no signs of subsiding soon. Indeed, recently, a 2021 flare-up in the conflict sparked by ethnic and religious tensions has resulted in rocket attacks as well as aerial and arterial bombardment on both sides of the conflict. This has resulted in an additional 378 deaths (including 32 children; International Crisis Group, 2021). Many Israeli and Palestinian youths are being exposed to the conflict constantly as it is occurring near their homes and being shown to them via the media (Dvir Gvirsman et al., 2016). As this conflict is ongoing, determining the consequences of the exposure to this ethno-political violence on the functioning and well-being of the exposed youth is critical. Specifically, it is important to understand how youths' exposure to ethno-political violence in the context of this ongoing conflict is related to youths' subsequent aggressive beliefs. The present study aims to do exactly that.

Social-Cognitive Information Processing Model

One theory that has been used to understand the association between exposure to violence and aggressive beliefs is the social-cognitive information processing model (SCIP). Bandura's social-cognitive theory states that social behavior is overseen by processes that are internal and self-regulating. These processes involve the cognitive interpretation and analysis of events that are taking place in an individual's environment, as well as how competent an individual feels in responding in different manners to these events (Dubow et al., 2009; Bandura, 1977; Boxer et al., 2005). These interpretations and analyses act as a sort of roadmap for the way an individual will

behave across different situations and events. Implicit in this roadmap are a set of standards for how an individual is able to and willing to behave, and these standards are based upon information that was picked up in that individual's environment, typically through the observation of social others (e.g., friends, family, and/or characters or individuals portrayed in the media). These standards inform the beliefs that one has, such as how they identify. Essentially, when an individual engages in a behavior, their engagement in the behavior is informed by: the behaviors that the individual has been exposed to in their environment (e.g., by social others) that help to shape their identity, the way the individual interprets and analyzes the events and behaviors that they have been exposed to, and the information the individual has from actually doing the behavior (or similar behaviors) in the past. This model that emphasizes the interaction of observational and enactive learning with existing internal cognitive processes informs the present investigation of the influence of exposure to ethno-political violence on negative stereotypes and beliefs supporting aggression toward one's outgroup (Dubow et al., 2009). Previous findings (e.g., Bandura, 1977; Eron et al., 1991; Guerra et al., 2003; Huesmann et al., 2003) have indicated that as children grow older, they transition from simply imitating the behaviors of social others to acquiring actual behavioral scripts and schemas (beliefs and attitudes), whether directly or inferentially, that have long-term influences on the identity and social behavior of those children (Dubow et al., 2009; Huesmann, 1997, 1998; Huesmann & Kirwil, 2007).

It should be emphasized here that while social-cognitive models typically focus on the mediating roles of cognitive processes in explaining the association between social and environmental antecedents and behavioral consequences, factors that are related to emotions are also relevant. Past theoretical findings have highlighted links between emotions and cognitions at

various steps of cognitive information processing in response to observed conflict (e.g., higher levels of callous unemotionality predicting aggressive cognitions; Pardini & Byrd, 2012; Muñoz & Frick, 2012). This work has specifically highlighted how emotional desensitization (i.e., reduced emotional arousal in response to violent stimuli; Carnagey et al., 2007; Huesmann & Kirwil, 2007) might act together with cognitions supporting aggression (e.g., negative stereotypes) to lead to beliefs supporting aggression toward one's outgroup (Dubow et al., 2009).

Given the present study's focus on attitudes toward the outgroup and beliefs about aggression toward the outgroup, we are especially interested in the following aspects of emotion, cognition, and identity: callous unemotionality, negative stereotypes about the outgroup, and religiosity. As children age and are exposed to more environmental interactions, these aspects of emotion, cognition, and identity seem to crystallize and become more resistant to change around middle childhood and early adolescence (Dubow et al., 2009; Huesmann & Guerra, 1997), and from then on these aspects seem to direct behavior on their own (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). Once established, these aspects of emotion, cognition, and identity tend to limit the variety of ways in which behaviors can develop and be conceptualized. Indeed, it is hypothesized that these kinds of emotions and cognitions may lead one to be more likely to believe that it is okay to engage in aggressive behaviors that are directed at members of one's outgroup.

The Consequences of Viewing Violence

In the context of ethno-political violence, it is possible that a Palestinian (or Israeli) child could see an Israeli (or Palestinian) soldier committing violence against Palestinian (or Israeli) citizens on the television and identify with that victim based on ethnicity and/or assumed shared religious beliefs. This identification could lead an individual to develop negative stereotypes about the individual who is committing violence (Dubow et al., 2008; Huesmann et al., 2008).

Indeed, in a study conducted by Huesmann and colleagues (2012), it was found that in the context of the Israel-Palestine conflict, Jewish American youth who identify with Israelis portrayed in the media as victims of violence tend to possess more negative stereotypes about their outgroup. This identification, as well as the negative cognitions that this identification elicits (Huesmann et al., 2012), may make the idea of committing violence against Palestinian (or Israeli) citizens more acceptable (Huesmann & Eron, 1984; Huesmann & Kirwil, 2007) and therefore more likely (Huesmann et al., 2017). Indeed, the exposure to ethno-political violence directed at one's ethnic in-group has been linked to increased negative stereotyping of and hostility toward ethnic outgroups (Dvir Gvirsman et al., 2016; Huesmann et al., 2012; Niwa et al., 2016; Niwa et al., 2014; Oren & Bar-Tal, 2007). In turn, these negative cognitions (e.g., negative stereotypes representing dehumanizing beliefs about outgroups) have been identified as positively relating to beliefs in support of aggression toward outgroups (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005; Brenick et al., 2007; Haslam, 2006; Saleem et al., 2016).

These results are consistent with Tajfel and Turner's (1979,1986) identity theory, which states that the social groups to which an individual belongs represent an important source of pride and self-esteem. These groups are used as a basis for social categorization and stereotyping. Stereotyping serves to exaggerate the difference between groups, as members of the "in-group" will attempt to identify negative aspects of the "out-group" in order to increase their own self-image. In other words, an individual's beliefs and reactions in response to the exposure to ethno-political violence, and specifically to the "out-group" who is committing this violence, may be impacted by the ethnoreligious ingroup with which they identify. Thus, one's interpretation of violence is affected by their identification with the victim (Vollhardt, 2009), and in the context of ethno-political violence this identification is reliant on some ethnic or religious

characteristic. That identification with the victim may lead to the development of negative stereotypes about the outgroup (Dubow et al., 2008; Huesmann et al., 2012; Huesmann et al., 2008). Indeed, in a study conducted by Niwa and colleagues (2014) examining ethnic variation in the development of negative stereotypes about ethnic outgroups among Palestinian (n = 600), Israeli Jewish (n = 451), and Israeli Arab (n = 450) youth across 3 age cohorts (ages 8, 11, and 14), it was found that exposure to ethno-political violence was positively correlated with negative stereotypes about ethnic outgroups at three yearly waves (time 1 (r = .21; p < .01), time 2 (r = .15; p < .01), and time 3 (r = .25; p < .01). These negative stereotypes promote a cognitive foundation for hostility and mistrust between conflicting groups (Niwa et al., 2014; Oren & Bar-Tal, 2007) and may increase the risk of endorsing beliefs in support of aggression toward the outgroup (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005; Brenick et al., 2007; Haslam, 2006; Saleem et al., 2016). Indeed, Bar-Tal & Teichman (2005) put forth that, in the context of the Israel-Palestine conflict, exposure to violence increases negative attitudes and cognitions toward the outgroup, which, in turn, increase the acceptance of aggression toward that outgroup. Thus, it is possible that exposure to ethno-political violence may predict beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup, by increasing negative stereotypes about the outgroup.

As mentioned above, it is hypothesized that, similar to the exposure to ethno-political violence, the exposure to community violence will lead to general increases in aggression (Dubow et al., 2010), which may be captured by the outcome variable of beliefs in support of aggression toward the outgroup. Importantly, we hypothesize that the link between exposure to community violence and beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup will not be mediated by negative stereotypes toward the outgroup, because the exposure to community violence does not elicit the same negative outgroup beliefs as does the exposure to ethno-political violence due

to the fact that in the exposure to community violence, exposure to aggressive acts by members of one's ingroup are captured, while in the exposure to ethno-political violence, exposure to aggressive acts by one's outgroup are captured.

The Relationship Between Exposure to Ethno-Political Violence and Beliefs Supporting Aggression: The Role of Negative Stereotypes

Consistent with the social-cognitive information processing model described above, it is hypothesized that the environmental input of ethno-political violence will lead youth to develop negative stereotypes about their ethnoreligious outgroup. The general aggression model (GAM; Anderson et al., 2007) provides further support for negative stereotypes as a mechanism through which exposure to violence may predict beliefs supporting aggression. The general aggression model posits that our thoughts, decisions, and memories are formed on the basis of complex associative networks of nodes that represent emotions and cognitions. A youth's experience, whether real or virtual, may include the development of various links and associations between concepts, and concepts that are frequently activated together may become associated and as a result, they may form readily accessible knowledge structures. These knowledge structures function to influence perceptions, guide evaluations, and influence attitudes and behavior (Anderson et al., 2007; Saleem & Anderson, 2013). The current study views exposure to ethno-political violence as a repeated experience that activates certain cognitions such as "the [outgroup individual] committing violence is threatening, violent, and/or bad." Indeed, it is hypothesized that increases in negative stereotypes encompass the development of dehumanizing and delegitimizing beliefs by attributing negative characteristics to outgroups to deny their humanity (Haslam, 2006). Exposure to ethno-political violence becomes connected to these negative outgroup thoughts, which may lead to the development of negative stereotypes. These

negative stereotypes represent a knowledge structure (Dambrun & Guimond, 2004) that, according to the GAM, may influence perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors. Thus, negative stereotypes toward the outgroup may influence one's perceptions of aggression by leading them to accept aggression toward their outgroup.

While the relationships among exposure to ethno-political violence, negative stereotypes about the outgroup, and normative beliefs supporting aggression have been previously studied, they have not been studied in the context of negative stereotypes mediating the relationship between exposure to ethno-political violence and acceptance of aggression toward the outgroup. Based on previous findings (Niwa et al., 2014), it is hypothesized that exposure to ethno-political violence leads one to develop negative stereotypes about the outgroup. Indeed, how one perceives and reacts to the exposure to ethno-political violence is processed through their ethnoreligious identity, and thus, this exposure to ethno-political violence may intensify distinctions between one's ingroup and their outgroup; Bar-Tal, 2004; Brenick et al., 2007; Niwa et al., 2016). As a result, those individuals who live in areas that are characterized by ongoing ethno-political conflicts may develop negative stereotypes about their outgroup (Bar-Tal, 2004; Bar-Tal et al., 2008; Barrett & Oppenheimer, 2011; Hammack, 2008; Huesmann et al., 2012; Dubow et al., 2019; Niwa et al., 2014). These negative stereotypes, in turn, may lead an individual to view aggression that is directed toward members of the outgroup as acceptable (Haslam, 2006; Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005; Saleem et al., 2016). This may be because stereotypes emphasize differences and cause belief distortions (Moss et al., 2022). As such, it has been posited that stereotypes are a major factor influencing outcomes such as brutal treatment of outgroup members (Hadden, 2001; Laird et al., 2014; Taylor et al., 2019). Supporting this, past findings have shown that greater exposure to negative stereotypes (e.g., negative gender

stereotypes) is linked to beliefs supporting aggression (e.g., acceptance of intimate partner violence; Moss et al., 2022). Thus, youths' high exposure to ethno-political violence in the context of the Israel-Palestine conflict might socialize youth to acquire specific (i.e., negative) beliefs about their ethnic outgroup that may make attitudes accepting of violence toward that outgroup more tolerable (Moss et al., 2022).

Moderating Factors in the Links among Exposure to Ethno-Political Violence, Negative Stereotypes, and Beliefs Supporting Aggression

Previous findings have shown that not all children who are exposed to ethno-political violence develop negative outcomes (e.g., acceptance of aggression toward the outgroup). Indeed, studies of children who have been exposed to violence (Garbarino & Kostelny, 1996; Punamaki et al., 1997; Quota & El Sarraj, 1992) demonstrate that many of these children show no clear psychological or externalizing symptoms following exposure to violence. Those findings have led to an increasing recognition of the need to study factors that increase the influence of exposure to ethno-political violence (Dubow et al., 2009).

Callous-Unemotionality

One factor that may be important in understanding the relationships among exposure to ethno-political violence, negative stereotypes about the outgroup, and acceptance of aggression toward the outgroup, is callous unemotionality (CU). CU is defined as the lack of guilt and remorse for antisocial acts committed, absence of empathy, callous use of others for personal gain, and low emotional expressivity (Hare, 1998; Frick & Marsee, 2006). We theorize that being exposed to ethno-political violence in the environment will cause a child to cognitively interpret that event in such a way that leads to the development of negative stereotypes about the ethnoreligious outgroup, perhaps through seeing a member of the outgroup committing the

violence and deciding that the group that the perpetrator represents is violent and therefore bad. That child, upon developing negative stereotypes about the outgroup, may, based upon this environmental and cognitive input, develop beliefs in support of aggression against their outgroup. Importantly, CU may act together with cognitions supporting aggression (e.g., negative stereotypes) to lead to these beliefs supporting aggression. Past findings have identified a positive association between the exposure to violence and CU among youth (Davis et al., 2015; Waller et al., 2018). These callous reactions to being exposed to high levels of violence might be due to the desensitization to and normalization of the violence that is ongoing in one's environment, known as pathologic adaptation (Ng-Mak et al., 2002). This pathologic adaptation protects the youths from the emotional distress that accompanies the exposure to violence, but it also increases their proneness to violence (Dubrow & Garbarino, 1989; Garbarino 1995, 1999; Garbarino & Kostelny, 1997). As such, it is theorized that some youth may adapt to violence by viewing it as normal (Farrell & Bruce, 1997; Ng-Mak et al., 2002; Richters, 1993), becoming protected from it (Hill et al., 1996), becoming prepared for future instances of it (Fitzpatrick, 1993), and developing uncaring attitudes toward others as a means to protect themselves (Osofsky et al., 1993; Ng-Mak et al., 2002). These uncaring attitudes represent a component of CU, indicating that youth's desensitization to violence may be represented by the presence of CU (Hitti et al., 2018; Howard et al., 2012; Ng-Mak et al., 2002). Indeed, youth with CU exhibit decreased emotional arousal (Howard et al., 2012). This could especially be the case in an environment that is affected by ongoing, extreme ethno-political violence, such as the Israel-Palestine region. Thus, the presence of CU may be indicative of emotional desensitization, especially in the context of exposure to ethno-political violence.

Moreover, an association between CU and negative attitudes toward members of one's outgroup has been identified in the extant literature. In a study conducted by Zalk and Kerr (2014), it was found that callous unemotional traits were positively associated with negative attitudes toward the outgroup (immigrants) in a community sample of non-immigrants. Furthermore, the social-cognitive information processing model described above puts forth that internal cognitive processes might act together with factors related to emotion to explain the association between social and environmental antecedents to behavioral consequences, as shown by work that has specifically highlighted how emotional desensitization (i.e., reduced emotional arousal in response to violent stimuli; Carnagey et al., 2007; Huesmann & Kirwil, 2007) might act together with cognitions that support aggression (e.g., negative stereotypes). Thus, it appears that the development of negative stereotypes about the outgroup in response to the exposure to ethno-political violence might be increased among youth with elevated CU.

Furthermore, the relationship between CU and the development of beliefs in support of aggression has been previously studied among youth, with findings indicating that CU may increase beliefs supporting aggression (e.g., Hitti et al., 2018; Ng-Mak et al., 2002; Waller et al., 2018). Indeed, in a study conducted by Stickle and colleagues (2009), it was found that among a sample of 150 antisocial adolescents, CU was associated with increased beliefs supporting aggression. Thus, it appears that youth who have high levels of CU may be at a greater risk for developing beliefs supporting aggression.

Previous studies have investigated CU as a mediator of the impacts of exposure to violence (e.g., Chang et al., 2021), due to its associations with exposure to violence (e.g., childhood maltreatment; Chang et al., 2021) and aggressive behavior (e.g., delinquency; Chang et al., 2021). However, past studies have not investigated the role of CU as a moderator of the

association between exposure to ethno-political violence and variables related to aggression. In the present study, we posit that exposure to ethno-political violence may impact youth differently than exposure to violence generally, as detailed above. This may be because exposure to ethno-political violence may lead a youth to view acts of violence or aggression by outgroup members as representative of the outgroup as a whole, influencing the development of negative stereotypes about that outgroup, especially for youth higher in CU because CU involves impairments in perspective taking (O'Kearney et al., 2016). These negative stereotypes, as detailed above, may lead to distortions in beliefs such as acceptance of aggression against outgroup members, especially for youth higher in CU, because youth with greater CU are prone to support acts of aggression (Stickle et al., 2009). The role of CU in these associations is more trait-like and categorical, as we are viewing CU as relatively stable and unchanging throughout adolescence. This view is supported by extant research (e.g., Frick et al., 2007; Frick & White, 2008). Negative stereotypes, on the other hand, are more likely to change in the context of war, as war increases the availability of negative information about one's outgroup (Kashmina et al., 2003).

Religiosity

Another factor that may be important in understanding the relationships among exposure to ethno-political violence, negative stereotypes about the outgroup, and beliefs in support of aggression toward the outgroup, is religiosity. Religiosity is conceptualized in this study as the degree to which an individual engages with their religion. In the context of this study, this would refer specifically to the degree in which Israeli Jewish participants engage with Judaism and the degree to which Palestinian participants engage with Islam. Religiosity is an important variable to study in the context of the Israel-Palestine conflict because the sides of this conflict are largely divided upon religious lines (Mostafa, 2018). Thus, it is hypothesized here that individuals who

engage highly with their religion will be more likely to identify with victims of ethno-political violence that share their religious affiliation, given how salient religion has been in the Israel-Palestine conflict (Mostafa, 2018). Indeed, previous research has identified a link between religiosity and identification with the victim of violence (Kreidie & Monroe, 2002; Vollhardt, 2009). This identification leads to the development of negative stereotypes about the outgroup (Dubow et al., 2008; Huesmann et al., 2012; Huesmann et al., 2008).

We hypothesize that greater religiosity will make individuals more likely to develop negative stereotypes regarding the religion that they do not engage with following exposure to violence. The centrality of one's religion has been linked to negative attitudes toward one's outgroup (Kaminsky & Bar-Tal, 1996). In a study conducted by Shamoa-Nir & Razpurker-Apfeld (2019), it was found that the centrality of one's religion had a moderating effect, which either increased or reduced stereotypes following exposure to outgroup concepts (e.g., a word search puzzle in which words representing concepts central to the religion of the outgroup were embedded). Specifically, this study was conducted with a sample of Muslim and Arab Christian undergraduate students in Israel, and findings indicated that the higher sense of centrality the Muslim individual had with Islam, the more negative the stereotypes were toward the Jewish individuals after exposure to Jewish concepts. Interestingly, the opposite effect was observed for the Arab Christians (i.e., more negative stereotypes about Jewish individuals were elicited when exposed to Christian concepts rather than when exposed to Jewish concepts). The authors stipulate that this is because it has previously been identified that Arab Christians who reside in Israel share more cultural norms with the secular Jews than with the Muslim Arabs (Radai et al., 2015), and thus the exposure of Christians to Jewish concepts must not have tapped into a large gap between these groups that would elicit negative stereotypes as did the exposure of Muslims

to Jewish concepts. However, the authors also note that this unexpected finding may reflect a broader phenomenon in which the priming of religious concepts that are specific to Christianity may lead to general increases in negative attitudes toward the outgroup (Johnson et al., 2010). Thus, as exposure to ethno-political violence represents an exposure to outgroup concepts (e.g., violent acts committed by the ethnoreligious outgroup), we hypothesize that greater religiosity will make one more likely to develop negative stereotypes about their outgroup following exposure to ethno-political violence.

Furthermore, previous studies have identified links among the development of negative attitudes toward the outgroup, religiosity, and beliefs in support of aggression toward the outgroup. In a qualitative study based upon narrative interviews with five ordinary people who participated in acts of violence during the Lebanese civil war, conducted by Kreidie and Monroe in 2002, it was found that, "What turned [the participants] toward violence was… the perceived threat to their [religious] group... The social representations with which they had been socialized made each of these men see themselves as part of their… religious [in]group and view the other [out]group members as a direct threat to their group..." (*p*. 20) Moreover, one of the participants in this study reported that, "…they instilled in me the belief that we had to fight because the war is us or them" (*p*. 23). In this study, the exposure to violence directed at members of one's religion led the participants to view the religious outgroup members negatively (i.e., as a threat), and these negative attitudes (i.e., stereotypes) toward the outgroup led the participants to engage in beliefs that were in support of aggression toward their religious outgroup (i.e., that one has to fight against the threatening outgroup). Thus, we hypothesize that greater religiosity will increase one's beliefs in support of aggression toward the outgroup after developing negative stereotypes about the outgroup.

Therefore, it is hypothesized that upon exposure to ethno-political violence, greater religiosity will be associated with greater negative stereotypes about the outgroup, and a greater likelihood of engaging in beliefs in support of aggression toward the outgroup after the development of these negative stereotypes. Thus, religiosity may represent a moderator of the links between exposure to ethno-political violence, negative stereotypes about the outgroup, and acceptance of aggression toward the outgroup.

Limitations of Previous Research

As noted above, previous studies have identified positive cross-sectional (Boxer et al., 2008) and longitudinal (e.g., Farrell et al., 2022) associations among the exposure to violence and beliefs supporting aggression, generally. Moreover, past articles have discussed the potential association between negative views of outgroup members and beliefs supporting aggression against these members, suggesting that negative views of outgroup members may longitudinally lead to beliefs supporting aggression against those outgroup members, although this hypothesis was not directly tested (Saleem et al., 2016). Previous studies have also examined direct associations between the exposure to violence, CU, negative stereotypes, and beliefs supporting aggression, with greater exposure leading longitudinally to greater CU (Waller et al., 2018), greater CU leading longitudinally to fewer decreases in prejudice toward outgroup individuals (Zalk & Kerr, 2014), and greater CU leading to greater beliefs supporting aggression cross-sectionally (Stickle et al., 2009). Studies have also cross-sectionally looked at CU as a mediator in the association between the exposure to violence and aggression (Chang et al., 2021), finding it to be a mediator such that greater exposure led to higher CU, which led to higher levels of aggression. However, CU as a moderator of longitudinal associations among exposure to violence, negative stereotypes about the outgroup, and beliefs supporting aggression against the

outgroup has not been tested in previous research. Even further, studies have examined cross-sectional associations between religiosity, negative stereotypes, and beliefs supporting aggression, finding that religiosity may increase stereotypes following exposure to outgroup concepts (Shamoa-Nir & Razpurker-Apfeld, 2019). Moreover, a qualitative study by Kreidie and Monroe (2002) found that one's degree of religiosity, or identification with their ingroup, may lead to acceptance of aggression against their religious outgroup. Thus, although religiosity has been related cross-sectionally to negative stereotypes about the outgroup and beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup, again – just as with CU – previous research has not examined religiosity as a moderator of longitudinal associations among exposure to violence, negative stereotypes about the outgroup, and beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup.

Previous studies using the current dataset have not tested the specific hypotheses proposed in this paper but have examined similar research questions. The study used in this paper involved longitudinal data collection on variables related to the exposure to violence, aggression, and coping, over three annual waves in Israel and Palestine. Specifically, this study has produced the following findings: Initial levels of exposure to ethno-political violence were associated with less increase in negative stereotypes about the outgroup for Palestinians and greater initial levels of and larger decreases in negative stereotypes about the outgroup for Israeli Arabs from waves 1 to 3 (Niwa et al., 2016); and exposure to ethno-political violence at wave 1 was associated with greater normative beliefs supporting aggression (a measure that included normative beliefs about aggression generally as well as against the outgroup specifically) at wave 2 (Huesmann et al., 2017). Other findings that did not involve variables used in the present paper include: emotional desensitization across waves 1 to 3 was positively associated with normative beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup across waves 1 to 3 (Niwa et al.,

2016); exposure to ethno-political violence averaged across waves 1 to 3 was positively associated with violent as well as antisocial outcomes at wave 4 (Dubow et al., 2019); and exposure to violence through the media (scores summed across waves 1 to 2) was longitudinally associated with greater post-traumatic stress and aggression (both measured at wave 3; Dvir Gvirsman et al., 2014). Thus, prior results from the current study provide evidence for longitudinal associations from exposure to ethno-political violence to subsequent normative beliefs supporting aggression and negative stereotypes against the outgroup (albeit counter to the present study's hypotheses for the latter association).

As is apparent above, past studies have investigated cross-sectional and longitudinal relationships among the exposure to violence and beliefs supporting aggression (generally), exposure to violence and negative attitudes and stereotypes toward outgroup members, and associations among CU, exposure to violence, negative stereotypes, and beliefs supporting aggression, and between religiosity, exposure to violence, negative stereotypes, and beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup, using this dataset and other datasets. However, previous research with this study has not directly tested whether exposure to ethno-political violence or negative stereotypes about the outgroup predict subsequent beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup specifically. In addition, research has not examined the role of negative stereotypes against the outgroup as a mediator of the association between the exposure to ethno-political violence and beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup, either cross-sectionally or longitudinally. Finally, the roles of religiosity and CU as moderators of this mediational pathway have yet to be studied. The current study aims to fill these gaps in the literature.

It is important to further investigate these variables in the context of the hypothesized model in order to better understand the links among exposure to ethno-political violence at W1, negative stereotypes about the outgroup at W2, and acceptance of aggression toward the outgroup at W3. By understanding this link, we can begin to devise ways to more specifically aid youth who may be at a greater risk for developing an acceptance of aggression toward the outgroup. If, for example, we find that negative stereotypes about the outgroup at W2 do in fact mediate the association between exposure to ethno-political violence at W1 and beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup at W3, we may be able to identify those youth who are more likely to develop an acceptance of aggression against their outgroups, following the exposure to ethno-political violence (i.e., those youth who develop negative stereotypes). If we are able to identify these more high-risk youth, then we may be able to reduce the acceptance of aggression toward the outgroup more effectively in this population through interventions focused on reducing stereotypes (i.e., interventions focused on increasing positive intergroup contact; Berryman-Fink, 2006; Harmon-Jones & Allen, 2001; Holt, 2013). Moreover, by identifying moderators of the hypothesized mediation model, we may be able to add to the literature a more specific explanation of *how* exposure to violence leads to beliefs supporting aggression, and why some youth may be more likely to endorse beliefs supporting aggression than others.

At least one previous study has looked at the exposure to ethno-political violence and the exposure to (non-ethnic, non-political) community violence together in predicting aggressive outcomes generally, in a cross-sectional model (Dubow et al., 2010). This study found that both the exposure to ethno-political violence and the exposure to community violence may increase aggressive outcomes (Dubow et al., 2010). However, no studies to date have looked into the differential effects of exposure to ethno-political violence and community violence in predicting

beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup. The current study aims to fill this gap in the literature by demonstrating that the exposure to community violence does not elicit the same cognitions regarding the outgroup (e.g., negative stereotypes) as does the exposure to ethno-political violence. Thus, while the exposure to community violence may predict beliefs supporting aggression generally due to its associations with general aggressive outcomes (e.g., Dubow et al., 2010), we hypothesize that this association will not be mediated by negative stereotypes toward the outgroup. This is because in the case of exposure to community violence, negative actions by the outgroup are not hypothesized to be emphasized and so aggressive beliefs will likely increase generally, but not more specifically toward the outgroup and not through the mechanism of negative stereotypes toward the outgroup.

Current Study

This study involves a secondary data analysis of data from three waves of a larger longitudinal study on the impact of various forms of exposure to violence on internalizing and externalizing symptoms in youth (ages 8, 11, and 14 years at baseline) over three annual waves (W1, W2, and W3) growing up in Palestine (n = 600) and Israel (n = 451 Israeli Jewish youth). In the current study, we propose that exposure to ethno-political violence that involves members of one's own ethnic and religious group may lead to identification with the victim based upon some shared ethnoreligious characteristic (Dubow et al., 2007; Huesmann et al., 2012; Huesmann et al., 1983). This exposure to violence may lead one to develop beliefs supporting aggression toward their outgroup, through the development of negative stereotypes about the receiver (or perpetrator) of the aggression (Haslam, 2006; Niwa et al., 2014; Saleem et al., 2016) that are brought about by identification (Dubow et al., 2008; Huesmann et al., 2012; Huesmann et al., 2008). Thus, as depicted in **Figure B1**, we hypothesize that:

1. Exposure to ethno-political violence at W1 will positively predict beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup at W3, even after accounting for negative stereotypes about the outgroup at W2.
2. Negative stereotypes about the outgroup at W2 will positively mediate the association between exposure to ethno-political violence at W1 and beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup at W3.
    a. Exposure to ethno-political violence at W1 will predict negative stereotypes about the outgroup at W2.
    b. Negative stereotypes about the outgroup at W2 will predict beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup at W3.

Importantly, in the current study we hypothesize that the links between exposure to ethno-political violence, negative stereotypes about the outgroup, and acceptance of aggression toward the outgroup are impacted by one's degree of religiosity as well as their degree of CU. Specifically, we believe that if, say, an Israeli child is exposed to ethno-political violence (e.g., sees that a Palestinian soldier is perpetrating violence against an Israeli civilian), that child may identify with the victim and develop negative stereotypes about Palestinians. These negative stereotypes may make that child more likely to accept aggression against Palestinians. In this case, it is our hypothesis that individuals with a greater degree of religiosity, as well as individuals with higher levels of CU, will be more likely to develop negative stereotypes about their outgroup as well as to subsequently develop beliefs in support of aggression toward their outgroup, following the exposure to ethno-political violence. Thus, as depicted in **Figure B2**, we hypothesize that:

3. CU (averaged across W1-3) will moderate the indirect effect from exposure to ethno-political violence at W1 to beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup at W3 through negative stereotypes about the outgroup at W2, such that the indirect effect will be stronger for youth higher in CU.
    a. Exposure to ethno-political violence at W1 will be a stronger predictor of negative stereotypes about the outgroup at W2 for youth higher in CU (averaged across W1-3).
    b. Negative stereotypes at W2 will be a stronger predictor of beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup at W3 for youth higher in CU (averaged across W1-3).
4. Religiosity (averaged across W1-3) will moderate the indirect effect from exposure to ethno-political violence at W1 to beliefs supporting aggression at W3 through negative stereotypes about the outgroup at W2, such that the indirect effect will be stronger for youth higher in religiosity.
    a. Exposure to ethno-political violence at W1 will be a stronger predictor of negative stereotypes about the outgroup at W2 for youth higher in religiosity (averaged across W1-3).
    b. Negative stereotypes about the outgroup at W2 will be a stronger predictor of beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup at W3 for youth higher in religiosity (averaged across W1-3).

We conceptualize identification as the likely pathway by which negative stereotypes about the outgroup are developed due to previous findings suggesting that those who identify with the victims of violence will develop negative stereotypes about the perpetrators of violence

(Dubow et al., 2008; Huesmann et al., 2012; Huesmann et al., 2008). Unfortunately, in the current dataset we do not have access to a variable that measures identification with the victim of violence, so we are assuming but not actually testing this link. Given that cognitions supportive of aggression toward the outgroup are highly predictive of actual aggression toward the outgroup (Huesmann & Guerra, 1997; Lim & Ang, 2009), it is important to understand how these beliefs develop in order to identify and intervene with youth who may be most at risk for engaging in actual physical aggression.

As mentioned above, both the exposure to community violence and the exposure to ethno-political violence are associated with negative consequences (e.g., aggression; Cooley et al., 2019; Dubow et al., 2010; Dubow et al., 2019). Thus, it is unclear whether it is just the violent nature of the conflict, or whether it is the added ethno-political nature of the conflict, that facilitates the development of negative stereotypes about the outgroup and, in turn, possibly leads to the acceptance of aggression toward one's outgroup. Therefore, the current study includes an exploratory analysis that will examine the hypothesized mediation model for community violence at W1 (as opposed to ethno-political violence). We hypothesize that the exposure to community violence at W1 will lead to general increases in aggression (Dubow et al., 2010), which may be captured by the outcome variable of beliefs in support of aggression toward the outgroup at W3. However, it is important to note that we hypothesize that the link between exposure to community violence at W1 and beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup at W3 will not be mediated by negative stereotypes toward the outgroup at W2, because the exposure to community violence at W1 does not elicit the same negative outgroup beliefs as does the exposure to ethno-political violence at W1. Thus, as depicted in **Figure B3**, we hypothesize that:

5. Exposure to community violence at W1 will positively predict beliefs supporting aggression toward outgroup at W3, but to a lesser extent than exposure to ethno-political violence.
6. Negative stereotypes about the outgroup at W2 will not mediate the association between exposure to community violence at W1 and beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup at W3.

METHODS

Sampling Procedures

Palestinian Sample

At Wave 1, the Palestinian sample included 600 participants and was representative. This sample includes 200 8-year-olds (101 girls and 99 boys), 200 11-year-olds (100 girls and 100 boys), and 200 14-year-olds (100 girls and 100 boys), along with one of each of these children's parents (98% were mothers). Residential areas were carefully sampled in order to attain a representative sample of the general Palestinian population, as based upon census maps of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip that were provided by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. For more detailed sampling procedures, see Niwa et al., 2014. Sixty-one families declined to participate in the study (10% rejection rate), and staff from the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research guided the sampling as well as the interviews. Most (99.8%) parents were Muslim, 99% were married, and about 33% reported having at least a high school degree. About half (47%) of the parents reported their incomes as below the Palestinian average, 33% reported their incomes as at the Palestinian average, and 20% reported their incomes as above the Palestinian average. On average, parents reported having 4.89 (*SD* = 1.86) children at home. The aforementioned figures are reflective of the general Palestinian population (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2008). At Waves 2 and 3, 98% of Palestinian children and 95% of the Palestinian parents were re-interviewed. Wave 3 interviews were interrupted briefly by the infiltration of Israeli troops into Gaza, known as Operation Cast Lead (2009). However, this disruption lasted only 2 weeks.

Israeli Sample

At Wave 1, the Israeli sample represents a sample of 451 children along with one of each of these children's parents (87% were mothers), all who identified as Israeli Jewish. This sample consisted of 151 8-year-olds (79 girls and 72 boys), 150 11-year-olds (73 girls and 77 boys), and 150 14- year-olds (94 girls and 56 boys), along with one of each of their parents. High-risk areas in Israel were oversampled due to relatively low levels of conflict in the heavily populated areas of Israel, compared to Palestine. For more detailed information on sampling procedures, see Niwa et al., 2014. Staff from the Mahshov Survey Research Institute guided the sampling as well as the interviews for the 55% of the Jewish sample that agreed to participate. In the sample, 91% of parents were married and more than 80% had graduated from high school. Forty-two percent of these parents reported their incomes as below the Israeli average, 28% reported their incomes as at the Israeli average, and 30% reported their incomes as being above the Israeli average. On average, parents reported having 3.59 (SD = 1.83) children at home. At Waves 2 and 3, 68% of the Israeli Jewish parents and 63% of the Israeli Jewish children were re-interviewed. As noted in Niwa et al., 2014, the decrease in the number of participants re-interviewed among Israeli Jews was mostly due to refusals related to financial incentives for participation (Niwa et al., 2014).

Study Procedures

The procedures for the current study were approved by the institutional review boards (IRBs) of the University of Michigan (Behavioral Sciences) and Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Participants in the current study were told that the goal of the study was to examine the effects of ethno-political conflict on children and their families. These participants were informed that assessments would take about 1 hour, and one child as well as one parent from the family would be asked to participate. Parental consent and child assent were obtained in writing.

Each family was compensated $25 for the 1-hour interview. For more details on interviewing procedures, see Niwa et al., 2014. The timing of the waves in Palestine and Israel was similar, but they did not overlap exactly. In Palestine, the data in each of the waves were collected in the following order: Wave 1: May 2007 - September 2007; Wave 2: May 2008 - September 2008; Wave 3: May 2009 - August 2009. In Israel, the data in each of the waves were collected in the following order: Wave 1: May 2007-October 2007; Wave 2: May 2008 - December 2008; Wave 3: May 2009 - April 2010.

Measures

Independent Variables

Exposure to Ethno-Political Conflict and Violence. The exposure to political conflict and violence scale was used to evaluate the exposure to ethno-political conflict and violence at W1. This scale contains 15 items adapted from Slone and colleagues (1999). For the 8-year-old cohort, parents provided reports on their child's exposure to political conflict and violence in each wave. For children in the 11- and 14-year-old cohorts, self-reports were provided in each wave. The overall scale had good inter-item reliability (Cronbach's α = .69 for self-report, .72 for parent report). Participants reported how often the child experienced each event during the past year using a 4-point scale (0 = never to 3 = many times). The 15 items encompassed three realms of political conflict and violence events: loss of/injury to a friend or family member (5 items, α = .51 for self -report and .54 for parent report; e.g., "Has a friend or acquaintance of yours been injured as a result of political or military violence?"); experiencing security checks/threats (6 items, α = .47 for self-report and .55 for parent-report; e.g., "How often have you spent a prolonged period of time in a security shelter or under curfew?"); and witnessing actual violence (4 items, α = .66 for self-report, .60 for parent-report ; e.g., "How often have you seen right in

front of you Palestinians being held hostage, tortured, or abused by Israelis?"). Higher total scores reflect the mean response to all 15 items (Boxer et al., 2013) and indicate greater exposure to ethno-political violence.

As mentioned above, parents of the 8-year-old cohort reported on their child's exposure to ethnic-political conflict and violence. However, the older children (11- and 14-year-olds) provided self-reports. We followed this procedure because (a) the original Institutional Review Board held concerns about the 8-year-olds' emotional responses to reporting on their exposure to such conflict and violence. And (b), interviews with young children can be time-consuming, and so having parents report their child's exposure to conflict and violence helped to shorten these interviews. Analyses of data from a subsample of the youngest age cohort at Wave 3 (age: 10; N = 408), indicates that utilizing parent reports was not problematic. In this study, children's self-reports of exposure to ethnic-political conflict and violence and parents' reports of the child's exposure were significantly and positively related (r = .68; Boxer et al., 2013).

Intra-Ethnic Community Violence. Exposure to intra-ethnic community violence at W1 was measured via the exposure to community violence scale. This scale contains four items taken from Attar and colleagues (1994) and Barber (1999; α = .54). Participants responded to each item reporting how often they experienced each event during the past year using a 4-point scale that ranged from 0 (*never*) to 3 (*many times*). Sample items include: "How often has someone in your family been robbed or attacked by another [individual from the same ethnic group as yours]?" "How often have you seen or heard a violent argument between your neighbors?" Higher scores indicate greater exposure to intra-ethnic community violence. Cronbach's alpha = .58 in the present sample.

Mediator

Negative Stereotypes about the Outgroup. Negative stereotypes about the outgroup were examined in W2 using a scale that was designed to capture the extent to which individuals perceived outgroups as living human beings. This scale is a 4-item Likert-type scale ranging from 0 (not at all true of [outgroup]) to 2 (very true of [outgroup]). This scale was created based on existing measures of ethnic stereotypes (Huesmann et al., 2012) and modified for the current sample by the research team (i.e., American, Israeli, and Palestinian scholars). Lower scores indicate more negative stereotypes about the outgroup. Sample items include: "How true is this of [ethnic outgroup]... care about and love their family...feel sad if someone they love dies...are peaceful." Item four ("How true is this of [ethnic outgroup]… are mean") was reverse coded to ensure agreement across items and scoring. Cronbach's alpha = .76

Dependent Variable

NOBAGS (Normative Beliefs about Acceptability of Aggressive Acts) toward the Outgroup. Beliefs about acceptability of aggression toward the outgroup at W3 was measured by an adapted version of the NOBAGS (Huesmann & Guerra, 1997) scale (α = .96). The original NOBAGS asks participants to indicate the degree to which they believe that certain aggressive acts are "okay" or "wrong." For the current study, a seven-item measure of acceptability of aggressive acts toward the "outgroup" was created. Participants were asked to report whether certain acts of aggression that target out-group members are "OK" or "wrong" using a 4-point scale. This scale ranged from 1 = always wrong to 4 = always OK. Sample items include: "If a Palestinian (Israeli) is angry, is it OK for them to threaten to kill Israelis (Palestinians)?," "Is it usually OK for Palestinians (Israelis) to harm Israelis (Palestinians)?" Higher scores reflect a greater degree of acceptability of aggression toward the outgroup.

Note. In the context of the current ethno-political conflict, the ethnic outgroup for Israeli Jewish youth was Palestinian youth, while the ethnic outgroup for the Palestinian youth was Israeli Jewish youth.

Moderators

Religiosity. Religiosity was averaged across W1-W3 and was measured using 3 items. The first two items were measured using a 5-point scale (1 = Never, 2 = A few times a year, 3 = once a month, 4 = once a week, 5 = at least once a day) to rate how often participants engaged in the following two religious acts: "How often do you pray to God?" and "Approximately how often do you attend mosque/synagogue?" The third item was included and asked: "How important is your religion to you?" and was measured using a 4-point scale (1 = not at all important, 2 = a little important, 3 = somewhat important, 4 = very important). Higher scores on these items indicate greater religiosity, or greater engagement with one's religion. Cronbach's alpha = .62 at W1, .63 at W2, and .64 at W3.

Callous Unemotionality. CU was averaged across W1-W3 and was measured via 10 items from the Inventory of Callous-Unemotional Traits (ICU; Essau et al., 2006) in W1-W3. The ICU is a 24-item self-report scale that was created to examine callous and unemotional traits in youth. This scale was created based on the callous-unemotional (CU) subscale of the Antisocial Process Screening Device (APSD, Frick & Hare, 2001). The ICU is comprised of three subscales: the callous subscale, the unemotional subscale, and the uncaring subscale. The 10 items selected for W1-W3 of this study were comprised of the five items from the Unemotional subscale (e.g., "You do not show your emotions to others") and the five items from the Callous subscale (e.g., You do not care whom you hurt to get what you want") with the highest factor loadings in a previous study (Essau et al., 2006). Each item is scored on a 4-point

scale ranging from “Not at all true” (0) to “Definitely true” (3). Four items were reverse coded to ensure agreement across items and scoring. The total score was calculated by averaging across all 10 items after reverse scoring four of the items. Higher scores indicate greater CU. Cronbach’s alpha = .45 at W1, .48 W2, and .49 at W3.

Controls

Controls. We will include child sex, age, W1 negative stereotypes about the outgroup (Cronbach’s alpha = .77), and W1 levels of beliefs in support of aggression toward the outgroup (Cronbach’s alpha = .96), as covariates in our analyses predicting W2 negative stereotypes about the outgroup and W3 beliefs in support of aggression toward the outgroup. Sex will be included as a control because males tend to engage in aggression more than females (Huesmann et al., 2002; Huesmann, et al., 2009*;* Kokko et al., 2009), and thus we expect that gender differences in the endorsement of aggression will mirror gender differences in aggression. We will control for age due to findings indicating that aggressive acts tend to increase from late childhood and into early adolescence, and do not change much after this time (Nansel et al., 2001; Tremblay, 2000), and thus we expect older children to have beliefs that are more accepting of aggression. We will control for earlier levels of negative stereotypes about the outgroup to ensure that the association between the exposure to ethno-political violence and negative stereotypes about the outgroup is not being impacted by earlier levels of this outcome. Finally, we will control for the child's earlier levels of beliefs in support of aggression toward the outgroup in light of theory that indicates that there is moderate continuity of beliefs in support of aggression from childhood to adulthood due to the crystallization of these beliefs in middle childhood (e.g., Huesmann & Taylor, 2006).

Data Analysis Plan

To assess whether negative stereotypes about the outgroup at W2 mediate the association between exposure to ethno-political violence at W1 and acceptance of aggression toward the outgroup at W2, and if CU and religiosity (averaged across W1-3) moderate that mediated relationship among exposure to ethno-political violence at W1, negative stereotypes about the outgroup at W2, and acceptance of aggression toward the outgroup at W3 among Israeli Jewish and Palestinian youth, we conducted a secondary data analysis testing structural equation models.

Assumption Checks

Assumptions of the planned analyses (e.g., normally distributed residuals, independence of observations, linear relationship between X and Y, and absence of heteroscedasticity) were checked in SPSS version 27.0 (IBM Corp, 2020) by creating residual plots and scatterplots, histograms of the residuals, probability plots of the residuals, and by checking the distribution of the residuals. Data were then transferred to R Studio (R Core Team, 2020) for analyses. Descriptive statistics for study variables are presented in **Table A1** and bivariate correlations among study variables are presented in **Table A2**. Statistical significance for all significance tests was tested at $p < .05$. Analyses were conducted using the *lavaan* package in R Studio (Rosseel, 2012).

First, the simple mediational model involving negative stereotypes about the outgroup at W2 as a mediator of the association between ethno-political violence at W1 and beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup at W3 was tested using an SEM framework (Wang & Wang, 2012). This included estimating the a path (the association between exposure to ethno-political violence at W1 and negative stereotypes about the outgroup at W2; both manifest

variables) by regressing W2 negative stereotypes about the outgroup on W1 levels of exposure to ethno-political violence and on control variables. Additionally, W2 negative stereotypes about the outgroup were regressed on W1 negative stereotypes about the outgroup to control for earlier levels of this variable. In order to test the b path (i.e., the association between negative stereotypes about the outgroup at W2 and beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup at W3; both manifest variables), the c′ path (i.e., the direct effect of exposure to ethno-political violence at W1 on beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup at W3, absent negative stereotypes about the outgroup at W2), the indirect effect (i.e., the effect of exposure to ethno-political violence at W1 on beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup at W3 that occurs through negative stereotypes about the outgroup at W2), and the total effect (i.e., the sum of direct and indirect effects), beliefs in support of aggression toward the outgroup at W3 were regressed on negative stereotypes about the outgroup at W2, exposure to ethno-political violence at W1, and control variables (W1 age and sex). Additionally, W3 beliefs in support of aggression toward the outgroup were regressed on W1 beliefs in support of aggression toward the outgroup to control for earlier levels of this outcome. A significant indirect effect would indicate that the direct, positive association between exposure to ethno-political violence and beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup was mediated (at least partially) by negative stereotypes about the outgroup. This would indicate that youth develop beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup after being exposed to ethno-political violence through the pathway of negative stereotypes about the outgroup.

Testing the Moderated Mediation Models

For the moderated mediation models, four interaction terms were computed: one between the mean-centered independent variable (i.e., exposure to ethno-political violence) and mean-

centered moderator (CU or religiosity; CU and religiosity were calculated by averaging the scores for these variables across Waves 1-3), and one between the mean-centered mediator (i.e., negative stereotypes about the outgroup) and mean-centered moderator (CU or religiosity).

To test moderated mediation, two models (one for each moderator) were created, again using a structural equation modeling framework. We estimated the a paths from exposure to ethno-political violence at W1 (a1) and the moderator (averaged across W1-3; a2) to negative stereotypes about the outgroup at W2, as well as their interaction (a3). In order to test the a paths, W2 negative stereotypes about the outgroup were regressed on W1 levels of exposure to ethno-political violence, the interaction between W1 exposure to ethno-political violence and the moderator, the moderator, and on control variables. Additionally, W2 negative stereotypes about the outgroup were regressed on W1 negative stereotypes about the outgroup to control for earlier levels of this outcome. We also estimated the b paths from negative stereotypes about the outgroup at W2 (b1), and the moderator (averaged across W1-3; b2), as well as their interaction (b3), to beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup at W3, and the c′ path (i.e., the direct effect of exposure to ethno-political violence at W1 on beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup at W3, absent negative stereotypes about the outgroup at W2 and the moderator, averaged across W1-3). Indices of moderated mediation were calculated in order to quantify the linear association between the indirect effect and its moderator. An index of moderated mediation is an interval estimate of the parameter of a function linking the indirect effect to values of a moderator (Hayes, 2015). In other words, the index of moderated mediation quantifies the linear relationship between the indirect effect and the moderator of that effect. In order to test the b paths and the c’ path, beliefs in support of aggression toward the outgroup at W3 were regressed on negative stereotypes about the outgroup at W2, the interaction between

W2 negative stereotypes about the outgroup and the moderator (W1-W3 CU or W1-W3 religiosity), W1 exposure to ethno-political violence, the moderator, and control variables (W1 age and sex). Additionally, W3 beliefs in support of aggression toward the outgroup was regressed on W1 beliefs in support of aggression toward the outgroup to control for earlier levels of this outcome. Thus, these models estimated: (a) the association between exposure to ethno-political violence at W1 and negative stereotypes about the outgroup at W2; (b) whether this association was strengthened in youth with a greater degree of CU or religiosity (averaged across W1-3); (c) the association between negative stereotypes about the outgroup at W2 and beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup at W3; (d) whether this association was strengthened in youth with a greater degree of CU or religiosity (averaged across W1-3); and (e) the association between exposure to ethno-political violence at W1 and beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup at W3 when controlling for negative stereotypes about the outgroup at W2. These models were estimated using full information maximum likelihood estimation. Indirect effects were examined using bootstrapped confidence intervals based on 5,000 resamples in R Studio.

The sem function in the *lavaan* package was used to estimate the direct, indirect, and total effects, the standard errors, and the 95% CIs from 5000 bias-corrected bootstrapped samples. Prior to running the full model, we examined measurement models of each of the variables in our sample to assess their potential fit to the data. Conventional model fit statistics and rules of thumb were used to determine adequate model fit, however, each of these statistics has their own limitations and is not a perfect assessment of model fit (West et al., 2012). Specifically, CFI and TLI greater than .95, RMSEA less than .06, and SRMR less than .08 were used as criteria to indicate the model provided a good fit to the data. Although the χ^2 goodness of

fit test is presented, we did not use a significant χ^2 test to judge poor model fit, given the test's sensitivity to sample size and its increased likelihood of rejecting the null hypothesis in large samples (West et al., 2012).

Missing data was handled in the *lavaan* package by using full information maximum likelihood estimation (FIML). FIML works by estimating a likelihood function for each individual based on the variables that are present so that all the available data are used (Enders & Bandalos, 2001). Overall, 240 participants had missing data on one or more study variables. Compared to participants who provided complete data for study variables, those participants with missing data on study variables displayed lower scores on the exposure to ethno-political violence variable at W1 ($t = 3.98$, $p < .001$), lower scores on the exposure to community violence variable at W1 ($t = 7.88$, $p < .001$), lower scores on the normative beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup variable at wave 1 ($t = 6.67$, $p < .001$), lower scores on the religiosity variable (averaged across W1-3; $t = 3.16$, $p < .01$), and higher scores on the negative stereotypes toward the outgroup variable at wave 2 ($t = -3.17$, $p < .01$). Moreover, in terms of nationality, 63% of Israeli Jewish participants had missing data, while only 12% of Palestinian participants had missing data ($X^2 = 114.30$, $p < .001$).

Hypothesized Results of Analyses

We hypothesized that both models would indicate significant moderated mediation, which would quantify whether the mediating effect of negative stereotypes about the outgroup on the association between exposure to ethno-political violence and beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup is conditional on one's degree of CU or religiosity. Any significant moderated mediation would have been investigated by examining the coefficients for

the interactions. Additionally, any significant interactions would have been probed by examining the mediation model at low (-1sd), average (mean) and high (+1sd) values of the moderator.

Exploratory Analyses

Mediation with Community Violence

In order to determine whether it is the ethno-political nature of the event, the violent nature of the event, or both that may predict Israeli and Palestinian youths' subsequent negative outgroup stereotypes and beliefs in support of aggression toward the outgroup, we also tested an exploratory model that looked at exposure to community violence at W1 (instead of exposure to ethno-political violence at W1) as a predictor of acceptance of aggression toward the outgroup at W3 through negative stereotypes about the outgroup at W2 among Israeli and Palestinian youth. Exposure to community violence was modeled as a manifest variable because it is composed of only one observed measure. The same regression procedure described above involving the simple mediation model with exposure to ethno-political violence as a predictor was used. The only change here was that exposure to community violence replaced exposure to ethno-political violence in the model. Though this analysis was exploratory, we hypothesized that there would be a direct effect of community violence at W1 on beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup at W3, but that there would be no mediation through negative stereotypes at W2.

(Moderated) Mediation with Community Violence and Ethno-Political Violence as Predictors

If we had found a significant relationship in the mediation model involving exposure to community violence at W1 as a predictor of beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup at W3, then we would have included two additional **exploratory** models: The first would have been a model including both the exposure to ethno-political violence at W1 and the exposure to community violence at W1 as simultaneous predictors of beliefs supporting aggression toward

the outgroup at W3 with negative stereotypes about the outgroup as a mediator at W2[1]. If the indirect effects in this model were significant and the original separate models involving moderated mediation with the exposure to ethno-political violence as a predictor indicated significant moderation, then we would have also tested an exploratory model with both the exposure to ethno-political violence at W1 and exposure to community violence at W1 as simultaneous predictors, negative stereotypes about the outgroup at W2 as a mediator, CU or religiosity (averaged across W1-3) as a moderator, and beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup at W3 as an outcome. This would have been done in order to parse out the effects of the independent predictors and how much they are uniquely contributing to the significant mediated and moderated effects of exposure to violence on beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup. It is important to note that at this point we did not expect negative stereotypes about the outgroup to mediate the association between the exposure to community violence and beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup, so the first proposed model was only exploratory. Additionally, we expected neither CU nor religiosity to moderate the indirect effects among the exposure to community violence, negative stereotypes about the outgroup, and beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup. Thus, the first model was intended to be exploratory, and the second proposed moderated mediation model involving the exposure to community violence as a predictor was also intended to be exploratory and would have only been tested if significant indirect effects were identified in the first exploratory model.

For the exploratory model involving the exposure to community violence at W1 and the exposure to ethno-political violence at W1 as predictors in the hypothesized mediation model (as

[1] This model was tested but excluded from the final results in the present document, as both the exposure to ethno-political violence and the exposure to community violence displayed unique contributions in the model, similar to the in separate models included in the results section of the present document.

opposed to exposure to ethno-political violence), the same procedure as described above would have been followed, with the only change being that exposure to community violence would have been added as a predictor in addition to exposure to ethno-political violence.

RESULTS

Assumption Checks and Descriptive Statistics

Assumptions of the planned analyses were checked. Variables were approximately normally distributed (skewness values between -.720 and 1.291; kurtosis values between -1.406 and 1.982). Additionally, P-P plots of the regression models indicated normality, and scatterplots of the residuals indicated homoscedasticity and satisfactorily linear relationships among study variables. There was an absence of problematic multicollinearity among the study variables (all variance inflation factors (VIFs) < 2). After confirming assumptions were met, data were then transferred to R Studio (R Core Team, 2020) for analyses.

Table A1 presents descriptive statistics and Table A2 presents correlations for study variables. Exposure to ethno-political violence at W1 was positively correlated with exposure to community violence at W1 (r = .38, p < .001), beliefs in support of aggression against the outgroup at W3 (r =.18, p < .001), and religiosity (Waves 1-3) (r =.15, p < .001). Exposure to ethno-political violence was positively associated with CU (Waves 1-3) (r = .09, p < .01). It is worth noting here that the coding of the negative stereotypes about the outgroup variable was reverse coded, meaning that correlations with this variable should be interpreted inversely. Exposure to ethno-political violence at W1 was positively correlated with negative stereotypes toward the outgroup at W2 (r = -.09, p < .01), meaning that exposure to ethno-political violence related to greater negative stereotypes against the outgroup. Exposure to community violence was positively correlated with beliefs in support of aggression against the outgroup (r = .32, p < .001) and religiosity (r = .25, p < .001). Exposure to community violence was positively associated with negative stereotypes toward the outgroup (r = -.11, p < .01). The exposure to community violence was positively associated with CU (r = 14, p < .001). Negative stereotypes

toward the outgroup was negatively correlated with religiosity (r = .10, p < .01) and not correlated with CU (r = .05, p =.05), meaning that youth with less negative stereotypes had higher religiosity. CU was negatively correlated with beliefs in support of aggression against the outgroup (r = -.07, p < .05). Religiosity was positively correlated with beliefs in support of aggression against the outgroup (r = .26, p < .001).

Simple Mediation Model

Exposure to Ethno-Political Violence

First, we tested the simple mediational model involving negative stereotypes toward the outgroup at W2 as a mediator of the association between exposure to ethno-political violence at W1 and beliefs in support of aggression against the outgroup at W3 in this sample of Israeli Jewish and Palestinian participants (*see* **Figure B4**). Fit statistics for this model were satisfactory (χ^2 (2) = 9.59, p < .01, *CFI* = .99, *TLI* = .93, *RMSEA* = .06, *SRMR* = .02). Exposure to ethno-political violence at W1 was positively associated with negative stereotypes toward the outgroup at W2 (β = -.04, *SE* = .02, p < .05), such that higher violence exposure led to more negative stereotypes. Exposure to ethno-political violence at W1 was positively associated with beliefs in support of aggression against the outgroup at W3 (β = .16, *SE* = .04, p < .001), while negative stereotypes toward the outgroup at W2 were not associated with beliefs supporting aggression (β = .02, *SE* = .09, p = .87). Both the total (β = .16, *SE* = .04, p < .001) and direct effects were significant, indicating that exposure to ethno-political violence is longitudinally and positively related to beliefs in support of aggression against the outgroup. However, the indirect effect was not significant (β = -.00, *95% CI* [-.006 , .006], *SE* = .00, p = .87), indicating that the positive association between exposure to ethno-political violence at W1 and beliefs in support of

aggression against the outgroup at W3 cannot be explained by higher levels of negative stereotypes toward the outgroup at W2. Thus, this hypothesis was not supported.

Moderated Mediation Analyses

CU as a Moderator of the Associations among the Exposure to Ethno-Political Violence, Negative Stereotypes about the Outgroup, and Beliefs Supporting Aggression toward the Outgroup

We examined a moderated mediation model which incorporated CU as a moderator of the relations among the exposure to ethno-political violence, negative stereotypes toward the outgroup, and beliefs in support of aggression against the outgroup *(see* **Figure B5***).* Fit statistics for this model were adequate (χ^2 (3) = 10.35, $p < .05$, *CFI* = .99, *TLI* = .93, *RMSEA* = .05, *SRMR* = .01). Participants reporting higher exposure to ethno-political violence at W1 evidenced more negative stereotypes toward the outgroup at W2 (a1; β = -.03, *SE* = .01, $p < .05$). CU (averaged across W1-3) was not significantly associated with negative stereotypes toward the outgroup at W2 (a2; β = .43, *SE* = .26, p = .10. The interaction between the exposure to ethno-political violence and CU was not significant in predicting negative stereotypes toward the outgroup at W2 (a3; β = -.01, *SE* = .05, p = .90). Negative stereotypes toward the outgroup at W2 was not significantly associated with acceptance of aggression against the outgroup at W3 (b1; β = .04, *SE* = .10, p = .70). CU (averaged across W1-3) was significantly associated with beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup at W3 (b2; β = -1.82, *SE* = .73, $p < .05$). The interaction between negative stereotypes toward the outgroup and CU was not significant (b3; β = .03, *SE* = .32, p = .92). Greater exposure to ethno-political violence at W1 was associated with greater acceptance of aggression against the outgroup at W3 (c'; β = .15, *SE* = .04, $p < .001$). Moreover, the total effect was significant ($p < .001$). The two indices of moderated mediation

were not significant (a path: β = .00, *SE* = .00, *p* = .91; b path: β = −.00, *SE* = .01, *p* = .92), indicating that the mediational effect did not differ across one's level of CU. Thus, participants' level of CU did not moderate the mediated model proposed in the study.

Religiosity as a Moderator of the Associations among the Exposure to Ethno-Political Violence, Negative Stereotypes about the Outgroup, and Beliefs Supporting Aggression toward the Outgroup

Next, we examined a moderated mediation model which incorporated religiosity (averaged across W1-3) as a moderator of the relations among the exposure to ethno-political violence at W1, negative stereotypes toward the outgroup at W2, and beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup at W3 *(see* **Figure B6***).* Fit statistics for this model were generally adequate, although the TLI was below the cutoff of .95 (χ^2 (3)= 15.16, *p* < .01, *CFI* = .98, *TLI* = .88, *RMSEA* = .06, *SRMR* = .02). Participants reporting higher exposure to ethno-political violence at W1 evidenced more negative stereotypes toward the outgroup at W2 (a1; β = -.04, *SE* = .01, *p* < .05). Religiosity (averaged across W1-3) was significantly associated with lower negative stereotypes toward the outgroup at W2 (a2; β = .24, *SE* = .09, *p* < .01). The interaction between the exposure to ethno-political violence and religiosity was not significant in predicting negative stereotypes toward the outgroup at W2 (a3; β = -.01, *SE* = .02, *p* = .46). Negative stereotypes toward the outgroup at W3 was not associated with acceptance of aggression against the outgroup at W3 (b1; β = .01, *SE* = .10, *p* = .93). Religiosity (averaged across W1-3) was significantly and positively associated with acceptance of aggression against the outgroup at W3 (b2; β = .54, *SE* = .27, *p* < .05). The interaction between negative stereotypes toward the outgroup and religiosity was significant in predicting greater acceptance of aggression against the outgroup at W3 (b3; β = -.26, *SE* = .11, *p* < .05). This means that among youth higher

on religiosity (averaged across W1-3), there was a positive association between negative stereotypes about the outgroup at W2 and beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup at W3. Greater exposure to ethno-political violence at W1 was associated with greater acceptance of aggression against the outgroup at W3 (c'; $\beta = .15$, $SE = .04$, $p < .001$). Moreover, the total effect was significant ($p < .001$). The indices of moderated mediation were not significant (a path: $\beta = -.00$, $SE = .00$, $p = .93$; b path: $\beta = .01$, $SE = .01$, $p = .09$, indicating that the mediational effect did not differ across one's level of religiosity. Moreover, the indirect effects of exposure to ethno-political violence at W1 on acceptance of aggression against the outgroup at W3 were not significant across low (a path: $\beta = .00$, $SE = .00$, $p = .93$; b path: $\beta = -.01$, $SE = .01$, $p = .16$), average (a path: $\beta = .00$, $SE = .00$, $p = .93$; b path: $\beta = .01$, $SE = .01$, $p = .15$), nor high levels of religiosity (a path: $\beta = .00$, $SE = .00$, $p = .93$; b path: $\beta = .01$, $SE = .01$, $p = .17$). Thus, participants' level of religiosity did not moderate the simple mediated association proposed in the study.

Exploratory Analysis

Exposure to Community Violence

Next, we tested the exploratory simple mediational model involving negative stereotypes toward the outgroup at W2 as a mediator of the association between exposure to community violence at W1 and beliefs in support of aggression against the outgroup at W3 in this sample of Israeli Jewish and Palestinian participants. Fit statistics for this model were satisfactory (χ^2 (2) = 6.38, $p < .05$, $CFI = .99$, $TLI = .96$, $RMSEA = .05$, $SRMR = .02$). Exposure to community violence at W1 was associated with greater negative stereotypes toward the outgroup at W2 (β = -.09, $SE = .03$, $p < .01$) and positively associated with beliefs in support of aggression against the outgroup at W3 ($\beta = .45$, $SE = .09$, $p < .001$). There was no association between negative

stereotypes toward the outgroup at W2 and beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup at W3 (β = .03, *SE* = .08, p = .745). Both the total (β = .45, *SE* = .09, $p < .001$) and direct effects were significant, indicating that exposure to community violence is longitudinally and positively related to beliefs in support of aggression against the outgroup. However, the indirect effect was not significant (β = -.00, *95% CI* [-.02 , .01], *SE* = .00, p = .747, indicating that the positive association between exposure to community violence at W1 and beliefs in support of aggression against the outgroup at W3 cannot be explained by higher levels of negative stereotypes toward the outgroup at W2. Thus, the hypothesis for this exploratory analysis was supported. Negative stereotypes about the outgroup at W2 did not mediate either the main model involving exposure to ethno-political violence at W1 and beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup at W3 nor the exploratory model involving exposure to community violence at W1 and beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup at W3. In both models, exposure to violence at W1 was associated with negative stereotypes about the outgroup at W2 and beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup at W3.

DISCUSSION

In the present study, the relationships among the exposure to ethno-political violence, negative stereotypes toward the outgroup, beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup, callous-unemotionality, and religiosity were explored longitudinally among a sample of 1,051 Israeli Jewish and Palestinian youth ages 8, 11, and 14. It is important to note that this study is the first to examine, longitudinally, the direct relationship between the exposure to ethno-political violence and beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup using W1 and W3 data and controlling for earlier levels (W1) of beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup. Thus, this study adds a valuable longitudinal examination of the association between the exposure to ethno-political violence and beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian war. Specifically, structural equation modeling procedures were conducted to determine whether negative stereotypes about the outgroup mediated the association between exposure to ethno-political violence and beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup. This hypothesis was not supported. Moreover, structural equation modeling procedures were conducted to examine if CU and religiosity moderate the mediated relationship among the exposure to ethno-political violence, negative stereotypes about the outgroup, and beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup. This hypothesis was not supported. Finally, as an exploratory analysis, structural equation modeling procedures were conducted to examine if negative stereotypes about the outgroup mediate the association between exposure to community violence and beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup. This hypothesis was supported, as negative stereotypes did not mediate this association. Findings are discussed in detail below.

As mentioned above, negative stereotypes about the outgroup failed to mediate the association between exposure to ethno-political violence and beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup. The association between the exposure to ethno-political violence and negative stereotypes toward the outgroup was significant and in the expected direction. This is consistent with past findings, which have found that the exposure to ethno-political violence is related to greater negative ethnic outgroup stereotypes, specifically among Palestinian youth (Niwa et al., 2014). However, the association between negative stereotypes toward the outgroup and beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup was not significant in this sample. This is contrary to ideas proposed by both the general aggression model (Anderson et al., 2007) and the social-cognitive information processing model. The GAM puts forth the idea that exposure to negative stereotypes may cause beliefs that support and foster aggression (Dill et al., 2008), and the SCIP posits that internal cognitive (e.g., negative stereotypes) processes regulate identification, beliefs, and social behavior, in concert with environmental inputs (Dubow et al., 2009; Bandura, 1977; Boxer et al., 2005; Pardini & Byrd, 2012; Muñoz & Frick, 2012). It is possible that negative stereotypes toward the outgroup may not have been associated with beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup because, as depicted by the significant interaction involving negative stereotypes and religiosity, the association between negative stereotypes about the outgroup and beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup may only be visible at higher levels of religiosity. Indeed, it was hypothesized that the identification with a religiously similar victim of outgroup aggression would enhance one's negative stereotypes about their outgroup, making them more likely to endorse violence against members of that outgroup.

As expected, there was a significant positive relationship between the exposure to ethno-political violence and beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup. This is consistent with

previous findings that have identified positive relationships between the exposure to ethno-political violence and acceptance of aggression toward the outgroup (Dvir Gvirsman et al., 2016; Huesmann et al., 2017). This finding is important, as the exposure to ethno-political violence was significantly associated with beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup longitudinally, and while controlling for earlier levels of beliefs supporting aggression. Thus, it is important for future studies to explore ways to disrupt the link between the exposure to ethno-political violence and beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup. This could potentially be done through interventions, as discussed below. Negative stereotypes toward the outgroup failed to mediate the relationship between exposure to ethno-political violence and beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup, and as such, this variable may not be useful in the effort to disrupt the link between exposure to ethno-political violence and beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup. Thus, the hunt is still on for mechanisms that may mediate this association.

Although negative stereotypes failed to mediate the association between exposure to ethno-political violence and beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup, I was still interested in how callous emotionality and religiosity might strengthen or weaken relations between the exposure to ethno-political violence and negative stereotypes about the outgroup, and between negative stereotypes about the outgroup and beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup. Namely, I was interested in whether the associations between exposure to ethno-political violence, negative stereotypes toward the outgroup, and beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup may only present or may be stronger at higher levels of the investigated moderators. Thus, structural equation modeling procedures were again conducted to examine whether, separately, CU and religiosity moderate the associations between exposure to ethno-

political violence and negative stereotypes toward the outgroup, and between negative stereotypes toward the outgroup and beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup.

In regard to the model testing CU as a moderator in the proposed hypothesized mediated relationship among exposure to ethno-political violence, negative stereotypes toward the outgroup, and beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup, the hypothesis was not supported. That is, the associations among exposure to ethno-political violence, negative stereotypes toward the outgroup, and beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup did not differ as a function of youth's CU. Interestingly, the significant main effect for CU on beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup was negative, which is contrary to expectations. Past cross-sectional findings have identified positive relationships between CU and beliefs supporting aggression (e.g., Hitti et al., 2018; Ng-Mak et al., 2002; Pardini, 2011; Stickle et al., 2009; Waller et al., 2018). Thus, we expected that CU traits would be related to higher levels of beliefs supporting aggression. It was hypothesized above that CU may desensitize youth from the consequences of violence, by protecting them from negative outcomes and potentially making the idea of aggressing against the outgroup less aversive. However, it is possible that the desensitization that accompanies CU may have led to a negative association between CU and beliefs supporting aggression, because youth higher in CU may not have any interest in endorsing beliefs supporting aggression. Thus, these youth may have failed to endorse beliefs supporting aggression because they lack the emotional arousal (Carnagey et al., 2007; Huesmann & Kirwil, 2007) that may follow seeing a member of one's ingroup aggressed against by the outgroup. Without this sense of anger or wrongdoing by the outgroup, youth high in CU may have failed to endorse beliefs supporting aggression because they did not have any motivation to support those beliefs.

As noted above, our hypotheses that for youth high in CU, exposure to ethno-political violence is more likely to lead to the development of negative stereotypes about the outgroup, and that negative stereotypes about the outgroup are more likely to lead to beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup, were not supported. We hypothesize that this is perhaps because CU is not necessarily related to beliefs about aggression toward individuals from certain groups, and instead related to general aggression. Therefore, perhaps CU did not moderate the association between negative stereotypes and beliefs supporting aggression because youth with high CU may not care about stereotypes toward certain individuals, they may just support aggression toward everyone due to their general callousness and/or uncaringness (Frick et al., 2003; Ritchie et al., 2022). Additionally, the association between CU and negative stereotypes about the outgroup was not significant. Furthermore, the interactions between CU and exposure to ethno-political violence and between CU and negative stereotypes may not have been significant due to the lack of general associations among the variables.

Additionally, the present study utilized a 10-item subset of the original measure of CU (I.e., the ICU; Frick et al., 2004). This subset consistently produced low-reliability calculations, and thus our measure of CU may not have been internally reliable. Indeed, the factor structure and psychometric properties of the full version, as well as shortened versions (like the one used in the present study) of the ICU are debated (Lahey, 2014; Waller et al., 2015), and recent reviews have revealed that the ICU produces poor validity and reliability estimates in shortened self-report versions (Cardinale & Marsh, 2020; Frick et al., 2014), one of which was used in the present study. Unfortunately, the full ICU is the current most popular and most used measure of CU traits, which is why a subset of these items was used in the present study despite low reliability calculations.

In regard to the model testing religiosity as a moderator in the proposed hypothesized mediated relationship among exposure to ethno-political violence, negative stereotypes toward the outgroup, and beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup, our hypothesis was not supported. Specifically, main effects of religiosity indicated that people with stronger religious ties were less likely to endorse negative stereotypes toward the outgroup and more likely to endorse beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup. The interaction between religiosity and negative stereotypes was significantly positively associated with beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup. This means that, for youth higher on religiosity, the association between negative stereotypes about the outgroup and beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup becomes positive. However, the interaction between the exposure to ethno-political violence and religiosity was not significant in predicting beliefs supporting aggression. Thus, it seems as though while religiosity alone may negatively predict negative stereotypes and positively predict beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup, when negative stereotypes interact with religiosity, the prediction of beliefs supporting aggression becomes more positive (meaning that greater negative stereotypes predicts greater beliefs supporting aggression at higher levels of religiosity). This association was expected to be positive, and thus these results are consistent with hypotheses. Interestingly, although the interaction between religiosity and negative stereotypes was significantly positively associated with beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup, the indices of moderated mediation for this model were not significant. That is, the indirect effects of exposure to ethno-political violence on acceptance of aggression against the outgroup through negative stereotypes were not significant across low, average, nor high levels of religiosity. This lack of significance for the whole model, in conjunction with the significance of the interaction between religiosity and negative stereotypes toward the outgroup,

may be due to the aggression piece. That is, it is possible that upon exposure to ethno-political violence, youth in the present study may not have developed beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup through the development of negative stereotypes about their outgroups because the salience of ethno-political violence may be strong enough to lead to these beliefs without the middle piece of identifying with a religiously similar victim of aggression and developing negative stereotypes about the perpetrator of violence. Thus, religiosity may not have been significant in the full model. However, when the exposure to ethno-political violence is taken out of the mix, religious youth, upon developing negative stereotypes, may support aggression due to their identifications with religiously-similar victims of aggression. While our moderated mediation model involving religiosity was not significant overall, it is important to note that we did find significant main effects between religiosity and negative stereotypes, and between religiosity and beliefs supporting aggression. These results were somewhat consistent with our hypotheses, in that greater degrees of religiosity predict less negative stereotypes toward the outgroup; and greater degrees of religiosity predict greater beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup. These findings are important, as they suggest that religiosity may be an important variable in the association between negative stereotypes toward the outgroup and beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup. Previous studies that have investigated religiosity in the context of war, negative stereotypes, and aggression have not investigated these variables together in one model. Indeed, this study is the first to directly investigate the relationships among negative stereotypes, religiosity, and beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup in one model. Thus, the results have important implications for reducing beliefs supporting aggression amongst youth entrenched in ethno-political conflict.

Consistent with the analysis plan, we conducted an exploratory analysis examining negative stereotypes toward the outgroup as a mediator of the association between the exposure to intra-ethnic community violence, in place of ethno-political violence, and beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup. We hypothesized that negative stereotypes about the outgroup would not mediate the association between exposure to intra-ethnic community violence and beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup. This hypothesis was supported. Specifically, the exposure to community violence was associated with greater negative stereotypes toward the outgroup and greater beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup. Interestingly and contrary to hypotheses, exposure to intra-ethnic community violence was also positively associated with negative stereotypes about the outgroup. It is possible that this is due to inabilities to parse out differences between ingroup and outgroup violence, or due to the salience of the war in the lives of the studied youth, the negative stereotypes are elicited by discussion of violence generally, rather than just by ethno-political violence specifically. The positive association between exposure to community violence and beliefs supporting aggression toward the outgroup was somewhat expected, as it was hypothesized that the effects of exposure to violence in general on variables related to aggression would be strong enough that it would not matter who this aggression is directed toward. Indeed, the exposure to violence in general has been found to be robustly related to aggressive outcomes (Boxer et al., 2008; Guerra et al., 2003; Huesmann et al., 2017; McMahon et al., 2009; Shahinfar et al., 2001; Zhu et al., 2020). As discussed below, negative stereotypes toward the outgroup were not associated with beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup in this model, similar to the results from the main model.

It is important to note that in all of the models that were run in this study, negative stereotypes toward the outgroup were not significantly associated with beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup. This is contrary to expectations, because, as mentioned above, Anderson et al. (2007) put forth that exposure to negative stereotypes may cause beliefs that support and foster aggression. It is unclear why negative stereotypes consistently failed to associate with beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup in the expected direction. These results may be due to the specific context in which the present study was conducted. The general SCIP framework and the GAM model support the identification of negative stereotypes as a mechanism through which exposure to ethno-political violence relates to beliefs supporting aggression (Anderson, 2007; Dubow et al., 2009; Huesmann, 1997, 1998; Huesmann & Kirwil, 2007). However, these models were not conceptualized in the context of war. Thus, perhaps in contexts where youths are entrenched in war, there is more of a visceral reaction to violence where one experiences beliefs supporting aggression first (e.g., "violence is horrible, and I want revenge"; Pittman, 2022) and these beliefs are followed by a sort of cognitive dissonance where one thinks that if they believe that this group of people should be aggressed against, that group of people must be "bad" (Glass, 1964; Metin & Camgoz, 2011). This could lead to the development of negative stereotypes against one's outgroup.

The results of the present study are key in informing the literature on the relationships among the exposure to ethno-political violence, negative stereotypes about an ethnopolitical outgroup, beliefs supporting aggression against that outgroup, religiosity, and CU. The investigation of factors that may influence the development of beliefs supporting aggression against one's outgroup is relevant because beliefs supporting aggression relate to actual aggression (Hitti et al., 2018). As such, it is important to address exposure to ethno-political

violence in general and find interventions that have been proven to protect against the effects of exposure to ethno-political violence. Indeed, an intervention developed by Guerra & Slaby (1990) has been found to be effective in reducing beliefs supporting aggression. This intervention was initially used with a population of youth who were incarcerated in a juvenile detention facility. This intervention is called CMT (I.e., cognitive mediation training), and it involves 12 weeks of hourly meetings (1 meeting/week) wherein youth are taught, by the instructors and in a group setting, an eight-step sequential problem-solving model. This model involves a) identifying if there is a problem, b) stopping and thinking, c) questioning why there is a conflict, d) having the youth question what they want, e) thinking of solutions, f) looking at consequences, g) choosing what to do and doing it, and h) evaluating the results. I am not aware of any cognitive mediation training interventions that have been done with youth in the context of the Israel-Palestine conflict, however, some studies have utilized different interventions to reduce the endorsement of aggression amongst Israeli and Palestinian youth. Specifically, Shechtman & Tanus (2006) utilized an intervention that was designed to encourage "self-expression in regard to participants' multiple identities and their feelings toward the Jews" and enhance "empathy toward the Jewish narrative (Miller-Graff & Cummings, 2017; p. 31). This intervention was found to be effective in increasing empathy and decreasing the endorsement of aggression amongst Christian participants. In the present study, a significant interaction was identified between religiosity and negative stereotypes, such that those higher in religiosity displayed a weaker (or more negative) association between negative stereotypes and beliefs supporting aggression. Thus, efforts to highlight themes of nonviolence in religious youth may be beneficial in reducing the endorsement of aggression amongst those youth.

The present study provides key findings regarding the associations among the exposure to ethno-political violence, negative stereotypes about the outgroup, religiosity, and beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup. However, there are some limitations worth noting. As mentioned above, the reliability of the 10-item CU measure used in the present study was low. As such, CU may not have been adequately measured in the present study. The reliability and validity of the full 24-item inventory of callous-unemotional traits has also been debated (Lahey, 2014; Waller et al., 2015). As such, future studies may utilize the results of recent ICU invariance studies (e.g., Allen et al., 2021; Gao & Zhang, 2016; Pechorro et al., 2019; Zheng et al., 2021) and determine if there is a more reliable version of the ICU that can be applied to measure CU in the context of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Moreover, this study was conducted in a specific population that exists in a specific context-youth from Israel and Palestine in the context of war. Future studies may consider examining the associations among the studied variables in different populations, ages, and contexts. Thus, these results may not generalize to other ages or populations, or even to the same population in a different time period. As noted above, outliers were maintained in the present analyses in order to represent the data as it was gathered in “the real-world." However, the inclusion of outliers may have skewed the results. Thus, future studies may consider excluding outliers from their analyses. Finally, and as noted above, Arab Christians were excluded from the present analyses. The exclusion of this group may have skewed the results by hindering us from capturing the nuances of stereotypes that exist within different groups who live in the same region. Therefore, future studies may consider investigating the associations among the exposure to ethno-political violence, negative stereotypes about the outgroup, beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup, CU and

religiosity in a sample that includes Arab Christians as well as Arab Palestinians and Israeli Jewish individuals.

Concluding Thoughts

Overall, the present study adds a number of important findings to the literature. Notably, the main effects involving the associations between exposure to ethno-political violence and beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup, exposure to community violence and beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup, religiosity and negative stereotypes about the outgroup, CU and beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup, religiosity and beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup and exposure to ethno-political violence and negative stereotypes about the outgroup add significant information to the literature, as these variables have not yet been studied in the context of the Israel-Palestine conflict, especially when controlling for earlier levels of negative stereotypes and beliefs supporting aggression. Additionally, the interaction involving negative stereotypes toward the outgroup and religiosity, and its association with beliefs supporting aggression against the outgroup may help to inform intervention with youth at risk for developing beliefs supporting aggression against their outgroup. Importantly, negative stereotypes did not mediate the link between exposure to ethno-political violence and beliefs supporting aggression. Thus, future studies should continue to hunt for the link that may explain the connection between these two variables, in order to better intervene with youth who are entrenched in violent ethno-political conflict, and determine how to intervene with youth who may be at risk for developing beliefs supporting aggression.

REFERENCES

Attar, B. K., Guerra, N. G., & Tolan, P. H. (1994). Neighborhood disadvantage, stressful life events, and adjustment in urban elementary school children. *Journal of Clinical Child Psychology*, *23*, 391-400.

Bandura, A. (1977). Self-efficacy: Toward a unifying theory of behavioral change. *Psychological Review*, *84*, 191-215. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.84.2.191.

Bandura, A. (2002). Social Cognitive Theory in Cultural Context. *Applied Psychology: An International Review*, *51*, 269-290. doi:10.1111/1464-0597.00092

Barber, B. K. (1999). Political violence, family relations, and Palestinian youth functioning. *Journal of Adolescent Research*, *14*, 206-230.

Bargh, J. A., & Chartrand, T. L. (1999). The unbearable automaticity of being. *The American Psychologist*, *54*, 462-479. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.54.7.462.

Barrett, M., & Oppenheimer, L. (2011). Findings, theories and methods in the study of children's national identifications and national attitudes. *European Journal of Developmental Psychology*, *8*, 5-24. doi:10.1080/17405629.2010.533955

Bar-Tal, D. (2004). The necessity of observing real life situations: Palestinian-Israeli violence as a laboratory for learning about social behaviour. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *34*, 677-701. doi:10.1002/ejsp.224

Bar-Tal, D., Raviv, A., Raviv, A., & Dgani-Hirsh, A. (2008). The influence of the ethos of conflict on Israeli Jews' interpretation of Jewish-Palestinian encounters. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *53*, 94-118. doi:10.1177/ 0022002708325942

Bar-Tal, D., & Teichman, Y. (2005). *Stereotypes and Prejudice in Conflict : Representations of Arabs in Israeli Jewish Society*. Cambridge University Press.

Berryman-Fink, C. (2006). Reducing prejudice on campus: The role of intergroup contact in diversity education. *College Student Journal, 40*, 511-516.

Boxer, P., Guerra, N. G., Huesmann, L. R., & Morales, J. (2005). Proximal effects of a small-group selected prevention program on aggression in elementary school children: An investigation of the peer contagion hypothesis. *Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology*, *33*, 325-338. doi:10.1007/s10802-005-3568-2.

Boxer, P., Huesmann, L., Dubow, E. F., Landau, S. F., Gvirsman, S. D., Shikaki, K., & Ginges, J. (2013). Exposure to violence across the social ecosystem and the development of aggression: A test of ecological theory in the israeli-palestinian conflict. *Child Development, 84*, 163-177. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.2012.01848.x

Boxer, P., Morris, A. S., Terranova, A. M., Kithakye, M., Savoy, S. C., & McFaul, A. F. (2008). Coping with exposure to violence: Relations to emotional symptoms and aggression in three urban samples. *Journal of Child and Family Studies, 17*, 881-893. doi:10.1007/s10826-008-9196-z

Busby, D. R., Lambert, S. F., & Ialongo, N. S. (2013). Psychological symptoms linking exposure to community violence and academic functioning in African American adolescents. *Journal of Youth and Adolescence*, *42*, 250-262. doi:10.1007/s10964-012-9895-z

Brenick, A., Lee-Kim, J., Killen, M., Fox, N. A., Raviv, A., & Leavitt, L. A. (2007). Social judgments in Israeli and Arab children: Findings from media-based intervention projects. In D. Lemish & M. Götz (Eds.), *Children and Media at Times of Conflict and War* (pp. 287-308). Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.

Carnagey, N. L., Anderson, C. A., & Bushman, B. J. (2007). The effect of video game violence on physiological desensitization to real-life violence. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *43*, 489-496. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2006.05.003.

Centers For Disease Control and Prevention. (2021, May 10). *Violence Impacts Teen's Lives*. Https://Www.Cdc.Gov/Injury/Features/Teen-Violence-Impact/Index.Html. https://www.cdc.gov/injury/features/teen-violence-impact/index.html

Chang, S., Hou, Q., Wang, C., Wang, M., Wang, L., & Zhang, W. (2021). Childhood maltreatment and violent delinquency in Chinese juvenile offenders: Callous-unemotional traits as a mediator. *Child Abuse & Neglect*, *117*, 105085.

Coleman, J. N., & Farrell, A. D. (2021). The influence of exposure to violence on adolescents' physical aggression: The protective influence of peers. *Journal of Adolescence*, *90*, 53-65. doi:10.1016/j.adolescence.2021.06.003

Cooley, J. L., Ritschel, L. A., Frazer, A. L., & Blossom, J. B. (2019). The influence of internalizing symptoms and emotion dysregulation on the association between witnessed community violence and aggression among urban adolescents. *Child Psychiatry and Human Development, 50*, 883-893. doi:10.1007/s10578-019-00890-9

Council on Foreign Relations. (n.d.). *Israeli-palestinian conflict | global conflict tracker*. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved November 10, 2021, from https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/israeli-palestinian-conflict.

Dambrun, M., & Guimond, S. (2004). Implicit and explicit measures of prejudice and stereotyping: Do they assess the same underlying knowledge structure? *European journal of social psychology*, *34*, 663-676.

Davis, T., Ammons, C., Dahl, A., & Kliewer, W. (2015). Community violence exposure and callous–unemotional traits in adolescents: Testing parental support as a promotive versus protective factor. *Personality and Individual Differences, 77*, 7-12. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2014.12.024

Dubow, E. F., Boxer, P., Huesmann, L. R., Shikaki, K., Landau, S., Gvirsman, S. D., & Ginges, J. (2010). Exposure to conflict and violence across contexts: Relations to adjustment among palestinian children. *Journal of Clinical Child and Adolescent Psychology, 39*, 103-116. doi:10.1080/15374410903401153

Dubow, E. F., Huesmann, L. R., & Boxer, P. (2009). A social-cognitive-ecological framework for understanding the impact of exposure to persistent ethnic–political violence on children's psychosocial adjustment. *Clinical Child and Family Psychology Review*, *12*, 113-126. doi:10.1007/s10567-009-0050-7

Dubow, E. F., Huesmann, L. R., Boxer, P., Ginges, J., Souweidane, V., O'Brien, M., et al. (2008, May). Relations between Arab-American and Jewish-American adolescents' exposure to media depictions of Middle-Eastern violence and their ethnic stereotypes about the violent propensities of ethnic groups in America. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Psychological Science, Chicago, IL.

Dubow, E. F., Huesmann, L. R., Boxer, P., Smith, C., Landau, S. F., Dvir Gvirsman, S., & Shikaki, K. (2019). Serious violent behavior and antisocial outcomes as consequences of exposure to ethnic-political conflict and violence among israeli and palestinian youth. *Aggressive Behavior, 45*(3), 287-299. doi:10.1002/ab.21818

Dubow, E. F., Huesmann, L. R., & Greenwood, D. (2007). Media and youth socialization: Underlying processes and moderators of effects. In J. E. Grusec & P. D. Hastings (Eds.), *Handbook of socialization* (pp. 404–430). New York, NY: Guilford Press.

Dubrow, N. F., & Garbarino, J. (1989). Living in the war zone: Mothers and young children in a public housing development. *Child Welfare*, *68*, 3-20.

DuRant, R. H., Pendergrast, R. A., & Cadenhead, C. (1994). Exposure to violence and victimization and fighting behavior by urban Black adolescents. Journal of Adolescent Health, *15*, 311-318.

Dvir Gvirsman, S., Huesmann, L. R., Dubow, E. F., Landau, S. F., Boxer, P., & Shikaki, K. (2016). The longitudinal effects of chronic mediated exposure to political violence on ideological beliefs about political conflicts among youth. *Political Communication*, *33*, 98-117. doi:10.1080/10584609.2015.1010670

Dvir Gvirsman, S., Huesmann, L. R., Dubow, E. F., Landau, S. F., Shikaki, K., & Boxer, P. (2014). The effects of mediated exposure to ethnic-political violence on Middle East youth's subsequent post-traumatic stress symptoms and aggressive behavior. *Communication research*, *41*, 961-990.

Ellis, D. G. (2006). Transforming conflict: Communication and ethnopolitical conflict. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.

Enders, C. K., & Bandalos, D. L. (2001). The relative performance of full information maximum likelihood estimation for missing data in structural equation models. *Structural equation modeling*, *8*, 430-457.

Eron, L. D., Huesmann, L. R., & Zelli, A. (1991). The role of parental variables in the learning of aggression. In D. Pepler & K. Rubin (Eds.), *The development of and treatment of childhood aggression* (pp. 169–188). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Essau, C. A., Sasagawa, S., & Frick, P. J. (2006). Callous-unemotional traits in a community sample of adolescents. *Assessment*, *13*, 454-469. doi:10.1177/1073191106287354

Farrell, A. D., & Bruce, S. E. (1997). Impact of exposure to community violence on violent behavior and emotional distress among urban adolescents. *Journal of Clinical Child Psychology*, *26*, 2-14.

Farrell, A. D., Pittman, S., Bettencourt, A. F., Mehari, K. R., Dunn, C., & Sullivan, T. N. (2022). Beliefs as mediators of relations between exposure to violence and physical aggression during early adolescence. *The Journal of Early Adolescence*, *42*, 297-326.

Fick, A. C., & Thomas, S. M. (1995). Growing up in a violent environment: Relationship to health-related beliefs and behaviors. *Youth & Society*, *27*, 136-147. doi:10.1177/0044118X95027002002

Fitzpatrick, K. M. (1993). Exposure to violence and presence of depression among low-income, African American youth. *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology*, *61*, 528-531.

Frick, P., & Hare, R. (2001). The antisocial process screening device. Toronto, ON: MultiHealth Systems.

Frick, P. J., & Marsee, M. A. (2006). Psychopathy and Developmental Pathways to Antisocial Behavior in Youth. In C. J. Patrick (Ed.), *Handbook of psychopathy* (pp. 353–374). The Guilford Press.

Garbarino, J. (1995). Raising children in a socially toxic environment. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Garbarino, J. (1999). Lost boys. Why our sons turn violent and how we can save them. New York: Free Press

Garbarino, J., & Kostelny, K. (1996). The effects of political violence on Palestinian children's behavior problems: A risk accumulation model. *Child Development*, *67*, 33-45. doi:10.2307/1131684.

Garbarino, J., & Kostelny, K. (1997). What children can tell us about living in a war zone. In J. D. Osofsky (Ed.), Children in a violent society (pp. 32–41). New York: Guilford Press.

Garreau, O. (2017, October 4). *Children in war*. Humanium. https://www.humanium.org/en/children-in-war/

Gorman-Smith, D., & Tolan, P. (1998). The role of exposure to community violence and developmental problems among inner-city youth. *Development and Psychopathology, 10*, 101-116. doi:10.1017/S0954579498001539

Guerra, N. G., Huesmann, L. R., & Spindler, A. (2003). Community violence exposure, social cognition, and aggression among urban elementary-school children. *Child Development*, *74*, 1507-1522. doi:10.1111/1467-8624.00623.

Hammack, P. L. (2008). Narrative and the cultural psychology of identity. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, *12*, 222-247. doi:10.1177/1088868308316892

Hardaway, C. R., Larkby, C. A., & Cornelius, M. D. (2014). Socioemotional adjustment as a mediator of the association between exposure to community violence and academic performance in low-income adolescents. *Psychology of Violence*, *4*, 281-293. doi:10.1037/a0036375

Hare, R. D. (1998). Psychopaths and their nature: Implications for the mental health and criminal justice systems. In T. Millon, E. Simonsen, M. Birket-Smith, & R. D. Davis

(Eds.), *Psychopathy: Antisocial, criminal, and violent behavior* (pp. 188–212). The Guilford Press.

Harmon-Jones, E., & Allen, J. J. B. (2001). The role of affect in the mere exposure effect: Evidence from psychophysiological and individual differences approaches. *Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin, 27*, 889-898. doi:10.1177/0146167201277011

Haslam, N. (2006). Dehumanization: An integrative review. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10*, 252-264. doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr1003_4

Hayes, A. F. (2015). An index and test of linear moderated mediation. *Multivariate behavioral research*, *50*, 1-22.

Hill, H. M., Levermore, M., Twaite, J., & Jones, L. P. (1996). Exposure to community violence and social support as predictors of anxiety and social and emotional behavior among African American children. *Journal of Child and Family Studies*, *5*, 399-414.

Hitti, S. A., Sullivan, T. N., McDonald, S. E., & Farrell, A. D. (2019). Longitudinal relations between beliefs supporting aggression and externalizing outcomes: Indirect effects of anger dysregulation and callous-unemotional traits. *Aggressive Behavior*, *45*, 93-102. doi:10.1002/ab.21800

Holt, L. F. (2013). Writing the wrong: Can counter-stereotypes offset negative media messages about african americans? *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 90*, 108-125. doi:10.1177/1077699012468699

Howard, A. L., Kimonis, E. R., Muñoz, L. C., & Frick, P. J. (2012). Violence exposure mediates the relation between callous-unemotional traits and offending patterns in adolescents. *Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology*, *40*, 1237-1247. doi:10.1007/s10802-012-9647-2

Huesmann, L. R. (1997). Observational learning of violent behavior: Social and biosocial processes. In A. Raine, D. P. Farrington, P. O. Brennen, & S. A. Mednick (Eds.), *The biosocial basis of violence* (pp. 69–88). New York: Plenum.

Huesmann, L. R. (1998). The role of social information processing and cognitive schemas in the acquisition and maintenance of habitual aggressive behavior. In R. G. Geen & E. Donnerstein (Eds.), *Human aggression: Theories, research, and implications for policy* (pp. 73–109). New York: Academic Press.

Huesmann, L. R., Dubow, E. F., & Boxer, P. (2009). Continuity of childhood, adolescent, and early adulthood aggression as predictors of adult criminality and life outcomes: Implications for the adolescent-limited and life-course-persistent models. *Aggressive Behavior*, *35*, 136-149. doi:/10.1002/ab.20300

Huesmann, L. R., Dubow, E. F., Boxer, P., Ginges, J., Souweidane, V., O'Brien, M., et al. (2008). Relations between Arab-American and Jewish-American adolescents' exposure to media depictions of Middle-Eastern violence and their ethnic stereotypes about the violent propensities of ethnic groups in America. In L. Kirwil (Chair), Media effects on attitudes and behavior. Paper presented as part of a symposium at the XXIX International Congress of Psychology, Berlin, Germany.

Huesmann, L. R., Dubow, E. F., Boxer, P., Landau, S. F., Gvirsman, S. D., & Shikaki, K. (2017). Children's exposure to violent political conflict stimulates aggression at peers by increasing emotional distress, aggressive script rehearsal, and normative beliefs favoring aggression. *Development and Psychopathology*, *29*, 39-50. doi:10.1017/S0954579416001115

Huesmann, L. R., Dubow, E. F., Boxer, P., Souweidane, V., & Ginges, J. (2012). Foreign wars and domestic prejudice: How media exposure to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict predicts ethnic stereotyping by Jewish and Arab American adolescents. *Journal of Research on Adolescence*, *22*, 556-570. doi:10.1111/j.1532-7795.2012.00785.x

Huesmann, L. R., & Eron, L. D. (1984). Cognitive processes and the persistence of aggressive behavior. *Aggressive Behavior*, *10*, 243-251.

Huesmann, L. R., Eron, L. D., & Dubow, E. F. (2002). Childhood predictors of adult criminality: are all risk factors reflected in childhood aggressiveness? *Criminal Behaviour and Mental Health*, *12*, 185-208.

Huesmann, L. R., Eron, L. D., Klein, R., Brice, P., & Fischer, P. (1983). Mitigating the imitation of aggressive behaviors by changing children's attitudes about media violence. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *44*, 899-910. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.44.5.899

Huesmann, L. R., Eron, L. D., Lefkowitz, M. M., & Walder, L. O. (1984). Stability of aggression over time and generations. *Developmental Psychology*, *20*, 11-20.

Huesmann, L. R., & Guerra, N. G. (1997). Children's normative beliefs about aggression and aggressive behavior. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *72*, 408-419.

Huesmann, L. R., & Kirwil, L. (2007). Why observing violence increases the risk of violent behavior in the observer. In D. J. Flannery, A. T. Vazsonyi & I. D. Waldman (Eds.), *The Cambridge Handbook of Violent Behavior and Aggression* (pp. 545-570). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Huesmann, L. R., Moise, J., Podolski, C. P., & Eron, L. D. (2003). Longitudinal relations between children's exposure to television violence and their aggressive and violent

behavior in young adulthood: 1977-1992. *Developmental Psychology*, *39*, 201-221. doi:10.1037/0012-1649.39.2.201.

Huesmann, L. R., & Taylor, L. D. (2006). Media Effects in Middle Childhood. In A. C. Huston & M. N. Ripke (Eds.), *Developmental contexts in middle childhood: Bridges to adolescence and adulthood.* (pp. 303–326). Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511499760.016

IBM Corp. Released 2020. IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows, Version 27.0. Armonk, NY: IBM Corp.

International Crisis Group. (2021). *The Israel-Palestine Crisis: Causes, Consequences, Portents*. Crisis Group. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/israelpalestine/israel-palestine-crisis-causes-consequences-portents

Johnson, M. K., Rowatt, W. C., & LaBouff, J. P. (2012). Religiosity and prejudice revisited: In-group favoritism, out-group derogation, or both? *Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, 4*, 154-168. doi:10.1037/a0025107

Kliewer, W., & Zaharakis, N. (2013). Community violence exposure, coping, and problematic alcohol and drug use among urban, female caregivers: A prospective study. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *55*, 361-366. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2013.03.020

Kokko, K., Pulkkinen, L., Huesmann, L. R., Dubow, E. F., & Boxer, P. (2009). Intensity of aggression in childhood as a predictor of different forms of adult aggression: A two-country (Finland and the United States) analysis. *Journal of Research on Adolescence*, *19*, 9-34. doi:10.1111/j.1532-7795.2009.00579.x

Kreidie, L.H. & Monroe, K.R. (2002). Psychological Boundaries and Ethnic Conflict: How Identity Constrained Choice and Worked to Turn Ordinary People into Perpetrators of

Ethnic Violence During the Lebanese Civil War. *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 16*, 5-36. doi:10.1023/A:1016578210778

Leshem, B., Haj-Yahia, M. M., & Guterman, N. B. (2016). The role of family and teacher support in post-traumatic stress symptoms among Palestinian adolescents exposed to community violence. *Journal of Child and Family Studies*, *25*, 488-502. doi:10.1007/s10826-015-0226-3

Löfving-Gupta, S., Willebrand, M., Koposov, R., Blatný, M., Hrdlička, M., Schwab-Stone, M., & Ruchkin, V. (2018). Community violence exposure and substance use: Cross-cultural and gender perspectives. *European Child & Adolescent Psychiatry*, *27*, 493-500. doi:10.1007/s00787-017-1097-5

Lim, S. H., & Ang, R. P. (2009). Relationship between Boys' Normative Beliefs about Aggression and Their Physical, Verbal, and Indirect Aggressive Behaviors. *Adolescence*, *44*, 635-650.

McMahon, S. D., Felix, E. D., Halpert, J. A., & Petropoulos, L. A. (2009). Community violence exposure and aggression among urban adolescents: Testing a cognitive mediator model. *Journal of Community Psychology*, *37*, 895-910.

Miles, J. N. V., Kulesza, M., Ewing, B., Shih, R. A., Tucker, J. S., & D'Amico, E. J. (2015). Moderated mediation analysis: An illustration using the association of gender with delinquency and mental health. *Journal of Criminal Psychology*, *5*, 99-123. doi:10.1108/JCP-02-2015-0010

Mostafa, M. G. (2018). *Religion and the Israel-Palestinian conflict: Cause, consequence, and cure*. The Washington Institute. Retrieved December 5, 2021, from

https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/religion-and-israel-palestinian-conflict-cause-consequence-and-cure.

Muñoz, L. C., & Frick, P. J. (2012). Callous-unemotional traits and their implication for understanding and treating aggressive and violent youths. *Criminal Justice and Behavior, 39*, 794-813. doi:10.1177/0093854812437019

Nansel, T. R., Overpeck, M., Pilla, R. S., Ruan, W. J., Simons-Morton, B., & Scheidt, P. (2001). Bullying behaviors among U.S. youth: Prevalence and association with psychological adjustment. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, *285*, 2094-2100. doi:10.1001/jama.285.16.2094

Ng-Mak, D. S., Salzinger, S., Feldman, R., & Stueve, A. (2002). Normalization of violence among inner-city youth: A formulation for research. *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, *72*, 92-101. doi:10.1037/0002-9432.72.1.92

Niwa, E. Y., et al. (2014). Negative stereotypes of ethnic outgroups: A longitudinal examination among Palestinian, Israeli Jewish, and Israeli Arab youth. *Journal of Research on Adolescence*, *26*, 166-179.

Niwa, E. Y., Boxer, P., Dubow, E., Huesmann, L. R., Shikaki, K., Landau, S., & Gvirsman, S. D. (2016). Growing up amid ethno-political conflict: Aggression and emotional desensitization promote hostility to ethnic outgroups. *Child Development*, *87*, 1479-1492. doi:10.1111/cdev.12599

Nöthling, J., Suliman, S., Martin, L., Simmons, C., & Seedat, S. (2019). Differences in abuse, neglect, and exposure to community violence in adolescents with and without PTSD and depression. *Journal of Interpersonal Violence*, *34*, 4357-4383. doi:10.1177/0886260516674944

Osofsky, J. D., Wewers, S., Hann, D. M., & Fick, A. C. (1993). Chronic community violence: What is happening to our children? *Psychiatry*, *56*, 36-45.

Oren, N., & Bar-Tal, D. (2007). The detrimental dynamics of delegitimization in intractable conflicts: The Israeli– Palestinian case. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, *31*, 111–126. doi:10.1016/j.ijintrel.2006.07.003

Overstreet, S., & Braun, S. (1999). A preliminary examination of the relationship between exposure to community violence and academic functioning. *School Psychology Quarterly*, *14*, 380-396. doi:10.1037/h0089015

Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. (2008, August). *Census final results in the West Bank: Summary (population and housing)*. Ramallah, Palestine: Author. Retrieved June 25, 2013, from http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/ _PCBS/Downloads/book1487.pdf.

Pardini, D. (2011). Perceptions of social conflicts among incarcerated adolescents with callous-unemotional traits: 'You're going to pay. It's going to hurt, but I don't care.'. *Journal of child psychology and psychiatry*, *52*, 248-255.

Pardini, D. A., & Byrd, A. L. (2012). Perceptions of aggressive conflicts and others' distress in children with callous-unemotional traits: 'I'll show you who's boss, even if you suffer and I get in trouble'. *Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry*, *53*, 283-291.

Paxton, K. C., Robinson, W. L., Shah, S., & Schoeny, M. E. (2004). Psychological distress for African-American adolescent males: Exposure to community violence and social support as factors. *Child Psychiatry and Human Development*, *34*, 281-295. doi:10.1023/B:CHUD.0000020680.67029.4f

Punamaki, R., Qouta, S., & El Sarraj, E. (1997). Models of experiences and children's psychological adjustment: The roles of perceived parenting and the children's own resources and activity. *Child Development*, *64*, 718-728.

Qouta S, & El Sarraj E. (1992). Curfew and children's mental health. *Journal of Psychological Studies*, *4*, 13-18.

Radai, I., Elran, M., Makladeh, Y., & Kornberg, M. (2015). The Arab citizens in Israel: Current trends according to recent opinion polls. *Strategic Assessment*, *18*, 101-116.

R Core Team (2020). R: A language and environment for statistical computing. R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria. URL https://www.R-project.org/.

Richters, J. E. (1993). Community violence and children's development: Toward a research agenda for the 1990s. *Psychiatry*, *56*, 3-6.

Rosseel, Y. (2012). Lavaan: A R package for structural equation modeling. *Journal of Statistical Software*, *48*, 1-36.

Saleem, M., & Anderson, C. A. (2013). Arabs as terrorists: Effects of stereotypes within violent contexts on attitudes, perceptions, and affect. *Psychology of Violence*, *3*, 84.

Saleem, M., Yang, G. S., & Ramasubramanian, S. (2016). Reliance On Direct And Mediated Contact And Public Policies Supporting Outgroup Harm. *Journal of Communication*, *66*, 604-624. doi:10.1111/jcom.12234

Schlomer, G. L., Bauman, S., & Card, N. A. (2010). Best practices for missing data management in counseling psychology. *Journal of Counseling Psychology*, *57*, 1-10. doi:10.1037/a0018082

Shahinfar, A., Kupersmidt, J. B., & Matza, L. S. (2001). The relation between exposure to violence and social information processing among incarcerated adolescents. *Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 110*, 136-141. doi:10.1037/0021-843X.110.1.136

Sides, J., & Gross, K. (2013). Stereotypes of Muslims and Support for the War on Terror. *The Journal of Politics*, *75*, 583-598.

Slone, M. (1998). *The Political Life Events scale: Construction and validation.* Unpublished manuscript, Tel Aviv University.

Slone, M., Adiri, M., & Arian, A. (1998). Adverse political events and psychological adjustment: Across-cultural study of Israeli and Palestinian children. *American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry*, *3*, 1058-1069.

Slone, M., Lobel, T., & Gilat, I. (1999). Dimensions of the political environment affecting children's mental health. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *43*, 78-91. doi:10.1177/0022002799043001005

Shamoa-Nir, L., & Razpurker-Apfeld, I. (2019). Investigating stereotypes toward the outgroup: The role of religious concepts and group membership. *Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 41*, 188-200.

Shulman, E. P., Beardslee, J., Fine, A., Frick, P. J., Steinberg, L., & Cauffman, E. (2021). Exposure to gun violence: Associations with anxiety, depressive symptoms, and aggression among male juvenile offenders. *Journal of Clinical Child and Adolescent Psychology*, *50*, 353-366. doi:10.1080/15374416.2021.1888742

Stickle, T. R., Kirkpatrick, N. M., & Brush, L. N. (2009). Callous-unemotional traits and social information processing: Multiple risk-factor models for understanding aggressive

behavior in antisocial youth. *Law and Human Behavior*, *33*, 515-529. doi:10.1007/s10979-008-9171-7

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin, & S. Worchel (Eds.), The social psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 33-37). Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of inter-group behavior. In S. Worchel & L. W. Austin (Eds.), Psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 7–24). Chicago: Nelson-Hall.

The Economist. (2021). *The Israel-Palestine conflict has claimed 14,000 lives since 1987*. https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2021/05/18/the-israel-palestine-conflict-has-claimed-14000-lives-since-1987

Tremblay, R. E. (2000). The development of aggressive behaviour during childhood: What have we learned in the past century? *International Journal of Behavioral Development*, *24*, 129-141. doi:10.1080/016502500383232

UNICEF. (2012). *Children in War and Conflict*. UNICEF USA. https://www.unicefusa.org/mission/emergencies/conflict

UNICEF. (2021). *The state of the world's children 2021*. New York, NY: Author.

Vollhardt, J. R. (2009). The role of victim beliefs in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: Risk or potential for peace? *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, *15*, 135-159. doi:10.1080/10781910802544373

Waller, R., Baskin-Sommers, A. R., & Hyde, L. W. (2018). Examining predictors of callous unemotional traits trajectories across adolescence among high-risk males. *Journal of*

Clinical Child and Adolescent Psychology, 47, 444-457. doi:10.1080/15374416.2015.1102070

Wang, J., Wang, X., & Ohio Library and Information Network. (2012). *Structural equation modeling: Applications using mplus* (3. Aufl. ed.). Wiley.

War Child Holland. (2021). *Facts and figures about war child*. New York, NY: Author.

West, S. G., Taylor, A. B., & Wu, W. (2012). Model fit and model selection in structural equation modeling. *Handbook of structural equation modeling, 1,* 209-231.

World Health Organization. (2020, June 8). *Violence against children*. Https://Www.Who.Int/News-Room/Fact-Sheets/Detail/Violence-against-Children. https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/violence-against-children

Zalk, M. H. W., & Kerr, M. (2014). Developmental trajectories of prejudice and tolerance toward immigrants from early to late adolescence. *Journal of Youth and Adolescence*, *43*, 1658-1671. doi:10.1007/s10964-014-0164-1

Zhu, X. W., Chu, X. W., Zhang, Y. H., & Li, Z. H. (2020). Exposure to online game violence and cyberbullying among Chinese adolescents: Normative beliefs about aggression as a mediator and trait aggressiveness as a moderator. *Journal of Aggression, Maltreatment & Trauma*, *29*, 148-166.

APPENDIX A. TABLES

Table A1. Descriptive Statistics for Study Variables

Descriptives	NOBAGS	NS	EPV	ECV	CU	Religiosity
N	853	878	1050	1051	1051	1050
Mean	18.19	4.18	5.91	2.23	0.88	2.95
Standard Deviation	7.45	2.23	4.99	2.22	0.30	0.85
Skewness	0.00	0.04	1.29	1.18	0.08	-0.72
S.E. of Skewness	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07
Kurtosis	-1.41	-0.76	1.98	1.35	0.52	-0.34
S.E. of Kurtosis	0.17	0.17	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15
Range	24.00	8.00	30.00	12.00	2.20	3.67
Minimum	4.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.33
Maximum	28.00	8.00	30.00	12.00	2.20	4.00

Notes. Descriptives for CU (Callous Unemotionality) and Religiosity are calculated based upon the averaged scale scores across waves 1-3 for those variables. EPV = Exposure to Ethno-Political Violence at Wave 1. NOBAGS = Normative Beliefs Supporting

Aggression toward the Outgroup at Wave 3. ECV = Exposure to Community Violence at Wave 1. NS = Negative Stereotypes about the Outgroup at Wave 2. S.E. = Standard Error.

Table A2. Correlations among Study Variables

Study Variables	NS	EPV	CU	Religiosity	ECV	NOBAGS
Negative Stereotypes	1.00	-0.09**	0.07	0.10**	-0.11**	-0.04
EPV		1.00	0.09**	0.15***	0.38***	0.18***
CU			1.00	0.48***	0.14***	-0.07*
Religiosity				1.00	0.25***	0.26***
ECV					1.00	0.32***
NOBAGS						1.00

*Notes. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. EPV = Exposure to Ethno-Political Violence at Wave 1. CU = Callous Unemotionality, Averaged across Waves 1-3. ECV = Exposure to Community Violence at Wave 1. NOBAGS = Normative Beliefs Supporting Aggression toward the Outgroup at Wave 3. NS = Negative Stereotypes about the Outgroup at Wave 2. Religiosity was Averaged across Waves 1-3.*

Table A3. Mediation Model: Indirect Effect of Exposure to Ethno-Political Violence (IV) on Beliefs Supporting Aggression toward the Outgroup (DV) Through Negative Stereotypes about the Outgroup (M)

	Mediator Variable Model (DV = Negative Stereotypes about the Outgroup)			
Predictors	*B*	*S.E.*	*Z-score*	*p-value*
EPV (a)	0.16	0.04	3.75	0.00***
	Dependent Variable Model (DV = Normative Beliefs Supporting Aggression towards the Outgroup)			
Predictors	*B*	*S.E.*	*Z-score*	*p-value*
EPV (c')	-0.04	0.01	-2.45	0.01*
NS (b)	0.01	0.09	0.17	0.87
Age	-0.21	0.08	-2.48	0.01*
Sex	0.35	0.41	0.85	0.39
Indirect Effect	0.00	0.00	-0.17	0.87

*Notes. *p < .05, ***p < .001. B is the raw or unstandardized coefficient. EPV = Exposure to Ethno-Political Violence at Wave 1 (W1). NS = Negative Stereotypes about the Outgroup at Wave 2 (W2).Normative Beliefs Supporting Aggression towards the Outgroup*

was measured at Wave 3. S.E. = Standard Error. IV = Independent Variable. M = Mediator. DV = Dependent Variable. Covariates = Negative Stereotypes about the Outgroup at W1, Normative Beliefs Supporting Aggression Towards the Outgroup at W1, Age, and Sex.

Table A4. Moderated Mediation Model: Indirect Effect of Exposure to Ethno-Political Violence (IV) on Beliefs Supporting Aggression toward the Outgroup (DV) through Negative Stereotypes about the Outgroup (M) Moderated by Callous Unemotionality (Mo)

	Mediator Variable Model (DV = Negative Stereotypes about the Outgroup)			
Predictors	*B*	*S.E.*	*Z-score*	*p-value*
EPV (a1)	-0.03	0.01	-2.37	0.02*
CU (a2)	0.43	0.26	1.67	0.10
EPV x CU (a3)	-0.01	0.05	-0.12	0.90
Age	-0.05	0.03	-1.56	0.12
Sex	0.00	0.15	0.00	0.11
Indirect Effect	0.00	0.00	-0.35	0.73

	Dependent Variable Model (DV = NOBAGS)			
Predictors	*B*	*S.E.*	*Z-score*	*p-value*
EPV (c')	0.15	0.04	3.72	0.00***
NS (b1)	0.04	0.09	-2.35	0.70
CU (b2)	-1.82	0.73	-2.49	0.01*
NS x CU (b3)	0.03	0.32	0.10	0.92
Age	-0.20	0.08	-2.35	0.02*
Sex	0.59	0.42	1.41	0.16
Indirect Effect	0.00	0.01	-0.20	0.84

*Notes. *p < .05, ***p < .001. B is the raw or unstandardized coefficient. EPV = Exposure to Ethno-Political Violence at Wave 1. CU = Callous Unemotionality, averaged across Waves 1-3. NOBAGS = Normative Beliefs Supporting Aggression toward the Outgroup at Wave 3. NS = Negative Stereotypes about the Outgroup at Wave 2. S.E. = Standard Error. IV = Independent Variable. M = Mediator. DV = Dependent Variable. Mo = Moderator. Covariates = Negative Stereotypes about the Outgroup at W1, Normative Beliefs Supporting Aggression toward the Outgroup at W1, Age, and Sex.*

Table A5. Moderated Mediation Model: Indirect Effect of Exposure to Ethno-Political Violence (IV) on Beliefs Supporting Aggression toward the Outgroup (DV) Through Negative Stereotypes about the Outgroup (M) Moderated by Religiosity (Mo)

	Mediator Variable Model (DV = Negative Stereotypes about the Outgroup)			
Predictors	*B*	*S.E.*	*Z-score*	*p-value*
EPV (a1)	-0.04	0.01	-2.39	0.02*
Religiosity (a2)	0.24	0.09	2.65	0.01**
EPV x Religiosity (a3)	-0.01	0.02	-0.74	0.46
Age	-0.05	0.03	-1.5	0.13
Sex	-0.08	0.15	-0.5	0.62
Indirect Effect	0.00	0.01	-0.08	0.93
	Dependent Variable Model (DV =NOBAGS)			
Predictors	*B*	*S.E.*	*Z-score*	*p-value*
EPV (c')	0.15	0.04	3.62	0.00***
NS (b1)	0.01	0.09	0.08	0.93

Religiosity (b2)	0.54	0.27	2.01	0.04*
NS x Religiosity (b3)	-0.26	0.11	-2.47	0.01*
Age	-0.21	0.08	-2.53	0.01*
Sex	0.10	0.43	0.24	0.81
Indirect Effect	0.01	0.01	1.44	0.15

*Notes. *p < .05, **p <.01, ***p < .001. B is the raw or unstandardized coefficient. Religiosity is averaged across waves 1-3. EPV = Exposure to Ethno-Political Violence at Wave 1. NOBAGS = Normative Beliefs Supporting Aggression toward the Outgroup at Wave 3. NS = Negative Stereotypes about the Outgroup at Wave 2. S.E. = Standard Error. IV = Independent Variable. M = Mediator. DV = Dependent Variable. Mo = Moderator. Covariates = Negative Stereotypes about the Outgroup at W1, Normative Beliefs Supporting Aggression toward the Outgroup at W1, Age, and Sex.*

Table A6. Mediation Model: Indirect Effect of Exposure to Community Violence (IV) on Beliefs Supporting Aggression toward the Outgroup (DV) through Negative Stereotypes about the Outgroup (M)

	Mediator Variable Model (DV = Negative Stereotypes about the Outgroup)			
Predictor	*B*	*S.E.*	*Z-score*	*p-value*
ECV (a)	-0.09	0.03	-2.96	0.00**

	Dependent Variable Model (DV = Normative Beliefs Supporting Aggression toward the Outgroup)			
Predictors	*B*	*S.E.*	*Z-score*	*p-value*
ECV (c')	0.45	0.09	4.82	0.00***
NS (b)	0.03	0.09	0.32	0.74
Age	-0.06	0.03	-1.97	0.05
Sex	0.04	0.14	0.26	0.81
Indirect Effect	0.00	0.01	-0.32	0.75

*Notes. ***p < .001, **p < .01. B is the raw or unstandardized coefficient. ECV = Exposure to Community Violence at Wave 1. NS = Negative Stereotypes about the Outgroup at Wave 2. Normative Beliefs Supporting Aggression towards the outgroup was measured at Wave 3. S.E. = Standard Error. IV = Independent Variable. M = Mediator. DV = Dependent Variable. Covariates = Negative Stereotypes about the Outgroup at W1, Normative Beliefs Supporting Aggression Towards the Outgroup at W1, Age, and Sex.*

APPENDIX B. FIGURES

Figure B1. Hypothesized Mediation Model Involving Negative Stereotypes about the Outgroup as Mediator of the Association between Exposure to Ethno-Political Violence and Beliefs Supporting Aggression toward the Outgroup



Figure B2. Hypothesized Moderated Mediation Model Involving Exposure to Ethno-Political Violence, CU (or Religiosity), Negative Stereotypes about the Outgroup, and Beliefs Supporting Aggression toward the Outgroup



Figure B3. Hypothesized Model Involving Exposure to Community Violence as a Predictor of Beliefs Supporting Aggression toward the Outgroup



Figure B4. Mediation Model Involving Negative Stereotypes about the Outgroup as a Mediator of the Association Between Exposure to Ethno-Political Violence and Beliefs Supporting Aggression toward the Outgroup



*Note. *p < .05, ***p < .001. Exposure to EPV was measured at Wave 1. Negative Stereotypes about the Outgroup was measured at Wave 2. Normative Beliefs Supporting Aggression was measured at Wave 3. Covariates = Negative Stereotypes about the Outgroup at W1, Normative Beliefs Supporting Aggression Toward the Outgroup at W1, Age, and Sex.*

Figure B5. Moderated Mediation Model with Exposure to Ethno-Political Violence (IV), CU (Mo), Negative Stereotypes about the Outgroup (M), and Beliefs Supporting Aggression toward the Outgroup (DV)



*Note. *p < .05, ***p < .001. CU = Callous Unemotionality, averaged across Waves 1-3. Exposure to EPV was measured at Wave 1. Negative Stereotypes about the Outgroup was measured at Wave 2. Normative Beliefs Supporting Aggression was measured at Wave 3. Covariates = Negative Stereotypes about the Outgroup at W1, Normative Beliefs Supporting Aggression Toward the Outgroup at W1, Age, and Sex.*

.

Figure B6. Moderated Mediation Model with Exposure to Ethno-Political Violence (IV), Religiosity (Mo), Negative Stereotypes about the Outgroup (M), and Beliefs Supporting Aggression toward the Outgroup (DV)



Note. *$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$. *Religiosity was averaged across Waves 1-3. Exposure to EPV was measured at Wave 1. Negative Stereotypes about the Outgroup was measured at Wave 2. Normative Beliefs Supporting Aggression was measured at Wave 3. Covariates = Negative Stereotypes about the Outgroup at W1, Normative Beliefs Supporting Aggression Toward the Outgroup at W1, Age, and Sex.*

Figure B7. Mediation Model Involving Exposure to Community Violence as a Predictor of Beliefs Supporting Aggression Toward the Outgroup



*Note. **p < .01, ***p < .001. Exposure to ECV was measured at Wave 1. Negative Stereotypes about the Outgroup was measured at Wave 2. Normative Beliefs Supporting Aggression was measured at Wave 3. Covariates = Negative Stereotypes about the Outgroup at W1, Normative Beliefs Supporting Aggression Toward the Outgroup at W1, Age, and Sex.*