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A STUDY OF THE HAWAIIAN  
STATEHOOD MOVEMENT FROM  
1935 THROUGH 1952

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of the requirements for the degree  
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INTRODUCTION

The Hawaiian Islands, discovered by an English sea captain in 1778 and subsequently coveted by several nations have been seeking statehood for almost one hundred years. Interest among mainland residents in statehood for Hawaii, however, is the result of recent Congressional committee investigations which have focused attention upon the prolonged struggle for what the proponents consider equal rights not existing under territorial status. The Organic Act of 1900 provided a territorial government, acceptable to the statehood proponents only as a mere formality preceding admission as a State.

The writer's interest in the Hawaiian statehood movement stems from a three-year residence in the Hawaiian Islands as a member of the Armed Forces during World War II. The writer, like so many Americans, had given little thought to the group of small islands so far away prior to becoming a temporary resident, but personal contact with the permanent residents resulted in a curiosity about their desire for statehood which was not satisfied by what could be found in books already written. Many writers have touched on the subject in a sketchy way as a part of a general history of Hawaii, or in a biased and limited way according to their particular interests in political, economic or social factors. The writer's curiosity developed into a strong interest in the complete history of the movement. The purpose of this thesis, therefore, has been to set down a factual account of the political, economic and social factors in Hawaii which have directly influenced the problem of admitting Hawaii as a State, and the actual legislative attempts in Congress to

pass an enabling act.

Special attention has been given to the statehood movement since 1935. In that year a Congressional investigating committee held hearings in Hawaii pursuant to a statehood bill, the first serious consideration given to such a bill. The first three chapters of this study are devoted to essential historical facts, economic factors and social conditions in Hawaii, a knowledge of which is necessary for a full understanding of the concerted effort made by the statehood proponents and the opponents in the years following that initial Congressional investigation in 1935. The remaining chapters are concerned with the actual legislative consideration which has been given in Congress, and a study of the groups in the Hawaiian Islands and on the mainland who have supported or opposed the Hawaiian statehood movement.

The bulk of the material contained in the following pages has been selected from The Congressional Record, reports made by the Congressional committees which have conducted investigations in connection with Hawaiian statehood bills, the Hawaiian Governor's annual reports to the Secretary of the Interior, publications by the Hawaiian Historical Commission, and memoirs. Periodicals and newspapers have been the sources of substantiating evidence of the general interest shown by mainland as well as island residents in the current proposal of statehood which, during the closing month of research, could become reality at any time.

## CHAPTER I

### THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

On January 18, 1778 Captain James Cook, the English explorer, first sighted the islands in the Pacific Ocean known as the Hawaiian Islands. The history of these small dots of land in the vast, blue ocean is a record of struggle, growth and intrigue of world consequence scarcely conceivable when regarded in the light of their size. Only eight of the chain of islands have ever been inhabited, and the entire area of the islands is only 6,435 square miles, an area smaller than that of all but three of the forty-eight American States. Yet, prior to annexation by the United States in 1898, these volcanic creations of nature represented to the great world powers a prize well worth possessing.

#### I. FROM FEUDAL WARFARE AND DISUNITY TO A CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY

At the time of their discovery by white men, the islands were a unit only in the sense that the group was isolated from the rest of the world by the vast expanse of ocean which surrounded it. Each island was a kingdom, and there were wars of conquest waged almost constantly as each king sought to add to his realm. Finally, in the year 1810, the islands were united by King Kamehameha I, and the struggle for a place in the family of nations began.<sup>1</sup> Kamehameha I had little thought for

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<sup>1</sup>Ralph S. Kuykendall and A. Grove Day, Hawaii: A History (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1948), p. 29.



the rest of the world, but he and his successors were powerless to alter the circumstances which were to make the Hawaiian kingdom the subject of international concern.

The feat of uniting the islands had been tried by other kings without success. The statesmanship of Kamehameha was not a fleeting ability. His success did not end with merely conquering all the islands. He was as masterful in administration as he was in military strategy, and his nine-year rule brought peace and prosperity to all his people. The governmental organization which he left his successors all but assured a continuing prosperity. He drew closer to the throne religious and social controls, making his will felt in all activities within his newly formed kingdom.

His gods had brought him to power and guarded him for years on the throne of a growing kingdom, and he would not forsake them. No missionaries of Christianity arrived during his lifetime, and the example of the foreigners that came in increasing numbers to trade with and settle in his realm did not give him a high respect for the religion beyond his borders.<sup>2</sup>

The heir to the throne, Liholiho, lacked his father's strength of character, and inroads into the native customs were made by the foreign visitors and settlers during his short, five-year reign. Kamehameha I had provided a strong, sound advisory group to serve the throne and the transition from father to son was made without serious difficulties, although certain of the chiefs plotted to prevent Liholiho's accession.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Kuykendall and Day, Hawaii: A History, p. 29.

<sup>3</sup>W. D. Alexander, "Overthrow of the Ancient Tabu System in the Hawaiian Islands," Twenty-fifth Annual Report, Hawaiian Historical Society (Honolulu, 1906), p. 20.

Disaffection among the chiefs was somewhat allayed, and significant changes began to occur when Liholiho, who took the name of Kamehameha II, shared with his chiefs the monopoly on the sandalwood trade. The chiefs' newly acquired wealth created among them a buying mania which attracted many foreign traders to the islands. The year 1820 also marked the arrival of the first Christian missionaries from New England.<sup>4</sup> They came at the time when the native religion had already been severely shaken by Liholiho's disavowal of the native religious tabus which had been so carefully guarded by Kamehameha I. The coming of the traders and the missionaries sowed the seed of future arguments favoring the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States. Kamehameha II showed more inclination than his father had shown to attempt to understand the world represented by the traders and missionaries who came to Hawaii, and he made a trip to England to see and to learn. He died in 1824 while still in England,<sup>5</sup> leaving his successor, Kamehameha III, a throne threatened by circumstances calling for a firm ruling hand.

As a result of the increasing numbers of foreigners dwelling in the islands, Kamehameha III was confronted by the task of administering a greatly altered social and political situation through unwritten native law, which was wholly inadequate in the circumstances. The contrasting social and political concepts of the native and foreign cultures brought

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<sup>4</sup>W. F. Frear, "Hawaiian Statute Law," Thirteenth Annual Report, Hawaiian Historical Society (Honolulu, 1906), p. 20.

<sup>5</sup>Kuykendall and Day, Hawaii: A History, p. 48.

conflicts in matters involving the foreigners, who insisted upon protection according to their own laws. "Revealingly, the first laws printed in the kingdom (1822) had been designed to control the misdeeds of deserters and rioting sailors ashore."<sup>6</sup> Constant threats of intervention by foreign powers in behalf of their citizens in the islands made the king and his chiefs feel the need for being better informed about the polity of civilized countries. "In 1839, a course of lectures on the science of governments was delivered by the Reverend William Richards to the chiefs at their request, ..." <sup>7</sup> In the following year the Hawaiian Kingdom adopted a constitution which created a legislative body of representatives elected by the people. <sup>8</sup> The evolving of a constitutional government had consumed the first half of Kamehameha III's thirty years as king. The latter half of his reign was devoted to the struggle for freedom from threatened foreign intervention and to a fight for recognition by the powers of Hawaii's independence.

## II. THREATS OF FOREIGN CONTROL PRODUCED INDEPENDENCE

Foreign intervention in Hawaiian affairs had not begun immediately after discovery by Captain Cook. This Englishman did not anticipate the potential role of Hawaii in Pacific affairs and therefore made

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<sup>6</sup>Kuykendall and Day, Hawaii: A History, p. 51.

<sup>7</sup>W. F. Frear, "The Evolution of the Hawaiian Judiciary," Papers of the Hawaiian Historical Society, No. 7 (Honolulu: The Hawaiian Gazette Company, Printers, 1894), p. 8.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

no claims for his native land. For about two decades following Cook's landing, ships flying the flags of every major seafaring nation stopped at the islands, but no particular desire for possession moved any nation to attempt annexation. In fact, the first attempt at political union between Hawaiian territory and a foreign power was initiated by King Kamehameha I. In 1794 he and his chiefs, aboard the English ship Discovery, ceded the island of Hawaii to Great Britain, asking only that the land be protected from foreign enemies and that the native government, religion and customs be left untouched. This cession was never accepted by the British government,<sup>9</sup> "... but it led to a tradition of English supremacy in the islands for some years."<sup>10</sup> There was open reaffirmation in 1822 of Hawaiian desire for English protection when Kamehameha II, in accepting from that government the gift of a small schooner,

... stated: "The whole of these islands having been conquered by my father, I have succeeded to the government of them, and beg leave to place them all under the protection of your most excellent Majesty."<sup>11</sup>

The interest of other nations in the islands became gradually stronger, however, and the British position in Hawaiian affairs dwindled to a lesser significance. It will be seen in the following pages that Russian interest had its beginning in 1815, France appeared noticeably on the

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<sup>9</sup>W. D. Westervelt, "Kamehameha's cession of the Island of Hawaii to Great Britain in 1894," Twenty-second Annual Report, Hawaiian Historical Society (Honolulu; Paradise of the Pacific Press, 1914), p. 22.

<sup>10</sup>Kuykendall and Day, Hawaii: A History, p. 47.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

scene in 1819, and the United States became actively involved in 1826.

It was a Russian subject rather than the Russian government who sought to make the islands a part of Russia. Early visits to Hawaii by Russian ships were infrequent and were made for the sole purpose of getting supplies. The Russian American Fur Company, with a man named Baranoff as governor, had gained a monopoly of the fur trade in Alaska, and the aim of the company was to secure supply bases in California and Hawaii. Late in the year 1815 Baranoff sent Georg Anton Scheffer to the islands to accomplish one-half of that task. Scheffer was successful in erecting a strong fort on the island of Kauai after winning the favor of the island chief. His bold attempt to build a fort at Honolulu in 1816 brought the displeasure of Kamehameha I, who drove him from the island. Scheffer returned to Kauai where he prepared to remain by force of arms if necessary. In 1817, the chief of Kauai was finally convinced that Scheffer was his enemy, and the Russians were driven from the island.<sup>12</sup> Scheffer returned to Russia determined to convince the czar that Russia should annex the islands, but he experienced repudiation rather than acceptance of his actions.<sup>13</sup>

The first attempt at settlement by a foreign group ended two years before the initial French intervention occurred. As has already been mentioned, Liholiho failed to match his father's abilities. That

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<sup>12</sup>W. D. Alexander, "The Proceedings of the Russians on Kauai, 1814-1816," Papers of the Hawaiian Historical Society, No. 6 (Honolulu: Hawaiian Gazette Company, Printers, 1894), pp. 4-6.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 13.

fact, coupled with his youthfulness, created a strong temptation for one of the chiefs, Kekuakalani, to lead a revolt in protest against the breaking of the religious tabus. Kuykendall credits the captain of a French ship anchored at Honolulu in 1819 with strengthening Liholiho's hold on the throne because the captain let it be known that he supported King Liholiho.<sup>14</sup> French intervention really began in earnest about 1838, twelve years after the first French attempts to establish Catholic missions in Hawaii. The French government, considering itself the protector of all Catholic missionaries in the Pacific area, gave Captain G. P. T. Leplace, commander of the Artemise, instructions to collect reparations for the numerous rebuffs experienced by Catholic priests in the islands.<sup>15</sup> Protestantism had been made virtually the state religion by the chiefs and the years between 1826 and 1838 were witness to their fight to keep Catholicism out.<sup>16</sup> Every Catholic priest was denied residence, and in the spring of 1837 the chiefs even defied the combined efforts of British and French naval officers to keep two priests at Honolulu despite the fact that they had been banished by the chiefs. At this time Kamehameha III signed an agreement with the commander of the French warship Venus, Captain du Petit-Thouars, to give French subjects all the rights enjoyed by subjects of any other nation, but he steadfastly

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<sup>14</sup>Kuykendall and Day, Hawaii: A History, p. 40.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 61.

<sup>16</sup>W. P. Frear, "Hawaiian Statute Law," Thirteenth Annual Report, Hawaiian Historical Society, p. 32.

refused to concede on the issue involving the priests and even placed a ban on the teaching or practicing of Catholicism. When Captain Lepage arrived in 1839, he charged that the Hawaiians had violated the treaty made with Du Petit-Thuars and, under threat of immediate war, demanded a new treaty providing that the Catholics receive the right to practice their religion and to acquire land in Honolulu on which to build a Catholic church, and that the Hawaiian government deposit \$20,000 with him to guarantee the good conduct of that government. Kamehameha III approved the treaty and soon was forced to sign a second treaty with Lepage giving Frenchmen accused of crime in the islands the right to trial by a jury selected by the French consul. In 1842 the Hawaiian king sent envoys to France to negotiate a new treaty, and the problem of French interference in Hawaiian affairs was absorbed into the larger problem of securing recognition from the powers of Hawaiian independence.<sup>17</sup>

The United States, like France, was drawn into Hawaiian affairs by the desire to protect its citizens. Early in 1826 Lieutenant Percival, commander of the United States warship Dolphin, secured from the king acknowledgment of private debts owed to American citizens as government obligations. In the fall of the same year another United States naval officer, Captain Thomas ap Catesby Jones, made "articles of arrangement" which constituted a rough treaty for the protection of American interests in the islands, a document selected by the Hawaiian Committee for the Commemoration of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Annexation of Hawaii as

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<sup>17</sup>Kuykendall and Day, Hawaii: A History, pp. 59-62.

one of the ten important documents in Hawaiian history.<sup>18</sup> Actually, American influence dates back before the above-mentioned official activities. American citizens were among the first white settlers in Hawaii. Two Americans, John Young and Isaac Davis, served as advisers to Kamehameha I, directly contributing to his success in uniting the islands. The American missionaries were the teachers as well as the preachers of the islands. The first representative of a foreign government in Hawaii was an American trader who was designated American commercial agent in 1820. By 1840 American influence was plainly very strong. Captain Wilkes, United States naval officer, saw considerable evidence of American activities when he first visited Honolulu in September, 1840.

Honolulu exhibits, even at a distant view, many dwellings built in the European style, ... To look upon it was, notwithstanding, a source of pleasure as it gave evidence of a change being in progress, in which some of our own countrymen are performing a prominent part. It has for several years past been their scene of action, and bears testimony to their spirit of enterprise. They still constitute the majority of the foreign residents.<sup>19</sup>

With all of these unofficial activities showing increasing American influence, it is not surprising that Captain Wilkes reported a favorable attitude toward the United States on the part of the Hawaiian monarch.

I now found that his [Kamehameha III's] principle object in

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<sup>18</sup> Edwin H. Bryan, "Report of the Committee for the Commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of the Annexation of Hawaii to the United States," Fifty-seventh Annual Report, Hawaiian Historical Society (Honolulu: Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Ltd., 1949), p. 10.

<sup>19</sup> Charles Wilkes, U.S.N., Narrative of the United States Exploring Expedition during the Years 1838 through 1842, Vol. III (Philadelphia: Lea and Blanchard, 1845), p. 373.



requesting an interview with me was, that he might renew and amplify his treaty with the United States, for which purpose he thought it probable that I might have had instructions. When he found that this was not the case, and that I had no official communication for him, he was evidently disappointed; for he appeared most desirous to enter into a close friendship with the United States, and spoke in the highest terms of the kind manner in which he had ever been treated by our consul, Mr. Brinsmade, and the commanders of the United States vessels of war that had visited his islands.<sup>20</sup>

Diplomatic relations between Hawaii and the United States began without fanfare in 1843 with the appointment of a commissioner of diplomatic rather than consular rank, the first foreign representative of that rank in Hawaii.<sup>21</sup> This appointment followed closely upon the preparation of a document by Secretary of State Webster which declared that:

no power ought either to take possession of the islands as a conquest, or for the purpose of colonization, and that no power ought to seek for any undue control over the existing government, or any exclusive privileges or preferences in matters of commerce.<sup>22</sup>

This document was handed on December 30, 1842 to the two Hawaiian envoys who had come to Washington to procure United States recognition of Hawaii as an independent nation. Webster's statement did not prevent the occurrence of two attempts in the 1840's to annex Hawaii--one by a British naval officer and the other by a French commander. These threats to her sovereignty pointed up the precarious position of the Hawaiian government as an independent nation. Early in 1843, Lord Paulet, in command of the

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<sup>20</sup>C. Wilkes, Narrative of the United States Exploring Expedition, 1838-1842, Vol. IV, p. 19.

<sup>21</sup>Samuel F. Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1936), p. 348.

<sup>22</sup>Kuykendall and Day, Hawaii: A History, pp. 64-65.

British warship Carverfort, as a move to protect British interests "took matters into his own hands and forced the provisional transfer of Hawaii to a British Commission which governed until July, 1843." Lord Aberdeen, the British Foreign Secretary, upon inquiry from the United States, disavowed the action and Hawaii was returned to its independent status.<sup>23</sup>

The French seizure in 1849 was made by Rear Admiral de Tromelin, commander of the French frigate La Poursuivante, and Secretary of State Clayton informed the Hawaiians "that the United States would not only mediate 'but remonstrate,' [italics in the original] and that while the United States did not want to seize the Islands it would not consent to allow any other nation to take them."<sup>24</sup> The French restored the Hawaiian government, but the Hawaiians remained apprehensive through the years.

Relations between the two nations were cordial throughout the reign of Kamehameha III, so cordial, in fact, that the king, in time of crisis in 1854, had a treaty of annexation to the United States drawn up. Two controversial points--annexation as a state rather than as a territory and the amount of an annual payment to the king, chiefs and officials--delayed the signing of the treaty, and the death of Kamehameha III on December 30, 1854 ended the first movement toward annexation. There is some indication that the Hawaiians insisted upon the statehood provi-

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<sup>23</sup>Sylvester K. Stevens, American Expansion in Hawaii, 1842-1898 (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Archives Publishing Company of Pennsylvania, Inc., 1945), pp. 16-18.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., pp. 50-51.

sion at the suggestion of the British Minister Resident at Honolulu who was well aware that this would insure the failure of the treaty.<sup>25</sup>

Kamehameha III achieved recognition of Hawaiian independence by two of the powers late in 1843 when Great Britain and France signed a joint declaration to that effect. The United States declined an invitation to sign the declaration on the basis of American policy concerning entangling alliances.<sup>26</sup> Secretary of State Calhoun, however, reaffirmed in the summer of 1844 the statement made by Webster in 1842. The need for recognition of Hawaii's independence has been made more urgent by the desires of foreign capitalists who wished to develop the agriculture of the islands, but who held back because of the unsettled future of the Hawaiian government.<sup>27</sup>

During the years following Captain Cook's first visit to the Hawaiian Islands, geographic location gave the islands economic significance as supply stations for the fur traders plying between the northwest coast of America and China. The exchange media brought by the foreigners were guns and ammunition, which the chiefs were anxious to have for waging war against each other. The discovery of sandalwood, a commodity

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<sup>25</sup>W. D. Alexander, "The Uncompleted Treaty of Annexation of 1854," Papers of the Hawaiian Historical Society, No. 9 (Honolulu: Hawaiian Gazette Company, Ltd., 1897), p. 20; Bemis, A Diplomatic History, p. 349.

<sup>26</sup>Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (second edition; New York: F. S. Crofts and Company, 1944), p. 468.

<sup>27</sup>Kuykendall and Day, Hawaii: A History, p. 63.

much desired in China, occurred in 1790 and by 1811 its exportation was the most significant factor in commercial activities in the islands. During the American financial crisis of 1819 specie was scarce. The sandalwood was very acceptable as a medium of exchange in China, and the result was an uninhibited run by the Yankee traders on the supply in the islands--a run which depleted the supply and caused the sandalwood trade to collapse about 1830. For example, one single ship from Boston remained at Honolulu for eight months for trading purposes in 1819 and left with \$44,470 worth of sandalwood.<sup>28</sup> Location still favored the islands, however, since the loss of the sandalwood trade was compensated for by a vigorous trade with whalers who stopped for supplies. Their demands for food stimulated the agricultural endeavors of the islanders.<sup>29</sup>

All of the trading activities attracted persons of many nationalities, thus producing the political situation which emphasized the need for recognition of Hawaii's independent status. Toward the close of the 1830's the growing of sugar cane gave considerable promise of greatly increased income, and the foreign capital which became more readily available when the political picture had cleared gave an impetus to the shift to a new, more solid economy based on agriculture.

A significant proof to the general interest in agriculture at the middle of the century was the organization of the Royal Hawaiian

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<sup>28</sup>W. D. Alexander, "Early Trading in Hawaii," Papers of the Hawaiian Historical Society, No. 11 (Honolulu: The Bulletin Publishing Company, Ltd., 1904), p. 23.

<sup>29</sup>Kuykendall and Day, Hawaii: A History, p. 90.

Agricultural Society, which included not only farmer, planters, and graziers but also businessmen and government officials, all of whom were eager to see the natural resources of the country developed wisely.<sup>30</sup>

### III. FOUR HAWAIIAN MONARCHS-1855-1893

The death of Kamehameha III marked the end of strong American missionary influence and the beginning of a closer Hawaiian-British relationship. The two kings who ruled from 1855 to 1872, Kamehameha IV (1854-1863) and Kamehameha V (1863-1872), had visited England and the United States and had returned to Hawaii with a definite admiration for the British form of government and the English church. Both of them worked during their respective reigns toward stabilizing and improving relations with other countries for the purpose of counteracting the tendency toward political union with the United States which had so nearly reached completion in 1854.<sup>31</sup>

The last two Kamehamehas were in accord as to the problem of relations with the United States. Their aim was to find a substitute for annexation which would procure for them the economic benefits which the United States could provide. Sugar had become an important cash crop, and many of the sugar planters, being Americans, were interested in any arrangement which would open to the island industry duty-free markets in the United States. A reciprocity treaty seemed to offer the solution and

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<sup>30</sup> Kuykendall and Day, Hawaii: A History, p. 96.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., pp. 105-09.

both kings made concerted efforts during their respective reigns to consummate such a treaty. Neither was successful; in July, 1855, during the reign of Kamehameha IV, the sugar planters of Louisiana successfully opposed ratification of a reciprocity treaty in the United States Senate, and in 1870 a similar treaty, which had been drawn up and submitted three years earlier, was voted down by an apathetic, Southern-reconstruction-harassed Senate.<sup>32</sup>

Kamehameha IV and Kamshameha V also were of like mind on the matter of the constitutional monarchy provided for in the Constitution of 1852.

In 1852, recognizing the defects of the bill of rights and constitution of 1840, and having evidently made considerable progress towards a real constitutional government, the King [Kamehameha III] granted a constitution, which is often spoken of as the first constitution of Hawaii. Of course it is not the first, but it contained in the declaration of rights a statement of the rights and powers of the people, with limitations on the royal prerogatives which perhaps first made Hawaii a real constitutional monarchy.<sup>33</sup>

The last two of the Kamshamehas objected to the restraint placed upon the throne by the representative body which had been provided in that constitution. Kamehameha IV, having sworn to uphold the document, made legal attempts to amend it to strengthen the throne but succeeded in putting through only a few minor changes which did not by any means weaken the

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<sup>32</sup>John Patterson, "The United States and Hawaiian Reciprocity," The Pacific Historical Review, VII (1938), p. 18.

<sup>33</sup>W. R. Castle, "Sketch of Constitutional History in Hawaii," Twenty-third Annual Report, Hawaiian Historical Society (Honolulu: Paradise of the Pacific Press, 1915), p. 17.

power of the popularly elected House of Representatives. His successor showed his intent immediately upon his accession by refusing to take the prescribed oath at his inauguration.<sup>34</sup> When the convention which he called for the purpose of revising the constitution failed to provide what he wanted, Kamehameha V abrogated the Constitution of 1852, promising one of his own authorship. His document promulgated in 1864, restored the throne to a position of authority above the representative assembly. The citizenry had liked the freedom which it had tasted, yet the new constitution remained in effect during the whole of the reign of its originator. Opposition was not completely absent, but it was neither strong enough nor well enough organized to defy the king. It was, however, the first flame to be applied to the pot of dissension which was to boil over into revolution. The last two Kamehamehas ruled nine years each, with records of successful diplomatic relations with the world powers, secure agricultural-based economy, and relatively stable economy.<sup>35</sup>

The next king of the Hawaiian kingdom had the distinction of being the peoples' choice. Kamehameha V had died on December 11, 1872 without naming an heir, and it became the responsibility of the legislature to elect a new ruler. Before that body met, a plebiscite was held,

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<sup>34</sup>W. F. Frear, "Hawaiian Statute Law," Thirteenth Annual Report, Hawaiian Historical Society, p. 52.

<sup>35</sup>Sanford B. Dole, "Thirty Days of Hawaiian History," Twenty-third Annual Report, Hawaiian Historical Society, (Honolulu: Paradise of the Pacific Press, 1915), p. 29.

and the vote was almost unanimous for Lunalilo, a high ranking, popular chief. When the legislature did meet, its vote was in accord with the will of the people.<sup>36</sup> "His reign, however, was weak and contained signs of disintegration, ..."<sup>37</sup>

Lunalilo's reign was short but significant. One year and twenty-five days after he became king he was dead. In that time he contributed to the unrest begun by Kamehameha V. He restored through amendments the spirit of the Constitution of 1852, and he appointed cabinet members who, with one exception, were of American origin. The majority of the people approved the liberal constitution, but there was no prevailing desire for closer co-operation with the United States, a possibility definitely in view if the King's choice of cabinet members was any indication of his sentiments. Lunalilo's rule did not pass without the renewal of efforts to get the much-desired reciprocity treaty. Again there was failure, but this time it was due to Hawaiian opposition. A proposal to cede the harbor of Pearl River was a part of this projected treaty, and the opposition on the home front was strong enough to defeat ratification. A final contribution to the circumstances which were to shape the future was made by Lunalilo when he failed to name an heir.<sup>38</sup> It was necessary

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<sup>36</sup>Sanford B. Dole, "Thirty Days of Hawaiian History," Twenty-third Annual Report, Hawaiian Historical Society, p. 47.

<sup>37</sup>W. R. Castle, "Sketch of Constitutional History," Twenty-third Annual Report, Hawaiian Historical Society, p. 19.

<sup>38</sup>Kuykendall and Day, Hawaii: A History, pp. 140-44.



once again for the legislature to elect the successor to the throne. The choice which the legislators made provided fuel for the fire of dissension, and during the next two decades, events fanned the flame into the blaze that destroyed the monarchical government.

The Constitution of 1864 permitted a recourse by the King to a system of what may be described as personal government, and in many respects it afforded little or no encouragement or protection to the views or demands of the people at large, even when expressed through the medium of their representatives in the legislature.<sup>39</sup>

Lunalilo's successor "seized with avidity upon the political and personal advantages which the situation afforded," suppressing and strangulating anything remotely near the ideals of parliamentary or responsible government.<sup>40</sup>

It should be noted here that the main problems of the Hawaiian government were created by the diversity of nationalities represented in the populace. It is also significant to recall that from the very beginning of foreign infiltration the development of the social, political and economic facets of Hawaiian civilization was influenced openly as well as subtly by men and women of American birth. When the legislators made their choice of a successor to Lunalilo, it became just a matter of time until American influence would bring about annexation to the United States. It shall suffice here to sketch briefly the events which

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<sup>39</sup> Clarence W. Ashford, "Last Days of the Hawaiian Monarchy," Twenty-seventh Annual Report, Hawaiian Historical Society (Honolulu: Paradise of the Pacific Press, 1919), p. 20.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., pp. 20-21.

precipitated the revolution and accomplished annexation.

After Lunalilo's death on February 3, 1874, the legislature set February 12 as the date for meeting to select the next king. In the intervening time a contest for the throne developed between Queen Dowager Emma and Kalakaua, the chief who had been defeated by Lunalilo in the election of 1873. Both won considerable support among the natives. The foreigners split, with the British favoring Queen Emma and the Americans and others supporting Kalakaua.<sup>41</sup> The legislature selected the latter, and the supporters of Queen Emma in Honolulu protested the choice with violence. They attacked and wounded some of the legislators and sacked the court house. To prevent successful rebellion, the new King and his Minister of Foreign Affairs requested marine troops of the American minister and the British commissioner to restore order. The request was granted and Kalakaua's seventeen-year reign got off to a stormy beginning based on a show of force.<sup>42</sup>

Of signal importance was the fulfillment by Kalakaua of the dream so long in the thoughts of Hawaiians, the institution of a reciprocity treaty with the United States. The strides which were made in the economic and social phases of island life as a result are not as important to this consideration as are the political implications. The

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<sup>41</sup>Kuykendall and Day, Hawaii: A History, p. 144.

<sup>42</sup>W. H. H. Southerland, "Incidents connected with the Election of King Kalakaua in February, 1874," Twenty-first Annual Report, Hawaiian Historical Society (Honolulu: Paradise of the Pacific Press, 1913), pp. 12-15. Admiral Southerland was a midshipman at the time and was in charge of American marines who helped in quelling the riot.

treaty was signed on January 30, 1875, ratified by the United States Senate a month and a half later after the addition of an amendment, and put into operation on September 9, 1876.<sup>43</sup> The Senate amendment was significant in as much as it placed restrictions on the Hawaiian King in the area of foreign relations. The reciprocity treaty according to Bemis, was an attempt by the United States to prevent other nations from taking over the islands by means other than annexation. President Grant had stated that the United States did not want outposts

"in the hands of those who may at some future time use them to our disadvantage." This fixed policy was embodied in the treaty of commercial reciprocity ... which provided that none of the territory of the Hawaiian Islands should be leased or disposed of to any third power, and none of the privileges granted by the treaty should be conferred on any other nation.<sup>44</sup>

The treaty was to extend over a seven-year period, and it might be terminated thereafter by either party by the giving of a one-year notice of intention to the other party.<sup>45</sup> The treaty was almost universally approved by the island residents, but strong opposition in the United States grew until, by 1883 when the treaty could be ended by either country, continuation was seriously in doubt.<sup>46</sup> The treaty, however, was extended another seven years with the addition of another amendment. This time the Hawaiian government gave exclusive right to the use of the

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<sup>43</sup>Thomas Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, p. 468.

<sup>44</sup>S. F. Bemis, A Diplomatic History, p. 349-50.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., p. 451.

<sup>46</sup>Kuykendall and Day, Hawaii: A History, p. 159-60.

harbor of Pearl River as a coaling station to the United States. "Slowly and inexorably Hawaii was being drawn within the orbit of American control."<sup>47</sup> Final ratification was delayed until the islanders had been given assurance by the American government that Hawaiian independence would not be impaired by the amendment to the treaty.<sup>48</sup>

On the domestic scene, Kalakaua was working to make the power of the throne supreme. He was a champion of the absolutist ideas of Kamehameha V, but instead of making a new constitution to achieve these ideas, he used the right given him by the constitution to dismiss his cabinet and to govern without it. "An unrelenting struggle for political power went on during most of the reign of Kalakaua, and culminated in a series of revolutions that foretold the downfall of the monarchy in the following reign."<sup>49</sup> A secret political organization, known as the Hawaiian League, was formed about 1887 to reform the government by means of a more liberal constitution. Through the activities of the League, a mass meeting on June 30, 1887, which could have become a bloody riot, was held to inform the king that a new, more liberal constitution was the demand of the people. The threat of violence was very real to Kalakaua for earlier in the month of June the League "practically threw off the mask and assembled en masse" at the docks to receive and distribute arms and

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<sup>47</sup>Bailey, A Diplomatic History, p. 469.

<sup>48</sup>Kuykendall and Day, Hawaii: A History, p. 161.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid., p. 162.

ammunition.<sup>50</sup> Sanford B. Dole, a prominent figure in the League and in the revolution to come, wrote in his Memoirs, "Members of the League on the other islands were generally in favor of a radical policy and of annexation to the United States."<sup>51</sup> Kalakaua capitulated and signed the constitution which members of the League drew up. The new constitution, signed on July 6, 1887, placed the power in the hands of the legislature and subjected all official acts of the king to the approval of the legislature.<sup>52</sup> Unrest continued, however, and it developed into a struggle between the native Hawaiians supporting the king on the one hand, and the foreign element, fighting through the Reform Party to hold the ground gained through the Constitution of 1887 on the other. Kalakaua died on January 20, 1891, and his sister, Liliuokalani, "came to the throne at a difficult moment in the history of Hawaii. ... a time of great economic stress ... [and] political controversies ..."<sup>53</sup>

The new monarch had ruled as regent on two occasions during her brother's reign, so she was not totally unprepared for the task she faced. She shared her brother's political ideas, was hostile to the

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<sup>50</sup>C. W. Ashford, "Last Days of the Hawaiian Monarchy," Twenty-seventh Annual Report, Hawaiian Historical Society, p. 23-24.

<sup>51</sup>Andrew Farrell, ed., Sanford B. Dole's Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution (Honolulu: Advertiser Publishing Company., Ltd., 1936), p. 49, hereafter cited as Dole, Memoirs.

<sup>52</sup>Kuykendall and Day, Hawaii: A History, p. 171.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., p. 174.

Constitution of 1887, and was strong-willed enough to seek a return to a powerful monarchy. Her political troubles were magnified by economic depression in Hawaii which resulted from a change in the United States tariff policy in the McKinley tariff, a change which brought West Indian sugar into competition with the Hawaiian. Political strife increased in tempo, climaxing in January, 1893, when the Queen indicated that she intended to replace the Constitution of 1887 with one of her own making. An organization known as the Committee of Safety and composed of foreign-born residents was determined that she do no such thing. Sanford B. Dole, the man who was to be the first president of the Hawaiian Republic, wrote, "I found the meeting [of the Committee of Safety on January 16, 1893] unanimously in favor of setting aside the monarchy and establishing a republican form of government, with the view of eventual annexation to the United States."<sup>54</sup> The Hawaiian monarchy ended on January 17, 1893. The Committee of Safety took possession of the government building and read a proclamation which wrote finis to the monarchy and set up a Provisional Government headed by Sanford B. Dole.

The role in the overthrow of the monarchy played by the United States has been argued interminably. The fact that American troops were brought ashore and the American flag raised over the government building on February 1st gave rise to accusations that the United States had precipitated and actively participated in the revolution. Mary Krout, an American correspondent in the islands at the time, reported,

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<sup>54</sup>Dole, Memoirs, pp. 76-77.

And when Captain Swinburne, in command of the Marines which were landed, was questioned, his reply was:

"My orders are to protect the Legation, the Consulate, and the lives and property of American citizens, and to assist in preserving order. I do not know how to interpret that; I can do it in but one way. If the Queen calls upon me to preserve order I am going to do it."<sup>55</sup>

The raising of the American flag, according to Dole, was done at the request of the Provisional Government.

The administration of public affairs proceeded smoothly, but still a feeling existed in the councils that conditions were unsatisfactory and that a more quiescent influence than was possessed by the Provisional Government was desirable. With this object in view, a motion was adopted in the councils favoring a request to the American Minister that he assume a quasi protectorate of the Hawaiian Islands. Mr. Stevens assented to the request and on the 1st of February raised the United States flag over the Government Building, ...<sup>56</sup>

Alfred Stedman Hartwell, a member of the Hawaiian judiciary at the time of the revolution, attested to Mr. Stevens' innocence in the matter of sharing in the scheme.

There is no particle of foundation for the calumny that there was a conspiracy between the United States Minister, John L. Stevens, and Thurston and his friends to bring about a disturbance ... culminating in the overthrow of the monarchy and annexation.<sup>57</sup>

Hartwell maintained that

The coup d'etat was mainly due to Lorrin A. Thurston, who was not concerned with sugar men, whose vigorous mentality carried others

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<sup>55</sup>Mary H. Krout, Hawaii and a Revolution (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1898), p. 86.

<sup>56</sup>Dole, Memoirs, pp. 91-92.

<sup>57</sup>Alfred Stedman Hartwell, "Forty Years of Hawaii Nei," Fifty-fourth Annual Report, Hawaiian Historical Society (Honolulu: The Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Ltd., 1947), p. 21.

not connected with planting interests along with him in his conviction that the queen's government had been a menace to the lives and property of Americans.<sup>58</sup>

Bailey, writing in recent years, took a dim view of the claims that Stevens was innocent of active participation in the plot, for he described Stevens as "the notoriously proannexationist United States minister" and said "the enthusiastic [italics inserted] Stevens proclaimed Hawaii a protectorate."<sup>59</sup>

That the Provisional Government was only temporary is evidenced by the promptness exhibited by that government in sending a delegation to Washington to negotiate a treaty of annexation. The men left Hawaii on January 17, 1893, and arrived in Washington on February 3. The next day they were interviewed by John W. Foster, Secretary of State under President Harrison. Lorrin Thurston, a member of the delegation, reported

In a preliminary discussion with Secretary Foster, the commission expressed a desire to have Hawaii annexed as a state. Mr. Foster replied that he had no personal objections, but he added that our main problem was to secure annexation, and that whether Hawaii should be annexed as a state or a territory was secondary. Undoubtedly, he continued, there would be opposition to annexation in any form, and the opposition would find additional material ... upon which to object. Therefore he suggested that the status of Hawaii after annexation be eliminated from the treaty, ... The commission accepted the suggestion.<sup>60</sup>

In a paper read before the Hawaiian Historical Society in 1951, Charles

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<sup>58</sup> Alfred Stedman Hartwell, "Forty Years of Hawaii Nei," Fifty-fourth Annual Report, Hawaiian Historical Society, p. 20.

<sup>59</sup> Bailey, A Diplomatic History, p. 470.

<sup>60</sup> Andrew Farrell, ed., Lorrin A. Thurston's Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution (Honolulu: Advertiser Publishing Company, Ltd., 1936), pp. 283-84.



H. Hunter tried to show that

The evidence is clear that there was no desire for statehood on the part of the Provisional Government and the sugar planters.

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 While the treaty of 1893 was withdrawn from the Senate by Cleveland and annexation had to wait upon more propitious times, the Hawaiian oligarchy never changed its attitude toward statehood. Men like Thurston, Dole, Kinney, W. O. Hunter, and others, after long careers for the most part in Hawaii, went to their deaths opposed to statehood for Hawaii "now."<sup>61</sup>

A treaty of annexation was signed on February 14, 1893, and it was submitted to the Senate immediately. No action was taken, however, because President-elect Cleveland was due to take office shortly. "On March 7, 1893 [President] Cleveland sent a curt five-line message to the Senate in which he resorted to the unusual step of withdrawing the treaty for examination."<sup>62</sup>

President Cleveland showed no inclination to be friendly toward the Provisional Government. He sent James H. Blount, special commissioner, to investigate the circumstances surrounding the revolution. The validity of the report which Blount made to Cleveland was questioned on the basis of his reputation and the manner in which he conducted his investigation in Hawaii. Bemis called him an "avowed small-navy anti-imperialist."<sup>63</sup> Mary Krout said that he never examined the papers of the

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<sup>61</sup> Charles H. Hunter, "Statehood and the Hawaiian Annexation Treaty of 1893," Fifty-ninth Annual Report, Hawaiian Historical Society (Honolulu: Advertiser Publishing Company, 1951), p. 11.

<sup>62</sup> Bailey, A Diplomatic History, p. 472.

<sup>63</sup> Bemis, A Diplomatic History, p. 460.

American Consulate "so obligingly offered,"<sup>64</sup> and Bailey recorded that "Blount conducted an investigation of acknowledged thoroughness but disputed impartiality."<sup>65</sup> Having completed his investigation, Blount returned to Washington to report to President Cleveland. Albert S. Willis then was sent by Cleveland to undo the revolution and restore Queen Liliuokalani to the throne. Dole, as head of the Provisional Government, stood firm, refusing to recognize any right on Cleveland's part to interfere. Cleveland submitted the question to Congress for decision, and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations ruled, according to Dole,

that the President of the United States had no authority to attempt to reopen such determined questions, and to endeavor by any means whatsoever to overthrow the provisional government or to restore the monarchy which it had displaced.<sup>66</sup>

Without the support of Congress, Cleveland had little choice but to recognize the new republic as did the other powers.<sup>67</sup> Dole and the other officials of the Provisional Government realized that annexation was impossible as long as Cleveland was President of the United States, and they called a constitutional convention which was to create the Republic of Hawaii.

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<sup>64</sup>Krout, Hawaii and a Revolution, p. 148.

<sup>65</sup>Bailey, A Diplomatic History, p. 472.

<sup>66</sup>Dole, Memoirs, p. 162.

<sup>67</sup>Bemis, A Diplomatic History, p. 460.

#### IV. THE HAWAIIAN REPUBLIC AND ANNEXATION

The constitutional convention met on May 30, 1894 to consider the document written largely by Sanford Dole and Lorrin Thurston. Debate and amendments produced a constitution rather unique in its contents but effective enough to carry the Republic through its span of four years. The new constitution was promulgated and made effective on July 4, 1894.

Article Twenty-three read,

Sanford B. Dole is hereby declared to be the President of the Republic of Hawaii to hold office until and including the 31st day of December, 1900, and thereafter until a successor shall have been duly elected and qualified.<sup>68</sup>

The intent of the revolutionary leaders still was to achieve eventual annexation to the United States. Proof of this fact can be found in the Thirty-second Article of the Constitution of the Republic.

The President, with the approval of the Cabinet, is expressly authorized and empowered to make a Treaty of Political or Commercial Union between the Republic of Hawaii and the United States of America, subject to the ratification of the Senate.<sup>69</sup>

Mary Krout quoted a statement that she felt was typical of the reasons for the desire for annexation among the islanders as it was expressed by Mr. Gay, grandson of the first owner of the Island of Niihau, and an unqualified annexationist.

"I was a British subject," he said, "and have a profound love for English institutions. Personally, I would have preferred the

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<sup>68</sup> Robert C. Lydecker, compiler, Archives of Hawaii, Publication 1 (Honolulu: The Hawaiian Gazette Company, Ltd., 1918), p. 196.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid., p. 198.

protection of the English flag, but it is not practicable. The Hawaiian Islands, by all the laws of right and nature, are in sympathy with the United States, to whom they owe their institutions and their civilization. People of other nationalities have simply reaped the reward of the American enlightenment and Christianizing. With her markets freely open to us, our commercial and national prosperity will be assured.<sup>70</sup>

Miss Krout's interview with Mr. Gay took place in 1893. In 1897 President Dole expressed to the Hawaiian legislature his reasons for seeking annexation.

The grounds for the adoption of this policy on the 17th day of January, A. D. 1893, were:— First, the existing local condition under which the maintenance of stable government was beset with great and increasing difficulties, and the growing menace to the small Hawaiian population involved in the impending immigration, possibly unlimited, of races whose civilization was not in accord with the established institutions of the country; second, the rapidly developing of the great naval powers in the Pacific Ocean which rendered permanence of the independent government of the Hawaiian Islands extremely uncertain; third, the importance of securing such permanence of relations with the United States as would render possible the development of the resources of this country; and fourth, an abiding conviction that it was for the best interests of all the peoples of these islands.

All of these reasons for annexation to the United States of America still exist and subsequent events have emphasized their importance.<sup>71</sup>

Proposals of annexation met with mixed reactions in the United States. During the years of Cleveland's administration--the period in which the Hawaiians were certain that annexation would have to wait-- there was support from some areas. In 1893, a resolution in favor of annexation came from the Colorado State Legislature.<sup>72</sup> In the same year

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<sup>70</sup>Mary Krout, Hawaii and a Revolution, p. 136.

<sup>71</sup>Lydecker, Archives of Hawaii, Publication 1, p. 238.

<sup>72</sup>The Congressional Record (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office), Vol. 24, part 2, p. 1563.

Representative Sanford of New York introduced a resolution relative to annexation.<sup>73</sup> In 1895 the Chamber of Commerce of San Francisco passed a resolution favoring annexation.<sup>74</sup> Senator Lodge of Massachusetts was actively behind the movement for annexation in 1895, introducing a resolution as well as speaking for it on the floor of the Senate.<sup>75</sup> Arguments for annexation stressed the economic, political and strategic benefits which the islands would afford the United States.

The opposition within the United States during the period of the Hawaiian Republic was by no means insignificant. The opinions expressed by Senator Pettigrew and Representative Dinsmore typified the opposition. In a speech to the Senate in 1895 Senator Pettigrew said,

The chairman of the Committee of Foreign Relations has presented the only argument beside the fear of England yet presented. He says it is very essential that we should have the Hawaiian Islands as a port from which to protect the seals in the Bering Sea.<sup>76</sup>

From that point he proceeded to state strongly that he doubted the value of the islands which were 2,000 miles further from the Bering Sea than the ports along the Northwest coast of the United States. He further pointed to the lack of coal in the islands as reducing their value as a naval base.

On June 11, 1898, while debating the joint resolution for

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<sup>73</sup>The Congressional Record, Vol. 24, part 2, p. 1027.

<sup>74</sup>The Congressional Record, Vol. 27, part 1, p. 620.

<sup>75</sup>Ibid., part 2, p. 1167.

<sup>76</sup>R. F. Pettigrew, The Course of Empire. (New York: Boni and Liveright, Inc., 1920), p. 18.

annexation in the House, Representative Dinsmore argued that

I am opposed to it, in the first place, at this time, because I do not believe that we have any constitutional authority by the method proposed to us now to take them. ... I do not believe that we have the power to take them to ourselves except as a state, and I do not believe that the people of these islands are suitable for citizenship.<sup>77</sup>

Dinsmore also strongly suggested that annexation might have unfavorable consequences if done at a time when the United States was fighting Spain.

When the furor over the benefits and the evils of the possessing the Hawaiian Islands had spent itself, the House of Representatives acted favorably on the Joint Resolution of Annexation on June 15, 1898. The Senate added its approval on July 6th, and President McKinley signed the measure on the following day. The transfer of sovereignty took place on August 12, 1898, with the provision that the present government of the islands continue in power as the Republic of Hawaii until Congress could make some other provision for the governing of the islands. Such provision did not come until April 30, 1900, the date on which the President signed the Organic Act, the act to provide Hawaii with a territorial government.<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>77</sup>The Congressional Record, Vol. 31, part 6, pp. 5776-77.

<sup>78</sup>Kuykendall and Day, Hawaii: A History, p. 194.

CHAPTER II

THE JAPANESE IN HAWAII

The annexation of Hawaii to the United States was accomplished despite the fact that opponents had brought to light all of the social, economic and political problems which might make it undesirable to include the islands as an integral part of the United States. Many of these problems, looming large at the time, faded into obscurity almost immediately after annexation. Such was not the case with the problem of the Orientals in Hawaii--especially the Japanese element. In the House debate over annexation, Representative Dinsmore of Arkansas had said, "I do not believe that the people of these islands are suitable for citizenship."<sup>1</sup> All residents, Caucasians as well as Orientals, failed to meet the standards of American citizenship as Dinsmore saw them. However, the Japanese in Hawaii soon became the center of controversy, and this group of people has been called objectionable each time the question of statehood has been raised. The minority reports from the Senate Interior and Insular Committee in 1950 emphasized the fact that the Japanese are still so considered in the minds of some Americans. "If Hawaii had been settled and primarily populated by Americans from the Mainland, there might be no great problem about admitting it as a state."<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>The Congressional Record (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office), Vol. 31, part 6, p. 5777.

<sup>2</sup>"The Question of New States for Our Federal Union," Congressional Digest, XXIX (November, 1950), 277.

## I. MIXED REACTION TO PHENOMENAL INCREASE

Japanese immigration to Hawaii began in answer to an economic demand. Laborers were needed in the expanding agriculture phase of Hawaiian development, and Japan, so recently opened to foreign commerce, appeared to be an excellent source of supply of contract laborers. On June 19, 1868, the first Japanese laborers under contract arrived at Honolulu, numbering about 150.<sup>3</sup> This original group, according to Kuykendall,<sup>4</sup> was recruited with the approval of the Japanese government but did not obtain permission actually to leave Japan, and departed without permission. This lack of Japanese approval of actual departure deferred for a number of years any further immigration of Japanese to Hawaii.

Renewed efforts by the Hawaiian planters to obtain cheap Japanese labor came as a result of the increase of profits from agricultural activity resulting from the Reciprocity Treaty of 1876.<sup>5</sup> They worked through King Kalakaua, who had a personal reason for wanting Japanese immigration to his kingdom. His visit to Japan during his trip around the world was devoted to fulfilling specific objective.

The original purpose of negotiation with Japan for immigration of Japanese to Hawaii was intended by Kalakaua to provide a "Japanese

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<sup>3</sup>Ralph S. Kuykendall, "The Earliest Japanese Labor Immigration to Hawaii," Forty-third Annual Report, Hawaiian Historical Society (Honolulu: The Printshop Company, Ltd., 1935), p. 14.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>See *supra*, p. 20.



orientation for Hawaii as an antidote to American influence in the Islands.<sup>6</sup>

If the minority opinion on statehood for Hawaii reported out of committee in the Senate during June, 1950, is typical, opponents of the statehood movement are convinced that Kalakaua's objective has been nearly achieved.

The Japanese are by far the largest single racial group in the Islands. ... From a comparison of birth rates, it is easy to forecast that within a comparatively few years this one group with its own traditions will completely dominate the economic, social and political life of the Islands.<sup>7</sup>

The above expressed opinion is repetition of arguments that have been repeated over and over ever since 1902, when Congress was petitioned by a group of Hawaiian citizens as follows:

We, the undersigned citizens of the United States, do hereby represent\_\_

First. That the present and future prosperity [of the islands] ... depends ... on the maintenance of the present high standard of living ...

Second. That this standard can not be maintained if the sphere of the American mechanic is invaded by the hordes of Asia, ...

... 75 per cent of all the labor of the Hawaiian Islands, both skilled and unskilled, is being performed entirely by Orientals.

[We request] complete exclusion of both Japanese and Chinese or their descendents from American territory.<sup>8</sup>

A study of the rate of increase in number among the Island Japanese provides some justification for the above-expressed fears and

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<sup>6</sup>F. Hilary Conroy, "The Japanese Immigration to Hawaii," Fifty-eighth Annual Report, Hawaiian Historical Society (Honolulu: The Advertiser Publishing Company, Ltd., 1950), p. 8.

<sup>7</sup>"The Question of New States for Our Federal Union," Congressional Digest, 29:277, November, 1950.

<sup>8</sup>The Congressional Record, Vol. 35, part 4, p. 3816.

misgivings. When the Organic Act of 1900 gave Hawaii territorial status the Japanese numbered 61,111,<sup>9</sup> about thirty-nine per cent of the total population. Annexation brought an end to the immigration of Chinese, but the Japanese continued to come until the passage of the Johnson Immigration Act of 1924--in large numbers until the Gentlemen's Agreement between Japan and the United States State Department was made in 1907, and in a trickle thereafter through the picture bride movement. The unmarried Japanese men in the United States and its possessions were allowed to chose a bride from picture post cards, and, after marriage by proxy in Japan, were allowed to bring their "picture brides" inside United States boundries. The effectiveness of the control established by the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1907 is reflected in the population figures. Lind<sup>10</sup> includes a chart in his book which shows that in 1910 the number of Japanese in the islands had increased by 18,564 since 1900. Only one-fifth of the additional Japanese were foreign born. In the next decade only three per cent of the increase was foreign born, and each succeeding ten-year period has recorded a rapid decrease in the number of alien Japanese.

A further look at the rate of increase through the years of persons of Japanese blood reveals that the ten-year period showing the

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<sup>9</sup>Census Reports, Volume 1 (Washington, D. C.: United States Census Office, 1901), p. 487.

<sup>10</sup> Andrew W. Lind, Hawaii's Japanese (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1946), p. 14.

highest increase was that from 1910 to 1920, which saw a jump of thirty-seven per cent. The more obvious figures showing the Japanese population to be more than one-third of the total population at each census since 1900 caused much apprehension among those persons advocating the development of an American rather than an Oriental atmosphere in the islands before consenting to statehood. Those persons who rebelled against the thought of Oriental domination visualized the island-born Japanese, possessors of the right of suffrage, going to the poll in the near future to control the islands through the ballot.

Granting that no Japanese immigrant can ever become naturalized, nevertheless [there] remains the irrefragable law and fact that every male Japanese, Hawaii born, by his birth is automatically a citizen of the United States. Since practically every other person in all Hawaii is Japanese, it is merely a matter of time when the Hawaii born Japanese vote ... will be practically equal to all other votes combined. When such time comes, it looks as if the Japanese will have the dominant say in local politics. If Hawaii should get statehood, a Japanese governor of the State of Hawaii would be not merely probable but very possible.<sup>11</sup>

The above words of Jack London were written in 1916 when, percentage-wise, the Japanese were as near to being one-half the total population as they have ever been. Mr. London's vision of a Japanese bloc was not based on the suffrage figures of that year since there were only 179 Japanese registered voters as opposed to 18,981 non-Japanese.<sup>12</sup> His predictions were not groundless, however, for the Japanese seldom

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<sup>11</sup>Charmain London, Our Hawaii (revised edition; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922), p. 30.

<sup>12</sup>Statehood for Hawaii. Document No. 151. Senate Documents, Vol. I, Seventy-fifth Congress, second session (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1938), p. 32.

married outside their own race. The seed of racial antagonism found fertile soil in the minds of those who shared Jack London's opinions, and it grew to such proportions as to crowd out all other real objections to Hawaiian statehood. The reluctance of the Japanese to marry outside their own race, so said these people, was ample evidence of a sinister plot to populate the islands with Japanese, who would finally choke out all but Japanese culture.

In a sociological study of interracial marriage in Hawaii, Romanzo Admas explained the Japanese pattern of marrying within their race as a natural result of the large number of Japanese living in the islands.

The Japanese ethical system ... is based on ancestral worship. Filial piety ranks high in the list of virtues. Marriage is undertaken in the interest of the family and so according to old custom the parents select wives for their sons and husbands for their daughters. When the selection is made in this way marriages with persons of another race never take place.<sup>13</sup>

The ability to maintain this old custom can be attributed to the fact that the ratio of women to men was higher in the Japanese group than in the general population. It has not been necessary for the Japanese males to cross racial lines to select brides. Perhaps it is significant to note here that World War II may have created a situation leading to destruction of the Japanese in-group marriage. Lind reports that

Prior to the war, parental disapproval kept the out-marriages among Japanese brides to less than one out of every ten or fifteen. By

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<sup>13</sup>Romanzo Adams, Interracial Marriage in Hawaii (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937), p. 161.

the second year of the war, slightly more than one out of every five brides of Japanese ancestry had broken the ancestral code to the extent of finding a non-Japanese husband, ...<sup>14</sup>

Some of this deviant behavior was forgiven, but in most instances "the [alien] parents disowned and figuratively buried their recreant daughter."<sup>15</sup> The willingness of the younger generation of Island-born Japanese to defy its parents in such matters adds strength to statements made by William E. Hull, Representative from Illinois, after he had toured all of the islands in 1928.

If there is any doubt in the minds of those who live in the States as to the loyalty of those who live on the Hawaiian Islands, it should be dispelled. True Americanism exists in every part of each island and only from the fact that the older generation of the Japanese require their children to attend a Japanese school after the hours of public school, there would be no interference with true Americanism from even this source. But the Japanese boy and girl will soon rebel from attending Japanese schools and will become thoroughly Americanized ...<sup>16</sup>

## II. THE YELLOW PERIL

The apprehension over the flooding of Hawaii by the Japanese apparent during both the annexation negotiations and during World War II resulted in written and verbal protests from mainland residents and island residents alike. The Caucasian group in Hawaii was faced with the problem of reconciling the economic need for laborers with political expediency. Thousands of Japanese laborers were needed for the work to be

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid., Hawaii's Japanese, p. 196-97.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 197.

<sup>16</sup> Congressional Record, Vol. 69, part 2, pp. 1724-25.

done in the sugar industry, but the white residents foresaw in the wave of Orientals a threat to their influence in political matters. An attempt by the whites to protect their position was made while Hawaii was still a monarchy. The Constitution of 1887 which they had forced upon King Kalakaua provided for the denial of the electoral rights to Orientals.<sup>17</sup> The Japanese government lodged no protest against the discriminatory measures which followed until annexation to the United States was almost a reality. The Hawaiian Republic

with its eyes on annexation and aware of American misgivings over the flooding of the islands with Japanese, made a more positive move toward stemming it--and succeeded in outraging Japanese sensibilities more than ever. Shiploads of Japanese, arriving in Honolulu, were prevented from landing, and the majority of the immigrants, under one pretext or another were sent home.<sup>18</sup>

The phrase "American misgivings" used in the above quotation from Mr. Barber's treatise may well have been a reference to the sentiments echoed in the Senate in a speech by the Honorable R. F. Pettigrew on June 23, 1898.

It will be noticed that there is an enormous increase of the Asiatic population. If you look at their commerce, you will find that there has been an enormous increase of commerce between these islands and Asia and a decrease of commerce between these islands and the United States since 1890. Why? Because they want nothing that we produce.<sup>19</sup>

In addition to the economic consideration presented by Senator Pettigrew,

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<sup>17</sup>Joseph Barber, Jr., Hawaii: Restless Rampart (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1941), p. 129.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 130-31.

<sup>19</sup>R. F. Pettigrew, The Course of Empire (New York: Boni and Liveright, Inc., 1920), p. 14.

there was the difference in the social structure which received attention in the United States. In 1902, Senator Perkins stressed the contrasts between Oriental and Occidental civilizations which would create untold friction in Hawaii.

Personal freedom, the home, education, Christian ideals, respect for law and order, are found on one side; and on the other traffic in human flesh, domestic life which renders a home impossible, a desire for only that knowledge which may be at once coined into dollars, a contempt for our religion as new, novel and without substantial basis, and no idea of the meaning of law other than a regulation to be evaded by cunning or by bribery.<sup>20</sup>

While annexation was still in the offing, the Japanese government in 1897 sent high ranking officials to Honolulu to seek redress and specific indemnities for the treatment accorded the Japanese immigrants. The Hawaiian Government refused to make any concession at first, but on the recommendation of the United States Government finally paid \$75,000 to the Tokyo Government "just eleven days before the establishment of American sovereignty."<sup>21</sup> When Hawaii became American soil, the United States inherited the problem of the "yellow peril" in Hawaii which prevented cordial relations between Japan and the United States.

"For fifty years before the Russo-Japanese War, the relations which existed between the United States and Japan had been extremely cordial."<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Sidney L. Gulick, The American Japanese Problem (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1914), p. 4.

<sup>21</sup> Joseph Barber, Jr., Hawaii: Restless Rampart, p. 130.

<sup>22</sup> Meribeth E. Cameron, et al., China, Japan, and the Powers (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1952), p. 340.

The Russo-Japanese War ended the golden age in Japanese-American relations. From the time of Commodore Perry's mission of 1853-1854 to the outbreak of this conflict the United States had evidenced an almost parental pride in the amazing transformation of her Far Eastern protege. But as result of the astonishing victories of 1904-1905 Japan emerged as a world power, and a tinge of jealousy, not unmingled with suspicion and fear, began to affect the traditional friendship between the two peoples.<sup>23</sup>

During the years between 1906 and 1924, the United States pursued an immigration policy which engendered further diplomatic problems.

The problem of Japanese immigration was brought to a head when the San Francisco Board of Education passed a segregation order which required Chinese, Japanese, and Korean children to be kept away from the other public school children.<sup>24</sup> Bailey points out that the Metcalf report showed only ninety-three Japanese children enrolled in the San Francisco schools,<sup>25</sup> but the Japanese regarded the Board order as being directed toward the Japanese and protested strongly to the United States Government. While Bailey devotes 331 pages to the crisis thus precipitated, Cameron and associates summarize by saying that

The Roosevelt administration had to point out that this was a matter over which the federal government had no jurisdiction. However, it took steps in 1907 and 1908 to remedy the situation which finally proved acceptable to both the Japanese government and the San Franciscans. In the former year the Immigration Act of 1907 was amended in such a way that Japanese laborers were prevented from entering the United States by way of Hawaii, Mexico, and Canada, as many had

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<sup>23</sup>Thomas A. Bailey, Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese-American Crisis (Stanford University, California: Stanford University Press, 1934), p. v.

<sup>24</sup>Cameron, et al., China, Japan and the Powers, p. 342.

<sup>25</sup>Bailey, Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese-American Crisis, p. 33.



been doing. This prompted the San Francisco School Board to remove the restrictions which they had placed on Japanese children ... In 1907-8 the so-called "Gentlemen's Agreement" was worked out between the Japanese and American governments. Under this arrangement the Japanese authorities promised not to issue any more passports to Japanese laborers desiring to come to the United States. In other words, Japan itself would do the restricting, thereby saving face.<sup>26</sup>

Because of the great preponderance of Japanese males in Hawaii and on the West coast of the United States, the "Gentlemen's Agreement" permitted some immigration of Japanese women under the "picture bride" system, and the situation in California became worse instead of remaining static. The practice continued, though vigorously protested by the Californians, until 1920 when President Wilson requested the Japanese Government to discontinue issuing passports to the "picture brides."<sup>27</sup>

Relations between the United States and Japan were severely strained when Congress passed the Immigration Act of 1924. The Act contained a provision for the barring from entrance into the United States aliens who were ineligible to citizenship. Although the exclusion applied to all Orientals, the Japanese were particularly indignant because it had the effect of summarily abrogating the "Gentlemen's Agreement." Secretary of State Hughes, in an attempt to dispel the confusion of thought about the "Gentlemen's Agreement" which was revealed in the debate on the Immigration bill, asked Ambassador Hanihara to draw up a statement of Japan's conception of the Agreement. The opposite effect

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<sup>26</sup> Cameron, et al., China, Japan and The Powers, p. 342.

<sup>27</sup> Chitose Yanaga, Japan Since Perry (first edition; New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1949), p. 438.

from that which Secretary Hughes had hoped for resulted when Hanihara included in his note the words "grave consequences" in describing what the complete exclusion might lead to in Japanese-American Relations. The bill passed the Senate by a vote of seventy-one to four,<sup>28</sup> having already passed the House six days early by a vote of 323 to 71.<sup>29</sup>

One of the strongest protests against statehood for Hawaii during the pre-war years was made in 1927 by W. A. Kinney, a man who was born in Hawaii and who had been one of the Hawaiian commissioners who negotiated and signed the Treaty of Annexation after the Revolution of 1893. His book, in general, is a vehement protest against the wanton destruction of the native Hawaiian race. Groups other than the Orientals received their part of his blast, but the Japanese bore the brunt of Kinney's attack which was meant to show the wisdom of denying statehood to Hawaii.

... the Japanese, particularly, came with the set purpose of returning again to Japan, and are now staying on past the time for their return home, largely with thoughts of ultimate aggression, ...<sup>30</sup>

Kinney was not satisfied that the United States could prevent the Japanese bloc from controlling Hawaiian affairs through politics.

Most all of her powers exercised locally were conferred by Congress, and cannot be abridged or interfered with even by the Federal Government of the United States itself.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>28</sup>Bailey, A Diplomatic History, pp. 705-06.

<sup>29</sup>Congressional Record, Vol. 65, part 6, p. 6258.

<sup>30</sup>W. A. Kinney, Hawaii's Capacity for Self Government All But Destroyed (Salt Lake City, Utah: Frank L. Jensen, Publisher, 1927), p. 188.

<sup>31</sup>Kinney, Hawaii's Capacity For Self Government, p. 35.

He took a dim view of Hawaii's capacity in 1926 for self government.

By reason of the controlling non-assimilable elements in its population, unfitted to exercise the rights of American citizenship, Hawaii is unquestionably now not fit for real self government either as a state or a territory. ...<sup>32</sup>

Statehood, he felt, should come only after the Islands had been cleansed of their Oriental taint.

The reconstruction of Hawaii, along democratic lines, in the author's judgment necessitates .... formal creation of the entire Hawaiian group of Islands into a great military and naval United States reservation to be governed by laws applicable to such territory, and to be run by a commission consisting, say of five members, ... Upon development finally of the right kind of population.... Hawaii should be relieved from the status of a reservation ... and started once more towards development as a democratic commonwealth along traditional lines.<sup>33</sup>

Two incidents during the pre-war years, involving the question of a "fit population for statehood," added fuel to the ever-burning flame of resentment toward the Island Japanese. In September, 1928, the small son of a prominent white family was kidnapped and murdered, and when the perpetrator of the crime was found to be a youth of Japanese ancestry, sentiment waxed strong against all island Japanese.<sup>34</sup> The second incident-- the Massie case in 1931--brought even stronger verbal warnings about the "Japanese menace." The attack by four young men upon the wife of a United States naval officer brought the Massie incident closer to the Mainland residents than the other case cited, and it consequently hampered

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<sup>32</sup> Kinney, Hawaii's Capacity for Self Government, p. 185-86.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., p. 185-86.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., Hawaii's Japanese, p. 124.

more seriously the statehood cause. Ironically, only one of the four young men who were accused of the crime was of Japanese origin, but once again the numerical superiority of that group loomed large in the minds of the fearful who pointed an accusing finger at the entire Japanese population.<sup>35</sup>

Verbal defense of the Japanese failed to sway their accusers, despite the fact that it is a matter of record that the Japanese enjoyed an enviable reputation as a group for careful observance of the law. "The Japanese in Hawaii have been notably law abiding. Their record in this respect is the best in the whole population."<sup>36</sup> This statement by a sociologist is substantiated by the figures on crime submitted year after year in the Hawaiian governor's report to the Secretary of the Interior.<sup>37</sup>

The later years of the 1930's saw a continual effort by the proponents of Hawaiian statehood to vindicate the Japanese element. Delegate King from Hawaii read into the Record in Congress a radio speech which he made in 1936 over a national network.

The people of Japanese ancestry in Hawaii, a total of 148,972 persons, comprise 39 per cent of the total population. ... 40,617 are aliens ... ineligible to naturalization. ... their average age being about 55 ... [No increase in the number of aliens] since the Immigration Act of 1924 placed an absolute ban upon Japanese Immigration, which had, with minor exceptions, already ceased in 1908. ... No

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<sup>35</sup> Lind, Hawaii's Japanese, p. 124.

<sup>36</sup> Edwin G. Burrows, Hawaiian Americans, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947), p. 127.

<sup>37</sup> Report of the Governor of Hawaii, 1923-33 (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office), passim.

possible combination, unAmerican in background, could control locally.<sup>38</sup>

Lind quotes Lt. General Charles D. Herron, commander of the Hawaiian Department, as saying in 1939, "I am sold on the patriotism and Americanization of the Hawaiian people as a whole."<sup>39</sup> When the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the question of the loyalty of the Japanese was still being debated. However, General Walter C. Short, Commanding General in Hawaii when Pearl Harbor was bombed, did not launch out on a harsh program of suppression. General Order No. 5, issued on December 8, forbade Japanese aliens fourteen years of age and up to possess firearms, short wave receiving sets, codes, cameras, or maps of United States installations, and they were required not to change residence, occupation or move "from place to place" without military permission. Simultaneously with General Order No. 5, the military promised that the alien Japanese would not be disturbed in their normal movements as long as they observed the law and the above restrictions.<sup>40</sup>

### III. WORLD WAR II--A TEST BY FIRE

The early days of the war were trying ones for all of the inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands. The thoroughness with which the attackers destroyed the United States warships anchored in Pearl Harbor gave

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<sup>38</sup> Congressional Record, Vol. 80, part 4, pp. 4353-55.

<sup>39</sup> Lind, Hawaii's Japanese, p. 79.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., p. 69.

rise to a flood of rumors of sabotage engineered by the Island Japanese. The other racial groups envisioned all sorts of treachery from the numerically dominant group. The Japanese, in turn, feared a mass evacuation of their race by the government, duplicating the action taken on the West Coast of the Mainland. Their loyalty was questioned when they destroyed all semblances of Japanese culture in their homes in an attempt to avoid being accused of disloyalty for possessing such cultural objects, and also when they failed to destroy these objects. The problem of mass evacuation was complicated by economic necessity, and in the end it was decided to gamble on the loyalty of the group in order to have the benefit of Japanese labor in the all-out war effort.

The total number of Japanese actually held on suspicion during the entire period of the war was only 1,440, and the number actually interned and sent to camps on the mainland was 981, or about one per cent of the adult Japanese population.<sup>41</sup>

Much has been written in recent years which seems to provide adequate evidence that World War II tried the Hawaiian Japanese and found them not wanting. Supporters of the statehood movement point to the record of the Japanese-American army units which fought in Europe and to the overall support of the war effort by the civilian Japanese in Hawaii as undeniable proof of their right to full citizenship. It shall suffice to quote a Department of Interior publication to summarize the arguments of the proponents.

Hawaiians of all racial ancestries cooperated in preparing for

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<sup>41</sup>Lind, Hawaii's Japanese, p. 73.

cooperated in preparing for and prosecuting the war. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation agent in charge at Honolulu, there was not one single act of sabotage or fifth-column activity committed in Hawaii before, during, or after the attack on Pearl Harbor.<sup>42</sup>

#### IV. THE WAR PROVIDED NO BALM

The impressive record made by Hawaii's Japanese population during the war surprisingly, perhaps, did not cause the opposition to change its views. Testimony before the Congressional investigating committee in 1946 produced equally firm statements to the effect that the Japanese peril was not ended. Alice K. Campbell, Democratic senator from Maui County to the Territorial legislature, gave rather startling testimony in view of the fact that she maintained that she was elected to her office by a Japanese bloc in opposition to the Baldwin family, one of the Big Five, who she claimed normally controlled politics on Maui.

The Japanese are largely in their second and third generation with Shintoism still deeply impregnated into their very bloodstream. ...

The Japanese situation in the Territory is a serious menace to good American government.<sup>43</sup>

Another islander expressed sentiments in the same year as damning as those of Alice Campbell.

One influential business and political leader, commonly thought to be very friendly to the Japanese ... referred to the group as follows: "The Japanese, I believe, are loyal to us, most of them, because we are in charge. I do believe that as soon as a Japanese soldier is put on Hawaiian soil, the majority of the people will be loyal Japanese. I think they are just riding ... riding on the fence ...

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<sup>42</sup>United States Department of Interior, Territory of Hawaii (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 5.

<sup>43</sup>Congressional Digest, 26:281, November, 1947.

I have lived with them for 33 years. I know that even in the third and fourth generation the Jap is just as much a Jap as he was a thousand years ago. ... They are not becoming Americanized.<sup>44</sup>

The minority report which was quoted earlier in the chapter<sup>45</sup> indicates that the problem of admission of Hawaii as a state still hinges partially on the presence of so many Japanese in the islands.

The defenders of the Japanese residents of the Islands have not rested during the post-war years. On October 16, 1945, Congressman Robert Hale of the State of Maine said:

One of the obstacles which has stood in Hawaii's path to statehood has been the large proportion of its population which consists of Americans of Japanese ancestry. But Riley H. Allen, editor of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin ... shows dramatically how this picture has been put in a new light by the war.

" ... Americans of Japanese ancestry have made so fine a record in combat and in other wartime duties that it has become a matter of national recognition. ... the very large influx of war workers from the mainland has drastically changed the population situation here.<sup>46</sup>

Then in March, 1947 Julius A. Krug, Secretary of the Interior, in giving fifteen reasons for statehood for Hawaii said, " ... the mixed racial groups that compose the population present no obstacle to statehood, in my opinion."<sup>47</sup> The Majority report of the Senate Committee of Interior and Insular Affairs in June, 1950, pointed to significant figures which were meant to show that Hawaii's population was deserving of statehood.

<sup>44</sup> Lind, Hawaii's Japanese, p. 241.

<sup>45</sup> See supra, p. 34.

<sup>46</sup> Congressional Record, Appendix, Vol. 91, part 13, pp. 4346-47.

<sup>47</sup> Congressional Digest, XXIX (November, 1947), 276.



A preponderant majority of the population of more than half a million is native born and of the total, 87 per cent, or 460,417, are American citizens. ... 99.2 [per cent] of all school children of the territory are native born American citizens. ... attendance at the schools of Hawaii exceeds by far the average ratio in the United States.<sup>48</sup>

The United States Congress still holds the fate of the Hawaiian Statehood movement in the balance. Whether or not the loyalty and assimilable qualities of the Hawaiian Japanese will need further proof can only be a conjecture at the present. The statehood proponents, it seems, are more than willing to stake the future of the islands on the polygot population which has shown the islands' experiment in democracy to be well grounded in American principles of government.

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Congressional Digest, XXXII (November, 1950), 278.

CHAPTER III

LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS AT ADMISSION  
AS A STATE PRIOR TO 1936

Throughout the years following annexation repeated attempts have been made to induce Congress to admit Hawaii to Statehood. The most persistent efforts have been made by those Hawaiian residents who point to the words "integral part of the United States" which are contained in the Treaty of Annexation.<sup>1</sup> They believe that territorial status was intended only to be a formality preceding statehood. They have not been happy about the delay, and they have supported their request for statehood by citing the Consitution.

In the Constitution, the provision looking to the admission of new States is found in section 3 of Article IV, which merely says that "... new States may be admitted by Congress into the Union." No qualifications are set forth.<sup>2</sup>

Delay in granting statehood is, they feel, unwarranted discrimination.

I. THE ORGANIC ACT OF 1900--RESTRICTIVE LEGISLATION

In 1900 Congress passed the Organic Act which gave Hawaii territorial status and outlined her form of government and the extent to which her citizens could participate in the affairs of the United States.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of 1898 (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1936), p. 120.

<sup>2</sup>Statehood for Hawaii. Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Territories, October 7 to 18, 1935 (Washington, D. C.: United States Printing Office, 1936), p. 7.

<sup>3</sup>United States Statutes at Large, Vol. 31, Fifty-sixth Congress, first session (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1901), pp. 141-62.

These limitations stated in the Act have become the basis for much agitation for statehood, since they have made possible some discrimination against Hawaii by Congressional legislation. In addition,

The organic act of a territory, having been enacted by Congress, may be by it repealed or amended in important particulars, without the people's consent and perhaps to their detriment.<sup>4</sup>

This was the testimony before the House subcommittee investigating the statehood question in 1935 given by David L. Crawford, President of the University of Hawaii at that time. He was speaking as a member of the Citizens' Bipartisan Committee, a group which

... was organized by members of both Republican and Democrat parties as well as citizens of the community, who take no part politically but are interested in the welfare of the Territory as a whole.<sup>5</sup>

That committee supported statehood as a protection against " ... legislation fostered by ignorance, suspicion, racial prejudice and military jingoism."<sup>6</sup>

The problem of discrimination as fostered by the Organic Act was a very real one. Victor S. K. Houston, Hawaiian Delegate to Congress from 1926 to 1932, told the House subcommittee in 1935, "I did not get around to the position where I felt that discrimination could not be avoided except through Statehood until 1931; ..."<sup>7</sup> Mr. Houston was referring to such incidents of discrimination as were typified in one that

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<sup>4</sup>Statehood For Hawaii. Subcommittee Hearings. 1935. p. 9.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 14.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 25.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 97.

occurred in 1928. On April 18th of that year Mr. Celler, Representative from New York, on the floor of the House asked permission to extend his remarks and to place in the Record the contents of some correspondence between Delegate Houston and himself.

My Dear Congressman: I note from the Record of yesterday [April 13] ... you were yielded 10 minutes ... for the purpose of making some remarks on foreign investments made by American banks.

In the figures that you have inserted... there is listed in the tabulation under the term "Country" both Alaska and Hawaii.

... By decision of the United States Supreme Court, Hawaii is an integral part of the United States, and therefore any classification, be it only for convenience, which segregates Hawaii under the general heading of "foreign investments" is wholly wrong and liable to do damage to the interests of the Territory. ...<sup>8</sup>

Representative Celler concurred. "The contention of the Delegate from Hawaii is quite sound and it is wrong to classify Hawaii in any way other than that of a Territory of the United States."<sup>9</sup>

Other more serious threats of discrimination occurring in the early thirties were considered by the islanders as omens of darker days if statehood was not attained. For example, on May 23, 1933, President Roosevelt requested of Congress "suitable legislation temporarily suspending that part of the law which requires the Governor of Hawaii to be an actual resident of the islands."<sup>10</sup> Representative Rankin introduced a bill to amend the Organic Act to that effect the next day.<sup>11</sup> The bill

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<sup>8</sup>Congressional Record (Washington D. C.: United States Government Printing Office,) Vol. 69, part 6, p. 6730.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>News item in the New York Times, May 23, 1933.

<sup>11</sup>Congressional Record, Vol. 77, part 4, p. 4141.

was recommended by the Committee on Territories, passed by the House, and then rejected by the Senate after debate and a filibuster. It had taken the combined efforts of all factions in Hawaii to "kill" the bill, and the "whole affair ... gave island leaders pause for thought."<sup>12</sup>

Following close on the heels of the above attempted legislation came the Jones-Costigan Amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act passed in the early part of 1934. The purpose of the amendment was to set up quotas for the sugar-growing areas. When the quotas were announced, Hawaii learned that she had been classed with Cuba, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico as a 'foreign area'.<sup>13</sup> Many who had before been indifferent or opposed to statehood were now converted to that cause. They concluded that only as a state would the islands be safe from such discrimination.<sup>14</sup>

To many Hawaiians it seemed that Territorial status would continue to work to their disadvantage by imposing full responsibilities and duties of United States citizenship without providing full citizenship privileges. The Hawaiian Legislature summarized the undesirable status of Hawaii as compared to the status of the several States in Hawaii's Bill of Rights.

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<sup>12</sup> Joseph Barber, Jr., Hawaii: Restless Rampart (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1941), p. 109.

<sup>13</sup> Alexander MacDonald, Revolt in Paradise (New York: Stephen Daye, Inc., 1944), p. 207.

<sup>14</sup> Statehood for Hawaii, Subcommittee Hearings, 1935, p. 25-26.

... this legislature conceives and understands that the principal and material differences between the status of Hawaii and the status of several states are as follows:

1. That certain officers of the Territory are appointed by the President;
2. That the Territory of Hawaii does not vote for President or Vice President;
3. That the Territory of Hawaii is represented in Congress by a non-voting Delegate instead of by Senators and Representatives;
4. That the Territory of Hawaii operates under a Constitution (the Organic Act) enacted by Congress;
5. That the enactments of its legislature are subject to be repealed or amended by the Congress. (In the 23 years since the organization of the Territory of Hawaii, this power has never been exercised by Congress.)<sup>15</sup>

## II. EARLY ATTEMPTS--A FAMILIAR PROCEDURE DEVELOPED

The proponents of statehood did not wait very long after annexation to begin petitioning Congress for the coveted role of a full fledged partner in the Union. On May 16, 1903, Delegate Kalaniana'ole presented in the House of Representatives a joint resolution of the Territorial Legislature asking that the people of that Territory be enabled to organize a State government.<sup>16</sup> Nothing was ever reported out of committee. The second attempt came in the next year when Mr. Kalaniana'ole offered in the House on January 12 a memorial<sup>17</sup> from the Hawaiian Legislature. The memorial was referred, as was the joint resolution, to the Committee on the Territories with the same results, establishing what proved to be a pattern of "no action."

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<sup>15</sup>Statehood for Hawaii, Subcommittee Hearings, 1935, p. 320.

<sup>16</sup>Congressional Record, Vol. 37, part 1, p. 276.

<sup>17</sup>Congressional Record, Vol. 38, part 1, p. 685.

A little more than seven years passed before Congress received legislative notice of Hawaii's continuing desire for a change in political status. On May 16, 1911 the Senate heard a joint resolution from the Territorial Legislature which contained a reminder that

... immediately following the annexation by the United States, Congress passed an organic law giving Hawaii the status of a territory that has been the traditional stepping-stone to statehood; ...<sup>18</sup>

On the same day in the House of Representatives, the Record notes;

By Mr. Clark of Missouri: Memorial from the Legislature of Hawaii requesting the passage of a law admitting the Territory into the Union as a State; ...<sup>19</sup>

In both chambers of the legislature the plea fell on unsympathetic ears.

The Sixty-third Congress was in session when the next appeal came from the persistent petitioner to the hoped-for benefactor. It was a concurrent resolution<sup>20</sup> from the Hawaiian Legislature presented to the Senate by the Vice President early in 1913. It was reintroduced in December, 1915. The resolution was similar to the one first passed in Hawaii in 1903, and Joseph Barber, Jr., commenting on the almost mechanical passing of resolutions for statehood, remarks that

So regular [sic] did this occur that the representative who introduced the statehood resolution in 1915 was moved to admonish his fellows in this manner: "Let no member of the House treat the resolution memorializing Congress as a joke; ..."<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Congressional Record, Vol. 47, part 2, pp. 1218-19.

<sup>19</sup> Congressional Record, Vol. 47, part 2, p. 1260.

<sup>20</sup> Congressional Record, Vol. 50, part 1, pp. 121-22.

<sup>21</sup> Joseph Barber, Jr., Hawaii: Heistless Rampart, p. 99.

The next attempt was a bill<sup>22</sup> introduced in the House on February 11, 1919 by the Hawaiian Delegate to Congress. On June 17 of the same year the Senate heard a memorial<sup>23</sup> on the subject, one which was read by the Speaker of the House on the same day.<sup>24</sup> There was no deviation from the established pattern, so Mr. Kalaniana'ole reintroduced his bill<sup>25</sup> in February, 1920. It was his last contribution to the drive for statehood, since he died in 1922 without realizing his dream.

Five years elapsed before the tenth "assault" was made, and this time the Territorial Legislature tried a different approach. On December 10, 1925 the Senate was memorialized with a request that it make possible a probationary arrangement.

Whereas the repeated refusals of the Congress to consider our petitions for statehood justify a conclusion that Congress does not deem the Territory sufficiently qualified to assume the responsibilities of full self government; ...<sup>26</sup>

The joint resolution requested that Congress amend the Organic Act so that the Hawaiian legislature would be allowed to amend the Organic Act "... thereby in effect permitting the Territory to establish a probationary State, ... This would provide an opportunity for the territory to better prove to Congress their ability for self government."<sup>27</sup> The

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<sup>22</sup>Congressional Record, Vol. 57, part 3, p. 3175.

<sup>23</sup>Congressional Record, Vol. 58, part 3, p. 2693.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 2809.

<sup>25</sup>Congressional Record, Vol. 59, part 3, p. 2383.

<sup>26</sup>Congressional Record, Vol. 67, part 1, p. 603.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid.



Senate did not reciprocate, however, and the memorial suffered the fate of its predecessors.

Victor S. K. Houston, Delegate to Congress for six years beginning in 1926, did not rush into the task at hand. It has been mentioned that Mr. Houston did not believe until 1931 that statehood was a necessity. Thus, it was not until December of that year that he made a definite move. He introduced a bill in the House<sup>28</sup> on the ninth, one day after the Senate had heard a joint resolution from the Hawaiian Legislature containing a draft of an Enabling Act that Houston had drawn up for its guidance.<sup>29</sup> Still, Congress was not ready to consider the problem.

It was Delegate McCandless, successor to Mr. Houston, who made the fourteenth attempt to secure statehood for Hawaii. His bill<sup>30</sup> was introduced in the House in April, 1934. Sentiment on the mainland was perhaps as unfavorable toward statehood as it had ever been, due to the unusual attention focused on the islands as a result of the Massie case and other almost equally unflattering incidents. Therefore, it was not quite so strange that the bill died in committee.

### III. H. R. 3034--A GLIMMER OF HOPE

There must have been rejoicing in the "Paradise of the Pacific"

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<sup>28</sup> Congressional Record, Vol. 75, part 1, p. 265.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., pp. 64-5.

<sup>30</sup> Congressional Record, Vol. 78, part 7, p. 7727.

when the news arrived that the House Committee on the Territories was to hold hearings on the statehood question. The year 1935 seemed to hold promise of final success. Hawaii had a new Delegate to Congress, Samuel W. King, and on January 7, he introduced " ... a bill (H. R. 3034) to enable the people of Hawaii to form a constitution and a State government to be admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the States; ..."<sup>31</sup> Action was not immediately taken by the Committee on the Territories, and the Senate was once again presented with a joint resolution<sup>32</sup> from the Territorial Legislature on April 29, one month prior to the initial committee hearing on H. R. 3034.

The House Committee on the Territories met on May 31, hearing testimony from Delegate King. It was not an extended hearing but it was a significant one. Mr. King said, "The Hawaiian people as a whole will never be satisfied with any other political organization but that of a Sovereign State of the Union."<sup>33</sup> He tried to point out that statehood for Hawaii would not be a catastrophic step.

The people of Hawaii already share every burden that is laid upon the people of America. ...the only difference the change of status [from Territory to Statehood] would make is in Hawaii's participation in national elections, and in the deliberations of the United States Congress, and the election rather than the

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<sup>31</sup>Congressional Record, Vol. 79, part 1, p. 178.

<sup>32</sup>Congressional Record, Vol. 79, part 6, p. 6601.

<sup>33</sup>Hearing Before the Committee on the Territories, House of Representatives, May 31, 1935 (United States Government Printing Office, 1935), p. 5.

appointment of some of the Territorial officers.<sup>34</sup>

Representative O'Malley from Wisconsin countered with an expression of one of the most serious doubts when he said,

If Hawaii were to become a State, of course, Hawaii would be the first State that was not attached physically to the mainland, and with the possibilities of international complications with a State 2,000 miles away from the mainland, those possibilities would be very much more than they would be where the State is a part of the whole.<sup>35</sup>

The committee had a membership of twenty-three and only five of them, aside from the chairman, directed any questions to Mr. King. A subcommittee was named and further testimony was not heard until that subcommittee had traveled to Hawaii to get an on-the-spot picture of conditions.

The six-member subcommittee<sup>36</sup> arrived at Honolulu on the sixth of October, 1935, and began hearings the next day which continued through October 18.

In all, there were 105 witnesses whose testimony was taken before said committee, 90 of said witnesses giving testimony favoring a change for Hawaii from a Territory to a State.

.....  
It is the opinion of the committee that it would be conservative to state that a comfortable majority of the citizens of the Territory of Hawaii favor statehood for the islands.  
.....

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<sup>34</sup> Hearing Before the Committee on the Territories, House of Representatives, May 31, 1935, p. 5.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., p. 18.

<sup>36</sup> The membership of the subcommittee included Eugene B. Crowe, Indiana, Chairman; Raymond J. Cannon, Wisconsin; J. J. Dempsey, New Mexico; Ernest Lundeen, Minnesota; Jack Nichols, Oklahoma; Wilder King, Delegate from Hawaii.

Your subcommittee is of the opinion, however, that considerable further study is necessary before a favorable report be made on the King bill, which is H. R. 3034.<sup>37</sup>

Concurring were Representatives Crome, Dempsey, and Nichols. Representatives Lundeen and Cannon "... concur... but are of the opinion that H.R. 3034 be, by the subcommittee, favorably reported to the main committee for passage in the House of Representatives."<sup>38</sup>

The opinion of the majority of the subcommittee stood, and the glimmer of hope for Hawaii faded. Efforts for getting Congressional approval of statehood were to continue, and undoubtedly the task was undertaken with a great deal more spirit, the proponents having tasted of more success than in early attempts.

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<sup>37</sup>Statehood for Hawaii. Subcommittee Hearings, 1935. p. 329.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid.

CHAPTER IV

A STUDY OF GROUPS OPPOSING STATEHOOD  
SINCE 1935

The year 1935 closed without the addition of another star to the American flag, but the fact that an Hawaiian statehood bill had received the attention of an investigating Congressional subcommittee gave an impetus to the movement which has carried it through the years. Certainly, the investigation held in Hawaii in 1935 served as a keynote for a more concerted effort by the proponents of statehood; and the opponents would be no less stimulated to summon forth their forces to match the resulting boom for statehood. A study of the records, however, does not reveal any impressive list of groups opposing the statehood movement. During the 1937 hearings on the statehood bill, nineteen of the sixty-six witnesses who testified were opposed to statehood.<sup>1</sup> In the 1940 statehood plebiscite held in response to the recommendation of the 1937 investigating committee, one out of every three Hawaiian voters was opposed to statehood.<sup>2</sup> Yet in spite of this significant number of

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<sup>1</sup> Statehood for Hawaii. Senate Report No. 1928, Eighty-first Congress, second session (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 33.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

opponents to statehood, Samuel Wilder King testified in 1946 that "no organized group has yet appeared in opposition."<sup>3</sup> His contention can be supported by the fact that subsequent Congressional investigations made the absence of organized opposition more conspicuous. The committee hearings in 1947 list no witnesses appearing in opposition and only three communications expressing a negative attitude toward statehood for Hawaii.<sup>4</sup> Two investigations by Congressional committees in 1948 did not unearth much more opposition. When Senator Guy Cordon of Oregon held hearings in Hawaii during January, 1948, only sixteen of 231 witnesses opposed statehood. On April 15, eight additional witnesses appeared before the Senate subcommittee in Washington, none of whom were in opposition.<sup>5</sup> In 1949, "five witnesses testified, none in opposition, though two communications in opposition to the legislation were received ..."<sup>6</sup>

The Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee held hearings in Washington the early part of May, [1950] heard 60 witnesses, none in opposition, though several communications in opposition to statehood were inserted in the record.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>Statehood for Hawaii. Hearings before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Territories, the House of Representatives, Seventy-ninth Congress, second session, pursuant to H. R. 236 (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 31.

<sup>4</sup>Senate Report No. 1928, Eighty-first Congress, second session, p. 34.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 35.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 36.

Although some of the expressed opposition was received from groups, most of the statements came from individuals speaking for themselves.

I. FEAR OF REPRISALS CITED AS REASON  
FOR LACK OF OPPOSITION

In 1940, the statehood plebiscite showed that there were 22,428 Hawaiian residents who definitely did not want statehood for Hawaii.<sup>8</sup> Where were these people when the hearings were being held? A possible answer is contained in the records and reports kept by the Congressional committees making investigations in connection with statehood bills for Hawaii. One witness, before such a committee, Fredrick Charles Hart, a retired Navy service man, was opposed to statehood in 1937 because of the domination of the Hawaiian Islands by a group of business organizations referred to as the Big Five.<sup>9</sup> This group, since it has favored statehood since 1935, will be discussed at greater length in Chapter Five, and it is only necessary to mention here that there were many who opposed statehood because of the monopoly enjoyed by the Big Five. Several other individuals testified in 1937 in the same vein. The report made by the Senate committee after the hearings made special note of the situation.

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<sup>8</sup> News item in the New York Times, November 12, 1940.

<sup>9</sup> Statehood For Hawaii. Hearings before the United States Congress Joint Committee, Seventy-fifth Congress, second session, pursuant to Senate Concurrent Resolution 18 (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1938), p. 18.

It was only natural ... that the corporate executives of Hawaii, like the corporate executives of every State in the Union of the United States, should seek to influence the local legislative body. ...

This is the circumstance which caused several witnesses to come before the commission to charge that the "Big Five" are in complete control of the islands and that nothing is permitted to transpire without their consent. Members of the committee were impressed by the fact that many residents of the islands approached them privately to express opinions with respect to the subject of the inquiry with the expression that they feared reprisals if they testified publicly.<sup>10</sup>

The fear of reprisal from another group was in evidence in 1946 as Tom Fong, a resident of the islands, wrote the following to the House Committee on the Territories: "I, for one, would hate to see the day when a Yamamoto or Okino is elected to Governor of Hawaii. I trust that you will treat this letter in a confidential manner."<sup>11</sup> Again in 1948 the same note of fear appeared in two letters to Senator Hugh Butler of Nebraska, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. One was a letter from, as Senator Butler put it, a "prominent lawyer" who was a resident of Hawaii.

There are hundreds of people in the Territory who are opposed to statehood, but because of fear of reprisals, both political and economic, they must remain inarticulate.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Statehood for Hawaii. Document No. 151, Senate Documents, Vol. I, Seventy-fifth Congress, second and third sessions (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1938), p. 75.

<sup>11</sup> Statehood for Hawaii. Hearings before the Committee on the Territories, House of Representatives, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, pursuant to H. R. 3643 (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 29.

<sup>12</sup> Congressional Record (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office), Vol. 94, part 6, p. 5930.



The above evidence is not conclusive proof that fear of political and economic reprisals is the reason for the lack of more group opposition than has appeared, but the fact remains that many more Hawaiians made their stand against statehood through the secrecy of the ballot than have been willing to express opposition publicly.

## II. GROUP OPPOSITION WITHIN MAINLAND ORGANIZATIONS

There has not been a total lack of group opposition to Hawaii's aspirations for statehood. Mainland groups, not being dependent upon the whims of the "Big Five" for their continued existence, if that has been the reason for no Hawaiian group opposition, have made some protest against giving Hawaii participation in the Union equal to that of the several States. The year 1936 had scarcely begun before the 11th Women's Patriotic Conference on National Defense passed a resolution calling on the government to deny statehood to Hawaii. As originally drafted, the group's resolution "gave the reason for such action, namely, that the population of the islands was largely Asiatic with the Japanese holding great political power in them."<sup>13</sup> In the following year the American Federation of Labor Convention, meeting in Denver, "opposed incorporation of Hawaii into statehood."<sup>14</sup>

The action by the American Federation of Labor may have been in response to the conditions described by Webb Waldron in the American

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<sup>13</sup>News item in the New York Times, January 30, 1936.

<sup>14</sup>News item in the New York Times, October 8, 1937.

Magazine.

... a mechanic in Honolulu said to me, "I had a good job promised me down the street here in a garage, \$35 a week. Then a Jap comes along and offers to take the job for \$22 a week. He gets it. These Japs are running down the wages all over these islands. That's why I'm against statehood."

.....  
I discovered a number of instances in which Japanese had apparently brought wages down, in competitive jobs. This is one thing which persuades certain intelligent, clear-thinking people of the islands to favor the postponement of statehood.<sup>15</sup>

The early stand taken by the American Federation of Labor in opposition to statehood has not been reiterated in recent years, but that organization has not expressed itself in favor of statehood in recent years either.

Other pre-World War II group opposition, according to a Travel Magazine writer, observing the problem in 1946, included "Prominent members of bar associations, American Legion spokesmen, the California State Grange, and naval officers ..."<sup>16</sup> The American Legion has reversed its position since World War II,<sup>17</sup> but the others have not made further statement and may still be unsympathetic toward Hawaii's aspirations.

When World War II had ended and was no longer a reason for postponing the admittance of Hawaii to statehood, group opposition appeared along with renewed activity by proponents of statehood. The Sonoma

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<sup>15</sup>Webb Waldron, "A New Star in the Union," The American Magazine, CXXIII (April, 1937), 79.

<sup>16</sup>Hoyt McAfee, "Hawaii Bids for Statehood," Travel, LXXVIII (December, 1946), 11.

<sup>17</sup>Senate Report No. 1928, Eighty-first Congress, second session, p. 40.

County [California] Grange No. 1 objected in January, 1946, to giving Hawaii full membership in the Union. The reason was one which was as old as the Hawaiian statehood movement itself.

.... whereas inasmuch as a large portion of the population of Hawaii is ineligible to citizenship, and inasmuch as these ineligible would be blanketed into citizenship by acceptance of the Territory as a State: Therefore it is

Resolved by this Sonoma County Pomona Grange No. 1, That we herein express our absolute opposition to granting such statehood until such time as the above-mentioned ineligible can properly be excluded from citizenship; ...<sup>18</sup>

One month later The California Joint Immigration Committee sent a letter to the House Committee on the Territories which said in part,

No hearing was held on this coast, and residents of California, Washington, and Oregon most certainly desire to be heard in opposition. This committee intends to vigorously oppose the granting of statehood to Hawaii at this time.<sup>19</sup>

Then on March 2, 1946 The Native Sons of the Golden West added an appeal to sustain the thinking of the California Joint Immigration Committee.

The board of grand officers (board of directors) of the Grand Parlor of the Native Sons of the Golden West in session assembled in San Francisco, Calif., respectfully request that action on the bills to grant statehood for Hawaii be deferred until testimony is taken from the people of the Pacific coast by a Congressional committee.<sup>20</sup>

The purpose of this study is to record the facts which have had a bearing on the Hawaiian statehood movement. The above cited group opposition is the total number of instances of that form of opposition

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<sup>18</sup> Hearings on H. R. 3643, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, p. 34.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., p. 39.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 46.

which this writer has discovered. Any attempt to say more than already has been said concerning the reasons for the obvious lack of group opposition would be in the realm of conjecture. A limited study of the arguments for denying statehood advanced by individuals through the years would be of more value. The remaining pages of this chapter will contain the statements of individuals who have contributed to the delay in giving Hawaii statehood.

### III. REASONS FOR DENYING STATEHOOD REMAIN CONSISTENT

Those who have opposed statehood for Hawaii since 1935 cannot be accused of inconsistency, for they have stated their reasons for opposing the action which would add the forty-ninth star to the American flag, and they have remained steadfast in their belief. The number of reasons has been few, adding, perhaps, to the effectiveness of the opposition since the arguments have been concentrated and have obtained emphasis from repetition.

The most significant reason given has been considered at length in Chapter Two, but for the sake of completeness, a few additional examples of the very strong feelings against the Asiatics--particularly the Japanese--in Hawaii are desirable. It was the years prior to World War II that produced the most frequent and most condemning statements against the Japanese. Typical of the critical opinions is one reported by the New York Times in November, 1937--the opinion of Major Alexander Sidney Ianier, a Veterans' Administration employee. According to the Times,

Major Lanier asserted that the racial problem was a barrier to statehood, and that the Japanese children in Hawaii owed an allegiance to Japan "which they could not disavow if they would, and they would not if they could."<sup>21</sup>

The post-war period has been marked by sharp criticism of the Japanese element in spite of the outstanding record made by that group during the war. Two residents of the islands expressed as critical a view after the end of the war as any that had been expressed earlier. Mrs. Kamokila Campbell, Democratic National Committee woman, resigned her post in January, 1946, to open an office in Honolulu to help disseminate anti-statehood materials. "Mrs. Campbell objects to statehood at this time because, she said, there is danger that Oriental segments of the population, voting as a bloc, might hold political control ..."<sup>22</sup> Late in 1950 Leonard Slater, writing from Honolulu for Newsweek, said, "A [Honolulu] bank official commented thus: 'We never should have taught these Japs to kill white men in the war. Now they think they're as good as we are' ..."<sup>23</sup> An official recognition of the barrier to statehood created by the presence of the Asiatics in Hawaii is found in the report of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs submitted on June 29, 1950. The report summarized the main objections of the opposition,

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<sup>21</sup> News item in the New York Times, November 28, 1937.

<sup>22</sup> News item in the New York Times, January 7, 1946.

<sup>23</sup> Leonard Slater, "Hawaii: Stalled Statehood," Newsweek, XXXVI (November 27, 1950), 22.

and one objection read, "That with the so-called Caucasians outnumbered, political control will be in the hands of groups alien to our American political traditions, culture, and way of life."<sup>24</sup>

The remaining objections named in the above-mentioned report were:

(1) That Communists have great political and economic power in the Territory.

.....  
 (3) That the Territory is "noncontiguous" and hence outside the pattern of the present Union of States.<sup>25</sup>

The question of Communism noted here as a deterring factor is the latest in the series of questions raised since 1935 concerning the fitness of the Hawaiian population for maintaining a government embodying American democratic principles. The question of the fitness of the Hawaiian population goes back to the fight in Congress over the annexation of Hawaii.<sup>26</sup>

A disabled veteran, in testifying before a Congressional committee in 1937 said,

There is no patriotism where you can't get the Territory to furnish \$2,500 for a soldiers home, and you can't look to statehood to do better. ...You've got to put statehood off far enough so that these kids now in kindergarten are 25 years old, and are schooled on the proposition of patriotism.<sup>27</sup>

In a letter written in 1945 by a serviceman and signed by thirty-seven other servicemen, the lack of patriotism was the reason given for favoring the denial of statehood. "The treatment rendered to the service man

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<sup>24</sup>Senate Report No. 1928, Eighty-first Congress, second session, p. 8.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid.

<sup>26</sup>See supra, p. 31.

<sup>27</sup>Hearings on Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 18, Seventy-fifth Congress, second session, p. 23.

alone has proven the fact that these people are not deserving of statehood."<sup>28</sup> An Hawaiian resident said in 1946, "... the caliber of men available locally for our legislature and other public offices is low, far too low for them to carry us into and through statehood."<sup>29</sup> In 1950 Jen Fui Moo, executive vice president and general manager of Honolulu's American Security Bank said,

We are not yet capable of making true economic decisions. How many of our citizens of Oriental ancestry are members of the board of directors of leading houses of business in the Territory? How many sit in on these meetings when financial decisions are made or policies established? Until these people reach that plane, I don't think they will be ready to participate in national government.<sup>30</sup>

These few statements are typical of the feelings of many opponents of statehood who do not accept the idea that Hawaii has been a melting-pot on the order of that in continental United States.

The third objection listed by the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs in its 1950 report also is as old as the statehood movement. The fact that Hawaii is separated from the mainland by 2,500 miles of ocean has been an argument against statehood for two reasons. The first reason centered around the strategic importance of the islands to American military defenses. That was stressed very strongly prior to World War II when Japan first began to show signs of aggression in the

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<sup>28</sup> Hearings on H. R. 3643, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, p. 25.

<sup>29</sup> Hearings on H. R. 236, House Subcommittees, Seventy-ninth Congress, second session, p. 254.

<sup>30</sup> News item in the New York Times, December 3, 1950.

East. The periodical and newspaper writers of those years found that the situation offered good copy on a controversial subject.

Naturally, it would be inappropriate for any United States Navy or Army man to take an official position on statehood. But one officer at Pearl Harbor made a remark which bore on the matter. He said, "In case of war, it might be easier for us to control the islands under the present setup than under statehood."<sup>31</sup>

The above quotation appeared in 1937. The same sentiments were expressed in September, 1940, by Harold Callender, reporting to the New York Times from Hawaii.<sup>32</sup> Scholastic carried an article in the December 2, 1940 issue which emphasized the opinion of the military.

Aside from the "Japanese menace," the U. S. Navy has other reasons for opposing statehood. It believes that control of Hawaii as an outpost of American defenses in the Pacific would not be as complete and dependable if the Territory became a State.

.....  
The Army is not so worried about the Japanese. But it believes the Islands should be put under a commission government, with an army-navy-civilian control set up in Washington.<sup>33</sup>

Since the end of World War II the defense arguments have all but disappeared, but the great distance separating Hawaii from the continent still disturbs many individuals. Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, the president emeritus of Columbia University, wrote several letters in 1947 warning of the destruction of the Union as it had been conceived and developed through the long period of American history.

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<sup>31</sup>Webb Waldron, "A New Star in the Union," p. 76.

<sup>32</sup>Harold Callender, Special report to the New York Times, September 15, 1940.

<sup>33</sup>"Seven Times Seven Equals Hawaiian Statehood," Scholastic, XXXVII (December 2, 1940), 14.



To add outlying territory hundreds or thousands of miles away, with what certainly must be different interests from ours and very different background, might easily mark, as I said, the beginning of the end.<sup>34</sup>

Still another consideration to be made concerning the distance between Hawaii and the California coast was pointed out by a resident in the Hawaiian Islands in 1951.

This extension of the boundaries of the American republic farther and farther toward Asia disturbs me; if I were watching the development from Asia's shores I am sure it would disturb me much more.<sup>35</sup>

Though the proponents say that because of modern transportation Hawaii is closer in matter of time to the Nation's capitol than California and other western States were at the time of their admittance as States, the precedent which Congress would set by admitting an island State is one not to be established lightly.

One other serious objection to granting Hawaii full membership in the Union has been stressed only since 1947. It concerns the representation which Hawaii would have in the Senate. An editorial in the Portland, Maine Press Herald of July 3, 1947 ventured the opinion that "there is some sense in the objection that [at its present population] Hawaii would have one Senator for each 35,000 voters, ..." <sup>36</sup> A letter to the editor of the New York Times two years later pointed out the inequality which would exist if Hawaii and its 500,000 people were represented

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<sup>34</sup> Congressional Record, Vol. 93, part 3, p. 3833.

<sup>35</sup> "Betraying the American Ideal," The Christian Century, LXVIII (January 24, 1951), 103.

<sup>36</sup> Congressional Record, Vol. 93, part 8, p. 10778.

by two Senators while New York State has the same number of Senators for 15 million persons. The letter concluded, "Whatever may have been the reasons for admitting new states with small populations, there is no reason why such an inequality should be emphasized further."<sup>37</sup>

There is some evidence that many of those groups and individuals who oppose immediate statehood would agree to Hawaii's eventual statehood. The opposition, meager as it seems to be, has delayed statehood and perhaps will have helped to prepare Hawaii by enforcing a longer waiting period, during which time the objectionable features of Hawaii's political, economic and social life are being altered.

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<sup>37</sup> A letter to the editor of the New York Times, July 24, 1949.

CHAPTER V

A STUDY OF GROUPS SUPPORTING STATEHOOD  
1936 TO 1953

The 1935 Congressional investigation, though it failed to produce statehood for Hawaii, did produce concrete evidence of strong support for favorable action by Congress on a Hawaiian statehood bill. Subsequent investigations carried out in connection with Hawaiian statehood bills-- nine in all--have amassed evidence in support of statehood in such quantities as to make it difficult to believe that Hawaii still knocks at the door. In 1937 a joint Congressional committee, holding hearings on the five major Hawaiian islands, "heard 66 witnesses, 47 of whom favored statehood, and collected nearly 700 pages of testimony."<sup>1</sup> In 1946, after an interim of nine years due to the international unrest in the Pacific area and the culmination of that unrest in World War II, a House subcommittee that visited Hawaii compiled 908 pages of testimony, statements and exhibits contributed by "107 witnesses, 91 of whom favored statehood."<sup>2</sup> The voluminous report produced by the 1946 investigation was most significant since World War II, according to the proponents of statehood, had substantiated beyond question Hawaii's claim to full membership in the Union. The House Committee on Public Lands, meeting in Washington,

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<sup>1</sup>Statehood for Hawaii. Senate Report No. 1928, Eighty-first Congress, second session (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 33.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

D. C. in March 1947, made an addition of 310 pages to the material on hand after hearing the testimony of thirty-five witnesses, all urging favorable action on statehood.<sup>3</sup> Three separate investigations in 1948 incorporated into the records the testimony of 239 witnesses. Of that number 216 favored statehood.<sup>4</sup> Then, in 1949, a House subcommittee heard five witnesses testify for statehood, but none in opposition,<sup>5</sup> and the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, during hearings in May, 1950, heard sixty witnesses testify in favor of statehood while receiving no testimony against it.<sup>6</sup>

The 454 testimonies advocating statehood were not given by an equal number of witnesses, of course. The overwhelming amount of favorable testimony is indicative, however, of the scope of the group support. Two examples emphasize how wide the scope is, and serve to keynote a careful study of the group support which has been given to the Hawaiian statehood movement. On November 5, 1940, the Hawaiian voters went to the polls to register their wishes through a statehood plebiscite. The plebiscite was held in response to a recommendation by the 1937 Congressional investigating committee that such a plebiscite be held in order to

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<sup>3</sup>Senate Report No. 1928, Eighty-first Congress, second session, p. 34.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 35.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 36.

ascertain the wishes of the Hawaiian people.<sup>7</sup> The New York Times carried a report of the results. "The Hawaiian Islands voted more than 2 to 1 in favor of statehood in last week's plebiscite. The complete official count: Yes, 46,174; No, 22,428."<sup>8</sup> There were at that time 87,321 registered voters<sup>9</sup> in the territorial population of 423,330.<sup>10</sup> In terms of per cent, eighty-two out of every one hundred Hawaiian voters responded to the opportunity to go on record for or against statehood. More indication of the wide scope of the group support is the statement made by Samuel Wilder King to the Congressional investigating committee in 1946. Mr. King was retired at the time but had served as Governor of Hawaii and as Hawaiian Delegate to Congress.

I want to emphasize that statehood has never been a partisan or class issue in Hawaii. The proponents of statehood include a majority of every group, political, economic, or racial. The opposite is true. Such opposition as exists cuts across party, class and race lines.

I can think of no political issue that arouses such general support. Both party platforms have favored statehood; the leaders and candidates of both parties have invariably supported statehood. Organized labor has expressed itself as behind statehood. No organized group has yet appeared in opposition.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>Statehood for Hawaii. Document No. 151, Senate Document, Vol. I. Seventy-fifth Congress, third session (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1938), p. 95.

<sup>8</sup>News item in the New York Times, November 15, 1940.

<sup>9</sup>Statehood for Hawaii. Hearings before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Territories, the House of Representatives, Seventy-ninth Congress, second session, pursuant to House Resolution 236 (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 725.

<sup>10</sup>ibid., p. 655.

<sup>11</sup>ibid., pp. 30-31.

The Hawaiian Statehood Commission, the official organ of Hawaiian supporters in 1951, summarized the reasons for statehood, reasons which have been and still are the facts as the proponents see them.

Hawaii shares the inherent right of every territory to advance to statehood ...

Statehood is essential to the material progress of Hawaii. Of even greater importance to its people, statehood is indispensable to the full attainment of their rights and privileges as American citizens.

.....  
 Measured by every criterion [used for admitting new States in the past] Hawaii is fully prepared for statehood.

Statehood would be in the national interest.

.....  
 The territorial form of government was designed for immature, undeveloped units of the American Commonwealth. It was never meant to meet the complex economic, political, and social requirements in government that characterize Hawaii today.<sup>12</sup>

The Statehood Commission singled out two economic aspects for special stress.

Several Congressional Acts have discriminated against Hawaii--acts that might not have been passed had Hawaii been represented in the Congress by its full quota of Senators and Representatives.<sup>13</sup>

Situations such as created by the 1949 dock strike [a virtual standstill of economic activity because of Hawaii's dependence upon sea transportation] might have been dealt with more easily with representation in Congress.<sup>14</sup>

The proponents of statehood, though they represent a variety of special interests, are united in an effort to answer the question put by one

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<sup>12</sup> Hawaii, U.S.A., and Statehood (Honolulu: Hawaiian Statehood Commission, 1951), p. 100.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., p. 10.

proponent. "Since we're the equal of the States in so many points of fact, why should we be inferior in point of law?"<sup>15</sup>

#### I. GROUP SUPPORT--AS POINTED AS THE HAWAIIAN POPULATION

When former Hawaiian Governor King made the claim in 1946 that statehood had never been a partisan or class issue in Hawaii, he was not expounding a myth if the records of the nine Congressional investigations are any criteria for judging his statement. There is ample evidence in the form of testimonies, statements and exhibits to show that political, social and economic groups agree on the statehood issue. Probably the best illustration of combined group support is the official commission --known by various titles since its inception in 1935 by Territorial legislative action<sup>16</sup>--which has been responsible for presenting Hawaii's case before the people of the United States and Congress. The purpose of this organization, like its title, has undergone change since its creation in 1935. Delegate S. W. King, testifying in 1937, said, "We have an organization called the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission ... The Governor is chairman. The chief justice is a member, and the superin-

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<sup>15</sup>L. M. Judd, "Hawaii States Her Case," Current History, LI (July, 1940), 42.

<sup>16</sup>Hearings on H. R. 236, House Subcommittee, Seventy-ninth Congress, second session, p. 11

tendent of public works is another member."<sup>17</sup> When asked by Senator Tom Connally of Texas whether the Commission favored statehood, Mr. King responded, "No, of equal treatment for Hawaii, but not necessarily statehood."<sup>18</sup> That was in accord with the title of the organization, but in 1946, Governor Ingram M. Stainback, who as Governor was chairman of the Equal Rights Commission, told a Congressional committee, "Its primary purpose is to support the movement for admission of the Territory to statehood."<sup>19</sup> In 1947 the Hawaiian legislature entitled it the Hawaiian Statehood Commission,<sup>20</sup> signifying, perhaps, that Hawaii had become convinced that equal rights for Hawaii were only obtainable through statehood.

The commission, as the official organ of the Hawaiian statehood proponents, worked incessantly prior to 1946 to compile statistics and reports on every phase of life in the islands for presentation to the Congress and the people of the United States. Some assistance in accomplishing the commission's "educational program" came from individuals in official positions who would be expected to speak for statehood. Then,

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<sup>17</sup>Statehood for Hawaii. Hearings before the United States Congress Joint Committee, Seventy-fifth Congress, second session, pursuant to Senate Concurrent Resolution 18 (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1938), p. 217.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid.

<sup>19</sup>Hearings on H. R. 236, House subcommittee, Seventy-ninth Congress, second session, p. 11.

<sup>20</sup>Hawaii, U.S.A., and Statehood, p. 1.



in 1946, during the hearings before the House subcommittee, there was a flood of resolutions and memorials from groups in the islands whose members were active participants in all of the phases of Hawaiian life heretofore known only as statistics and printed facts in Congressional records--the product of the Equal Rights Commission. The two major political parties of Hawaii delegated individuals to place on record before the Congressional committee that "both parties have planks for statehood, and are ardently for statehood."<sup>21</sup> The Board of Supervisor of the City and County of Honolulu submitted a unanimous and earnest plea for favorable action on H. R. 236,<sup>22</sup> strengthening the claim that the statehood issue in Hawaii is not a political football. Business registered a favorable vote through the testimony of H. R. Faye, Chairman of the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce. Mr. Faye, in clarifying some of his statements, said,

I refer to the poll that was taken of the membership of the Chamber of Commerce, resulting in ballots being returned by 42 per cent of the membership. The ballots returned indicate a vote of 509 in favor of statehood, and 170 against it, which is a ration of 3 to 1 ...

Based on this result of the membership poll, the board of directors of the Chamber of Commerce of Honolulu, at a board meeting held on January 7, voted unanimously for immediate statehood, ...<sup>23</sup>

The Hawaiian Junior Chamber of Commerce, having gone on record in favor

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<sup>21</sup> Hearings on H. R. 236, House subcommittee, Seventy-ninth Congress, second session, p. 28.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p. 18.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., p. 415.

of statehood in August of 1944,<sup>24</sup> reaffirmed its stand before the House subcommittee.<sup>25</sup>

Members of the professions in Hawaii joined in the parade of groups which marched to the Congressional hearings to urge full citizenship. Heaton L. Wrenn, president of the Bar Association of Hawaii, presented a resolution from that group "unanimously recommending immediate admission of Hawaii into the Union as a State."<sup>26</sup> The physicians of Hawaii displayed unanimity also when they approved without dissent a statement urging statehood, to be presented during the 1946 investigation as the official stand of the Honolulu County Medical Society.<sup>27</sup> The teachers of Hawaii did not present a solid stand as did the other two professions, but the Hawaiian Education Association meeting in convention in 1946 did go on record favoring immediate statehood for Hawaii.<sup>28</sup>

Of great significance was the testimony of Jack W. Hall on behalf of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, boasting a membership of 33,000 workers in Hawaiian industry.

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<sup>25</sup> Hearings on H. R. 236, House subcommittee, Seventy-ninth Congress, second session, p. 56.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., p. 380.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., p. 69.

<sup>28</sup> Hearings on H. R. 3643, House Committee, Seventy-ninth Congress, second session, p. 57.

The International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, hereinafter referred to as the IUWU, is unqualifiedly on record for the Territory of Hawaii being granted statehood at once. The international executive board of the IUWU at its meeting in Washington, D. C., in October 1945, unanimously endorsed immediate statehood for the Territory.

Locally the demand of our membership is for statehood now.<sup>29</sup>

The white-collar workers, in separate action, joined the industrial workers in their endorsement of statehood. The Hawaii section of the American Society of Civil Engineers<sup>30</sup> and the Hawaiian Government Employees' Association<sup>31</sup> added resolutions to that effect to the voluminous records compiled by the House subcommittee in 1946.

A concluding recitation of island groups who sent resolutions which are recorded in the 1946 investigation emphasizes the interracial tone of the island support of the statehood movement. The hearings on H. R. 3643 contain resolutions in favor of statehood from the Honolulu Branch, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People,<sup>32</sup> The Women's Christian Temperance Union of Hawaii<sup>33</sup> and The Club 100-- Incorporated Association of Members of the One-Hundredth Infantry Battalion,<sup>34</sup> while the H. R. 236 hearings include resolutions of the same

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<sup>29</sup>Hearings on H. R. 236, House subcommittee, Seventy-ninth Congress, second session, p. 131.

<sup>30</sup>Hearings on H. R. 3643, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, p. 53.

<sup>31</sup>Hearings on H. R. 236, House subcommittee, Seventy-ninth Congress, second session, p. 380.

<sup>32</sup>Hearings on H. R. 3643, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, p. 37.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. 73.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid.

nature from the Hawaii Chinese Civic Association,<sup>35</sup> the Filipino Federation of America<sup>36</sup> and the Hawaii Civic Club.<sup>37</sup>

## II. SUPPORT FROM THE "BIG FIVE"

The Hawaiian Islands cannot be discussed very long before reference is made to the "Big Five". The term is one which has long been used to identify five large Hawaiian corporations--sugar and pineapple factors--whose control of the two basic industries has made them controllers of life in the islands. These corporations--namely Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd., American Factors, Ltd., Castle & Cooke, Ltd., Theo H. Davies & Company, Ltd. and C. Brewer & Company, Ltd.--were business enterprises established when the American missionaries and their descendants were shaping the Americanization of the islands. The Congressional joint committee on Hawaii points out the fact that the existence of the monopoly held by these five corporations is common knowledge. The controversies arise when any attempt is made to determine how completely the "Big Five" dominate life in the islands and whether the monopoly has helped or hindered the economic, political, and social development of Hawaii.<sup>38</sup> Differences of opinion also exist on the matter of how statehood would

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<sup>35</sup> Hearings on H. R. 236, House subcommittee, Seventy-ninth Congress, second session, p. 407.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., p. 380.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> Senate Document No. 151, Seventy-fifth Congress, third session, p. 69.

effect the control which the "Big Five" has maintained under territorial government. Correspondingly, the "Big Five" are concerned about their position of control under statehood.

Why the corporate interests have so much at stake can best be understood when the extent of their holdings and control is listed.

Army and Navy intelligence officers cooperate with the "Big Five" sugar corporations to control and completely dominate the political, economic and social life of the Hawaiian Islands, according to a report made to the National Labor Relations Board in 1937 by a board attorney, E. J. Eagen, and read today into the record of the Smith Committee investigating the Labor Board.

.....  
 The 22-page confidential report ... asserted that the "Big Five" controlled every activity on the island, including its industries, the sale of land, the banks, transportation, agencies for goods sold to the population, the telephone system, the Police Department, as well as the Legislative, the Executive, the judiciary, the bar, the university, churches, the commander of the National Guard and the election machinery.<sup>38</sup>

The "Big Five" has had too much at stake to remain neutral on the issue of statehood.

The consensus of opinion among writers of Hawaiian history seems to be that the "Big Five" opposed the statehood movement in the early years.

The question of the big interests being for statehood has only grown up since the Roosevelt administration, and prior to that time they had control; and they maintained it. I never heard anybody of financial importance, prior to the Roosevelt regime, mention it.<sup>39</sup>

The above statement was made in testimony before the 1937 Congressional

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<sup>39</sup>Special report to the New York Times, May 4, 1940.

<sup>40</sup>Hearings on Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 18, Joint committee, Seventy-fifth, Congress, second session, p. 182.

investigating committee, and its author, Hal Hanna, had really prefaced the opinions of later writers on the subject that "Hawaii's "Big Five"... decided on the statehood campaign after the AAA issued its first offshore sugar quotas."<sup>41</sup> Under the Jones-Costigan Amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, Hawaii was placed in the category of a foreign country, making it appear to the Hawaiian sugar planters that territorial status was going to work an economic hardship on them. The consequences of the discriminatory sugar quotas, coupled with the attempt in 1933 to amend the Organic Act to make it possible for the President to appoint a non-resident governor,<sup>42</sup> according to most of the writers, placed the big interests squarely behind the statehood movement.

Prior to 1946 there was no great amount of open evidence of active support of statehood by the "Big Five," but bits of written comment appearing from time to time indicated that they were supporters nonetheless. A few examples of what was being written and spoken between the years 1936 and 1946 show circumstantial evidence of support. In 1937 a John F. G. Stokes, when asked to list other Hawaiian residents who would substantiate his claims before the Congressional committee that the big interests were pressing for statehood, said that he could not name specific individuals, but the feeling "in this community is that the financial interests now desire statehood for Hawaii. In a small community

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<sup>41</sup> "Hawaiian Statehood," The New Republic, CIV (January 27, 1941), 101.

<sup>42</sup> See Chapter III, p. 53.

like this, one another's views are known pretty well."<sup>43</sup> In that same year an article appearing in the American Magazine tacitly suggested the attitude of the "Big Five".

On several sugar plantations I found that young Japanese of ability were being put into technical and administrative jobs.

"We can't put Japanese into the really top jobs," a plantation manager told me. "Not yet, anyhow. They might give the wrong impression. We know these boys are just as good American citizens as we are. But it might be hard to convince a visiting Congressman."<sup>44</sup>

In 1940 New York Times Correspondent Harold Callendar wrote from Honolulu,

Business interests here would like to have the islands represented in Congress. Sugar producers believe that statehood would bring an end to what they consider a discriminatory sugar-production quota imposed upon the islands.<sup>45</sup>

In the following year the New Republic carried the following statement as a part of a discussion of the statehood movement.

The Gallup poll showing that Americans with opinions favored Hawaiian statehood two to one is more than anything else a tribute to the Pan Pacific Press Bureau, a department of Bowman, Deute, Cummins, advertising agency for Hawaiian sugar and pineapple factors.<sup>46</sup>

The 1946 Congressional investigation has already been mentioned as being most significant for the number of Hawaiian groups who used the opportunity afforded by the hearings to speak out for immediate statehood.

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<sup>43</sup>Hearings on Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 18. Joint committee. Seventy-fifth Congress, second session, p. 266.

<sup>44</sup>Webb Waldron, "A New Star in the Union," American Magazine, CXXIII (April, 1937), 79.

<sup>45</sup>Special report to the New York Times, September 15, 1940.

<sup>46</sup>"Hawaiian Statehood," The New Republic, p. 101.

Additional quotations from the 1946 hearings place the "Big Five" just as solidly behind the movement. Chauncey B. Wightman, Secretary of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association, representing thirty-four of the thirty-five sugar plantations in the islands, said,

It is our conviction that the sugar workers and all other workers in the Territory will respond beneficially to statehood status ... We feel, in simple justice, we are entitled to equal treatment along with the 48 States.<sup>47</sup>

Producers in the other major industry, through resolutions passed by the Pineapple Growers' Association and the Pineapple Research Institute, informed the Congressional committee in 1946 that they too favored statehood for Hawaii.<sup>48</sup> Both of these major industries reiterated their position to a Congressional committee in 1950.<sup>49</sup> Randolph Seveir, vice-president of Castle and Cooke, Ltd., made the following statement on behalf of the Matson Navigation Company:

If Hawaii is ready for statehood today--and we believe unqualifiedly that it is--the responsibility may be undertaken with full confidence that Hawaii's sea and air commerce are abreast of the time and a bulwark to the Nation.<sup>50</sup>

In addition to the above cited group support, a number of important members of "Big Five" corporations gave personal testimony in support of statehood. C. R. Henenway,<sup>51</sup> chairman of the board of the

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<sup>47</sup>Hearings on H. R. 236, House subcommittee, Seventy-ninth Congress, second session, p. 564.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., p. 561.

<sup>49</sup>News item in the New York Times, May 4, 1950.

<sup>50</sup>Hearings on H. R. 236, House subcommittee, Seventy-ninth Congress, second session, p. 621.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid., pp. 639-40.



Hawaii Trust Company and a board member of eleven other corporations, H. A. Baldwin,<sup>52</sup> manager of the Maui Agricultural Company, Ltd. and holder of six other corporate board positions, Stanley C. Kennedy,<sup>53</sup> president and general manager of the Inter-Island Steam Navigation Company, and S. W. Castle,<sup>54</sup> on six corporation boards, all testified in 1946 in support of Hawaii's admission into the Union.

### III. GROUP SUPPORT ON THE MAINLAND

The year 1946 was the golden year on the mainland as well as in the islands for the Hawaiian statehood cause. Since there had been little in the way of group support in the islands prior to that year, it is not surprising that group action "stateside" had been negligible. There was also a parallel in the number of types of mainland organizations which registered strong support for Hawaii's claims. Political, economic and social groups are represented in the pages of the 1946 hearing report. Writing for The American Mercury in that year, Daniel James, an Information-Education officer on Oahu during World War II, said,

... the Hawaiians are taking no chances. They have experienced too many failures in the past. Under the leadership of Delegate Farrington they are now determined to make a do-or-die attempt.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>52</sup>Hearings on H. R. 236, House subcommittee, Seventy-ninth Congress, second session, p. 638.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., p. 609.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., p. 621.

<sup>55</sup>Daniel James, "Hawaii's Claims to Statehood," The American Mercury, LXIII (September, 1946), 330.

Logically, the attempt would include the mustering of all possible help on the mainland.

Although there was no noteworthy group support before 1946, the Congressional investigation in 1937 and the statehood plebiscite held in Hawaii in 1940 caused some mainland residents to ponder the problem. Two quotations, though not the expressions of organized groups, will serve to summarize the pre-World War II convictions of many individuals in continental United States. One of the very significant considerations before World War II, as stressed in Chapter II, was the questionable loyalty of the numerically superior Japanese population in the islands. In 1937 one writer said, "I am convinced now that, far from being insane, the admission of Hawaii would be the wisest thing this country ever did."<sup>56</sup> As he saw it,

... Hawaii as American, though largely of Oriental blood will be a link between East and West, an interpreter between Occidental and Orient. To incorporate within our borders a body of Citizens who can interpret the Orient to us is a matter of supreme importance.<sup>57</sup>

Late in 1940 Ray Wilbur, writing for The Atlantic Monthly, regarded the step as inevitable as well as wise.

The crux of the problem of Hawaiian statehood is the high preponderance of Japanese in the population of the islands.

.....  
Sooner or later we shall have to recognize that they are a part of our body politic. The melting pot has done well in our country. It will have to work along the Pacific as it has around the Atlantic.

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<sup>56</sup> Webb Waldron, "A New Star in the Union?," American Magazine, p. 37.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., p. 79.

The sooner we bring these citizens of diverse origin into all the responsibilities of statehood the better it will be for our future in the Pacific.<sup>58</sup>

With the war record made by Hawaii still fresh in everyone's mind, the group support in 1946 did not follow any one line of argument. The arguments as outlined by the Hawaiian Statehood Commission<sup>59</sup> were accepted by the mainland groups as sufficient grounds for making Hawaii the forty-ninth State. The first important political group to support the movement was the Republican National Committee, in April, 1946. The delegates to a meeting in Washington, D. C. adopted a resolution calling for "immediate admission of Hawaii as the forty-ninth State ..."<sup>60</sup> This was not the first mention of Hawaii by the National Republican party. In 1940 the Republican platform contained the following statement:

Hawaii, sharing the nation's obligations equally with the several States, is entitled to the fullest measure of home rule, and to equality with the several States in the rights of her citizens and in the application of our national laws.<sup>61</sup>

A recommendation of statehood for Hawaii was implied in the above party plank, but the Republican party did not again couch the recommendation in words with double meaning in 1946. The proposed Republican party plank on the issue in 1948 was "eventual statehood," and it was approved by the

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<sup>58</sup>Ray L. Wilbur, "Statehood for Hawaii," The Atlantic Monthly, CIXVI (October, 1940), 496-97.

<sup>59</sup>See Chapter V, p. 79.

<sup>60</sup>News item in the New York Times, April 2, 1946.

<sup>61</sup>Senate Report No. 1928, Eighty-first Congress, second session, p. 39.

Convention.<sup>62</sup> In 1952 the Republican party platform returned to the party stand of 1946 and proposed statehood.<sup>63</sup>

Support did not come from the Democratic National Party until 1948. The stand taken then was for immediate statehood for both Hawaii and Alaska.<sup>64</sup> In 1950, the Democratic National Resolutions Committee reaffirmed the statehood stand on statehood which was taken in 1948,<sup>65</sup> and the 1952 party platform reiterated that stand.<sup>66</sup> The inclusion of Alaska with Hawaii is reminiscent of pre-Civil War days when two States were admitted at a time in order to maintain the Senatorial balance between slave and free States. In the present instance it was a question of maintaining party balance. In 1946 a correspondent for Newsweek wrote,

The fact that the Islands almost invariably vote Republican in their territorial elections may be an obstacle to statehood so long as the Democrats have a majority in Congress.<sup>67</sup>

The Nation for February 16, 1952 indicated the thinking of a number of individuals. "Since Alaska is normally Democratic and Hawaii Republican,

<sup>62</sup> News item in the New York Times, June 23, 1948.

<sup>63</sup> News item in the New York Times, July 11, 1952.

<sup>64</sup> Senate Report No. 1928, Eighty-first Congress, second session, p. 39.

<sup>65</sup> News item in the New York Times, May 17, 1950.

<sup>66</sup> News item in the New York Times, July 24, 1952.

<sup>67</sup> Ernest K. Lindley, "Hawaii, 49th State?," Newsweek, XXVIII (July 22, 1946), 33.

a 'package deal' ought to be feasible."<sup>68</sup>

Political support was further apparent in the nonpartisan support given to the statehood movement by the Governors' National Conference. That group first passed a resolution favoring statehood in its meeting at Salt Lake City, Utah, in July, 1947, and took similar action at its next two conferences.<sup>69</sup> A fourth resolution in favor of admission passed in June, 1950, was emphasized by Governor Warren of California when he testified before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

In testifying in person before the committee in support of H. R. 49 and H. R. 331, Hon. Earl Warren, Governor of California, pointed out that all resolutions adopted by the Conference had to be unanimous.<sup>70</sup>

All four resolutions by the Governors' Conference, which is composed of all the governors of the forty-eight States, included Alaska as well as Hawaii as being deserving of statehood, suggesting that political bargains were involved. It has been suggested that such attempts to bring both territories into the Union at the same time has deferred Hawaii's admittance. "... Southern Senators fear that Congressional delegations from the new states would reinforce the proponents of civil rights."<sup>71</sup>

The Western Governors' Conference also endorsed statehood for

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<sup>68</sup>"The Shape of Things," The Nation, CLXXIV (February 16, 1952), 145.

<sup>69</sup>Senate Report No. 1928, Eighty-first Congress, second session, p. 40.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>71</sup>"The Shape of Things," The Nation, February 16, 1952, p. 145.

Hawaii, making it at the same time imperative that Alaska be granted full membership in the Union along with Hawaii. The 1948 resolution from the Western Governors said that it was urgent to grant both territories statehood so as to "give to the world in this crucial hour this further affirmative and tangible evidence of our democratic faith and profession."<sup>72</sup> The conference membership includes the chief executives of Hawaii and Alaska and eleven of the Far Western States.<sup>73</sup>

Editorial support for the Hawaiian statehood movement has been strong since 1946.

Evidence was introduced into the hearings [1946] of a newspaper poll recently completed which indicated favorable editorial comment in support of the legislation [H. R. 49] in the newspapers of 37 States.<sup>74</sup>

Senator Estes Kefauver, Tennessee, on April 4, 1950, read into the Record the following: "More than 300 editorials collected this year point out overwhelming national support for statehood."<sup>75</sup>

Active support from chambers of commerce has been in evidence since the end of World War II.<sup>76</sup> Unusually strong support has come from

<sup>72</sup>A special report from Lawrence E. Davis to the New York Times, April 24, 1948.

<sup>73</sup>News item in the New York Times, November 9, 1949.

<sup>74</sup>Report on H. R. 49, House Report No. 194, the United States House of Representatives, Eightieth Congress, first session (Washington, D. C., United States Government Printing Office, March 27, 1947), p. 19.

<sup>75</sup>Congressional Record, Appendix, Vol. 96, part 8, p. 2507.

<sup>76</sup>See Table I.

the West Coast cities, and this fact gives rise to considerable speculation, since the West Coast area had been the scene of mass evacuation of people of Japanese ancestry during the war period. Table I provides a list of chambers of commerce supporting Hawaiian statehood and shows the preponderance of West Coast groups. Since all of the resolutions were very similar, it will suffice to quote only one. In a letter to the House Committee on Territories, the California State Chamber of Commerce said,

Acting on a recommendation from a special committee, our board of directors has gone on record in favor of the granting of statehood to the Territory of Hawaii. ... We feel that the report of the Larcade committee offers inescapable proof of the desire of the people of Hawaii for statehood and their ability for self government.<sup>77</sup>

In favoring statehood for Hawaii, the Portland, Oregon, Chamber of Commerce inadvertently pointed up one of Hawaii's major complaints against territorial status--the fact that it was thought of by many Americans as a foreign country. The Portland Chamber of Commerce turned over the consideration of Hawaiian statehood to its foreign trade [italics not in the original] and shipping committee, and the Chamber gave support to statehood for Hawaii on the recommendation of that committee.<sup>78</sup>

Closing references to mainland support of the Hawaiian statehood movement can be confined to a notation of groups going on record in favor of it since 1949. Table II appeared as Appendix 7 in Senate Report 1928,

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<sup>77</sup> Hearings on H. R. 3643, House Committee, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, p. 37.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., p. 39.

81st Congress, 2d session. It was prepared for the information of the Senate Committee by the Hawaiian Statehood Commission, which may possibly have suggested such resolutions to the groups listed. It indicates conveniently the character and diversity of favoring groups which have paralleled the polygot character of the Hawaiian group support. Those groups which have come out in support since the compilation of the information in Table II have added somewhat to the already existing diversity. Specifically, the Interracial Federation of Milwaukee County, Wisconsin,<sup>79</sup> the National Federation of Business and Professional Women,<sup>80</sup> the National Federation of Shippers<sup>81</sup> and the National Grange<sup>82</sup> have been added to the already impressive list of groups in the United States who have identified themselves as proponents of Hawaiian statehood.

In view of the overwhelming group support both in Hawaii and on the mainland, as compared to the apparent lack of organized group opposition, the words of Winston Churchill might be altered to the situation to say, "never have so few denied so much to so many."

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<sup>79</sup>Congressional Record, Vol. 96, part 8, p. 10765.

<sup>80</sup>News item in the New York Times, July 5, 1952.

<sup>81</sup>News item in the New York Times, February 23, 1953.

<sup>82</sup>Ibid.



TABLE I  
CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE PASSING RESOLUTIONS IN 1946

City	State	Page Number*
Atlantic City	New Jersey	46
Canton	Ohio	45
Los Angeles	California	41
Oakland	California	54
Portland	Oregon	39
Richmond	California	47
San Francisco	California	26
San Mateo	California	47
San Pedro	California	30
Seattle	Washington	37
Tacoma	Washington	40
Venice	California	40
California State Chamber of Commerce		37

\*This is the page number of the published report, Hearings on H. R. 3643, Committee of the Territories, House of Representatives, 79th Congress, 1st session (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1946).

TABLE II \*

NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ADOPTING RESOLUTIONS  
SUPPORTING STATEHOOD FOR HAWAII

Association	Convention held	Dates
1. American Legion	San Francisco, Calif.	February, 1946
	Philadelphia, P.	September, 1949
2. American National Livestock Association	Boise, Idaho	Jan. 13-15, 1948
3. American Veterans Committee	National Convention, Des Moines, Iowa	June 14-16, 1946
4. American Water Works Assn.	National Convention,	June, 1948
5. Association of State and Territorial Health Officers	-----	April, 1946
6. Chamber of Commerce of the United States, board of Directors	Annual meeting	Nov. 22, 1946; Apr. 28, 1948
7. Committee of Maritime Unity (went out of existence in 1949)	San Francisco	May 6-11, 1946
8. Congress of Industrial Organization, executive board	-----	May 17-19, 1949
9. Congress of the National Society of Delta Sigma Rho	National convention, Chicago, Ill.	Apr. 10-12, 1947
10. Disabled American Veterans	Convention, Las Vegas, Nevada	Aug. 17-23, 1947
	Convention, New York,	Aug. 15-21, 1948
	Convention, Cleveland, Ohio	Aug. 15-21, 1949

TABLE II (continued)

NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ADOPTING RESOLUTIONS  
SUPPORTING STATEHOOD FOR HAWAII

Association	Convention held	Dates
11. General Conference of the Methodist Church	Boston, Mass.	May 10, 1948
12. General Council of Congregational Christian Churches	Convention, Oberlin, Ohio	June 24, 1948
13. Governors' National Conference	Salt Lake City, Utah	July 17, 1947
	Portsmouth, N. H.	June 13-16, 1948
	Colorado Springs, Colo.	June 22, 1949
14. International Association for Identification	Rochester, N. Y.	July 18, 1946
15. International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union	7th biennial convention, San Francisco	Apr. 7-11, 1947
16. Kiwanis Club	36th annual convention, Los Angeles, Calif.	June 6-10, 1948
17. Lions International	Philadelphia, Pa.	July 20, 1946
	New York City	July 29, 1948
18. National Association of Real Estate Boards	Atlantic City, N. J.	Nov. 15, 1946
19. National Association of Sanitarians	14th annual convention Salt Lake City, Utah	Sept. 15-17, 1947
20. National Education Association	Convention at Buffalo, New York	July, 1946
21. National Federation of Women's Republican Clubs	Convention at Chicago, Ill.	March, 1947

TABLE II (continued)

NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ADOPTING RESOLUTIONS  
SUPPORTING STATEHOOD FOR HAWAII

Association	Convention held	Dates
22. National Society, Daughters of the American Revolution	55th Continental Congress, Atlantic City, N. J.	May 20-23, 1946
23. Railway Labor Executive Association (motion)	-----	Apr. 27, 1949
24. Republican National Committee	Washington, D. C.	April, 1946
25. Scroptimists Clubs	-----	
26. United States Junior Chamber of Commerce, board of directors	Tulsa, Okla.	Aug. 21, 1947
27. Veterans of Foreign Wars	St. Louis, Mo. Miami, Fla.	Aug. 29-Sept. 3, 1948 Aug. 21-Sept. 26, 1949
28. World Trade Committee	-----	February 1947
29. Young Women's Christian Association	San Francisco	March 14, 1949
30. Zonta Clubs of America	Swampscott, Mass.	June 1946
31. Attorneys General Assoc.	St. Paul, Minn.	Oct. 13, 1949
32. National Grange	Sacramento, Calif.	Nov. 23, 1949

\*This table appeared as Appendix 7 in Hearings on H. R. 3643, 79th Congress, 1st session, p. 40.

## CHAPTER VI

## LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS SINCE 1935

The efforts of the several Hawaiian Delegates to Congress, serving during the years between 1900 and 1935, to get an Hawaiian statehood bill before Congress, as reported in Chapter III, had been fruitless. The Congressmen who had visited Hawaii for an on-the-spot investigation in 1935 "found the Territory of Hawaii to be a modern unit of the American commonwealth with a political, social, and economic structure of the highest type."<sup>1</sup> They were not sufficiently impressed, however, to recommend favorable action on H. R. 3034, statehood for Hawaii. "By a close margin of three to two the bill failed to be reported favorably to the full committee, since the majority felt that further study was necessary."<sup>2</sup>

I. 1936 TO 1946--A DECADE OF  
SUSTAINING ACTION

The partial success of 1935 must have seemed to the proponents of statehood a sign of ultimate success, for there was no statehood bill introduced in 1936. On the basis of the preponderance of favorable testi-

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<sup>1</sup>Statehood for Hawaii. Hearings before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Territories, the United States House of Representatives, Seventy-fourth Congress, first session, on H. R. 3034 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1936), p. 329.

<sup>2</sup>Statehood for Hawaii. Senate Report No. 1928, Eighty-first Congress, second session (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 33.

mony given during the hearings on H. R. 3034, it was not unreasonable for the proponents to expect favorable action in the second session of the Seventy-fourth Congress. H. R. 3034 had received the attention of a Congressional subcommittee, but it, like all other Hawaiian statehood bills up to that time, died in committee.

The process was begun anew by Hawaiian Delegate King when he introduced a statehood bill, H. R. 1523, in the opening days of the Seventy-fifth Congress. It was assigned to committee.<sup>3</sup> Mr. King later introduced an identical bill in June of the same year--probably as a reminder --which likewise was sent to committee<sup>4</sup> where it and H. R. 1523 died. There was significant Congressional action in 1937 as a result of "Senate Concurrent Resolution 18: To provide for the creation of a Joint Committee on Hawaii."<sup>5</sup> The House of Representatives concurred<sup>6</sup> and the joint committee was named. It was to be

... composed of not to exceed twelve Members of the Senate, to be appointed by the President of the Senate, and not to exceed twelve Members of the House of Representatives and the Delegate from Hawaii, to be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>The Congressional Record (Washington, D. C.: The United States Government Printing Office), Vol. 81, part 1, p. 32.

<sup>4</sup>Congressional Record, Vol. 81, part 5, p. 5508.

<sup>5</sup>Congressional Record, Vol. 81, part 7, p. 7360.

<sup>6</sup>Congressional Record, Vol. 81, part 9, p. 9625.

<sup>7</sup>Statehood for Hawaii. Hearings before the United States Congress joint committee, Seventy-fifth Congress, second session, pursuant to Senate Concurrent Resolution 18 (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1938), p. 1.

The twenty-five member joint committee traveled to Hawaii where extensive hearings were held, and the report, Senate Document No. 151, Seventy-fifth Congress, third session, contains the committee's conclusions and recommendations. The committee said, "Hawaii has fulfilled every requirement for statehood heretofore exacted from Territories."<sup>8</sup> Yet the committee recommended that a statehood plebiscite be held to establish definitely the wishes of the Hawaiian people and that further study be made in view of the disturbed condition of international affairs.<sup>9</sup> Hawaii was still without the coveted role of full participation in the Union when 1937 ended.

During the ensuing eight years there was no Congressional action on Hawaiian statehood bills. Delegate King introduced a bill in 1939,<sup>10</sup> another one in 1940<sup>11</sup> and two in 1941<sup>12</sup> before World War II began. The plebiscite recommended by the joint committee in 1937 was held in 1940, with a resulting vote of two to one in favor of statehood,<sup>13</sup> but the Hawaiians recognized the situation as it was and set the statehood issue

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<sup>8</sup> Statehood for Hawaii. Document No. 151, Senate Documents Vol. I, Seventy-fifth Congress, third session, (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1938), p. 94.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p. 95.

<sup>10</sup> Congressional Record, Vol. 84, part 1, p. 27.

<sup>11</sup> Congressional Record, Vol. 86, part 12, p. 13709.

<sup>12</sup> Congressional Record, Vol. 87, part 1, p. 16.

<sup>13</sup> Congressional Record, Vol. 87, part 4, p. 4485.

aside in an all-out effort to fight the war.

In 1942 Hawaii had a new Delegate to Congress. Joseph Farrington assumed the responsibility of seeing that Congress did not forget Hawaii's aspirations. During the war years he introduced statehood bills which met the fate of all previous bills on the subject, but whether or not he was expecting little more than that, he did serve notice that he intended to wage as aggressive a fight as his predecessors.

## II. 1946 MARKED THE BEGINNING OF STRONG SUPPORT FROM CONGRESSMEN

From the time of annexation through World War II, the burden of getting Congress to consider statehood had fallen upon the Hawaiian Delegate to Congress. From the close of the war to the present there have been increasing numbers of Congressman lining up in strong support of the Hawaiian statehood movement. In 1946 the Hon. William F. Knowland, Senator from California, introduced the statehood bill in the Senate.<sup>14</sup> The bill died in committee, but Senator Knowland had at least taken the first step which was to make him one of the most fervent advocates of statehood for Hawaii. The significant Congressional action in 1946 was the investigation held in Hawaii by a House subcommittee. The hearings were the most extensive of the three held in Hawaii to that date, with 107 witnesses testifying and filling 908 pages.<sup>15</sup> When the subcommittee

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<sup>14</sup> Congressional Record, Vol. 92, part 1, p. 1259.

<sup>15</sup> Senate Report No. 1928, Eighty-first Congress, second session, p. 33.



reported to the House Committee on the Territories it said, "It is the recommendation of this subcommittee that the Committee on Territories give immediate consideration to legislation to admit Hawaii to statehood."<sup>16</sup> The second session of the Seventy-ninth Congress ended before the Committee on Territories acted.

No time was wasted in 1947 in getting bills into committee. In the Senate, Senator Knowland reintroduced his bill,<sup>17</sup> and Delegate Farrington, along with ten Representatives, introduced statehood bills in the House of Representatives.<sup>18</sup> Most of the Representatives who introduced bills had served on investigating committees which had traveled to Hawaii. On March 20 the Committee on Public Lands voted unanimously to report favorably to the House H. R. 49, Farrington's bill on statehood.<sup>19</sup>

On the basis of the voluminous testimony, exhibits, and factual evidence consistently submitted to this and former Congressional committees, the Committee on Public lands is unanimously convinced that the Territory of Hawaii has met every necessary requirement to be admitted as a State of the Union. It therefore unanimously recommends immediate approval of H. R. 49 by the House of Representatives.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Report of a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Territories, United States House of Representatives, Seventy-ninth Congress, second session (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 11.

<sup>17</sup> Congressional Record, Vol. 93, part 1, p. 166.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., pp. 42-876.

<sup>19</sup> Congressional Record, Vol. 93, part 15, p. 36.

<sup>20</sup> Report on H. R. 49. House Report No. 194, the United States House of Representatives, Eightieth Congress, first session (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 21.

On May 15 H. R. 212 was passed in the House, granting four hours of debate.<sup>21</sup> The debate took place on June 30 with twenty-six Representatives taking part. Twenty-two of them spoke in support of the bill. The debate filled twenty pages of the Record.<sup>22</sup> At the close of debate a vote was taken and H. R. 49, providing for the admittance of Hawaii as a State, was passed: 195 yeas, 133 nays.<sup>23</sup> In the Senate H. R. 49 was sent to the Committee on Public Lands,<sup>24</sup> where it remained for the balance of the first session of the Eightieth Congress.

The efforts made in 1948 to admit Hawaii as the forty-ninth State provide the most colorful episode in the entire movement. A statehood bill had finally passed the House, and the supreme effort to get Senate approval was to be made. On April 2 the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, in executive session,

... considered Hawaiian statehood bill, and the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Territories and Insular Affairs announced after the meeting that his subcommittee would hold further hearings on the bill beginning April 15.<sup>25</sup>

The hearings were held as scheduled, eight witnesses being heard in favor of the bill and fifty-three pages of testimony being recorded.<sup>26</sup> Then,

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<sup>21</sup> Congressional Record, Vol. 93, part 6, p. 7914.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., pp. 7916-41.

<sup>23</sup> Congressional Record, Vol. 93, part 15, p. 323.

<sup>24</sup> Congressional Record, Vol. 93, part 6, p. 7969.

<sup>25</sup> Congressional Record, Vol. 94, part 14, p. 226.

<sup>26</sup> Senate Report No. 1928, Eighty-first Congress, second session,

on May 8, the committee deferred action by a seven to five vote, passing a resolution providing deferment which was offered by Senator Eugene D. Millikin, Republican of Colorado.<sup>27</sup> On May 10 Senator Knowland, in an attempt to bring the bill before the Senate, submitted a resolution in the Senate "providing for the withdrawal from the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs House bill 49, the Hawaiian Statehood bill."<sup>28</sup> Arthur Krock of the New York Times reported the unofficial reaction to Senator Knowland's resolution.

The Democrats on the Senate committee are willing to vote favorably at once on the application for statehood of the Territory of Hawaii; it is the committee Republicans who oppose. Senator Knowland, a Republican, broke the party front today by trying to have the committee discharged. But in the cloakrooms the reasons for the committee line-up suggest that his party majority will not support him.<sup>29</sup>

Senator Knowland's resolution, S. Res. 232, was the order of business on May 20.<sup>30</sup> The drama of the situation is best seen through the words of three Senators who spoke on that day prior to the vote. One was in favor of discharging the committee. Senator Guy Cordon of Oregon who had made a one-man investigation for the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs in January, 1948, said,

I rise in support of the resolution offered by the junior Senator

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<sup>27</sup> News item in the New York Times, May 9, 1948.

<sup>28</sup> Congressional Record, Vol. 94, part 4, p. 5467.

<sup>29</sup> A special report from Arthur Krock to the New York Times, May 11, 1948.

<sup>30</sup> Congressional Record, Vol. 94, part 5, p. 6176.

from California. ... I do not subscribe to the belief that legislative committees are established by the Senate for the purpose of having their jurisdiction taken from them and returned to the body of the Senate. That should be done, Mr. President, only when it can be said affirmatively that the committee ordinarily having jurisdiction of the matter has itself, in effect renounced its jurisdiction, when that committee has, in its judgment, concluded that as to the session then current it has completed its labors with reference to the subject in hand.

That situation prevails, Mr. President, with reference to the Hawaiian statehood bill.<sup>31</sup>

The second Senator, the Honorable Carl A. Hatch from New Mexico, who should be quoted to depict the drama surrounding the Knowland resolution was a member of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. He believed that more than just the Hawaiian statehood bill was involved. The fact that he had been one of the committee who voted to report the bill out of committee is significant.

... a majority of the committee voted to sustain the motion asking for additional consideration and the accumulation of further facts before the committee acts on the bill. ... I am not ready to say that my fellow members of the committee are not acting in good faith ... I shall not vote for a motion to discharge the committee.<sup>32</sup>

This Senator wanted favorable action in the Senate on the Hawaiian bill, but the method embodied in Knowland's resolution was disagreeable to him.

Hugh Butler, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, and Senator from Nebraska, was the third Member of the Senate who needs to be quoted to complete the picture.

I wish to make the statement, frankly, that if there were no reason for a further investigation of the situation in the Hawaiian

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<sup>31</sup> Congressional Record, Vol. 94, part 5, p. 6164.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., p. 6176.

Islands, I would be ready to report the bill to the Senate today. There is definite reason for further investigation.<sup>33</sup>

The Senate Members, then, were split into at least three camps when Knowland's resolution calling for the discharging of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs from further consideration of the Hawaiian statehood bill was put to a vote. Two of the three were not in sympathy with the spirit of Mr. Knowland's move in his attempt to get a hearing on the floor of the Senate before the end of the current Congressional session. The vote was twenty yeas and fifty-one nays,<sup>34</sup> and the 1948 Hawaiian statehood bill died in committee.

### III. EFFORTS SINCE 1948 ALMOST AN ANTICLIMAX

The tempo of the Hawaiian statehood movement did not slacken as a result of the reversal suffered in the Senate in 1948, but that near-success has not been matched for excitement or glamour since. When the new Eighty-first Congress convened in 1949, the statehood proponents in Congress began the process anew. On January 3 Delegate Farrington and Representative Angell of Oregon introduced identical bills<sup>35</sup> while on January 5 Senators Knowland and Cordon introduced in the Senate a bill of identical language.<sup>36</sup> Within the period of a month four more statehood

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<sup>33</sup> Congressional Record, Vol. 94, part 5, p. 6165.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., p. 6176.

<sup>35</sup> Congressional Record, Vol. 95, part 1, p. 14.

<sup>36</sup> Congressional Record, Vol. 95, part 1, p. 41.

bills were offered in the House.<sup>37</sup> The first committee action on any of the bills was taken by the House Subcommittee on Territorial and Insular Possessions on March 3, holding hearings in Washington.<sup>38</sup> The following day the subcommittee reported to the full committee, urging enactment of the statehood legislation.<sup>39</sup> The House Committee on Public Lands reported the statehood bill to the House on March 10.<sup>40</sup> The accompanying report said,

Known as the crossroads of the Pacific, the Hawaiian Islands would be under statehood in an even better position to further the interests of all the Pacific peoples. Statehood would increase immeasurably the prestige of America throughout the Orient.

The prompt enactment of H. R. 49, as amended, is recommended by the Committee on Public Lands.

The Committee amendments to H. R. 49 are of a minor nature, consisting only of clarifying language.<sup>40</sup>

From March 10 until August, the bill was ignored by the House Rules Committee. Then with time running out, Representatives Crawford of Michigan,<sup>41</sup> Miller of California,<sup>42</sup> Smith of Wisconsin,<sup>43</sup> Peterson of Florida,<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> Congressional Record, Vol. 95, part 1, pp. 80, 95, 737, 819.

<sup>38</sup> Senate Report No. 1928, Eighty-first Congress, second session, p. 35.

<sup>39</sup> Congressional Record, Vol 95, part 18, p. 118.

<sup>40</sup> Report on H. R. 49. House Report No. 254. the United States House of Representatives, Eighty-first Congress, first session, Committee on Public Lands (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 7.

<sup>41</sup> Congressional Record, Vol. 95, part 8, p. 10617.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., p. 10875.

<sup>43</sup> Congressional Record, Vol. 95, part 9, p. 11460.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., p. 11571.

Marshall of Minnesota,<sup>45</sup> and Bosone of Utah<sup>46</sup> all called for immediate, favorable action on H. R. 49, during the month of August. In spite of the earnest insistence that delay was no longer necessary, Hawaii was still a Territory when the first session of the Eighty-first Congress adjourned on October 19, 1949.

Though the members of the Eighty-first Congress had seemed unmoved by the pleas of the proponents of statehood during the closing days of the first session, they wasted little time in restarting the mechanics in the second session. On January 3, 1950, the House passed H. R. 218, providing for two hours for debate on H. R. 49, reported favorably by the Committee on Public Lands in 1949.<sup>47</sup> Consideration was begun on March 3,<sup>48</sup> and on March 7 the House of Representatives "voted 261 yeas to 110 nays, to pass H. R. 49, providing Statehood for Hawaii."<sup>49</sup> In the Senate hearings which were held by that body's Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, beginning on May 1, Delegate Farrington analyzed the House vote.

Those voting for the bill this year included an overwhelming majority of both Democratic and Republican Members of the House.

An analysis of the vote prepared by the Hawaii Statehood Commission shows the following:

In 37 State delegations, a majority voted for statehood for

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<sup>45</sup>Congressional Record, Vol. 95, part 9, p. 11691.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., p. 11934.

<sup>47</sup>Congressional Record, Vol. 96, part 20, p. 32.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., p. 140.

<sup>49</sup>Congressional Record, Vol. 96, part 20, p. 149.

Hawaii.

Fourteen States voted unanimously for statehood for Hawaii.

Of the 7 large States, only Texas, with 15 votes cast, recorded a majority against statehood.

The vote of the California representation showed 16 for statehood and 1 against.

In Illinois, 21 voted for statehood and 3 against, and 2 not voting.

Michigan, 12 for statehood and 4 against, with 1 not voting.

New York cast 27 votes for statehood and 8 against, with 10 not voting.

Ohio gave 16 votes for statehood, 5 against, and 2 not voting.

For Pennsylvania, 22 voted for statehood and 9 against, with 2 not voting.

I mention the large States particularly because it was argued extensively in the House that the larger States were opposed to statehood on the grounds that it would dilute the representation in the United States Senate. It is evident that Members of the House did not feel that way.<sup>50</sup>

The hearings before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs which began on May 1 lasted until May 5.<sup>51</sup> When the Committee met on May 26, H. R. 49 was discussed and June 12 was agreed to as the date to take a vote.<sup>52</sup> The Committee met on that date and considered amendments, but took no final action.<sup>53</sup> After two more postponements, the committee finally voted on June 28 to report the bill with amendments.<sup>54</sup> The report, Senate Report No. 1928, contained the following

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<sup>50</sup>Senate Report No. 1928, Eighty-first Congress, second session, p. 5.

<sup>51</sup>Congressional Record, Vol. 96, part 20, p. 310.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., p. 375.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., p. 410.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., p. 464.



conclusions, subscribed to by all committee Members except Senator Hugh Butler:

A greater amount of information regarding Hawaii was available to the committee than has been the case in the admission of any other Territory. Every effort was made to go into all of the issues thoroughly, and to give objective, impartial consideration to all of the objections presented.

After the formal hearings were concluded, the committee met in executive session over a period of 2 weeks to consider the evidence and to scrutinize the language of the bill in the light of the facts developed. Where needed, amendments have been made.

As a result, the committee is convinced that--

(1) The admission of Hawaii into the Union as a State is in the best interests of the Nation and the Territory.

(2) The Territory meets all of the traditional requirements for statehood, and, as a State, would make valuable contributions to the Nation and to the world.

(3) In the current clash of political and economic ideologies upon the world stage, the admission of Hawaii as a State would be a practical demonstration, in the very area in which communism is making a determined drive to win adherence to its totalitarian principles, that the United States is holding aloft for all of the world the banner of political and economic democracy.

Therefore, conscious of their responsibility as Members of the Senate of the Eighty-first Congress to the Senate and to the Nation, the committee recommends that the Senate continue the pattern under which America has grown great and approve this legislation to admit Hawaii to statehood.<sup>55</sup>

The statehood bill was only two steps short of becoming law and there was ample time for the Senate to consider it since the second session of the Eighty-first Congress was in session until December. It was on the calendar in September but was allowed to go over on the objection of Senator Walter F. George of Georgia.<sup>56</sup> The final opportunity for Senate approval

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<sup>55</sup> Senate Report No. 1928, Eighty-first Congress, second session, p. 14.

<sup>56</sup> Congressional Record, Vol. 96, part 11, p. 14698.

occurred on December 15, but several Senators responded with "Over."<sup>57</sup> The prospect for the statehood proponents for the new Congress was to begin again the steps so often taken in the past.

Almost immediately after the new Eighty-second Congress had convened, the proponents were at work to make 1951 the year of victory. Hawaiian Delegate Farrington introduced his now almost traditional H. R. 49 on January 3,<sup>58</sup> while Senator O'Mahoney offered S. 49 in the Senate on January 8, the bill being the cooperative effort of Senator O'Mahoney and twenty other Senators.<sup>59</sup> Senate action began before the end of January, the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs discussing S. 49 without making any attempt to hold a vote.<sup>60</sup> On February 20 the committee voted seven to six against holding further hearings on S. 49 and also decided to vote at the next meeting of the committee on whether to report the bill.<sup>61</sup> There was some delay while the committee made amendments and the vote to report the bill did not occur until April 3. The count was nine to four to report the bill favorably.<sup>62</sup> The report to the body of the Senate was not made until May 7, more than a month after the Interior and

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<sup>57</sup>Congressional Record, Vol. 96, part 12, p. 16598.

<sup>58</sup>Congressional Record, Vol. 97, part 1, p. 28.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., p. 87.

<sup>60</sup>Congressional Record, Vol. 97, part 17, p. 23.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid., p. 74.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid., p. 169.

Insular Affairs Committee had made its decision to recommend favorable action.<sup>63</sup> The majority report called attention to the fact that S. 49 was sponsored by twenty-one Senators of both political parties and representing every section of the United States.<sup>64</sup> S. 49 had the distinction of having reached the Senate floor earlier in a Congressional session than any of its predecessors, giving the Senate more time to act on a statehood bill. The additional length of time, however, failed to produce results. The bill was the order of business two times during the remainder of the first session of the Eighty-second Congress without a call for a vote. On May 17 Senator Allen J. Ellender of Louisiana called for it to go over.<sup>65</sup> Senator Pat McCarran of Nevada objected when the bill came up on June 21,<sup>66</sup> and again on October 11, along with Senator Richard B. Russell of Georgia.<sup>67</sup> At the close of the first session of the Eighty-second Congress Senator O'Mahoney promised as Chairman of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs to take the earliest practicable step in the next session to get Senate consideration of the Hawaiian

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<sup>63</sup> Congressional Record, Vol. 97, part 17, p. 257

<sup>64</sup> Statehood for Hawaii, Senate Report No. 314, Eighty-second Congress, first session (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 2.

<sup>65</sup> Congressional Record, Vol. 97, part 4, p. 5427.

<sup>66</sup> Congressional Record, Vol. 97, part 5, p. 6847.

<sup>67</sup> Congressional Record, Vol. 97, part 10, p. 14942

statehood legislation.<sup>68</sup>

Action in the second session of the Eighty-second Congress did come at an early date, but it was not the action desired by the proponents of statehood. S. 49 was on the calendar on January 24, 1952 and several Senators responded with "Over" when the bill was presented for action.<sup>69</sup> On February 27 Senator Knowland asked for immediate consideration of the bill without success,<sup>70</sup> and on May 14 made inquiry as to when the bill was to be the order of business.<sup>71</sup> The answer to Senator Knowland's inquiry came on July 3 and Senator McCarran of Nevada wrote finis to the 1952 version of the Hawaiian statehood legislation by "objecting" and thus allowing the bill to go over just prior to adjournment of Congress.<sup>72</sup>

During the years when the Hawaiian statehood movement became more prominently an issue of national interest, strong support from public opinion, newspaper editors, and the executive branch of the national government developed. In 1951, The Public Opinion Quarterly reported a comparison of percentage figures covering a ten year period which indicated an increase from forty-eight to seventy-one per cent in favor of and a decrease from twenty-three to twelve per cent opposed to statehood for Hawaii.<sup>73</sup> The editorial support given by the New York Times was

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<sup>68</sup>Congressional Record, Vol. 97, part 10, p. 13652.

<sup>69</sup>Congressional Record, Vol. 98, no. 12, p. 480.

<sup>70</sup>Congressional Record, Vol. 98, no. 30, p. 1563.

<sup>71</sup>Congressional Record, Vol. 98, no. 82, p. 5233.

<sup>72</sup>Congressional Record, Vol. 98, no. 119, p. 9179.

<sup>73</sup>"The Quarter's Polls," The Public Opinion Quarterly, IV (Spring of 1950), 178.

representative of the editorial support throughout the country.

Hawaii's long record of orderly government and its people's outstanding record of orderly living have shown it to be as capable of ordering its own affairs as any state in the Union. Hawaii has been a Territory since 1898. For forty-five years it has sought statehood. It is high time that this was granted.<sup>74</sup>

Senator Kefauver of Tennessee stressed the editorial support in a statement on the floor of the Senate in April, 1950. "More than 300 editorials collected this year point out overwhelming national support for statehood."<sup>75</sup> President Franklin D. Roosevelt was noncommittal on statehood, but in 1934, he had said, in an address to the people of Hawaii,

The problems you are solving are the problems of the whole nation and your administration in Washington will not forget you are in very truth an integral part of the nation.<sup>76</sup>

President Truman endorsed Hawaiian statehood in his message to Congress in 1948 and it has been a part of his civil rights program.<sup>77</sup> Vice President Barkley added his endorsement in 1952 when, in view of a prolonged absence from the presiding officer's chair in the Senate, he said, "... if a tie vote should develop during my temporary absence, I would, if present, cast a vote which would mean statehood for both Alaska and Hawaii."<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>74</sup> Editorial in the New York Times, May 7, 1948.

<sup>75</sup> Congressional Record, Vol. 96, part 14, p. 2507.

<sup>76</sup> News item in the New York Times, July 29, 1934.

<sup>77</sup> See *Infra*, p. 120.

<sup>78</sup> Congressional Record, Vol. 98, No. 19, p. 854.

IV. STRONG SUPPORT BY CONGRESSMEN NEUTRALIZED  
BY A MINORITY GROUP OF CONGRESSMEN

When the House of Representatives passed the Hawaiian statehood bill on March 7, 1950, the more than two to one ratio in favor is an indication of the strong support of Hawaiian statehood among many Congressmen. It is important in this study of the statehood movement to consider the reasons for failure in view of that strong Congressional support. The writers who cover the political scene, beginning in 1947, have strongly hinted and openly maintained the opinion that a bloc of Southern Democrats have denied statehood to Hawaii on the basis of the interracial make-up of the Hawaiian population. In the July 14, 1947 issue of Newsweek, Prince H. Preston, Jr., Georgia Democrat, was quoted as objecting to Hawaiian statehood because it would make "citizens with equal rights with you and me of 180,000 Japanese people."<sup>79</sup> Late in December, 1947, a report in Time Magazine referred to "... the Southern Senator [not identified] who, thinking of anti-poll and anti-lynching laws, told [Hawaiian Delegate] Farrington dourly, "I know how your people would vote."<sup>80</sup>

When President Truman referred to Hawaiian statehood in his message to Congress of January 8, 1948 as part of his civil rights program, there was marked increase in opposition from the Southern Democrats.

... Southern members of Congress are said to be determined to keep

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<sup>79</sup>"Hawaii: Star for Good Behavior," Newsweek, XXX (July 14, 1947), 25.

<sup>80</sup>"Knock at the Door," Time Magazine, L (December 22, 1947), 25.

out of the Senate four additional votes which might be expected to be cast in favor of civil rights legislation.<sup>81</sup>

The above concept of Southern Democratic opposition, appearing late in 1950 in a Christian Century editorial, was echoed in an article covering the opening session of the Eighty-second Congress which appeared in the New York Times on January 9, 1952.<sup>82</sup> C. P. Trussell, New York Times correspondent in Washington, observed late in January, 1952, that

Admittance of Hawaii and Alaska to the Union would add four Senate votes to the present ninety-six. Alaska and Hawaii are considered by a large segment of the Senate as "liberal." Among Southern Democrats, it is held that both probably would vote to tighten the present Senate rule on filibusters and probably effect their end. The filibuster is the remaining Southern weapon against Fair Deal programs.<sup>83</sup>

In the following month, The Nation said, "Southern Senators fear that Congressional delegations from the new States would reinforce the proponents of civil rights."<sup>84</sup> Again in March, Commonweal carried further evidence of the belief that the Southern Senators objected because "Republican Hawaii would send representatives favoring ... [civil rights] since its population is predominantly non-Caucasian."<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>81</sup>"Statehood Blocked by Racial Issues," Christian Century, LXVII (November 29, 1950), 1413.

<sup>82</sup>News item in the New York Times, January 9, 1952.

<sup>83</sup>A special report from C. P. Trussell to the New York Times, January 23, 1952.

<sup>84</sup>"The Shape of Things," The Nation, CLXXIV (February 16, 1952), 145.

<sup>85</sup>"Still Only Forty-eight," Commonweal, CV (March 14, 1952), 556.

Senator Hugh Butler of Nebraska has been, since 1948, outspokenly opposed to Hawaiian statehood. His reasons, as summarized in the 1950 Senate Report No. 1928, include objection to the extent of communistic infiltration into Hawaiian labor groups.<sup>86</sup> However, he was accused by Delegate Farrington of opposing statehood on the basis of race prejudice, aided and abetted by Dixiecrats.<sup>87</sup>

The supposition might be made, after noting the pattern in the writings of many authors and reporters who place the responsibility on the Southern Democrats, that it seemed logical and therefore would be good "copy." A brief analysis of Congressional action on recent Hawaiian statehood legislation does, however, reveal a foundation for their opinion. In 1947, when the House debated and passed H. R. 49, three of the four Representatives who spoke against the legislation were Southern Democrats.<sup>88</sup> After the House had passed H. R. 49 in 1950 by a vote of 261 to 110, Delegate Farrington analysed the vote and found that thirty-seven States had cast majority votes in favor of statehood.<sup>89</sup> The eleven States who voted in the majority against statehood were, with two

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<sup>86</sup> Senate Report No. 1928, Eighty-first Congress, second session, p. 58.

<sup>87</sup> News item in the New York Times, July 22, 1950.

<sup>88</sup> Congressional Record, Vol. 93, part 6, pp. 7916-41.

<sup>89</sup> See Chapter VI, p. 112.



exceptions, Southern States.<sup>90</sup>

Since there has been no floor vote in the Senate on Hawaiian statehood legislation, no comparison like the above one on the House vote is possible. Neither have the Southern Senators been "free speaking" on the floor of the Senate. Yet it has been indicated earlier in this chapter that the Southern Senators have been the most frequent users of the word "over" whenever an Hawaiian statehood bill has been the order of business. The writer wishes to make no comment on the merits of any argument condemning the power of the minority in the prevention of Hawaiian statehood. In the future when Hawaii is a State, perhaps the minority will be credited with enforcing a waiting period for Hawaii which provided ample time to get rid of the objectionable features which have been pointed out for so many years.

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<sup>90</sup> Congressional Quarterly, Vol. 6, 1950 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly News Features), pp. 552-53. The Southern States casting majority votes against Hawaiian statehood were, Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia. The other two States not supporting statehood were Arizona and New Hampshire.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

When Hawaii was annexed by the United States in 1898, the expectation of the leaders of the revolt which had destroyed the Hawaiian monarchy was that statehood would be the ultimate result. At the close of 1952 Hawaii was still a Territory of the United States, governed in the same manner that had been provided by Congress in the Organic Act of 1900. The study of the Hawaiian statehood movement has been made by the author in an effort to discover, if possible, whether or not the expectation of statehood has been a one-sided hope, what elements of the population in Hawaii have supported the statehood movement, from where the opposition has come, and what circumstances and consequences resulting from the addition of the forty-ninth State have been anticipated while the subject has been an issue before Congress and the American people.

Initial interest on the part of the writer was the result of a three-year residence in the Hawaiian Islands. After having witnessed what seemed to be remarkable Americanization of a population composed of numerous races, it seemed to him rather inconceivable that Hawaii was not already a State. The purpose of the study has not been to beat the drum for statehood, but rather to fill the need for a factual account of the currents and undercurrents which have moved the statehood issue through so many years. Many writers have expressed opinions on small facets of the issue without making any complete analysis. The writer does not

purport to have made an exhaustive study. Certain facts have come to light, however, which do cast some light on the Hawaiian Statehood movement through its long existence.

Geographic location catapulted the Hawaiian Islands into international affairs soon after its discovery by white men in 1778. Its economic importance at first was recognized by all of the great seafaring powers as a supply stop for their commercial sailing vessels. By 1854 several of the great powers had made attempts at controlling the Hawaiian Islands, a circumstance which gave birth to the movement to join the islands to the United States as a state. American influence had been at work as the political, economic and social institutions of the islands were developing. When the Far East began to show signs of seeking a new role in world affairs, the United States became interested in Hawaii as a military outpost needed for defense purposes. Hawaii's strategic defense position has been a constant consideration in the problem of admitting Hawaii as a State. The bone of contention has been whether Hawaii would provide a better defense position as a territory or as a State.

To the Hawaiian Island resident, the problem has centered in racial, political and economic inequalities imposed upon them by the territorial status assigned by the Organic Act of 1900. The issue as the Hawaiian resident sees it has not changed materially since 1935 when David L. Crawford, speaking before the 1935 Congressional investigating committee, said,

... the territorial form of government, not being set out in the Constitution, is recognized as a transitional or temporary form. The organic act of a territory, having been enacted by Congress, may be

repealed or amended in important particulars, without the people's consent and perhaps to their detriment.<sup>1</sup>

The Rankin bill to amend the Organic Act of 1900 in the matter of the appointment of the Governor of Hawaii and the Jones-Costigan Amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act passed in 1934 have been cited by proponents of statehood as conclusive evidence of the inherent dangers in a territorial form of government.

The research in connection with this study has disclosed a striking lack of organized group opposition to statehood in contrast to voluminous evidence compiled from the testimony, resolutions, and communications of a varied and numerous list of organized groups favoring statehood. The opposition has been confined largely to the efforts of individuals. Since 1946 the most effective opposition has come from Southern Senators who have opposed the admittance of Hawaii to prevent, according to periodical and newspaper writers observing the political scene, the addition of two more Senators who would support a civil rights program. In addition to the Southern Democratic bloc, Senator Hugh Butler of Nebraska has prevented Hawaiian statehood through his position as chairman of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. He has raised the issue of the threat of communism, maintaining that "by denying immediate statehood to Hawaii, we are denying the Communists an early opportunity

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<sup>1</sup>Statehood for Hawaii. Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Territories, October 7 to 18, 1935 (Washington, D. C.: United States Printing Office), p. 7.

to dominate a new State.<sup>2</sup> [*Italics in the original*] The racial issue now being stressed by the Southern Democratic opposition is one which has been present from the beginning of the statehood movement. Chapter Two does not contain a complete account of the campaign to discredit the Japanese group in Hawaii, but it indicates somewhat the extent to which the opposition has used the situation to postpone statehood. Ironically, the Caucasians now seeking statehood were responsible for bringing to Hawaii the racial group which has throughout the years been one of the most important reasons given for denying statehood. The Japanese had been brought into Hawaii to develop Hawaii's sugar industry, and the benefits which statehood would bring the sugar planters are beyond reach until the right people can be convinced that the Orientals in Hawaii are not a hazard and a risk.

Further study of the Hawaiian statehood movement could provide additional facts if it were possible to study the records of the Congressional committees to which the numerous Hawaiian statehood bills have been referred since the first one in 1903. The reports made by the various investigating committees no doubt provide accurate evidence on the issues involved, but they do not indicate the thinking of the Congressmen serving on the committees which failed to report out the statehood bills. An investigation of the history and fate of the 1953 statehood bill would provide further enlightenment.

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<sup>2</sup>Statehood for Hawaii, Senate Report No. 1928, Eighty-first Congress, second session (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 58.

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