THE ROLE OF THE EU-TURKEY JOINT ACTION PLAN IN SYRIAN REFUGEES'
EDUCATIONAL INTEGRATION INTO TURKISH SOCIETY: A QUALITATIVE CASE-
STUDY OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

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A Thesis

Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green
State University in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

May 2020

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ABSTRACT

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After the initiation of negotiations between the EU and Turkey on the conditions of temporary protection provision to Syrians arriving in Turkey in massive numbers, the policy of the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan emerged. The study focuses on the analysis of policy implementation, the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan (EU, 2015a), which has earned the reputation of a controversial international agreement due to the discussion of counteractive and preventive measures, aiming at a significant reduction of the illegal migration flows between Turkey and the EU. The EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan addresses the support provision for Syrian refugees under temporary protection in Turkey in the form of financial assistance, dedicated towards the enhancement and construction of facilities (FRIT), and the implementation of integrational projects and initiatives, such as Promoting Integration of Syrian Children into Turkish Education System (PICTES), which ensure the creation of a sustainable environment for Syrian refugees in Turkey (EU, 2015b).

The study uses a qualitative research design with the following sources of data collection for content analysis: policy documents, analytic reports, research articles, newspaper articles and news reports. The data are analyzed using Sabatier and Mazmanian's (1980) conceptual framework for policy implementation research. The research goal is to identify the strengths and weaknesses of EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan policy and the FRIT program implementation, and to describe their possible impact on Syrian refugees' educational integration. Additionally, the research also discusses the past and present effects of EU-Turkey inter-relational discourse on the implementation of EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan throughout 2015-2019.

To my mother and all my teachers both in life and in the classroom.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Accomplishing this thesis work is a step beyond imaginable for a girl like me, who comes from a Tatar lower-middle-class family in Russia and has no parents or relatives speaking English. So many people stand behind my current accomplishment, and I am afraid the Acknowledgements page is not enough to pay tribute to all of them.

I am very grateful for the Fulbright Foreign Student Program for making my educational journey to the United States possible. Without the granted financial assistance and the Fulbright staff's constant support, my study at Bowling Green State University, the United States, would not have been possible. I would not have had a chance to meet my outstanding advisor, Dr. Bruce Collet, and other professors who helped me with my thesis, Dr. Christy Galletta-Horner, and Dr. Marc Simon. At your classes, Dr. Collet, I learned about the existence of comparative studies in education, and about what kind of professor I would want myself to become if I ever decided to do so. Through your teachings, Dr. Galletta-Horner, I discovered educational and qualitative research methods. Until I met you, I did not know they were so many and that the methods classes could be so engaging. Dr. Marc Simon, your classes on conflict resolution served me as an introduction to the field of political science, and they inspired me to conduct research across the fields of education and public policy implementation.

In my heart, I feel forever grateful to all my English language teachers, who supported me from Grade 1 till the moment I entered the classroom as an English language teacher myself. All the work they put in me was so inspirational and profound that I do not know if I can ever be grateful enough to them.

Even though my mother will never be able to read and understand this thesis, she is the person who showed me by her example of how empowering learning can be. I am where I am today because of her unshakeable trust in me and her constant support.

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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

The EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan (EU, 2015a) was designed to address the initial causes of a large influx of undocumented people, and to reinforce the support for Syrian refugees under a temporary stay in Turkey. Based on the Joint Action Plan, the EU and Turkey agreed to launch and subsequently implement two projects, targeting the advancement of Syrian refugees' social and educational integration into Turkish society. These initiatives are titled as FRIT – Facilities for Refugees in Turkey, and PICTES – Promoting Integration of Syrian Children into Turkish Education System (EU, 2015b, Delegation of the European Union to Turkey, 2017). This qualitative case study analyzes the implementation of the Joint Action Plan, particularly the implementation strengths and weaknesses, which either lead to or hinder reaching the policy objectives successfully. Also, the political and public discourses regarding the Joint Action Plan formation and implementation are explored in the current study.

Purpose of the Study

The primary purpose of the study is to understand the mechanism of the Joint Action Plan implementation and to explore its implementation effectiveness. There are two questions I pose in the current research: 1. What are the implementational strengths and weaknesses of the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan regarding its effect on Syrian refugees' educational integration? 2. What are the characteristics of the EU-Turkey inter-relational discourse as it pertains to educational integration, and how are these discourse characteristics reflected within the outcomes of FRIT and PICTES? Getting to know more about the structurization of the inter-governmental policy implementation in humanitarian and development sectors lets us know in-depth the nature of variables that contribute to the effectiveness of policies aiming at the educational integration of refugees in their host countries.

Significance of the Study

  The agreement on and the implementation of the Joint Action Plan policy and the Facilities program can be considered as a milestone moment in the EU and Turkey's regulations of irregular migration. The studied policy and the program approach the issue of refugees' integration into Turkish society holistically, and the nature of their creation and implementation can be characterized through the principle of responsibility- and burden-sharing. The political developments between the EU and Turkey following a massive influx of Syrian refugees into the Turkish and the EU territory constitute a precedent, studying which helps understand the value of coordinated and timely actions taken to manage the refugees' stay in the countries under the regimes of temporary protection. The conclusions drawn from the study of the JAP and FRIT implementation shed light on the complexity of the structurization, coordination, and delivery of services concerning meeting a vast array of refugees' educational needs.

Organization of the Chapters

  This thesis consists of five chapters. The introduction chapter, Chapter One, briefly provides general information on the research topic, and on the purpose and the significance of the study. Chapter Two, the literature review chapter, examines the scope of the literature available on the EU-Turkey relations, as they contribute to the formation and implementation of the Joint Action Plan. Also, the literature review chapter mentions very limited but still existing research on the Joint Action Plan, and describes Sabatier and Mazmanian's (1980) conceptual framework for policy implementation analysis selected for the current study. Chapter Three, the methodology chapter, talks about the research questions, research design, and methods of data collection and analysis, and also discusses the validity and the limitations of the study. Chapter Four presents the analysis of the Joint Action Plan and the FRIT implementation research. The chapter ends with conclusions on policy implementation strengths and weaknesses

drawn from the theoretical and content analysis of primary and secondary sources. Chapter Five provides a general conclusion of the policy implementation research, discusses the implications of the study, and gives suggestions for further research in the area of humanitarian and developmental educational policy implementation.

CHAPTER II. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review chapter provides general information on the historical and socio-political prerequisites for the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan formation, discusses the normative aspects of the policy and describes the educational realities of its target group, highlights the existing research on the Joint Action Plan implementation, and characterizes the analytical framework of the current study. In this chapter I examine the preceding developments in the EU-Turkey relationships, having impacted the formation and implementation of the Joint Action Plan. Furthermore, I focus on the educational entitlements of Syrian refugees under temporary protection in Turkey within the scope of this policy.

Historical and Ideological Foundations of the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan Formation

EU-Turkey Relations in the Context of Accession, Migration, and Politico-Economic Partnership Prior to Signing the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan

Turkey's accession negotiations. Turkey has begun actively pursuing the European Union membership since the 1960s. The first attempts were made back in 1963 by signing the Ankara Agreement, which was expected to facilitate closer economic cooperation between Turkey and the EU (Morelli, 2010). The agreement postulated the creation of a customs union and served as a forecast for future accession in case the economic and political conditions were met (Naborne and Tocci, 2007). Regardless of the European Union's support of the enlargement process, Turkey's accession negotiations have not gone smoothly. Turkeys' first membership application to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1987 was denied two years later, and the accession discussions were postponed until the Helsinki Summit for political and economic reasons. Before Turkish military intervention in Cyprus in 1974, a military coup of 1980 in Turkey, and instabilities which followed after primarily contributed to the deferment of

the accession talks (Ata, 2017). Regardless, economic relations developed at their own pace; in 1996, the Customs Union Agreement between Turkey and the EU came into force, leading both sides towards deeper economic integration, and signifying a milestone of progress in membership negotiations (Ata, 2017). Finally, in 1999 at the Helsinki Summit, the EU granted Turkey candidate status, thus opening Turkey access to the EU funding, programs, and participation in the EU agencies. What was left to fulfill were the Copenhagen political criteria, without which the European Council was not willing to further accession negotiations (Ott, 2017).

In 2001, the EC composed an Accession Partnership Plan for Turkey, where Turkey's obligations to comply with the Copenhagen criteria were restated. In order to reach harmonization with the EU acquis and meet the requirements of the Copenhagen criteria, throughout the years of 2001-2005, the Turkish government implemented major political reforms. The reforms led to the change of 34 constitutional articles in 2001, the adoption of a comprehensive harmonization package in 2002, the introduction of five legislation packages, constitutional reform, and a new penal code in 2003 and 2004 (Ata, 2017). To this day, the years of 2003-2004 stand out as the period of most intensive socio-political reforms in Turkish society. Turkish political efforts were fruitful, for the next round of accession talks were scheduled to begin on 3 October 2005. However, EU member states urged Turkey to sustain the level and speed of political reforms throughout the negotiations. However, in 2006, shortly after the beginning of accession negotiations, alarming cases of freedom of expression limitations in Turkey were reported. From Turkey's side, the impetus for reforms was fading, and from the EU's side, skepticism over Turkey's accession was emerging. The EU was living through the times of a constitutional crisis and suffering from 'Enlargement fatigue': Cyprus and Malta had

joined the EU in 2004, and by 2006 the question of Turkey's recognition of Cyprus as a newly accepted EU member state was far from being solved (Naborne and Tocci, 2007). Failure to recognize the Republic of Cyprus led the Council not to open eight negotiation chapters until Turkey agreed to change its position (Ata, 2017).

Reforms following 2006 were cherry-picked and non-effective. In 2008, after charging several military officials with allegations of scheming a military coup, the prevalence of military influence in Turkish politics began to decline. At this point, the aim of keeping the accession negotiations alive was to ensure that Turkey's engagement in the prospective membership discussion prevented the country from falling down the rabbit hole of pursuing undemocratic social reforms and reversing already completed ones. Selective reforms were indeed implemented, but they were respective of the political agenda of the ruling party (Ata, 2017).

The year 2011 marked the beginning of large-scale violations of fundamental human rights and freedoms in 21st-century Turkey. Excessive use of police force, the persecution, and prosecution of dissidents demonstrated Turkey's significant step backward, reversing the effects of previously implemented reforms. In 2014, the imprisonment of 30 oppositional journalists by the Turkish government resulted in criticisms from the EU towards Turkey but were backlashed by Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan's harsh response. According to him, the EU needed to 'mind its own business.' The period from 2006 to 2014 can be described as the period of the de-Europeanization of Turkish politics and society: the public support of the EU membership fell from 70 percent to 30 percent within these years, and the Turkish political elite stopped viewing the EU accession as a sole means of power testimony and retention (Ata, 2017). Then, altering all politico-economic plans of both sides, the scope of the refugee migration crisis escalated, necessitating the two parties to redact their relationship dynamics and to formulate them anew.

EU-Turkey relations in the prospect of irregular migration management and the Syrian refugee crisis. Ankara had been practicing an open-door policy towards refugees and migrants for years before the Syrian refugee crisis began. As a signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention and 1967 Protocol,[1] Turkey provided access, stating a geographic limitation, for refugees and asylum seekers coming from Europe only. Regardless, refugees from multiple countries received temporary protection in Turkey over the years before the Syrian refugee crisis. The Revolution of 1979 resulted in waves of Iranian refugees fleeing the conflict. As well, Kurds fled the wars in Iraq in 1988 and 1991, Bulgarian nationals of Turkish descent fled Bulgaria's "Revival Process" – a campaign against minority populations, Bosnians and Kosovars fled the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and most recently Syrians fled the war in their country – all of these populations have found refuge in Turkey at various times (Sert, 2014).

Turkey has been popular as a transit country too, especially among the nationals of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and a number of African countries. Irregular migration through the territory of Turkey has long been affecting the EU and its member states neighboring with or located in close proximity to Turkey. Due to Turkey's growing economy, it has now become not only a transit zone but also a receiving destination country (Ozcurumez and Senses, 2011). Still, numbers of illegal migrants transiting through Turkey to the EU remain rather high. Between 1995 and 2006, Turkish authorities detected more than 180,000 nationals of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and Syria transiting through Turkey illegally to Europe (Kirisci, 2007). As the Turkish government reports, between the years of 2005 and 2016,

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[1] The 1951 Geneva Convention provided the description of the term 'refugee' and identified the rights of displaced populations, as well as the signatory states' legal obligations in refugees' protection. According to it, the refugee status was restricted to only those who got affected by "events occurring in Europe" before 1 January 1951. The 1967 Protocol removed the geographic and temporal restrictions but allowed the states, which had previously ratified the 1951 Convention, to retain the territorial restrictions. Turkey was among the states which chose to keep the territorial restrictions in place.

the number of irregular transiting migrants grew up to 900,000 (Turkey on Irregular Migration, 2020), putting Turkey and the EU countries in a strained position.

Since 1961, Turkey has been a country of labor emigration, providing a stable flow of work migrants to European countries, particularly to West Germany. The Ankara Agreement of 1963 regarded this labor migration trend as a substantial aspect of economic cooperation between Turkey and the European Economic Community (Tolay, 2012). Indeed, such a development added a new dimension to Turkey's multifaceted nature of migration. Turkey's characteristic of being a sending, a transitory country, and a country of temporary asylum has impacted the quality of Turkish immigration policies, which by the 1990s largely remained outdated and ad hoc and did not meet the EU's accession expectations and requirements.

The issue of irregular migration has stayed very high on the political agenda of EU-Turkey relations. Before the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011, the number of illegal migrants continued to rise in Turkey, becoming a major source of tensions between Turkey and the EU. Turkey's pursuit of EU membership necessitated the full implementation of the EU *acquis* on irregular migration. The EU *acquis* is special criteria developed for candidate countries to harmonize their legislation for full membership qualification, implementation of which, in the case of Turkey, were to result in the development of comprehensive and consistent migration policies in addition to initiation of other required reforms (Vukasinovic, 2011).

Ankara arranged a step-by-step reformation process to reach the full implementation of the EU *acquis*. In 2003, Turkey adopted the Law on Work Permits for Foreign Nationals, and in 2005 the National Action Plan for the Adoption of the EU Acquis in the field of Asylum and Immigration (NAP) was drafted, serving as the country's foundation for further comprehensive reforms. In accordance with the NAP, in 2008, a new task force was established. The aim of the

creation of this new task force was to draft new legislation on asylum and foreigners in Turkey. This step has proven to be effective – by mid-2011, a new EU-inspired Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) was ready to be presented to the Parliament, and it got adopted in 2013 (Tolay, 2012).

Despite all legal measures taken by the Turkish government to bring down the levels of illegal and transit migration, the country was still criticized for keeping the EU's border insecure. The EU's concern over illegal migrants and asylum seekers crossing the borders from the Aegean Sea coast to the territory of Greece made the EU's initiation of discussion on Turkey's readmission of illegal migrants inevitable. The EC hurried Turkey to sign a readmission agreement before resuming the accession negotiations. Turkey agreed to finalize the negotiations on the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement in February 2011, expecting a reciprocal move from the EU on visa liberalization for Turkish citizens (Vukasinovic, 2011). The EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement (EURAD) indicates the readmission of Turkey's own and third-country nationals and stateless persons, with the condition of them entering the EU through Turkey. According to EURAD, the EU is responsible for technical assistance in assuring border security and for availing financial support (Ott, 2017).

The year 2011 was the beginning of the Syrian refugees' arrival in Turkey. Turkish authorities decided to arrange the refugees' settlement by constructing temporary tents in the southern provinces of the country. The war-fleeing Syrian population was named "guests," assuming their short temporary stay. Also, this status did not provide them with any legal rights. Nevertheless, throughout 2012, the conflict in Syria was getting more profound, with no prospect for a fast ceasefire, and on average more than 20,000 Syrian refugees kept arriving in Turkey monthly. In 2013, these numbers continued to rise, reaching almost 40,000 people arriving on a

monthly basis. By the end of 2014, the Syrian refugees' arrival grew up to 55,000 people a month due to rising violence in Syria and neighboring Iraq (Icduygu and Simsek, 2016). Continually increasing numbers of Syrian refugees crossing the borders of Turkey and the EU raised serious concerns in the EC over the issue of border protection. This fact led to the initiation of negotiations on the management of refugee flows. The bilateral talks were finalized with the signing of the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan on Syrian refugees in 2015 (Ott, 2017).

History of the EU and Turkey's Identity-Based Policy Development

 The EC as the institutional embodiment of the EU: EC's self-vision in the question of relationship regulations with Turkey. The European Commission (EC) is the institutional platform for representation of legislative and executive functions of the EU member states. The Commission serves as the Brussels-located arena for holding organized policy discussions, carrying out legislative decision-making, and ensuring the implementation of policies and regulations (Nugent and Rhinard, 2015). The Commission's identity can, as Keyman and Aydin-Duzgit write, be defined through the enlargement process. The supranational nature of the Commission enables it to define a European identity – a feature, which kept seeping out during the negotiation processes. In EU-Turkey relations, the EC established itself as a 'cosmopolitan agent,' effective to assess Turkey's accession on criteria relating to democracy and human rights. However, the Commission drafted the Negotiating Framework for Turkey in 2005, where it mentioned the possibility of permanent derogations of the member states towards Turkey in areas such as the free movement of people, as well as structural policies and agriculture, thus violating the EU doctrine on disallowing any permanent derogations from the EU law. This fact seemed to place Turkey in a queue for a 'second-class membership' (Keyman and Aydin-Duzgit, 2013). By and large, the EC played a game-changing role in the arrangement of discussions

around Turkey's accession process and thus impacted significantly how the Turkish government and society began to perceive the EU membership and its participation in the Europeanization process.

While discussing Turkey's accession in the 2000s, the common EC rhetoric spun around the EU's 'absorption capacity.' Turkey's full membership was viewed as a possible hindrance to the EU's political, economic, and cultural stability in essence. Turkey was "too big to be absorbed" (Keyman and Aydin-Duzgit, 2013, p.276). Both the European Council and Commission continuously stressed the point of the EU's inability to accommodate Turkey's membership due to differences in the EU's political and institutional structure, cultural identity, and the limitedness of economic resources, though research has been proving the matters otherwise (Emerson, Aydin, De Clerck-Sachsse, & Noutcheva, 2006). Further on, the concept of 'privileged partnership' has been put forward by Germany and France. According to this idea, Turkey would have close ties to the EU, especially on the questions of security and migration, but would not become a full member. The access to participation in the EU institutions would remain restricted, and visa liberalization would not follow, but Turkey would need to follow the EU norms and regulations. The outcomes of debates based on this EC's standpoint led to Turkey's diminishing support of the EU membership idea (Keyman and Aydin-Duzgit, 2013). Nevertheless, the long-term EU-Turkey relationships left a trace on Turkey's internal and foreign policy development - the process of Europeanization has been under implementation for years with varying success, but with definite outcomes.

Cumulatively, up until 2011, Turkey had put substantial efforts into meeting the EU's conditions. With the beginning of the Syrian refugee crisis, the EU's conditionality towards Turkey got reversed for the first time. The unfolding refugee crisis gave Turkey more strength in

negotiations, thus equilibrating the power imbalance between the EU and itself. Keeping the

EU's extensive concerns over its border security in mind, Turkey saw the prospects of pushing

the EU for bigger concessions regarding the accession negotiations, visa liberalizations for

Turkish citizens and the financial assistance in managing the refugee flows (Oltean and Iov,

2017).

      Islamisation and Turkishness as the leading forces behind the identity-driven policy

development in modern Turkey. Historically, Turkish foreign policy was alliance-centric and

security-oriented. The principles of security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity were at the core

of policy creation. However, for years, the main focus of Turkish policy reforms remained on the

EU membership project, which led to the implementation of a full diapason of democratic

reforms resulting in the transformation of Turkish society (Erdogan, 2017). By the 2010s, "be

more European than the Europeans" rhetoric dominated various domains of Turkish life, be it

political or social. Interestingly, the extent of Europeanization in Turkey in the context of

migration management has received twofold development: on the one hand, due to being

"othered" by the Europeans, Turkish society perceived Europeans as "them," clearly

distinguishing their norms and practices from their own, Turkish ones. On the other hand,

profound appropriation of EU norms regarding the migrants' integration and protection enabled

Turkish society to identify and point at the shortcomings in Europeans' migration policy

formation and implementation (Tolay, 2012).

      Turkey's specific 'order-creating' self-vision came into life due to its strategic position in

Asia, Europe, Balkans, and the Middle East. The quality of 'central power-ness' got reflected in

Turkey's urge to maintain the regional order. When the refugee crisis began, the Turkish

government treated solving some of the issues within neighbors' internal and external affairs as

the responsibility of its own, thus practicing an 'open-door' approach in dealing with the refugee flows. Despite the normative approach of Turkish policy construction and implementation, based on the state's 'order-creating' and 'central' qualities, the geopolitics remained shaped by civilizational characteristics of culture and religion. Currently, all Turkish/Muslim/Ottoman categories of culture-religion interplay broadly define Turkey's strategic policy-making (Erdogan, 2017).

All the characteristics mentioned above define the EU and Turkey's reasons and motivating factors for beginning the negotiations on cooperative management of refugee flows, which led to the signing of the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan in 2015.

Normative Nature of the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan

Joint Action Plan as the Legal Tool for Ensuring Syrian's Temporary Protection on the Territory of Turkey

Legal scope of the Joint Action Plan. EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan (EU, 2015a) was designed to address the initial causes of a massive influx of undocumented people and to reinforce the support for Syrian refugees under a temporary stay. To realize the Joint Action Plan, the EU and Turkey agreed to launch and subsequently implement two projects, targeting the advancement of Syrian refugees' social and educational integration into Turkish society. These initiatives are titled FRIT - Facilities for Refugees in Turkey (EU, 2015b), and PICTES - Promoting Integration of Syrian Children into the Turkish Education System (Delegation of the European Union to Turkey, 2017). PICTES project was operationalized within the framework of FRIT.

The FRIT serves as a coordination mechanism, which sponsors the coverage of mainly infrastructural needs in the areas of education, healthcare, and municipal, socio-economic

services (Eastern Mediterranean route, 2019). PICTES, in turn, is a direct financial assistance project, established as a grant of 300 million euros from the EU to the Ministry of National Education (MoNE) of Turkey for the creation and provision of services, facilitating the integration of Syrian refugee students into the Turkish education system (Delegation of the European Union to Turkey, 2017).

Temporary protection of the Syrian population in Turkey: educational rights and entitlements. Regardless of Turkey's geographical limitation to the 1951 Convention, not obliging the country to grant refugee status to asylum seekers coming outside of Europe, many succeed in claiming asylum, getting a 'conditional refugee status' instead. Conditional refugees are entitled to lesser protection in comparison to refugees coming from Europe, and their status serves as a temporary solution, whereas resettlement to a third country would be considered as durable (Ineli-Ciger, 2017). The legal framework for Syrian's protection in Turkey is built on two documents - Article 91 of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP), and the Temporary Protection Regulation (TPR).

When it comes to border regimes and protection standards, Turkish law prohibits seeking refuge at its borders. There are decided border gates by the Ministry of the Interior, which the asylum seekers could be allowed to enter Turkey through (Article 17(1) of TPR). In the case of Syrian refugees fleeing the conflict in large masses, Turkey has kept the borders open. The borders closed for temporary periods due to procedural questions and security reasons (Ineli-Ciger, 2016). Before the adoption of the Temporary Protection Regulation, there was no legal document clearly stating the rights and entitlements of Syrian refugees in Turkey. According to TPR, the moment a person fleeing Syria crosses the borders of Turkey and registers with the authorities as a temporary protection beneficiary, he gets entitled to receive information on the

temporary protection regulations in his language, to have free access to emergency health assistance, and to have his identity card issued. Additionally, the Syrian population also has the right not to get arrested for the reason of irregular entry, but to have access to education, to the system of family reunification, to legal consultations and translation services under the regulations of TPR (Ineli-Ciger, 2016).

Under the Turkish Constitution, the right for education extends for all children regardless of their nationality. Similarly, the LFIP states that asylum seekers, temporary protection status holders and their family members qualify for receiving access to primary and secondary education (Law on Foreigners and International Protection, 2016). TPR separately states that temporary protection beneficiaries may access educational services either inside or outside the centers of temporary accommodation. Temporary protection beneficiaries have the right to access pre-school education, language education, vocational, and higher education (Temporary protection in Turkey, 2019). Although, in practice, Syrians have difficulties accessing education in Turkey (Asylum Information Database, 2019).

Syrian Refugees as Temporary Protection Beneficiaries Under the Joint Action Plan

      Barriers for Syrian refugees' access to education. Existing research on Syrian refugees' access to education reveals two general types of barriers: 1. Barriers for Syrian school-aged children to have access to mainstream education; 2. Barriers concerning active student participation in the public school system, once the child gets enrolled.

Despite having unrestricted access to public schools, many Syrian refugee children are unable to enroll and remain in the school system due to the remote locations of schools from the places of their residence, high costs of transportation, study materials and stationery. Socio-economic factors extensively contribute to Syrian children's staying out of school; some youth

get engaged in low-paid work, while others initiate early marriages. In the provinces with a high concentration of Syrian refugees, the public school capacities remain limited, leading to adverse effects on school enrolment and the quality of provided education (Jalbout, 2015).

Enrolment in Temporary Education Centers (TECs) has long been promoted by Turkish authorities as a temporary alternative for Syrian children, enabling them to continue their education uninterrupted. Temporary Education Centers provide an alternative formal education by offering an adapted Syrian curriculum in Arabic, and they mainly function in public school buildings at the times of second shifts. TECs operate both in and out of refugee camps and are recognized by the Ministry of National Education (MoNE). Many parents enroll their children in TECs because students there share the same language and culture, and the language of instruction is Arabic. However, some TECs do not receive their accreditation due to the low quality of teaching (Icduygu and Simsek, 2016). Also, TECs are not located in all the places of Syrians' residence, and when they are located there, they still do not have sufficient capacity to serve all refugee children in the area (Tosten, Toprak, and Kayan, 2017).

In order to be provided with a level-appropriate placement in the nearest TEC, Syrian students prove their previous education trajectory by having necessary documentation or taking a placement exam at the TEC. The placement examination is not uniform across TECs; each TEC has its questions and exam tasks. The students wishing to transfer from the TEC to Turkish public schools are swiftly placed in the nearest public school. Even though taking this step is easy, not so many Syrian students choose to do so (Aras and Yasun, 2016).

The most frequently mentioned barriers among Syrian refugees already enrolled in public education are the following: the unavailability of Turkish language training, an inadequate placement into classes, and a widening gap between Syrian students and their peers. As a

consequence, the lack of quality of prior language preparation creates additional educational needs among Syrian children enrolled in the public school system (Aydin and Kaya, 2017).

Educational possibilities for Syrian refugees under the scope of the Joint Action Plan. The Joint Action Plan text does not specifically mention Syrian refugees' rights and entitlements. However, within the discussion of the intentions of the EU, it is stated that the EU plans to prioritize the allocation of funds towards improving access to education at all levels, and also towards supporting host communities in infrastructure and service areas (EC, 2015a). According to the JAP, Turkey intends to "adopt and implement policies, legislation, and programs facilitating for Syrians under temporary protection to have access, for the duration of their stay in Turkey, to public services, including education for pupils…" (EU, 2015a, p.2)

By August 2015, the reported numbers of Syrian refugees in Turkey was close to 1.94 million people (UNHCR, 2014). A 2015 3RP Regional Progress Report indicated a total number of 394,049 Syrian school-age children being out of school, and just 226,944 were enrolled in any school in Turkey (UNHCR, 2015a). Hence, in 2015 167,105 more Syrian children were out of school than were in school. The Turkish Ministry of National Education has been operating under a temporary protection mandate, thus eliminating any administrative barriers for Syrian refugees' access to the Turkish education system (Deane, 2016). However, other language- and income-related barriers remain. The remaining barriers for educational access are dealt with through the implementation of MoNE Circular No:2014/21 on "Education Services for Foreign Nationals" (Jalbout, 2015), PICTES (2016-2017) and PIKTES projects (2018-2019) within the framework of FRIT and the Joint Action Plan.

Initiatives for educational integration of Syrian children within the framework of Joint Action Plan implementation. In order to ensure higher enrolment rates of Syrian refugee

children in the Turkish public schools, a two-year PICTES project was launched within the framework of FRIT. The project focuses on the support of the activities offered by Turkish MoNE for the integration of refugee children into the public education system. By March of 2018, more than 600,000 Syrian children enrolled in primary and secondary level education. Enrolment rates are higher for primary school children than for secondary due to a compulsory education being for nine years in Syria. Engagements in the job market have led to a decrease in enrolments among the students of a high school age. In 2018, around 40% of school-aged Syrian children under temporary protection still remained out of school (EU, 2018a).

In order to ensure a regular enrolment of Syrian children in the Turkish public school system, the following initiatives have been introduced under the FRIT program and PICTES project:

- Accelerated Learning Program: MoNE developed an Accelerated Learning Programme (ALP) for ten and 18-year-old out-of-school Syrian youth;

- Conditional Cash Transfers: In 2017, a national Conditional Cash Transfer for Education (CCTE) Program was initiated, and the financial assistance was provided to more than 300,000 Syrian children, which led to increased enrolment and improved school attendance;

- Grants: The direct EU grant to MoNE enabled the provision of Turkish language training for 390,000 Syrian students and 10,000 Syrian students received the Arabic language training;

- Teacher and Staff Training: As of March 2018, 128,843 teachers and other educational staff were trained, and 12,965 Syrian volunteer teachers got financially compensated;

- School Construction: The construction of 215 schools is in progress through the EU-supported FRIT project, this will help to reach 21% of total needs;

- School supplies and clothing: About 500,000 Syrian students have received stationery and clothing aid packages (EU, 2018a).

There are multiple areas for future work and cooperation between Turkey and the EU regarding the implementation of the Joint Action Plan (JAP). The Turkish national education sector needs sustainable and comprehensive support, with a particular focus on formal, non-formal, and informal forms of education of Syrian children, including their vocational and language training. As well, there is a need for supporting the government of Turkey and Turkish communities in hosting Syrian refugees, burden sharing, and integrating the refugees into the Turkish system of services. The goal of the JAP is to support Turkey in its efforts to maintain the principle of nonrefoulement, and the right for the voluntary return of Syrian refugees to places of their origin following the end of the conflict (EU, 2018a).

Existing Studies of the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan

The amount of academic research done on the overall impact of the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan is scarce. One of the main reasons for the absence of research on the topic is its practical character - the Joint Action Plan has been an implementation-oriented agreement from the beginning of its formation and the primary funding mechanism, based on which it is being operationalized, FRIT, is not directly tied to the educational integration and attainments of Syrian refugees in Turkey. The only project directly supporting Syrian children's integration into mainstream Turkish education is PICTES (Coskun et al., 2017).

Some of the existing research focused on the analysis of the integration of Syrian refugees mentions PICTES as the EU-sponsored project, which is designed to support the MoNE

of Turkey in its efforts to sustain Syrian students' educational integration (Hacioglu, 2018).

However, no research analyzes the overall effect of the Joint Action Plan on Syrian children and

youth's participation in the educational system.

The limited research on the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan discusses the development of

negotiations prior to signing the JAP and analyzes its benefits for both parties. Due to the

'securitization'[2] discourse, which was actively constructed and pushed by the EU, the Syrian

population almost began to be viewed as an unbearable burden threatening the stability of the EU

member states. Turkey played a crucial role in changing this discourse by stepping in and

expressing its readiness to participate in burden sharing, given the financial support and direct

participation from the international community (Oltean and Iov, 2017).

Description of Analytical Framework

The scheme for policy implementation analysis, designed by Sabatier and Mazmanian

(1980), is taken as a central theoretical framework for the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan

implementation analysis. The scheme covers multiple independent variables impacting policy

implementation, such as tractability of the problem, the ability of statute to structure

implementation, and other non-statutory variables affecting the implementation process

(Sabatier, 1986).

Tractability of the problem can be analyzed through:

1. Availability of valid technical theory and technology, underpinning the policy creation.

Any policy creation process begins with the common assumption of the possible elimination of

the problem by making the modifications in the target group behavior. Thereby, the initial

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[2] 'Securitization' discourse can be defined as an intentional construction of speech acts based on the notion of a
security threat to the existence and the survival of a particular social group (Lindvall, 2015).

assessment of the problem enables the generation of technical data necessary for an adequate policy implementation.

2. Diversity of target group behavior and percentage of target group population within the area of policy influence. Target group behavior needs to be changed as a response to the policy goals: the more diverse the behavior, the more difficult it is to situate it under regulatory policies.

3. The extent of behavioral change required: the higher the amount of behavioral change (for example, learning in a foreign language classroom context), the more problematic successful implementation is (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1980).

The ability of statute to structure the implementation can be analyzed through the following:

1. Clear and consistent structurization of policy (implementation), and the capacity of the constituent to structure the implementation coherently. Selecting the implementing institutions, providing them with legal and financial resources, regulating the possibility of non-agency actors to participate in the implementation process all impact the outcomes of policy implementation.

2. The validity of causal theory underlying the policy. There are two components for proving the validity of causes on which the policy creation is based: technical validity and implementation effectiveness. The component of technical validity denotes the relationship between the target group behavior and the level of policy objectives attainment. The component of implementation effectiveness concerns the capability of implementing institutions to generate necessary behavioral changes in the target group.

3. Funding mechanism and financial resources available to the implementing agencies.

4. The extent of hierarchical integration within and among implementing institutions. The extent of coordination of actions within the implementing agency(-ies) and among other

contributing semi-autonomous agencies. If the system is "loosely integrated" (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1980, p. 546), significant variations in behavioral compliance among the implementing agencies and the target group will be observed.

Non-legal variables affecting policy implementation:

1. Socio-economic conditions of the target group, affecting the attainability of policy objectives.

2. The amount and continuity of media attention to the problem/policy implementation.

3. Public support and its variations over time. The public can impact the implementation process in the following ways: 1) public opinion (altogether with its interaction with mass media) can influence the policy agenda; 2) opinion polls can serve as valuable sources for marking of the public attitude towards the policy implementation agenda.

This chapter discussed the history of the EU and Turkey's relations in the context of accession, migration, and politico-economic partnership before signing the agreement on the Joint Action Plan. Accession negotiations with Turkey have not been going smoothly all the time, there have been various periods of pursuits of Europeanization followed by times of re-evaluation of Turkishness by the Turkish society. The beginning of the civil war in Syria gradually led to a massive refugee influx into the territory of the EU. By the end of 2014, almost 55 thousand people were crossing the EU-Turkey border every month. This crisis led both sides to revise their relationships and create more comprehensive measures, which would allow tackling the high numbers of irregular migrants.

On 15 October 2015, the EU and Turkey agreed to cooperate on the development of sustaining programs and initiatives for the Syrian refugee population in Turkey. According to the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan, Turkey is responsible for the provision of support on the necessary

educational, health, and employment needs. In contrast, the EU is responsible for the accumulation and transfer of financial aid to the governmental and international organizations operating in Turkey. The financial support from the side of the EU is delivered through the FRIT program and the PICTES (now PIKTES) projects.

The arranged initiatives for the Syrian students' educational integration in Turkey include the creation of accelerated learning programs, conditional cash transfers for students who are enrolled and attending the classes, conducting training for the teachers and school staff, construction and renovation of schools, the provision of school supplies and clothing.

The methodology of the policy implementation research is discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER III. METHODS

Research Questions

In order to define the role of the Action Plan in Syrian refugees' educational integration, the following research questions need to be answered:

1. What are the implementational strengths and weaknesses of the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan regarding its effect on Syrian refugees' educational integration?

2. What are the characteristics of the EU-Turkey inter-relational discourse as it pertains to educational integration, and how are these discourse characteristics reflected within the outcomes of FRIT (Facilities for Refugees in Turkey) and PICTES (Promoting Integration of Syrian Children into the Turkish Education System)?

Research Design

The study involves qualitative research design and is presented in the form of a policy implementation case-study with the following data sources and treatment: a theoretical study of the policy(-ies), analytical reports, research articles, and a content analysis of newspaper articles and interviews. The European Commission (EC) documents on the policy, FRIT, and the PICTES (PIKTES) projects provide the primary sources of data for the research. All other EC audit, assessment, and evaluation reports, EC communications are of substantial importance. The collected data are analyzed through the method of evaluation of policy implementation, focusing on content analysis and synthesis of documented results of an ongoing policy implementation process. Public discussions affecting policy implementation are analyzed using the method of qualitative coding and discourse analysis. Online interviews are first transcribed, then coded, and later analyzed.

The Role of Case Study Methodology in Policy Implementation Studies

For the current research, a qualitative research method has been selected. The *case-study* methodology is used to learn about the strengths and weaknesses of the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan policy implementation. The case-study has been long used in political science to explore the "causes-of-effects," specifically how "causes interact in the context of a particular case or a few cases to produce an outcome" (Bennett and Elman as cited in Crasnow, 2012, p. 657). Case-study is considered as the research tool allowing to make causal inferences in policy implementation outcomes through *process tracing*. Initially, under the process tracing learning about the decision-making process was understood, whereas now its meaning extended to studying any causal process. Van Evera describes process tracing as the action, during which "the investigator explores the chain of events or the decision-making process by which initial case conditions are translated into case outcomes" (Van Evera as cited in Crasnow, 2012, p. 658). Rist (1984) states in his paper on qualitative research methods in policy studies, that "program implementation necessitates an ability to postulate a causal chain of sequences that will allow the original causal objectives to be translated into program realities" (p. 23).

Data Collection

The sources of data collection for the current study are the EC policy documents, analytic reports, strategy plans, and expert interviews.

1. Study of theoretical materials.

In order to answer the research questions, I conducted a theoretical study of the Joint Action Plan policy and the FRIT program documents, needs assessment reports, Commission decisions, Commission communications, and monitoring and evaluation reports.

A. European Union (EU) documents.

The European Union, European Commission documents on the Joint Action Plan, the

FRIT and PICTES implementation are the primary sources of current research. All other EC

audit, assessment, and evaluation reports, EC communications are of substantial importance as

well. The list of these documents is captured in Table 1.

Table 1

List of the EU Documents Used as the Primary Sources

No.	Primary source document title	Year of issuance
1	EU-Turkey joint action plan	2015
2	Commission Decision of 24 November 2015 on the coordination of the actions of the Union and of the Member States through a coordination mechanism – the Refugee Facility for Turkey (C(2015)9500 final)	2015
3	Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the follow-up to the Leaders' Meeting on refugee flows along the Western Balkans Route (COM(2015)676 final)	2015
4	Contribution of the LIV COSAC (2016/C 29/01)	2015
5	Facilities for Refugees in Turkey. Strategic Concept Note	2016
6	Needs assessment report for the preparation of an enhanced EU support to Turkey on the refugee crisis (Contract No. 2015/366838)	2016
7	Commission Decision of 10 February 2016 on the Facility for Refugees in Turkey amending Commission Decision C(2015)9500 of 24 November 2015 (32016D0216(01))	2016
8	Commission Decision of 18 April 2017 on the Facility for Refugees in Turkey amending Commission Decision C(2015)9500 of 24 November 2015 (32017D0419(01))	2017
9	Commission Decision of 14 March 2018 on the Facility for Refugees in Turkey amending Commission Decision C(2015)9500 of 24 November 2015 (32018D0321(01))	2018
10	Commission Decision of 24 July 2018 on the Facility for Refugees in Turkey amending Commission Decision C(2015)9500 as regards the contribution to the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (32018D0808(01))	2018
11	Assistance to Syrian refugees in Turkey. Document prepared for the Brussels II Conference "Supporting the future of Syria and the region", Brussels, Belgium	2018
12	Technical Assistance to the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey. Needs Assessment Report. Final Report (Contract No. 2017/393359/1)	2018
13	Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Third Annual Report on the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (COM(2019) 174 final/2)	2019
14	EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey. List of projects committed/decided, contracted, disbursed	2019
15	Managing the refugee crisis. The Facility results framework. Monitoring Report	2019

B. Study of visual, statistical data.

Statistical data is gathered from the following online platforms, which are kept updated throughout the time of research: UNHCR Inter-Agency Coordination Turkey, UNHCR Operational Portal of Refugee Situations, 3 RP Regional Refugee Resilience Plan on Syrian Refugee Crisis. The use of statistical data in current research is essential to present valid and ever-changing numbers of refugees residing in Turkey and the number of school-aged children enrolled in public/private educational institutions throughout the studied years of 2014 and 2019.

C. Study of Analytic Reports, Strategy Plans.

The policy implementation analysis is based on data, acquired through the study of analytic reports on policy implementation and the study of strategy plans, such as Theirworld's report "Partnering for a better future: ensuring educational opportunity for all Syrian refugee children and youth in Turkey" (2015), SETA's report "Breaking Down Barriers: Getting Syrians Children into Schools in Turkey" (2017), Turkish Ombudsman Institution's Special Report on Syrians in Turkey (2018), Asylum Information Database (AIDA) Country Report: Turkey (2019), and an extensive number of UNICEF and UNHCR reports.

2. Study of expert interviews: interviews of Turkish government and EU/EC officials.

The familiarity with official positions of key government and EC figures is vital to understand the underlying interests of the parties, actors. This part of the study of online interviews, speeches will help us identify the dominating discourses within parties. and determine their effects on the JAP policy, FRIT program, and PICTES project implementation outcomes. In Table 2, the following general information on the selected video sources is presented: date of recording, episode title, source channel, episode overview, and the reason(s) for selection of the episode for analysis and coding.

Table 2

General Information on Video Episodes Selected for Coding

Date of recording	Episode title	Source channel	Episode overview	Reason(s) for selection of the episode
1. 15th October, 2015	"EU and Turkey agree on joint migrant action plan"	SABC Digital News	Episode presents current state of refugee flows between the EU-Turkey borders and provides the opinion of the EU Policy Center expert.	This episode highlights the divisions between the EU members on assisting Turkey and presents the reasons for integration difficulties of refugees into the EU member states.
2. 15th October, 2015	"EU leaders offer Turkey aid in plan to stop migrant flow in Europe"	Euronews (in English)	The episode contains discussions of conditions on housing the migrants in Turkey and coordinating the border control.	Episode provides details of the EU and Turkey's conditions for agreement and features A. Merkel's statement on "housing refugees closer to homes."
3. 16th October, 2015	"EU tries new Turkey strategy to tackle refugee crisis"	New China TV	News excerpt features the EU and the EC President's requirements on strengthening the EU borders and stemming the refugee flows.	The episode material benefits towards understanding the nature of conversations between the EU and Turkey on the terms of building a bilateral cooperation.
4. 16th October, 2015	"EU states back Turkey migrant action plan"	Channels Television	Episode focuses on the EU and Turkey leaders' attitude towards the acceptance of JAP.	News excerpt contains D. Tusk's expression of "cautious optimism" when welcoming the agreement on the JAP.
5. 8th February, 2016	"Aleppo: EU and Turkey come up with a 10-point action plan"	Euronews (in English)	Episode covers the excerpt of the German Chancellor's visit to Ankara for the discussion of further management of refugee flows.	Episode features Turkish government's concerns over lacking the financial funding for complete stemming of refugee flows.
6. 18th February, 2017	"Belgium: Joint Action Plan with Turkey is a priority – Tusk"	RT, Ruptly	Episode highlights D. Tusk's press conference speech on the migration management agreement with Turkey.	The episode contains an uninterrupted announcement of D. Tusk on the negotiation of migration agreement with Turkey.
7. 3rd March, 2016	"Turkey, EU vow to handle Syrian refugee crisis with agreed action plan"	New China TV	News excerpt mentions promises given by the Turkish PM and requests put forward by his government regarding the acceptance of the Joint Action Plan.	The episode material reflects the consistence in Turkey's requests regarding the financial aid, visa liberalizations and the sped-up accession talks.

Data Analysis

To achieve the complete understanding of implementational strengths and weaknesses of the policy, the following methods will be used: theoretical study of policy documents, research articles, relevant book chapters and analysis, synthesis of information gained from statistical data presented both online, on websites of organizations of international and national levels, and in reports, policy evaluation documents.

Conducting the content and discourse analysis of interviews of the EU and Turkey's officials is vital for understanding the causal effects of the political agenda and the policy implementation outcomes. The dominant discourses on media platforms regarding the EU-Turkey cooperation on migration crisis management will be studied in order to understand the effect of politicization of migration discussions. I selected video materials for the content analysis and coding based on their relevance to the formation process of the Joint Action Plan. All the studied news episodes and video materials discuss the sides' agreement conditions on the JAP, highlight claims made during the bilateral negotiations and evaluate preceding efforts.

Coding specifics

While studying the interviews, I have identified the following coding themes listed in Table 3, which have continuously emerged during the news reports of negotiations and interviews on the EU-Tukey Joint Action Plan formation and implementation.

Table 3

Emergent Thematic Codes for Discourse Analysis

Category	Thematic code	Key terms	Characteristic phrases used in interviews	Code frequency
Refugee flows	Stemming the refugee flows	Stemming, standing refugee flows	"Stem the flow of refugees to Europe" (New China TV), "to stand the flow" (Channels Television).	3
	A threat to social stability	Threat	"Refugees potentially pose a threat to social stability" (Source: New China TV)	2
	Caused crisis	Crisis	"Migratory crisis", "refugee crisis", "migration crisis" (Multiple sources).	3
Migration and border management solutions	Housing migrants closer to their homes	Housing migrants	A. Merkel's "it is better to house refugees closer to their home" (Source: Euronews).	1
	Stronger border management	Border management, FRONTEX	"…leaders took important decisions to help secure the Union's external borders." (Source: Channels Television)	3
	EU's establishment of democratic solutions	Legal framework for migration; system of fair distribution of refugees among MS	"Merkel and Davlutoglu also stressed the need to bring an end the human trafficking, to establish a legal framework for migration and to set up a system to fairly distribute the arriving refugees among the EU Member States." (Source: Euronews)	2
The EU and its Member States (MS)	Divisions among MS regarding the JAP	Divisions among MS	"…we must first avoid a battle among plans A, B and C. It makes no sense at all. As it creates divisions within the European Union." (D. Tusk, RT, Ruptly)	2
	Homogeneity of MS as host societies	Homogeneous (not diverse) composition of societies	"…the Central and Eastern Europe, who are not as diverse in terms of the composition of their societies…"(SABC News)	1
	European consensus	JAP as a priority	"…Joint Action Plan with Turkey remains a priority…" (D. Tusk, source RT, Ruptly)	2
EU's assistance to Turkey	Financial aid		"the EU offered a possible 3 billion Euros in aid and the prospect of easier travel visas, to re-energize the talks on joining the bloc" (source: Channels Television)	3
	Visa liberalizations			4
	Sped-up accession negotiations			4

Validity

The researcher bias is one of the main possible validity threats. In the current study, the following strategies for overcoming this validity threat can be used: searching for discrepant evidence during the theoretical study and searching for negative cases during the content and discourse analyses. The number of articles that prove only the mainstream point of view within the EU countries regarding policy implementation may become prevailing in the analysis. That is why relevant articles coming from various reliable sources will be gathered in order to compare and contrast their main ideas.

Internal validity of research findings when using case-study methodology may become questionable. The researcher may wrongly identify the causes of the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan implementation outcomes. In order to counter this validity threat, the principle of data triangulation can be utilized. The following data collection techniques will be used to ensure the validity of research outcomes: study of theoretical material (both textual and statistical information) and the content and discourse analyses of expert interviews, remarks.

Limitations of the Study

Researcher's Turkish language knowledge capabilities. I do not know Turkish to the extent sufficient for a full and correct understanding of the academic, government and media materials published in the Turkish language. Due to my very limited knowledge of Turkish, I could not use it as a language tool for conducting current research, thus I could not appeal to sources of data, which used Turkish as the medium of data presentation. All the information gathered in the research is taken only from the sources, which have published the data in English.

Researcher subjectivity. The possible researcher subjectivity arising from the use of a selected theoretical framework for the current study are elaborated by Paul Sabatier (1986) in his

analysis of top-down and bottom-up approaches of implementation research. While applying the

top-down researching lenses, I may uncritically focus on the central perspective of decision-

makers, which may lead to ignoring the perspectives of other actors. It may lead to an erroneous

assumption that the "writers" of policy are the key actors, and thus the perspectives of the local

implementing parties may be mistakenly omitted. The use of data generated by different

international organizations, such as the UN organizations operating locally, should be appealed

to in order to avoid a preconceived presentation of the statistical data.

Policy implementation study limitation. The criticism of the top-down policy

implementation analysis approach, provided by Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983), may

significantly contribute to the researcher subjectivity. As the authors of the conceptual

framework claim, the 4-5-year span of policy implementation research sometimes fosters

bringing forward immature statements on whether the policy succeeded or failed, thus leading to

the miss of essential features of the policy implementation process (Mazmanian and Sabatier,

1983).

CHAPTER IV. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

This qualitative theoretical research of the policy implementation explores two following research questions: 1. The implementational strengths and weaknesses of the Joint Action Plan regarding its effect on Syrian refugees' educational integration; 2. The characteristics of the EU-Turley inter-relational discourses and Turkish public opinion and their reflection on policy formation and implementation.

In this chapter, I analyze existing data on the Joint Action Plan formation and FRIT, PICTES implementation following Sabatier and Mazmanian's conceptual framework. First, I present the analysis of the variables shaping the policy formation process, later I discuss the statutory and non-statutory variables impacting the policy implementation. In conclusion of the chapter, I present the description of identified implementational strengths and weaknesses of the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan.

Tractability of the Problem of Syrian Refugees' Educational Integration in Turkey

Addressed by the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan

Availability of Valid Technical Theory and/or Technology Underpinning Policy Creation

The period between the beginning of the Syrian refugee flows to Turkey and signing the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan can be approximately divided into the following three stages: the years of 2012, 2013-2014, and the time from late 2014 until the fall of 2015. The EU and the Government of Turkey consented to the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan on 15 October 2015 and activated it on 29 November 2015. Thus, all the developments in the preceding periods provided a substantial basis for the policy formation and necessitated its further implementation. After the eruption of the conflict in Syria in 2011, the first period in the second half of 2012 led to the influx of 20,000 refugees on average per month. In 2013 and 2014, the numbers doubled up to

40,000 newcomers, seeking refuge monthly in Turkey throughout this period. By late 2014, the number of Syrians crossing the border increased up to approximately 55,000 people per month (İçduygu, & Şimşek, 2016). According to UNHCR statistics, the number of registered Syrian refugees on the territory of Turkey was 2,072,290 people by 2 October of 2015 (UNHCR, 2015b).

The technical theory behind the formation of the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan.

Over these periods, the policies addressing the issues around the Syrian refugees in Turkey evolved from the basic 'open door' to more integrationist. The progress in policy formation had to keep up with the increase in refugee flows to the EU through Central, Eastern Mediterranean, and Balkan routes. After the onset of the civil war in Syria and Iraq, the Eastern Mediterranean route became the most used as well as most insecure. As Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, data indicate, "this route, used for many years as an entry path into Europe, saw the continent's biggest migratory wave since Second World War when 885,000[3] migrants used it to reach the EU in 2015" (Migratory Routes, 2020). Border crossings from Turkey to Greece were reflected in the formation of intense refugee flows at the Western Balkan route alike. The formation of the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan served as a bilateral response mechanism from the sides of the EU and Turkey towards the regulation of illegal crossings of the EU-Turkey border. As the Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council dated 15 December 2015 states, the EU's national policies[4] were insufficiently ready to tackle the changes in migration flows, which resulted in taking many unilateral measures, leading to a rising "uncertainty and instability in the region" (EU, 2015c, p. 3). The practices of

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[3] 885,386 as more precisely presented on the Illegal border crossings in the Eastern Mediterranean route chart (Migratory Routes, 2020).

[4] Particularly the policies of the countries, which acquired the status of countries for transit, such as Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Greece, Hungary, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia.

'waving refugees' became widespread, where certain countries encouraged the passage of refugees and migrants from one country to the neighboring countries inside the EU, thus creating the "acceleration of the flows," leading to blockages on the borders of "destination countries at the end of the Western Balkan route" (EU, 2015c, p.4). The EU was facing a critical situation; therefore, the Members of the European Parliament and national Members of Parliament strongly supported the agreement on the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan at COSAC (European Parliament, 2015).[5]

The technical theory underpinning the establishment of the FRIT program and the PICTES project. The prerequisites for the existence of the program such as Facilities for Refugees in Turkey (FRIT) and of its subsidiary project Promoting Integration of Syrian Children into the Turkish Education System (PICTES), lie in the acceptance of the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan. The Joint Action Plan (2015) mentions the responsibilities of both sides - the EU and Turkey, in supporting Syrians under the temporary protection in Turkey and their Turkish hosting communities. As mentioned in Part I(1) of the policy document, the EU intends to allocate its funds and to help mobilize additional funds to provide means for immediate humanitarian assistance, for the establishment of improved infrastructures and social services, and for enabling access to education at all levels (EU, 2015a). Turkey had to serve as a recipient country of a more significant number of Syrian refugees than any other country. Nonetheless, it did not have sufficient financial resources and physical capacities of its own to handle the refugees' influx adequately.

Facilities for Refugees in Turkey (FRIT) was first developed as a coordination mechanism on 24 November 2015 based on the Commission Decision on the coordination of the

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[5] Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union.

actions of the Union and of the Member States (EU, 2015b). FRIT is characterized as a program allowing the provision of both humanitarian and non-humanitarian (developmental) support to Turkey from the EU and other international donor organizations. The target of the program aid includes the following six priority areas: Humanitarian Assistance, Migration Management, Education, Health, Municipal Infrastructure, and Socio-Economic Support (EU, 2016a).

Education was considered to be one of the primary areas in need of financial support due to a broad scope of difficulties faced by school-aged Syrian refugees in Turkey. Some of the significant difficulties could be described as follows: firstly, there were almost twice as many Syrian students schooled in Temporary Education Centers (TECs) than in public schools - 65% of Syrian students attended TECs while the rest went to Turkish public schools. TECs served as short-term solutions, and their existence indicated the unavailability of seats in public schools and also the presence of social and cultural barriers for Syrian children's enrollment into the public education system. Secondly, 41% of all school-age Syrian children were not schooled at all. Thirdly, human resources and financial support of school constructions and teaching staff employment remained inadequate. For example, Syrian teachers had to keep working at TECs based on a two-year contract because of a relatively high number of Turkish teachers having not been allocated to schools yet (Coskun et al., 2017). The project of Promoting Integration of Syrian Children into the Turkish Education System (PICTES) was launched through the direct EU grant of 300 million euros to the Ministry of National Education (MoNE) of Turkey to ensure the possibilities for Syrian children to study alongside their Turkish peers. The PICTES project budget is part of a 3-billion-euro tranche within the implementation framework of FRIT, aiming to support 23 regions of Turkey with the highest concentration of Syrians. These regions are Istanbul, Kocaeli, Sakarya, Bursa, Ankara, İzmir, Konya, Antalya, Kayseri, Adana, Mersin,

Malatya, Kahramanmaraş, Osmaniye, Hatay, Kilis, Gaziantep, Adıyaman, Şanlıurfa, Diyarbakır, Mardin, Batman, Siirt (Akyuz et al., 2018). The main goal of the project is to specifically train and employ 5,600 Turkish language teachers, provide 390,000 Syrian students with Turkish language courses and organize catch-up training for 30,000 students who have stayed out of school for too long (Delegation of the European Union to Turkey, 2017).

Ultimately, the program of Facilities for Refugees in Turkey can be viewed as a comprehensive support mechanism, approaching the aid process holistically and allowing it to utilize auxiliary mechanisms such as the PICTES project for complete educational integration of Syrian refugees. The first and foremost step leading to successful educational integration is increased school enrollment and attendance throughout all stages. The Facilities program was activated as from 1 January 2016 to enable the financial contributions within the budgetary years of 2016-2017. The duration of the program activity could be reviewed depending on the financial capacity of donors and the nature of funding (EU, 2016b).

The given analysis of technical theories underpinning the formation of the Joint Action Plan and the establishment of FRIT and PICTES shows the presence of a solid technical theory basis for further successful policy implementation. This finding comes in line with Sabatier and Mazmanian's (1980) assertion that "the absence of a valid causal theory and/or the requisite technology in turn poses a number of difficulties for the successful implementation of statutory objectives" (p. 543).

Diversity of Target Group Behavior and Percentage of Target Group Population Within the Area of Policy Influence

The diversity of target group behavior can be analyzed by studying the variations of Syrian refugees' educational needs. The needs are going to differ depending on refugees'

demographic situations, on the geography of the families' regional settlement, on the educational and socio-economic status of Syrian refugees.

Demographic data and the percentage of target group population. Throughout 2014-2020 the number of Syrian refugees under temporary protection kept changing year by year. In 2014 there were 1,591,286 (2,05% of total population) registered Syrian refugees, and in 2015 their number rapidly increased to 2,503,549 (3,18%) people. In 2016 there were 2,834,441 (3,55%) Syrian refugees, and in 2017 there were 3,426,786 (4,24%) Syrian refugees living in Turkey. The maximum number of registered newcomers from Syria residing in Turkey was reached in 2018 at 3,623,192 (4,42%), according to the official DGMM data. Gradually, within the next year, this number began slowly decreasing. In 2019 there were 3,576,370 (4,47%), and by January 2020 there were 3,571,175 (4,35%) registered Syrian refugees living in Turkey (Temporary Protection, 2020).

In 2016, the vast majority of Syrian refugees (up to 90%) lived outside the camps, and many lived in urban areas. In contrast, some have settled down in rural areas.[6] In April 2016, there was an estimated number of 2,479,552 people living outside the camps, while 269,858 people continued to stay in camps (EU, 2016b). It is important to note that the efforts made by the Government of Turkey before the beginning of the implementation of FRIT led to an increase in Syrian students' enrolment into free public schools. Nevertheless, the enrollment was as high as 90% in camps only, while outside the camps, it remained staggeringly low - at just 26% (EU, 2016b). By June 2016, more than half a million Syrian school-age children between the ages of 5-17 remained out of school, regardless of the place of their residence. The

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[6] It is complicated to present separately the exact numbers of Syrian refugees staying in the cities and rural areas, for Turkey's Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) registers based on province, district centers and do not tie the registration to the personal addresses. Even those who are registered at a specific address may become highly mobile, which undermines the accuracy of such registration data.

population of Syrian refugees in the top ten provinces of Turkey presented comparatively for the

years of 2016, 2018, and 2020 is provided in Table 4.

Table 4

The Comparative Data on the Population of Syrian Refugees in the Top Ten Provinces of Turkey

Years	April 2016[a]	June 2018[b]	January 2020[c]
Regions	Total number of Syrian refugees/School-aged refugees		
Adana	150,117/48,476	204,200	243,933
Bursa	134,490/27,035	138,333	176,288
Hatay	386,090/114,479	443,760	438,330
Gaziantep	325,151/108,389	382,604	452,533
Istanbul	537,084/108,294	561,848	482,483
Izmir	128,690/25,990	137,338	147,018
Kilis	129,221/45,835	130,405	115,491
Konya	99,212/20,104	107,664	112,136
Mersin	138,634/41,782	208,338	207,700
Şanlıurfa	401,084/129,563	474,531	423,600

Note. [a] Source: European Union, European Commission. (2016b). *Needs assessment report for the preparation of an enhanced EU support to Turkey on the refugee crisis* (Contract No. 2015/366838).
[b] Source: European Union, European Commission. (2018b). *Technical Assistance to the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey. Needs Assessment Report. Final Report* (Contract No. 2017/393359/1).
[c] Source: DGMM. Temporary Protection. Up-to-Date Statistics. January 2020.

From the data shown in Table 4, in 2016 in some regions of Turkey, school-aged Syrian

children comprised up to 30% of the total number of Syrian refugees in the areas of their highest

density. When looking at the bigger picture, the same demographic pattern gets represented: out

of 2,8 million Syrian refugees residing in Turkey in 2016, almost 1,2 million were children under

the age of 18. It is important to consider the differing realia the children lived in depending on

their accommodation: children in camps attended the schools administered on the territory of

camps, that is why their enrollment was smoother and faster, and their drop-out rate was lower compared to the second and bigger group of children outside the camps. The children residing in Turkish host communities had two options: whether to attend free Turkish public school or join Temporary Education Centers (which were, in part, run based on private support received from Syrian charities) with Arabic serving as the language of instruction. The low enrollment, inconsistent school attendance, and absenteeism of children residing outside of camps were grounded in a series of problems such as high levels of child labor, early marriages, unmet transportation needs, bullying in Turkish public schools, and the children's fear of getting deported (Asylum Information Database, 2019). For example, the Asylum Information Database (2019) portal mentions that such fear was represented physically in the Bursa region of Turkey, where up to 8,500 children preferred to stay out of public schools.

Syrian refugees' educational status. The data on Syrians' educational statuses are mainly unavailable, and the only source where such information was found was the special report of the Ombudsman Institution of Grand National Assembly of Turkey (2018). The report sheds some light on the general education status of Syrian refugees coming to Turkey based on the information provided by the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) as well as the Ministry of Development. According to the reported data from 2016, 33,3% of incoming Syrians are illiterate. 13% know how to read and write, but they have not ever been formally schooled. 16,5% of refugees have attended just the primary schools or their equivalents. A lower percentage, 6.5% of people graduated from middle schools or their equivalents, whereas even less number, just 5.6%, completed the secondary schools. 26,6% of Syrian refugees came to Turkey, having obtained a higher education certificate or credential.

Among the reasons explaining this phenomenon is the fact of many Syrians coming to Turkey are from the northern regions of Syria, where the level of education is considered to be generally lower than in the rest of the country. Also, many refugee families with higher levels of education leave for Europe. This situation exacerbates Syrians' general education status in Turkey (The Ombudsman Institution, 2018).

Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) claim that "the more diverse the behavior being regulated, the more difficult it becomes to frame clear regulations and thus the less likely that statutory objectives will be attained" (p. 543). When it comes to Syrian refugees' educational integration into the Turkish school system, the complexity of the matter becomes apparent, and the changes intended to occur in the target group are rather profound. Thus, the implementation mechanism of the Joint Action Plan policy, FRIT, is comprehensive. The profiles of policy implementing actors convey the plurality of their responsibilities as well as their cross-sector engagement.

Extent of Behavioral Change Required

Regarding the extent of a required behavioral change, Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) assert that "the amount of behavioral modification required to achieve statutory objectives is the absolute number of people in the ultimate target groups and the amount of change required of them" (p. 544). The population of Syrian refugee children residing in Turkey constitutes approximately 30% of the total population of Syrian refugees. The number of the target group kept growing from 1,2 million up to 1,6 million Syrian children throughout the years of 2014-2019. This number is high enough for a quick educational behavioral change.

The Government of Turkey (GoT) made enormous efforts to meet the basic, socio-economic, and educational needs of Syrian refugees. The Needs Assessment report of the EC

(2016) states that before signing the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan, Turkey had spent close to 10 billion US dollars from its budget for the registration and accommodation of Syrian refugees, and the establishment of their socio-educational benefits. By the time of receiving the coordinated financial help from the EU, its Member States, and the international community through the FRIT program, Turkey had received just up to half a billion US dollars - an amount far below what the country had been expecting and had needed. Regardless, Turkey had managed to reach an enrollment rate of 323,592 children of ages 3-17 in pre-, primary, and secondary schools. However, there were more than half a million children of school age remaining out of school (EU, 2016b).

Enrolment rates in primary education were considerably higher than in secondary education. Schools demonstrated shortages of their capacities in terms of physical and human resources and were unable to admit an increased number of refugee students. At the time of the beginning of the FRIT program implementation, the Syrian refugee population was facing the following problems regarding the school enrollment and attendance:

- Challenges in the socio-economic character faced by families (for instance, inability to cover the education costs, children's domestic/income-generating labor, child marriages);

- The expectation of low economic returns from children's education by their families, compared to their present work, family engagements (particularly in case of adolescents);

- Staying out of school for too long due to pre- and post-migration issues;

- Problems of school finding and registration;

- Failing at attempts of getting registered at schools;

- Scarcity of transportation and inability to commute to schools;

- Lack of Turkish language proficiency, based on which the difficulties with enrollment arise - either families cannot (or are unwilling to) navigate through the registration process, or are being denied of the school placement;

- Deficits of necessary knowledge of legal procedures and regulations at school administrations;

- Lack of awareness of educational opportunities in Syrian refugee families;

- View of the Turkish language and education as inessential due to the families' plans of possible future migration to third countries or back to Syria (EU, 2018b).

The identified problems are addressed via the implementation of numerous complementary strategies based on FRIT and PICTES initiatives, which are currently the following:

1. the improvement of physical capacities of schools (through establishing dual shifts and building new infrastructure) and their human resources (through the training/recruiting of higher numbers of both Turkish and Syrian teachers);

2. the elimination of economic barriers (provision of transportation and school materials, or reimbursement of their costs);

3. the implementation of incentive programs, such as conditional cash transfers and school food catering programs;

4. the establishment of remedial/catch-up education training, language courses, and accelerated learning programs;

5. the identification of students with special education needs, and providing them the necessary support (EU, 2016b).

The EC states that it is a priority "to design and implement accelerated Turkish language programs for non-Turkish language students through the public school system, as the language barrier is a serious hindrance for continuing education" (EU, 2016b, p. 14). Also, there is a necessity for conducting educational training for teachers and school staff on the psycho-social support and inclusion mechanisms for refugee children in public schools in order to let the educators minimize the effects of discrimination and encourage Syrian children's active participation in the school and community lives. The university students should be getting more support in preparation for university entrance exams in the form of additional training and scholarships. More prominent budgetary support to TECs is needed to ensure the improvements in enrolment and the quality of offered education. Still, given the fact that TECs were established as temporary solutions by the GoT to impede the educational gaps in generations of Syrian children, it is vital to pursue long-term integration via a consecutive transfer of Syrian students to Turkish public schools, simultaneously revising the standard curriculum for the eventual inclusion of courses on the Arabic language and culture (EU, 2016b).

<div align="center">**Ability of Statute to Structure the Implementation**</div>

Clear and Consistent Structurization of Policy Implementation

From the point of view of Sabatier and Mazmanian's (1980) conceptual framework for policy implementation analysis, the fundamental aspects for any successful policy implementation are the indication of the problems addressed and of the objectives pursued. The capacity of the organization to structure the policy implementation is demonstrated through the proper selection of the implementing agencies, institutions, through providing these institutions with necessary legal and financial resources, and through letting the "nonagency actors" (p. 544) participate in the implementation process.

The central policy - the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan. The text of the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan distinguishes multiple issues regarding the migration of Syrian refugees across Turkish and EU borders. According to the text of the policy document, the refugee crisis can be addressed in three directions: a) through addressing the causes leading to the mass migration; b) by showing support to Syrians living in Turkey under temporary protection, as well as to their host Turkish communities; and c) by strengthening security measures to prevent irregular migration across the EU-Turkey border. The second measure concerning the support of Syrians and their host communities in Turkey is described more thoroughly in Part I of the Joint Action Plan. It clearly states the intentions of the EU to mobilize funds for Turkey rapidly, and in a sustained, coordinated manner in order to enable the country to tackle the developing migration crisis. The areas in need of priority funding are decided *jointly* by the EU and Turkish authorities. The causes receiving priority funding are those providing "immediate humanitarian assistance" (EU, 2015a, p.1). Other essential areas selected for financial support allocation towards helping Syrian refugees are the "provision of legal, administrative and psychological support; support for community centers; the enhancement of self-sufficiency and participation in economy and their social inclusion during their stay in Turkey; improved access to education at all levels; but also actions supporting host communities in areas such as infrastructures and services" (EU, 2015a, p.1).

Also, the EU intends to attract relevant humanitarian organizations to help tackle the immediate situations of humanitarian nature, in cooperation with the Turkish authorities. As a way of ensuring the efficient use of funds, "the EU institutions and Turkey will proceed with a comprehensive joint needs assessment as a basis for programming" (EU, 2015a, p. 2).

Turkey, from its side, intends to ensure the effective implementation of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP).[7] Furthermore, it provided opportunities for refugees to register, obtain the appropriate documents, and facilitate Syrians' access to public services such as education, healthcare, and economic participation in the labor market within the duration of their stay in Turkey (EU, 2015a).

The follow-up policy implementation program: FRIT (2016, 2018). The primary Joint Action Plan implementation mechanism is the program of Facilities for Refugees in Turkey. The Commission Decisions (2016c, 2017, 2018c, d) on the establishment and development of the FRIT clearly and concisely specify what kind of support is going to be provided to Turkey and in which ways it is going to be delivered. The program of the Facility aims at the coordination and modernization of humanitarian and developmental actions financed from the EU's budget and is complemented by contributions coming from the EU Member States. The FRIT program outlines the type of causes towards which the financial support can get allocated such as the "support contributing to integration in the labor market, access to education and social inclusion of refugees and host communities, including in terms of provision of adequate infrastructure" (EU, 2016c, p. 3).

The decision-making and executive body of the Facility: the Steering Committee. A special Steering Committee was created to watch over the implementation process and to provide strategic guidance when coordinating the support delivery. The Steering Committee is composed of two representatives of the European Commission and one representative from each Member State (EU, 2016c). However, the Commission chairs the Committee and plays a leading role in the coordination of its work. Turkey is represented as a member of the Steering Committee "in

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[7] Law on Foreigners and International Protection was passed in 2013. This law regulated the foreigners' employment status and work permits for enabling their active involvement in the Turkish labor market.

an advisory capacity" for safeguarding the full coordination of assisting actions on the ground,

"except when the steering committee examines the strategic guidance concerning conditions

relating to the implementation by Turkey its commitments under the EU-Turkey Joint Action

Plan for the delivery of the assistance or monitors and assesses the respect of these conditions"

(EU, 2016c, p.3).

In addition, the European Commission leaves the right to veto strategic decisions of the

Steering Committee for the cases of ensuring the legality of the decisions, also their

compatibility with the implementing responsibility of the Union's budget (EU, 2016c).

Implementation modalities of FRIT. As it is stated in the Communication from the EC

to the European Parliament, the main principles governing the implementation of the Facility are

"speed, efficiency, and effectiveness, while ensuring sound financial management" (EU, 2019,

p.5). Special independent and comprehensive needs assessments[8] were conducted in years of

2016 and 2018 before the commitment and allocation of tranches (worth of 6 billion Euros in

total) to help guide rational decision-making, and identify the priority areas for assistance,

particularly taking into account vulnerable groups (EU, 2019a).

The selection of projects for further financial support is made based on their nature and

extent of immediate humanitarian, developmental assistance value to refugees and their host

communities. The support can be addressed to national as well as local authorities for managing

the consequences of the substantial refugee inflows (EU, 2015b).

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[8] There have been two Needs Assessments reported in 2016 and 2018, based on the data of which the first tranche of 3 billion Euros in 2016 and another tranche of 3 billion Euros in 2018 were committed and contracted by the EU and its Member States.
Needs assessment report for the preparation of an enhanced EU support to Turkey on the refugee crisis (2015/366838). European Commission, June 2016. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/2016_needs_assessment_.pdf
Technical Assistance to the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey (2017/393359/1). Needs Assessment Report. European Commission, 31 October 2018. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/updated_needs_assessment.pdf

It is the responsibility of the Commission to provide "information on and promote the actions supported by the Facility so as to ensure its visibility" (EU, 2015b).

Monitoring and evaluation. The European Commission keeps the European Parliament and the Council informed about the implementation of the Facility through annual reports. The program of Facility was established on 1 January 2016 to begin receiving financial contributions towards the years of 2016-2017 and the years of 2018-2019. The funds are managed depending on the availability of contributions from the Member States. The Commission, in coordination with the Member States, shall evaluate the first tranche disbursement by 31 December 2021 and the second tranche disbursement by 31 December 2023 (EU, 2018b).

The Validity of Causal Theory Underlying the Policy

For the effective study of the validity of causal theory, Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) suggested the application of two separate analysis components: technical validity and implementation effectiveness. *Technical validity* concerns the relationship between the behavior of the target group and the achievement of statutory objectives. *Implementation effectiveness* implies the ability of implementing institutions to generate the intended behavioral changes in the target group.

Technical validity of the causal theory. The essence of causal theory underlying Part I of the Joint Action Plan is in a firm connection to the EU's resource mobilization for the provision of security, education, healthcare and employment opportunities for a large number of Syrian refugees residing in Turkey and a consequent, guaranteed stay within the country for the period of temporary protection. The program for the implementation of policy objectives, Facilities for Refugees in Turkey, is structured in a way which allows the allocation of funds to

the priority sectors such as protection, education, health, basic needs and towards meeting the developmental objectives in the areas of socio-economic support, health and education infrastructure construction, migration management. Thereby, the policy objectives of maintaining the influx of Syrian refugees within Turkish borders are approached holistically.

Claiming a complete technical validity of the causal theory, which connects the drop in numbers of the EU-Turkey border crossings with the improvement of the living conditions for Syrian refugees in Turkey through reaching their gradual integration into the socio-economic reality of their host country may be controversial. One of the key reasons is the creation and implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement (or the Deal) from 18 March 2016, which accounts for strict measures to counter the irregular migration from Turkey to the territory of the EU. The Deal states that all irregular migrants crossing the border are to be returned to the territory of Turkey. Therefore, the general causal theory may not be fully technically valid, even though the statistics on border crossings show positive developments in terms of compliance with the policy agenda. The number of border crossings kept decreasing from October of 2015, when the maximum of 197,166 refugees arrived at the EU, to between one to two thousand people monthly (EU, 2018b).

When analyzing the education sector, it is clear that a different causal theory is present. This causal theory underlying the implementation of FRIT and PICTES can be framed as follows: EU's comprehensive support of the Turkish education system directly (through the issuance of grants to Turkish MoNE), or indirectly (via financing the projects of international organizations) leads to an increase of public school enrollments and class attendance. By being given credible educational solutions for their children, Syrian families may be willing to stay under temporary protection in Turkey.

Implementation effectiveness. The effectiveness of implementation can be analyzed through the comparison of available statistical data, systematically provided in UNICEF's Humanitarian Situation Reports on Turkey[9] as well as PICTES (currently PIKTES) implementation data found in various evaluation reports. The Government of Turkey, presented by the Turkish Ministry of National Education, and UNICEF are co-leading partners in the education sector response.

UNICEF has been active in the facilitation of education quality improvement and in increasing the enrollment and retention of Syrian children at schools. Table 5 on the next page provides the most prominent UNICEF projects. Projects have been implemented selectively throughout 2015-2019, and some are still ongoing.

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[9] The data on Syrian children's public school and TEC enrollments are not officially presented on the Turkish MoNE website and in their yearly statistical reports. Such data are available in the reports of the implementing agencies in the educational sector and research organizations. UNICEF is one of the leading partnering organizations to the EU and Turkish MoNE, the data from the reports of which will be primarily relied upon in this research.

Table 5

Data on UNICEF's Results in Educational and Human Resource Capacities Improvement in Turkish School System

Years	2015[a]	2016[b]	2017[c]	2018[d]	2019[f]
Projects					
Schools constructed	7			-	-
Schools renovated	108	259	768	-	-
TECs (upgraded)/ Est. of container-based classrooms (in 2017 only)	-			-	-
School supplies distributed (number of students)	284,000	Over 440,000	300,000	-	-
Conditional Cash Transfer for Education (CCTE)	-	-	187,155	Jan - 311,926[e]; Nov - 410,740	525,928
Incentives for SVEPs (number of teachers)	*8,700*	*12,963*	*13,180*	*12,994*	*12,593*
Training for teachers on incoming refugee children's psychosocial support	6,737	Nearly 10,000	-	-	-
Intensive pedagogical teacher training (numbers of Turkish and Syrian teachers)	-	20,000	55,639	154,451	54,400 (target)
Training for Syrian volunteer teachers	*-*	*-*	*18,600*	*1,100*	*-*

Note. The data of two rows are italicized in the table – this is done to distinct these two projects from the rest due to the different source of their funding. Incentives for SVEPs and training for Syrian volunteer teachers are not financed through FRIT program. SVEP = Syrian Volunteer Education Personnel.
[a] Source: UNICEF. (2015). *UNICEF Annual Report 2015, Turkey*.
[b] Source: UNICEF. (2016). *UNICEF Humanitarian Results. UNICEF Turkey Year-End Situation Report*.
[c] Source: UNICEF. (2017). *UNICEF Turkey Humanitarian Situation Report No.14 – October 2017*.
[d] Source: UNICEF. (2018). *UNICEF Turkey Humanitarian Situation Report No. 27 – November 2018*.
[e] Source: UNICEF. (2018). *UNICEF Turkey Humanitarian Situation Report No.16 – January 2018*.
[f] Source: UNICEF. (2019). *UNICEF Turkey Humanitarian Situation Report No. 35 – July-September 2019*.

When looking at Table 5, it is noticeable that some of UNICEF's projects were terminated after the year 2016, and some, quite oppositely, emerged. For example, the school and TEC constructions, renovations, or teacher training on children's psychosocial support stopped being actively implemented after the year of the FRIT activation. However, projects such as CCTE and comprehensive training for Turkish and Syrian teachers took their start. Such a change can be explained by positive developments on the implementation route of PICTES (now PIKTES), which was administered by the Turkish Ministry of National Education in the years of 2017-2018 and 2018-2019 based on the two consecutive EU grants provided directly to the Ministry within the framework of FRIT. The following implementation achievements of PICTES project throughout 2016-2017 and 2017-2018, managed by the MoNE, can be mentioned in particular:

Turkish language courses for 390,000 Syrian refugee children both in- and out-of-school were organized. As a part of the PICTES project, 5,700 Turkish language instructors were hired by MoNE to work as language teachers in Temporary Education Centers. 4,200 instructors were hired to teach Turkish as a second language at public schools - their contracts are temporary.

1.   Arabic language courses were conducted for 10,000 Syrian children in- and out-of-school. The coursebooks for Turkish and Arabic language courses were distributed.

2.   Catch-up, remedial/support classes. These classes were provided for children who enrolled in public schools but lacked knowledge due to the missed period of schooling. 20,000 Syrian students attended the remedial classes either after the classes during weekdays or on weekends.

3.   Transportation services were provided for 40,000 Syrian school students who resided in "the most disadvantaged areas" (Akyuz et al., 2018, p.10).

4.   Educational materials such as stationery, textbooks, and clothing provided to half of the million Syrian children, regardless of their enrollment to the public schools or TECs. Additionally, every school with a minimum of 90 Syrian students received educational equipment such as computers, printers, projectors, materials for arts and sports worth 15 thousand Euros per school.

5.   Seminars and meetings were conducted for Syrian families to raise awareness of the educational opportunities for their children.

6.   Alongside with the cooperation with UNICEF, examination and evaluation mechanisms were developed, 400 thousand examination kits were distributed and used.

7.   Counseling services were arranged for students studying at TECs and public schools. Education centers and public schools with at least 90 students had the counselors appointed. In total, 491 counselors received the appointment.

8.   Creation of safer and cleaner learning environments by additionally hiring 900 cleaning staff for 16 provinces and 300 security personnel for 12 provinces.

9.   Teacher and administrative personnel training provided to more than 15,000 Turkish and Syrian instructors on essential aspects of teaching the refugee children with possible experiences of trauma (Akyuz et al., 2018).

UNICEF has acted as a partner organization to the Turkish MoNE in implementing some of the initiatives mentioned above. In 2016, after the delivery of PICTES grant of 300 million Euros within the first tranche of FRIT, the presence of a very acute problem - the lack of classroom spaces - became apparent. Atop the 300 million Euros committed, the EU decided to allocate another 200 million Euros for the improvement of educational infrastructure. This step led to the shift in UNICEF's agenda of infrastructure betterment - from now on, MoNE curated

and sponsored the construction and renovation of educational spaces. At the same time, UNICEF focused on covering the spendings for incentives such as the CCTE and on programming and delivering support, remedial services for Syrian refugees as well as their Turkish host communities.

Overall results of the joint efforts between the EU, Turkey, and international organizations can be expressed through the gradual, year-by-year increase in school enrollments, which are presented in Table 6.

Table 6
Syrian School-Aged Students' School Enrollment

Academic Year	Number of Syrian students in public schools	Their percentage[b]	Number of Syrian students in TECs	Their percentage[c]	Total number of enrolled Syrian students	Number of school-aged Syrian students	The total school enrollment rate among Syrian students
2014-15	40,000	17,39%	190,000	82.61%	230,000	756,000	30%
2015-16	62,357	20,03%	248,902	79,97%	311,259	834,842	37%
2016-17	201,505	40,91%	291,039	59,09%	492,544	833,039	59%
2017-18	384,245	63,13%	223,049	36,87%	608,702	976,200	62.35%
2018-19[a]	-	-	-	-	684,000	-	-

Note. Adapted from "Evolution of National Policy in Turkey on Integration of Syrian Children into the National Education System," by A. Akyuz, D. Aksoy, A. Madre, and E. Polat, 2018, *Paper commissioned for the 2019 Global Education Monitoring Report, Migration, displacement and education: Building bridges, not walls,* p. 7.
[a] Data acquired from UNICEF Report on Syria Crisis Jan-Sep 2019 Humanitarian Results.[10]
[b] The percentage of students representing number of Syrian students in public schools from the total number of enrolled Syrian students.
[c] The percentage of students representing number of Syrian students in TECs from the total number of enrolled Syrian students.

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[10] The data for 2018-2019 academic year obtained from the UNICEF Report indicate only the total number of enrolled students by September 2019. The data on other enrollment categories were not published neither in the Report, nor in other resources, therefore could not be obtained.

The significant factors, which are necessary to keep in mind when looking at the Syrian children's school enrollment data, are Syrian families' mobility, leading to the absence of certain children's registrations, and also the given opportunity for Syrian families to enroll into public schools and TECs throughout the whole year. These two moments do not guarantee the precision of any presented data on enrollment at the time of it being viewed.

Funding Mechanism and Financial Resources Available to the Implementing Agencies

The total available budget for the coordination, contraction, and disbursement by the Facility is 6 billion Euros: 3 billion for the years of 2016-2017, 3 billions for 2018-2019. The first tranche of 3 million consisted of 1 billion Euros from the EU budget, and 2 billion Euros from the Member States,[11] for the second tranche, the EU provides 2 billion Euros and the Member States - 1 billion.[12]

The contribution of the Member States to the Facility for the first tranche in 2016 comprised 677 million Euros and 847 million Euros in 2017, with 396 million in 2018; the remaining 80 million were paid in 2019. For the second tranche, the Member States mobilized 68 million Euros in 2018, and the remaining payments are going to be delivered within 2019-2023. Payments coming from the Member States are going directly to the EU General Budget as an "external assigned revenue" (EU, 2019a, p.6).

The following financial assistance coordination instruments were created in order to implement the objectives of the Facility: humanitarian aid[13] (Humanitarian Implementation Plan,

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[11] The overall distribution of Member States' contributions can be found at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/02/03/refugee-facility-for-turkey/
[12] More details on the formation of the budget for the second tranche are available at
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/06/29/facility-for-refugees-in-turkey-member-states-agree-details-of-additional-funding/
[13] Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 concerning humanitarian aid, OJ L163, 2.7.1996, p. 1.

HIP Turkey 2016-2019), the European Neighborhood Instrument (ENI),[14] the Development

Cooperation Instrument,[15] the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA)[16] and the

Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)[17] (EU, 2019a). The breakdown of the

Facility funding throughout the first tranche (2016-2017) can be presented as follows: 46% of

funds were distributed via ECHO (European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations),

43% of the financial resources were contracted through the IPA, 10% - via the EUTF (European

Union Trust Fund) and 1% - through the IcSP (EU, 2019a).

   To analyze the scope of coordinated financial resource distribution to the educational

sector, the data on the following humanitarian and developmental projects are presented in Table

7 on the next page. The table covers the information on both tranches, based on the activity

status last updated on 31 December 2019[18] (EU, 2019c).

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[14] Regulation (EU) No 232/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council establishing a European Neighborhood Instrument, OJ L 77, 15.3.2014, p. 27.
[15] Regulation (EU) No 233/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation, OJ L 77, 15.3.2014, p. 44.
[16] Regulation (EU) No 231/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council establishing an Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance, OJ L 77, 15.3.2014, p. 11.
[17] Regulation (EU) No 230/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council establishing an instrument contributing to stability and peace, OJ L 77, 15.3.2014, p. 1.
[18] Complete information on all the funded projects can be found at https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/facility_table.pdf

Table 7

List of FRIT Projects in Education Sector Towards Which the Funds are Committed, Contracted, Disbursed

Funding Instrument	Applicant Name	Amount committed, in €	Amount contracted, in €	Net payments made to projects, in €
HIP Turkey 2019	UNICEF	10,000,000	10,000,000	8,000,000
HIP Turkey 2019	UNICEF	70,000,000	70,000,000	41,000,000
IPA Special Measure on Education 2018	Turkish MoNE	400,000,000	400,000,000	124,577,154
IPA Special Measure on Education 2018	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW)	100,000,000	100,000,000	20,000,000
HIP Turkey 2017	UNICEF	12,500,000	12,500,000	10,000,000
HIP Turkey 2016	UNICEF	34,000,000	34,000,000	34,000,000
HIP Turkey 2016	Concern Worldwide	2,988,941	2,988,941	2,988,941
HIP Turkey 2016	IOM	8,000,000	8,000,000	8,000,000
EUTF	UNICEF	31,382,891	31,382,891	31,382,891
EUTF	Concern Worldwide	17,280,000	17,280,000	11,710,334
IPA Special Measure 3 (July 2016)	Turkish MoNE	300,000,000	300,000,000	297,838,560
IPA Special Measure 3 (July 2016)	World Bank	150,000,000	150,000,000	127,000,000
IPA Special Measure 3 (July 2016)	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW)	255,000,000	255,000,000	78,200,000
Total:		1,391,151,832	1,391,151,832	794,697,880

Note. Adapted from "EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey. List of Projects Committed/Decided, Contracted, Disbursed," by European Commission, 2019.

The number of funds receiving organizations implementing the educational objectives of the Facility and the Joint Action Plan is quite extensive. However, the main organizations constantly operating on the ground based on public and donor funds, including funds from the EU, are the Ministry of National Education of Turkey, UNICEF, IOM, and the World Bank. The operations, the organizations receive funding for, are conducted in the sphere of education and are carried out for the future prosperity of the Syrian refugee children and their host communities. In the years of 2016 and 2018, Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau received funding of 355 million Euros for building as well as equipping the new schools in regions of Turkey with the highest numbers of Syrian refugees. The World Bank received 150 million Euros for the same purposes - for constructing and equipping the school buildings in areas with the highest density of the Syrian population. The Turkish Ministry of National Education accepted a direct EU grant of 300 million Euros in 2016 (PICTES) and 400 million Euros in 2018 (PIKTES) in order to be able to provide better educational opportunities for over 1 million school-aged Syrian refugees.

UNICEF is another partner organization, which has continuously received support from the EU through the FRIT program. In 2016 UNICEF put its efforts into increasing access to formal and non-formal education for refugees, as well as facilitating projects on psychosocial protection and well-being of both Syrian and Turkish children. Beginning from 2016, UNICEF has been curating the CCTE project (the Conditional Cash Transfer for Education), which aims at supporting the integration of refugee children into the Turkish education system through a financial incentive given to families in the case of children's regular class attendance. In 2017, UNICEF took up the work on increasing Syrians' access to non-formal learning programs, which could bridge over the gap on their way to enrolling in formal education. These action steps were

taken during the years of first tranche disbursement, 2016-2017. From the second tranche, UNICEF acquired funds for the continuation of its previous projects on Conditional Cash Transfer and facilitation of Syrian children's enrollment in formal education. Over the years of 2016-2019, within the framework of FRIT, UNICEF received a total of 157,882,891 Euros.

The International Organization for Migration, having received the 8 million Euros in 2016, focused on enhancing protection through addressing basic needs, aiding access to education, and providing holistic support. The international NGO Concern Worldwide participated in receiving a total of 20,268,941 Euros through FRIT in 2016 as well - it was responsible for an emergency humanitarian response in dealing with the educational needs of incoming Syrian refugees (EU, 2019c).

The Extent of Hierarchical Integration Within and Among Implementing Institutions

The scope of cooperation between the intergovernmental and governmental organizations such as the European Commission and the Turkish Ministry of National Education is broad. The Turkish MoNE interacts with the EC through the Government of Turkey, and with the international NGOs and UN organizations, which have an operational focus on education, MoNE maintains direct connections. Altogether, the inter-relations of the above-mentioned organizations during the policy implementation process can be schematically structured in the way as presented in Figure 1 below.

The figure provided below represents a hierarchical relationship between the agencies involved in the legislative, implementational, and evaluation actions regarding the formation and realization of the Joint Action Plan and the FRIT program. The European Commission is responsible for reporting annually on the implementation status of the program to the European Parliament and the Council. There have been three consecutive annual reports on FRIT in the

forms of Communications from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council in the years of 2017, 2018, and 2019.

During the process of formation of the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan, the EC, EU Member States and the Government of Turkey remained in constant contact on the issues of migration management and Turkey's accession acceleration. Later, when the Joint Action Plan was agreed upon, two members of the EC and one member from each Member State became part of the FRIT Steering Committee - the body which provides strategic guidance in the implementation of the FRIT program and decides which initiatives receive the financial support. The Turkish government and the representatives of the MoNE of Turkey play the leading consultative roles in the activities of the Steering Committee but are not considered as part of it.

As the EC's evaluation of the FRIT carried out by the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection, and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) states, "the Facility is not a Fund but a coordination mechanism" (EU, 2018b). The actions undertaken within the FRIT program are managed (from the on-the-ground operational perspective) by the following three departments of the European Commission:

- DG ECHO - the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, which is responsible for the humanitarian projects;
- DG NEAR - the Directorate-General for Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations, which navigates the Pre-Accession questions and manages the spendings from the EU Regional Trust Fund for Syrian refugees' non-humanitarian needs;
- FPI - the service for Foreign Policy Instruments, which keeps the EC informed on the situation concerning the regional stability and peace.

Figure 1. Hierarchical Relationships of Managing and Implementing Agencies.

To make the interventions in the education sector more effective, a quite informal

Working Group on Education is meeting monthly. This group is active in each province with the

highest numbers of refugees, and the results of its activity are reported to the central Education

Sector Working Group (ESWG) located in the Turkish capital. The group's members are

permanent, but some other relevant organizations can be invited as guests whenever necessary.

The Working Group consists of organizations such as the MoNE, AFAD,[19] DGMM, UNICEF,

UNHCR, IOM, and the Turkish Red Crescent. The current working group is not directly related

to the policy and the FRIT implementation, but its joint efforts in structuring the organizations'

activities contribute to the overall implementational success of the FRIT program. As an example

of such an activity, the following case can be provided. The Meeting Minutes of a local

(Gaziantep region) Education Sector Working Group available on UN's Inter-Agency

Coordination Turkey website show that during one of the monthly meetings in January 2018, the

MoNE representatives did not present the updated information on the implementation of PICTES

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[19] Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (abbreviated from *Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı* as AFAD).

to the members of organizations and NGOs attending the Meeting. As an action point, UNHCR

and UNICEF representatives were to reach out to the MoNE officials, requesting them to present

the updates on PICTES (UN, 2018a). During the next meeting, in February 2018, MoNE

officials were present at the meeting to deliver the updates and to inform on the PICTES

implementation progress (UN, 2018b).

Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) noted that the primary obstacle in policy implementation

is reaching the "coordinated action within any given agency and among the numerous semi-

autonomous agencies involved in most implementation efforts" (p. 546). The structurization of

the Joint Action Plan and the FRIT implementation process serves as a vivid proof of the truth of

Sabatier and Mazmanian's statement. Maintaining horizontal connections between the

implementing agencies on the level of international UN, non-governmental, and governmental

organizations is effective and challenging at the same time. All these international organizations

mentioned in the analysis have the status of the EU's and Turkish Government's humanitarian

partners, thus serving as the main stakeholders in the Joint Action Plan implementation.

Non-Legal Variables Affecting Implementation

Socio-Economic Conditions of the Target Group, Affecting the Attainability of Policy

Objectives

In 2013, Turkey enacted the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP),

adding new regulations on issuing the work permits for the better integration of foreigners into

the Turkish labor market. After the beginning of Syrian refugee flows to the territory of Turkey,

the LFIP needed amendments, for it had become clear that the Law helped facilitate the

employment of refugees in general but did not address the needs of Syrian refugees in particular.

In 2016, five years after the beginning of the Syrian war, the Regulations on Work Permits for

Foreigners under Temporary Protection were passed. Before this step, Syrian refugees mostly found employment in an informal sector, and their wages were not adequately regulated. According to new regulations, Syrian adults could apply for a work permit six months after receiving the "temporary protection" status. Their prospective employers were not allowed to pay Syrian workers less than the minimum wage. Furthermore, as the government hoped, these changes would let the workers in the informal sector move to the formal, regulated one (İçduygu and Şimşek, 2016). The availability of a stable source of income is vital for Syrian families to ensure their children's uninterrupted participation in the Turkish education system.

The previously mentioned LFIP regulates the refugees' educational access in the following way: the participation in formal education, including the enrollment to either public schools or TECs, remains free, regardless of Syrians' residence in or out of camps (Jalbout, 2015). However, the enormous efforts made to ensure the Syrian school-age children's enrollment to schools still incarnate more of a struggle than a total success. Up to 40% of school-aged children keep staying out of school, regardless of the measures taken by the EU, Government of Turkey, and many other international organizations. Refugee children can register at schools throughout the whole year and begin attending the classes even without the personal ID being issued, but these solutions do not bring into the classrooms those children who have kept staying out of them for already too long. Parents whose children did not go to school named the following socio-economic and socio-demographic reasons when explaining why their children did not attend formal educational institutions: being a single parent, the family's high mobility, and other economically related reasons (Coskun et al., 2017).

Economic reasons and single-parent households. Many Syrian families who relocated to neighboring countries, including Turkey, have lost their sole breadwinners during the ongoing

Syrian war. Many of those families reside outside of camps, live in cities and villages, and are struggling to make ends meet. If these families have brothers or older sons, then these brothers and sons come as a substitution to missing fathers. These are the primary reasons why the boys' enrollment in high schools remains lower compared to girls'. In other families, even younger children may work. Some parents claim the existing difficulties in obtaining the work permit, which makes parents send their children to work. As one NGO representative in Istanbul mentioned, children may be working up to 16 hours a day, mainly when employed by textile companies (Coskun et al., 2017).

Frequent domestic movements of Syrian families occur due to economic reasons as well. Many families come to large cities such as Istanbul and Ankara from the southern regions of Turkey, mainly searching for job opportunities. When coming to a new place, the relocating families usually lack the necessary information on school enrollments, and sometimes think that the local schools would not enroll the children due to their IDs being issued not locally, but in one of the southern regions. Yet, for schools operating under the Turkish MoNE, the presence of any ID is sufficient, if it has been previously issued, regardless of the place of its issuance (Coskun et al., 2017).

Socio-demographic conditions of Syrians hindering their full participation in the Turkish school system. Some of the incoming Syrian children arrive in Turkey without being previously formally schooled due to reaching the school-age at times of erupting conflict. Without having obtained the necessary learning skills and presently facing the language barrier, these children are of a higher risk of dropping out even after getting enrolled.

Also, in some families, marriage is considered a better perspective for young girls than their academic success. The time spent commuting to and studying in public schools, which can

be located in far and disturbing (from a safety standpoint) neighborhoods may be considered by the families as wasted. Thus, tangibly and intangibly, school enrollment and participation may be hard and challenging to Syrian families not only from economic but also from socio-demographic and cultural perspectives (Coskun et al., 2017).

The Amount and Continuity of Media Attention to the Problem and to the Policy Implementation

  TV news reports covering the negotiations during the pre- and post-agreement periods on the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan. Content analysis of seven news reports (Channels Television, 2015; Euronews (in English), 2015, 2016; New China TV, 2015, 2016; SABC Digital News, 2015; Ruptly, 2016), aired before the agreement on the Joint Action Plan on 15 October 2015 and following it in November, February, and March, makes it evident that the most common themes present across the majority of news episodes touch upon the refugee issues. The themes are the following: the state of the refugee crisis, stemming of the refugee flows, the importance of securing and strengthening the EU borders, and provision of the 3 billion aid and the visa liberalizations to Turkey. These themes are mentioned continuously by the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, and the President of the European Commission, Jean Claude Juncker.

  Chancellor Angela Merkel actively participated during the negotiations on the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan and kept stating the necessity of letting the migrants stay in the counties on their way. She claimed that "generally there was a widely spread opinion that it is better to house the migrants closer to their home than financing them in the end in our own countries" (Euronews (in English), 2015). Thus, the German leader let everybody know that she

was in support of the financial aid plan to Turkey regardless of the various kinds of disagreements among the EU Member States on this idea.

The EU leaders set reaching the agreement on the Joint Action Plan high on their agenda. There was an ever-present rhetoric of the policy being a priority for the EU in the sphere of management of refugee flows. Also, the Turkish Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, noted during one of his visits to Brussels, that the "summit itself shows how indispensable Turkey is for the EU and how Europe [is] for Turkey" (New China TV, 2016b). The Turkish leader appreciated the chance to re-energize the accession talks, and his statement on Turkey's readiness for cooperation sounded very timely: "And Turkey is ready to work with the EU. Turkey is ready to be a member of the EU as well" (New China TV, 2016b).

The TV news reports of those years, 2015 and 2016, mostly highlighted the negotiations and the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan policy formation process. Further on, the media outlet reports were mostly made on the EU-Turkey politics, on the questions of Turkey's accession to the EU, and the violations of democracy taking place in Erdogan's Turkey. In general, the reports widely concerned the changes of political moods leading to shifts in the relations of the EU and Turkey in terms of the EU accession prospects. The EU and Turkey kept having ups and downs in their relationships even after signing the Joint Action Plan, but these arguments and misunderstandings did not stand in the way of integrational work that Turkey had already committed itself to. According to the media news reports, in the summers of 2017 and 2019, the relationship between the European Parliament and the Turkish Government resembled more a confrontation than cooperation. Regardless of many political difficulties and heated debates in the European Parliament and the Government of Turkey, the implementation of FRIT and

PICTES (now PIKTES) did not cease, quite oppositely, continued to run at the same pace and based on previously arranged budgets.

Online media articles discussing the lives and educational opportunities of Syrian refugees in Turkey. The U.S. edition of the online media source "The Conversation" has been monitoring the lives of Syrian refugee students in Turkey and other countries since the beginning of the conflict. The current entry, published before signing the Joint Action Plan on 5 October 2015, states that the situation of Syrian refugee children in Turkey is similar to situations in Lebanon - children are recruited into working by their own families because parents or guardians do not know how to sustain them in the times of scarce number of public services available. These kinds of situations serve as primary reasons why children do not enroll in schools or education centers. Also, the overcrowded classrooms in some of the regions with the highest density of Syrian refugees do not motivate students to stay at schools. Due to overcrowdedness, the quality of education drops. (Before the beginning of the implementation of FRIT and PICTES - *added by the author*), UNICEF established a Syrian teacher incentive program for 5,503 teachers, who were supported monthly, in order to meet the rising deficiency in teachers for Syrian children (Chetty, 2015).

Another article from The Conversation points at the very restricted nature of the issuance of work permits. By September 2017, fewer than 20 thousand work permits have been issued, regardless of the law being amended a year ago, which legally allowed work permits for any adult Syrian refugee who had stayed in Turkey for more than six months before applying for the work permit. Even though the Turkish government's spendings on Syrian children's education is viewed controversially by the Turkish public, the Government's efforts are continuously making the difference. As of March 2017, 459,521 Syrian school-aged students have received

educational services, and special bilingual learning kits are being prepared for them to accelerate their Turkish language learning. Akdemir mentions that the school spaces and human resources are insufficient to provide enrollment opportunities for every incoming child. The author is also predicting the necessity of hiring 40 thousand more teachers and arranging 30 thousand more classrooms if the Turkish government is planning to integrate up to 80% of Syrian children. Also, as the author concludes, the integration efforts of Syrians into the Turkish society should be accompanied by incorporating the local citizens into the agenda by educating the latter on Syrians' struggles and challenging living conditions (Akdemir, 2017).

In November of 2018, the Turkish Anadolu Agency published the article on UNESCO's positive evaluation of Turkey's inclusive educational policies towards Syrian refugees. The article referred to the Global Education Monitoring (GEM) report, which described Turkey's approach to including school-aged Syrian children into the Turkish school system by 2020 as a commitment. The article also mentioned the funding already secured for the construction of the classrooms, for the provision of language courses and the arrangement of catch-up and remedial classes (Onum, 2018).

These are quite a few articles on the educational integration of Syrian refugee students. Even though the articles raise education and work-related issues, they do not touch upon the implementation of the Joint Action Plan, or the FRIT program. The discussion of Syrians' educational opportunities is widely inspired by the community of academics and researchers, rather than the media. The media has been rigorously and continuously focusing on the political clashes between the EU and Turkey, whereas the community of academics engaged in studying the problems of educational integration more in-depth.

Turkish Public Support of Syrian Refugees and Its Variations Over Time

The secondary research data consistently point out that Turkish society extensively views the topic of Syrian refugees' presence in Turkey from the political perspective, rather than the humanitarian. Both studied reports (Erdogan, 2014; Aksel and İçduygu, 2018) on the Turkish citizens' attitudes towards the Syrian population note the existence of politicization of the discussions around the migration issues and the Syrians' long-term stay in the country.

Erdogan's comprehensive study (2014) of Syrians perceptions in Turkey from the perspectives of their social acceptance and integration states that "despite the occasional negative attitudes more in line with racism, xenophobia, and hate, the level of general social acceptance is unusually high for Syrians in Turkey" (p. 4). The report accumulates the data derived from conducting in-depth interviews with 144 people: 72 locals and 72 Syrians from the cities of Istanbul, Izmir, Mersin located far from the Syrian border, and the provinces of Gaziantep, Kilis, and Hatay located close to the Syrian borderland. Also, the research includes the survey data "Syrian perception in Turkey" with the sample of 1501 people from 18 provinces with the highest number of Syrians, and the media analysis of online news and commentaries published by 21 national and 56 local media sources.

At the time of Erdogan's research, on November 5, 2014, the number of Syrians residing in Turkey exceeded 1.6 million people (Erdogan, 2014), out of which 1,097,740 were registered by October 31, 2014 (UNHCR, 2014). It was estimated that 53,3% of the Syrians in Turkey were children under the age of 18 (Erdogan, 2014).

Erdogan's findings from the in-depth interviews provide the specific descriptions of Syrian and Turkish people's views and expectations of each other. Interviewed Syrian people voiced the following reasons for their contentment and concern: the interviewed population was

content with finding refuge in Turkey but felt troubled by the lack of legal and regulated work opportunities. Some Syrians, though willing to return to the homeland, realized the peace in Syria was far from being reached. Education of Syrian children was one of the biggest concerns for the families - many children could not continue and complete their education due to Turkish being the language of instruction at Turkish public schools and due to the limited capacity of TECs, which taught the adapted Syrian curriculum. Syrian respondents also claimed that Turkish people received them well and showed hospitality, but the prolonged nature of Syrians' stay in the country affected the society's relationship and emotions towards Syrians not in a positive way. The term "guest" (*konuk*) was widely used in the daily media, and this fact showed how Turkish people and the government viewed and treated the Syrians' presence in the country as temporary. Syrians noted that within the Turkish public discourse, the "guest" status was descriptive of their social condition rather than served as an assignment of their rights. Besides, Syrians observed how the Turkish population was under the influence of the growing politicization of Syrian migration issues (Erdogan, 2014).

The interviews conducted with Turkish citizens identified the presence of general discontent among the Turkish population with issues arising because of a high number of Syrians staying in Turkish cities and provinces. In provinces, Turkish people complained about increasing rent payments, growing joblessness, and difficulty of getting healthcare services. Some of the points made by the locals reflect general perceptions developing among the provincial population and do not convey an actual state of things. At local levels, Syrians keep being identified with the theft, property damage, early child marriages, and prostitution. As the researcher states, all these exaggerated claims are based on an insignificant number of incidents that cannot be generalized. Many interviewed Turks repeated that Syrians were "guests," which

automatically necessitated their conformity with the laws, regulations, and traditions existent in

Turkish society. Also, Turkish people made particular distinctions when assigning characteristics

to Syrians: Syrians were perceived as a "trouble" somewhat often, and the rhetoric of "Syrians as

brothers" kept getting extinct. The host society realized that Syrians were the people who

escaped the brutality and found themselves in hard conditions, but they were not viewed as "one

of us" by Turkish people due to the cultural gap (Erdogan, 2014).

The survey results of 1501 Turkish people from 18 provinces indicated that Turkish

people are favoring the acceptance of Syrians and their integration more than their expulsion.

The main propositions and the results of the survey are presented in Table 8.

Table 8
Turkish Citizens' Votes from 18 Provinces on the Admission of Syrian Refugees to Turkey[20]

Propositions	Agree	Disagree
"Admission of Syrian refugees into Turkey is an obligation that originates from history, the geography of our country"	39,05%	30,3%
"We admitted the refugees as our religious fraternity dictates"	43,1%	25,1%
"Turkey helped and paid significant attention to the Syrian Turkmen"	51,2%	14,1%
"Admission of Syrians without any discrimination regarding their language, religion, and ethnical background is a humanitarian obligation on our part"	50,3%	18,3%
"Syrian refugees are not our concern, we should not be involved"	28,3%	36,2%
"Refugees should not have been admitted, as this is an intervention in the domestic affairs of Syria"	30,6%	35,7%
"Syrian refugees are beneficial for our country"	14,2%	44,2%

Note. Adapted from "Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration," by M. Erdogan, Hacittepe University Migration and Politics Research Centre, Executive Summary & Report, 2014, p. 27.

The analysis of national and local media activity drew the author to conclude that the

media of any level seemed rather indifferent to the arrival of 1,6 million Syrian refugees. On the

[20] The Table 6 is adapted and does not include the results of participants' votes on categories such as "strongly agree," "neither agree nor disagree," and "strongly disagree", which are available in the original study.

contrary, the media "prioritized incidence-based publishing" (Erdogan, 2014, p. 41). The main discourses characterizing those incidences were on polar ends - much of the media publications either focused on the vulnerability and poverty of refugees, or their involvement in crimes (Erdogan, 2014).

D. Aksel and A.İçduygu, the authors of the National Report on Turkey: Patterns of Politicization on Refugees and Policy Responses (2018), specify the following two periods, the "episodes of contention," which brought forward the discussions of the necessity of 'responsibility sharing' between the EU and Turkey: May 2015-March 2016, and March 2017-September 2017. The first "episode of contention" presents a particular interest in the current study. This is the period when the politicization of the issues of refugee migration management occurred. The authors repeatedly noted that within the framework of negotiations between the EU and Turkey, the influx of refugees kept being continuously termed as a "refugee crisis," thus leading to a growing polarization of societies' views on the issue.

The report of Aksel and İçduygu (2018) assesses the changes in public opinion and the reflections of politicization on the media. The analyses of public opinions are based on the polls conducted by the EU Economic Development Foundation and by Kadir Has University in Turkey. The media analysis is conducted based on the daily news reports of the online portal *Hurriyet*, which is one of the major daily online news platforms in Turkey. The results of the researchers' study indicated the emergence and persistence of two following trends: despite the refugee influx, people were troubled by the threat of terrorism in 2015-2016, by the rising prices in 2015 and the unemployment in 2016. When it came to the EU-Turkey negotiations of 2015-2016, Turkish people identified the refugee crisis as the most important topic in the EU-Turkey

relationships (56,1%), and the importance of visa liberalization (23,6%), accession process (13,9%) and Customs Union (4,6%) discussions were mentioned with less frequency.

The EU-Turkey Deal (2016) regulated the readmission of illegal migrants crossing the EU border from the territory of Turkey. The Deal was formed as a final policy measure in the management of refugee flows between the EU and Turkey within the period of October 2015– March 2016. Several months prior, in November 2015, the first part of the EU-Turkey Deal - the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan was activated. According to it, Turkey was entitled to receive financial aid for carrying out an integrational work with the rising population of Syrian refugees in Turkey. The Turkish respondents were asked if and in which ways the EU-Turkish Deal was positive: 57,6% said that it would bring funding for Turkey, and 47,9% considered that it would stop illegal migration. 31,3% assumed that it would improve Syrians' living conditions in Turkey. 15,7% was hopeful about the revitalization of Turkey's accession process to the EU, and 10,6% anticipated the upcoming visa liberalizations. The negative views were tied to the following respondents' concerns: 58,2% considered that the Deal would lead to an increase in the number of migrants coming to Turkey. 48,8% noted that the increasing number of migrants would inevitably create economic problems. 31,9% did not believe the agreement would result in the EU's adherence to its promise in migrants' resettlement. 20,2% considered the Deal as unethical and inhumane, and 5,8% stated that the forced readmission under the Deal would cause the violation of international human rights (Aksel and İçduygu, 2018).

The analysis of online news reports published by *Hurriyet* indicates that the period from September 2015 was primarily impacted by the discussions of the 'burden-sharing', 'responsibility sharing' in the media. Even though the overwhelming numbers of refugees began arriving at the Turkish border much earlier, the media paid significant attention to the migration

issues mainly after the death of a 2-year-old Alan Kurdi in the sea, when the boat, which his family had boarded to reach Greece, overturned. This incident raised the mass protests among Syrian refugees in Turkey who demanded the EU to provide a safe entry by land, rather than leaving the irregular entry as the only possible option. After these incidents, in September 2015, the EU and Turkey launched negotiations on taking necessary measures to manage the irregular migration from the territory of Turkey to the EU (Aksel and İçduygu, 2018).

It is somewhat symbolic that the findings from the analysis on the Joint Action Plan and the FRIT formation and implementation illustrate the game-changing effect of the media and the public attention to the Syrian refugees' issues. Media and public activity were followed by the initiation of political negotiations between the EU and Turkey on arranging Syrian refugees' temporary protection in Turkey and managing irregular migration flows. This finding comes in line with Sabatier and Mazmanian's (1980) statement on the media being a "crucial intervening variable between changes in socio-economic conditions" (p. 550) of the target group and in perceptions of such changes by the general public.

Conclusions Drawn from the Analysis

General

From the theoretical analysis of primary sources and the content analysis of news reports, I found that the technical theory underlying the policy creation coincides with the continuously repeated rhetoric of the security management for the EU side, and of the EU accession negotiations and visa liberalization for Turkey.

The causal theory underpinning the policy implementation considered the holistic integration of Syrian refugees into Turkish society as an effective solution preventing the future occurrence of Syrians' movements from the territory of Turkey to the territory of the EU.

Implementational Strengths

The implementation of Part I of the Joint Action Plan policy was step-by-step and very data-driven. All the funding was allocated based on the exhaustive needs assessments, and the spendings were meticulously kept track of in order to be justified. The EU required the use of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms throughout the implementation period: from the beginning of the FRIT program formation until now.

The FRIT program was created as a comprehensive support mechanism, which allowed the establishment of the necessary infrastructure and the provision of vital public services for a large number of refugees, including educational services. The comprehensive nature of the program is one of the main implementational strengths of the program, allowing the implementing parties to effectively reach their target goals.

Cooperation was key in the relative success of Part I of the policy and the FRIT program implementations. Governmental, intergovernmental, and international organizations have been cooperating closely to ensure reaching the desired results.

Implementational Weaknesses

All the parties are doing extensive work, but the families' socio-economic data and the data on Syrians' educational enrollments are not kept up-to-date. Monitoring these situations is challenging due to Syrian refugees' mobility, but doing it is crucial to understand the current situation and the present-day needs of the target group. Due to the scarcity and inaccuracy of such category of data, it is difficult to monitor and evaluate the policy implementation real-time.

When studying the implementation of the FRIT program, it is difficult to identify which parts of the international or UN organizations' projects are covered by the FRIT funds and which are implemented based on other donors' contributions: specifically, in the case of UNICEF. UNICEF has been active in the Turkish education sector and has made effective contributions long before the existence of the agreement on the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan. Moreover, even after receiving the funding within the framework of FRIT, the organization has continued to realize a variety of initiatives addressing Syrian children's need in educational integration, while also supporting their Turkish peers. There is no specific marking of the projects carried out by UNICEF based on the FRIT funding.

In that sense, the exception is PICTES (now PIKTES), which was granted to the MoNE twice, and the Ministry has been outspoken about its use ever since 2017. However, all the sources providing the implementational results of PICTES present the same data, without any changes in it over time. The reason for this may lie in a constant referral to the data presented by the Ministry of National Education on the PICTES implementation. This situation begs the question of transparency. There is not much information available on the implementation outcomes of PICTES besides the numbers presented both on the PIKTES website and the research reports, which copy the same data.

CHAPTER V. CONCLUSION

In the concluding chapter of the thesis, I summarize the findings to two of the research questions which guided the current study and contemplate on the role of the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan in Syrian refugees' successful educational integration into Turkish society. Additionally, I talk about the implications of my policy implementation research and suggest areas for further inquiry. This research primarily focused on analyzing the process of the Joint Action Plan implementation and its preliminary outcomes regarding Syrian refugees' educational integration in Turkey. The EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan is the example of policy, created as a result of long, successive political-level discussions concerning the management of refugee flows between the EU and Turkey. The complexity of irregular migration management matters led to the creation of multiple instruments for countering the adverse effects of massive refugee flows. The Facilities for Refugees in Turkey was one of them. The FRIT program stemmed from the goals of Part I of the Joint Action Plan policy and served as a comprehensive support mechanism for financing the initiatives aiming at the integration of the Syrian refugees into Turkish society.

General Conclusion

The implementation of the Joint Action Plan was analyzed based on Sabatier and Mazmanian's (1980) conceptual framework for policy implementation analysis. The framework was adapted for the purposes of analyzing the policy implementation more thoroughly in areas pertaining to the tractability of educational integration problems, and the structurization of the policy implementation in the educational and humanitarian sectors. Other factors affecting the policy implementation outcomes, such as the socio-economic conditions of the target group, media attention to, and public support of the policy, were also studied within this policy implementation research.

As I have previously stated in the Analysis chapter, when evaluating the role of the Joint Action Plan on Syrian refugees' integration into Turkish school system, it becomes challenging to draw explicit lines between the UN and INGO projects funded through the JAP executive mechanism, the FRIT program, and their initiatives supported by the funds of the third-party donors. The data on education interventions carried out based on the FRIT show that the EU indeed sponsored the following actions through the Facilities program: a Turkey-wide implemented project on Conditional Cash Transfers for Education (CCTE), school transportation services for Syrian school children, and catch-up, remedial and non-formal learning courses for out-of-school children. It isn't very easy to provide exact up-to-date data on students who have already benefited from the initiatives mentioned above. The reasons for such difficulty are the plurality of implementing actors, and the complexity of the arrangement of refugee students' full-time education enrollment.

To understand Syrian refugees' educational prospects in the Turkish society, I have also studied the political rhetoric present during the EU and Turkey negotiation processes, and the public opinions regarding the integration of Syrian refugees into Turkish society. My theoretical study of reports on political and social discourses showed that on the governmental and inter-governmental levels, a distinct trend of politicization of migration issues was developing. Such growing attention from the EU and the Government of Turkey led to a proactive bilateral response towards meeting rising social and educational needs of large numbers of incoming Syrian refugees. The study of the results of surveys and opinion polls demonstrated general acceptance of Syrian refugees by Turkish people. However, there is also a gradually lessening positivity towards them, due to Syrians' protracted stay in the country where they live under the temporary protection and are called and treated as "guests" by the host society.

Conclusion on the Role of the Joint Action Plan in Syrian Refugees' Educational Integration into Turkish Society

The formation and further step-by-step implementation of educational aims of the Joint Action Plan promoted the delivery of positive results in Syrian refugees' educational integration into Turkish society. The improvement strategies outlined in the EU's initial needs assessment report from 2016 were fully implemented and yielded positive results. I present the aiding strategies funded through Joint Action Plan's FRIT and PICTES initiatives from 2016 through 2019 and the achievements regarding the implementation of these strategies in Table 9.

Table 9
Achievements on Implementation of FRIT/PICTES (Now PIKTES) Strategies in Educational Sector

Strategies identified in 2016 EU Needs Assessment Report[a]	Achievements on implementation of the outlined strategies by October 2019
1. Improvement of physical capacities of schools (through building new infrastructure, training/recruiting teachers)	WorldBank, German KfW Development Bank and Turkish MoNE received financial assistance within FRIT for improvement of educational infrastructure. All their constructional projects are to be completed by 2023[b]. Also, 5,700 Turkish language instructors were hired to teach at TECs and 4,200 – to teach Turkish in public schools[c].
2. Provision of transportation and school materials	Transportation services were provided from and to schools for 196,500 Syrian students; 628,522 stationary kits were distributed among school-aged Syrian students[d].
3. Implementation of incentive programs (Conditional Cash Transfers for Education, CCTE)	In cooperation with UNICEF and MoNE, CCTE were distributed for 525,928 Syrian students' families[e].
4. Establishment of remedial/catch-up education courses, language courses	Total of 599,670 Syrian students received Turkish language training, 24,800 students attended remedial/catch-up courses[e].
5. Provision of necessary support to special need students	Total of 106,897 Syrian students attended special support classes[e].

Note.[a] Source: European Union, European Commission. (2016b). *Needs assessment report for the preparation of an enhanced EU support to Turkey on the refugee crisis* (Contract No. 2015/366838).
[b] Source: European Union, European Commission. (2019c). *EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey. List of Projects Committed/Decided, Contracted, Disbursed*.
[c] Source: Akyuz A., Aksoy D., Aysel M., & Ertugrul P. (2018). *Evolution of national policy in Turkey on integration of Syrian children into the national education system*.
[d] Source: Retrieved from official PIKTES website: https://piktes.gov.tr/Home/ProjeninCiktisi
[e] Source: UNICEF. (2019). *UNICEF Turkey Humanitarian Situation Report No. 35 – July-September 2019*.

The actions taken during the Joint Action Plan implementation through the activation of its financial and executive mechanisms as FRIT and PICTES (PIKTES) explicitly contributed to the improvement of Syrian school-aged children's school enrollment rates. Official PIKTES website curated by the Turkish MoNE reports the enrollment of 684,728 students into the public-school system (with 397,919 remaining out of school) as of October 11, 2019. This fact shows a clear achievement of educational integration goals resulting from uninterrupted financial assistance of the EU and from close cooperation of all stakeholders during the implementation process.

As a result of the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan implementation research, I have learnt of the crucial role of a multilayered and comprehensible structuration of policy implementation with a distinct identification of main stakeholders, target group, sources of financial support and the required extent of target group's behavioral change. When it comes to the implementation of educational objectives of the Joint Action Plan, the main stakeholders, such as the EU structures, UN organizations, INGOs, are profoundly involved; the educational needs of the target group are monitored by the main educational sector actors; relevant EU structures continue the disbursement of financial resources to the contributing parties and evaluate the intermediate outcomes of financial assistance. Therefore, this policy has made a measurable, positive change in the educational integration of Syrian students.

However, there are problematic areas in the given policy implementation process. The multiplicity of actors makes the *process tracing* ambiguous: at the current stage, it is difficult to forecast the true results of the policy implementation emanating from the input of each stakeholder. Inconsistency of data presented in various sources makes the research of the policy

implementation effectiveness rather complicated. This possibly occurs due to the inaccuracy of Syrians' registration data following their frequent intra- or inter-region movements.

The standing flow of Syrian refugees to Turkey makes the prediction-based approach to policy implementation difficult. The policy implementation measures within the education sector are not reactive but are thoroughly planned and carried out. Regardless, as for now, there is lack of precision when attempting to estimate the outcomes of this policy implementation.

Implications of the Study

The current study can be beneficial for those who are interested in the multifaceted nature of policy implementation in the humanitarian sector, particularly when it pertains to the implementation of agreements and policies of the bilateral and international scope in the area of refugees' educational integration. I consider the selected theoretical framework for the policy implementation analysis as one enabling the researcher to explore the Joint Action Plan implementation under scrutiny. Sabatier and Mazmanian's (1980) framework avails the reader with much detail on the tractability of the policy problem, as well as informs him or her on the statutory and non-statutory variables affecting the policy implementation. This research can serve as a foundation for further inquiry to those who are primarily interested in the topic of Syrian refugees' educational integration in Turkey.

Suggestions for Further Research

It is important to note that the Facilities' first tranche (2016-2017) disbursement evaluation is scheduled to be carried out by 31 December 2021. Current research is being completed earlier, based on data existing at the period of the conducted study. There is considerable potential in continuing the analysis and the evaluation of the FRIT program and PICTES (PIKTES) projects implementation once all the necessary data are released by the

European Union and the implementing agencies. The analysis of this research cumulatively presents the available data demonstrative of the role of the JAP in Syrian refugees' educational integration. However, as the EU suggests, at this point, "assessing the level of attribution of particular results to the Facility's actions is equally problematic due to the scale and diversity of interventions and the multiple stakeholders involved. In summary, the measurement of the level of achievement of the Facility's specific results remain challenging" (EU, 2019a).

Furthermore, current study can be complemented with an ethnographic research based on the use of survey instruments, organization of individual interviews or focus group discussions with the key policy implementation agents, members of the target group, the school staff.

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