THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT AND ENVIRONMENT DEBATE: A CASE STUDY ON THE INFLUENCE OF VALUES, BELIEFS, AND LIFE EXPERIENCES IN GOVERNMENT AGENDA-SETTING

Laurie A. Perin

A Thesis

Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green
State University in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

May 2006

Committee:

Edmund Danziger, Jr., Advisor

Shannon Orr

ABSTRACT

Dr. Edmund Danziger, Jr., Advisor

This thesis examines the process of government agenda-setting by using the historic North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and environment debate, and the roles that Congressman Donald Pease, Congressman Sherrod Brown, and Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur played within it, as case studies. It demonstrates that American trade policy never included environmental protection as a primary concern until the creation of NAFTA in the early-1990s. In order to analyze why the environment became a leading concern within the trade agenda in the early-1990s when it had never before represented a trade-related issue, this thesis employs Political Scientist John Kingdon's "agenda-setting" theory to determine which factors prompted policymakers like Pease, Brown, and Kaptur to demand that trade officials incorporate environmental protections into NAFTA. Kingdon argues that three factors cause policymakers to bring new issues to a government agenda: how they recognize and define problems, how they are affected by political events, and how they develop policy proposals from their own values, beliefs, and life experiences. Connecting the "agenda-setting" theory to the NAFTA and environment historiography reveals that academics have highlighted several factors that influenced policymakers' perceptions of NAFTA and the environment. They contend that the end of the Cold War, the proliferation of organized interests, the Republican and Democratic Party's reversal on free trade stances, the rise of the fourth wave of the environmental movement, and the inclusion of Mexico into the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) all prompted policymakers to bring environmental protection to the NAFTA agenda. These interpretations mirror the first two components of Kingdon's "agenda-setting" theory; indeed,

external problems and political factors contributed to the commencement of the NAFTA and environment debate. However, no scholar examined how the third element of Kingdon's model--how policymakers' develop policy proposals from their own values, beliefs, and life experiences--caused decision-makers to bring environmental protection to the NAFTA agenda. This thesis offers a new interpretation to enrich the NAFTA and environment historiography by examining the lives of Representatives Pease, Brown, and Kaptur and arguing that their life experiences caused them to develop strong environmental values and beliefs that influenced their personal and professional decisions, including their perception of NAFTA and the environment. Additionally, it should serve as a model for future academics to follow when observing other government agenda-setting case studies.

To Fast Eddie who opened my eyes to the beauty and wonder of the environment.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis would not have been possible without the help and encouragement that I received from several individuals. I am indebted to Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur, Congressman Sherrod Brown, and Jeanne Pease for taking the time to meet with and talk to me about NAFTA and the environment and their personal environmental values. The three of you did more for me than simply help me with a project; you inspired me to become a better person. The archivists at the Oberlin College Archives, Dr. Roland M. Baumann and Tamara L. Martin, were also a great help to this project. Thank you for allowing me to visit your facility for three days—and even allowing me to come in early on one of those days! The interviews and research trip were the first steps in what became a long and arduous process of converting the details of the NAFTA and environment debate into an engaging historical narrative. Although this task often caused me to endure much stress and panic, Meredith Clark and Brittany Bayless were always there to encourage me and keep me positive. I cannot thank you both enough for your friendships and encouragement. I am also grateful to Jim Buss for always making me see “the big picture” and for keeping me grounded. The History Department secretaries, Tina Amos and DeeDee Wentland, were also a great help while I worked to complete my thesis and throughout my entire experience in graduate school in general. Thank you both for always being there to talk and lend a hand. Dr. Shannon Orr was a tremendous help to this thesis project. Thank you for teaching me about the agenda-setting process and for your unending support. This thesis would not be what it is today without you. Perhaps I owe the greatest debt to Dr. Ed " Fast Eddie" Danziger for constantly providing me with positive feedback, kind words, wisdom, guidance, confidence, friendship, Pollyeye’s stuffed breadsticks, and candy. You have done more for me than you will ever know.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS v
TABLE OF CONTENTS vi
TABLE OF FIGURES viii
INTRODUCTION 1
A Brief History of NAFTA 2
Outline of the Study 5
The Historiography of the NAFTA and Environment Debate 8
Looking Forward 11
CHAPTER ONE: THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN TRADE POLICY AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NAFTA: FROM PROTECTIONIST POLICIES AND OPEN-MARKET MENTALITIES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 14
An Historical Analysis of United States Trade Policy 16
Period One: Protectionist Policies and Isolationism 17
Period Two: Open-Market Mentalities as Foreign Policy 21
Period Three: The Introduction of Trade Protests and Incorporation of Environmental Protection into the Trade Agenda 25
Did the Trade and Environment Debate Originate in the 1990s? 28
Conclusion 31
CHAPTER TWO: "I DO CONSIDER MYSELF AN ENVIRONMENTALIST, AND I ALWAYS HAVE:" REPRESENTATIVE DONALD J. PEASE, NAFTA, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 33
Congressman Donald J. Pease: The Development and Influence of His Environmental Values 34
Representative Pease and the North American Free Trade Agreement: Connecting His Environmental Values, Beliefs, and Life Experiences to His Role in the NAFTA and Environment Debate 40
Conclusion 46

CHAPTER THREE: "PROUD TO CARRY THE PROGRESSIVE BANNER:" REPRESENTATIVE SHERROD BROWN, NAFTA, AND THE ENVIRONMENT..... 48
Congressman Sherrod Brown: The Development and Influence of His Environmental Values 49
Representative Brown and the North American Free Trade Agreement: Connecting His Environmental Values, Beliefs, and Life Experiences to His Role in the NAFTA and Environment Debate..... 55
Conclusion 61
CHAPTER FOUR: "AMERICAN WILL PAY A VERY HEAVY PRICE FOR HER NEGLECT:" REPRESENTATIVE MARCY KAPTUR, NAFTA, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 64
Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur: The Development and Influence of Her Environmental Values..... 65
Representative Kaptur and the North American Free Trade Agreement: Connecting Her Environmental Values, Beliefs, and Life Experiences to Her Role in the NAFTA and Environment Debate..... 72
Conclusion 78
CONCLUSION: THE IMPORTANCE OF HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION: A SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT ON HOW VALUES, BELIEFS, AND LIFE EXPERIENCES INFLUENCE DECISION-MAKING..... 80
Epilogue 85
BIBLIOGRAPHY..... 89
Primary Sources..... 89
Secondary Sources..... 96
APPENDIX I: TRANSCRIBED INTERVIEW WITH JEANNE PEASE, AUGUST 12, 2004 AT 12:30 P.M. IN OBERLIN, OHIO..... 100
APPENDIX II: TRANSCRIBED INTERVIEW WITH CONGRESSMAN SHERROD BROWN, AUGUST 2, 2005 AT 1:00 P.M. IN LORAIN, OHIO..... 108
APPENDIX III: TRANSCRIBED INTERVIEW WITH CONGRESSWOMAN MARCY KAPTUR, JULY 6, 2005 AT 3:00 P.M. IN TOLEDO, OHIO..... 118

TABLE OF FIGURES

FIGURE 1: PHOTO OF DONALD J. PEASE..……. 33

FIGURE 2: CONGRESSIONAL PHOTO OF SHERROD BROWN...…… 48

FIGURE 3: CONGRESSIONAL PHOTO OF MARCY KAPTUR....…….. 64

INTRODUCTION

In the middle of the twentieth century, Donald Pease began his career as a journalist and public official in Oberlin, Ohio, a small town notable for its progressive sentiment and appreciation for the natural world. At roughly the same time, another ambitious individual, Sherrod Brown, developed important lessons about the environment as a Boy Scout in Mansfield, Ohio, just fifty miles south of Oberlin. On the opposite side of Ohio, Marcy Kaptur, then an adolescent living in Toledo, walked alongside a river with her grandmother, learning the importance of conserving natural resources. The environmental values and beliefs of Pease, Brown, and Kaptur solidified throughout the decades that followed as Rachel Carson penned her famous book *Silent Spring*, leading to the birth of the American environmental movement and the nation's first Earth Day. Although they lived their lives apart from one another in separate Ohio cities, Pease, Brown, and Kaptur, all with a passion for environmental protection, eventually found themselves connected to a common interest in the early-1990s as members of the United States House of Representatives. They each played major roles in the historic North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) debate during that time and shaped the trade agenda in ways that reflected their personal values, beliefs, and life experiences.

The entire procedure of policymaking is quite interesting, yet academics tend to know much more about the formal processes that policymakers use to craft policy than they do about why decision-makers incorporate specific issues onto the government agenda in the first place. This is unfortunate; policy historians and political scientists would gain a wealth of information from observing the agenda-setting process, primarily

an understanding of the broader context in which multiple external and internal factors, including values, beliefs, and life experiences, influence the types of policy legislators enact. An analysis of the agenda-setting process is particularly interesting when examining why policymakers introduce an issue onto the government agenda that had never before been a government concern, such as the inclusion of environmental protections within NAFTA.[1]

A Brief History of NAFTA

President Bush agreed to pursue a trade agreement with Mexico on June 10, 1990, only to be faced by angry policymakers, organized interests, and ordinary citizens who believed that the proposed accord, which eventually became a tri-lateral agreement when Canada committed itself to the deal, would destroy the environment, promote job loss, and decrease worker rights and wages. Understanding that the future of NAFTA meant appeasing the groups in opposition to the agreement, Bush promised in a May 1991 "Action Plan" to address environmental and labor concerns within NAFTA. The Bush administration, in conjunction with the Mexican and Canadian governments, concluded a

[1] John W. Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, Second Edition (New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1995), *xi*. Environmental protection had been a secondary concern in other trade agreements, including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), but never to the degree that it was within the NAFTA debate. As Gary Clyde Hufbauer explains, "Indeed, NAFTA stands as a landmark accord for handling environmental issues in a trade agreement." Other scholars, like Steven Shrybman, explain that there had only been tentative efforts to address environmental protection within trade agreements prior to NAFTA. He contends that "these initiatives [had] been limited to resource- and environment-specific issues." Under NAFTA, however, "the environment [had] emerged as an important dimension of the public debate over international trade." See: Gary Clyde Hufbauer, *et al*., *NAFTA: an Assessment* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1993), 91; Steven Shrybman, "Trading Away the Environment" in Maxwell Cameron, *et al*., eds., *The Political Economy of North American Free Trade* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 271-272; M. Delal Baer, ed., *et al*., *The NAFTA Debate: Grappling with Unconventional Trade Issues* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), ix-xi.

first draft of NAFTA in 1992. This preliminary draft fell short of the NAFTA opponents' requests, leaving many groups outraged and demanding more protections.[2]

As the 1992 presidential election approached, Bush and his opponents, Democratic Governor of Arkansas, Bill Clinton, and Independent Ross Perot, focused their campaigns on the future of NAFTA. Bush supported the agreement as it stood, Clinton promised to attach environment and labor side accords to the agreement, and Perot opposed the agreement in its entirety. Clinton's proposal appealed to the country the most and contributed to his being voted into the White House that November. As the new head of state, Clinton lived up to his pledge to protect the environment and labor by allowing the drafting of NAFTA environment and labor parallel accords. Policymakers,

---

[2] Frederick W. Mayer, *Interpreting NAFTA: the Science and Art of Political Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 46-47; 67-68; David A. Weiss, "Notice of North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Negotiations, of Goods and Services That Might be Affected by Such Negotiations, and of Public Hearings Relating to Such Negotiations" in Don J. Pease Papers, Subgroup III, Legislative Records, US Congress, Series 2, Legislative Subject Files, Box 9, Chronology Files, 1990-92, Oberlin College Archives; Renee G. Scherlen, "NAFTA and Beyond: The Politics of Trade in the Post-Cold War Period" in James M. Scott, ed., *After the End: Making U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 362-365. Under the United States Constitution, Congress regulates foreign trade. The United States government created a rule for fast-track authority under the Trade Reform Act of 1974 during that year's Tokyo Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Thus, President Bush needed to obtain fast-track negotiating authority from Congress before he could negotiate a NAFTA agreement. Once Bush informed Congress of his intention to enter into negotiations for NAFTA, the Senate Finance Committee or the House Ways and Means Committee had sixty legislative days to block the talks. The President would automatically receive fast-track authority if neither Committee voted against the negotiation within this time limit. The fierce opposition described above challenged Bush's ability to receive fast-track authority from Congress. Fast-track negotiating authority, as the Trade Act of 1974 describes, would allow the President to draft a trade agreement, which Congress could only accept or reject without amendment. Despite much opposition, Capitol Hill granted Bush initial fast-track authority by not denying the application before the end of the sixty-day period. At that point, the President automatically received fast-track authority. Bush later requested an extension of fast-track authority, which Congress approved by not adopting an "extension disapproval resolution" before June 1, 1991. Renee Scherlen explains how and why fast-track became a governmental procedure within trade negotiations, arguing that policymakers believed it would balance power between the executive and legislative branches on trade issues. She contends that the post-Cold War context of uncertainty and heightened interest group and organization involvement created opposition to fast-track by influencing Congress's perception of the agreement. President Bush announced his "Action Plan" in a letter on May 1, 1991. He created the "Action Plan" in response to those people and groups that opposed NAFTA for not including environmental and labor protections. As a part of the plan, President Bush promised to work with "the Congress to ensure that there [was] adequate assistance and effective retraining for dislocated workers," to "develop and implement an expanded program of environmental cooperation in parallel with the free trade talks," and "expand U.S.-Mexico labor cooperation," Mayer, 89-90.

environmental organizations, labor unions, and others debated the terms of the side agreements for months until trade officials in the United States, Mexico, and Canada all reached a consensus on August 13, 1993. The next step for those in support of or opposition to the agreement was to influence the final vote on NAFTA, which Speaker of the House Tom Foley and the White House agreed would be held in the House of Representatives on November 17, 1993.[3]

Those opposing NAFTA generated the most aggressive resistance movement to a trade initiative in American history. The anti-NAFTA surge demanded that policymakers protect the environment, jobs, and worker rights within the agreement or they would vote it down. Countless policymakers, environmental and labor organizations, and citizens used traditional lobbying efforts to create an opposing force to NAFTA. They petitioned policymakers, testified before Congress, and held public rallies for nearly three years. Throughout much of the NAFTA debate, the opponents to the agreement seemed to be winning the fight over those that supported it.[4]

Pro-NAFTA forces returned to Washington after their August 1993 recess to find that public opposition to the agreement had amplified and that hundreds of Representatives in the House also had negative views of NAFTA. These groups realized they had to turn the public and Congressional tide to support of NAFTA by issuing a counter-attack against those that opposed the agreement. For the next two months, NAFTA proponents, led by the USA*NAFTA group, conducted the largest campaign ever waged in support of a free trade agreement. Grassroots organizing, paid television

---

[3] Mayer, 2-6, 165-205; Jan Gilbreath, *et al*., "The Environment: Unwelcome Guest at the Free Trade Party" in M. Delal Baer, *The NAFTA Debate: Grappling with Unconventional Trade Issues* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), 53-89.

[4] Mayer, 219-256; Baer, ix-xi; Gilbreath, 53-89.

commercials and talk shows, newspaper editorials, bargaining, joint public support from President Clinton and former Presidents Jimmy Carter, Gerald Ford, and Bush, and a nationally-televised debate between Vice President Al Gore and Perot all made up the campaign that eventually won enough support to pass NAFTA by a margin of 234-200 in the House.[5]

Many of the House members who had fought tirelessly against NAFTA for three years were shocked by the vote for NAFTA. "I have been in Congress twenty-three years and there's never been a moment like it," commented Representative Marcy Kaptur. "When it was over, I felt like a big tank had gone down my backside." Congressman Sherrod Brown was less surprised by the final vote but equally disappointed. His mentor and former Democratic Whip, Congressman David Bonior (D-MI), who led the NAFTA resistance movement in the House, informed Brown two days prior to the vote that the NAFTA advocates had already garnered enough support to pass the agreement. President Clinton, President Salinas, and Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney officially implemented NAFTA on January 1, 1994.[6]

Outline of the Study

NAFTA is significant and worthy of historical recognition for many reasons. Among them is the overwhelming concern for environmental protection the agreement attracted, which previously was never a primary issue within American trade policy. This thesis focuses on the historic NAFTA and environment debate while answering an

---

[5] Mayer, 273-343.

[6] Interview with Marcy Kaptur, 6 July 2005, Toledo, Ohio; Interview with Sherrod Brown, 2 August 2005, Lorain, Ohio. For a brief, but more in depth, overview of the NAFTA and environment debate, see: Annette Baker Fox, "Environment and Trade: the NAFTA Case" in *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 110, No. 1 (Spring 1995), 49-68.

important puzzle: What factors caused policymakers to bring environmental protection to the NAFTA trade agenda in the early-1990s when it had never been considered a dominant trade-related concern prior to that time?

A review of trade policy history reveals that United States trade debates never included environmental protection as a prominent concern until NAFTA. Throughout the late-eighteenth to the mid-twentieth century, trade disputes centered on protective policies versus open-market mentalities, until free-trade became the norm and a dominant means of conducting foreign policy following World War II. Policymakers never focused their trade policy on environmental protection during these more than two-hundred years. Trade officials did not consider environmental protection a trade-related concern even after the rise of the environmental movement in the 1960s and 1970s or during the 1980s. However, it was one of the leading issues on the trade agenda within the early-1990s NAFTA debate. An analysis of American trade policy history illustrates the emergence of environmental protection onto the trade agenda in the early-1990s, but it does not explain why policymakers became concerned about protecting the environment at that time.

Political scientist John W. Kingdon examined the agenda-setting procedure in his prize-winning book *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*. He argues that three sets of processes dictate which concerns policymakers will bring to the agenda: how they recognize and define problems, how they are affected by political events, and how they develop policy proposals. A crisis, major event, or drastic change in an indicator, such as economic security, the rise in gasoline prices, or a natural disaster, causes an issue to become a problem that the government must address. Swings in national mood, changes

in public opinion, and growth in organized interests also influence the politics of making policy and help bring new issues to the government agenda. Lastly, policymakers' ideas, informed largely by their personal values and beliefs, shape the decision-making process and introduce new concerns to the agenda.[7]

This thesis employs Kingdon's "agenda-setting" theory to analyze how and why environmental protection became an integral part of the trade agenda in the early-1990s by using Congressman Donald Pease (OH-13), Congressman Sherrod Brown (OH-13), and Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur (OH-9) as case studies. These individuals are important candidates to study because they openly opposed NAFTA and demanded that trade officials include environmental protections within the agreement. In addition to these commonalities, Pease, Brown, and Kaptur all possessed similar environmental values, which they developed as a result of their life experiences. These included living through and participating in the American environmental movement and residing in a state that had a deep history of environmental abuse and an important relationship to the Great Lakes.[8]

Several sources assisted the author in answering the thesis's underlying question. She interviewed Representatives Brown, Kaptur, and the late Congressman Pease's wife, Jeanne, and studied their participation within the NAFTA and environment debate. The use of oral history within this project distinguished it from many other studies written on the NAFTA and environment debate; interviews provided the thesis with an observation

[7] Kingdon, xi, 2, 16-20, 87.

[8] Of the nineteen U.S. House Representatives from Ohio that voted on NAFTA, ten voted against the agreement and nine voted for it. Those that voted against it were: Douglas Applegate, Sherrod Brown, Eric D. Fingerhut, Tony P. Hall, Martin R. Hoke, Marcy Kaptur, Ralph Regula, Ted Strickland, James A. Traficant, and Louis Stokes. Those that voted for it were: John A. Boehner, Paul E. Gillmor, David L. Hobson, John R. Kasich, David Mann, Michael G. Oxley, Rob Portman, Deborah Pryce, and Thomas Sawyer. Donald Pease did not vote on NAFTA because he retired from government at the end of 1992, eleven months before the members of the House voted on the agreement.

into the personal lives of policymakers that cannot be found in most traditional primary and secondary documents. Aside from interviews, the author used primary sources, including Congressional Hearings, campaign literature, personal papers, newspaper and magazine articles, and books as well as a wealth of information that Congressman Pease donated to the Oberlin College Archive upon his death. Secondary sources, such as books and journal articles, provided background information on NAFTA, the history of American trade policy, and the "agenda setting" theory.

The Historiography of the NAFTA and Environment Debate

The historiography of NAFTA is vast and interdisciplinary. Hundreds of historians, political scientists, economists, law professors, and cultural studies scholars have written about countless topics pertaining to NAFTA. Much of the early works on NAFTA concentrate on the significance of the agreement and the processes involved with developing it. Later scholarship tends to focus on the successes and failures of NAFTA and the proposed effort to expand the agreement into Central America and, eventually, throughout the entire Western Hemisphere. Aside from these general works, other academics have been curious specifically about the emergence of environmental protection onto the early-1990s NAFTA trade agenda. While it is nearly impossible to obtain and examine every written work on the subject, it seems that the historiography of the NAFTA and environment debate fits into four schools of thought.

The first consists of scholars like James M. Scott, Renee G. Scherlen, Frederick W. Mayer, and Howard Wiarda who argue that the end of the Cold War caused environmental protection to become a major concern within NAFTA. They contend that

the executive branch's foreign policy decision-making power declined during this time, which opened the door to organized interests and Congressional policymaking influence. As a result, these groups were able to introduce new concerns, such as environmental protection, into trade policy that were not addressed at an earlier date. The end of a major event and a change in public opinion thus allowed previously non-influential groups to use the agreement as a means to promote their causes within the realm of trade.[9]

Scholars within the second school of thought, such as Charles F. Doran, Eric M. Uslaner, and Timothy J. McKeown, argue that the Republican and Democratic Party's reversal on free trade by the early-1990s introduced environmental concerns into trade policy. They explain that the Democratic Party did not support free trade by the end of the twentieth century as it had historically, because it no longer benefited their constituency of environmentalists, workers, human rights activists, progressives, and minority groups. Republicans, on the other hand, embraced free trade as opposed to rejecting it as they had traditionally, since it now benefited its largest supporters, including big-businesses, CEOs, and other well-to-do members of American society. Therefore, the Democratic Party brought environmental protection to the NAFTA trade agenda in response to its constituents' concerns and the overall public mood at the time.[10]

---

[9] James M. Scott, ed., *After the End: Making U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998); Scherlen; Mayer; Howard Wiarda, "The U.S. Domestic Politics of the U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Agreement" in M. Dela Baer, *The NAFTA Debate: Grappling with Unconventional Trade Issues* (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1994).

[10] Charles F. Doran, *et al*., eds., *The NAFTA Puzzle: Political Parties and Trade in North America* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994); Eric M. Uslaner, "Political Parties and Free Trade in the United States" in Charles F. Doran, *et al*., eds., *The NAFTA Puzzle: Political Parties and Trade in North America*. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994); Timothy J. McKeown, "What Forces Shape American Trade Policy?" in Charles F. Doran, *et al*., eds., *The NAFTA Puzzle: Political Parties and Trade in North America* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994).

Daniel Faber, Michael Dreiling, and others make up the third school of thought and contend that the rise of the fourth wave of the environmental movement prompted the development of environmental opposition within the early-1990s NAFTA debate. This movement emerged in the mid-1980s with the intention of protecting minority groups from environmental abuse. The success of capitalism in the Cold War caused free enterprise economics to increase and become more competitive internationally. As a result, countries increasingly took advantage of their own low-income minority groups and the low wages and environmental standards in developing countries in order to compete within the global market. This directly affected minority groups that had no choice but to work under these conditions. Scholars of the third school contend that these issues were a major concern during the NAFTA negotiations and caused environmental protection issues to abound throughout the debate.[11]

The fourth group of writers, which includes scholars Robert Sánchez, Annette Baker Fox, and Margo L. Paul, found that the inclusion of Mexico into the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) spurred environmental opposition to NAFTA. Policymakers, environmental organizations, and ordinary citizens were concerned that Mexico would not enforce its environmental laws and that pollution would increase along the Mexican-American border. In addition, these groups feared that NAFTA would lower United States environmental standards to the level of Mexico's as a means to prevent American companies from fleeing the border to avoid being limited by strict United States laws. Pollution was already widespread in Mexico's *Maquiladora*

[11] Daniel Faber, ed., *The Struggle for Ecological Democracy: Environmental Justice Movements in the United States* (New York: The Guilford Press, 1998); Michael Dreiling, "Remapping North American Environmentalism: Contending Visions and Divergent Practices in the Fight over NAFTA" in Daniel Faber, ed. *The Struggle for Ecological Democracy: Environmental Justice Movements in the United States* (New York: The Guilford Press, 1998).

zone and the country had a long history of undemocratic practices, which also caused environmental opposition to develop within the NAFTA debate.[12]

These studies make excellent observations about the external factors that prompted policymakers to introduce environmental protections onto the NAFTA trade agenda. They acknowledge correctly that the policymaking procedure involves more than the formal processes that decision-makers employ to create governmental policy, such as the rules of fast track authority, the act of lobbying for or against an agreement, and the actual voting system. Indeed, these scholars demonstrate that the agenda-setting process is also a fundamental part of policymaking, particularly because it determines which concerns the government will even consider to become actual policy. Yet, the current scholarship is lacking in one specific and important area: none of these academics analyze how internal factors, namely individual policymakers' values, beliefs, and life experiences, shape the agenda-setting process.

Looking Forward

The scholars writing on the NAFTA and environment debate make interesting and valid arguments that mirror Kingdon's observations about the agenda-setting process. They document that policymakers saw specific external events and crises, including the

[12] Robert Sánchez, "NAFTA and the Environment" in Victor Bulmer-Thomas, *et al*., eds., *Mexico and the North American Free Trade Agreement: Who Will Benefit?* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994); Fox; Margo L. Paul, "Trade and Environment: The Emergence of Environmental Issues in the Context of the NAFTA Negotiations" (Halifax; Nova Scotia; Canada: Dalhousie University, 1994). The *Maquiladora* zone developed from the 1965 Border Industrialization Project, which, according to Mayer, "Allowed foreign businesses to locate in areas of northern Mexico near the U.S. border and export the unfinished product without duties. The program began . . . as part of Mexico's strategy to improve the economy of its border region and support the United States' efforts to reduce incentives for illegal immigration," 36. Many scholars and critics of NAFTA argue that the *Maquiladora* zone has increased environmental destruction, weakened labor rights in Mexico, resulted in company relocation South of the border, and spurred job loss in the United States.

end of the Cold War and the inclusion of Mexico into the agreement, as problems that triggered them to bring environmental protection to the trade agenda. Additionally, scholars have recognized that decision-makers brought environmental protection to the trade agenda in response to external political changes, like the proliferation of organized interests, change in public opinion, and the rise of the fourth wave of the environmental movement. While problems and politics certainly affect the government agenda, Kingdon also stressed the significance of how policy—or individual policymakers' personal values, beliefs, and life experiences—influences the agenda-setting process. This thesis will offer a new interpretation to enrich the current historiography of the NAFTA and environment debate and argue that the environmental values, beliefs, and life experiences of Representatives Donald Pease, Sherrod Brown, and Marcy Kaptur, together with external problems and politics, helped shape their perception of the NAFTA debate.

The best place to begin this thesis is by describing the emergence of the modern era of American trade policy that began with the NAFTA negotiations in the early-1990s and included an unprecedented concern for protecting the environment from increased trade. Therefore, chapter one examines the long and ever-changing history of United States trade policy and argues that American trade initiatives never included environmental protections until NAFTA. The second chapter focuses specifically on Representative Pease and demonstrates that he possessed strong environmental values and beliefs that shaped the decisions he made in his personal life and his policy as a public official. Thus, his personal values, beliefs, and life experiences also influenced the role he played in the NAFTA debate, prompting him to bring environmental protection to

the NAFTA agenda. Chapter three centers on Representative Brown and argues that he too possessed environmental values and beliefs that influenced his personal life and policymaking, including his participation in the NAFTA and environment debate. The fourth chapter, in agreement with chapters two and three, examines Representative Kaptur's personal and public life to document that she possessed core environmental values and beliefs that shaped her personal decisions and policymaking. These strong environmental values ultimately informed her actions in the NAFTA and environment debate, causing her to include environmental protection within the NAFTA trade agenda.

The historical interpretation into the pasts of Pease, Brown, and Kaptur uncovers the many reasons why the have made decisions in their personal lifestyles and professional lives as policymakers. The government agenda naturally changes throughout time to address the development of new problems, crises, events, and changes in public attitudes and political climate. However, individual policymakers also influence the government agenda in ways that reflect the values and beliefs they acquired as a consequence of their life experiences. This thesis offers a glimpse into the personal lives of Representatives Pease, Brown, and Kaptur. They symbolize a much larger segment of the population that also lived through the events of the mid-twentieth century. Ultimately, these three legislators demonstrate how the personal values and beliefs of decision-makers influenced the NAFTA agenda.

CHAPTER ONE: THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN TRADE POLICY AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NAFTA: FROM PROTECTIONIST POLICIES AND OPEN-MARKET MENTALITIES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

President Bush announced his decision to begin negotiations for a trade agreement between the United States and Mexico in June of 1990, creating immediate resentment from several groups that feared the agreement would harm the environment, worker rights, employment opportunities, and agricultural production. Stewart Hudson, Pharis Harvey, and Cam Duncan, respectively representatives of the National Wildlife Association, the International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund, and Greenpeace, reacted to the announcement by holding a one-day forum on Capitol Hill five months later to draw attention to their concerns. They expected an audience of roughly one hundred individuals to attend the discussion but were greeted instead by a jam-packed room of more than four hundred people. At that moment, the three men realized that NAFTA had evolved into something entirely different from traditional American trade policy.[1]

The success of the forum marked the beginning of a resistance movement that characterized the entire three-year NAFTA debate. In February of 1991, sixty-two organized interests joined to form a single opposition group called the Mobilization on Development, Trade, Labor, and the Environment, or MODTLE. Opposition to NAFTA increased throughout 1991 and into 1992 as organized interests continued to lobby influential policymakers and educate the American public about the dangers associated with the agreement. Many members of Congress, including Representatives Donald

[1] Mayer, 69-77.

Pease and Marcy Kaptur, added to the movement by writing letters to influential policymakers and speaking before their colleagues, urging them to reject an agreement that risked American interests. By the end of 1992 and the beginning of 1993, nearly every environmental organization from the mainstream and grassroots levels had "plugged into the debate," and several new freshman members of Congress, such as Sherrod Brown, had joined the anti-NAFTA campaign. The intensity of the opposition movement reached its peak in the spring and summer of 1993 as the Citizen's Trade Campaign launched a "National Week of Action for Fair Trade" during the Congressional recess in April. During the event, opponents rallied against NAFTA in cities throughout the United States by giving speeches, setting up convoys and caravans, holding conferences, and serving chili dinners. A few months later the Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, and Public Citizen filed a lawsuit against the NAFTA negotiations on the grounds that the agreement was harmful to the environment, prompting federal Judge Charles Richey to demand trade officials to issue an environmental impact statement before their trade talks could continue. The strength of the opposition movement influenced many policymakers' perceptions of NAFTA and nearly led to its defeat that November. Nevertheless, organized interests, policymakers, and citizens were unable to garner enough last-minute support to prevent Congress from passing the agreement.[2]

This chapter offers an historical examination of United States trade policy to demonstrate that the NAFTA debate depicted above symbolized the beginning of a new

[2] *Ibid*., 75-77; 174-177; 226-229; Tim Shorrock, "U.S., Canada Groups Plan Anti-NAFTA Action," *The Buffalo News*, 29 March 1993; Marshall Ingwerson, "Resistance to NAFTA is on the Rise," *The Christian Science Publishing Society*, 2 July 1993, page 1; John Bremmer, "Environmentalists Put NAFTA in Precarious Spot," *The St. Louis Post*-Dispatch, 12 July 1993, page 19.

period in American trade policy history that included public opposition and an unprecedented concern for protecting the environment from increased trade. Once the chapter establishes this claim as correct, the rest of the thesis addresses its primary question - "What factors caused policymakers to bring environmental protection to the NAFTA trade agenda?" - by examining why Congressman Donald Pease, Congressman Sherrod Brown, and Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur decided to include environmental protections within the NAFTA agenda.[3]

An Historical Analysis of United States Trade Policy

Many Americans might assume that trade protests represent a long-standing tradition in their country, since opposition to free-trade and globalization, as well as concern for non-traditional trade issues like protecting the environment, characterize the modern era of trade policy. However, an analysis of the history of United States trade policy reveals that protests against trade agreements and opposition to free-trade from an environmental perspective are recent phenomena.

Trade has been one of the federal government's most important concerns since the birth of the nation in 1776. Its trade policies have changed drastically throughout time, making the history of American trade initiatives easy to divide into three periods. The earliest period lasted for more than the first century and a half of the nation's existence as a free country. As World War II ended, the second period in American trade

[3] Historian Alfred E. Eckes explains, "Until the bitter 1993 debate over the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) energized ordinary Americans and fractured the two major political parties, trade struggles usually aroused only Washington insiders—a group largely composed of U.S. officials, foreign representatives, and lobbyists….This trade policy elite lived and thrived inside the Washington beltway, distant from the farms, factories, and concerns of average Americans. Eckes, *Opening America's Markets: U.S. Foreign Trade Policy Since 1776* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995), xi-xiii.

policy history began and persisted until the late-1980s. The third and most recent period commenced in the early-1990s at the advent of the NAFTA debate. It was at this time that policymakers and the American public took a strong interest in trade policy and fought to include environmental protection within the trade agenda for the first time in United States history.[4]

Period One: Protectionist Policies and Isolationism

America's founding fathers understood the importance and necessity of trade during the early years of their nation's fragile existence. The American Revolution caused the nation to exhaust much of its resources, and the weak economy and non-existent source of federal revenue were insufficient to support the newly-independent government. Many expected the perils of war to haunt the United States in the future, which furthered the country's urgency for finances.[5]

The leaders of the early American republic concluded that trade would provide the nation with its much needed source of revenue, but they did not agree on how to utilize trade for the good of their country. One group, led by Thomas Jefferson, contended that the United States would prosper best by building a strong agrarian-based domestic economy, while trading freely with other nations to obtain industrial materials that the nation did not produce at home. Moreover, he argued that this open-market concept would create a demand for American agriculture abroad and reduce the risks of war by creating international connections and promoting peace among all nations.

---

[4] *Ibid*., 1-2; Eckes, "U.S. Trade History" in William A. Lovett, *et al*., *U.S. Trade Policy: History, Theory, and the WTO, Second Edition* (Armonk; New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2004), 36; Steven D. Cohen, *et al*., *Fundamentals of U.S. Foreign Trade Policy: Economics, Politics, Laws, and Issues* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2003), 26-29.

[5] Eckes, *Opening America's Markets*, 1-2; Eckes, "U.S. Trade History," 36.

Alexander Hamilton led the opposing group, claiming that the United States needed to employ tariffs and other trade barriers to protect its domestic economy and build an industrial base that would compliment its existing agricultural market. This, he maintained, would prevent the nation from becoming dependent on foreign goods and isolate it from the threat of wars overseas.[6]

American officials implemented policies from 1776 to 1812 that reflected the interests of both groups. In accordance to Jefferson's trade approach, policymakers opened the American market to other nations, expecting to receive the same open-access to foreign markets in return. Their expectations were short-lived; British and French merchants, for example, rarely allowed the United States the same access to their goods as they sought from the American market. As a result, American policymakers began to

---

[6] Eckes, *Opening America's Markets*, 2-13; Eckes, "U.S. Trade History," 40-42; Cohen, 29-30; Cynthia Clark Northrup, *et al*., eds., *The Encyclopedia on Tariffs and Trade in U.S. History: Volume 1: The Encyclopedia* (Westport; Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2003), 210-211. Eckes, *Opening America's Markets*, 14-18; Eckes, "U.S. Trade History," 43-45; Cohen, 29-30; Northrup, *Volume I: The Encyclopedia*, 175-176; John M. Rothgeb, Jr., *U.S. Trade Policy: Balancing Economic Dreams and Political Realities* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2001), 8-10. Frequent wars defined Great Britain and France's relationship for centuries, including the years during the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries. These squabbles made Hamilton reluctant to involve the nation in foreign affairs. He feared that increased trade with Britain or France could lead the nation to partake in foreign wars, which would prolong the United States's economic decline and state of international inferiority. Hamilton's *Federalist Papers* and *Report on Manufactures* illustrated his support for trade as the best means of federal revenue and his encouragement for protectionist trade policies. For example, he explained in the *Federalist No. 12* that "the prosperity of commerce is now perceived and acknowledged by all enlightened statesmen to be the most useful as well as productive source of national wealth, and has accordingly become a primary object of their political cares . . . Commerce . . . must of necessity render the payment of taxes easier, and facilitate the requisite supplies to the treasury." In his *Report on Manufacturers*, he explains that "manufacturers; and particularly to the means of promoting such as will tend to render the United States, independent of foreign nations, for military and other supplies . . . The expediency of encouraging manufactures in the United States, which was not long since deemed very questionable, appears at this time to be pretty generally admitted. The embarrassments, which have obstructed the progress of our external trade, have led to serious reflections on the necessity of enlarging the sphere of our domestic commerce . . . In order to a better judgment of the Means proper to be resorted to by the United States, it will be of use to Advert to those which have been employed with success in other Countries. The principal of these are: I Protecting duties . . . II Prohibitions of rival articles or duties equivalent to prohibitions . . . III Prohibitions of the exportations of the materials of manufacturers . . . IV Pecuniary bounties . . . " Alexander Hamilton, *Federalist No. 12* in Northrup, *The Encyclopedia of Tariffs and Trade in U.S. History: Volume II: Debating the Issues: Selected Primary Documents* (Westport; Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2003), 32-36; 63-64; 98-105.

experiment with Hamilton's trade approach by implementing policies, such as the Tariff of 1789, in order to protect the United States from these competing interests. European nations, whose economic superiority far surpassed the weak and unstable American economy, continued to limit the United States's access to their markets and violate American commercial and navigation rights. In addition, Great Britain flooded the United States's markets with its goods in an attempt to destroy infant American industries. These actions intensified during the War of 1812, forcing policymakers in the United States to rethink the nation's existing trade policy.[7]

By the time the War of 1812 concluded, a majority of United States policymakers realized the need to protect the American economy from external competition. Thomas Jefferson and other former "free-trade" proponents now agreed with Alexander Hamilton's protectionist trade philosophy; the weak state of the American economy simply would not permit it to engage in open-market trade at this time. Within a few years, the United States slowly transformed into a protectionist nation, isolated from the competition and quarrels of other countries. The government implemented trade barriers, including the Tariffs of 1816, 1824, and 1828, that quickly became the norm. Although the government favored protectionist policies at this time, many individuals, particularly members of the new Democratic Party, continued to support open-trade practices. Nevertheless, Republican Party dominance of the federal government between 1860 and 1928 allowed protectionist ideals to dictate American trade policy. Democrats

[7] Eckes, *Opening America's Markets*, 14-20; Eckes, "U.S. Trade History," 44-45; Cohen, 29-30.

continuously sought ways to endorse their open-market policies during this time, but their efforts proved fruitless time and again.[8]

The stock market crash in October of 1929, the passage of the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff, and the Great Depression presented Democrats with a chance to pursue their open-market policies in the early-1930s. Former Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, who promoted open trade for years, led the charge to reduce protective barriers. Democrats blamed protectionist policies like Smoot-Hawley for the stock market crash and the Great Depression. The ramifications of the Depression were so great that many other policymakers began to agree that tariff reduction was a necessary means to revamp the nation's failing economy. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was cautious about changing United States trade policy but eventually opened the American market in hopes of strengthening the economy. American policymakers increasingly participated in freer trade practices throughout the 1930s and early-1940s; they also continued to use tariffs to protect domestic industry. The United States did not fully open its markets until World War II ended.[9]

---

[8] Eckes, *Opening America's* Market, 18-20; Eckes, "U.S. Trade History," 45-50; Cohen, 30-31. This chapter refers to free-trade, as used during the first period in American trade history, in quotation marks to indicate that "free-trade" in the late-eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth centuries was much different from the principles of free-trade used today. "Free-trade" in early American history "offered participation in foreign trade without discriminating tariffs or other prohibitive practices." Today free-trade is governed by international agreements and organizations that operate with the intention of eliminating trade barriers. In today's global market, free-trade is an easier practice to come by, which often leads to an increase in unfair free-trade practices and, thus, a rise in opposition to trade agreements, Northrup, 151-153, 211. According to Northrup, the Tariff of 1789 was the "first tariff passed under the U.S. Constitution." It "taxed most goods at 5 percent, but some duties ranged as high as 50 percent," *Volume I: The Encyclopedia*, 356-357. There were brief moments when policymakers used open-market policies during this time. For example, Woodrow Wilson promoted expanded international trade and lower protectionist policies during his presidency. While he lowered tariffs prior to World War I, his open-market policies declined following the conclusion of the war. Protectionist policies again became the norm as Republican leaders dominated the executive branch throughout most of the 1920s, Eckes, "U.S. Trade History," 51; Cohen, 31; Rothgeb, 27-30; Northrup, *Volume I: The Encyclopedia*, 439-440.

[9] Some modern trade historians and policymakers have argued against the long-standing belief that Smoot-Hawley caused the Great Depression and was the highest tariff in American history. They contend that these claims are untrue and over-exaggerated, Eckes, *Opening America's* Markets, 100-139; Eckes,

Period Two: Open-Market Mentalities as Foreign Policy

The aftermath of World War II signaled a profound change in the international system of power and American trade policy. The war had devastated the European continent, leaving its economies in ruins. The United States, on the other hand, found its domestic economy reinvigorated by the war. American policymakers had a decision to make: the United States could either return to its pre-war role as an isolationist power, or it could pursue the opportunity of becoming a world leader. To prevent the events that followed the First World War, including the Great Depression and the rise of Nazi Germany, Republican and Democratic leaders decided to take on the latter challenge of becoming a non-isolationist world power.[10]

The rise of Soviet communism in the years following World War II directly challenged the United States's objectives of promoting world peace. American policymakers from both political parties quickly realized that they needed to suppress the Soviet's advances to ensure that democracy would prevail and bring amity to the world. America would soon rely on her economic supremacy to promote world order.[11]

"U.S. Trade History," 53-55; Sherrod Brown, *Myths of Free Trade: Why American Trade Policy Has Failed* (New York: The New Press, 2004), 175-181. Despite these revelations, the legacy of Smoot-Hawley lives on today, and many policymakers continue to refer to it when arguing against protectionist trade policies. Vice President Al Gore, for example, used Smoot-Hawley in his debate against Ross Perot in 1993. Gore stated the following during the debate: "This is a picture of Mr. Smoot and Mr. Hawley. They look like pretty good fellas. They sounded reasonable at the time. A lot of people believed them. The Congress passed the Smoot-Hawley Protection Bill. He wants to raise tariffs on Mexico. They raised tariffs, and it was one of the principal causes—many economists say the principal cause—of the Great Depression in this country and around the world. Now, I framed this so you can put it on your wall if you want to," *Gore-Perot Debate over the Ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement* in Cynthia Clark Northrup, *et al*., eds., *The Encyclopedia on Tariffs and Trade in U.S. History: Volume II: Debating the Issues: Selected Primary Documents* (Westport; Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2003), 433.

[10] Eckes, *Opening America's Markets*, 153-157; Eckes, "U.S. Trade History," 58-60; Cohen, 33-34; Rothgeb, 55-56; Northrup, *Volume 1: The Encyclopedia*, 440-441.

[11] Eckes, *Opening America's Markets*, 153-157; Eckes, "U.S. Trade History," 58-60; Cohen, 33-34; Rothgeb, 55-56.

Shortly after World War II ended, the United States began drafting plans to create international institutions that would strengthen the world economy and prevent another major depression. This effort produced the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), and the International Trade Organization (ITO). The United States also invited nineteen foreign nations to participate in creating a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947, which established international rules and regulations to guarantee fair, open-market trading procedures and reduce the use of tariffs. Officials believed that these institutions would accelerate trade liberalization and promote political and economic order throughout the world. The institutions would also provide means for ensuring world peace through increased trade.[12]

The United States's foreign policy initiatives also centered on bringing economic assistance to its allies while strengthening democracy against the threat of Soviet communism. The Truman Doctrine stated that America's assistance to foreign governments "should be primarily through economic and financial aid." The Marshall Plan echoed the Truman Doctrine by creating a multi-million dollar aid package for the European continent. Secretary of State George Marshall explained that the American goals for recovery in Europe "were a decent standard of living and political stability." The United States's foreign policy goals and initiatives to create international trade institutions demonstrated its trade policy reversal from protectionism to open-market economics. Free-trade provided the nation with great wealth during the late-1940s, the

[12] Eckes, "U.S. Trade History," 58-61; Rothgeb, 64-75. The IMF, World Bank, and ITO were born from a meeting in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. Thus, scholars often refer to them as the Bretton Woods institutions, Eckes, *Opening America's Market*, 160; Eckes, "U.S. Trade History," 58-61; Rothgeb, 70.

1950s, and the early-1960s. However, the rate and extent to which the United States opened its market to the world eventually caused the American economy to endure much suffering.[13]

In an effort to promote international stability and peace as Cold War tensions heightened, the United States continued to open its markets to its allies throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. The anticipated result of open American markets was to help nations rebuild their struggling economies and create democratic governing institutions. Policymakers based this open-market mentality on reciprocity, meaning that American firms would have the same access to foreign markets as they provided for other nations. While this objective was well-intended, the United States failed to enforce the concept of reciprocity, since many of its allies were unable to offer Americans the same access to their markets due to the poor state of their economies. It was more important for the United States to contain communism and promote democracy at this time than to ensure that other nations allowed American markets into their economies. These policy decisions caused the United States to begin importing far more goods than it was able to export. Recognizing this problem, American policymakers fought to lower other nations' protectionist trade barriers by way of the GATT.[14]

The international economic system no longer favored American interests by the mid-1960s. Foreign nations had taken advantage of America's open market for nearly two decades, while refusing to eliminate their own trade barriers. Japan had strengthened its economy significantly since World War II, and several European nations had taken part in creating a common economic bloc within that continent. President John F.

---

[13] Eckes, "U.S. Trade History," 61-63; Rothgeb, 85-88.
[14] Eckes, *Opening America's Markets*, 256-258.

Kennedy decided to launch a GATT meeting to promote freer international trade while reducing tariffs. This meeting, which became known as the Kennedy Round, brought few results. Other presidents continued to pursue American free-trade interests. Richard Nixon took part in the Tokyo Round of the GATT in the 1970s, and Ronald Reagan, Bush, and Clinton participated in the Uruguay Round in the 1980s. All of these efforts to grant American markets entry into other nations' economies brought unfavorable results to the United States's domestic economy.[15]

The 1970s and 1980s found the United States in an increasing state of economic decline and dislocation. Japanese markets had overwhelmed the American economy, forcing hundreds of firms to shut down or relocate to other countries. The United States had moved from being the world's largest creditor nation after World War II to the world's largest debtor nation a few decades later. Its trade surplus grew to monumental proportions as the nation continued to import far more than it exported. Attempts to enforce fair trade practices proved ineffective—the damage had already been done. Democratic leaders began to call for an increase in protective barriers to defend the interests of laborers. Other policymakers, particularly those from the Republican Party, maintained their support for free-trade measures. American citizens began to notice their nation's economic problems as more and more businesses closed or relocated and as the United States's economy continued to stagger into the late-1980s. Soon, thousands of angry citizens would join forces to demand a change in American trade policy.[16]

---

[15] *Ibid*., 178-218; Eckes, "U.S. Trade History," 66-78; Cohen, 36-41; Rothgeb, 112-139.

[16] Eckes, *Opening America's Markets*, 178-218; Eckes, "U.S. Trade History," 66-78; Cohen, 36-41; Rothgeb, 112-139, 177-194.

Period Three: The Introduction of Trade Protests and Incorporation of Environmental Protection into the Trade Agenda

The North American Free Trade Agreement became the breaking point between the nd and third periods in United States trade policy history and was unlike any other trade concern the country had faced. It attracted an enormous opposition movement from thousands of traditionally uninterested American citizens, organized interests, and policymakers, which scholars Albert Eckes, Steven D. Cohen, and John M. Rothgeb, Jr., explain was not a characteristic of previous American trade policy. The resistance movements that defined the NAFTA debate persisted throughout the 1990s and into the twenty-first century as the United States increased its free trade engagements with foreign countries. During the week before hundreds of trade officials were scheduled to arrive in Seattle to attend a World Trade Organization (WTO) meeting in November of 1999, thousands of angry protesters amassed the streets, forcing Mayor Paul Schell to declare a civil emergency and Governor Gary Locke to call for the National Guard. Similar protests against the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and the recently passed Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) took place in various cities throughout the Western Hemisphere. These trade protests, initiated by the NAFTA debate, have become the norm in recent years, characterizing the modern era in trade policy history.[17]

---

[17] Eckes, *Opening America's Markets*, xi-xii; Cohen 311-12; 319; Rothgeb 213; "WTO Opposition Signs In," *The Seattle Times*, 12 November 1999, page E1; Robert McClure, "Critics of WTO Launch Ad Blitz," *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, 12 November 1999, page C1; Laurence M. Cruz, "Opponents of WTO Use Ads in Campaign to 'Educate' Public," *The Columbian*, 12 November 1999, page C2; Rebecca Cook, "Protestors Launch 'Battle in Seattle' Against WTO," *The Associated Press & Local Wire*, 28 November 1999; David Postman, "Environmentalists Scale Crane by I-5 -- They Prepare Anti-WTO Banner," *The Seattle Times*, 29 November 1999, page A1. Eckes explains, as stated earlier, that "until the bitter 1993 debate over the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) energized ordinary Americans and fractured the two major political parties, trade struggles usually aroused only Washington

In addition to its public debates, NAFTA also represented another recognizable difference between the first two periods and the third in American trade history: the NAFTA trade agenda included a prominent focus on environmental protection. The main trade concerns on which policymakers focused throughout the first and second periods in American trade policy history were whether or not to implement open-market or free-trade policies and how the government could utilize trade as a foreign policy tool. Trade officials never focused on how increased trade affected the environment or how they could protect the natural world from economic activity. In 1988, only two years before the NAFTA negotiations began, there was little public or governmental concern about how trade impacted the environment when the United States implemented a free trade agreement with Canada. Yet in the early-1990s, environmental opposition played a leading role in the debate against NAFTA.[18]

Thousands of environmental organizations, American citizens, and policymakers refused to support NAFTA unless it addressed protecting the natural world from economic destruction. These demands forced presidents Bush and Clinton to take

---

insiders—a group largely composed of U.S. officials, foreign representatives, and lobbyists....This trade policy elite lived and thrived inside the Washington beltway, distant from the farms, factories, and concerns of average Americans." Cohen contends that "the private sector input into the formulation of trade was historically monopolized by businesses affected by trade flows and, beginning in the 1960s, labor unions that believed their members were hurt by intensifying import competition. The 'public opinion factor grew significantly in the 1990s as nongovernmental organizations emerged as influential voices having a direct impact on U.S. trade policy substance. . . .The result was the coalescing of an informal but determined coalition that ranged from large, often well-financed nationwide organizations to small grassroots groups operating n a shoestring. It did not take long for the coalition to hit critical mass within the United States in terms of influencing Congress and stirring public opinion, or to link up with NGOs in other countries that had parallel agendas. With hindsight, we now know that the beginning of the end of this era [the second period in American trade history] in U.S. trade policy materialized when the NAFTA debated energized not only opposition to its foreign investment provisions but also a demand for expanding the ambits of trade policy to include social issues." In addition, Rothgeb states that "although trade was always a priority for the special interests affected by trade agreements, the American public as a whole paid little attention to the subject, and trade issues were rarely featured prominently in the media. Few people seemed to know much about trade and even fewer seemed to care, and for those who did care, trade issues often seemed arcane."

[18] Cohen, 311-319; Mayer, 67-106, 109-146, 165-205; Gilbreath, 53-89; Scott, 2, 17-20; Fox, 49-68.

environmental concerns into consideration. Clinton promised to attach an environmental side agreement to the accord, which policymakers voted in favor of on August 13, 1993. The overwhelming concern for environmental protection that characterized the NAFTA debate and the addition of an environmental side agreement to NAFTA has led many scholars to label the agreement as the "greenest" trade initiative in American history. Organized interests, citizens, and policymakers have maintained their concern for protecting the environment from unfair trade initiatives since the NAFTA negotiations ended, playing a significant role during the "Battle in Seattle" and within protests against the FTAA and CAFTA. The extent to which environmental protection dominated the NAFTA and other trade agendas since the 1990s was remarkable and completely unprecedented.[19]

This brief review of American trade policy history clearly demonstrates the relatively recent emergence of public opposition to trade initiatives and concern for the effects of economic activity on the natural environment. No longer do policymakers concern themselves with whether or not protectionist or free-trade policies should characterize American trade policy like they did during the first two-centuries of United States history. Federal officials also cannot use trade policy just to serve as the back-

[19] Cohen, 311-319; Mayer, 67-106, 109-146, 165-205; Gilbreath, 53-89; Scott, 2, 17-20; Fox, 49-68; Stephen H. Dunphy, "Opening Ceremonies Besieged by Protestors, Then Canceled—Delegates Couldn't Get Through," *The Seattle Times*, 30 November 1999, page A1; Martin Crutsinger, "Demonstrators Disrupt WTO Meeting; Mayor Declares Curfew," *The Associated Press State & Local Wire, AM Cycle*, 30 November 1999; Cook, "Police Surprised By Aggressive Stance of Protestors," *The Associated Press State & Local Wire, AM Cycle*, 30 November 1999; Dirk Beveridge, "Tear Gas Fired on Demonstrators Against World Trade Organization," *The Associated Press State & Local Wire, PM Cycle*, 30 November 1999; Dunphy, "Delegates Get on With Business -- International Trade Talks are Under Way," *The Seattle Times*, 01 December 1999, page A1; Scott Sunde, "Chaos Closes Downtown; Police Use Rubber Pellets, Tear Gas Against Thousands; Demonstrators Delay Start of Trade Meeting for Hours; Schell Orders Curfew; National Guard Called," *Seattle Post-Intellegencer*, 01 December 1999, page A1; "Seattle Declares Emergency, Imposes Curfew Due to Violent WTO Protest," *The News Tribune*, 01 December 1999; "Seattle Police Use Tear Gas Against World Trade Organization Protestors," *The News Tribune*, 01 December 1999.

bone of the nation's foreign policy decision-making. Rather, they now must take public protests against unfair trade practices into consideration when making trade policies and find ways to protect the environment from increased economic activity. Indeed, the contemporary era of American trade policy history, born from the advent of the NAFTA debate, is much different and more complex than either the first or second periods.

Did the Trade and Environment Debate Originate in the 1990s?

Many find it hard to believe that concern for the environment within trade policy did not exist until the early-1990s. Millions of ordinary Americans became aware of the state of their natural environment following the rise of the environmental movement in the 1960s and 1970s, and federal, state, and local governments already had taken action to prevent increased destruction. If concern for the environment had been so widespread in other areas of governmental policy throughout the 1970s and 1980s, why would not policymakers have thought to include environmental protection within trade policy?[20]

Several scholars have acknowledged that concern for the environment within trade policy did exist prior to the 1990s, but that the extent to which the government addressed the effects of economic activity on the natural world was always a secondary matter that never received much attention. Jan Gilbreath and John Benjamin Tonra

[20] For further information concerning the environmental movement, see: Samuel P. Hayes, *Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States, 1955-1985* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Victor B. Scheffer, *The Shaping of Environmentalism in America* (Seattle: The University of Washington Press, 1991); Robert Gottleib, *Forcing the Spring: the Transformation of the American Environmental Movement* (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1993); Terry H. Anderson, *The Movement and the Sixties* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Hal K. Rothman, *The Greening of a Nation?: Environmentalism in the United States Since 1945* (Orlando: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1998); Benjamin Kline, *First Along the River: A Brief History of the United States Environmental Movement, 2nd Edition* (San Francisco: Acada Books, 2000); Jeff Sanders, "Environmentalism." in Beth Bailey, *et al*., ed., *The Columbia Guide to America in the 1960s* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); Philip Shapecoff, *A Fierce Green Fire: the American Environmental Movement, Revised Edition* (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2003).

explain that "concerns over the environmental effects of trade predate NAFTA by at least twenty years." Policymakers created a trade and environment working group under the GATT umbrella in the early-1970s. This showed that apprehensions existed about increased pollution as a result of extended free-trade before the 1990s. However, Gilbreath and Tonra make clear that this trade and environment working group "remained inactive until October of 1991."[21]

Other works also indicate that environmental concerns were present in trade agreements prior to NAFTA. Joseph A. McKinney explains that "environmental issues had been slowly making their way onto the international trade agenda quite apart from NAFTA." He recognized the 1971 GATT trade and environment working group as well and explained that it had been inoperative for several years. In 1979, another GATT agreement "formally gave countries the right to depart from international trade rules in order to prevent degradation of the environment." Yet, a different clause in the agreement stated that "countries could not discriminate against products from other countries based upon how the products from those countries were produced," unless importing those products directly affected the importer's environment.[22]

---

[21] Gilbreath, 55-59.

[22] Joseph A. McKinney, *Created from NAFTA: the Structure, Function, and Significance of the Treaty's Related Institutions* (Armonk; New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2000), 9-10. Shrybman also explains that these efforts to address environmental protection within trade agreements prior to NAFTA did exist, but that they were tentative and had been "limited to resource- and environment-specific issues." Shrybman, "Trading Away the Environment," 271-272. This specific clause is what led to the infamous "tuna-Dolphin" GATT controversy in the early-1990s. American companies argued that Mexico's method of catching tuna harmed dolphins, because the process of using encirclement nets caused dolphins to be drowned and killed. After these practices killed nearly seven million dolphins, American tuna companies wanted to "depart from international trade rules in order to prevent degradation of the environment." The American government passed the Marine Mammal Protection Act, which eliminated the most harmful practices of tuna-fishing. Congress also passed a "dolphin safe" labeling program in 1990 that would be placed on tuna caught using procedures that did not harm dolphins. Congress banned the sale of all tuna two years later that did not use "dolphin safe" procedures. The Mexican tuna industry challenged the ban, claiming that it violated GATT rules. The GATT later ruled that the United States could not discriminate against Mexico's tuna procedures based upon "how the products from those countries were produced."

Margo L. Paul investigated the claim that NAFTA was the "greenest" trade agreement in history by comparing the text of the accord to the GATT and CUFTA. Paul also recognizes that trade initiatives prior to NAFTA included some environmental provisions. However, she argues that the GATT "largely ignored the impact of trade-liberalization on the global environment." Some parts of GATT seem to indicate concern for protecting the natural world, such as article XX, but these clauses had been ineffective and poorly enforced. In fact, Paul points out that the word "environment" does not appear anywhere in the text of GATT. Her study found that CUFTA included no environmental concerns other than those already stated in GATT. In contrast to these two agreements, NAFTA included a several-hundred-page side agreement dedicated to protecting the environment from economic activity. The main body of NAFTA also emphasizes the importance of environmental protection. Therefore, NAFTA clearly "signals a change in the perception of environmental issues in the context of trade liberalization."[23]

These initiatives seem to illustrate a reasonable concern for trade and the environment before the early-1990s. However, they did not bring significant results to protecting the environment from increased trade. Not until the early-1990s did environmental protection become a primary concern within trade agreements or before an

---

This ruling spurred much opposition in the United States against GATT and NAFTA and caused hundreds of environmental organizations to become aware of how trade agreements failed to protect the environment, Mayer, 77-80; Brown, 62-63.

[23] Paul, 19-113. Article XX of the GATT states that "subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: . . . b. necessary to protect human, animal or plant life, or health; . . . g. relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption. . . ." *The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade* in Cynthia Clark Northrup, *et al*., eds., *The Encyclopedia on Tariffs and Trade in U.S. History: Volume II: Debating the Issues: Selected Primary Documents* (Westport; Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2003), 373.

agreement would include specific environmental provisions that created working groups, like NAFTA's Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) and Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAC), that remain active today. Public opposition to trade initiatives also never existed until the early-1990s. Before this, the public paid little attention to trade policy and certainly never demanded safeguards to protect the environment from economic activity.[24]

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that the NAFTA debate in the early-1990s initiated a new era in trade policy history that included public opposition and a prominent concern for protecting the environment from increased trade. The review of the first and second periods show that the public remained uninvolved and unconcerned about trade and that environmental protection was never a prominent issue during these times. Although the emergence of public opposition and concern for the environment within the third period

[24] According to the CEC's website, "the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) is an international organization created by Canada, Mexico and the United States under the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC). The CEC was established to address regional environmental concerns, help prevent potential trade and environmental conflicts, and to promote the effective enforcement of environmental law. The Agreement complements the environmental provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)." The CEC includes a Council, a Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAC), which includes five representatives from each of the three member nations, and a Secretariat. The JPAC website states that "the Joint Public Advisory Committee, together with the Council and the Secretariat comprise the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC), a unique institution charged with seizing an historic opportunity. The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation sets a precedent as a formal environmental agreement adopted in parallel with a trade agreement, and the Commission it created also set a precedent by including a public, nongovernmental advisory group as one of its components. JPAC was established as a cooperative mechanism to advise the Council in its deliberations and to advise the Secretariat in its planning and activities. Our vision is to promote continental cooperation in ecosystem protection and sustainable economic development, and to ensure active public participation and transparency in the actions of the Commission," "Who We Are: Three Countries Working Together to Protect our *Shared* Environment," http://www.cec.org/who_we_are/index.cfm?varlan=english (accessed 16 September 2005); "Who We Are: Joint Public Advisory Committee Vision Statement," http://www.cec.org/who_we_are/jpac/vision/index.cfm?varlan=english (accessed 16 September 2005).

is clear, one important question remains unresolved: What prompted policymakers to include environmental protection within the NAFTA trade agenda at this time?[25]

The rest of this thesis examines why Congressman Pease, Congressman Brown, and Congresswoman Kaptur demanded trade officials to include environmental protection within the NAFTA trade agenda in the early-1990s and argues that their personal values, beliefs, and life experiences influenced their perception of NAFTA and the environment. Indeed, other factors, including external problems and politics, caused them to demand that trade officials include environmental protections within the NAFTA agenda. Kingdon explains, however, that policymakers also incorporate an issue into the government agenda when it directly interferes with or contradicts their own personal values and beliefs. Therefore, external problems and politics alone could not have caused the environment to become a prominent concern within the NAFTA agenda. These external factors triggered "a mismatch between the observed condition and one's conception of an ideal state," prompting Pease, Brown, and Kaptur to defend their environmental values and beliefs by fighting to protect them from increased trade.[26]

[25] For a review of these questions, see pages 6-7 in the Introduction.
[26] *Ibid.*, 15, 110.

CHAPTER TWO: "I DO CONSIDER MYSELF AN ENVIRONMENTALIST, AND I ALWAYS HAVE:" REPRESENTATIVE DONALD J. PEASE, NAFTA, AND THE ENVIRONMENT

Figure 1: Photo of Donald J. Pease 1

Congressman Donald J. Pease entered into the United States House of Representatives in the mid-1970s, marking the beginning of a political career at the federal level dedicated to supporting progressive causes. He fought consistently for the well-being of his constituents and the American public during his time in Washington, earning him a solid reputation among his colleagues and the honor of being named one of the "straightest arrows" in Congress. The last notable issue in which Pease participated was the debate over the highly controversial NAFTA. He devoted his last two years in Congress to opposing the agreement in ways that mirrored the progressive political philosophy he possessed his entire life, including demanding that trade officials incorporate environmental protection within the NAFTA trade agenda.[2]

---

[1] Photo of Donald J. Pease, http://www.oberlin.edu/archive/30PhotoPages/pease_p.html (accessed 22 February 2006).

[2] Roland M. Baumann, *et al.*, *A Researcher's Guide to the Donald J. Pease Papers in the Oberlin College Archives* (Oberlin; Ohio: Oberlin Press, 2003). This thesis uses the term "progressive" to mean promoting or favoring progress toward better societal conditions or new policies. It uses "liberal" to mean favoring change, reform, and new ideas that would improve American society and its people.

This chapter examines Representative Pease's life experiences to demonstrate that he possessed strong environmental values and beliefs that influenced his personal and professional decisions. It then connects his environmental awareness to the role he played in the NAFTA and environment debate and argues that his motivation for including environmental protections as an integral part of the NAFTA trade agenda stemmed directly from his personal values, beliefs, and life experiences. While external problems and political factors undoubtedly prompted him to incorporate environmental protections as part of the NAFTA agenda, Congressman Pease's values, beliefs, and life experiences were also among the underlying factors that influenced his perception of NAFTA and the environment.

Congressman Donald J. Pease: The Development and Influence of His Environmental Values

Jeanne Pease remarked in an interview that environmental awareness was such a big part of her husband's life that she never thought about questioning why he based his everyday decisions around environmental protection; "it was just the way he did things." Congressman Pease first developed an environmental awareness as a young child, living in a city that bordered Lake Erie and learning important lessons about nature as a Boy Scout and Eagle Scout. His appreciation for the environment solidified as he received his education at a college that valued its environmental surroundings and began his career in a city renowned for its progressive sentiments. Years later, the "death" of Lake Erie and the Cuyahoga River fire reminded Pease of the urgent need to protect the environment. The rise of the environmental movement in the 1960s and 1970s allowed him the

opportunity to defend his environmental values and beliefs as a state and federal legislator. These life experiences together with his unrelenting passion for learning and improving society ultimately formed an environmental awareness that influenced the decisions he made in his professional and personal life.[3]

Congressman Pease was passionate about life, learning, and leading as a young boy, prompting him to participate in several activities that strengthened his leadership skills and shaped the progressive values he would later use to inform his life decisions. He developed an interest in journalism and writing as an eighth-grader in Toledo, Ohio, at the guidance of a teacher who introduced him to the subjects and urged him to pursue them further. Pease consented to this advice, enrolling in several journalism courses at Scott High School that sharpened his writing skills and eventually allowed him to serve as editor of the school newspaper. He later became interested in government and politics and represented the student body as its student council president. After four years of hard work and preparation for college, Pease earned a scholarship to attend Ohio University, a liberally-minded college located within the environmentally scenic hills of southeast Ohio, enabling him to further his training in journalism. College proved to be no different than any other previous endeavor he had faced; his determination to learn and lead allowed him to become the editor of the Ohio University newspaper and president of the student body. During his summer breaks from college, Pease returned to Toledo to

[3] Interview With Jeanne Pease, 12 August 2005, Oberlin, Ohio; Charles J. Ping, *Ohio University in Perspective" The Annual Convocation Addresses of President Charles J. Ping, 1975-1984* (Athens; Ohio, Ohio University Press, 1985), 2. In 1969, scientists declared Lake Erie "dead" as a result of it enduring several decades of industrial and human waste. During the same year, the Cuyahoga River in northeast Ohio erupted into flames. The event received national attention when *Time Magazine* described it as "chocolate-brown, oily, [and] bubbling with sub-surface gases" and declared it the river that "oozes rather than flows" and in which a person "does not drown" but "decays." Both of these events heightened the American environmental movement and forced the federal government to take action, "The Cities: The Price of Optimism" in *Time Magazine* (1 August 1969), 41-44.

work at a local oil refinery, which likely introduced him to the hardships of the working class and the damage that industry caused to the environment. Once he received his undergraduate degree, Pease continued his studies at Ohio University as a graduate student in government, forcing him to remain politically informed. He spent two years in the United States Army upon completing his graduate work but employed his strong leadership skills, appreciation for knowledge, and progressive mentality in the fields of journalism and government following his honorable discharge in 1957.[4]

Pease began his journalism and government careers in Oberlin, Ohio, a city historically known for its strong liberal sentiments, which strengthened his pre-existing progressive values. While working as co-editor-publisher of the Oberlin *News Tribune* and vice president and co-owner of the Oberlin Printing Company, he became passionate about the city of Oberlin and the causes for which it stood. Oberlin had always been a progressive community. In the 1830s, Oberlin College became the nation's first institution of higher education to allow men and women to participate together in its classrooms as both students and teachers. Moreover, it was one of the pioneering institutions in America to resist slavery and admit African Americans. The historic social causes that defined Oberlin College were not limited to its faculty, students, and classrooms; indeed, the wider Oberlin community also encouraged public reform. In an effort to create a "truer democracy," the people of Oberlin stressed social equality over individualism by regulating public utilities, checking the accumulation of wealth, and encouraging the conservation of natural resources. As chairman of the Oberlin Public Utilities Commission, vice president and president of the Oberlin United Appeal, and a member of the Oberlin City Council, Pease championed similar progressive causes. He

[4] Baumann; Interview with Jeanne Pease; Ping, 2.

fought to ensure reasonable public utilities, fair housing policies, and safe drinking water for the community. As he began his political career at the state and federal levels, the values and beliefs that Pease acquired as a young man and the experiences he gained from working within Oberlin's progressive climate guided his decisions.[5]

Of his many progressive values and beliefs, Pease emphasized the importance of environmental protection throughout his political career and fought continuously for environmental causes. In 1964, he entered into the Ohio General Assembly, playing a key role in education reform. He used his positions on the Ohio School Survey Commission, the Senate Education Committee, the House Education Committee, and the Review Education Committee as opportunities to not only improve education in Ohio but also to educate young children about the importance of conserving natural resources. In 1976, after serving in the Ohio General Assembly for twelve years, Pease won the election to represent Ohio's Thirteenth District as a member of the United States House of Representatives. He served in the Environmental Study Conference as a federal legislator and sponsored hundreds of bills related to environmental protection. During his last term in Congress, Pease co-sponsored or co-signed at least thirty-three environmental bills, including the Wetlands Conservation and Management Act of 1991, the Solid Waste Management Act, the Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1991, the Global Climate Protection Act, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Great Lakes Improvement Act. Congressman Pease remained committed to protecting the environment at the local level as well; he worked hard in his district to

[5] Robert Samuel Fletcher, *A History of Oberlin College from its Foundation through the Civil War, Volume I* (Oberlin: Oberlin College Press, 1943) 167-178; 236-253; 290-315; 373-385; 386-400; John Barnard, *From Evangelicalism to Progressivism at Oberlin College, 1866-1917* (Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 1969) 110-127; Baumann; Interview with Jeanne Pease.

obtain the resources for developing the Lorain Harbor and Century Park, to provide grants to Mansfield and Avon for sewer improvement, and to present funding to the area for water treatment projects. The extent to which Pease valued the environment in his political life was evident in a campaign pamphlet that listed environmental protection as one of his top priorities.[6]

Representative Pease's environmental values permeated into other areas of his professional life as well; he demonstrated his passion for the natural world through correspondence with his constituents and by supporting environmental organizations. In a 1990 letter, Pease explained, "Let me start by saying that I do consider myself an environmentalist, and I always have." He went on to describe how he had used his influence as a politician to endorse environmental legislation, including the Clean Air Act, the Stratosphere Ozone Protection Act, and the Recycling Clearinghouse Information Act. Peace also received letters from constituents and environmental organizations that commended his work to protect the environment. Marilyn Rehm of the Mohican Outdoor School applauded the Congressman's "efforts in behalf of a cleaner and healthier Ohio." Another constituent and associate to the Sierra Club, Betty Liska, thanked Pease for supporting a bill that would restore funds to the United Nations Family Planning Agency and help stabilize population and thus better the environment.[7]

---

[6] Baumann; Interview with Jeanne Pease; Donald J. Pease, "Bill Files," Don J. Pease Papers, Subgroup III, Legislation Records from the US Congress, Series I, Bill Files, 102nd Congress, 1991-1992, Box 5, Oberlin College Archives; Pease, "Campaign Pamphlet: Don Pease: The Model of What a Good Congressman Should Be," Don J. Pease Papers, Subgroup VI, Campaign Files, Section 2, Campaign Files for US Congress, Box 17, 1990 Campaign.

[7] Pease, "Letter from Don J. Pease to Mike Monda," Subgroup II, Don J. Pease Papers, US Congress Personal/Political Papers, Series 2, Correspondence, Box 8, 1990, Oberlin College Archives (his emphasis); Marilyn Rehm, "Letter from Marilyn Rehm of the Mohican Outdoor School to Don J. Pease," March 1990, Subgroup II, Don J. Pease Papers, US Congress Personal/Political Papers, Series 2, Correspondence, Box 8, 1990, Oberlin College Archives; Betty Liska, "Letter from Betty Liska to Don J.

In addition to corresponding with constituents, Pease participated in the 1990 Earth Day in several ways. He took an Earth Day pledge promising to use environmentally sound modes of transportation, to recycle both at work and at home, and "to remain open to further environmentally supportive changes" in his personal lifestyle. Pease promoted Earth Day's "Clean Motion Campaign" at a rally on Transportation Day in Washington by bicycling from the Capitol to Freedom Plaza and promising to do his part "in Congress to support legislation" that encouraged "people to get out of their cars and peddle, not pollute, to work." In the days leading up to Earth Day, he sent President Bush a letter urging him to "give the American people an 'Earth Day' present" by endorsing the Federal Facilities Compliance Act. Congressman Pease also spoke before Congress to explain the importance of Earth Day to his colleagues and implored them to do their part to protect the environment.[8]

Representative Pease's personal lifestyle reflected his beliefs about the environment and the need to conserve natural resources as well. He walked, bicycled, carpooled, or rode the subway to work every chance that he could while living in Oberlin, Columbus, and Washington. When he moved to Washington, Pease specifically chose a residence that had a bus route close by. In addition to his allegiance to alternative methods of transportation, he was always aware of the limited resources in the world and

---

Pease," March 1990, Subgroup II, Don J. Pease Papers, US Congress Personal/Political Papers, Series 2, Correspondence, Box 8, 1990, Oberlin College Archives.

[8] Pease, "Letter from Don J. Pease to Constituents;" July 1990 in Don J. Pease Papers, Subgroup II, U.S. Congress Personal/Political Papers, Series 2, Correspondence, 1990, Box 8, Oberlin College Archives; Pease, "Statement of Don J. Pease at the Bike-to-Work Rally," 19 April 1990 in Don J. Pease Papers, Sub-Section III, Legislative Records from US Congress, Series 2, Legislative Subject Files, Box 3, Oberlin College Archives; Pease, "Letter from Don J. Pease to Nancy Beckett," 28 March 1990 in Don J. Pease Papers, Sub-Section III, Legislative Records from US Congress, Series 2, Legislative Subject Files, Box 3, Oberlin College Archives; Pease, "Letter from Don J. Pease (co-signer) to President Bush," 19 April 1990 in Don J. Pease Papers, Sub-Section III, Legislative Records from US Congress, Series 2, Legislative Subject Files, Box 3, Oberlin College Archives; Pease, "Statement by Don J. Pease: Congressional Record—House," 22 March 1990 in Don J. Pease Papers, Sub-Section III, Legislative Records from US Congress, Series 2, Legislative Subject Files, Box 3, Oberlin College Archives.

never used more than his share. His family owned only "one car, one television, one of anything." Pease also recycled, and probably did so earlier than most other Americans, since Oberlin was one of the first cities to use recycling as a method of conservation. Pease never specifically "taught" his family to be environmentally conscious, but both his wife and daughter formed environmental morals by following his example. His daughter inherited his "ethics and love for the outdoors" and currently employs her environmental values as a naturalist at a state park. After he retired from politics in 1992, Representative Pease returned to Oberlin to devote his last years to the activities he valued the most in his life: spending time with his family, enjoying the city and community, teaching government courses at Oberlin College, and appreciating the beauty of the natural world.[9]

Representative Pease and the North American Free Trade Agreement: Connecting His Environmental Values, Beliefs, and Life Experiences to His Role in the NAFTA and Environment Debate

The environmental values and beliefs that Pease developed as a consequence of his life experiences influenced nearly every aspect of his personal and political life, including the role he played in the NAFTA debate. Pease dedicated the last two years of his political career to debating the issues of NAFTA. Although his decision to retire from Congress in 1992 prevented him from voting on the agreement, the role Pease played in opposition to NAFTA during the first two years of the debate was extraordinary, making him one of the most noteworthy NAFTA opponents. His membership on the House Ways and Means Committee, a group committed to negotiating trade policy, presented

[9] Interview with Jeanne Pease; Baumann.

him with the opportunity to be actively involved in the NAFTA debate and to correspond regularly with important trade officials and political figures. He traveled to Mexico to observe firsthand the implications of creating a United States-Mexico trade agreement, wrote numerous letters to policymakers, trade officials, and his constituents outlining his concerns about NAFTA, and published articles and gave speeches that portrayed his perception of the agreement. One of Representative Pease's leading concerns with NAFTA was the presumed negative impact increased economic activity would have on the environment. As a result, he fought consistently throughout the two years he debated the agreement to incorporate environmental protections into NAFTA. The records he left behind leave no doubt that he decisively opposed NAFTA and was deeply concerned about the affects it would have on the natural world.[10]

Congressman Pease visited Mexico twice at the end of his career to evaluate the effects of industrial production along the Mexican-American border and negotiate the terms of the proposed NAFTA. In 1989, before the trade negotiations officially commenced, he traveled to Mexico as a member of the "Congressional Competitive Caucus Task Force on Mexico" to attend meetings with important Mexican officials. Pease toured the *Maquiladora* zone and some of its surrounding cities in between

[10] Northrup explained that the House Ways and Means Committee "is the oldest standing committee in the U.S. Congress, dating back to 1802." It is also "the most prestigious committee in the U.S. House of Representatives" and "its members serve on no other committees and important pieces of legislation that move to the floor do so under a 'closed rule,' with the rationale that the complexity of legislation precludes the feasibility of floor amendments. A major component of the committee's jurisdiction includes revenue legislation involving both taxes and tariffs," *Volume I: The Encyclopedia*, 190-191. Congressman Pease opposed NAFTA for several reasons, one of which was his belief that the agreement would harm the environment. However, he was also "skeptical" of the agreement because it lacked a social charter that would protect workers, human rights, public health issues, the environment, and other similar social causes. Pease, "Hasty Talks on Free Trade Spell Trouble," *International Business Magazine* (June 1991) in Don J. Pease Papers, Subgroup III, Legislative Records (US Congress), Series 2, Legislative Subject Files, Box 9, Trade, Chronology Files, 1990-92, Oberlin College Archives; Pease, "Letter from Don J. Pease (co-signer) to Carla Hills," 23 October 1991 in Don J. Pease Papers, Subgroup III, Legislative Records (US Congress), Series 2, Legislative Subject Files, Box 9, Trade, Chronology Files. 1990-92, Oberlin College Archives.

scheduled meetings, lunches, and other events during his visit, enabling him to investigate the ramifications of manufacturing in those areas. He noted in a personal journal that "major infrastructure and environmental problems" had developed "near the border," and that Tijuana had "acres of cardboard, plastic and corrugated iron shacks on hillsides" which were "'home' to workers." Two years later, in April of 1991, the Congressman visited Mexico a second time with the specific intention of negotiating NAFTA with trade officials, policymakers, and businessmen. He observed similar findings during this trip as he toured the "residential areas surrounding the maquillas to see environmental and other problems workers" faced. These trips provided Pease with an understanding of how unregulated industry could devastate a community and the environment and helped strengthen his belief that the agreement needed to include strong environmental protections to prevent increased pollution.[11]

The NAFTA debate was underway by 1990, and Pease became more involved in negotiating the terms of the agreement by writing a letter to President Bush to convey his opposition to NAFTA and express his strong desire to have environmental protections included within the agreement. President Bush formally notified the House Ways and Means Committee of his intention to begin negotiations to establish a free trade agreement between the United States and Mexico that September, only to receive a response from Pease two months later explaining that he and his colleagues were "opposed to such negotiations." He disliked the agreement largely because trade officials had failed "to recognize publicly the need to incorporate a social charter" into the

[11] Pease, "Personal Notes: Trip to Mexico," August 27-September 2, 1989 in Don J. Pease Papers, Subgroup II, U.S. Congress Personal/Political Papers, Series II, Trip Files, 1991, Box 2, Oberlin College Archives; Pease, "Mexico Trip Tentative Agenda: Revised Version," April 1-5, 1991 in Don J. Pease Papers, Subsection III, Legislative Records from U.S. Congress, Series 2, Legislative Subject Files, Box 10, Trade, 1990-92, Oberlin College Archives.

agreement that would address the differences that existed between the two countries; for example, environmental standards in Mexico were "very weak compared to American standards" and the "enforcement of what standards" did exist in Mexico was "quite lax." As a result of its being the first American trade agreement with a partner at Mexico's "level of economic development," Pease urged President Bush to allow Congress to be "actively engaged at all stages" of the negotiation in order to ensure that American interests, including environmental protection, would be secured.[12]

A few months later, after President Bush promised in his "Action Plan" to incorporate environmental and labor protections into the NAFTA negotiations, Pease sent letters to United States Trade Representative, Carla Hills, reemphasizing the importance of including environmental safeguards within the agreement. One letter questioned the administration's progress in nominating environmental representatives who would serve as authorities to ensuring environmental protection within NAFTA. Additionally, Pease asked Hills when trade officials would complete a review of the trade-related environmental issues. In another letter, he stressed that trade and the environment could "no longer be treated as separate subjects" within trade agreements, and that officials needed to understand the urgency in protecting the natural world from increased trade. Pease shunned the administration's effort to include environmental protections into NAFTA by way of the "Draft Border Environmental Plan," arguing that that initiative was "little more than a smoke screen for the status quo" or a "paper exercise, full of false assurances." Representative Pease was not satisfied with the Bush Administration's

[12] Pease, "Letter From Don J. Pease and Charles B. Rangel to President George H. W. Bush," 14 December 1990 in Don J. Pease Papers, Subgroup III, Legislative Records (US Congress), Series 2, Legislative Subject Files, Box 9, Trade, Chronology Files, 1990-92, Oberlin College Archives.

efforts to incorporate environmental safeguards into NAFTA at the end of 1991, well over a year after negotiations began.[13]

Congressman Pease targeted his concern for protecting the environment within NAFTA toward candidate Bill Clinton as the presidential election approached in the closing months of 1992. During his campaign, Clinton explained that he intended to accept the NAFTA "as negotiated by the Bush Administration," a decision that angered Pease and several of his colleagues. Pease sent a letter to Clinton in response to his statement, urging him to negotiate a "more equitable" NAFTA that would include environmental safeguards within the "central body of the agreement." He reminded Clinton of the problems that resulted from an increase in *Maquiladora* plants along the border, including environmental destruction; many workers in Mexico lived "in shacks with no running water or electricity, and the air pollution and waste generated by the plants" were "among the worst in the world." Pease argued that pollution would increase along the border and American environmental laws would weaken unless Clinton repaired the "serious flaws in the agreement."[14]

Aside from pressuring influential policymakers to improve the agreement, Congressman Pease warned his colleagues of the ways that NAFTA would harm the environment and urged them to fight for the agreement "the Administration promised." He wrote in one letter that a free trade agreement with Mexico would impact a "broad range of issues," including the environment and American environmental laws. Mexico

---

[13] Pease, "Letter From Don J. Pease (co-signer) to Carla Hills of the USTR," 29 July 1991 in Don J. Pease Papers, Subgroup III, Legislative Records (US Congress), Series 2, Legislative Subject Files, Box 9, Trade, Chronology Files, 1990-92, Oberlin College Archives; Pease, "Letter from Don J. Pease (co-signer) to Carla Hills."

[14] Pease, "Letter from Don J. Pease (co-signer) to Governor Clinton," 3 October 1992 in in Don J. Pease Papers, Subgroup III, Legislative Records (US Congress), Series 2, Legislative Subject Files, Box 9, Trade, Chronology Files, 1990-92, Oberlin College Archives.

had a reputation for having non-enforceable environmental laws, which would entice American industries to relocate to Mexico to avoid complying with strict environmental provisions in the United States. In another letter, he argued that NAFTA did not "go far enough" to protect the environment, namely because it lacked strong enforcement measures. Trade officials incorporated a provision into the agreement stating that no country could "lower its environmental standards to encourage domestic investment," but Pease contended that the "ability to enforce it" was "non-existent." Moreover, it failed to include "definitive guidelines" outlining what would constitute an "unacceptable relaxation of standards" and neglected the use of sanctions, provisions, or "further avenues of redress." As a result, he advised his colleagues to "withhold any judgment on the agreement" until trade officials delivered a NAFTA that included enforceable, strong environmental and labor safeguards.[15]

Pease did not limit his role in the NAFTA debate to working closely with trade officials, important policymakers, and colleagues; he also expressed his apprehension for NAFTA and belief that the agreement needed to include environmental protections in journal articles and public hearings. The Congressman explained in one essay that he held "great skepticism" toward the agreement because it ignored several fundamental issues, one of which was "environmental regulations and enforcement." Although it had an "impressive set of regulations on environmental protection," Mexico, unlike the United States and Canada, could not claim to enforce successfully these provisions.

---

[15] Pease, "Letter from Don J. Pease and Terry L. Bruce to Colleagues: URGENT! The Far-Reaching Impact of a Possible U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Warrants an Active, Strong Role for the Congress!," 3 December 1990 in Don J. Pease Papers, Subsection III, Legislative Records from U.S. Congress, Series 2, Legislative Subject Files, Box 10, 1990-92, Oberlin College Archives; Pease, "Letter from Don J. Pease to Colleagues: The NAFTA on Labor and the Environment: Take a Good Hard Look," 2 October 1992 in in Don J. Pease Papers, Subgroup III, Legislative Records (US Congress), Series 2, Legislative Subject Files, Box 9, Trade, Chronology Files, 1990-92, Oberlin College Archives.

Pease feared that the lack of enforcement in Mexico would attract American investors to the country and thus force businesses in the United States to weaken their environmental laws in order to compete with Mexican companies. He expressed these same concerns for NAFTA at a public hearing held in Cleveland, Ohio, in September of 1991. While addressing the implications of NAFTA to the crowd, he focused his talk on his core belief that the agreement needed to include environment protections.[16]

Conclusion

Congressman Pease participated in several activities throughout his life that provided him with a progressive mentality and helped him form strong environmental values and beliefs, all of which influenced his professional and personal decisions. He developed an appreciation for the environment as a young child living near Lake Erie and learning about the natural world as a Boy Scout. As he received his education at Ohio University and began his professional career in Oberlin, his environmental values solidified and became a key issue for which he fought to defend as a local, state, and federal politician. Representative Pease's environmental values and beliefs influenced his personal life as well; he employed alternative methods of transportation, recycled to conserve natural resources, and limited the amount of material possessions his family owned. If these environmental values influenced nearly every decision he made

[16] Pease, "Hasty Talks on Free Trade Spell Trouble;" Pease, "Written Testimony of Congressman Don J. Pease for the USTR Field Hearing on the NAFTA: The North American FTA: Economic Integration with a Price," 9 September 1991 in Don J. Pease Papers, Subsection III, Legislative Records from U.S. Congress, Series 2, Legislative Subject Files, Box 10, 1990-92, Oberlin College Archives. *International Business Magazine* gave Representative Pease a $300 honorarium for writing this article to give to his charity of choice. A note at the end of the article explained that he donated the money to STOP-IT, a citizens' group opposing a toxic waste incinerator. This further illustrates his environmental values.

throughout his life, it is indisputable that Congressman Pease's environmental awareness also weighed heavily on the role he played in debating the issues of NAFTA.

It is clear from this observation of Congressman Pease that his environmental values and beliefs prompted him to incorporate environmental protections onto the NAFTA trade agenda, yet academics have ignored this aspect of the agenda-setting process when examining the origins of the NAFTA and environment debate. Other scholars have argued that external problems and political factors, such as major events, crises, and changes in public opinion, caused policymakers to bring environmental protection to the trade agenda during the early-1990s NAFTA debate. These analyses are valid; Congressman Pease's personal files, journal articles, and public speeches demonstrate that external factors, particularly the inclusion of Mexico into the agreement, influenced his perception of NAFTA. However, these external factors alone did not prompt Pease to demand trade officials to include environmental protections within the NAFTA trade agenda. His internal environmental values and beliefs also influenced his perception of NAFTA and the environment. The same can be said for other legislators that participated in the NAFTA debate and opposed the agreement for environmental reasons, including Congressman Sherrod Brown.

CHAPTER THREE: "PROUD TO CARRY THE PROGRESSIVE BANNER:" REPRESENTATIVE SHERROD BROWN, NAFTA, AND THE ENVIRONMENT

Figure 2: Congressional Photo of Sherrod Brown [1]

At the end of 1992, Congressman Pease retired from politics, allowing a new candidate to represent the people of Ohio's Thirteenth District. This political vacancy caught the eye of a young politician named Sherrod Brown who previously had been active in the Ohio General Assembly. Brown's decision to run for office thrilled Representative Pease; it was clear that the two men shared the same progressive political philosophies, which assured Pease that Brown would represent the district in the same ways that he had for sixteen years. Representative Brown lived up to Pease's expectations immediately. As soon as he was sworn into office on January 5, 1993, Brown quickly became a leading opponent within the NAFTA debate, fighting for the same causes that Pease had during the first two years of the negotiations, including demanding that trade officials incorporate environmental protections into the agreement.

This chapter first argues that Congressman Brown possessed strong environmental values and beliefs that ultimately influenced his professional and personal decisions and then connects his environmental awareness to the role he played in the

[1] Photo of Sherrod Brown, http://www.ucc.org/ocinc/parker/brown.htm (accessed 22 February 2006).

NAFTA and environment debate. In agreement with previous scholarship, external factors undoubtedly influenced Brown's perception of NAFTA. However, this chapter contends that his environmental values and beliefs were also among the fundamental factors that prompted him to incorporate environmental protections within the NAFTA trade agenda.

Congressman Sherrod Brown: The Development and Influence of His Environmental Values

When asked in a recent interview if he considered himself an environmentalist, Congressman Sherrod Brown answered with an affirmative, "Of course." Brown first became a declared environmentalist as an adolescent, coming of age during a time when the environmental movement developed across the nation. At the same time, he read news stories about the "death" of Lake Erie and the unimaginable Cuyahoga River fire, which also helped spark his environmental awareness. The environmental values and beliefs Brown developed as a youth strengthened as he became a politician. His roles as a state and federal legislator provided him with a formal opportunity to demand the government to protect the environment and to work closely with a number of environmental organizations. An observation of Brown's life experiences reveals his enthusiasm for improving American society and his unwavering environmental consciousness and passion for the natural world—characteristics that influenced his professional and personal decisions.[2]

Representative Brown's eagerness for learning and leading has been a part of his existence for much of his life. Born in Mansfield, Ohio, in 1952, Brown learned about

[2] Interview with Sherrod Brown; Phone Message from Sherrod Brown, 20 August 2005.

the importance of political activism at a young age from his mother who was an early supporter of the civil rights movement in Georgia. He later became a member of the Boy Scouts of America, an organization committed to teaching children important values and life lessons, which strengthened his leadership skills and intellect. Brown maintained his membership in the Boy Scouts throughout his childhood until he received the highest rank of Eagle Scout after serving six months as a Life Scout and earning twenty-one badges for completing work in a variety of possible activities, such as citizenship in the community, citizenship in the nation, and environmental science. His involvement in Boy Scouts throughout his childhood forced him to be active in the community, familiar with social, economic, and governmental systems, and conscious of the natural world. This experience, coupled with his family influences, likely made him mindful of the world in which he lived, including how the United States had been changing politically by the end of the 1950s.[3]

A new political mood swept through the United States in the 1960s, changing the conservative nature of American politics that had defined the nation for much of the 1950s. Liberalism emerged from the shadows of conservatism during this time as Americans became increasingly aware of the troubled state of their nation; policymakers could no longer maintain the status quo by ignoring the horrific social problems, including poverty, racial discrimination, and environmental destruction, that plagued the well-being of the United States and its citizens. John Fitzgerald Kennedy, a young Senator from Massachusetts, embodied the progressive sentiment for which his nation

[3] Christopher Hayes, "Who is Sherrod Brown?: An Unabashed Progressive Takes Aim at Senate Seat" in *In These Times* (19 December 2005); "Sherrod's Biography," http://www.house.gov/sherrodbrown/bio.htm (accessed 6 October 2005); "What is Boy Scouting? Purpose of the BSA," http://www.scouting.org/factsheets/02-503.html (accessed 12 December 2005); "BoyScouts.com: Ranks," http://boyscouts.com/ranks/index.html (accessed 12 December 2005).

yearned, prompting him to seek presidential candidacy. Americans eager for a new direction and purpose in their country elected Kennedy to the White House in 1960, marking the beginning of a new era in American politics. In his first Inaugural Address, Kennedy explained to his constituents, "The torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans, born in this century, tempered by war, disciplined by hard and bitter peace"—it was time for change. Americans accepted their president's demand to "ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for your country" by fighting for civil rights, world peace, an end to poverty, and environmental protection throughout the remainder of the decade. Many children of this generation, including Sherrod Brown, carried on this progressive, liberal political philosophy as they became adults in the 1970s.[4]

Almost certainly, Representative Brown's activeness in American society during the 1960s together with his family and childhood influences opened his eyes to the ways in which his country had changed politically and caused him to adopt these progressive values as his own and demonstrate them publicly as he reached adulthood. In high school, Brown served as the president of the student council and frequently promoted his progressive values to his peers; his mother explained that he "caused people a lot of headaches because he was such an activist." Brown served as a bystander to the environmental movement during its early years, hearing and reading about the nation's increasing awareness of environmental destruction. News stories told of the "death" of Lake Erie and the Cuyahoga River fire, illustrating the urgent need for environmental protection. By 1970, Brown, following the example of Kennedy and other progressive-

[4] Randall Bennett Woods, *Quest for Identity: America Since 1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 155-207.

minded leaders who came before him, became directly involved in the environmental movement by organizing an environmental awareness march down Park Avenue in Mansfield to celebrate the launch of the nation's first Earth Day. This act demonstrated Brown's progressive sentiments and his desire to improve American society, indicating the career he would pursue after high school.[5]

Congressman Brown's educational endeavors following his graduation from high school satisfied his longing for knowledge and provided him with an opportunity to become a formal political activist. He attended Yale University in the early-1970s, where he received a Bachelor of Arts degree in Russian studies. While at Yale, Representative Brown volunteered to campaign for liberal political candidates, including former South Dakota Senator, George McGovern, and remained politically active during summer breaks from college when he returned to Ohio. His work as a political activist in Mansfield was so impressive that Don Kindt, his local Democratic County Chairman, personally phoned and encouraged Brown to run for a seat in the Ohio General Assembly during his senior year at Yale. Brown consented and began his campaign effort following his graduation from college. In 1974, at the age of twenty-two, he won the election to the Ohio House of Representatives, making him the youngest person ever to hold that position. Brown earned Master's degrees at The Ohio State University in both education and public administration while serving as a member of the Ohio General Assembly and later worked as an Instructor at The Ohio State University Mansfield branch, teaching courses in government and political science. After teaching college

[5] Hayes; Interview with Sherrod Brown; Phone Message from Sherrod Brown.

courses for a short time, Brown focused his passion for leading and improving society exclusively as a public official.[6]

Since he began his political career in the mid-1970s, the progressive environmental values and beliefs Brown developed as a youth have influenced his governmental decisions. As a member of the Ohio General Assembly, he helped write Ohio's first Solar Energy Bill and worked on projects associated with Brownfield sites, safe-drinking and safe-air issues, and infrastructure projects. He served four years in the Ohio House before becoming Secretary of State in 1982. Congressman Brown won and served a second term as Secretary of State and then used Representative Donald Pease's decision to retire from government in 1992 as an opportunity to become a federal legislator and represent the people of Ohio's Thirteenth District. He won the election that year and has continued as a member of the United States House of Representatives for seven consecutive terms. Representative Brown has maintained his allegiance to environmental protection since becoming a federal legislator, serving on the House and Senate Great Lakes Task Force. He has fought to protect the Great Lakes from environmental abuse and to prevent private companies from buying and selling Great Lakes water. He has also tried to prevent Pentagon pollution, safeguard America's National Forests, clean up hazardous waste, and preserve wilderness treasures. Additionally, Brown has worked hard to protect the nation's Clean Air Acts from being weakened and to defend wetlands and streams from mining pollution.[7]

---

[6] Hayes; "Member Profile Report," 109th Congress, Representative Sherrod Brown D-OH, http://0-web.lexis-nexis.com.maurice.bgsu.edu/congcomp/document?_m=cd531647a0cde3e8c8183274c7d8c84e&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkSA&_md5=42e732b3b3145891ab65947300786944 (accessed 6 October 2005); "Sherrod's Biography," http://www.house.gov/sherrodbrown/bio.htm (accessed 6 October 2005).

[7] "Member Profile Report;" "Sherrod's Biography."

Congressman Brown has won several awards from environmental organizations on behalf of his legislative efforts to protect the environment, which demonstrates the extent to which he has dedicated his political work to defending the natural world. The League of Conservation Voters rated his environmental legislation at ninety-five percent, and the Defenders of Wildlife gave him a one hundred percent score for his attempts to preserve the environment, indicating his pro-environment votes. As a result of his reputation as "a national leader in the fight to protect and conserve America's natural resources" and recognition for being "one of Congress's most vigilant fighters for the environment," Brown received the Friend of the National Parks award and the Friend of the Earth award. His political websites also demonstrate his commitment to protecting the environment by listing environmental protection as one of his top issues.[8]

In addition to affecting his professional decisions, Brown's environmental values have influenced the decisions he has made in his personal life, including his involvement with environmental organizations and other grassroots groups. He has donated personal money to groups, such as the Sierra Club, on many occasions and spoken to several environmental organizations. Representative Brown's passion for justice and fairness among people has been so great that he donated the proceeds of his book, *Myths of Free Trade*, to two grassroots organizations. The first, RESULTS, strives to create a "public and political will to end hunger and the worst aspects of poverty," and the second group, Cleveland Jobs with Justice, fights to improve workers' standard of living, job security, and right to organize. The success of these organizations' goals is directly related to the

[8] "Issues and Legislation: Environment," http://www.house.gov/sherrodbrown/issues.htm (accessed 10 October 2005); "Issues - Environment Record of Environmental Leadership," http://www.house.gov/sherrodbrown/issuesenvironmentrecord.htm (accessed 10 October 2005); "Sherrod Brown: He's on Our Side: Environmental Protection," http://www.sherrodbrown.com/environment (accessed 10 October 2005).

need to create a sustainable environment. Congressman Brown has taken great pride in his work to encourage liberal reform in both his professional and personal life, commenting in a recent newspaper article that he was "proud to carry the progressive banner."[9]

Representative Brown and the North American Free Trade Agreement: Connecting His Environmental Values, Beliefs, and Life Experiences to His Role in the NAFTA and Environment Debate

Congressman Brown's progressive sentiments and environmental awareness have played an extremely influential role in shaping the decisions he made as an adolescent and adult, including the position he assumed during the NAFTA debate. He entered into the United States House of Representatives in the midst of the controversial NAFTA debate and quickly became a leading opponent of the agreement. His participation in the NAFTA debate was evident in his frequent floor statements during Congressional Hearings, where he displayed his opposition to the agreement and outlined the many reasons why he disliked NAFTA. He firmly believed that the agreement would harm American jobs, worker rights, worker safety, food safety, truck safety, human rights, and drug trafficking. In addition to these concerns, he also feared the negative affects that NAFTA would have on the environment and American environmental laws. Representative Brown believed that the inclusion of Mexico into the agreement, the pace at which policymakers were negotiating the agreement, the cost of implementing the

[9] Interview with Sherrod Brown; Brown, *Myths of Free Trade;* "The Power to End Hunger: RESULTS," "http://www.results.org/website/article.asp?id=19" (accessed 12 October 2005); "About JwJ: What is Jobs with Justice?," http://www.jwj.org/AboutJWJ/AboutJWJ.htm (accessed 12 October 2005); Jim Tankersley, "Candidate Brown Challenges GOP Establishment," *The* (Toledo) *Blade*, 4 December 2005, Section B, page 1.

agreement, and the harmonization—lowering American environmental laws to the level of Mexico's—and job displacement associated with the agreement would directly harm the environment. As a result, Congressman Brown quickly became an avid opponent to NAFTA, protesting against the agreement continuously during the last eleven months of the debate. He has remained heavily involved in contesting other unfair trade agreements, like the 2005 CAFTA, as a United States Congressman. Brown's interest in NAFTA and trade issues in general has been so profound that he published a book, *Myths of Free Trade*, in 2004 to address his trade concerns.[10]

The inclusion of Mexico into CUFTA troubled Congressman Brown; he feared that the extreme economic and political differences between Mexico and the United States would serve as a direct threat to American interests, including environmental protection. Mexico had a long history of corrupt and undemocratic governmental institutions, and Brown believed that those political traditions were still present in Mexico, even after it had claimed to have reformed its socio-economic institutions. He argued that NAFTA itself reflected Mexico's history of undemocratic practices. Brown explained to his colleagues that President Salinas solicited his business friends to provide his political party with twenty-five million dollars each to support the NAFTA campaign in Mexico and the United States. In addition to this act of extortion, a one-party system had governed Mexico for decades by way of a fraudulent governmental structure that prevented the public from participating in free elections. Supporters of NAFTA argued

[10] Sherrod Brown's reasons for opposing NAFTA were numerous including, but not limited to, his concern for worker rights, worker safety, labor rights, human rights, food safety, truck safety, and drug trafficking. In addition, he argued that NAFTA would hurt the environment. The reader must understand that Congressman Brown did not oppose NAFTA just for environmental reasons, but that his concern for the natural world was among his leading apprehensions. What is important here is that his concern for the environment existed at all, since environmental protection was never an issue in trade policy prior to NAFTA.

that the agreement would encourage social reforms in Mexico, such as higher wages, enforceable environmental laws, and lower levels of pollution. Congressman Brown explained that there was "absolutely no evidence that that [would] happen." The undemocratic nature of the Mexican governmental system and its failure to enforce its environmental and labor laws would entice American corporations to relocate to Mexico to take advantage of its corrupt system. Instead of correcting the problems that caused increased pollution and low worker wages, NAFTA would only benefit the wealthy in Mexico while continuing to neglect the environment and workers. As a result, Congressman Brown urged his colleagues to vote against the agreement unless trade officials took seriously the need to incorporate strong, enforceable environmental and labor safeguards.[11]

The fast pace at which policymakers negotiated NAFTA also concerned Representative Brown, because it caused them to ignore key social issues that he believed needed to be addressed within the agreement. Brown compared the NAFTA negotiations to the process several European nations employed to implement a common European Community in the early-1990s. Those countries "took twenty, twenty-five, or thirty years to put [an] agreement together," and that was "when they had wage ratios of only two or three to one," he explained. The United States, with a wage ratio of ten to one with Mexico, was trying "to do something in two to three years that took the European

[11] Sherrod Brown, "The North American Free- Trade Agreement," *United States House of Representatives Congressional Hearing*, 23 June 1993, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, H4001-H4002; Brown, "NAFTA: Wages and Productivity," *United States House of Representatives Congressional Hearing*, 30 June 1993, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, H4392-H4395; Brown, "NAFTA," *United States House of Representatives Congressional Hearing*, 14 July 1993, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, H4670; Brown, "The Dangers of the North American Free- Trade Agreement," *United States House of Representatives Congressional Hearing*, 23 September 1993, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, H6966-H6967; Brown, "Update on NAFTA," *United States House of Representatives Congressional Hearing*, 30 September 1993, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, H7334.

Community twenty or twenty-five years." Brown contended that the social issues between the United States and Mexico clearly were more severe, since their socio-economic institutions differed so drastically, yet trade officials failed to incorporate enforceable safeguards into NAFTA that would remedy key social problems. President Bush and Clinton, as well as their trade representatives, promised to include environmental protections within NAFTA, but Brown explained that the "environmental side agreement that the Trade Representative's office" negotiated was "far, far short of what the American people" wanted. He demanded his colleagues to pressure President Clinton and other trade officials to slow down the negotiations to ensure that the agreement would adequately address social issues.[12]

In addition to these apprehensions, Brown voiced his concern about the actual and social costs that would result from implementing NAFTA during several Congressional debates. Members of Congress expected the United States to pay forty to fifty billion dollars to implement NAFTA, much of which the government would pull directly from American taxpayers' pockets or obtain from cutting other necessary and more beneficial government programs, such as unemployment compensation, flood relief plans, and environmental protection projects. Moreover, the agreement would also cost American citizens a clean environment, strong environmental laws, and their jobs as a result of it not including enforceable environmental and labor safeguards. At a time when the American budget deficit was tremendous, Brown explained that NAFTA was "a morally

[12] Brown, "American People Do Not Like NAFTA," *United States House of Representatives Congressional Hearing*, 13 July 1993, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, H4513; Brown, "The Impact of NAFTA on American Jobs," *United States House of Representatives Congressional Hearing*, 28 July, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, H5433-H5438; Brown, "The North American Free Trade Agreement," *United States House of Representatives Congressional Hearing*, 20 October 1993, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, H8316.

bankrupt program" that would harm ordinary citizens by forcing them to pay higher taxes to fund the agreement. The cost of NAFTA, he argued, created three clear winners and two major losers: the Mexican government, American lobbyists, and corporate America would benefit, while the agreement would harm American workers and taxpaying citizens. Congressman Brown urged his colleagues to "say no" to NAFTA because it would cost Americans their basic rights, including their right to a clean environment and strong, enforceable environmental safeguards.[13]

Other concerns Sherrod Brown held toward NAFTA were its risks of harmonizing-down environmental laws, wages, and labor safeguards and the incentive it created for massive job relocation. Representative Brown feared that NAFTA would harmonize American environmental laws and labor standards down to the level of Mexico's instead of forcing that country to strengthen its laws and increase its wages. The non-existent environmental law enforcement in Mexico would clearly benefit Mexican industry if strong environmental safeguards in the United States forced American corporations to take appropriate measures to protect the environment. In order to compete with Mexican manufacturers, American companies would relocate to Mexico to avoid strict environmental laws and high wages in the United States. Brown believed that this massive job relocation would not only increase unemployment, but it would also cause domestic firms to lower or ignore American environmental laws in the name of competing with a country that lacked these same laws. This would contradict the decades

[13] Brown, "Update on NAFTA;" Brown, "The North American Free- Trade Agreement," *United States House of Representatives Congressional Hearing*, 13 October 1993, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, H7809, H7812-H7813; Brown, "NAFTA: A Bad Deal for a Lot of Reasons," *United States House of Representatives Congressional Hearing*, 20 October 1993, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, H8206; Brown, "The North American Free Trade Agreement," 20 October 1993; Brown, "NAFTA: A Bad Deal for the United States," *United States House of Representatives Congressional Hearing*, 3 November 1993, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, H8780-H8782.

of fighting that Americans endured to achieve environmental protection in the United States, which had been secured by a consensus of the American public by the early-1990s. NAFTA would surely harm the environment and workers if the United States did not take the steps to produce a fair trade agreement that ensured strong environmental laws and worker rights in both countries.[14]

Representative Brown further portrayed his concern for environmental protection within trade policy in his book *Myths of Free Trade*. He echoed many of the claims he made against NAFTA in the early-1990s but did so in the context of myths associated with modern trade policy in general. One was the idea that free trade served as an extension of American values abroad. He countered this claim by explaining that American trade officials did not reflect their nation's domestic values, such as environmental protection, in the trade agreements they made with foreign countries. Instead, many United States trade agreements threatened the nation's core values by creating an incentive for American companies to relocate to developing countries in order to exploit the weak environmental regulations and worker rights there. Representative Brown made similar arguments against the myths that free trade benefited people in rich and poor countries alike and brought democracy, human rights, and freedom to authoritarian nations. Clearly Brown opposed unfair trade agreements and held a high regard for protecting the environment from increased trade.[15]

Representative Brown's opposition to unfair trade agreements endured throughout the remainder of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first. In addition to writing a

---

[14] Brown, "Update on NAFTA;" Brown, "Further Debate on NAFTA," *United States House of Representatives Congressional Hearing*, 6 October 1993, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, H7539; Brown, "Summing Up on NAFTA Opposition," *United States House of Representatives Congressional Hearing*, 9 November 1993, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, H9075-H9076.

[15] Brown, *Myths of Free Trade*, 49-135.

book about the "myths of free trade," Brown spent countless hours demanding his colleagues and trade officials to address the problems associated with unfair trade agreements. He devoted much of his time and energy to opposing the CAFTA vote in the summer of 2005, much like he had with NAFTA. Brown wrote several editorials and articles about the negative aspects of CAFTA, including the ways in which it would risk environmental protection and undermine labor rights. Congressman Brown and his staff members supplied the constituents of Ohio's Thirteenth District with literature that documented the issues of CAFTA. Perhaps the most noteworthy hand-out he offered to visitors of his Lorain, Ohio, office was a bumper-sticker that read, "NAFTA + CAFTA = SHAFTA." Those three words, printed onto hundreds of bumper-stickers, summarized Brown's ultimate perception of unfair trade agreements in a cogent—and unique—way.

Conclusion

Congressman Brown's life experiences caused him to form an affinity for progressive causes and an environmental awareness that influenced the decisions he has made in his professional and personal life. His mother exposed him to progressivism when he was a young child, helping him build values that would solidify throughout his adolescence. These initial progressive sentiments strengthened as a result of his involvement in the Boy Scouts of America throughout the later years of his childhood. In high school, during a time when the United States experienced a political transformation and the American public instituted several social movements, Brown employed the leadership tools and liberal values and beliefs he acquired during his youth as student council president, urging his peers to adopt similar progressive beliefs and encourage

social reform. At the same time, scientists announced the "death" of Lake Erie and decades of uncontrolled pollution caused the Cuyahoga River to erupt into flames, prompting the rise of the American environmental movement and the establishment of the nation's first Earth Day. Brown read and heard news stories about the increase in environmental awareness in the United States, which strengthened his own environmental consciousness and triggered him to lead an Earth Day march down Park Avenue in Mansfield, Ohio, during his senior year in high school. The strong environmental values that Brown acquired as a youth later informed his professional decisions as he became a state and federal politician. Since his adherence to environmentalism influenced nearly every decision he has made throughout his political career, it is irrefutable that these same values and beliefs also influenced the role he played in the NAFTA debate.

This chapter has employed a wealth of primary documents to illustrate Congressmen Brown's environmental awareness and demonstrate how his personal values and beliefs prompted him to incorporate environmental protection into the NAFTA agenda, an important aspect of the agenda-setting process that previous scholarship has ignored when examining the causes of the NAFTA and environment debate. Academics have only observed how external problems and political factors influenced the policymaking process, making their analyses of the NAFTA and environment debate incomplete. The inclusion of Mexico into the agreement and the rise in organized interests did influence Congressman Brown's perception of NAFTA, but, like Donald Pease, his environmental values and beliefs also played a significant role in prompting him to demand trade officials to include environmental protections within NAFTA. Strong progressive values and environmental beliefs influenced the roles that

other policymakers played in the NAFTA and environment debate as well, including Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur.

CHAPTER FOUR: "AMERICA WILL PAY A VERY HEAVY PRICE FOR HER NEGLECT:" REPRESENTATIVE MARCY KAPTUR, NAFTA, AND THE ENVIRONMENT

Figure 3: Congressional Photo of Marcy Kaptur [1]

In the middle of Congressman Pease's service in the United States House of Representatives and a decade before Sherrod Brown became a federal legislator, Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur began her political career in Washington. Kaptur had been an advocate for progressive causes as a youth and as a professional urban planner; not surprisingly, she adhered to these values and beliefs upon winning the election to represent Ohio's Ninth Congressional District. Kaptur quickly became a leading player in Congress known for her devotion to protecting the interests of her constituents and the American public. In the early-1990s, she recognized the negative impact that NAFTA posed to citizens across the country, prompting her to become an avid opponent of the agreement. One of her greatest concerns with NAFTA was that it would threaten the vitality of the natural world by increasing pollution and weakening American

[1] Photo of Marcy Kaptur, http://www.kaptur.house.gov/Library/biography.aspx (accessed 22 February 2006).

environmental laws. Throughout the three year debate over the agreement, Kaptur demanded that trade officials include environmental safeguards within NAFTA.

This chapter explores Representative Kaptur's life experiences to illustrate that she possessed strong environmental values and beliefs that influenced the personal and professional decisions she has made throughout her life. It then links her environmental values and beliefs to the role she played in the NAFTA and environment debate and argues that her personal perception of the natural world prompted her to demand trade officials to incorporate environmental protections into the NAFTA agenda. External factors were not the only causes that motivated Congresswoman Kaptur's environmental concerns. This chapter contends that Kaptur's values, beliefs, and life experiences were among the primary factors that influenced the role she played in the NAFTA and environment debate.

Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur: The Development and Influence of Her Environmental Values

Representative Kaptur has considered herself a "conservationist and a steward" for "as far back" as she could remember. Her progressive family influences and schooling caused her to develop an environmental awareness at an early age. As a college student, several national events and personal experiences re-enforced her pre-existing environmental sentiments: the Cuyahoga River fire, the development of the environmental movement, and the nation's first Earth Day. By the time she began her professional career as an urban planner, Congresswoman Kaptur had established a firm belief that the government needed to protect the environment from increased pollution.

Her election to the United States House of Representatives a few years later provided her with a formal opportunity to implement her values and beliefs by enacting legislation that protected the environment. These life experiences caused Representative Kaptur to develop values and beliefs that have had a lasting impact on her personal and professional decisions.[2]

Kaptur's allegiance to environmental protection and other progressive causes has been a fundamental part of her life since she was a young child. Born in 1946 in Toledo, Ohio, her family frequently taught her important lessons about man's relationship with nature. Congresswoman Kaptur's grandmother immigrated to America from modern-day Ukraine, where the people worked intuitively with the land and depended upon it for their existence. As she began a new life as an American citizen, her grandmother preserved her Eastern European values and traditions by bequeathing them to the family she created in the United States. Representative Kaptur recalled a particular childhood incident that introduced her to the importance of environmental protection and altered her perception of the land forever. While they walked beside the Maumee River in Toledo, her grandmother explained, "America will pay a very heavy price for her neglect." It was at that moment that Representative Kaptur first developed an environmental consciousness. Other family influences, including her parents' working-class roots, prompted Kaptur to become progressively-minded as a young child. At the age of thirteen, she volunteered to work for her local Democratic Party, marking the beginning of many years that she has devoted to public service.[3]

---

[2] Interview with Marcy Kaptur, 3.

[3] *Ibid.*; Hugh P. Vowels, *Ukraine and Its People* (London; T. and A. Constable Ltd., 1939), 23-30; "Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur: Biography," http://www.kaptur.house.gov/Library/biography.aspx (accessed 6 November 2005); "Member Profile Report Archive: 107th Congress: Representative Marcy

Congresswoman Kaptur's liberal mentality and environmental values solidified as she became formally educated. The Franciscan Sisters at Little Flower Elementary School taught her the importance of the environment, adding to the lessons she had learned from her family. Representative Kaptur explained that you could not "come out of that education without loving the environment." She enrolled in several science courses during high school at St. Ursula Academy that furthered her appreciation for the natural world. By the time she entered college, Kaptur had developed a solid admiration for the environment which strengthened as she reached adulthood.[4]

Congresswoman Kaptur's progressive values influenced the decisions she made after graduating from high school, and several events that took place during that time reinforced her pre-existing environmental beliefs. She earned a scholarship to the University of Wisconsin at Madison as an undergraduate student of history and then enrolled at the University of Michigan to pursue graduate studies in urban planning, a career that would allow her to improve cities and their surrounding environments. As she received her college education, the United States underwent a major transformation that not only changed how policymakers and citizens perceived the natural world but also strengthened the environmental values that Congresswoman Kaptur had always held in such high regard. The burning of the Cuyahoga River and the death of Lake Erie symbolized to her the severity of environmental neglect and abuse in America. Such problems reminded her of the importance of conservationism and gave her and the

---

Kaptur D-OH," http://0-web.lexis-nexis.com.maurice.bgsu.edu/congcomp/document?_m=27f3f3842fbb60830d7b1d0011bc3af8&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkSA&_md5=d308004c5fae92cf398333dab8e10447 (accessed 6 November 2005).

[4] "Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur: Biography," http://www.kaptur.house.gov/Library/biography.aspx (accessed 6 November 2005); "Member Profile Report Archive: 107th Congress: Representative Marcy Kaptur D-OH," http://0-web.lexis-nexis.com.maurice.bgsu.edu/congcomp/document?_m=27f3f3842fbb60830d7b1d0011bc3af8&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkSA&_md5=d308004c5fae92cf398333dab8e10447 (accessed 6 November 2005).

American public something around which to rally for environmental protection. Earth Day served a similar purpose for Kaptur; it buttressed her pre-existing environmental values and provided her with a sense of organization to fight for environmental causes. Another important event strengthened her environmental values. While on her first trip to Washington, D.C., Kaptur had the opportunity to meet former Wisconsin Senator, Gaylord Nelson, who was the renowned father of Earth Day and author of the nation's original Clean Air Act. Representative Kaptur explained that this encounter, "Helped to add to what I was already carrying, kind of a heritage of conservation and of stewardship that had come from my early years and all my teachers and my family." As she prepared to graduate from college and enter into the workforce, Kaptur's environmental values were firmly in place and would later influence the decisions she has made throughout her professional career.[5]

Marcy Kaptur implemented her passion for public service and progressive causes for several years as an urban planner after completing graduate school in 1974. She held several positions as an urban planner, including her appointment as assistant director for urban affairs under the Jimmy Carter Administration in the late-1970s. Moreover, she served on the board of directors for the American Planning Association, American Institute of Certified Planners, and the Gund Association. Representative Kaptur held additional memberships in a variety of groups that further signified her dedication to public service.[6]

---

[5] "Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur: Biography"; "Member Profile Report Archive"; Interview with Marcy Kaptur, 3, 6. For more information on Senator Nelson see Bill Christofferson, *The Man from Clear Lake: Earth Day Founder Senator Gaylord Nelson* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2004).

[6] "Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur: Biography." Kaptur was a member of several different groups before she became a federal legislator. These included the National Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs, the University of Michigan Urban Planning Alumni Association, the Polish American Historical Association,

Congresswoman Kaptur's political career as a federal legislator resulted from a rather unexpected event. After several years of working as an urban planner, the Lucas Country Democratic Party recruited her to seek election to the United States House of Representatives—a position she had not personally sought. Kaptur accepted the nomination and began a modest campaign effort based on limited funds. Despite being outspent by her opponent three to one, she won the election, making her race the national upset of 1982. Her victory was a true representation of her moral character. She did not depend on a flashy and expensive campaign to sway her voters; her life-long commitment to the Democratic Party and service to blue-collar neighborhoods and rural areas within Ohio's Ninth District ultimately brought her to office on Election Day.[7]

As she began her political career, Kaptur quickly developed a strong reputation among her colleagues as a devout fighter for humanitarian causes and for her commitment to protecting the environment. On a national level, she has played a key role in establishing new environmental legislation and updating pre-existing bills, including working to reauthorize the Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act and drafting a bill that would make clean soil a national priority. Additionally, Congresswoman Kaptur sponsored the Federal Water Pollution Control Amendment to include a Great Lakes pollution prevention demonstration program within the original act. Her other contributions to environmental protection have included fighting to expand National Parks and Forests, increase funding for the National Forest Service, create laws against clear cutting, and prevent insect infestation that has threatened the nation's hardwoods. Kaptur has also sponsored numerous bills that would provide farmer's markets with

---

the Lucas County Democratic Party Executive Committee, and the Democratic Women's Campaign Association, "Member Profile Report Archive."

[7] "Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur: Biography."

governmental assistance and protect family farmers. Alternative energy recently became one of Congresswoman Kaptur's top priorities. In an effort to lessen the United States's dependence on oil and to protect the environment, she has led the initiative to popularize alternative energy sources, including solar, wind, and hydrogen power. Furthermore, Representative Kaptur helped introduce the use of biofuel, biomass, corn, and soybeans as other forms of renewable energy that could replace oil as the nation's leading form of power. She sponsored several biofuel acts, including the Biofuels Energy Independence Act of 2005, to authorize the Secretary of Agriculture "to make and guarantee loans for the production, distribution, development, and storage of biofuels." Congresswoman Kaptur has clearly fought to protect the environment at the national level, but she has also remained committed to defending her constituents from increased pollution at the local level.[8]

Improving and protecting the environment in northwest Ohio has been one of Representative Kaptur's main priorities as a federal legislator. Decades of industrial production in Toledo brought devastating environmental affects to the city, Lake Erie, and many surrounding areas, creating an urgent need for environmental repair in recent years. Responding to this problem, Congresswoman Kaptur has dedicated much of her time to restoring the natural environment in her district. Her efforts have included doubling the protected federal lands on Lake Erie, restoring bird populations, cleaning up rivers, especially the Ottawa River, which is the most polluted River in Ohio, refurbishing toxic waste sites left over from places like Camp Perry, and protecting the

[8] Interview with Marcy Kaptur, 5-6; "Members and Committees: Marcy Kaptur: Bills Sponsored," http://0-web.lexis-nexis.com.maurice.bgsu.edu/congcomp/doclist?_m=07f335f2eb4472bef834eb81b789e0af&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkSA&_md5=233f5c7a7372c5d32e72e44d7893a73c (accessed 3 January 2006).

Great Lakes from water diversion. She sponsored the Ottawa National Wildlife Refuge Complex Expansion and the Detroit River International Wildlife Expansion Acts, both of which expanded their boundaries to include "everything from lower Michigan, all Detroit, all along the Toledo coast, all the way East to Sandusky" and prevented water diversion and oil drilling in those areas. In addition, Kaptur sponsored the Lake Erie Western Basin International Wildlife Refuge Establishment Act, which created a Lake Erie wildlife refuge in the States of Ohio and Michigan, and legislation to create the Maumee River Heritage Corridor between the Port of Toledo and Fort Wayne, Indiana.[9]

Marcy Kaptur's involvement with environmental organizations and her interest in environmental education further demonstrate her dedication to and passion for the environment. She has supported environmental groups at the national and local levels, including the Wildlife Federation, the Toledo Metro Parks, the Toledo Botanical Garden, and the Toledo Zoo. Representative Kaptur also has fought to create programs that would educate the children of America about the environment. She brought federal support to the life lab at Lourdes College, a program that trains teachers to educate children about the environment, and to Toledo Grows, another program dedicated to environmental education. Additionally, Congresswoman Kaptur helped bring nature education centers to Quarry Pond and the Ottawa Wildlife Refuge in her home district.[10]

Other events have also indicated her environmental values. Congresswoman Kaptur listed environmental protection as one of her core issues during her 2004 campaign effort, illustrating her devotion to environmental causes. In addition, the Ohio Environmental Council recently presented her with its Legislator of the Year Award for

---

[9] *Ibid.*; Interview with Marcy Kaptur, 4-5.
[10] Ibid., 4.

her work to protect the environment along Ohio's "North Coast." The League of Conservation Voters (LCV), a national organization dedicated to creating a pro-environment federal government, rated Representative Kaptur's environmental voting record at ninety-five percent. Kaptur has continued to serve the American people at the national level for twelve consecutive terms. Her commitment to progressive causes and environmental protection has remained solid, ensuring sustained support from the people of Ohio's Ninth District.[11]

Representative Kaptur and the North American Free Trade Agreement: Connecting Her Environmental Values, Beliefs, and Life Experiences to Her Role in the NAFTA and Environment Debate

Congresswoman Kaptur's environmental values and beliefs, which influenced the personal and professional decisions she has made as both an adolescent and an adult, also affected the role she played in the NAFTA debate. She dedicated three years of her political career to playing a leading role in the NAFTA resistance movement, an experience unlike any other she had experienced. Kaptur opposed NAFTA for a variety of reasons: it threatened American jobs, eroded worker rights, and risked food safety. She also feared the seemingly negative impact NAFTA would have on the environment and American environmental laws. As such, she consistently fought to demand that trade officials include environmental protections and enforcement mechanisms within the agreement. Her trip to Mexico, frequent testimonies before Congress, and many co-

[11] "Let's Keep Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur Working for Us: Marcy Kaptur On the Issues," http://votemarcy.com/Kaptur_on_the_issues.html (accessed 16 November 2005); "On the Issues: Every Political Leader on Every Issue: Marcy Kaptur on the Environment," http://www.issues2000.org/OH/Marcy_Kaptur.htm#Environment (accessed 16 November 2005).

signed letters to influential policymakers demonstrated the devotion and passion she contributed to the NAFTA and environment debate. Representative Kaptur had been aware of the environmental problems along America's borders long before the NAFTA negotiations began; she lived in areas that bordered the Great Lakes her entire life and had visited the United States-Mexico border regions as a federal urban affairs director in the late-1970s. These experiences allowed her to grasp the urgency of protecting the environment from increased trade that would inevitably result from a trade agreement among Canada, Mexico, and the United States.[12]

Representative Kaptur's participation in the NAFTA debate included her traveling to Mexico on a fact-finding mission called "The Human Face of Trade" in the spring of 1993. The environmental conditions she encountered on this trip were reminiscent to the ones she had seen in her previous visit to Mexico when she was an urban planner for President Carter. She witnessed American companies, as well as other international firms, operating their industrial production with no central sewage systems and thus bringing devastating consequences to the environment. Representative Kaptur also observed Mexican farmers washing their cows in "filthy" streams, dogs rummaging through dumps of waste, and even a chicken die as it drank water from a stream. Many of these environmental problems spread into the United States, threatening the livelihood of the American people. The horrific environmental conditions in Tijuana, for example, extended into Southern California and forced the United States to build a billion dollar sewer system as a means to control the waste. Congresswoman Kaptur feared that these

[12] Interview with Marcy Kaptur, 2. Kaptur's primary concern with NAFTA was its potential to pull jobs from her district and the United States in general, and its failure to address worker rights. However, environmental protections was also one of her leading concerns with the agreement, which is of particular importance to this thesis.

problems would "exacerbate" as a result of a United States-Mexico free trade agreement unless trade officials addressed environmental protections within the NAFTA negotiations.[13]

Aside from visiting Mexico, Congresswoman Kaptur's role in the NAFTA and environment debate included speaking before her colleagues during Congressional hearings. One issue she addressed was the incorporation of environmental protections into NAFTA. Kaptur explained that failed attempts at enforcing environmental laws in Mexico prior to the NAFTA negotiations illustrated the urgent need to include strong provisions within the main body of the agreement; "more than 1,000 American-owned plants" in Mexico generated "hazardous waste" but only thirty percent of those companies "complied with Mexican rules requiring them to file information on how they handle those wastes." In addition to these figures, only nineteen percent of "plants using toxic materials" could prove that "they had disposed of wastes properly." The Bush Administration planned to address these environmental law enforcement problems by integrating environmental protections into the trade negotiations by way of a parallel agreement. Representative Kaptur dismissed that idea, contending that a parallel agreement would not serve as an enforcement mechanism to guarantee environmental protection and that it illustrated the Bush Administration's lack of concern for actually protecting the natural world from increased trade. Kaptur argued that trade officials needed to incorporate explicit environmental regulations into the body of the main agreement if they were serious about ensuring environmental protection. This would hold all NAFTA members accountable for preventing environmental destruction and

[13] Interview with Marcy Kaptur, 1-2; Marcy Kaptur, "The Impact of NAFTA on American Jobs," *United States Congressional Hearing*, 28 July 1993, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, H5431.

would also make environmental protection a core component of the agreement, thus illustrating its importance.[14]

The inclusion of Mexico in CUFTA was another common concern Representative Kaptur shared with her colleagues during Congressional hearings. She feared that the "substantial differences between the United States and Mexico" would prevent NAFTA from being successful and would ultimately jeopardize many American interests, including environmental protection. Mexico had a long history of undemocratic practices and a reputation for not enforcing its environmental laws, unlike the United States that embraced democracy and realized the importance of protecting the environment. Moreover, the Mexican economy was much less developed than the American financial system. Representative Kaptur argued that these political and economic differences would only encourage Mexico to continue to neglect its environmental laws as a means to compete with America's economic might. This would then serve as an incentive for American companies to relocate to Mexico in order to take advantage of its non-existent environmental law enforcement and possibly weaken environmental laws in the United States. Kaptur emphasized these discrepancies and their consequences to illustrate to trade officials the urgency in including strong environmental provisions within the main body of NAFTA as opposed to within a parallel agreement.[15]

---

[14] Marcy Kaptur, "Congress Should Not Rush Into United States-Mexico Free Trade Negotiations," *United States Congressional Hearing*, 11 April 1991, 102nd Congress, 1st Session, H2163; Kaptur, "Concerns Regarding North American Free Trade Agreement," *United States House of Representatives Congressional Hearing*, 25 September 1991, 102nd Congress, 1st Session, H6874; Kaptur, "The North American Free Trade Agreement," *United States Congressional Hearing*, 23 June 1993, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, H4001.

[15] Kaptur, "Free Trade Agreement Must Be With Free Societies," *United States Congressional Hearing*, 23 April 1991, 102nd Congress, 1st Session, H2402; Kaptur, "Concerns Regarding North American Trade Agreement;" Marcy Kaptur, "NAFTA," *United States Congressional Hearing*, 14 July 1993, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, H4670; Kaptur, "The Impact of NAFTA on American Jobs."

While she acknowledged the horrific environmental conditions in Mexico and along its border with the United States, Representative Kaptur reminded her colleagues that NAFTA also needed to protect America's border with Canada from increased trade. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had designated funding for pollution clean up and prevention along the United States-Mexico border in preparation for NAFTA, but it had not done the same for the northern border regions. Moreover, policymakers had proposed the creation of a Border Environmental Fund (BEF) that would provide monies for environmental clean up and pollution prevention programs geared strictly toward "southern border needs." Congresswoman Kaptur believed that it was "incorrect" to assume that NAFTA would not affect the United States-Canada border environmentally or that there were no pre-existing environmental problems that officials needed to address before increasing economic activity. Indeed, she argued that there was a pressing need to clean up toxic hot spots, to update outdated manufacturing facilities, and to adopt pollution prevention technologies within the industrial base along the American-Canadian border. Kaptur also described the imperative need to protect the Great Lakes, the world's largest source of fresh water, from harmful trade. Under the terms of a free trade agreement, water would become a commodity that all members of the agreement could freely trade. As such, Representative Kaptur urged trade officials to include an environmental provision within NAFTA that would protect the Great Lakes from water diversion.[16]

Kaptur also participated in the NAFTA and environment debate by co-signing letters to government officials. She demonstrated her opposition to NAFTA and concern

[16] Kaptur, "Testimony of Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur: Clean Water Act Reauthorization: Senate Subcommittee on Clean Water Fisheries and Wildlife," *United States Congressional Record*, 4 August 1993, 103rd Congress, 1st Session; Interview with Marcy Kaptur, 2; 8.

for environmental protection in a letter to President Bush, for example, demanding that he include environmental provisions within the agreement. Kaptur later voiced her concerns to Governor Clinton as he began his presidential campaign and as the NAFTA negotiations progressed. She and several other members of Congress co-signed a letter that urged Clinton to renegotiate a NAFTA that included environmental protections within the main body of the agreement, rather than supporting the Bush Administration's effort to include environmental protection within a parallel agreement. Kaptur continued to demonstrate her opposition to NAFTA even during the years after the agreement had passed into law. In 2001, she sent President George W. Bush and Mexican President Vicente Fox a letter urging them to support the establishment of an "Intercontinental Organization on Working Life and Cooperation in the Americas" in response to the hardships that Ohio, Michigan, and Indiana had endured since the enactment of NAFTA. She alerted these leaders to the environmental problems that persisted along the United States-Mexico border seven years after the passage of the agreement, including "sewage affluent flowing into drinking water, moot environmental laws, and crumbling infrastructure that [could not] bear the load being placed on it." Representative Kaptur has remained committed to defending fair free trade policies for well over a decade since the historic NAFTA debate subsided. In 2005, she played a leading role in the opposition movement against the CAFTA.[17]

[17] Pease, "Letter from Don J. Pease and Charles B. Rangel to President George H.W. Bush;" Pease, "Letter from Don J. Pease (co-signer) to Governor Bill Clinton;" Kaptur, "Letter to President George W. Bush and Mexican President Vicente Fox: President Bush and President Vicente Fox Visit to Toledo," 5 September 2001, http://www.kaptur.house.gov/Speech.aspx?NewsID=1098 (accessed 3 January 2006). Congresswoman Kaptur co-signed the letters written by Congressman Pease cited above.

Conclusion

Congresswoman Kaptur's experiences as a child and adult caused her to develop an environmental consciousness and progressive values and beliefs that shaped the decisions she made throughout her life. The lessons she learned about the environment from her family and her teachers as a youth helped her build strong environmental values that guided her decision-making as she reached adulthood. As a result of her progressive beliefs, Kaptur pursued a career that would enable her to improve American society. Several events reinforced her environmental consciousness while she attended college, including the Cuyahoga River fire, the development of the American environmental movement, and the nation's first Earth Day. They reminded Kaptur of the importance of preserving the natural world and provided her with a sense of organization around which to rally for environmental protection. After she graduated from college, Representative Kaptur worked for several years as an urban planner and eventually found herself serving as a member of the United States House of Representatives when the Lucas Country Democratic Party recruited her to represent Ohio's Ninth District. She maintained the environmental values and beliefs she developed as a youth while serving as an urban planner and federal legislator, consistently fighting to improve the natural world and create legislation to protect the environment. There can be no doubt that Congresswoman Kaptur opposed NAFTA in large part because of her own personal environmental values and beliefs, since her environmental consciousness influenced nearly every other decision she made throughout her professional and personal life.

An observation of Representative Kaptur's life experiences and her role in the NAFTA debate clearly demonstrate that she possessed strong environmental values and

beliefs that influenced her perception of NAFTA and the environment. Nevertheless, scholars have ignored how individual policymakers' personal values and beliefs shape their decision-making when examining the origins of the NAFTA and environment debate. They argue that external factors were the sole causes that prompted policymakers to demand that trade officials include environmental protections within the NAFTA agenda. Congresswoman Kaptur's speeches during Congressional Hearings and letters to influential policymakers affirm these scholars' claims; the inclusion of Mexico into the CUFTA and the proliferation of organized interests helped prompt her to fight for the incorporation of environmental protections into the trade agenda. An observation of Kaptur's personal life, however, reveals that her internal values and beliefs also influenced the role she played in the NAFTA and environment debate.

CONCLUSION: THE IMPORTANCE OF HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION: A SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT ON HOW VALUES, BELIEFS, AND LIFE EXPERIENCES INFLUENCE DECISION-MAKING

Burning rivers, dying lakes, DDT, population bombs, silent springs: these images from the American environmental movement are more than common blurbs found in modern United States history textbooks; they were events, ideals, and cultural customs that drove a large segment of the American population to action in the 1960s and 1970s. Many who experienced the environmental movement, like Representatives Pease, Brown, and Kaptur, would later become policymakers and carry the powerful environmental values and beliefs they developed as a result of living through their nation's first Earth Day, the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency, and Lake Erie's rebirth with them into the legislative chambers at both the state and federal levels. These policymakers' pasts influenced their votes, colored the rhetoric of their speeches, and shaped the legislation they created as policymakers. Ultimately, historical interpretation of these personal motivations can help explain the reasons why policymakers define certain events as problems and bring new issues to the government agenda.

This thesis has made two important arguments: that no American trade agenda or agreement prior to NAFTA included environmental protections and that the values, beliefs, and life experiences of Representatives Pease, Brown, and Kaptur played a leading role in prompting them to bring environmental protection to the trade agenda in the early-1990s. Other scholars have already acknowledged that NAFTA was significant for being the first United States trade accord to include environmental protections as an integral part of the agreement; this thesis is certainly not unique for pointing this out.

However, no scholars have examined how policymakers' values, beliefs, and life experiences helped bring this non-traditional trade concern to the government agenda during the NAFTA debate. By employing the "agenda-setting" theory as a model to interpret why decision-makers craft certain policies, this study has made an important contribution to the NAFTA and environment historiography and demonstrated the significant role that internal factors play in the government agenda-setting process.

Chapter one explored the history of American trade policy to describe the emergence of a new trade era in the early-1990s and to illustrate the significance of NAFTA. Research revealed that American trade officials were largely concerned about the use of open-market versus protectionist trade policies and how trade could serve as a foreign policy tool for the first 200 years of United States history. In the early-1990s, thousands of organized interests, American citizens, and policymakers began to speak out about their trade concerns, which included their fear that increased trade would threaten the environment. This concern was unprecedented, changing the ways in which trade officials would create trade policy forever and marking the beginning of the modern era in trade policy history.

The author realized the significance of NAFTA and the emergence of the third period in American trade policy history but remained puzzled as to why the environment became a leading concern on the trade agenda in the early-1990s when it had never before been a trade-related issue. In an attempt to answer this question, she read several works on the NAFTA and environment debate only to discover that academics had disregarded an extremely significant group of people involved in the actual process of making policy: the legislators on Capitol Hill. An analysis of one of the most notable

works on the agenda-setting process, John W. Kingdon's *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, confirmed the assumption that policymakers play a leading role in the agenda-setting process. Kingdon explains that several different participants in the policymaking procedure play roles that help shape the government agenda. They include the President and his cabinet, members of Congress, civil servants, lobbyists, organized interest groups, and academics. Among these participants, Kingdon contends that legislators have an exceptional ability to influence agenda-setting because they possess legal authority that allows them "to revise current stature or to fund or cut appropriations," are extremely visible to the public, and serve as a source of "blended information" that triggers new ideas. If they play the most significant role in the agenda-setting process after the executive branch, why would academics ignore policymakers when analyzing why the environment became a prominent component of the NAFTA agenda?[1]

In addition to explaining the participants who influence the agenda-setting process, Kingdon argues that problems, politics, and policy are the three factors that cause policymakers to place a specific issue on the government agenda. Policymakers react to external problems, such as an economic recession, a natural disaster, or the outbreak of a war, by introducing new policy to address these dilemmas. In other instances, external political events, including a change in public opinion or political mood, cause policymakers to incorporate a new item within the government agenda. Lastly, internal policy factors, such as an individual's values, beliefs, and life experiences, prompt policymakers to bring a concern to the government agenda.[2]

---

[1] Kingdon, 34-38.
[2] *Ibid*., xi, 2, 16-20, 87.

This thesis connected Kingdon's "agenda-setting" theory to the NAFTA and environment historiography and found that academics had made assumptions about the origins of the NAFTA and environment debate that mirrored the first two factors in Kingdon's model. They explained that external problems and political factors, including the end of the Cold War, the proliferation of organized interests, the party reversal on trade issues, the addition of Mexico into CUFTA, and the rise of the fourth wave of the environmental movement, prompted policymakers to demand trade officials to include environmental protection within the NAFTA agenda. However, no scholar examined how internal factors influenced policymakers' perceptions of NAFTA and caused them to demand the inclusion of environmental protection within its agenda. As a result, the NAFTA and environment historiography remained largely incomplete.[3]

In order to address this deficiency, chapters two, three, and four examined respectively the life experiences of Pease, Brown, and Kaptur to document that each individual possessed strong environmental values and beliefs that influenced his or her personal and professional decisions, including their perceptions of NAFTA. These chapters underscored their environmental values and how they had shaped their life decisions. Interviews, traditional secondary sources, Congressional hearings, letters, campaign literature, and articles revealed that their environmental awareness, and their progressive mind-sets in general, influenced the activities in which they participated, the educations they received, the professions they sought, and the policies they advocated as members of the United States House of Representatives. Since their environmental values and beliefs shaped nearly every decision they made as adolescents and adults, it is

[3] *Ibid*.

unquestionable that the affinities of Pease, Brown, and Kaptur to the natural world also influenced their perceptions of NAFTA and the environment.

This thesis has agreed with other scholars' assessments of how the environment became a prominent concern on the trade agenda in the early-1990s, but it has not accepted these analyses as the only reasons that policymakers brought environmental protections to the NAFTA debate. Clearly, policymakers' values, beliefs, and life experiences also prompted them to include environmental protection within the trade agenda. Although they played a leading role in influencing the perceptions of Pease, Brown, and Kaptur to NAFTA and the environment, these internal factors, much like the external ones, did not prompt policymakers to include environmental protection within the trade agenda on their own. It was a culmination of the external and internal factors that ultimately led to the introduction of environmental protection onto the trade agenda in the early-1990s.

Policymakers like Pease, Brown, and Kaptur would not have fought to protect the environment from increased trade unless external factors directly threatened or stimulated their environmental values and beliefs. In this case, the inclusion of Mexico into CUFTA served as a direct threat to their values and beliefs, causing them to defend them. The rise in environmental organized interests represented an opportunity for policymakers to bolster their values and beliefs and garner enough support to do so. Therefore, it is not enough to argue that external factors caused decision-makers to enact certain policies without examining how their own internal factors also influenced the policies they created. Likewise, academics must understand how external factors trigger an individual's internal make up and ultimately shape the government agenda. This

recognition of policymakers' role in the agenda-setting process, how their internal factors help shape the government agenda and how external factors influence those internal factors and the overall agenda-setting procedure, has shed new light on the NAFTA and environment historiography and helped to address unanswered questions that previous scholarship ignored. This examination should serve as a model for academics to follow when seeking to understand other case studies of the agenda-setting process.

Epilogue

Much has happened in American and world commerce since NAFTA narrowly passed through the United States House of Representatives on November 17, 1993. On January 1, 1995, the WTO replaced the GATT as the international body responsible for overseeing and enforcing trade rules, and the United States as well as dozens of other countries immediately became a member of the organization. The principles of free trade have continued to dominate American trade policy as the United States has become increasingly connected to and dependant upon other nations.

The anti-free trade movement that began with NAFTA has responded to this escalation in free trade and development of international trade organizations and agreements by speaking out against economic pacts that threaten their interests. In November of 1999, thousands of individuals from hundreds of countries joined forces in Seattle to protest against the WTO meetings, causing trade officials to postpone their scheduled events. The United States has negotiated several free trade agreements, including CAFTA and the proposed FTAA, and participated in other WTO events since then that continue to upset organized interests, citizens, and policymakers throughout the

country and world. Organized interests have developed their trade concerns into global movements by using the Internet to promote causes like the "Make Trade Fair" campaign. Many policymakers have also maintained their opposition to trade agreements that threaten American interests since President Clinton, President Salinas, and Prime Minister Mulroney implemented NAFTA on January 1, 1994.

Congresswoman Kaptur has continued to demonstrate publicly her dissatisfaction with NAFTA and highlight the ways in which the agreement has failed to live up to its promises of protecting the environment and worker rights. In 2003, she led a delegation of policymakers on a trip to Mexico to examine the effects of NAFTA after it had been operative for ten years. The group discovered that industry along the Mexican-American border had almost doubled since 1990, resulting in higher levels of pollution and disease. Additionally, they found that millions of Americans had lost their jobs as a result of NAFTA and that labor and wage standards in Mexico remained far below levels in the United States. Representative Kaptur fears that NAFTA will serve as a model for trade officials to follow when negotiating future free trade agreements. As a result, she has dedicated much of her time to protesting against trade agreements, like CAFTA and the FTAA, that threaten the environment, American jobs, wage rates, and labor rights. Kaptur will continue to do so as she seeks her thirteenth term in Congress.[4]

Congressman Brown has also sustained his protests against trade agreements that risk the environment, jobs, and worker rights and to educate his colleagues and constituents about the dangers associated with unfair trade agreements. His 2004 book, *Myths of Free Trade*, focused on harmful trade agreements like NAFTA, arguing that

[4] Kaptur, "NAFTA at Ten: Journey to Mexico: Report of the U.S. Delegation," http://www.kaptur.house.gov/Article.aspx?NewsID=1409 (accessed 31 January 2006).

these initiatives do not reflect American values and interests, such as promoting democracy, protecting the environment, and securing employment opportunities, high wages, and worker rights. Rather, they create environmental destruction, promote job relocation, and cause wages and worker rights to remain low or non-existent. Trade remains one of Brown's top priorities as he works to ensure that future American free trade agreements will not mirror NAFTA. In 2005, he announced his decision to run for election to the United States Senate.[5]

After he retired from Congress in 1992, Congressman Pease returned to Oberlin, Ohio, to spend time with his family, teach government courses at Oberlin College, and to enjoy the city and its environmental surroundings. He removed himself from the formal realm of politics but remained an advocate for progressive causes by educating citizens about how "humaneness and public service [come] together in the nation's interest." Although he died in 2002, the example that Pease set throughout his life has continued to influence hundreds of peoples' lives, ensuring that his message will endure.[6]

Family influences, educational experiences, societal and political changes, and unexpected events influence the lives of people everyday and cause them to develop strong values and beliefs that shape the decisions they make as they reach adulthood. Events such as the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the American war in Iraq, and Hurricane Katrina as well as family lessons, childhood activities, and school experiences are affecting thousands of young Americans coming of age in the twenty-first century.

---

[5] Brown, *Myths of Free Trade*.

[6] Interview with Jeanne Pease; Anita M. Spacek, "Building Named to Honor Pease," *The Sun Times*, October 2002; Steven Y. Bressler, "Donald J. Pease: An Inspiring Professor," *The Plain* Dealer, 5 August 2002, B6; Andy Young, "Don Pease, Journalist and Mentor," *The Chronicle-Telegram*, 5 August 2002, C1. The author took the quote used here from a plaque on the monument that remains in Medina, Ohio, in memory of Congressman Pease.

Some may find themselves connected to a common cause and become members of the United States House of Representatives and shapers of the government agenda in ways that reflect their personal values, beliefs, and life experiences. Therefore, future academics need to realize the significance of history and policymakers' pasts when analyzing the agenda-setting process.[7]

[7] To learn more about the formation of values, value change, and the influence of values on decision-making, see Ronald Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977); Lawrence E. Harrison, *et al*., eds., *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress* (New York: Basic Books, 2000).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

"About JwJ: What is Jobs with Justice?," http://www.jwj.org/AboutJWJ/AboutJWJ.htm (accessed 12 October 2005).

Beveridge, Dirk. "Tear Gas Fired on Demonstrators Against World Trade Organization," *The Associated Press State & Local Wire, PM Cycle*, 30 November 1999.

"BoyScouts.com: Ranks," http://boyscouts.com/ranks/index.html (accessed 12 December 2005).

Bremmer, John. "Environmentalists Put NAFTA in Precarious Spot," *The St. Louis Post-*Dispatch, 12 July 1993, page 19.

Bressler, Steven Y. "Donald J. Pease: An Inspiring Professor," *The Plain* Dealer, 5 August 2002, B6.

Brown, Sherrod. "American People Do Not Like NAFTA," *United States House of Representatives Congressional Hearing*, 13 July 1993, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, H4513.

_____ "NAFTA: A Bad Deal for the United States," *United States House of Representatives Congressional Hearing*, 3 November 1993, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, H8780-H8782.

_____ "NAFTA: A Bad Deal for a Lot of Reasons," *United States House of Representatives Congressional Hearing*, 20 October 1993, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, H8206.

_____ "NAFTA," *United States House of Representatives Congressional Hearing*, 14 July 1993, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, H4670.

_____ "NAFTA: Wages and Productivity," *United States House of Representatives Congressional Hearing*, 30 June 1993, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, H4392-H4395.

_____ "Further Debate on NAFTA," *United States House of Representatives Congressional Hearing*, 6 October 1993, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, H7539.

_____ "Summing Up on NAFTA Opposition," *United States House of Representatives Congressional Hearing*, 9 November 1993, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, H9075-H9076.

_____ "The Dangers of the North American Free- Trade Agreement," *United States House of Representatives Congressional Hearing*, 23 September 1993, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, H6966-H6967.

_____ "The North American Free- Trade Agreement," *United States House of Representatives Congressional Hearing*, 13 October 1993, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, H7809, H7812-H7813.

_____ "The Impact of NAFTA on American Jobs," *United States House of Representatives Congressional Hearing*, 28 July, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, H5433-H5438.

_____ "The North American Free- Trade Agreement," *United States House of Representatives Congressional Hearing*, 23 June 1993, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, H4001-H4002.

_____"The North American Free Trade Agreement," *United States House of Representatives Congressional Hearing*, 20 October 1993, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, H8316.

_____"Update on NAFTA," *United States House of Representatives Congressional Hearing*, 30 September 1993, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, H7334.

"Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur: Biography," http://www.kaptur.house.gov/Library/biography.aspx (accessed 6 November 2005).

Cook, Rebecca. "Police Surprised By Aggressive Stance of Protestors," *The Associated Press State & Local Wire, AM Cycle*, 30 November 1999.

_____ "Protestors Launch 'Battle in Seattle' Against WTO," *The Associated Press & Local Wire*, 28 November 1999.

Crutsinger, Martin. "Demonstrators Disrupt WTO Meeting; Mayor Declares Curfew," *The Associated Press State & Local Wire, AM Cycle*, 30 November 1999.

Cruz, Laurence M. "Opponents of WTO Use Ads in Campaign to 'Educate' Public," *The Columbian*, 12 November 1999, page C2.

Dunphy, Stephen H. "Delegates Get on With Business -- International Trade Talks are Under Way," *The Seattle Times*, 01 December 1999, page A1.

_____ "Opening Ceremonies Besieged by Protestors, Then Canceled—Delegates Couldn't Get Through," *The Seattle Times*, 30 November 1999, page A1.

Gore-Perot Debate over the Ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement in Cynthia Clark Northrup, *et al*., eds., *The Encyclopedia on Tariffs and Trade in U.S. History: Volume II: Debating the Issues: Selected Primary Documents* (Westport; Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2003).

Hamilton, Alexander. *Federalist No. 12* in Northrup, *The Encyclopedia of Tariffs and Trade in U.S. History: Volume II: Debating the Issues: Selected Primary Documents* (Westport; Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2003).

Hayes, Christopher. "Who is Sherrod Brown?: An Unabashed Progressive Takes Aim at Senate Seat," *In These Times* 19 December 2005.

Ingwerson, Marshall. "Resistance to NAFTA is on the Rise," *The Christian Science Publishing Society*, 2 July 1993, page 1.

Interview with Jeanne Pease, 12 August 2005, Oberlin, Ohio.

Interview with Marcy Kaptur, 6 July 2005, Toledo, Ohio.

Interview with Sherrod Brown, 2 August 2005, Lorain, Ohio.

"Issues - Environment Record of Environmental Leadership," http://www.house.gov/sherrodbrown/issuesenvironmentrecord.htm (accessed 10 October 2005).

"Issues and Legislation: Environment," http://www.house.gov/sherrodbrown/issues.htm (accessed 10 October 2005).

Kaptur, Marcy. "Congress Should Not Rush Into United States-Mexico Free Trade Negotiations," *United States Congressional Hearing*, 11 April 1991, 102nd Congress, 1st Session, H2163.

_____ "Concerns Regarding North American Free Trade Agreement," *United States House of Representatives Congressional Hearing*, 25 September 1991, 102nd Congress, 1st Session, H6874.

_____ "Free Trade Agreement Must Be With Free Societies," *United States Congressional Hearing*, 23 April 1991, 102nd Congress, 1st Session, H2402.

_____ "Letter to President George W. Bush and Mexican President Vicente Fox: President Bush and President Vicente Fox Visit to Toledo," 5 September 2001, http://www.kaptur.house.gov/Speech.aspx?NewsID=1098 (accessed 3 January 2006).

_____ "NAFTA," *United States Congressional Hearing*, 14 July 1993, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, H4670.

_____ "NAFTA at Ten: Journey to Mexico: Report of the U.S. Delegation," http://www.kaptur.house.gov/Article.aspx?NewsID=1409 (accessed 31 January 2006).

_____ "Testimony of Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur: Clean Water Act Reauthorization: Senate Subcommittee on Clean Water Fisheries and Wildlife," *United States Congressional Record*, 4 August 1993, 103rd Congress, 1st Session.

_____ "The Impact of NAFTA on American Jobs," *United States Congressional Hearing*, 28 July 1993, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, H5431.

_____ "The North American Free Trade Agreement," *United States Congressional Hearing*, 23 June 1993, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, H4001.

"Let's Keep Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur Working for Us: Marcy Kaptur On the Issues," http://votemarcy.com/Kaptur_on_the_issues.html (accessed 16 November 2005).

Liska, Betty. "Letter from Betty Liska to Don J. Pease," March 1990, Subgroup II, Don J. Pease Papers, US Congress Personal/Political Papers, Series 2, Correspondence, Box 8, 1990, Oberlin College Archives.

McClure, Robert. "Critics of WTO Launch Ad Blitz," *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, 12 November 1999, page C1.

"Members and Committees: Marcy Kaptur: Bills Sponsored," http://0-web.lexis-nexis.com.maurice.bgsu.edu/congcomp/doclist?_m=07f335f2eb4472bef834eb81b789e0af&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkSA&_md5=233f5c7a7372c5d32e72e44d7893a73c (accessed 3 January 2006).

"Member Profile Report Archive: 107th Congress: Representative Marcy Kaptur D-OH," http://0-web.lexis-nexis.com.maurice.bgsu.edu/congcomp/document?_m=27f3f3842fbb60830d7b1d0011bc3af8&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkSA&_md5=d308004c5fae92cf398333dab8e10447 (accessed 6 November 2005).

"Member Profile Report," 109th Congress, Representative Sherrod Brown D-OH, http://0-web.lexis-nexis.com.maurice.bgsu.edu/congcomp/document?_m=cd531647a0cde3e8c8183274c7d8c84e&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkSA&_md5=42e732b3b3145891ab65947300786944 (accessed 6 October 2005).

"On the Issues: Every Political Leader on Every Issue: Marcy Kaptur on the Environment," http://www.issues2000.org/OH/Marcy_Kaptur.htm#Environment (accessed 16 November 2005).

Pease, Donald J. "Bill Files," Don J. Pease Papers, Subgroup III, Legislation Records from the US Congress, Series I, Bill Files, 102nd Congress, 1991-1992, Box 5, Oberlin College Archives.

_____ "Campaign Pamphlet: Don Pease: The Model of What a Good Congressman Should Be," Don J. Pease Papers, Subgroup VI, Campaign Files, Section 2, Campaign Files for US Congress, Box 17, 1990 Campaign, Oberlin College Archives.

_____ "Hasty Talks on Free Trade Spell Trouble," *International Business Magazine* (June 1991) in Don J. Pease Papers, Subgroup III, Legislative Records (US Congress), Series 2, Legislative Subject Files, Box 9, Trade, Chronology Files, 1990-92, Oberlin College Archives.

_____ "Letter from Don J. Pease (co-signer) to Carla Hills," 23 October 1991 in Don J. Pease Papers, Subgroup III, Legislative Records (US Congress), Series 2, Legislative Subject Files, Box 9, Trade, Chronology Files. 1990-92, Oberlin College Archives.

_____ "Letter From Don J. Pease (co-signer) to Carla Hills of the USTR," 29 July 1991 in Don J. Pease Papers, Subgroup III, Legislative Records (US Congress), Series 2, Legislative Subject Files, Box 9, Trade, Chronology Files, 1990-92, Oberlin College Archives.

_____ "Letter from Don J. Pease to Colleagues: The NAFTA on Labor and the Environment: Take a Good Hard Look," 2 October 1992 in Don J. Pease Papers, Subgroup III, Legislative Records (US Congress), Series 2, Legislative Subject Files, Box 9, Trade, Chronology Files, 1990-92, Oberlin College Archives.

_____ "Letter from Don J. Pease to Constituents;" July 1990 in Don J. Pease Papers, Subgroup II, U.S. Congress Personal/Political Papers, Series 2, Correspondence, 1990, Box 8, Oberlin College Archives.

_____ "Letter from Don J. Pease (co-signer) to Governor Clinton," 3 October 1992 in Don J. Pease Papers, Subgroup III, Legislative Records (US Congress), Series 2, Legislative Subject Files, Box 9, Trade, Chronology Files, 1990-92, Oberlin College Archives.

_____ "Letter from Don J. Pease to Mike Monda," Subgroup II, Don J. Pease Papers, US Congress Personal/Political Papers, Series 2, Correspondence, Box 8, 1990, Oberlin College Archives.

_____ "Letter from Don J. Pease to Nancy Beckett," 28 March 1990 in Don J. Pease Papers, Sub-Section III, Legislative Records from US Congress, Series 2, Legislative Subject Files, Box 3, Oberlin College Archives.

_____ "Letter from Don J. Pease (co-signer) to President Bush," 19 April 1990 in Don J. Pease Papers, Sub-Section III, Legislative Records from US Congress, Series 2, Legislative Subject Files, Box 3, Oberlin College Archives.

_____ "Letter From Don J. Pease and Charles B. Rangel to President George H. W. Bush," 14 December 1990 in Don J. Pease Papers, Subgroup III, Legislative Records US Congress), Series 2, Legislative Subject Files, Box 9, Trade, Chronology Files, 1990-92, Oberlin College Archives.

_____ "Letter from Don J. Pease and Terry L. Bruce to Colleagues: URGENT! The Far-Reaching Impact of a Possible U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Agreement Warrants an Active, Strong Role for the Congress!," 3 December 1990 in Don J. Pease Papers, Subsection III, Legislative Records from U.S. Congress, Series 2, Legislative Subject Files, Box 10, 1990-92, Oberlin College Archives.

_____"Mexico Trip Tentative Agenda: Revised Version," April 1-5, 1991 in Don J. Pease Papers, Subsection III, Legislative Records from U.S. Congress, Series 2, Legislative Subject Files, Box 10, Trade, 1990-92, Oberlin College Archives.

_____ "Personal Notes: Trip to Mexico," August 27-September 2, 1989 in Don J. Pease Papers, Subgroup II, U.S. Congress Personal/Political Papers, Series II, Trip Files, 1991, Box 2, Oberlin College Archives.

_____ "Statement by Don J. Pease: Congressional Record—House," 22 March 1990 in Don J. Pease Papers, Sub-Section III, Legislative Records from US Congress, Series 2, Legislative Subject Files, Box 3, Oberlin College Archives.

_____ "Statement of Don J. Pease at the Bike-to-Work Rally," 19 April 1990 in Don J. Pease Papers, Sub-Section III, Legislative Records from US Congress, Series 2, Legislative Subject Files, Box 3, Oberlin College Archives.

Phone Message from Sherrod Brown, 20 August 2005.

Photo of Donald J. Pease. http://www.oberlin.edu/archive/30PhotoPages/pease_p.html (accessed 22 February 2006).

Photo of Marcy Kaptur. http://www.kaptur.house.gov/Library/biography.aspx (accessed 22 February 2006).

Photo of Sherrod Brown. http://www.ucc.org/ocinc/parker/brown.htm (accessed 22 February 2006).

Postman, David. “Environmentalists Scale Crane by I-5 -- They Prepare Anti-WTO Banner,” *The Seattle Times*, 29 November 1999, page A1.

Rehm, Marilyn. “Letter from Marilyn Rehm of the Mohican Outdoor School to Don J. Pease,” March 1990, Subgroup II, Don J. Pease Papers, US Congress Personal/Political Papers, Series 2, Correspondence, Box 8, 1990, Oberlin College Archives.

“Seattle Declares Emergency, Imposes Curfew Due to Violent WTO Protest,” *The News Tribune*, 01 December 1999.

“Seattle Police Use Tear Gas Against World Trade Organization Protestors,” *The News Tribune*, 1 December 1999.

“Sherrod’s Biography,” http://www.house.gov/sherrodbrown/bio.htm (accessed 6 October 2005).

“Sherrod Brown: He’s on Our Side: Environmental Protection,” http://www.sherrodbrown.com/environment (accessed 10 October 2005).

Shorrock, Tim. “U.S., Canada Groups Plan Anti-NAFTA Action,” *The Buffalo News*, 29 March 1993.

Spacek, Anita M. “Building Named to Honor Pease,” *The Sun Times*, October 2002.

Sunde, Scott. “Chaos Closes Downtown; Police Use Rubber Pellets, Tear Gas Against Thousands; Demonstrators Delay Start of Trade Meeting for Hours; Schell Orders Curfew; National Guard Called,” *Seattle Post-Intellegencer*, 01 December 1999, page A1.

Tankersley, Jim. “Candidate Brown Challenges GOP Establishment,” *The* (Toledo) *Blade*, 4 December 2005, Section B, page 1.

“The Cities: The Price of Optimism” in *Time Magazine* (1 August 1969).

“The Power to End Hunger: RESULTS,” http://www.results.org/website/article.asp?id=19 (accessed 12 October 2005).

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in Cynthia Clark Northrup, *et al*., eds., *The Encyclopedia on Tariffs and Trade in U.S. History: Volume II: Debating the Issues: Selected Primary Documents* (Westport; Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2003).

Weiss, David A. “Notice of North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Negotiations, of Goods and Services That Might be Affected by Such Negotiations, and of Public Hearings Relating to Such Negotiations” in Don J.

Pease Papers, Subgroup III, Legislative Records, US Congress, Series 2, Legislative Subject Files, Box 9, Chronology Files, 1990-92, Oberlin College Archives.

"What is Boy Scouting? Purpose of the BSA," http://www.scouting.org/factsheets/02-503.html (accessed 12 December 2005).

"Who We Are: Joint Public Advisory Committee Vision Statement," http://www.cec.org/who_we_are/jpac/vision/index.cfm?varlan=english (accessed 16 September 2005).

"Who We Are: Three Countries Working Together to Protect our *Shared* Environment," http://www.cec.org/who_we_are/index.cfm?varlan=english, (accessed 16 September 2005).

"WTO Opposition Signs In," *The Seattle Times*, 12 November 1999, page E1.

Young, Andy. "Don Pease, Journalist and Mentor," *The Chronicle-Telegram*, 5 August 2002, C1.

Secondary Sources

Anderson, Terry H. *The Movement and the Sixties* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

Baer, M. Delal, *et al*., eds. *The NAFTA Debate: Grappling with Unconventional Trade Issues* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994).

Barnard, John. *From Evangelicalism to Progressivism at Oberlin College, 1866-1917* (Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 1969).

Baumann, Roland M., *et al. A Researcher's Guide to the Donald J. Pease Papers in the Oberlin College Archives* (Oberlin; Ohio: Oberlin Press, 2003).

Brown, Sherrod. *Myths of Free Trade: Why American Trade Policy Has Failed* (New York: The New Press, 2004).

Christofferson, Bill. *The Man from Clear Lake: Earth Day Founder Senator Gaylord Nelson* (Madison:The University of Wisconsin Press, 2004).

Cohen, Steven D., *et al*. *Fundamentals of U.S. Foreign Trade Policy: Economics, Politics, Laws,and Issues* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2003).

Doran, Charles F., *et al*., eds. *The NAFTA Puzzle: Political Parties and Trade in North America* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994).

Dreiling, Michael. "Remapping North American Environmentalism: Contending Visions and Divergent Practices in the Fight over NAFTA" in Daniel Faber, ed. *The Struggle for Ecological Democracy: Environmental Justice Movements in the United States* (New York: The Guilford Press, 1998).

Eckes, Alfred E. *Opening America's Markets: U.S. Foreign Trade Policy Since 1776* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995).

_____ "U.S. Trade History" in William A. Lovett, *et al*., *U.S. Trade Policy: History, Theory, and the WTO, Second Edition* (Armonk; New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2004).

Faber, Daniel, ed.. *The Struggle for Ecological Democracy: Environmental Justice Movements in the United States* (New York: The Guilford Press, 1998).

Fletcher, Robert Samuel. *A History of Oberlin College from its Foundation through the Civil War, Volume I* (Oberlin: Oberlin College Press, 1943).

Fox, Annette Baker. "Environment and Trade: the NAFTA Case" in *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 110, No. 1 (Spring 1995).

Gilbreath, Jan, *et al*. "The Environment: Unwelcome Guest at the Free Trade Party" in M. Delal Baer, *The NAFTA Debate: Grappling with Unconventional Trade Issues* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994).

Gottleib, Robert. *Forcing the Spring: the Transformation of the American Environmental Movement* (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1993).

Harrison, Lawrence E., *et al*. eds., *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress* (New York: Basic Books, 2000).

Hayes, Samuel P. *Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States, 1955-1985* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, *et al*. *NAFTA: an Assessment* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1993).

Kingdon, John W. *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies,* Second Edition (New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1995).

Inglehart, Ronald. *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).

Kline, Benjamin. *First Along the River: A Brief History of the United States Environmental Movement, 2nd Edition* (San Francisco: Acada Books, 2000).

Mayer, Frederick W. *Interpreting NAFTA: the Science and Art of Political Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).

McKinney, Joseph A. *Created from NAFTA: the Structure, Function, and Significance of the Treaty's Related Institutions* (Armonk; New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2000).

McKeown, Timothy J. "What Forces Shape American Trade Policy?" in Charles F. Doran, *et al*., eds., *The NAFTA Puzzle: Political Parties and Trade in North America* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994).

Northrup, Cynthia Clark, *et al*., eds. *The Encyclopedia on Tariffs and Trade in U.S. History: Volume 1: The Encyclopedia* (Westport; Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2003).

Paul, Margo L. "Trade and Environment: The Emergence of Environmental Issues in the Context of the NAFTA Negotiations" (Halifax; Nova Scotia; Canada: Dalhousie University, 1994).

Ping, Charles J. *Ohio University in Perspective" The Annual Convocation Addresses of President Charles J. Ping, 1975-1984* (Athens; Ohio, Ohio University Press, 1985).

Rothman, Hal K. *The Greening of a Nation?: Environmentalism in the United States Since 1945* (Orlando: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1998).

Rothgeb, John M., Jr. *U.S. Trade Policy: Balancing Economic Dreams and Political Realities* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2001).

Sánchez, Robert. "NAFTA and the Environment" in Victor Bulmer-Thomas, *et al*., eds., *Mexico and the North American Free Trade Agreement: Who Will Benefit?* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994).

Sanders, Jeff. "Environmentalism." in Beth Bailey, *et al*., ed., *The Columbia Guide to America in the 1960s* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).

Scheffer, Victor B. *The Shaping of Environmentalism in America* (Seattle: The University of Washington Press, 1991).

Scherlen, Renee G. "NAFTA and Beyond: The Politics of Trade in the Post-Cold War Period" in James M. Scott, ed., *After the End: Making U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998).

Scott, James M. ed.. *After the End: Making U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998).

Shapecoff, Philip. *A Fierce Green Fire: the American Environmental Movement, Revised Edition* (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2003).

Shrybman, Steven. "Trading Away the Environment" in Maxwell Cameron, *et al*., eds., *The Political Economy of North American Free Trade* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).

Uslaner, Eric M. "Political Parties and Free Trade in the United States" in Charles F. Doran, *et al*., eds., *The NAFTA Puzzle: Political Parties and Trade in North America* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994).

Vowels, Hugh P. *Ukraine and Its People* (London; T. and A. Constable Ltd., 1939).

Wiarda, Howard. "The U.S. Domestic Politics of the U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Agreement" in M. Dela Baer, *The NAFTA Debate: Grappling with Unconventional Trade Issues* (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1994).

Woods, Randall Bennett. *Quest for Identity: America Since 1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

APPENDIX I: TRANSCRIBED INTERVIEW WITH JEANNE PEASE, AUGUST 12, 2004 AT 12:30 P.M. IN OBERLIN, OHIO.

Interviewer: Laurie Perin
Interviewee: Jeanne Pease

Laurie Perin: I know that we talked about that we both were, you know, aware that he (former Congressman Don Pease) was an environmentalist and that he did have these really strong environmental values, and I kind of hinted to you on the phone if you knew how he developed those, but—I have a list here of different ways that I thought he might have developed them and I wondered if you could say "yes" or "no" if you think that was a way—

Jeanne Pease: Of course, yes.

Perin: --um, either through his childhood, his family influence, how were his parents, his education. I mean, elementary, junior high, high school—up through college. And then, um, working in an oil refinery.

Pease: Ah, I'm not sure—probably. I mean, it was probably formed somewhat in his childhood, but I don't think it was in any direct way. Um, his dad worked as both a salesman and as a pipe fitter and his mom was a housewife. I don't think that they would have taught him. And in school—it was odd. I don't know back in those days if the environment was even thought of, per say. And his interest in grade school, I think an eighth-grade teacher interested Don more in writing and journalism.

Perin: Oh, okay. That's how he got that started?

Pease: That's how he got that started. In high school—he was always interested in both government and journalism, but I think he felt journalism was going to be the thing he did as a profession and, if things worked out, he might get into politics. So certainly in high school journalism was his main interest, but he was also student council president, editor of the paper—so he did both. I don't think in high school he took environmental courses, because unfortunately I don't think there were such things.

Perin: I think you're right, because Don—he was born in 1932, right?

Pease: '31.

Perin: '31. So when he was in high school, it would have been the '40s and environmental protection really wasn't a huge concern. You're right. There was a sort of conservation movement, but it wasn't something that the entire public was aware of. So,

I kind of assumed that about him. That—in fact, when I was studying Marcy Kaptur and Sherrod Brown—they were born in the ‘50s.

Pease: Yes.

Perin: So, I kind of assumed that, because they grew up then, when environmentalism was really developing—

Pease: --beginning to be, yes—

Perin: --that they might have been influenced at an earlier age. So, he must have been influenced somewhere later on down the road.

Pease: I think so. Because—well, he spent a year in England, but that was political because he was studying the politics of Britain. And then in the Army where he taught map reading and biological warfare. Not a pleasant subject for him to teach, but it was part of being a second lieutenant and being trained in the Army.

Perin: I would think that, even though he might not have had environmental values as a child, he seemed to be the type who was always wanting to do things for others and be active—always active.

Pease: Yes. He was always active, always concerned.

Perin: So, being that type of person, of course when something like the environmental movement developed, it was natural for him to be concerned about something like that.

Pease: And I think Oberlin, too. It was a wonderful place to live.

Perin: That’s what they suggested at the archives. They thought--

Pease: I really think Oberlin formed both of us.

Perin: You can look around and tell that about this city. You can tell that everyone is really wanting to help each other and really aware. But in what other ways did Oberlin physically impact his environmentalism?

Pease: Well, he was on the public utilities commission. And he always thought that utilities should pay their fare share and not brush it all off on, you know, the Oberlin citizens. That they should pay for some of their own explorations, and their housing was a high issue for him in the early years. Safe water. He was on city council—you know, I just think it was inbred in him, that he was always thoughtful about *all* issues.

Perin: Yeah. He was a very progressive person.

Pease: Yeah. And our daughter is really a conservationist. And I asked her, and I don't think he taught her, per say, but it was the way that he lived that she just became that type of person.

Perin: She learned by example.

Pease: She did. She has his ethics and his love of the outdoors. I suppose that's part of everything. I forgot about his being a Boy Scout and an Eagle Scout.

Perin: Oh, was he a Boy Scout and an Eagle Scout?

Pease: That *had* to have been an ultimate influence.

Perin: Was he a Boy Scout and Eagle Scout growing up as a young boy?

Pease: Uh huh, in Toledo.

Perin: So was Sherrod Brown. He made it to be an Eagle Scout. I thought that that might have influenced him. But I forgot to mention that in our interview. But actually one of the questions I was going to ask you towards the end was did he teach you or your daughter about the importance of the environment. Or do you kind of think it was more learning from his example?

Pease: We all just—it was just important to all three of us and even more so to Jennifer. I tend to use paper cups now and then or paper plates. She just doesn't. If I go to her house, I usually buy a roll of paper towels, because when I help clean I like to use paper towels. Well she says, "Mom, the cloth or the towel works just as well, and I can just wash it." So, it's just, you know. And I think all of us have always been aware of the limited resources in this world, and we don't want to use more than our share. We've always only owned one car, one TV, you know one of anything. That's been part of our existence always. Just, it's too bad he's not alive and I couldn't ask, because I really--it was always just apart of us that I never even thought about it.

Perin: Yeah. It was something that was just always there that you never thought to stop and ask, "Why do we live this way?" You know? But, still some people are just born that way. Were his parents really active in doing things like this, do you know?

Pease: [Shakes head no] No.

Perin: I wonder if he wanted to do better or wanted to do differently.

Pease: I think—his parents were not college graduates, and he knew he needed to go to college. So from a young age he had a paper route and worked in a grocery store and saved everything, you know so he could go. And he was planning to go to Toledo University, although he had been to a journalism workshop at Ohio U once. He really wanted to go to Ohio U.

Perin: Did they have the E.W. Scripps School of Journalism back then?

Pease: No.

Perin: One of my friends from my high school class went there and she loved it. I knew that they had a great journalism program there and they probably still--

Pease: They did and do. They do. And now it's probably more of a school of communications and TV and other things as well, which, of course, it didn't back then. But, so I think he had applied for a scholarship to OU. I think he had applied and was accepted at Toledo, but that was, you know, our home-town, and he got a scholarship for his tuition to OU and it made the difference. And it was $90 a year!

Perin: 90!?!

Pease: Isn't that incredible? But he got there and he was able to get a board job and, you know. So he worked two or three jobs all the way through college.

Perin: So he really knew. He had to work for what he wanted and he was focused. I bet you that helped--

Pease: I was going to use the word driven, but that never would have been him. Focused is a much better word. He just knew what he wanted—

Perin: --and he did it.

Pease: --he did it.

Perin: You kind of mentioned him maybe being influenced by the environmental movement that developed in the '60s and '70s.

Pease: Ah!

Perin: Do you think that influenced—

Pease: I'm sure it would have been.

Perin: Do you remember was he active or participate in the environmental movement in any way? He was working in journalism at the time. He probably wrote about it.

Pease: Yeah. I mean through editorials and things, I'm sure he did. And his main focus in the Ohio Legislature was always education but educating people about the environment was part of that as well.

Perin: Certainly.

Pease: Uh huh.

Perin: I'm just curious. What type of ways in his personal life did he practice environmentalism? Did he recycle? Did he try to walk or bike?

Pease: All of the above. Even in Oberlin he rode his bike to work or walked. In Washington and actually Columbus, he rode with another person because we only had one car. I got to use the car, even though I didn't really need it in Oberlin, because I walked also. And then when we lived in Washington, we chose the area in which we lived because it had a bus route, and we knew the subway would be coming out there.

Perin: That was one of the reasons you chose to live in that particular part?

Pease: [Shakes head yes]. And it was only about 10 blocks out of the district, and we wanted Jennifer in public schools, so. It was both the public school issue and being able to—

Perin: I saw on—in some of his papers that on Earth Day 1990 he was really active in that in Washington. He wasn't able to be back here, but he participated in a ride your bike to work day, um, other events, and, you know, he spoke at a couple events from what I saw. So that shows that even in 1990 he was still really—

Pease: Oh yes, he was. I think. I guess, Laurie, it was so much a part of our life that I just never thought about differentiating what he did. It was just the way he did things. And he always. I mean, I would drive with him to the capitol sometimes, but often we both took the subway and if he went alone, he *always* took the subway or the bus. And he always walked as much as he could.

Perin: He practiced what he preached, unlike others.

Pease: Definitely. Uh huh.

Perin: Was he a member of any environmental organizations? The Sierra Club, or anything like that? A lot of time people are members and they donate money.

Pease: Yeah. That's probably what he may have done. But I know he was always in the ACLU and Common Cause, and he certainly donated to things in Oberlin and United Appeal.

Perin: So he was involved locally and nationally?

Pease: Uh huh.

Perin: Marcy and Sherrod were both members of several organizations, but, you know, they're just so busy that sometimes the most you can do is donate money, which is still *something*.

Pease: And I think he worked toward the bike path in Oberlin and, maybe not legislatively, but just with information that they needed or, whatever. And our vacations usually meant going by train as much as we could, and, if we were lucky enough to get to Europe a couple times, we always took trains and hiked.

Perin: Where did you guys go in Europe?

Pease: Switzerland was our favorite because you could ride trains or walk from town to town.

Perin: I haven't made it to Europe, but I will someday! Someday when I have a job and money, I'll go.

Pease: And go when you're young enough to still do it by doing hostiles and bed and breakfasts. We always tried to look for local places to stay and local restaurants.

[This part of the interview is omitted because it is irrelevant to the thesis.]

Perin: Well, I guess I have about one more question here and then you can tell me anything else you can think of! In the late '60s, Lake Erie was declared "dead" and the Cuyahoga River caught fire. Do you remember his reaction to that or your family's reaction? Your reaction? I can't imagine.

Pease: No. And by then, Don would have been in Columbus. It's odd to say, but we weren't connected to Cleveland much. When we came to Oberlin, we thought, "Oh, Cleveland's only 30 miles away. We'll be in a lot. There's so much there to do." But I think Don was always aware of Lake Erie. For a while he lived in Michigan and, of course, Toledo. But—trying to guess how a river caught fire is really—it's just sort of—

Perin: --most people don't think of *water* catching on fire. I cannot imagine. In today's day and age, with all of the environmental protections we have, even though they are not enough, nobody in this current generation could ever imagine—maybe that's. They should be reminded of it, though, I think, otherwise they'll think that everything's fine, and they can do whatever they want.

Pease: I mean the Lake has come back far more than anyone ever dreamed it would.

Perin: It has.

Pease: But it still needs, you know, to be monitored.

Perin: I was just on the Lake last weekend, and you know it's a good sign when the May Flies are still out. They weren't out in the abundance that they were earlier this summer, but they'll still attract to some light at night and, you know, that signifies the health of the Lake. So, the more the merrier! Even though they might be gross and bothersome.

Perin: I went to the Ohio Historical Society down in Columbus earlier this summer. I just wondered what the State of Ohio's stance on environmentalism has been.

Pease: Has it been very good? Could you tell?

Perin: Well. It's probably just like any other state was, you know. Ohio started making environmental state—state environmental laws around the, you know, the '60s and '70s. Things like that. I think they started doing tests on Lake Erie in about 1960. I don't know if anybody really knew how bad it was until then.

Pease: Probably not. I don't think people thought about the environment. I mean it was there and it was just part of their—maybe as water became short, you know, shortage out West, and people here began to realize, you know, what we had to do.

Perin: Not only that but, in the '40s, I mean I guess people were just coming out of the depression, so when you don't have money, you're not worried about protecting the environment. You're worried about making money. But after WWII, the US experienced its greatest economic boom ever. Some scholars have argued that that was one thing that triggered the environmental movement, because people's standards of living—they had money. They could actually devote their time to other causes and become more aware. So, when you're in the middle of WWII, the Great Depression, WWI, you don't really think about—and by the '60s and '70s, I just think that society was tired of war and everything else overseas. Vietnam. And, so when all of the other social movements arose, everybody became aware of everything. People were sick of conflict overseas, which I am too.

Pease: I didn't understand it at the time, and it just gets worse.

[This part of the interview is omitted because it is irrelevant to the thesis.]

Pease: But thinking about the environment, Oberlin starting recycling a long time before—

Perin: Were a lot of people recycling a long time before the state as a whole?

Pease: I don't know. We might have. Certainly we were the forefront of fair housing, and I'm assuming environment as well.

Perin: I need to—I need to find out when recycling picked up as a national thing or even a statewide thing. I'm trying to think, as a child—I was born in '81. I don't remember us recycling until the early 1990s? Late 1980s, maybe?

Pease: I was going to say. I don't remember recycling in Washington, of all places where we should have been. I'm not sure if the state parks are yet.

Perin: I wonder if the 20th anniversary of Earth Day, which was in 1990—

Pease: Maybe that spurred on—

Perin: That Earth Day. It was a really big Earth Day. I'm not sure if Earth Day had been forgotten by then and they wanted to give it, kind of, a rebirth, or something. I was in elementary school then, and I remember specifically having lessons in class where people would come in and you'd take a two-liter bottle, and at the bottom how they have the plastic around it. You'd cut that off, and we had all different colors and cut it into pieces and melted into key-chains, and that was recycling. And we took paper and made it into recycled paper. So I know we were being taught that in the early 1990s. And looking through the papers at the Ohio Historical Society—environmental education was a big deal in Ohio for Earth Day 1990. There were pamphlets that were distributed to all the schools.

Pease: Yeah, I think it's been even longer than that in Oberlin.

Perin: I would believe it.

Pease: But there's still people that don't recycle.

APPENDIX II: TRANSCRIBED INTERVIEW WITH CONGRESSMAN SHERROD BROWN, AUGUST 2, 2005 AT 1:00 P.M. IN LORAIN, OHIO.

Interviewer: Laurie Perin
Interviewee: Sherrod Brown

I began to explain briefly my thesis project to the Congressman. I told him that I was interested in why environmental protection became a concern in the early-1990s NAFTA debate rather than within earlier trade talks. Before I finished my summary and turned on my tape recorder, he began answering questions that I had raised indirectly:

Congressman Sherrod Brown: [He was talking about how the country, as a whole, was not concerned about trade agreements until the early-1990s]. . .fast-track in 1991, I think it was, 1990-1991, um, trade was really a province of, of, sort of corporate lawyers, sort of, um, bureaucrats that no one--unknown bureaucrats--in the USTR's [United States Trade Representative's] office and the Congress department, CEOs that, um, hit some of the major companies and the members of the [House] Ways and Means Committee. Nobody else much paid attention because, partly because the country wasn't, we weren't losing manufacturing, we weren't--we didn't have a very big trade deficit. Trade deficit didn't go from surplus to deficit until '73, at the same time as the oil embargo, and all of that was, of course, related. But, because of that, nobody, um, really, uh, nobody was paying much attention to trade The country--the economic--the country's economy was, was not threatened, and, but I don't think the public saw their livelihoods threatened by foreign trade the way they did starting in the late '80s. So, the environment wasn't part of--I mean there was sort of nothing on the public agenda about trade. Worker--whether it was worker rights, or whether it was lost manufacturing jobs, or whether it was the environment, or whether it was food safety, or whether it was intellectual property, or any of those. So, by the time--so the environment's never been the main issue surrounding trade, but it's--it didn't--it played a much smaller role in this debate [referring to the Central American Free Trade Agreement, or CAFTA], I thought, in large part because we had most of the Democrats right from the beginning. The Democrats that weren't, we had trouble lobbying on CAFTA. I'm talking CAFTA now. The ones we had the most trouble lobbying were ones who that--New Zealand, to whom the environment isn't that important domestically. Um, those who were strong environmentalists kind of came to the conclusion on CAFTA that, um, "Why do we trust George Bush on the environment in Central America? We don't trust George Bush on the environment in California or Ohio." And so why--of course he won't enforce environmental standards anymore than he'd enforce worker standards in Central America, because he doesn't enforce them here.

Laurie Perin: Would you say that, for these specific reasons, those are the reasons that you *yourself* opposed NAFTA for environmental reasons as well?

Brown: My reasons for opposing NAFTA are many, I mean--

Perin: --Yeah.

Brown: --they were, to me, I have close to a 100% rating from many of the environmental groups, and I care a lot about that issue, but, for me, the worker safety standard--the worker standards, labor rights, come before anything. I mean, if labor rights had been good, but they hadn't done the environmental standards right, I still would have voted no. Because environmental standards are important. But what I talked about--because my passion is, is, is more labor standards--environment secondarily--and the way to move voters, the way to move voters and the members of Congress who were voting on the agreement is to talk labor standards. And that's more important to them. Well, there's other--there were other things. If we're talking Republicans, it was sovereignty issues. It was a whole host of other things.

Perin: Just one other question about that. Do you consider yourself, personally, to be an environmentalist?

Brown: Of course.

Perin: When do you remember first becoming concerned about the environment?

Brown: 1970 Earth Day. I was--organized with two high school friends, as seniors in high school. The first Earth Day in Mansfield, where I grew up. Marched down Park Avenue and got to the city--got to the center of town, the square, and we had forgotten that we needed to, like, do something when we got there. So, we didn't have any speakers lined up, including us, so we were like, "What do we do now?" We forgot that part.

Perin: I was wondering if people who are around your age group would have been affected by the environmental movement as opposed to, maybe, older members of Congress, who were in Congress at that time [of the NAFTA debate]. Do you think that the environmental movement shaped people from your generation specifically, or had an impact on older members of Congress?

Brown: I think yes and yes. I think--I think that, um, I mean it all depends on their political philosophy overall. People that are progressives care about the environment regardless of their age. People in Congress that are very pro-business don't too much.

Perin: And somebody who's a great example is Don Pease, who--I just spent a week at Oberlin College looking through his papers at the archive and it's evident that he's been an environmentalist his whole life. And he's obviously, you know, from a different generation.

Brown: Don was so much older than me. Don is--

Perin: I think he was born in '34.

Brown: He was 46 when he got elected--he was born in '32. So, he's 20 years older than I am.

Perin: Do you belong to any specific environmental organizations?

Brown: I've given money to the Sierra Club, I've given money to a lot of--I don't tend to belong to groups, so much, like that. I mean, of any kind of groups. But I've--I mean, I've spoken to environmental groups a lot, I've given money to the Sierra Club, I've given money to--I don't know--personal, personal money to some of those groups.

Perin: Is there any specific environmental legislation you can remember working on as a member of the--

Brown: As a member of the legislature, I wrote the first Solar Energy Bill in Ohio. Um, I've worked on a lot of brown field stuff, um, worked on a lot of amendments on the environment, a lot of safe-drinking stuff, safe-air stuff, a lot of infrastructure stuff on water. Um, there's probably a dozen things I'm not thinking of.

Perin: Do you think that one reason you were concerned about environmental protection within NAFTA, even as a secondary issue, is because of the fact that you represent an industrial area that borders the Great Lakes?

Brown: Ah, no. I think it's more of the way I think of the issues of justice and fairness. My district didn't have much to do with my opposition to NAFTA, although most people would say it did, because, I mean I know it helped me politically. It only helped me politically as it helped Marcy, because we talked about it. Environment--trade issues can play either way at home depending on how you, how assertive you are in your discussion. Almost any issue in politics is not just how you frame it, but how aggressively you talk about it. Because you're going to do a controversial vote, but you go home and argue for it assertively, you win people over. And those that disagree say, "At least, at least Congresswoman so and so believes it." And that gets you off the hook on controversial kinds of votes.

Perin: So, it was more of a--it was a broader viewpoint that you had--

Brown: Yeah. It was a philosophical view that trade agreements hurt the poor, and all countries--it hurts the poor and working class families in all--in both the rich country and the poor country. And I don't have any doubt about that. That's why I'll never vote for a trade agreement that doesn't have labor standards and also the environment, but.

Perin: I know that this is your philosophical standpoint as being a Democrat, your specific values that you adhere to personally. Do you think that, specifically, the Democratic Party--I know you said your constituency in Lorain itself, or your region, didn't have the biggest influence on why you looked at NAFTA this way. Would you

say that the American public as a whole and the people in Mexico and Canada were more of a reason?

Brown: Um, yeah, I mean all--laughs. That's a little bit of a set-up question, and I know you don't mean it that way, but. I mean, the fact that it, I mean that--how do I say this that I'm being clear? My position coincides with what I think is the best interest of my district and what is the best interest of most Canadians, Mexicans, and Americans. It's not coincident with what the wealthiest people in those three countries-what their interests are. But, I'd like to think that--I almost, by my first answer and then where you went with it, was almost like I was indifferent to the interests of my district. And I know you're not saying that, but you could almost read that into it. So, I mean, my interest is, my--you kind of look at. You look at all issues. How does this affect the country? How does this affect your district? Maybe sometimes it's your district's over why I think sometimes the country does, but I think my values--I don't think you could--I mean implicit in your comments are that, that I'm doing it because I believe it, not because it's the best interests of the country necessarily. Well, I think my beliefs coincide with the best interests of the country. I voted against the Iraq War because I thought it was bad for the United States and Iraq and our image in the world. So, that fits my philosophy. My philosophy is centered around, as what most people's are, I assume, what's best for the country or the world.

Perin: Here are a couple more broad and general questions about the NAFTA and environment debate in general. You kind of answered this in the very first part of the interview, but: Why do you think that so many other policymakers, interest groups, and American citizens held similar views about NAFTA and the environment at this time? Two years before NAFTA was negotiated, the United States and Canada created a FTA [Free Trade Agreement] which received little opposition from environmentalists. So, why NAFTA instead of the Canada-U.S. FTA?

Brown: Because the U.S.--because Canada's environmental--because merging the Canada's--Canada's and the U.S.'s economy--the environment, I would say two things. The less important of the two is that there probably wasn't the sophistication in the environmental community that there was later. But, I think the bigger answer--the more important answer is that Canada and the U.S. have similar environmental standards. I would have guessed, but only guessed, that Canada's were stronger. So, there wasn't the danger of what George Bush, Senior--he didn't speak it as a danger, but I would have--harmonization. He said, "We need to harmonize all of these rules and regulations and economies and all that." But the harmonization, harmonization by practice--President Bush meant it this way or not. He probably did--harmonization by practice means pulling standards down. They don't have to mean that, but they kind of always do. So, it wasn't a question of the U.S. being pulled down to Canadian standards. Maybe the U.S. would be pulled up, maybe Canada might have been pulled down a little, but it wouldn't have made much of a difference. I think they weren't as--the environmentalists weren't as sophisticated because they didn't look, sort of, they didn't look to what this meant on future trade agreements. But environmentalists weren't paying attention--the country wasn't paying attention, as I said earlier. The country wasn't paying much attention to

trade agreements until after the Canadian one. Because the Canadian one didn't do much damage to us or to Canada. It probably helped in some ways. It probably--I mean I know there are some issues on something called "Durham Wheat," which is what you make brooms out of, I guess. Was it Durham--it was some weird thing that. Some district--the one district in the country that grows some kind of wheat and the straw they make brooms out of or something. I mean, just little things like that, I think, that got hurt by the Canadian deal. But, um, I wouldn't have written a book about trade if there were always trade agreements between the U.S. and Canada, or Australia, or countries that have decent labor standards.

Perin: On the same level.

Brown: Yeah, more or less the same level. And, I wouldn't have written this book, likely, if the U.S. had seemed to do trade the way the E.U. did. They'd bring in countries slowly after they reached a fairly high bar of environmental--over a fairly high bar of environmental, food safety, worker rights, IRO standards, all of that. If those countries--and wages of those countries--get to those standards, they're admitted. But our trade agreements aren't anything like that.

Perin: I know that one of your arguments is that Bush was trying to rush into this trade agreement too quickly and that the E.U. took thirty to forty years to get to where it is today.

Brown: Right. Right.

Perin: Alright, some scholars have argued that it was the context in which the United States, Canada, and Mexico debate NAFTA that caused the agreement to receive such a large degree of opposition. For example, some scholars have argued that the post-Cold War context allowed for more issues to be addressed, such as environmental protection, than would have been an issue during the Cold War. Others contend that the Republican and Democrat Party's reversal on trade issues by the early 1990s caused a significant amount of opposition to the agreement to form. Do you think that environmental opposition to NAFTA resulted from the *time* in which the United States, Canada, and Mexico negotiated the agreement in the early 1990s, or do you think it was primarily because Mexico, a developing country, was to be part of the agreement?

Brown: I think it was more of the latter. But, I mean, it was certainly both. Um, I think it was the time. But the time is--what was happening at that time was not a very good economy. If the economy is great, the trade agreements get more support. If the economy is bad, they don't. Um, so it was the economy, it was loss in manufacturing especially. Um, it was, um, it was Ross Perot's campaign, highlighting it, even though he was terrible in terms of how he articulated it. I remember thinking, writing about that in my book, when he debated Gore, he couldn't--No, I remember thinking about that debate ahead of time, and I was rooting against the Vice President of my party, but so what. And I was just thinking, "You know all Perot has to do is make a couple of really cogent, strong, logical arguments. Doesn't have to win the debate. Doesn't have to make more

good points than Gore. Doesn't have to answer Gore's charges. He just needs to do that." And Perot was, he was too egocentric to do anything but just be weird. And he was so thrown off by Gore's bull-shit about, uh, Smoot-Hawley, which everybody bought because nobody knew the history--I didn't even know the history of it then either, until I really started reading it. But, uh, Perot was, in the newspapers--I think I mentioned this in my book--the largest newspaper in the country to oppose it was the *Toledo Blade* and CAFTA was, it was much different than CAFTA, just horrible. The *New York Times*, the *Washington Post* were just vicious towards those of us that opposed to these trade agreements on CAFTA. I have--no publishers ever lose their jobs to trade agreements and they just, they--what's interesting about this is those same people--Bill Clinton was in this category and I never could get this out of him--I never asked him directly, but he really, uh--my relationship, personal relationship with him was effected by NAFTA pretty deeply. I mean, for whatever reason, Clinton didn't--you could vote against Clinton on his budget, you could vote against him on welfare, you could vote against him on lots of things, and he didn't take it personally. But if you voted against him on NAFTA, particularly if you fought him on it like I did and like Marcy did and a handful of us did, he really took it personally. And he--because I think he thought it was going to be his legacy. Globalization, or something. I don't know. But, in--my relationship with Clinton was never as good as it would have been because of that. But, um, what I was going to say was that, in a nutshell, what disturbs me, what still puzzles me is that people like Clinton--who are, you know, pretty conservative Democrats--but people like Clinton--well there were other Democrats who voted for these agreements, like Pelosy voted for NAFTA. She did it because she wanted to help a Democratic President in his first year. That was more or less. . . [unable to transcribe the rest of the sentence]. But, what they did with the trade agreement, what Bill Clinton and what most modern Democrats and progressive Democrats believe, we believe in free-enterprise, but we think we need rules. We need worker safety rules, we need environmental laws, we need various kinds of [unable to transcribe] of child labor, whatever, the rules that surround free markets. Well, if we had free markets with no rules, you could hire people at $2.00 an hour, you could exploit children, you could fire people without cause, you could dump all your shit in the ocean or the lake or in the air--I mean, it's free enterprise with no rules. So, you need free enterprise with rules. But they don't apply that same free trade model--they don't apply it with free trade. And to me it's identical. Free enterprise with rules. Free trade with rules. And that's all we're asking--those of us opposing these free trade agreements--all we're asking is that trade have rules. And what Bush does, worse than Clinton--Clinton was bad, Bush is significantly worse--what Bush does is he applies all the rules to protect property. He applies the rules to Hollywood films, he applies to rules to the prescription drug industry, he applies the rules to protect all kinds of intellectual property, including Microsoft, or anything else, but he won't apply these same rules to the environment, food safety, and workers. So, that's, in a nutshell, why these trade agreements are awful.

Perin: There's something that I've just been dying to ask you about because, from reading your book and--

Brown: Dying to ask me about? Is it that big a deal?

Perin: Laughs. No, um. I thought one of the most interesting parts of your book was you describing all the votes that have taken place in the wee hours of the night when everybody else is asleep in the country, and, which is exactly what just happened with CAFTA.

Brown: We just did it again, yep.

Perin: Yep. But you specifically described in one part that I remember the Trade Promotion Authority or fast-track vote in 2001, which included an "unprecedented twenty-three minute delay that kept the vote open and frantic last minute arm-twisting, horse-trading, and blatant political bribery by Republican leaders" on the House floor. Now, from what I understand, this is similar to what was happening on November 17, 1993 when NAFTA was voted upon in the House. Can you describe to me what it was like to be in the House that day?

Brown: Well, I think that, and my memory's not that good. Do you know what you did twelve years ago? How old are you?

Perin: Twenty-three.

Brown: You don't know what you did twelve years ago, do you?

Perin: Not today. But NAFTA was pretty historic, you know!

Brown: No, NAFTA was defeated, was already passed by the night it was on. It's interesting to me though, I thought the way you were going to go, was that it was twenty-three minutes, and twenty-three minutes is short now, considering how much they do it. I laid out in the book the whole--did you read both of my books or just the trade one?

Perin: Just the trade one.

Brown: Did I lay out in my book the middle of the night stuff? The hours and all that stuff?

Perin: Uh-huh.

Brown: Okay, because I put it in the other book too, I think, in the last edition, but anyway. Um, this is something, this is something else [hands me papers], but there's also something Public Citizen put out about all the deals and how they were unfulfilled. The great thing is, Clinton made these promises--one woman he made promises, the same thing three times and she bought it each time and she never got it. It was just kind of amazing. But in NAFTA there wasn't the horse-trading on the floor, there wasn't the wheeling and dealing. That had all been done already. So, by the time it got to the floor--I mean, David Bonior was the Democratic Whip, and he said to me two nights before, he said, "Come on down." Because I'd worked so hard on it, and he wanted to talk to me

about it, and he was kind of my mentor. He said, "We're going to lose." And I said, "No we aren't!" And he said, "Yeah we are." The votes were gone by then. But Clinton had made the deals. I mean he had gotten six floor Republicans who had campaigned against NAFTA to say they were going to vote for it--to change their votes, because he had made some vegetable, some winter vegetable deal, I don't remember precisely what it was, Laurie, but something. Winter fruits or winter vegetables. By the time the vote came--well, it was not a one-vote margin. It was a 230 to 200, or something like that?

Perin: 234 to 200.

Brown: But anyway, we were ahead until the last month. But, that's how this stuff always works, because the White House--particularly if the White House, if the same party that runs the White House has the Congress, there are unbelievable amounts of things they can give to members of Congress. They can give or take away committee chairs, they can give you a lobbying business after you leave Congress if you're lame duck, they can raise money for you, they can give you a appropriations. Some Democrat told me they wanted to see the President's people--this guy was sort of undecided, but he was really just seeing what the were going to do--and they said, "You can have a $30 dollar appropriation on whatever you want." So, taxpayers, ultimately, pay these bribes.

Perin: To me that's just--

Brown: Somebody said, after the vote, that they were going to--some lobbyist that was on our side, some group, I don't remember--he said that if people would have went with their consciences, it would have lost by a few votes. A few Democrats voted no on CAFTA just to stick it to Bush, but not very many. Maybe five. But a whole bunch of Republicans voted yes, because they had deals, or Bush beat them up, or whatever the deal.

Perin: Do you think NAFTA was as partisan--

Brown: No, NAFTA clearly wasn't. In fact, more Republicans than Democrats voted for it. Trade deals--what you've got to understand--trade deals are going to be more partisan with a Republican President, because, first of all--I mean, Clinton's last trade-deal, Jordan, in 2000 was actually pretty good. I voted for it. It was a voice vote, so it's not recorded, but I was in the chamber, and I yelled out a "yes" when they called the vote. And nobody yelled out "no." So, it was, um, it had labor stands, environmental stands--pretty good. Not as good--I would have written then better, but they were better in my viewpoint. But, they, so Clinton had evolved into labor and environmental standards. He learned from NAFTA that that's not the way to do it. Um, I sent a note to--I'll show you this before you leave--well, let's see if I have it. I sent Clinton my book, and it wasn't very complimentary to him. [He leaves the room.] And, I wrote in, it was part of the book on page 128, when Clinton was, um. [Reads from book] "And China, after congressional passage of PNTR, continues to prove it. In August 2000, in the irony of all ironies, Chinese customs officials seized 16,000 copies of *The Clinton Years*, a 227-page coffee-table book of black-and-white photographs of the president of the

United States. The Chinese government confiscated the books, which were printed in English for sale in the United States, from a bindery in Schenzen in south China after they had been printed in Hong Kong. The officials' objection was a picture of Clinton in 1994 shaking hands with the Dalai Lama." So, you know, Clinton got it through Congress for him. They were printing Clinton's book, ironically enough, in China, and the Chinese censor wouldn't even allow it in the U.S., because it had--so I sent Clinton a letter with the book that said, "You might be amused in reading this page." And so he sent me this back. [Hands me a letter.] But it, um, Clinton will read the book--I'm going to call him at some point and see if I can talk to him about the book--but he will read the book, because he reads everything.

Perin: I'm actually reading his book *My Life*.

Brown: You're reading *My Life*? It's what? I haven't read it yet and I don't wish to.

Perin: Well, I read it at night when I'm trying to get sleepy.

Brown: Are you a full-time grad-student?

Perin: Yeah.

Brown: Do you want to teach?

Perin: No, not at this point.

Brown: What do you want to do?

Perin: Um, I'm probably going to take some time off and try to work, get a couple years experience in some environmental policy-work and then maybe go on to get my PhD.

Brown: Do you think we should have stronger environmental laws in this country?

Perin: I just think they need to be enforced more. For example, I did an internship with Ohio Citizen Action, based out of Cleveland. They're working on a campaign in Toledo on the Sunoco Refinery. You wouldn't believe the amount of stuff that refinery can get away with. They just actually settled a lawsuit with the U.S. EPA and they're forced to make millions of dollars in repairs to the refinery by *2009*. So the citizens who live, you know, right outside of the gates are still going to--

Brown: It's always poor people.

Perin: Oh! Their health problems. It's horrible. They're too poor to even move. One woman--she doesn't have a car. She can't even leave her house. She doesn't even have a stove! It's just, really sad.

Brown: About five more minutes. Can we wrap it up?

Perin: Yeah. Another things about Clinton that's interesting to me--I mean, if I had to take a guess, I would guess that his stance on NAFTA was all political to try to win support for the election because he kind of took both stances.

Brown: Well, he dodged. Yeah. Well I think it's--I don't blame him for doing it then, but I think he could have, um, because he wanted to be a "New Democrat," but didn't, you know, want to [unable to transcribe], but he could have done it very differently after his office. Clinton, Clinton. One real quick story, I was talking to Nancy Pelosy once and she said when she was--do you know what Make a Wish Foundation is? When some kid's dying and they get their last wish--or *a* wish. And somebody in her district wanted to meet Bill Clinton. So he shows up, Nancy takes him into the Oval Office and he has like these English knickers, these shorts on and knee socks--this little kid does. Suspenders and whatever he had one. He walks in and Clinton, who is very, very good with children, probably better than anybody. And Clinton says, "You know. I always wanted to dress like that when I was a little boy, but I was too fat." And Nancy, Nancy telling it is in a way--that she just thinks that, you know, Clinton always wanted to be accepted. And he always wanted to be accepted by the elite in this country. And that was his problem. I mean, I don't think Clinton has very strong political views, except about civil rights. I think he's *very* good on civil rights. And I think it's deeply held--part of where he grew up, part of his own hardships, perhaps, I don't know.

Perin: Yeah, that's clear in his book.

Brown: But I don't think he had strong feelings about much of anything else and I think that he wanted acceptance from the elite, and you know, one of the things about trade, is the elite in this country are all on one place on trade. And I've had people come up to me, one of my--a good friend of mine, a fairly good friend, better friend of my brother's, working in Cleveland--he's a liberal Democrat by most stands--he came up to me and said, "Sherrod, I'm an internationalist." And I said, "Yeah, I'm a moron." I mean it's just, if you're a thinking person--I mean, people have said--I've had people write to me and say, "OK [unable to transcribe because assistant came in to warn about the time]. People have said to me--I've had letters that saying, "You went to Yale. How could you be on this side of trade?" I mean, it's just--the newspaper publishers, the presidents, the CEOs, most of the economists, they just think trade agreements--that you've got to be a free trader and give the world over to corporate interests and I don't buy it. Anyway.

Perin: Well, I commend the work that you've done because--

Brown: Send me your paper when you're done. Can I see it?

Perin: Yes, you can.

APPENDIX III: TRANSCRIBED INTERVIEW WITH CONGRESSWOMAN MARCY KAPTUR, JULY 6, 2005 AT 3:00 P.M. IN TOLEDO, OHIO.

Interviewer: Laurie Perin
Interviewee: Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur

Laurie Perin: Let's start with the first part of the interview. Now, I know that you're main concern within NAFTA was job loss and worker rights and that's really what you fought for, but I also know that you fought for environmental protection. I know that you were concerned about pollution along the American-Mexican border. I know that you were concerned about environmental--U.S. environmental--laws being "dragged down" to the level of Mexico's. I know that you were also concerned that most attention was being focused upon the pollution along the Mexican-American border and not as much in the Great Lakes area along the Canada-United States border. And I know that you still remain concerned about the environment within NAFTA today. So, my first question really is: What influenced your perception of environmental protection along the United States's borders with Mexico and Canada and for protecting U.S. environmental laws in the Canada-United States border within NAFTA?

Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur: Before NAFTA's passage, I traveled to the region along our border into Mexico extensively, along with other members of Congress, and we experienced life in the communities adjacent to the border and in many of the so-called Maquiladora zones--Maquila Zones--where these factories were already proliferating *before* NAFTA's passage. We witnessed industrial production by *U.S.-based* companies, as well as other international firms, particularly from Asia, operating in those areas with no, uh, central sewage treatment, for example. With, uh, the problems of the Tijuana area, for example, coming up into Southern California, and the United States being forced to build a billion dollar treatment plant to try to handle all of the waste coming out of Mexico, *already*, even before this passed. We knew NAFTA was going to exacerbate, that was our theory, it would exacerbate investment, it would exacerbate these problems. Others were saying, "Oh, no! This will just really promote development that will produce all this wealth and then, you know, all of this will be taken care of on its own. There'll be enough revenues produced. We won't have anymore environmental problems." We went down there--the only plant we saw was when, oh, I'm trying to think, it was in the Tijuana area or Madamalas, anyway it was a General Motors company that literally had dammed off its site and was trying to collect the waste interior--within that interior parcel--and trying to treat it with a little package treatment plant. That was the *only* place that had that kind of effort put forward. There was no environmental enforcement. We met--we went down to Mexico City, we met with the environmental ministers. "Don't worry, Congresswoman, uh, look at our laws." Yeah, the laws look great but there was no enforcement and no money. And so it was direct experience with actually traveling through those areas, seeing what was happening. [Laughs] There was, a chicken died. We were in one community and the chickens were eating in the water, and one just died right in front of us. People were, were watering their cows in *filthy*, uh, streams in these lower income communities that we were in. And it was just direct experience coming into Mexico City seeing people on dumps--dogs digging out of dumps-

-and just the huge problems *prior* to NAFTA's passage. And then when NAFTA was considered, our belief that NAFTA was more than an agreement, NAFTA should be a treaty so we could deal with water issues, so we could deal with cross border issues. But the George Bush the first administration and--which negotiated the treaty--and then President Bill Clinton, who pushed it through Congress, did not want to have any environmental concerns included in the main body of the agreement. But it was personal experience. During the Carter administration--I actually worked for President Carter--I had traveled down on the U.S. side of the border, and I saw, even on the US side, the tremendous need in the area we call the Colonias for water, for housing, for basic infrastructure. The Mexican side is even more limited income. It's, uh, a lot of squatters, squalor communities, and, so our thought was, when we did NAFTA originally, we should have like a development zone. We *knew* NAFTA was going to propel development into Mexico. The question was how were we going to prepare for it. And the environmental piece was totally missing. And so they said, "We'll put it in the side agreement, we'll negotiate it in a side agreement, not as a part of the main agreement." Well, in any type of international arrangement of this magnitude, you ought to have a treaty. Canada passed NAFTA as a treaty. Mexico passed NAFTA as a treaty. The United States only passed it as an agreement, because the administration did not believe it could get the 2/3 votes that were necessary in the Congress. And so we're the only party to that agreement that didn't sign it as a treaty. And I think that if you'd have had a treaty--which I agree with, it should have been a treaty--then you could have gotten into some of these other issues more exhaustively. From the Great Lakes standpoint, I was very concerned because NAFTA defines water as a commodity. And, we all know that commodities are traded, and we have one great advantage here, among others, and that's our fresh water. And I am very worried about diversion, because that part of the continent is water short. And, unless they figure out how to desalinate water cheaply, the gas pipelines that run North can carry water South, and I am very worried about our ability to manage our water asset in the years ahead. So, both from the Mexican and our border side to our issues in the Great Lakes, we were concerned about the environment. And then, finally, one of the members that voted for NAFTA said, "Well, all of the problems will be solved by something called NADBank--the North American Development Bank." They were able to secure his vote through inclusion in the agreement of this NADBank, which was supposed to fund infrastructure development along the border and 10% of the dollars of NADBank were to be used in communities in the North that had been hurt by NAFTA's passage by job dislocation. Well, NADBank passed as a part of the treaty, but it has *never* really functioned. It is sitting under the Secretary of the Treasury, it's not been funded, it's terribly managed, and, if you go down to the border now, which I just did a year and a half ago, one of the things NAFTA did was it uprooted nearly two million farmers whose lands were taken away from them. And they're wandering the country side, and they're gravitating North, which they view as salvation, right, or to Mexico City. But a lot of them are coming North, and they're forming more and more of these squatter communities, and they are very unhealthy to live in. We visited a number of them back in, uh, a year ago November, I think it was when we went, and the environmental issues--there is no money--and what's happening is our Government is trying to, um, indirectly fund through a number of different accounts different border improvement projects. Taking money from *U.S. taxpayers* to fund treatment plants, uh, what I call minor infrastructure down on the border, rather than having an environmental plan for that region, which the cross border trade pays for. That burden is now being paid for by our general taxpayers, if it's being done at all, many of whom have lost their jobs in the United States. So, I didn't think the financing of even what is

currently being done was fair. It should relate to those instrumentalities that benefited from trade, and they should pay for the improvements and they are not.

Perin: Thank you. The next question I have for you is: Do you consider yourself to be an environmentalist, and, if so, when did you first become concerned with protecting the environment?

Kaptur: I consider myself a conservationist and a steward and for are far back as I can remember, when our grandmother, who could hardly speak English, walked with us along this river, back when I was a child, and she said, "America will pay a very heavy price for her neglect." And sure enough, it was twenty-five years later, after she had said that--and she had no degree from anywhere, just life, and she had grown up in the countryside in Eastern Europe--we began, long before I was in Congress, to pass Clean Water Acts and Clean Air Acts. And she understood intuitively the relationship to the environment. And so it goes way back into my family history. And then, as I became educated, I took courses in the sciences. For grade school, I was educated by the Franciscan Sisters--you can't come out of the education without loving the environment. And then in college I took several courses. In fact, I was just reminded that yesterday a Senator died, Senator Gaylord Nelson, who had retired, he was the Senator from Wisconsin who, uh, died at age 89, but, when I was in college, I traveled to Washington for the first time and met him. And he was the father, he was the author of Earth Day. And so his work in that arena, as well as the Clean Air Act, helped to add to what I was already carrying, kind of a heritage of conservation and of stewardship that had come from my early years and all my teachers and my family. In fact, in back of you there is a, um, a window box on the very bottom shelf that comes from the village of our Grandmother in what is now modern day Ukraine, which just went through its own velvet revolution. And every single stone and piece of bark and bug and butterfly and insect--everything in there--is exactly from the area from which she came. And I was presented that by the people of Ukraine when I was there on one trip. I was so impressed that they did that and that really means a lot to me.

Staff Assistant Daniel E. Foote: That's a work of art. That would take weeks to put together.

Kaptur: Oh, it's just lovely. Mushrooms, everything, flowers.

Foote: Those are the bugs you wouldn't want living under your bed!

Kaptur: [Laughs] Yea, because you know because, about our area, someone who doesn't come from this area, said to me, "You know traveling around Ohio, there isn't another community like Toledo, because there are big metro parks, there are city parks that are all interconnected. There is a sense of the environment here that is missing in so much of the rest of Ohio. If you go to the city, if you look around. The way that we handle nature here. There's a great deal of respect. Not that there aren't state parks and bike trails and, you know, certain other--but, as a whole community, I always call our place a city in a garden. Toledo's a city in a garden, because we really do have, I think, a sense of the environment that many people contribute to.

Perin: Do you belong to any environmental organizations?

Kaptur: Well, I'm trained as a city and regional planner and so, I guess, the American Planning Association would be my primary organization that I belong to. And then--I mean I donate money to a lot of different groups over the years, gosh, especially locally, Toledo Botanical Gardens and the metro parks and, um, I'm not a member of--I don't really participate in a lot of national organizations. The Wildlife Federation, I always try to buy their Christmas cards. I try to give support back to the wild over in Casadalia, Toledo Zoo, those kinds of organizations. I brought Federal support to the life lab at Lourdes College, which is very involved in the education of teachers of children to teach them how to teach about the environment. Very supportive of Toledo Grows, a program out at the Botanical Gardens, to grow--to help our school children learn about growing plants at the grade school level. They develop a little more sensitivity to the environment. I think our children are--today's children in America--are very robbed of nature experience. They think going camping means going to the Holiday Inn in Perrysburg and using the pool.

Perin: Yeah [Laughs].

Kaptur: And they're very out of touch with nature, and I think it hurts them. In fact, there was a story in the paper yesterday about how many hours you watch TV and what it does to a child and, um, they're hot house flowers. And that's not good. So, I'm very interested in environmental education. I guess I've spent a lot of time--we brought in money to create--where the old work house property was in Western Lucas County--

Foote: Quarry Pond.

Kaptur: Pardon?

Foote: Quarry Pond.

Kaptur: Quarry Pond, yes. Quarry Pond out there--to create a nature education center. I brought in money now--we've expanded the Ottawa Wildlife Refuge. It will be an international refuge before we're done with it, but we'll have an environmental education center there, which is under construction. During my tenure in office, we've doubled the amount of acreage on Lake Erie now, and our wildlife refuges to help with our fly ways--we're one of just a few North American fly ways. So, we're restoring our bird population. And, so I try to add to--and improve--the environment that we were given as part of what we do. We've done a lot of work on Darby Creek--a lot of cleanup on rivers. One of the things I inherited from this job are just *a lot* of toxic sites. And one of my hardest jobs is trying to bring in money to help clean this up. It's not like I have a *pure* environment that I'm working with. I have a very damaged environment that I have to try to repair. One of the rivers in this city, the Ottawa River, is the most polluted river in Ohio and just to clean it up takes hundreds of millions of dollars. So, I think I'm thinking about, now after we've done a lot of the work, I think we're going to see if we can divert the river, if we can change its path. It was changed once before. Because I don't think we're going to be able to get the toxics up and they're leeching into Lake Erie. So, I have a lot of very specific projects we work on to try to clean up some of what we've been given.

Perin: You kind of answered part of my next question, which was: Have you worked on projects that dealt with environmental issues? And you just said yes, you've worked on several. Have you been responsible for any other environmental legislation, perhaps at the federal level, that you can recall, in your career?

Kaptur: Well, we're always passing laws to update the Clean Water Act, to update the Clean Air Act. I'm very interested in drafting legislation, which I haven't done yet, on clean soil. And providing to the U.S. Department of the Interior authority to operate our National Parks as a part of my work and expand our National Parks and the services they offer. As a part of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, making sure we have funds for our National--for our Forest Service, our National Forest Service. And expanding our National Forests where we can. Laws dealing with clear cutting and *now* a major infestation of insects that are threatening out hardwoods. Right here at Creason Park, we're cutting down about a third of our ash trees right now, just in this region, because of the emerald ash bore. And our hardwoods could be next. In fact, I was just out at Lake Erie over the weekend and somebody showed me a tree. I don't know, it was a cottonwood that had big, like rusty spots on it. They said, "Marcy do you know what that is?" I said, "Oh, boy. I hope it's not the Asian long-heart beetle." I said, "I don't know, but that is very weird looking to me, whatever's going on there!" So, a lot of laws that deal with funding for remediation, funding for understanding are there any natural predators for what may be troubling our living plants and living species. As far as our region goes, national legislation to create the Maumee River Heritage Corridor between the Port of Toledo and Fort Wayne, Indiana. National legislation to expand the Ottawa National Wildlife Refuge to include everything from lower Michigan, all Detroit, all along the Toledo coast, all the way East to Sandusky so that we have a big foot print on the Great Lakes and, at least this part of the Great Lakes, legislation dealing with the Great Lakes to prevent the diversion of those waters to, and the drilling for oil under our Great Lakes. There've been a lot of bills, I mean I could go on for a long time.

Foote: If I may, there's just a whole host of things also with all your votes for the EPA and those kinds of things. The Corp of Engineers with the projects out in Wood County, with the cleanup out there in Luckey. Um--

Kaptur: [unable to transcribe...] toxics.

Foote: --leftover from previous generations. And then your whole initiative on alternative energy is also all linked to the environment.

Kaptur: You what you said about the clean up issue on the Two Saint River, we have all of this unexploded ordinance that's been there from Camp Perry for years and it's a *huge* problem, *huge*. It's floating out to the base of Lake Erie and there's areas where you can't move a boat because this stuff can go at anytime--its explosive. And so we're going to try to bring in dollars to begin to try to clean some of that up--it's a *massive* job, but there are a lot of hidden things people around here don't even know are here. And Dan mentioned alternative energy. Solar, wind, making enormous investments in this region to try to bring on new sources of renewable energy. Bio-fuel, using corn and soy beans and bio-mass. Renewable sources to produce power. I left a meeting this morning in the area of hydrogen power. They're not just working on natural

production of hydrogen, new fuel cells moving away from the oil age. We've got to get away from that into new power forms.

Perin: Some scholars have argued that an individual's values take shape as he or she reaches adulthood and then change relatively little thereafter. Therefore, value change among the American public isn't something that happens over night, but it's something that changes slowly as younger generations replace older generations. Based upon these analyses, one could argue that the post-World War II generation came of age in approximately the 1960s and 1970s. Many individuals from this generation were members of Congress in the early 1990s, like yourself. Therefore, some of the Congressmen and women could have values and beliefs that differed from older members in Congress, such as environmentalism. Do you agree with this analysis? Would you say that environmentalism is a value you developed from growing up during the environmental movement in the late 1960s and 1970s, and, if so, did this value influence your perception of environmental protection within NAFTA?

Kaptur: I think that the activities of the, of Earth Day and of the events that happened, for example the Cuyahoga River burning, created a consciousness that Earth Day focused. So it gave people something to organize around. And I think for me you could say it helped focus me more, but I would have to say that my values were formed much earlier than that. And that I carried those into office and probably trained to be a city planner because I always loved the land. And that came from my family, and, uh, it came through the tradition--very ancient traditions, really, in our family--and we were growing up in an area that I saw change. We grew up, we weren't the City of Toledo, we were a more rural area and then we became urban. And so when you live through that transformation you think about different ways of living and, uh, so we were very close to nature as children. So, I think Earth Day just gave a word to how we were already living. But I think that it helped to focus a very urban country--what had become a very urban country--on what were then called "environmental concerns." It gave it a new name, kind of gave it a Good Housekeeping seal of approval. And people gravitated to that and a new agency was set up, the Environmental Protection Agency, which focused more heavily on cities because one of the first things that it did was to try to help build treatment plants around the county to deal with all this raw sewage and our closed beaches--and, by the way, we still have those. It's getting better, but we still haven't solved all of those problems in this region. But I do think that, for me *personally*, what that period did was it helped to focus me. But the actual reason I went into city planning was I was trying to be relevant to my own time. And when I was in, during the 1960s, in college, several of our neighborhoods in our big cities burned to the ground because we had gone through the Civil Rights Movement. And that was an immediate need, to try to help to rebuild America and its a very historic community. So, I think I went into city and regional planning more out of that motivation than initially an environmental one.

Perin: I just, I have a hypothesis that, you know, maybe some of the older members of Congress might not have had these same values or beliefs, because, perhaps, they had already developed their values prior to the environmental movement, that, unlike you, maybe weren't already environmentally focused.

Kaptur: I'd say that's probably true.

Perin: So for those who didn't really see the environment as a problem during NAFTA, I'm wondering, was it because they were older? And, another thought that I might have was, *was* the environment such a concern within NAFTA because there was a whole new group of people, a whole new generation, coming to power in government at that time who maybe had these different values.

Kaptur: It would be interesting to look at the ages of the people who voted at that time. I don't know what it would show, I've never thought about that.

Perin: I know that there were a lot of Democratic freshman in that year in the House. I know Sherrod Brown was one, or he'd been in the House a year or two.

Foote: 1994? By November of 1994?

Perin: Um, I think he came to office in 1992 or 1993.

Foote: So it would have been his, the end of his first term.

Kaptur: You know, you ought to--it would be very interesting to go back to the Congressional Directory at that time and do an age cross-cut. *That* would be *very* interesting. I have no idea. I never looked at it that way.

Foote: We don't have any old Directories that go back that far. I've got one that's a couple years old, but nothing back to 1994 or 1995.

Kaptur: It wouldn't take long to do.

Perin: I bet there's something online, or Bowling Green's library has a great Government Documents collection.

Kaptur: Uh huh, you could go back to the Congressional Directory at that time and look at their name and look at their age and how they voted. It'd be easy! That's a definable project! [Laughs]

Perin: That's just one, that's just kind of one component of my project. You know, I'm looking at people's values and beliefs and then trying to see how or why they voted or defined policy in these specific ways, and I just kind of thought, maybe, age and values and beliefs were kind of connected in that kind of way and that's why I was asking you that question.

Foote: We used to talk about Ronald Reagan's values being formed prior to World War II and there we were in the 1980s.

Perin: And according to these scholars, once you form a specific set values system, like you did as a young child [to Marcy], it didn't, it hasn't changed through the time. And these scholars claim that you do develop them as a child or as you're reaching adulthood, and your values stay the same for the most part throughout your adulthood. So, I think that'd be something interesting

to look at. You kind of already answered this question indirectly, but I'll ask it again incase you can think of anything else you'd like to add. Were you concerned with environmentalism within NAFTA because you represent an industrial area that borders that Great Lakes?

Kaptur: Well, I am worried about water diversion and our fresh water asset being *so* precious on the face of the continent and the earth and it was unclear when water is defined as a commodity and what can happen in the future. But I think, I had served a President of the United States, so I think I had at least a national focus, if not an international one, when I had traveled down into that region, though not in Mexico, but along the border in Laredo and other cities--San Antonio--when I worked for President Carter. So, I had some exposure to actually being there, spending the time and thinking about conditions on both sides of the border. And then by the time we voted on NAFTA, I had been in Congress for about, over a decade. And I had had visits to my office by, for example, farmers who told me that if you go down to Mexico there were--and Honduras and some of these other countries--the farmers down there were allowed to use DDT, and DDT was banned in the United States. And then those tomatoes were able to be introduced into the United States and how could that be? And so my constituents had experienced the dissimilarity in environmental regulations. And I had businessmen tell me, "Oh, there's one way you do business in Tijuana. You cross somebody's palm with money. My company asked me to do it, to go down there and build a parts supply company. I did it." So I had people talk to me about conditions and I learned a lot through my constituents. So it was a combination.

Foote: Did you travel to NAFTA prior to the vote--or, did you travel to Mexico prior to the NAFTA vote?

Kaptur: Oh, yes. We have that trip report, too.

Perin: Was that the Human Fact of Trade group?

Kaptur: Yes, the Human *Face* of Trade.

Perin: I mean the Human *Face* of Trade? You just mentioned your constituency, which kind of ties into the next question. Did you fight for environmental protection within NAFTA at the request of your constituency or the Democratic Party, or did you fight for environmental protections based upon your own pre-existing values and ideologies? Now I know that you just said that you fought for your constituency and because of your values and beliefs. Do you think that any of these outweighed the other? Or, did all of these different things influence the way you thought?

Kaptur: It was a blend. We looked for an integrated position where you're receiving all of this different information from your constituents, and then, at the national level, the environmental groups were *very* organized on this. And many of them, of course, reach across the border. They're national or international in their scope, and they were deeply concerned about what could happen to NAFTA, to its enforcement. They felt that enforcement wouldn't be equal--we certainly saw that when we were down there--and Mexico didn't have the money to invest in all of these first world treatment plants and package treatment plants and water lines and, there

wasn't really--this one bell pepper grower said to me, "Marcy, I've been going down to Mexico my whole life." He said, "All of the peppers that are coming out of that little community, and they can't even put in a paved road. People work so hard. Why not?" I said, "Because they've got the wrong government. They don't have state of mind where they want to make life better for the people. They might make life better for the governor or the three rich guys that run the state, but the perspective's not to make life better for all. And when you don't have that perspective, then all that money that's made doesn't have any broad distribution. The benefits of it aren't broadly distributed." And he said, "Yea," he said, "As hard as the people work, they don't seem to ever get ahead." And that has a lot to do with the way that country's governed.

Perin: Lack of democracy?

Kaptur: The lack of a real operational democracy there.

Perin: Well, that's the end of part one and part two will now focus on more general questions about NAFTA and the environment debate, OK?

Kaptur: OK.
Perin: Why do you think that so many other policymakers, interest groups, and American citizens held similar views about NAFTA and the environment at this time?

Kaptur: Why do I think, back in 1993, you mean?

Perin: Back in--from the moment that NAFTA was first proposed, to, throughout the entire debate, throughout the entire three year debate, there was just such an opposition to NAFTA for environmental reasons. Why do you suppose that that was happening at that time when it hadn't happened at an earlier date in other trade talks? To me that's what I really think is interesting about this, that in the early-1990s, this caused such a stir within environmentalism.

Kaptur: That's a good question. I suppose because environmental organizations were very global in their thinking. I think environmentalists break the bounds of nationality because the patterns of wind know no boundaries, the patterns of water know no boundaries. And I think at that point, the environmental organizations had matured to a point where they understood some of the economic activity and life--the interconnections--and therefore their friendship, whether they were worried about rainforests and what impact that has on rain fall and toxics in the Great Lakes--their thinking was very broad and there were enough of them that they communicated. And they were also webbed very well on the Internet, even back then, and so they had a way of communicating with one another that probably hadn't existed in the past. They had a national presence with organizations that could help mobilize them. And you even had organizations like Green Peace, which are really global, they were global before the U.S. even--

Foote: Yea, thought about NAFTA.

Kaptur: --and so I think it was, there was a consciousness that had gelled by then that perhaps hadn't have existed before.

Foote: Do you think the proximity to the United States had anything to do with it? I mean, as opposed to a trade agreement with China or Japan or something. They're right at our front door, so to speak. I remember all the talks about waste flowing North into Arizona and so forth, and, you know, all the concerns that environmentalists had even before NAFTA, not just on the eve of NAFTA. And I always thought it was concern for the fact that Mexico and the United States were so close as opposed to some of the other countries that we have trade agreements with.

Perin: A lot of scholars have discussed that and not only was it proximity, I think, but also the fact that Mexico was a developing country that the United States was dealing with and, as you mentioned [to Marcy], didn't have a very well functioning democracy, and I think that that was a big concern to people at that time. I don't know if that was the only concern, or if Mexico itself was the reason that prompted all of this environmental concern, but I do know that some scholars have targeted that.

Kaptur: And I think a lot of environmental groups had experience outside of the United States. They had a working knowledge of what actually happened in some of these societies. And that was brought to bear somehow through their organizations, through the way that they inter-communicated. I never actually asked, you know, "Why are you here?" But they were. They were *very* involved. I know the, uh, there was a case, tuna?

Perin: Tuna-Dolphin.

Kaptur: Tuna-Dolphin issue was a big issue and the way that the different countries enforced the law, and they must have had working knowledge that Mexico turned its back, or, you see there was this international information that was coming forward, and I think that had an impact. And it really drove them. And really when I first heard about it, I will say this, I mean, here I'm worried about *thousands of jobs*, you know, leaving the Mid-west, right, and the possibility of Great Lakes diversion, and the people from the West were talking about tunas and dolphins, and I was like, "What?" And, so the environmental concerns, in some ways, seemed narrower, initially, to me, but we saw them all as part of a much bigger picture of what could possibly happen to the continent and all of the waters adjacent to the continent. And, so, and the environmentalists--a lot of the environmentalists also had experience in Latin America, I don't know how. But, a lot of them had traveled there, they had--I suppose because of the rain forests, I don't know.

Perin: Here's a question for you.

Foote: [Laughs]

Perin: Why do you think that environmental protection was such a prominent concern within NAFTA in the early 1990s but less of a concern, or not even a concern, within the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, which was only, which had only been passed in 1988?

Kaptur: I think because of the dissimilarity in standard of living and the real question, how will we afford to pay for the pollution that is to be generated off the likely relocation. I remember one member from, I think it was Arizona, he could look across his property into Mexico and see

copper smelting going on--the very companies that had stopped production in his state and merely moved across the border. I remember there where people who--and he could see the pollution--and he said, "What are we doing?" I remember people talking about power production and these big generators that were going to be moved into Mexico, so Mexico would end up producing power that was then wheeled into the United States and, but not having to meet any of our [environmental] standards at the point of generation. And so there were people from different perspectives were seeing that that border become a source of real defilement, rather than lifting standards that one would merely give the empromoterer the go ahead to standards that were lower than ours. With Canada, it's different. I mean, we shared the seaway for years. We had a similar standards of living. Canada is also a country with population *far* below the United States. In, Mexico you had a hundred million, for sure, and probably many more, even at that time, in exponential population growth and with it all of the that problems people bring. They'll little polluters, everyone of them, and everyone of us. So it was *a lot* of people being brought into the same agreement, and so I think it was just the magnitude of it.

Perin: I'm going to kind of read to you some of the arguments that scholars have made for why there was so much opposition to NAFTA and then I kind of want to see what you think about it. Some scholars have argued that it was the context in which the United States, Mexico, and Canada debated NAFTA that caused the agreement to receive such a large degree of opposition. For example, some scholars have argued that the post-Cold War context allowed for more issues to be addressed, such as environmentalism, that would not have been concerns during the Cold War. They believe that NAFTA was an opportunity for interest groups and environmental organizations to promote their causes within the realm of trade in a time when non-governmental organizations had more influence within foreign policy decision-making. Others scholars contend that the opposition to NAFTA had less to do with the Cold War era and more to do with the Republican and Democratic Party's reversal on trade issues that had taken place by the early-1990s. Still, other scholars argue that the rise of the fourth wave of the environmental movement in the mid- to late-1980s, known as the environmental justice movement, spurred environmental opposition to NAFTA. So my question to you is: Do you think that it was the context in which the three countries negotiated NAFTA in the 1990s--the early 1990s--or do you think that it was more to do with Mexico itself that caused more of the opposition. Or do you think it was a little bit of both?

Kaptur: I think that, from the United States standpoint, the 1980s were a time of great job loss and great deficits and development of service economy and *huge* job losses and manufacturing and industries that America had come to depend on--real wealth producing industries. So I think from a standpoint of most people who were opposed to NAFTA it came out of having lived through the 1980s. Oil prices rose like crazy during the late 1970s and propelled the nation into a deep recession in the early 1980s, and I don't think the American psyche was out of that as NAFTA was being first negotiated in the end of the 1980s. And, so as we moved into the 1990s--and the Bush administration was negotiating that back in the 1980s. What you're saying about environmental justice, that rings a bell for me, because I think that a lot of the environmentalists had an international perspective, and I think that consciousness was brought to the debate because they did speak more from that than from an economic perspective. It's interesting what you said about the Cold War, I don't know, I guess people thought that after the Cold War America would have this big boom here at home. And what we got was, we got job creation, but

in jobs that paid less, and we got this continual erosion of the jobs that used to pay well. So I think that that's what was really effecting people. I always felt with NAFTA that we married the wrong countries. That--and I just spoke with a group of Europeans about this the other day--I really think the United States should have had a trans-Atlantic alliance of democratic republics. Canada, the United States, Europe, Australia, New Zealand--the countries that really have functioning democracies with a rule of law that is transparent and a financial system that is transparent. But we should have invited in other countries in the world. I think what was happening post--to help them bring up standards, rather than have our standards go down. We got in exactly the wrong agreement on the basis that if we didn't get in a deal with Mexico, why there was going to be a united Europe with a common currency and European common law, and there struggling toward that, but that we might be beat out! And then we'd have the Asians--my golly, there's a lot of them--and they've had some kind of alliance over there, and so we've got to marry our closest neighbors, Canada and Mexico, which is exactly what NAFTA did, rather than people saying, "Hey wait a minute! We're in the political, we're in the freedom business first." So we ought to be marrying places that are like us and then invite in to this alliance the other countries of the world and give them incentives to be pulled up. We did exactly the opposite, pulling them back down. And so what's happening is, even in Europe, Germany has lost so many jobs, all of Europe really has, the United States, Canada, and you have a lot of capital moving to these third world environments, which are like, some of them are [unable to transcribe word] states almost where there's no rule of law, there's no transparent business system, even accounting. It's a very hard way to go and that's the road the world is on right now. It's rather dysfunctional. And now the poor nations of the world are speaking up more loudly. It's not working for them. The whole NAFTA model, in my opinion, and others like it, are export led. The growth will come to poor countries through exports, rather than demand led growth within their own country. And so we've set up this whole system that I think is a very, very polarizing system globally. Now I don't know where its all going to come out, but I know how I would have rather sketched the pad. And that's not the direction we're headed. And the reason I would have sketched it differently is because the most vulnerable are hurt the most, the most vulnerable. So it defies one of my basic principles, which is the priority for the poor. And they should not be hurt the most in any realignment. They should be given a safe landing pad, at least to make their condition no worse. And so when we see these demonstrations against us around the globe, against us as the G8 or the G7 countries, there's reason for it. And now we see on TV, "Those are the anarchists!" No, it's not just anarchists. There is legitimate pain out there by people who don't have much to fight back with. And all you have to do is go South of the U.S. border into some of those communities, or even just sit in Arizona at the border. I have a colleague, Raul Grohaga. He puts water jugs all across his district so that people don't die as they struggle to come over the border to get into this country and he's not the only one. But that shouldn't be. That system shouldn't be. It's too painful to the least among us.

Perin: I think that one of the main arguments with the Cold War being a factor here, is, there's an argument that, during the Cold War, policy was actually easier to make because we were dealing with a bi-polar world at that point. So, our main issues were with the military and security. But, after the Cold War ended, all kinds of other issues came to the fore and economics became, like you mentioned, one of the most commanding issues. And people started allying themselves, you know, competing with other groups. So I think that those people who maybe argue that it was this context that NAFTA was negotiated that all types of different interest

groups became involved and concerned about all these different things because it was now, because now the world was focusing on economics.

Kaptur: Right. In fact, the free traders would argue that free trade brings freedom. I don't agree.

Perin: Yeah.

Kaptur: Free trade can bring exploitation when you don't have freedom. And most of these places don't have real freedom. I like free trade among free people.

Perin: I should probably end this soon, since your next appointment's here, right?

Foote: Yes, we're on a tight schedule.

Perin: OK. I guess the last thing I wanted to ask was, I'm planning to obviously study you within my thesis project and others, like Sherrod Brown--

Kaptur: OK. There's a book--

Perin: I have his book. *The Myth of Free Trade--The* Myths *of Free Trade*. And I was thinking about studying Don Pease. He donated all of his research to Oberlin College in Lorain County.

Kaptur: He was a great member.

Perin: Do you think he'd be a good person to study?

Kaptur: I do. He was one of the members on that committee--Ways and Means Committee--that worked tirelessly and died younger than he should for the cause of working men and women across the globe. His wife is still living over there, Jeanne.

Perin: Are there any other people you worked with from Ohio that you think would be good candidates for this study?

Kaptur: Dennis Kucinick, although he was not in Congress at the time. I'm trying to think. I don't remember whether he was there during the NAFTA vote. I don't know what years he got elected. An interesting person to talk to that may have time is a man named Dave Bonior, who used to be the Democratic whip and he's up in Michigan. He would be worth talking to.

Perin: Yeah, I've read a lot about him.

Kaptur: And just a brilliant man you can get through the Internet is Harley Shaikan, Dr. Harley Shaiken from Berkely. Dr. Harley H-a-r-l-e-y S-h-a-i-k-e-n. He's written extensively on trade. He just gave a speech her in Toledo a few months ago and he was very good--a very thoughtful man.

Perin: OK.

Foote: Did you suggest Prestowitz?

Kaptur: Uh, he's written a couple books, Mike Prestowitz. He just did another one. I saw him on TV. He focuses more on Asia, but, um.

Perin: OK. What do you think is the best way for me to get in touch with Sherrod Brown?

Kaptur: He has a district office over in Lorain.

Perin: Do you think I should just call his office?

Kaptur: Uh huh, there's a woman over there named Beth as far as I know.

Foote: We can get you the numbers. On that sort of thing, we'd be happy to help.

Perin: OK. My friend actually just moved from Toledo to Maryland, so I said, "Maybe I can visit some people in Washington!"

Kaptur: [Laughs]

Perin: I would actually go see, if I need to talk to you again or Sherrod Brown or anyone else, I could come to you, too.

Kaptur: Yeah, I always think its easier in the district. You'd have a quieter time.

Perin: OK. Well, I can't tell you enough how much I really appreciate your time.

Kaptur: Oh! Thank you! Thanks for taking an interest!

Perin: Thank you for all of the hard work you've done.

Kaptur: This fight isn't over.

Perin: No.

Kaptur: We're working to organize--we just had our first meeting with Mexican Parliamentarian and we are, if NAFTA were voted today, it would not pass in Mexico. And we're about the task of arranging a Parliamentary working group for Mexico, Canada, and the United States. We have to have a push back. This is too costly in many, many--at many, many levels. And so the Parliamentarians of our three countries are going to--we're walking down that road because one of the Ministers from Mexico here recently, and we just met with a Central American Parliamentarian as we approached this CAFTA (the Central American Free Trade Agreement) vote. And, regardless of what happens, we are going to assemble ourselves. We have to form new institutions to meet the needs of the new day. We have to give voice, and they

come from very repressive societies. And, so we're looking at a way to do this. We're trying to find a foundation who might fund it, this kind of an exchange, because we know our governments won't. Because those at the executive level, really, aren't interested in any change. So, the Parliamentarians are going to have to play a little bit of a larger role, here. So, that's one of the projects I'm involved in. I think I'm going to Canada in November, or something, to Ottawa. I was just on the phone the other day with one of the--so there should be new institutions that come out of this that we have to create to try to deal with the fall out from NAFTA, continentally. And I hope we can come up with some legislation proposals that all of us can offer in our own countries. And not that it will necessarily get passed, but we'll create a bottom line. And, where there's a continental minimum wage, continental environmental standard, continental labor standard. We are going to have a working document that we all share, which should have been there at the beginning but never was.

Perin: That would have been if it would have been a treaty? Is that what it would have been?

Kaptur: Yes, it would have been negotiated with more participation of the public, with more deliberation, not rammed down our throat like NAFTA was. Negotiated and then, "OK, Congress, take it or leave it!" You have no--you cannot amend it under the procedure that was sued, and you get 90 days and that's it.

Perin: Fast-track.

Kaptur: And there was not--and it was passed very late in the night, I mean just, ugh.

Perin: On November--in November?

Kaptur: Really, uh, really, uh, really awful.

Perin: You know, I hope to be able to talk to you again sometime, because I have so many more things I could ask you. Like, I would just love to know what it was like on that day in November in the House to have that vote, because I know that NAFTA itself rested upon the House.

Kaptur: I've been in Congress twenty-three years, there's never been a moment like it. Other than my votes on war and peace, which are terribly significant votes, I've never had a another experience like that one. Then I really understood the power of capital over people. I really understood that. When it was over I felt like a big tank had gone down my backside. And when it was won it was not won on the merits, but they bought the votes.

Perin: Oh, yeah. The month before the counter-attacks from the pro-NAFTA forces were able to buy off votes.

Kaptur: And they're tying to do the same on CAFTA.

Perin: When is CAFTA going to be negotiated?

Kaptur: As soon as they can buy off enough votes. It, it'll--we thought we'd have the vote before July 4th, but now it looks like part of the sugar group caved so it looks like we'll do it when we go back.

Foote: We have to move--would you tell her your story about watching Sunday morning--or, the talk shows on Sunday morning when you were combing your hair?

Kaptur: Oh! I was trying to get--when we debated NAFTA, I had the staff cut out of the newspapers, because I knew the public was basically with us more than was against us, but yet all the news stories were pro-NAFTA, pro-NAFTA. All the newspapers editorialized for it, for it, for it. Other than the Toledo Blade, which was the only, in the top thirty papers in the country, the only one that editorialized against it. The only one. So, one Sunday I was getting ready for church, and I had been calling Sam Donaldson, and, let's see, the guy who always talked about baseball--George Will--and all the national shows. They said, "Oh, you want to get on the show?" I said, "I do. You only have one point of view on these morning talk shows, and I'm leading the opposition with Dave Bonior and others and, um, "Well, call Washington because we can't really take you in New York. Call Washington, you know, ask." "Well, call New York, we can't take you here." And so it was like--and even though at least half of the public or more were with us, we couldn't get on television. And then we couldn't get in the papers. There were 20 to 1 against us, the articles. I thought, "What is going on?" So one day I was getting ready for church and I was combing my hair, and I was listening to TV, one of those talk show news--"Sponsored by Supermarket to the world, Archer, Daniel, Midland and Company." And I thought, "Ahh, of course they won't let me on. They're blocked by the sponsors, and the sponsor has a major lobbyist involved in fighting us in the Congress." So we were blocked from the airwaves. Then I *really* understood.

Perin: I've read about all of this in the Congressional Hearings with you and Sherrod Brown talking about how the media had been bought out and the opposition had been completely blocked out from the process and half the Mexican government itself spent millions of dollars on their campaign--the most that any other country had spent on a campaign like this. I couldn't believe it. I still remember reading those Hearings in amazement, but. Again, thank you *so* much.

Kaptur: It's good to know someone's interested. [Laughs]

Perin: I was very interested, and I will continue to be very interested.

Kaptur: It's not exactly like a Poli-sci text book!

Perin: No! So, I really appreciate having the honor of speaking with you here today.

Kaptur: Thank you *so* much.

Perin: And to hear your point of view.

Kaptur: I'm still fighting on it.

Perin: Good! I know you are. I check your website.

Kaptur: But, we're not done. [Laughs]