

A SYSTEMS UNDERSTANDING OF TERRORISM WITH  
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY

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IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY

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Dissertation

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## ABSTRACT

Articles and books have been written on the phenomenon of Islamic terrorism. Most of these writings focus on some specific aspect of terrorism or the terrorist perpetrators; terrorist methods, their ideology, education level, societal hardships, etc. While it is important to understand the actual terrorist perpetrators (those that carry out terrorist attacks) and the processes and conditions that give rise to them, nonetheless, terrorist attacks do not arise in a vacuum. The terrorist perpetrator is only one part of the picture. Much less exists that examines the terrorist phenomenon as a complex system of interlocking factors and players – each with its own separate influences, motivators/precipitators, and interdependent relationships.

The present study seeks to address this gap by looking at terrorism not as a single phenomenon (i.e., ‘the terrorists’), but rather as a system composed of many interlocking elements. It is suggested that terrorism is an interdependent system of variables and players and that a more complete understanding of the terrorist phenomenon can be gained by looking at it in a complex system manner. While scientific research usually begins with some specifics of a topic and then seeks to gain from that a more generalized understanding; a system analysis begins with the identification of a whole (a system); evaluating the properties of that larger whole, and then seeing the issue or phenomenon in

its place within the larger whole (Wallman, 2001). In other words – a system analysis starts with the whole and then seeks to understand its parts in relation to the larger whole. The present study will look at many of the elements that make up the complex system from which extremism and terrorism arise, as well as the policy implications that are suggested by looking at this system.

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To Dr. Raymond W. Cox III,

Handicapped with a slightly overly-large heart (and fools himself that no-one sees it).

Without him I would not be where I am today (not that we made it easy for one another).

Don't lie and say you aren't going to miss me.

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is the biggest security threat to governments and societies, replacing nuclear confrontation, which was the prime threat during the Cold War (Gunaratna & Rich, 2004). Access to nuclear materials after the Cold War and the use of the nerve-agent Sarin in Tokyo attacks by the terrorist group Aum Shinrikyo are examples of newly lethal capabilities of terrorist groups (Cronin, 2004). Currently, two thirds of the countries in the world are affected by political or ideological violence (Stevens & Gunaratna, 2004). About 612 politically motivated groups with guerilla or terrorist capabilities are active in 140 countries, with about forty of them having an external reach and an international threat capability (Stevens & Gunaratna, 2004). These 40 are larger and have a bigger audience and a broader reach and are largely religiously based (Pedahzur, Eubank, & Weinberg, 2002).

To protect themselves and operate more effectively, these terror groups are spreading internationally (Stevens & Gunaratna, 2004). Islamic groups tend to be the longest lasting - with the major groups having been around for more than two decades (Rapoport, 2004). Al-Qaeda alone has about 5000 members in 72 countries (Gunaratna, 2002).

With 9/11 – when 19 people killed close to 3000 others – the threat has increased and the bar has been raised. Unlike in the past, when many if not most terrorist groups

operated locally (Stevens & Gunaratna, 2004), most major terrorist groups operate outside of their local conflicts – often cooperating with one another (Stevens & Gunaratna, 2004).

According to Stevens and Gunaratna (2004) until 9/11, North America and Europe had the lowest rate of casualties from terrorist attacks. This is no longer the case (Stevens & Gunaratna, 2004). The U.S. is slowly becoming a target because terrorist groups with a specifically Islamist orientation perceive that U.S. support is holding up secular Arab regimes and Israel (Gunaratna, 2002). Western Europe is becoming both a staging ground as well as a target because of its perceived vulnerabilities and a Muslim immigrant population from which recruits can be drawn (Ates, 2006; Fukuyama, 2005).

The present study will be specifically examining the terrorist movement inspired and motivated by radical, violent Islam. Radical Islamist groups are the primary form of terrorism in the current international arena (Metz & Millen, 2004). This examination will include the societies, recruits, perpetrators, organizers, indoctrinators, state sponsors and non-state supporters that make terrorist operations possible. All of the above elements will be looked at as an integral and interdependent whole.

The aim of this study is to look at terrorism as a complex system in order to better understand the different elements of the terrorist phenomenon and how these different elements function together to create the whole. Systems theory is study of the structure and function of complex systems in the real world (Bar-Yam, n.d.; Capra, 1996; Heylighen, 1998; Raab, 2003; Sanders, 1998). The principles of systems theory will be applied to construct a complex systems-model of transnational Islamist terrorism (Raab, 2003).

The systems-model will also be applied to the formation of counter-terrorism policy. In acknowledgment of the complexity of the terrorist system, policymakers have stated the need for a multi-dimensional front, rather than a fragmented and ad-hoc collection of tactics (Alexander, 2000, 2002; Chin, 2003; Crenshaw, 2004; Cronin, 2004; Eikmeier, 2005; Gunaratna, 2002; Mockaitis, 2003; Roberts, 2004). It is hoped that an examination of terrorism and suggestions for policy that address the entire system will help to advance in some small measure that need for a comprehensive, system-wide policy that so many researchers have called for.

### Perspectives on Terrorists and Terrorism

It is important to note that the purpose of a careful examination of the phenomenon of terrorism is not to condone or explain away the purposeful killing of innocents (Richardson, 2006). Rather it is to take the focus off of the method and onto the factors that contribute to creating and maintaining terrorism – where meaningful discussion and strategic long-term planning can take place (Richardson, 2006).

When speaking of terrorists, it is necessary to distinguish between those who are using terrorism to achieve a particular political end, which if achievable through other means might make the violence no longer necessary; terrorists who are acting out of an ideological, religious or ethnic fervor (which does not lend itself to a political solution); and those who are acting out of simple criminal or violent impulses. To complicate the situation: while these distinctions are useful, more often the reality is some combination of all of these elements. Additionally, as will be discussed later, it is necessary to separately examine the perpetrators of terrorism, the organizers, the instigators and the

sponsors, as the psychology, motivations and vulnerabilities of each are separate and distinct.

Stern (Kristof, 2002) points out that the three factors which correlate closely with terrorist groups and individuals are: feelings of humiliation (personal and national), economic isolation relative to other nations, and a foreign policy that is seen as a provocation (such as the U.S. support of Israel or American army bases on Islamic soil).

Regarding the personal profile of the terrorist, Stern (Kristof, 2002) goes on to say,

I have met some of these ‘Osamas’. They appear in many countries and subscribe to many religions. They are usually drawn to extreme movements out of a feeling of severe deprivation whether socioeconomic, political or psychological. Inside extremist groups . . . the weak become strong. (p. 1)

Personal danger is not a deterrent. Stern goes on to quote an extremist as saying “ the more heightened the threat... the more joy I experience” (p. 2).

The term ‘terrorism’ comes from the French Revolution – it referred to a systematic, non-random and organized campaign of violence in order to create a new and better society (Hoffman, 1998). Terrorism is driven primarily by an ideological, religious, political, ethnic or nationalist motive – while common crime is usually economically driven (Stevens & Gunaratna, 2004). Cronin (2002) defines terrorism as “sudden acts of violence against the innocent for political ends” (p. 1).

The U.S. had suffered major terror attacks prior to 9/11; for example the bombing of the U.S. Marine Barracks in Beirut Lebanon in 1983, the first World Trade Center bombing attack in 1983, and the attack on the U.S.S. Cole in 2000 (Gunaratna, 2002). Nonetheless, the terrorist attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 were noteworthy for their degree of surprise, sudden and devastating loss of life, failure of the intelligence

community to protect the U.S., and the extent to which the attacks unified the American people and galvanized their support for war. The even more significant effect of 9/11 is that it shattered the myth that the United States or any other country could exist as an isolated entity, one that had little need or responsibility to involve itself in the affairs and issues of other nations far away. The attack of 9/11 brought home to America its vulnerability and the need to involve itself in a war brewing far from home. In this sense the attack on September 11<sup>th</sup> had a broader significance. When viewed superficially, September 11<sup>th</sup> looked like a specific country (the U.S.) waking up to the need to fight a specific war against a specific enemy, largely centered in a specific location. However, it is also possible to see the attacks of 9/11 as a manifestation of an era of globalism that will increasingly characterize the world in which we find ourselves. As Bergen (2002) puts it, al-Qaeda is “as much a creation of globalism as a response to it” (p. 196). What we (the United States and other Western countries) are coming to understand is that we can be profoundly affected by trends, events, emotions and eruptions that occur in societies far away, foreign to our culture and with whom we have had little interchange. This is particularly true since the demise of the Soviet Union left a vacuum for other, smaller powers to fill (Rapoport, 2004; Shay, 2002). Radical groups may, in fact, use regional issues, power struggles and instability to recruit others to their cause (Andersen & Aagard, 2005; Jaquard, 2002).

An additional point is that according to the new global rules, size does not matter: If a tiny nation or even five people call themselves a movement and declare that their grievances are against the U.S., Europe, or any other country or region, that is the reality whether we agree or not. In like manner, power is not measured by troops, weaponry or



fortification. *Power belongs to whoever is willing to seize it and use it with the least amount of constraint.* (Mendelson, 2002).

Actions and reactions are determined less by fact than by perception – particularly how other nations view us and react to us. We are now capable of being intimately (and violently) affected by the ways people in Kashmir, Chechnya, Mongolia and Indonesia perceive us - and the symbolic value that they accord to even the most seemingly insignificant of our actions (Mirskii, 2003). As such, we need to take care in our counterterrorist responses (Cronin, 2004).

In the past we were able to look at violence in other countries as being of little concern – with the conditions giving rise to it as perhaps being worthy of academic study or optional humanitarian response, but no more. It is now necessary for our own safety to examine the preconditions, direct causes and contributing factors, as well as the major elements that give rise to terrorist attacks like what took place on 9/11. This includes appropriate strategies both for prevention and intervention. As we are coming to realize, it is no longer a question whether we should or should not involve ourselves in the concerns of other nations or regions - in the new era of interconnected responsibility and vulnerability, we cannot afford not to (Benjamin & Simon, 2002).

The U.S. State Department has designated five countries as terror sponsors: Cuba; Iran; North Korea; Sudan, and Syria. All except Sudan have been on the list for more than a decade. Sanctions and reprisals have not altered the behavior of any of these countries (Hoffman, 1998). This designation changes over time; while Libya used to be considered the major sponsor of terrorism – by the mid 1990s it had shifted to Iran (Hoffman, 1998).

While state-sponsorship of terrorist groups was a central issue during past decades, the end of the 20th century has seen the rise of groups that are not directly state-sponsored or controlled, but still have access to state resources. Future terrorism, especially religiously motivated, may not be constrained by the long-term interests of a state (Cronin, 2004). Therefore, as stated above, al-Qaeda and associated groups are part of a global culture - a religious and ideological system that transcends states (Cronin, 2004). From this perspective, international terrorism may be a reflection of a broader process of the transcending of states and the formation of alternate models of government (Cronin, 2004). General changes in the international system include (1) increase of anti-secular ideologies, (2) decreasing power of state-focused tools, and (3) increase of conditions leading to state failure (Crenshaw, 2004).

U.S. policy tends to be focused on direct state-sponsorship and control. This may be outdated. Policymakers should take care not to simply cast international terrorism into familiar models. Action in Iraq was an example of taking a non-state issue and shifting it into familiar, statist terms (Crenshaw, 2004). State sponsorship is not necessary for an organization with the resources of al-Qaeda (Crenshaw, 2004).

One of the places for terror groups to operate is within the boundaries of failed states. A failed state is a state with a weak, changing, unstable, transitioning or nonexistent central government (Crocker, 2004). Failed states provide a perfect environment for terrorist groups. They can hide behind state sovereignty and use state resources (Crenshaw, 2004). Rather than state-sponsorship, as was the case in the past, the new form may be where groups undermine, overtake and overpower the functions of the government – such as in Sudan and Afghanistan (Cronin, 2004). Both Sudan and

Afghanistan were considered 'failed states' (Crocker, 2004); in relation to these countries, al-Qaeda was less sponsored by a state, and more a state in itself - this was also the case in Lebanon with Hezbollah, and recently in Somalia as well (Benjamin & Simon, 2000). While failed states may encourage the growth of terrorism, there is no foundation for the assumption that democracy reduces terrorism. On the contrary, if presently authoritarian states democratize, they may be replaced by extremist regimes (Cronin, 2004).

Terrorists play for the audience of public opinion – media attention is the terrorist's prize. Acts of terrorism are neither haphazard nor capricious, but premeditated and planned. Terrorist attacks are deliberately tailored to their constituents with the use of symbolic targets (Hoffman, 1998). There is a symbolic nature to the victims as well as the targets of terror attacks. The goal is to generate a state of 'chronic fear' in the surrounding population and change the approaches or actions of these 'secondary targets' (Schmidt, 1983).

Terrorism is the means to strike a major power in its softest underbelly, and affect the state of mind of millions of people by preying on them where they are most vulnerable – attacking their basic sense of safety, stability and normalcy (Schmidt, 1983). Multiple causes give rise to terrorism, and no single type of understanding and consequently no single type of solution will provide the remedy to completely solve the problem (Alexander, 2000). Terrorism is not an ideology or a political doctrine; it is rather a method (Laquer, 1996). In the eyes of those who make use of this method, terrorism is an asymmetrical tool of combat that represents a way for the weak to wage war against the strong, the few to wage war against the many. Terrorism is only a

weapon, rather than an end in and of itself (Mockaitis & Rich, 2003). “Wars are waged against adversaries, not methods” (Crenshaw, 2004, p. 90).

To understand terrorist groups, one needs to take into account that to the terrorist, terrorism is simply a weapon used to wage battle (Eikmeier, 2005; Richardson, 2006) - as justified and legitimate as any other military tactic or use of high-powered weaponry. From this perspective, terrorism is little different than any other time-tested form of warfare – death marches, mines, napalm, sieges of cities, mass bombings, etc. As we express horror over terrorism, we as a nation need to recall our own use of warfare with consequent civilian casualties – many of them intentional – throughout the recent past (Richardson, 2006). This forces us to stop taking refuge in a simple condemnation of violence that begs any closer examination (Richardson, 2006).

Nonetheless, while it is useful to look at factors that contribute to the rise of terrorist groups, it is important to keep in mind that while terrorists and their leaders tend to justify actions based on rationales of victimhood and mistreatment, one cannot forget that terrorism is as much the result of decisions of political actors as it is a response to external circumstances (Crenshaw, 2004; Cronin, 2004).

Different researchers divide terrorism into various categories. Nakash (2006) distinguishes between nationalist, ideological, religio-political, single-issue, state-sponsored and state-supported terrorism. Cronin (2002) divides terrorists into left wing, right wing, separatist and religious (or ‘pseudo-religious’) terrorists – with the latter being particularly ascendant in current times (Cronin, 2002; Metz & Millen, 2004). “The religious imperative for terrorism is the most important defining characteristic of terrorism today” (Hoffman, 1998, p. 87). “For the religious terrorist, violence is first and

foremost a sacramental act or divine duty...” (p. 94). For that reason, religious terrorists are not constrained by political, conventionally moral or practical boundaries (Hoffman, 1998).

The focus of the present study is religiously-motivated Islamic terrorism. Islamic terrorism is based on radical Islamic fundamentalism. The term ‘fundamentalism’ has Christian-Protestant origins, where it referred to religious and ideological fanaticism (Shay, 2002). The term ‘Islamist’ is used to refer to radical groups that (often violently) espouse a politicized, fundamentalist and ideological Islam (Kramer, 2003). It is used to differentiate from the mainstream religion of Islam (Kramer, 2003). From this point onwards, the term ‘Islamist’ will be used to differentiate radical, politicized, violent (or violence-supporting) fundamentalist groups and their supporters from the mainstream religion of Islam and its adherents. The term ‘Islamism’ refers to the umbrella movement that encompasses these groups (Kramer, 2003).

Terrorism is often a tactic used by sub-national insurgency groups (Richardson, 2006). An insurgency is a movement for change that arises on a sub-national level (Metz & Millen, 2004; Mirskii, 2003). Local insurgencies can function as breeding grounds and training grounds for terrorism (Gray, 1990). At times the two terms are even used interchangeably, particularly once a group has resorted to terrorist tactics (Richardson, 2006). For this reason it would be useful to review basic information regarding insurgent groups:

In the past, insurgencies have often been waged against a ruling class by an ethnic, political or religious minority group (Mirskii, 2003). Insurgencies may also be waged as a form of surrogate conflict between larger powers unwilling to confront each

other directly (Metz & Millen, 2004). In more recent times, many insurgencies were Marxist - or Marxist inspired and influenced - and sought to raise the banner of class struggle (Metz & Millen, 2004).

Insurgencies in general avoid direct military confrontation (often because the insurgents lack the capability), and instead prefer to wear down their more powerful opponents by other means, both violent and psychological (Metz & Millen, 2004). However, what they lack in outright strength, they make up for in strategy, persistence, speed, flexibility, mutability, image of legitimacy, strength and appeal of ideology, willingness to absorb and inflict losses, and lack of ethical and legal constraint (Metz & Millen, 2004). In order to survive, insurgencies need the following types of resources: manpower, funding, supplies/equipment, sanctuary and intelligence (Metz & Millen, 2004).

An insurgent group that begins by targeting counterinsurgent forces, will likely target local civilian populations as well - both to provoke the counterinsurgents into unpopular retaliation (Wilkinson, 2001), as well as to intimidate the locals into providing support (Krepinevich, 2004). They may also strike the counterinsurgents within their own countries (Gray, 1990). Lastly, the insurgents may be co-opted by larger, transnational groups to carry out terror attacks on non-local enemies (Taheri, 2005). Regional conflicts can serve as a recruiting and training ground for insurgent/terrorist groups that then use the new recruits to serve larger goals abroad (Taheri, 2005).

Insurgencies are powered by ideologies that powerfully motivate the followers – even to the extent of risking life and limb for the sake of the cause (North, 1981). In understanding the causes of insurgencies that use terrorism, one should not underestimate

the persuasive power of ideology and the receptiveness of a population to that message (Cronin, 2004). O'Neill (1990) identifies seven different types of insurgencies: Anarchist (desires to eliminate all political institutions), Egalitarian (desires to impose new system based on equal distribution), Traditionalist (Reimpose traditional religion and practice instead of existing political institutions), Pluralist (displace political system in favor of individual freedoms), Secessionist (desires to withdraw from existing political community and create new one), Reformist (gain autonomy and reallocate resources within existing system), Preservationist (maintain existing system against threat from others). Alexander, Kyle, and McCallister (2003) add an eighth type that they term Restorationist - which they explain refers to an elite group opposed to an occupying authority who wants to re-establish their power. They group both the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq under this category (Alexander, Kyle, & McCallister; 2003).

The key factor in winning an insurgency is winning over the hearts and minds of the local population (Evans, 2004; Krepinevich 2004; Mirskii, 2003; Mockaitis & Rich, 2003). The 'hearts' refer to the perception that the goals of the local population will be better served by the insurgents than by the counter-insurgents; the 'minds' refers to the perception that the insurgents will win (Krepinevich, 2004). Crucial to defeating this perception is the security that the counter-insurgents provide against the attempts by the insurgents to spread their ideas, intimidate, and terrorize the population (Krepinevich, 2004). In order to survive, insurgencies need the following five types of resources: manpower, funding, supplies/equipment, sanctuary and intelligence (Metz & Millen, 2004). Defeating an insurgency is a process that often takes between one and two decades or more (Metz & Millen, 2004).

One of the key prizes in insurgent warfare is the banner of legitimacy (Evans, 2004; Telhami, 2004). The perception of legitimacy may have more of an influence on the outcome than the actual balance of military strength (Telhami, 2004). The party that can convince the local population that it is the most legitimate will gain the support of the population and eventually defeat the insurgency provided they stay at it (Evans, 2004). Similarly, terrorist groups that want to expand into larger insurgencies need the popular support of the population (Wilkinson, 2001). They also need repressive reactions of governments and security forces; access to weapons and the presence of leaders capable of inspiring and sustaining the insurgency (Wilkinson, 2001). One manifestation of this desire for legitimacy is the manner in which Islamist radicals couch their goals in the mantle of mainstream Islamic scholarship (Benjamin & Simon 2002). Legitimacy is not infallible, however. Counterinsurgency efforts that may be seen as legitimate may still eventually be perceived as more trouble to the population than they are worth (Krepinevich, 2004). Likewise, an insurgency may wield such control over a population that actual perception of legitimacy is irrelevant - fealty is gained through fear (Krepinevich, 2004).

According to Metz and Millen, the world has currently entered an age of insurgency that is global, networked and based upon violent, radical, political Islam (Metz & Millen, 2004). This is in contrast to the period of the 1950s through the 1980s when insurgencies were largely localized, secular and revolutionary. Today's foremost insurgencies are Islamist-based and feed upon anti-Western, anti-American, anti-globalist and anti-Israel sentiments (Ajami, 2005; Mirskii, 2003).



The above discussion regarding insurgencies examined the issue primarily on a local level. From a broader, international perspective, Huntington (1996) posits four stages of conflict in the modern Western world: First there were conflicts between kings and princes over power, treasure and land. After the collapse of feudalism and the monarchy, the conflict became between nations. With the rise of communism, conflicts became ones between competing ideologies - such as communism and fascism versus capitalism and democratic liberalism. Since the end of the Cold War, conflicts are between cultures – especially Islam versus the West. This fourth conflict also represents a shift away from the domination of Western culture and a struggle with Islam, which Huntington considers the most militant culture of our time. Huntington posits that we are facing a fundamental clash of culture and ideology between the West and Islam (especially militant Islam) and this will be the great post Cold War struggle - similar to the struggle between the West and Communism (Huntington, 1993). Huntington does not distinguish between moderate and radical Islam (Huntington, 1996). However, the struggle may be less between Islam and the West than between civilization and barbarity (Mirskii 2003).

From this perspective, modern Islamist terrorist groups are part of a global culture; a religious and ideological system that transcends states (Cronin, 2004) and is in direct conflict with the West (Bodansky, 2001; Huntington, 1996). This conflict of cultures between Islam - particularly radical, violent, politicized Islam - and the West may be a reflection of a broader process of the transcending of states and the formation of alternate models of government in the broader international system (Cronin, 2004).

Terrorism and Militant Islam

Militant Islam emerged out of Islam's cultural and religious conflict with the West and modernity (Bodansky, 2001). From a political and military perspective, past Muslim defeats created several centuries worth of antagonism with the West (Bodansky, 2001). The Muslim leaders who were able to defeat the crusaders and Christians (going back as far as the 12th century) revived religious extremism to legitimize their power as well as creating an anti-intellectual backlash that focused only on the Koran. This was repeated and re-emphasized by later rulers all the way to Khomeini (Bodansky, 2001).

This is complicated by the fact that historically, Muslims have tended to identify themselves either 'supra-nationally' (i.e., the 'Nation of Islam'), or 'sub-nationally (i.e., nationally' (by tribe, clan or family), but have not identified themselves with the nation-state (Bodansky, 2001). This tends to cast conflicts and loyalties outside of the bounds of the traditional nation-state and its interests. Characteristic of this perception is Ayatollah al-Sadr, a leading Shi'a cleric in Iran calling for the 'destruction of the West' so Islam can 'reconstruct the world' (Bodansky, 2001). The center of confrontation between Islamists and the Muslim world is for the control of governments that were at some time a part of the historic 'Islamic world', with the imposition of Islamic law (Bodansky, 2001). Another goal is for the control of energy resources in the Middle East and as far away as Central Asia and the Caucasus (Bodansky, 2001).

Rapoport distinguishes four major "waves" of terrorism: 1) Anarchist – from the 1880s to the 1900s. 2) Anti-Colonial (from the 1920s to the 1960s). 3) New Left – from the 1960s to 2000. 4) Religious – from 1979 to the present. The religious form of terrorism is the Fourth Wave, which we are currently in (Rapoport. 2004). Rapoport says that the 'fourth wave' is explicitly 'anti-democratic' because the democratic idea is

“inconceivable without a significant measure of secularism” (Rapoport, 2004, p. 65). A unifying theme of fourth wave is desire to return to a “pure” Islamic entity (such as a caliphate) where religion and state unite. While the initial (stated) al-Qaeda objective was to force the U.S. evacuation of bases in Saudi Arabia, the goal then became a single Muslim state under Sharia law (Rapoport, 2004). For this reason, the fourth wave is basically incompatible with the current international state system – unlike earlier forms of terrorism (Rapoport, 2004). The Islamist fundamentalist slogan “Neither East nor West” refers to the global ambitions of Islamism (Shay, 2002, p. 10).

The Islamist ‘fourth wave’ of terrorism represents the most dangerous continuous threat and should be the main focus of counterterrorism efforts (Cronin, 2004). One reason for this is that Islamism has non-negotiable aims - unlike previous ethnic/nationalist/separatist groups (Crenshaw, 2004). This movement along with its sub-groups has as its goal the establishment of a pan-Islamic caliphate within the larger Muslim world (Eikmeier, 2005) – established by force whenever necessary (Gunaratna, 2002).

The fourth wave of terrorism – i.e., radical Islamist terrorism - was launched by the Iranian Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the storming and occupation of the Grand Mosque in Mecca (Rapoport, 2004). 1979 was also the beginning of a new Islamic century – when the Muslim redeemer was anticipated to come (Rapoport, 2004). Later, the fourth wave was galvanized by the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 – this was seen as a big victory for militant Islam (Rapoport, 2004). It also caused a dispersal of the forces that had fought – including the al-Qaeda organization (Rapoport, 2004). Also the breakup of the USSR freed lands that had large Muslim populations

(such as Chechnya and the 'Stans') and these became new fronts for resistance – with Afghan Arab veterans providing a major part of this (Rapoport, 2004).

#### In Summation

1. International terrorism is a growing threat.
2. The major terrorist threat is posed by groups inspired by radical politicized Islam.
3. Terrorism is a complex system and therefore Systems Theory may be a useful explanatory model.

#### The Gap

Those who study terrorism focus on explanations of terror rather than prescriptive solutions. They also consider terrorism in the context of foreign policy issues (Crenshaw, 2004). “The best approach is consciously to reach across conceptual, disciplinary, cultural and sometimes even ideological divisions” (Cronin, 2004, p. 40). Proponents of grand strategies (i.e., long-term, comprehensive and multi-faceted) tended to use 9/11 to justify their previous ideological and theoretical approaches. Rather than rely on outdated theories, we need to take a new and fresh look at policy. There is a need for a fundamental rethinking of U.S. grand strategies (Roberts, 2004).

Policy experts need to take a long-term, big-picture approach to this complex issue that has as many solutions as it has facets to the problem (Eikmeier, 2005; Alexander, 2000). This would involve both the mobilization of the international community in the areas of both diplomacy and intelligence (Cronin, 2004); as well as a military approach that includes a comprehensive offensive strategy of conventional and unconventional weapons, focused force and intelligence (Mockaitis, 2003). It is also

important to keep in mind the link between terrorist networks and criminal networks: Criminal and terrorist behavior unite in terror networks – that become, in effect, criminal/terror networks (Clutterbuck, 2004).

Current operations both in Iraq as well as the overall global war on terror are flawed due to an over-reliance on military means (Chin, 2003). Longstanding ‘grand strategy’ in the U.S. was an emphasis on unilateral action, military instruments and state targeting. This is unlikely to be successful against a non-state phenomenon like international terrorism: “A stealthy, diffuse, non-state coalition” (Cronin, 2004; page 285). Classic counterinsurgency warfare stresses economic, political and psychological measures along with traditional military operations (Galula, 1964). Even Military successes, like the operation in Afghanistan should not make the U.S. more focused on the military response to the neglect of other areas (Chin, 2003). In order to see the limitations of a military approach alone, note that past demonstrations of U.S. power did not dissuade terrorists. For example, the U.S. raid on Libya in 1988 was followed by bombing of Pan Am flight 103. 1998 strikes against Sudan and Afghanistan did not stop al-Qaeda (Crenshaw, 2004). Although al-Qaeda took blows to its infrastructure in Afghanistan, it remained virtually untouched in many other places (Gunaratna, 2002). This is not to say that military measures are not necessary, however there is a need to integrate and unite military and political (non-military) measures – for example, the clear (military) and build (non-military) strategy (Crenshaw, 2004).

An approach that focuses only on capturing and killing insurgents and ignores the larger battle of ideas will be unsuccessful (Eikmeier, 2005; Richardson, 2006). Islamist groups are not only military. They challenge the West and moderate Muslims on

political, social, cultural, and educational areas. The West has focused mostly on the military and financial areas when formulating counterterrorism policies (Gunaratna, 2002). Long-term strategy to counter violent and radical forms of Islam will not be military, but rather by challenging the misrepresentation and misinterpretation of the Koran – creating a powerful counter ideology (Gunaratna, 2002).

A comprehensive approach needs to be active, not just reactive (Cronin, 2002). Connected to this, we also need to be flexible and adaptive – avoiding rigid, monolithic approaches. Responding too uniformly means that a) responses will not fit specific contexts b) terrorist groups will be able to design strategy around it (Crenshaw, 2004). “Terrorism and counterterrorism are interactive phenomena: Like any sophisticated enemy, the so-called international jihad adapts its approaches and methods to what the U.S. does” (Crenshaw, 2004, p. 289). Counterterrorism policy needs to be flexible enough to do the same.

There is an essential need for a ‘hearts and minds’ strategy; not for use with hard-core perpetrators, but among communities of supporters and potential recruits (Mockaitis, 2003; Richardson, 2006). If international terrorism is an expression of smaller conflicts overflowing their boundaries and internationalizing, then the policy approach may be to target the local/state level – which is the source from which the larger problem springs. There is a strategic need to address the local grievances that are used by groups like al-Qaeda (Mockaitis, 2003). These local issues are not only political. Terrorism policy should endeavor to meet basic human necessities for survival in impoverished areas. Addressing human needs and legitimate issues will lessen support for groups that capitalize on them in one fashion or another (Mockaitis, 2003). We also need to be

willing to look at all of the parties (including ourselves) that enable terrorism to exist by commission, omission, fear, greed and apathy (Dershowitz, 2002; Napoleoni, 2003; Richardson, 2006).

Policymakers and leaders need to be careful in their choice of responses. State responses can increase or decrease the legitimacy of a terror group (Quinton, 2004; Shay, 2002). They need to be careful that not to neglect the issue of international legitimacy; “It is critical that U.S. Counterterrorism efforts be legitimate in the eyes of the international community... support of other nations is indispensable” (Crenshaw, 2004, p. 90). “U.S. grand strategy should not ignore interdependence (with other nations)” (Crenshaw, 2004, p. 90). “A selective, variegated approach is necessary” (Cronin, 2004, p. 287). From a purely practical perspective, since al-Qaeda (along with other major terrorist groups) is global, a global, multinational approach is needed (Gunaratna, 2002).

“Terrorism has been evolving for at least a decade into a core threat to international security” (Cronin, 2004, p. 1). Fighting terrorism is not a ‘war’ where we can ‘defeat’ an enemy – but rather a long-term threat that must be addressed with effective tools. This requires a long-term perspective, a willingness to look at past mistakes and an acceptance of risk (Cronin, 2004).

From all of the above, it can be seen that a comprehensive look at the terrorism phenomenon that examines all of its aspects is greatly needed. It is important that this examination not be a justification or restatement of some prior political theory, but is guided instead by the facts. It is also important that this examination include policy recommendations.

## The Research Issue

While it is important to understand the actual terrorist perpetrators (those that carry out terrorist attacks) and the processes and conditions that give rise to them, nonetheless, terrorist attacks do not arise in a vacuum. The terrorist perpetrator is only one part of the picture. Without the terrorist leaders/organizers, indoctrinators, supporters and state sponsors, the perpetrator might not exist at all, or their rage and alienation might take a much more limited (or perhaps completely different) form. When seeking to understand the different components that come together to create the terrorist system, it must first be understood that there is not one type of person called a 'terrorist' (Jaquard, 2002). 'Terrorists' may include those who lead terror groups and plan terror attacks, but do not directly perpetrate the attack itself (Jaquard, 2002). The term may also encompass those who are not leaders, but who are recruited and trained to work within terrorist groups and directly carry out terror attacks (Jaquard, 2002). The term may also include those who do not directly either plan or carry out attacks, but provide inspiration and motivation for those who do (Mandel, 2002). It may also include those states, non-state groups and individuals who provide financial support, safe-haven, and other resources (material, logistical etc.) for terrorist groups and activities (Byman, 2006). Lastly (though of a very different category), there are those who are the potential or actual targets of terror attacks – states, non-state groups and individuals (Cronin, 2002). Each of these categories also contains sub-categories - different types of leaders for example (Brisard and Martinez), or different types of perpetrators (Bloom, 2005). The categories may also overlap - some terrorist leaders who are also direct perpetrators, such as Abu-Musab al-Zarqawi (Brisard & Martinez, 2005); and some perpetrators who also take the role of



organizers and leaders – such as Mohammed Atta (McDermott, 2005). For the sake of simplicity, in examining the terror system the current work will restrict itself to the six general categories of terrorist Recruit/Perpetrator (Bloom, 2005); Leader/Organizer (Jaquard, 2002); Indoctrinator (Mandel, 2002); State Sponsor (Byman, 2006); Non-State Supporters (Alexander & Swetnam, 2001; Andersen & Aagard, 2005; Winer, 2002); and Observer/Target (Ajami, 2006; Cronin, 2002).

Articles and books have been written on the phenomenon of Islamic terrorism. Most of these writings focus on some specific aspect of terrorism or the terrorist perpetrators; terrorist methods, their ideology, education level, societal hardships, etc. Much less exists that examines the terrorist phenomenon as a complex system of interlocking factors and players – each with its own separate influences (when speaking of influencing factors) and motivators/precipitators (when speaking of players) and interdependent relationships.

### Conclusion

The present study seeks to address this gap by looking at terrorism not as a single phenomenon (i.e. ‘the terrorists’), but rather as a system composed of terrorist perpetrators, organizers, instigators, sponsors, local societies and observer/targets. It is suggested that terrorism is an interdependent system of variables and players and that a more complete understanding of the terrorist phenomenon can be gained by looking at it in a complex system manner. While scientific research usually begins with some specifics of a topic and then seeks to gain from that a more generalized understanding; a system analysis begins with the identification of a whole (a system); evaluating the properties of that larger whole, and then seeing the issue or phenomenon in its place

within the larger whole (Wallman, 2001). In other words – a system analysis starts with the whole and then seeks to understand its parts in relation to the larger whole.

While the above chapter has reviewed some of what is known regarding the issue of terrorism, it is necessary to go over in more detail what is currently known about both terrorism in general, Islamist terrorism in particular, and all of the possible elements within the terrorist system. To do so, the following review of the literature will first examine the principles of Systems Theory, as this will be the framework for the present study; we will then look at terrorism in general; Islamist terrorism in particular; the specific elements that make up the Islamist terrorist system; and how these elements relate back to the principles of Systems Theory.

## CHAPTER II

### REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

#### Introduction

As stated above, International terrorism is a growing threat. The major terrorist threat is posed by groups inspired by radical politicized Islam. Terrorism is a complex system and therefore Systems Theory may be a useful explanatory model. A Systems Theory model of terrorism should also result in policy explanations that address all major aspects of the terrorist system.

In order to understand how Systems Theory could be used to better understand terrorism; we first need to establish the basic ideas of Systems Theory (the framework being used for this study). We will then look at the related theories of Chaos, Complexity and Graph/Network theories. Next we will explore the application of the above theories to human systems. The general topic of terrorism and Islamist terrorism will be explored. Lastly, the specific elements of that make up the international Islamist terrorist system – perpetrator, leader/organizer, indoctrinator, state-sponsor and supporter will be examined in some depth. What will then emerge is a set of research questions with which to explore the issue of terrorism in the context of Systems Theory.

## Systems Theory and Its Related Theories

We will begin with a general overview of Systems Theory, its history, major principles, and the related theories of complexity, chaos, and networks/graph theory. This will be followed by a brief look at some applications of the above theories.

In order to understand the significance of Systems Theory, it is first necessary to understand how a systems mode of thinking has evolved throughout the history of scientific thought in general, and in relation to other ways of thinking in particular.

Capra (1996) traces the history of scientific thinking and how it has evolved into modern Systems Theory with its related theories of Chaos, Complexity, Network/Graph theory:

Ancient thinkers attempted to understand the world by seeing everything as a combination of the four basic elements – fire, air, earth and water. They felt that in order to understand anything one had to break it down into the proportion of the four elements that it contained (Capra, 1996). In contrast to this reductionist way of thinking, the Greek philosopher Pythagoras distinguished between the substance of an object (i.e., what elements it was composed of and in what proportion) and the pattern or form that it took as an indivisible whole (O'Meara, 1989): He understood that an object is more than just the sum of its component parts, and was therefore an early precursor of modern Systems Theory (Capra, 1996).

Unlike Pythagoras who was interested in patterns and wholes, the influential French philosopher Rene Descartes focused on the analysis of the separate parts that an object was made up of, and sought to understand it by breaking it down into its separate parts (Keeling, 1968) – in the same way that someone would try to understand a machine

by taking it apart (Capra, 1996). In this way he was more like those ancients that had preceded him than was Pythagoras (Capra, 1996). Descartes view was termed 'reductionism' – analyzing something by trying to understand its smallest and most basic component parts (Keeling, 1968). This was also termed 'mechanistic thinking' – looking at the world as a collection of machines that could be understood by taking them apart the same way one would deconstruct the workings of a clock (Capra, 1996).

In part because of the strong influence of Descartes, this type of mechanistic, reductionist thinking dominated what we think of as modern scientific thought and certainly helped form the approaches of later thinkers (Jones, 2000). Due to the influence of reductionism, modern science tended to see the world in linear ('a' causes 'b' which then causes 'c'); mechanistic (understand a thing by taking it apart); and scientific (things behave according to logical, consistent and measurable rules) ways (Capra, 1996).

The first modern challenge to what was known as the Newtonian/Cartesian understanding (after Newton and Descartes) came not from the world of science, but from the romantic and mystical poets such as Goethe - who stated that every created thing is a single harmonious whole (Stephenson, 1995). This was echoed by the poet Blake, who in a pointed critique of the predilection of the scientists to try to take the world apart and thereby lose the ability to see and understand it in its mysterious wholeness (Capra, 1996) – stated: "May God us keep, from single vision and Newton's sleep" (Blake, 1802). This was followed by the philosopher Kant, who also stated that even separate organisms exist as part of a larger whole (Broad, 1978). These thinkers were termed 'romantics' and their influence at the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century was quite strong (Broad, 1978). Science began to reflect this influence, with the scientist Claude

Bernard examining the influences of the environment upon living organisms (Bernard, 1949) – another way of looking at the functioning of larger wholes (Capra, 1996).

During the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, reductionist scientific thinking again became quite strong due in large measure to the invention of the microscope (Capra, 1996; Jones, 2000) – which enabled scientists to see the living world in ever-smaller parts (Capra, 1996; Jones, 2000). This reductionism was reinforced by the germ theory of Pasteur, who stated that a single germ was the sole cause of a particular disease (Latour, 1988).

Eventually later scientists began looking at multiple causes and environmental influences in the occurrence of disease (Davidson, 1983), and what were called ‘organismic’ biologists such as Bertalanffy (Davidson, 1983) started seeing living things as self-organizing wholes that could not be understood just by looking at their different components (Capra, 1996; Davidson, 1983).

The linear and reductionist way of looking at and analyzing the world was greatly impacted by the invention of the electron microscope, which marked the birth of quantum physics (Capra, 1996; Wolf, 1989). When physicists began to look at the world of tiny particles, they saw that the world of the tiny could not be understood as little chunks of matter – instead, what they saw was not solid at all, but rather shifting patterns of possibilities and relationships – indivisible from each other and from the influence of the observer as well (Capra, 1996; Wolf, 1989). Because of its recognition of the interconnectedness of matter and function; the new discoveries of quantum physics greatly influenced the developing science of modern Systems Theory (Capra, 1996).

These new discoveries were echoed in psychology by the Gestalt theorists like Wertheimer and Kohler (Benjafeld, 1996) who said that when humans perceive the world they do so not in parts, but rather in wholes – in patterns of meaning – which are influenced as much by the observer as by that which is actually perceived (Capra, 1996).

At about the same time, the new science of Ecology was created as scientists studied the complex systems of forests, food chains and other natural phenomena (Worster, 1994). This strengthened the growing view that the earth was made up of communities – systems – of living things, that were inseparable from one another and dependent upon and influenced by one another (Worster, 1994). All of these different disciplines led to the new paradigm of Systems Theory – which stood in opposition to the linear, reductionist, mechanistic views that had preceded it (Capra, 1996). Following the development of Systems Theory, several practical applications were developed using Systems Theory principles. These applications included: Applied Systems Thinking (Warren, 2002) – which was the attempt to try and foresee the ways that a system would grow and change as a whole (Capra, 1996). This is also known as Strategic Systems Thinking – when Applied Systems Thinking is used to understand human systems (Sanders, 1998). This was then followed by Systems Analysis (Warren, 2002) – a form of problem solving (usually of organizational systems) that looked at a given issue as a whole, including its larger context, and saw proposed solutions in light of their system-wide impact (Capra, 1996; Warren, 2002).

Systems Theory has been criticized as being non-scientific, dependent on inexact analogies across fields and not possessing any rigorous mathematical formulas that could be used to solve real-world problems (Capra, 1996). While this has been remedied to

some degree by the advent of the mathematical formulas of Chaos Theory (Gleick, 1987), nonetheless the critics are still there, and the weakness of Systems Theory as an inexact science still stands (Capra, 1996).

Basic Principles of Systems Theory (Capra, 1996):

A shift from looking at separate parts to looking at wholes – collections of parts that function together as unified systems.

Every system is made up of smaller systems, and every system is part of a larger system.

The idea that one cannot reduce the entire properties of a system into the properties of its component parts. The system as a whole is more than the sum of its parts.

The properties of a system break down when the parts are separated.

Every level of a system is important – no matter how small or large.

The properties of a system are ever changing – therefore nothing is absolute, because everything is in a state of dynamic flux.

While systems are ever changing, they also maintain a dynamic balance (Capra, 1996).

Heylighen (1998) adds the following:

Systems within nature are ‘open’ and cannot be isolated from the influence of the larger environment. They affect the larger environment as well.

A system takes from the larger environment in the form of ‘inputs’ and releases into the environment in the form of ‘outputs’. What the system takes in is affected, processed, used and changed by the system before being released back into the environment. The process of change inside the system is known as ‘throughput’.



An organism is a system composed of smaller subsystems, which are held together by their mutual interactions or ‘links’. Without these connections – or ‘links’, the organism would just be a collection of disconnected units.

There are two ways to study a system: When we look at a system without referring to its subsystems, this is referred to as a ‘black box view’, since the subsystems are unseen – by choice or necessity. When we look at a system along with its subsystems this is referred to as a ‘white-box view’.

Traditionally, science has taken a perspective that a system is created by the laws and behavior of its smaller components. This is referred to as ‘upward causation’ – meaning that system behavior is caused from the bottom up. Systems Theory also acknowledges the role of ‘downward causation’ – meaning that the components of the system are also affected by the behavior of the system as a whole. This is also called ‘higher level laws’.

Though every level of a system has different laws, nonetheless, they also share characteristics in common: an organism, a larger environment, a separation boundary, inputs, outputs and throughputs. This is true whether the building blocks of the system are humans, data, atoms, etc. The system view seeks the universal characteristics of systems apart from their building blocks.

### Complexity Theory

The theory of Complexity arose out of Systems Theory (Coveney & Highfield, 1995). Systems Theory gave us the understanding that the world is made up of wholes, not parts. Complexity Theory sought to describe in more detail the ways in which large systems behave in ways that their component parts do not (Coveney & Highfield, 1995).

It looks at the ways that the system organizes and becomes more and more complex (Coveney & Highfield, 1995).

Basic Concepts of Complexity Theory (Coveney & Highfield, 1995):

Systems in the natural world evolve over time.

Natural systems are non-linear, multifaceted and complex.

Matter has an inborn tendency to self-organize and become more complex.

Complexity is a way that the system adapts in response to the demands of its own growth and the demands of the environment.

An understanding of complexity allows us to grasp multi-faceted phenomena that do not lend themselves to linear analysis.

When looking for causation, since systems are complex, causation is multiple (Coveney & Highfield, 1995).

One type of behavior in complex systems is called a Phase Transition (Bar-Yam, undated). When stimuli are applied to elements in a system they initially respond to the stimuli in a random and chaotic fashion. As the power of the stimulus is increased, the chaotic behavior of the elements likewise increases in speed and randomness. At a certain point a threshold is reached, and the behavior transitions in to coordinated behaviors (sometimes in the manner of a pendulum or cycle – going back and forth from chaos to order) – water comes to a boil, crickets chirp together, iron particles become polarized, etc. The units retain their own characteristics individually, but now they coordinate their movements and differing functions with one another. This produces a larger level of organization and complexity than existed prior to the transition. The shift represents a new phase in the system, and for this reason it is called a Phase Transition (Bar-Yam,

undated). Examples of phase transitions are water reaching a boil, chemicals forming into crystals, etc. Significantly, this does not take place in response to a centralized command, but rather the spontaneous interactions of all the elements of the system (Bar-Yam, undated).

### Chaos Theory

Chaos Theory (Gleick, 1987) was a related discovery about the ways that systems within the world functioned as complex patterns. As systems theory began to develop by looking at the natural world, advances in computers began looking at the universe of pure patterns and numbers. It was found that a tiny change in a series of numbers would eventually lead to large changes in the final numerical output – because the difference multiplied and became magnified over the entire equation sequence (Gleick, 1987). Not only did the numbers change, but they began to change in patterned ways – repeating and repeating the same complex patterns on all different scales of numbers and equations (Gleick, 1987). This took place when a scientist named Konrad Lorenz entered numerical data that was compiled from weather information. When the same technique was used to enter numerical data about many other seemingly random (chaotic) systems – natural as well as manmade, it was found that the supposedly random fluctuations of the system actually behaved according to certain rules - that showed patterns and changes across scale – as well as sensitivity to even minor disruptions in their system (Gleick, 1987).

This understanding gave rise to chaos theory; which stated that the behavior of systems is non-linear and does not repeat itself in exact patterns (Gleick, 1987). Like the patterns that oil makes on water, or the swirls of smoke in the air, or the rise and fall of the stock market, fluctuations political cycles or animal populations – what seemed at

first totally random was actually responding to outer stimuli in complex and repeating patterns of interaction – called fractal patterns – that repeated in consistent ways across scale (Gleick, 1987). An example of a fractal pattern is the way a tree branches off into ever-smaller branches – though the pattern of branching remains the same even as the scale changes. Now it was not only possible to say that nature was made up of wholes and systems, it began to be possible to map the non-linear patterns of each system, as well as the ways in which the system's patterns echoed and repeated across different levels (Gleick, 1987). While Systems Theory stated that a small change in a part of the system would affect the entire system (Capra, 1996; Heylighen, 1998), Chaos theory demonstrated this hypothesis using actual numbers and real-life examples – as well as demonstrating that all of these ideas were true in non-natural (manmade, non-living) systems as well (Gleick, 1987).

### Graph/Network Theory

Long before the sciences of Systems Theory, Complexity Theory and Chaos Theory were formally articulated; mathematicians were using 'Graph Theory' to solve mathematical problems and puzzles (Barabasi, 2002). Graph Theory studied the ways in which different parts of a system are linked together. The system, together with all of its linked parts is known as a 'Network'. For this reason, Graph Theory is also known as Network Theory (Barabasi, 2002). Later scientists began to look at how graphs (now called 'networks') arose in the world and what governs their formation, growth and structure. Their goal was to find the fewest and simplest explanations for the behaviors of linked networks (Barabasi, 2002).

Basic Principles of Graph/Network Theory (Barabasi, 2002):

Nothing happens in isolation. Everything is linked with everything. Networks are everywhere.

Networks form when enough points (nodes) become linked to one another so that a large linked cluster is formed instead of the previously isolated points.

Nodes need only one link to be connected to the larger cluster. The more links, the less isolation – but only one link is needed.

In nature, networks of any kind tend to have multiple, dense links. This lessens the risk to the network, since even if some links are compromised, others are there.

Isolated links are more vulnerable.

Resources (information, material resources, energy) use links to travel from one node to another.

Networks in the natural world do not have equal numbers of links across all nodes in the network. They are ‘scale-free’ – meaning they do not follow average distributions. On the contrary, some nodes have very large numbers of links, while some do not. These very densely linked nodes are referred to as ‘hubs’.

No matter how large a network, one node is linked to another by an average distance of 5.5 links. This is the famous ‘Six Degrees of Separation’ – used to describe the interconnection of the human system of links.

Changes in any part of the network will ultimately affect the entire network due to its interconnected nature.

Networks can fail when enough nodes (especially the ‘hubs’) are removed, or enough links are destroyed or compromised.

Failure in one part of the network may ‘cascade’ into failure in the entire network – like a food chain that collapses when one link in the chain is compromised or destroyed.

Networks may radically change if an accumulating amount of events reverberate through the system. This is called a Phase Transition (described above) – when enough stimuli are present that the system goes into first a chaotic state and then into a higher and more complex form of order in response to the stimuli. An example would be the heating of water – the molecules churn in a chaotic manner until the heat rises to the point at which the molecules organize into a patterned boil.

The organizing quality of a network is not an indication that there is a centralized or top-down control in the network. Networks are self-organizing – ‘a web without a spider’ (Barabasi, 2002).

Quantum Physics, Systems Theory, Chaos Theory, Complexity Theory, and Graph/Network taught us that our world is not linear and predictable. Quantum Physics taught us that the smaller the world gets, the more intangible and unpredictable it becomes (Capra, 1996; Wolf, 1989). Chaos Theory taught us that what seems chaotic has a rhyme and reason – though not the kind we can enclose in traditional mathematical models (Gleick, 1987). Complexity Theory teaches us that large systems are increasingly complex at each succeeding level (Coveney & Highfield, 1995). Systems Theory taught us that systems have consistent (though dynamically changing) characteristics that are true across systems, scales and types (Capra, 1996). What does this all offer us in dealing with real-world issues (other than – obviously – a lot of uncertainty)?

## Applications to Human Systems

Strategic Systems Thinking seeks to apply the concepts of Systems Theory to better understand, predict and influence the behavior of human systems (Sanders, 1998).

### *Strategic Systems Thinking*

The following is a brief list of the concepts that may be relevant to real-world analysts and strategists (Sanders, 1998):

Real world systems are dynamic – constantly evolving and changing in response to internal and external stimuli. A single stimulus on one level of a system may bounce back and forth and magnify throughout the system in what is known as a ‘feedback loop’. A feedback loop may also take place between the system and the surrounding environment. Therefore a system is extremely sensitive to changes at all levels of the system – no matter how small. Often the change and growth in a system takes place at the boundary between the system and the environment - where they both interact. This boundary is likely where the system is at its least stable. This is where new patterns of chaos and complex organization may arise.

Strategic Systems Thinking poses the following questions regarding human systems:

- a) What forces create the dynamics of this particular system? In particular, what are the connections and relationships that are only semi-visible, but that drive the structure of this system?

- b) What future changes in the system are present now in small ways, that given the right stimuli from the environment can erupt in ways that would change the entire system?
- c) What are those environmental forces that might trigger a change?
- d) What type of structure might the system evolve into (after the instability of the transition phase has resolved)?
- e) How might we direct attention and resources at these evolving trends to guide them to our advantage?
- f) What types of links connect the different nodes on this system/network?
- g) Where are the hubs on this system/network?
- h) What travels along the links?
- i) What causes the system/network to become more linked or complex?
- j) What might cause links to break down, or hubs to be destroyed?
- k) Is it possible to think about this system visually, and/or use metaphors and models from the natural world of systems and networks?
- l) What might those metaphors teach us (Sanders, 1998)?

*Applied Systems Theory - Specific Examples*

Bar-Yam (undated) compares the evolution of human civilization to the evolution of a complex network. First, the different elements of human civilization were operation in random and uncoordinated small units – tribes, families, villages. As time went on the system began to organize itself into larger and larger networks. Some of these large networks were presided over by a single ‘hub’ or ruler. The people in these networks behaved in a coherent manner – all doing similar work and subject to the laws and



constraints of the ruler. As human civilization became more and more complex, the centralized rulership model began to break down and eventually evolved into a spontaneously organizing network without central rule. This new type of organization can be seen in systems like modern cities, large markets, publicly owned corporations, complex democracies, etc. While the random aspects are still present, and the centralized models are also present, the evolution is towards the decentralized, non-chaotic, non-random complex system model (Bar-Yam, undated).

Another practical application to human systems is articulated by Raab (2003), where he looks at what he terms 'Dark Networks' in society – drugs, terrorism and arms trafficking. He says that instead of looking at these as random/ disorganized problems, it may be more accurate to see them as networks actively promoting their own growth (Raab, 2003). The 'Dark Network' will actively oppose every solution that others enact to try and fight these problems. He also looks at the links, not only within the network itself, but possible links between the network and the larger society within which it operates – such as corrupt officials, or spies from governments operating within the network (Raab, 2003). These 'Dark Networks' are also connected to the larger world economic and political systems – they do not operate within a vacuum. Raab (2003), echoing Nye (2002) states that there are three levels to the world international system. There are the governmental actors and their military might. Then there are the non-governmental actors – organizations, corporations, currencies and markets, the media. Lastly there are the covert networks – arms, drugs, and terror networks (Raab, 2003). The author suggests that instead of looking at networks as a benign social phenomenon where people get together to solve problems cooperatively, it may be useful to recognize that

networks may also be responsible for creating problems and keeping them going – frustrating the efforts of others to stop them (Raab, 2003). Raab asks - what we can learn by looking at these issues as the activities of networks? Do they share structures in common? Do they adopt similar measures to cope with the need for secrecy? Have they evolved unique organizational structures – similar to other clandestine organizations in the past? In what ways do these different networks link and collaborate with one another? Where are these networks densely linked with strong ties and where are they less densely linked with only a few weak ties? Do they need access to territory to be effective? How can studying these networks lead to solutions in combating them? (Raab, 2003). He also examines the possibility that it may take networks to combat networks – and (of specific relevance to the present study) action on a variety of levels (Raab, 2003). Speaking specifically of terror networks, the author points out that they are ethnically, geographically and socio-economically diverse (Raab, 2003). They are specifically able to draw on a web of people who have integrated into their host societies – and can be called on to act as needed (Raab, 2003). They are also able to plan operations over a very long time and keep up the connection and motivation of their operatives over these extended periods of time (Raab, 2003). This means that they are able to operate over vast stretches of both time and distance – without a single centralized authority or clear hierarchical structure (Raab, 2003). Just as any network has levels, so Raab (2003) distinguishes in terror networks the political level, the organizational level and the operative levels. Barabasi (2002) also points out that modern terrorist networks follow the behavior of all large systems, and that the study of such groups in the light of systems theory may shed light on the growth and behavior of such systems.

Given the above, it would appear that systems theory (along with its related theories) would be a useful model to use to further explore and understand real-world phenomena – in particular, the formation, evolution and dissolution of so called ‘dark networks’ (Raab, 2003) such as terror groups and their related support systems.

### Terrorism – What We Know

The present work looks specifically at the international terrorist system that is associated with radical Islam.

#### *Terrorism Defined*

For the purpose of the present work, terrorism will be defined in the most simple and operational terms (Cronin, 2002; Richardson, 2006) as ‘The use or threat of violence against non-combatants by sub-national actors for political, religious or ideological reasons’. This definition combines the phrase ‘use or threat of violence’ from Steven and Gunaratna (2004), with the addition of the ‘sub-national’ element from the U.S. State Department definition (<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65462.pdf>, p. 10.). It also adds the religious and ideological reasons from the Department of Defense definition ([http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new\\_pubs/jp1\\_02.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf).) to the political reason given by Steven and Gunaratna (2004). This definition is simple, concise and incorporates the essential elements of the abovementioned definitions. Cronin argues that the definition of terrorism - which she defines as “Sudden acts of violence against the innocent for political ends” (2002, p. 1) - should encompass only the act – and not the justification for the act – removing the ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’ argument. Richardson (2006) also argues for a purely operational definition. In contrast, here is one example of a normative definition of terrorism: Unjustified violence

against a democratic state which permits effective modes of non-violent opposition. (O'Brien, Quoted by Crenshaw, 1983). Note that the terms 'unjustified' and 'effective' are subjective and open to differing interpretations. Shay calls a normative definition like that of O'Brien difficult because of its subjective elements (Shay, 2002). For this reason the above definition purposefully avoids issues of justification and other types of language that lend themselves to subjective interpretation and normative value judgments - which would lessen clarity - instead focusing only on the actions themselves (Cronin, 2002; Richardson, 2006).

While it is important to note that states can engage in terrorism; when terrorist acts are perpetrated directly by states (rather than by sub-national actors – even when operating with the approval or support of states) the acts are called by other terms. (Richardson, 2006). This is clearly the case with those definitions that clearly reference 'sub-national' or 'clandestine' actors (or 'non-governmental actors'); it may also be implicit even in those definitions that do not specify. In any case, the definition in the present work distinguishes 'terrorism' as being the action of subnational actors.

Terrorists specifically do not believe in peaceful means to achieve their aims (such as elections, petitions, marches, etc) – they believe in violence as the best/most effective way to reach their goals (Laqueur, 1996). It is important when examining the terrorist phenomenon to keep in mind that terrorism is a weapon – a means - not an end in itself (Mockaitis & Rich, 2003). It is therefore necessary to look deeper at the underlying motives as well as the goals of those who perpetrate terrorist acts – especially those who are on the planning and leadership levels. More central to the issue of terrorism are the

topics of legitimacy and the related role of religion or ideology which are used both as means and ends (Cronin, 2002; Evans, 2004; North, 1981; Telhami, 2004).

### *Terrorism and the Struggle for Legitimacy*

While terrorists couch their cause in the language of war in order to gain legitimacy and justify their means, nonetheless the struggle is more for minds and less for traditional military aims of rulership or territory (Cronin, 2002; Evans, 2004; Telhami, 2004). While traditional military targets are the soldiers of the opposing side, their land, the ability to rule them; the targets of terror groups are a) symbolic victories, strikes or even defeats; b) the support (willing or coerced) and sympathy of the masses (based on defeats as well as victories) c) the perception of legitimacy of their group, ideology and struggle (served as much by defeat as by victory) (Cronin, 2002).

On the contrary – use of purely military tactics to respond to terrorism may play into their hands by giving them even more attention, legitimacy, support and sympathy - the prime terror prizes (Eikmeier, 2005; Richardson, 2006). It may also drive their group underground, and causing them to innovate and decentralize further, making future actions even more difficult (Cronin, 2002). In short: Terrorism is *intended* to be a matter of perception (Cronin 2002).

In general, terror goals may extend well beyond a particular target (Bell, 1975). The goal of a specific attack may be to make an impression upon others (Bell, 1975; Cronin, 2002). “Terror may strike only one victim, yet have many vicarious targets. The murder of one policeman may be intended to intimidate an entire police force” (Bell, 1975, p.8).

Of prime importance is the ability of the terrorist leader to create a perceived legitimacy of their cause (Cronin, 2002; Evans, 2004; North, 1981; Telhami, 2004). The more perception of legitimacy, the more the perpetrator will be motivated to fight for the cause and absorb losses (Evans, 2004; Telhami, 2004).

If the legitimacy of their cause is also echoed by outside observers (such as heads of state, intergovernmental or nongovernmental organizations or the international community in general), this greatly increases their level of energy, motivation and feelings of support (Evans, 2004).

Legitimacy is about group consensus and cannot be imposed or grown in isolation (Evans, 2004). It is necessary to find ways to delegitimize the terrorist's cause in the society in which it springs (Evans, 2004; Telhami, 2004). There needs to be an emphasis on bridge-building and public dialogue (to destroy the 'us' versus 'them' mentality that causes thrive on) to achieve these aims (Evans, 2004; Telhami, 2004). The U.S. also needs to be cautious to avoid those practices and policies that reinforce negative attitudes towards them, as the battle is primarily one for the hearts and minds of others (Cronin, 2002; Evans, 2004; Telhami, 2004).

Governments that are able to retain an image of legitimacy when fighting terrorist groups eventually defeat them (Evans, 2004). However, when terrorists can convince the society in which they are based that the government is actually trying to attack or occupy the society and victimize them, then they will lose the struggle (Cronin, 2002; Evans, 2004).

The target of the terrorist is not those they attack, but those whose support they are trying to garner (Cronin, 2002; Evans, 2004). In the case of Islamist terrorists, the

target population is the entire Islamic world (Evans, 2004). Having Islamic societies – as well as the larger international community – see terror groups as legitimate is the ultimate prize (Evans, 2004). Therefore international cooperation is a necessary factor because (if nothing else) it reduces the perception of legitimacy of the terrorist cause (Evans, 2004).

The role of perceived legitimacy also plays a role in the strength of an ideological system – the more the system is seen as ‘legit’, the more it will be supported by its followers (North, 1981; Richardson, 2006). For this reason, those involved in the creation and maintenance of ideologies have always paid close attention to the legitimizing of their cause (Evans, 2004; North, 1981). This may be through propaganda, displays of wealth or power, edifices, oratory, media, proof of victimization, elevation of martyrs, etc (North, 1981).

One cannot understand a system/ideology simply by trying to understand what material benefits it brings to its adherents – the strength of its vision is likely the most powerful motivating factor of all (North, 1981).

### *Terrorism and the Role of Religion*

A key factor in terrorist ideologies is the role of religion (Bloom, 2005; Hoffman, 2003). Religious (as opposed to nationalistic) ideology seems to be connected to the ability to recruit and radicalize followers and persuade them to carry out suicide attacks (Bloom, 2005). According to a Rand survey religious terrorists have been more able and willing to kill larger numbers of people than nationalistic groups (Bloom, 2005).

Al-Khattar (2003) gives the following tentative definition of terrorism in the name of religion: “Religious terrorism is a violent act against others (individuals, groups or states) to coerce them (or to coerce others by means of indirect intimidation) to behave or

act according to the perpetrator's (individual, group or state) interpretation of a religion" (PAGE ). The literal interpretation of a scripture along with the approval of a religious leader is the precondition for religious terrorism (Al-Khattar, 2003). This is because appeal to God and religion are the foremost justifications, along with the view that the terrorist's victims are the enemy of God and religion (Al-Khattar, 2003).

Religious terrorism is not a new phenomenon (Hoffman, 2003). There are words used in present day language ('Thug', Assassin, Zealot') that derive from ancient terms denoting those who attacked others in the name of religion (Hoffman, 2003):

Religious terrorism carries certain distinguishing characteristics – even advantages. For example, while those involved with secular terrorism tend to have a long gradual process of involvement and radicalization; religious involvement and radicalization seems to take place much more quickly (Hoffman, 2003). For example, some Hamas and Islamic Jihad bombers are recruited weeks or even days prior to an attack (Hoffman, 2003). This may be because a leader who speaks in the name of God or religion draws on a galvanizing and cohering power that is preexisting in the nature of religion and worship (Hoffman, 2003).

Research has found that those with strong religious belief systems (often emphasizing the authority of the divine or of religious law) are more amenable to the commands of an outside authority in general (Waller, 2002). Those who see themselves as being controlled by fate, the divine, or some other outside locus of control are also more likely to react passively to authority rather than seek to challenge or redefine it, or make independent choices (Waller, 2002). They also have been found to be more likely to have prejudicial feelings about others (Waller, 2002).



While religion can motivate someone to help and heal; it can also be a motivating factor (often mixed with ethnic or nationalist feelings or beliefs) in large-scale violence and conflict (Al-Khattar, 2003; Hoffman, 2003; Kidder, 1993; Waller, 2002). An additional issue is that terrorist attackers who are religiously motivated are not only prepared to be killed, they may even want to be killed - since they are acting out of religious beliefs such as a desire to please God or go to Paradise (Al-Khattar, 2003; Bloom, 2005; Kidder, 1993). This adds to the degree of danger, menace and difficulty in deterrence (Al-Khattar, 2003).

Some of the specific religious factors that helped to create the terrorist phenomenon along with its perpetrators are the rise of fundamentalism as a modern religious phenomenon (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). In the U.S. from 1909 until 1915, a group of American clerics published books titled “The Fundamentals: A Testimony to the Truth’. These books were about the need to read biblical texts literally and resist modern interpretations that recast the biblical accounts as metaphors or myths, asked critical questions, or sought to reconcile the bible with science. This group became known as ‘fundamentalists’ (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). Fundamentalism as a term is therefore associated with a reaction and distancing from secularism and modern thought (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). Fundamentalism does not only distance itself from modernity, it may also distance itself from ‘traditional’ religion – which may be seen as an insufficiently strong response to secularism (Andersen & Aagard, 2005).

### *Islamist Fundamentalism*

Fundamentalism, particularly in the Arab/Islamic world, also arose as a political movement. Fundamentalism became a reaction to and a critique of western civilization,

its cultural influence and its world dominance (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). The perceived wealth and ambitions of the Judeo-Christian West was seen in contrast to the poor living conditions and lack of political power (or avenues to even express an opinion) within the Muslim/Arab world (Andersen & Aagard, 2005).

This is similar to past critiques of modern civilization by left-wing intellectuals who called for violence as the response to colonial oppression (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). From a political perspective, fundamentalism is a struggle between The West (including modernized Arabs) and the World of Islam (Andersen & Aagard, 2005).

The type of fundamentalism most closely connected to Sunni Islamic terrorism is Salafism – a form of Sunni Islam (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). Salafism is a movement founded in the late 1800s by clerics who rejected the process of interpretation of Islam through the ages (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). They wanted an Islam that relied only on the writings of the Koran and the Sunna (acts of the prophet) as written in the Hadith (similar to the Bible and Gospels with no subsequent interpretations) (Andersen & Aagard, 2005).

Salafists oppose the separation of religion and politics, believing that religious leaders should be responsible for appointing political leaders (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). Osama bin Laden quotes often from Salafiya writings (Andersen & Aagard, 2005).

Wahabism is a Saudi form of Salafism, begun by Sheik Muhammad al-Wahab, who founded the first Saudi state along with the Saud family in the mid 1700s (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). From there, Wahabism spread to Afghanistan (as a resistance against

the British) and later to India (again resisting the British) (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). In 1930, Wahabism became the state religion of Saudi Arabia (Andersen & Aagard 2005).

Generally al-Qaeda perpetrators are followers of Wahabism - a radically conservative and anti-modern form of Sunni Islam that originated in Saudi Arabia (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). While Sunni Islam is the religious association of al-Qaeda, other groups such as Hezbollah find their roots in Shiite Islam (Iran Policy Committee, 2006).

The Muslim world experienced a specific religious revival (called the 'Sahwa' or awakening) during the late 1960s through the 1980s that affected the growth of religious extremism and the proliferation and strength of terrorism (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). This awakening was started by the 1967 military defeat at the hands of the Israelis, which dealt a blow to Arab nationalism/socialism – which had been the dominant paradigm since the 1950s (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). It was also spurred on by the assassination of Egyptian religious writer Sayyid Qutb – portrayed as a martyr – that motivated the Islamist movement (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). It peaked in 1979 with the overthrow of the Shah of Iran by Khomeini, the armed takeover of the mosque in Mecca by Saudi militants, Egypt's cease-fire with Israel and the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). The Awakening of Islam made it clear that it was not enough to observe the basic precepts of Islam, one needed to be involved in Dawa – missionary outreach to bring others to true Islam (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). Al-Zawahiri calls Qutb's writings the spark that ignited the Islamic revolution 'against the enemies of Islam at home and abroad' (Andersen & Aagard, 2005).

The Islamic awakening in general and terrorists in particular were very influenced by the writings of Sayyid Qutb – who had been executed in Cairo in 1966 (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). Qutb argued that it was not enough for Islam to be a series of traditional observances; it needed to be an entire way of life (including a government by theocracy) (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). He criticized Muslim governments as being caught in ‘jahiliya’ – a barbaric state, contrary to true Islam (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). Like the counterculture revolution taking place at the same time in the U.S., it was a time of rebelling against an entrenched establishment (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). Osama Bin-Laden attended lectures on education of children given by Qutb’s brother who was a visiting professor at his university in the 70s (Bergen, 2006).

#### Individual Elements Within the Islamist Terrorist System

As mentioned previously, rather than looking at terrorism as a single phenomenon, Systems Theory teaches us that all phenomena (including human phenomena) exist as part of a complex interacting system – with each part of the system contributing a specific type of energy and functions to the system (Capra, 1996; Heylighen, 1998). Each part also has its own mechanisms that it uses to connect to and capitalize on the other parts of the system (Capra, 1996; Heylighen, 1998). Therefore, if the phenomenon we call ‘terrorism’ is actually a complex system, what are its component parts? How do those different parts function together to create the terror system?

Systems theory speaks of levels or sub-systems within a larger system (Capra, 1996; Heylighen, 1998). These sub-systems may be thought of as co-existing nodes within a network (Barabasi, 2002), or they may be conceptualized as different levels or layers within a system (Capra, 1996; Heylighen, 1998). Both of these models may be

used to visualize the terrorist system (Raab, 2003). The different elements in the global system of Islamist extremism are in some ways discrete nodes or elements within a system or network (Barabasi, 2002; Raab, 2003); but they can also be visualized as different levels or layers within the global system of terrorism – from those closest (geographically and operationally) to an actual terrorist attack, to those higher up organizationally in the terror system – and likely further away (geographically and operationally) from an actual attack. All of these elements – both proximate to the attack in action and planning, as well as further away either geographically or causally – operate in different and interdependent ways to create the different levels in the terrorist system – and thereby the entire system as a whole. This is what is referred to as a ‘dark network’ (Raab, 2003).

Let us review what it is that we currently know about these different parts of the terror system and how they function both individually and in connection with one-another.

### *The Perpetrator*

The terrorist perpetrator is the person actually carrying out the attack (Bloom, 2005). The perpetrator may or may not be involved with the organizational details - meaning that the roles of perpetrator and leader/organizer may overlap (McDermott, 2005). Examples of perpetrators are the nineteen hijackers that carried out the attacks on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001- including Mohammed Atta, who also took on the role of an organizer (McDermott, 2005). When a person is being approached, indoctrinated and trained, prior to an attack, they are in the role of Recruit (Bergen, 2006; Bloom, 2005).

For the sake of simplicity, the term perpetrator will be used to refer to both new recruits and those who are functioning as active perpetrators.

Nechayev in his 'Revolutionary Catechism' supplies a summation of some of the attributes of the terrorist perpetrator. He says (using the older term 'revolutionary' to describe one who wants to influence or overthrow a society by any means including violence):

"The revolutionary is a dedicated man. He has no personal inclinations, no business affairs, no emotions, no attachments, no property and no name. Everything in him is subordinated towards a single exclusive attachment, a single thought, and a single passion – the revolution... he has torn himself away from the bonds that tie him to the social order and to the cultivated world, with its laws, moralities, and customs... The revolutionary despises public opinion... morality is everything that contributes to the triumph of the revolution. Immoral and criminal is everything that stands in his way... Night and day he must have but one thought, one aim – merciless destruction... he must be ready to destroy himself and destroy with his own hands everyone who stands in his way" (cited by Waller, 2002, pp. 6-7).

Perpetrators are not all alike – they fall into different types, with differences in motivation, education and background (Bergen, 2006; Bloom, 2005). Some perpetrators are well educated and come from middle-class families (Bloom, 2005; Jaquard, 2002). Some of these are 'outsiders' who come to join terrorist groups of their own accord and for personal reasons (Bloom, 2005; Jaquard, 2002). These reasons may include the loss of a loved one to the cause for which they are now volunteering (Bloom, 2005). This may be particularly advantageous, as those who have lost relatives are less likely to defect –

which is a problem among suicide attackers (Bloom, 2005). Others may join up only having been exposed to images of violence, such as the deaths of children, and this convinced them to sign up as suicide attackers (Bloom, 2005). Others join for the celebrity that it affords; while they are usually also religiously, politically or ideologically motivated, the indoctrination or conversion may be quite recent and of brief duration (Bloom, 2005). Becoming a suicide attacker may be appealing to those who do not feel that their lives have significance, and are looking for a way out, along with a sense of having mattered (Bloom, 2005; Maslow, 1943).

Perpetrators/recruits may be frustrated by limited options in the societies from which they come or into which they have settled (Benjamin & Simon, 2002; Andersen & Aagard, 2005). For the perpetrator, the terror group may satisfy a need to belong, a need for self-esteem, a need for a feeling of power, and a need for a sense of meaning (Maslow, 1943).

Another category of perpetrator is composed of those that are poor; less educated and may have been products of a society that glorifies suicide attackers (Bloom, 2005). They may have left their families as youths to seek out religious or military training (Bloom, 2005). These followers may have been sent to radical madrassas (religious schools) when young and then recruited in these same madrassas in Pakistan, Nepal and Afghanistan – or more recently even the Islamic orphanages of Bosnia (Bergen, 2006; Bloom, 2005; Jaquard, 2002). These children grow up in settings where suicide attackers are held up as heroes (Bergen, 2006). They may declare at a very young age that they want to grow up to be suicide attackers, without being fully aware of what it means. By

the time they are a bit older – about 12 – they fully understand and are committed to the cause (Bloom, 2005; Jaquard, 2002).

An example of this type of indoctrination can be seen in an interview with a five-year old in Pakistan cited by Bergen (2006) from *Jihad Magazine* (Issue 81/1991):

Q: “What is your name?”

A: “Saleh.”

Q: “What is your family name?”

A: “Sayf al-Rahman.”

Q: “What is your country of origin?”

A: “Palestine.”

Q: “How old are you?”

A: “Five years old.”

Q: “Do you go to school?”

A: “I go to Hadan Al-Ansaar School and the Center for memorizing the glorious Koran in Peshawar.”

Q: “Who do you like?”

A: “I like God and Mohammed, the messenger of God, praise be upon him, and I like my mommy and daddy and the mujahedeen.”

Q: “Trivia question – The Stinger missile is used against what?”

A: “Airplanes!”

Q: “And rocket propelled grenades?”

A: “Against guerrillas!”

Q: “What is the name of the weapon held by the defender?”



A: “Kalashnikov!”

Q: “And after you kill the Communist infidels in Afghanistan, what next?”

A: “I want to go with daddy and the mujahedeen to Palestine and fight the infidel Jews” (Bergen, 2006).

Connected to this very specific type of indoctrination is the general view of violence held by the societies and families that perpetrators come from (Waller, 2002). Ajami points out that “The extremist is never just a man of the fringe: He always works at the outer edges of mainstream life, playing out the hidden yearnings and defects of the dominant culture” (2005, p. 1). These societal and familial norms play a part in creating the terrorist response, and may be capitalized on by terrorist leaders and recruiters (Ajami, 2005).

Regarding the issue of coercion: “Although some have argued that suicide bombers are coerced, this is not borne out by the evidence. However the individuals may be subject to intense pressure to sacrifice for the greater good” (Bloom, 2005, p. 85). “Individuals most easily manipulated for such purposes also tend to be young and impressionable” (Bloom, 2005, p. 86). Bergen (2006) reports that when recruiting new trainees, bin-Laden and his deputies were careful to choose men who were young, zealous, obedient, and with a ‘weak character that obeys orders without hesitation’.

While most suicide attackers are male, more and more females are being used – especially those who either carry a personal grievance, as well as those who have been outcast or face death for suspicion of dishonor to their families (Bloom, 2005). There have been accusations of militants’ purposely seducing women and then persuading them to become attackers to make up for their conduct (Bloom, 2005).

### *Terrorism, Mass Murder, and the Role of Psychopathology*

There is a widespread misconception that terror-perpetrators (along with other perpetrators of mass-violence throughout history) suffer from some type of psychopathology, or at least have some special predisposition to violence or criminal behavior (Waller, 2002). However, previous research on those who attack and kill large numbers of people for political, religious or ideological reasons does not support this view.

While some isolated and unstable persons may be involved in assassination attempts on public figures or other forms of violence, these people are usually psychotics acting out fantasies or trying to get attention and using political rhetoric to make some case for their acts (Bell, 1975; Waller, 2002). Such people are usually loners and not a real part of a larger organized group (Bell, 1975; Waller, 2002). Their politics are a justification for abnormal acts committed out of a general hostility or irrationality (Bell, 1975; Waller, 2002;). Psychotics may find revolutionary organizations appealing – but the psychotic is often a socially isolated person, unable to make connections to others, and therefore unsuitable for an organization that requires discipline, consistency and teamwork (Bell, 1975). Examples would be the person who attempted to take the life of then President Ronald Reagan, or the person who shot and killed John Lennon (Waller, 2002).

Examinations of perpetrators of the Nazi genocide – both high ranking and lower level operatives – did not find any evidence of psychopathology (Waller, 2002). No abnormal personality type was found during testing, and any similarities were outweighed by differences (Waller, 2002). Recruiters actually avoided those with clear

sadistic tendencies – perhaps because they were seen as unstable and therefore unreliable (Waller, 2002). Average types of people were preferred – those that could be depended upon to carry out tasks in a responsible fashion (Waller, 2002). These types did not even necessarily need large amounts of indoctrination. Arendt (in Waller, 2002) pointed out that they even had a conscience – one that functioned to keep them performing their jobs as good workers. CITE ARENDT Not Waller!

While no specific psychopathology has been found among the perpetrators studied; some personality traits were found to be common (Waller, 2002): Among these traits were a simplistic attitude towards others – specifically a tendency towards ‘us versus them’ thinking; the lack of a strong internal compass (what Bergen spoke of above as a ‘weak character’) – implying that the person would be more easily molded and would be obedient to orders; difficulties in forming relationships; a tendency to suffer from stress; and the view that they were victims of circumstances outside of their control (Waller, 2002). In addition, ‘social dominance orientation’ (the desire to have one’s group dominate other groups – i.e., an adversarial mentality) is a factor (Waller, 2002). People high in social dominance orientation show more attraction to political ideologies that foster group inequality and intolerance/hatred of others (Waller, 2002). If psychopathology is not a useful explanation for mass violence (of which terrorism is an example), what then can be used to understand the phenomenon?

### *Terrorism and Social Learning*

In contrast to those suggesting psychopathologies or even specific personality types of traits, this approach focuses on the role of social learning through the example set by parents (including child-rearing practices), school, media, peer groups and other

forms of transmission of social norms (Bloom, 2005; Waller, 2002). The social learning perspective points out that personalities and attitudes are fluid and quite susceptible to learning and inculcation/indoctrination of various types (Waller, 2002). When it comes to cruelty both large and small, many people are a product of a multitude of interacting social forces, more than they are products of a specific personality type (Waller, 2002). A culture of cruelty where people are socially rewarded and recognized for cruel acts promotes the idea that all are capable of such cruelty – and that it is good, not bad (Ajami, 2005; Bloom, 2005; Waller, 2002). Attitudes about life, death, killing and violence are all a part of the culture – often consciously developed and systematically inculcated in the populace by those who can then capitalize on these attitudes for their own uses. This ‘culture of cruelty’ helps create, sustain and help perpetrators commit extraordinary acts (Bloom, 2005; Waller, 2002).

In the terrorist’s society, a necessary precondition for suicide terror is the existence of a society that (either) believes in violence or thinks that other, (more peaceful) strategies have failed. Thus, there needs to be some pre-existing level of violence which has become institutionalized and taken on life of its own. (Bloom, 2005, p. 86)

Connected to societal attitudes towards violence are societal and familial attitudes towards authority in general (Ajami, 2005; Waller, 2002): If a person or a culture has a strong ‘authority orientation’ – the tendency to defer to those above and exercise power over those below (‘kissing up and kicking down’ in the words of the author) - this can affect the way one relates to those who are different in authority, status, or beliefs (Waller, 2002). Our ‘authority orientation’ is created by how we are reared, educated and inculcated (Waller, 2002). Living in a setting (family, society) that physically or emotionally abuses or denies affection (often in combination with a rigid authority

structure and an emphasis on obedience) also predisposes people to commit violence (Gilligan, 2000; Waller, 2002). This has been found in Turkish, German, Cambodian and also Rwandan societal structures (Waller, 2002). Eichmann stated “All my life I have been accustomed to obedience, from early childhood... used to being led, in business and in everything else... little by little we were taught all these things... all we knew was obedience...” (Waller, 2002). Another form of strong ‘authority orientation’ is ones obedience and conformity to, and identification with the state, its political structures and its leader (Waller, 2002). This is true of a culture in general (their degree of authority orientation) and it is also true of individuals within a culture – making them more or less likely to obey orders to kill (Waller, 2002).

Again – no predisposition to violent behavior was found amongst the (Nazi) perpetrators studied (Waller, 2002). Interestingly, perpetrators were found to suffer adverse reactions (nightmares, alcoholism and other physical and emotional symptoms) connected to their violent duties, and while some clearly enjoyed their tasks, others did not – and many SS guards were at times kind, and even saved lives – as reported by survivors (Waller, 2002). Perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide likewise came from a cross-section of society and participated for a variety of reasons (Waller, 2002). Quoting Browder: “The causes of (SS) behavior apparently lie not in defective personalities, but in the processes they experienced that legitimized participation in mass inhumanity” (Waller, 2002, p. 86). The following section will discuss the role of selection and training as these represent major processes in the transformation of ordinary people into violent perpetrators.

### *The Role of Selection and Training*

Whether recruits come from societies that glorify attackers, or whether they have joined for personal reasons, they are all subject to a training period that usually takes place in camps set aside for that purpose (Bergen, 2006). These training camps are a key component in the indoctrination of attackers. Bergen (2006) quotes an al-Qaeda trainee as saying that the training camps are ‘a place where one is transformed from being a civilian to being a guerilla warrior’.

The al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan served as much a psychological role as a military one (Bergen, 2006; Jaquard, 2002). They provided a place of mutual trust and a shared ideology (Jaquard, 2002). Many followers were veterans of the uprising against Soviet occupation – who had a ‘permanent war mentality’ (Jaquard, 2002). This phenomenon was also seen in Gulf War veterans Timothy McVeigh and members of other militias – where specific national or political ideological struggles take on the characteristics of a wider conflict of religious or cultural paradigms (Jaquard, 2002). In a similar manner, the Palestinian struggle as well as the Irish nationalist struggle began more narrowly and were then inflamed into holy conflicts by religious figures who gave the struggle broad religious significance (Jaquard, 2002).

This concept of screening and ranking of recruits is further echoed by Bergen (2006) who states that Osama bin-Laden’s training camps turned out many young combat trainees. These trainees were carefully scrutinized, and if accepted they were first sent home to say farewell to their families, and then trained in various levels – beginning, middle and advanced (Bergen 2006). The lesser of which were sent to die fighting the Northern Alliance, the more promising of which were given advance training in terror

tactics and the making of primitive weapons of mass destruction (Bergen, 2006). They were told that one has to obey the emir (bin-Laden) as long as his words are in accordance with Islam, and asked to take an oath of allegiance to al-Qaeda (Bergen, 2006). Again, this form of pressure may be as strong as outright coercion (Bloom, 2005; Waller, 2002).

Prior militarization is a factor in the formation, recruitment abilities and growth of terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda (Jaquard, 2002). While prior militarization may not be a factor with all recruits, it certainly is the case with some of them (Jaquard, 2002). In the case of al-Qaeda, this is true particularly of members who joined during the 1980s. Many of these original members were veterans of the anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). Many had a 'permanent war mentality' (Jaquard 2002). This phenomenon was also seen in Gulf War veterans Timothy McVeigh and members of other militias – where specific national or political ideological struggles take on the characteristics of a wider conflict of religious or cultural paradigms (Jaquard 2002). The Palestinian struggle as well as the Irish nationalist struggle began more narrowly and were then inflamed into holy conflicts by religious figures who gave the struggle broad religious significance (Jaquard, 2002). This will be discussed at greater length in the section on indoctrinators (below). Later members did not have military experience but were recruited (perhaps in a mosque or school) in various countries – both in the Middle East as well as Western countries (Andersen & Aagard, 2005; Bloom, 2005; Jaquard, 2002). These recruits were often from middle-class families, educated and willing to devote themselves to what they saw as a higher cause - motivated by religious or political reasons, or a mix of both (Andersen & Aagard, 2005; Bloom, 2005). This

second category is the same mentioned above regarding middle-class recruits who come of their own accord for a mix of personal reasons (Bloom, 2005). What are the ways that recruits become motivated to attack others for the terrorist cause?

### *Terrorist Indoctrination*

The role of the context and the processes experienced by the perpetrators – during training, indoctrination and during the actual perpetration is echoed by psychologist Milgram (1974) regarding his experiments on the willingness of people to inflict electric shocks on others when given orders to do so. Commenting on his experiments, he said “... The most fundamental lesson of our study (is that) ordinary people, simply doing their jobs, and without any particular hostility on their part, can become agents in a terribly destructive process” (Milgram, 1974, p. 6). He compared this (while at the same time acknowledging the ‘enormous differences’) to the processes involved in the Nazi genocide (Milgram, 1974).

A similar comment is made by Browning: “If ordinary Serbs, Croats, Hutus, Turks, Cambodians, and Chinese can be the perpetrators of mass-murder and genocide, implemented with terrible cruelty, then we do indeed need to look at those universal aspects of human nature that transcend the cognition and culture of ordinary Germans” (in Waller, 2002, p. 49).

Throughout history, there have been mechanisms specifically designed to train and inculcate people to commit violent acts that they would not otherwise do (Milgram, 1974; Waller, 2002; Zimbardo, 1971). While not specific to Islamic terrorism, Waller (2002) has cited those tools used on perpetrators throughout the history of radical violent groups in general. Some of the tools and techniques that he lists are the following:



Moral disengagement: The process whereby individuals and groups are trained or indoctrinated to detach from and operate outside of accepted moral values, rules and consideration of others. The process of moral disengagement may include:

The creation of a moral justification that justifies killing as a moral, virtuous action on the grounds of protecting the community, fighting oppression, protecting values, righting past victimization, protecting national or religious honor or preserving peace and stability.

The creation of a moral imperative (stronger than a justification) that tells people that killing is moral, righteous and necessary. The killer is moral, and not killing is a crime against the nation, leader or group. Large-scale massacres are often preceded by the creation of a moral imperative.

Euphemistic labeling of evil actions that serve to reduce responsibility, conceal actions and make actions respectable. This may include the use of terms during indoctrination such as ‘servicing the target’, ‘collateral damage’, ‘liquidation’, ‘final solution’, etc. The word killing may be avoided completely, as may be first person terms such as ‘I’, ‘me’, and ‘us’.

### *The Role of Group*

Another key issue in the motivating of people to a cause is the role of the group. Waller (2002) cites specific pressures that have been historically used to keep perpetrators compliant and willing to commit ever-greater acts of violence on behalf of a group. These often emphasize the group at the expense of the individual, and are referred to by as the ‘binding factors of the group’. The binding factors of the group may or may not include the following specific strategies or factors:

Diffusion or segmentation of responsibility: This refers to dividing up of tasks and responsibilities (managing a schedule, sorting belongings, guarding prisoners) so that no one person feels individually to blame – instead feeling like part of the group, acting on orders of the group or acting for the sake of the group. The larger the group, the less responsibility is felt by the individual. In some mass violence this tactic is used heavily (Nazi Germany) and in some not at all (Rwanda and Bosnia).

De-individuation: This is when people give up their individual identities and become more identified as a group member through the use of uniforms, rank and numbers, masks, paint or costumes, etc. Again, this tactic may or may not be present.

Conformity to peer pressure: This refers to the creation of intense bonds of loyalty and dependence between group members – as well as a need for group approval, and a strong fear of disapproval, shame or rejection by the group.

Professional socialization: New group members are trained to look to more senior members to see what is ‘right’ or ‘expected’. This results in the creation of new norms of behavior for group members. Both peer pressure and socialization make refusal to take part extremely difficult.

Escalating commitments: this is also called the ‘foot in the door’ tactic and refers to having people agree to small actions at first (such as group cheers, greetings or salutes) that later increase the likelihood of agreeing to larger actions and commitments (such as attacks and killings).

Ritual conduct: These are group rituals that are consciously created to socialize the individual as part of the group and strengthen group identity. The rituals have

psychological rather than actual value and may include salutes, roll-calls, parades, exercises and competitions (even competitive killing or abuse of victims).

Distance between perpetrator and victim: This distance is consciously created and may be mental, emotional, social or physical. Actions that create distance may include stripping a victim of their clothing, identity or dignity; mistreating, subjugating, bestializing or starving them prior to killing them; or referring to them using non-human terms such as 'lice', 'vermin', 'cancer', 'pigs', etc. The attackers may continue to feel a moral obligation to humanity, but the victim ceases to be regarded as human.

The creation of 'us versus them' thinking: This causes group members to see themselves as being worthy, righteous and superior, and the victim as inferior, unworthy and even a threat to the group. 'Us versus them' thinking is based on evolutionary survival mechanisms that ensure the survival of the group or tribe, but are consciously created, manipulated and exacerbated to encourage aggression.

Blaming the victim: This is when the victim is seen to deserve and even require their punishment or extermination – allowing the perpetrator to feel that their thoughts and actions are consistent, understandable and rational; and that their world is just and makes sense. This may also include blaming the victim for not resisting more strongly.

Repression of conscience or the purposeful creation of a culture of cruelty – where 'outside' values and norms are kept on the outside and group norms prevail. This repression of conscience may include prohibiting criticism or even discussion of actions.

General rationalizations: These may be used consciously or unconsciously by the perpetrators are rationalizations such as following the orders of a superior; just doing ones duty; a change in standards due to the situation ('wartime'); powerlessness and lack

of personal responsibility as part of a group or the combative realities of nature (Waller, 2002).

A last cautionary note: While some blame violent behavior on the existence of a ‘group mentality’, groups do not significantly alter the character of those within the group or make certain behaviors inevitable, but rather magnify, reveal, and unite together the pre-existing natures (good or bad) of those within the group. The group is a ‘social amplifier’ (Waller, 2002).

The purpose of the present study is not to look in depth at those aspects of human nature that motivate cruelty and violence – as others have already done so quite ably. Rather the point is that much of understanding human behavior is about understanding the conscious inculcation processes that others use to create the behaviors that they want to elicit in others. Bloom (2005) quotes Atran in saying “The key to understanding and parrying suicide terrorism is to concentrate more on the organizational structure, indoctrination methods and ideological appeal of recruiting organizations” (p. 79). One key point in the inculcation of others is the use of grievances and justifications.

#### *The Role of Grievances and Justifications*

A related tool used in order to recruit the perpetrator is of a more secular and political nature. Those seeking to recruit perpetrators feed off of a generalized sense of real or perceived grievance in the Muslim world – both against their own governments as well as against the West (Ajami, 2003, 2006; Jaquard, 2002; Mirskii, 2003). Generally, terrorist perpetrators have been convinced by their leaders and indoctrinators that the world is at war and violence is a necessary response – either as self-defense, or to prevent greater violence (Jaquard, 2002; Waller, 2002). They see their actions as counterstrikes in

an ongoing battle and as retaliation to violence that they have already suffered (Jaquard, 2002). In 1998, Bin Laden declared that Americans (he later added Jews), through their actions in the Middle East, had declared war on God, and on Muslims (Alexander & Swetnam, 2001; Bergen, 2006; Jaquard 2002). There is a general fear of a global political/economic conspiracy threatening to engulf the entire world (Jaquard, 2002).

Grievances need not be directly linked to specific actions. As with any political or social movement, the 'opinion' may coalesce around an idea or viewpoint quite apart from events or acts. As Ajami states (p. 1): "No Iraqi agents had to slip into hotel rooms in Prague for meetings with jihadists to plot against America. The plot sprang out of the deep structure of Arab opinion"

Exonerating comparisons are related to the use of grievances in recruiting and training those who commit violent terrorist acts (Waller, 2002). Comparing one's actions with the real or perceived past actions or future threats of one's enemies can create a justification, rationalization, or exoneration (Waller, 2002). Sometimes practical arguments are used for moral justification: Nonviolent actions are judged to be ineffective and therefore not a possible option (Waller, 2002). Analyses are made to show that one's actions in the present will prevent worse outcomes in the future (Waller, 2002). Even though there may be accuracy in these analyses, their chief function is to exonerate guilt and judgment and preserve self-regard on the part of the perpetrators (Waller, 2002).

To use religious examples of the above types of neutralization (Al-Khattar, 2003): Denial of responsibility would be for example 'it is the fault of the oppressors and their supporters'; the denial of having caused damage or injury 'they were just collateral – an unfortunate outcome of a just struggle'; the portrayal of the victim/target as the

wrongdoer ‘they are sinners’, ‘enemies of God’; the condemnation or criticism of those who condemn an act ‘how can they criticize when they support the oppressor’, ‘they are infidels – so they do not need to be heeded’, ‘they support evil regimes and are hypocrites’; and the use of higher goals as a justification ‘it is what God wants’, ‘it is necessary for the defense of religion’ (Al-Khattar, 2003).

Specific types of justification used by Muslims for terrorist acts include Jihad (holy battle) against the enemies of Islam/God; resisting the Israeli occupation and its supporters (the U.S.) and practicing self-defense (Al-Khattar, 2003). Other justifications used by religious leaders in general include: Unintended casualties of a ‘Just War’, preventing future violence, self-defense/protection, and protection/defense of land goals (Al-Khattar, 2003).

Reasons (not justifications) cited by religious leaders included misreading/misinterpretation of religious doctrine; frustration with status quo; desire to achieve political, social or religious goals (Al-Khattar, 2003).

#### The Terrorist Leader/Organizer

The next level, the leader/organizer, is in contact with and manages (directly or indirectly) the perpetrators (Jaquard, 2002). The leader/organizer is like a hub in the network - directly involved in planning attacks, recruiting higher-level operatives and exhorting members on ideology or warfare (Jaquard, 2002). For this person there exists a direct and acknowledged connection between them and the terrorist operatives (Jaquard, 2002). They do not hide their actions, but rather take pride in them (Jaquard, 2002). They are not out to attain conventional political respect in the international arena (Jaquard, 2002). For the leader/organizer, terrorism is a combination of a need for a greater level of

achievement (albeit in a criminal manner), strong adherence to a specific ideology/religion/ethnic or racial bias, and a brute means to gain and consolidate their own power (Jaquard, 2002). It is not always clear whether the person serves the ideology or the ideology serves the person, as the two are often inseparably enmeshed (Jaquard, 2002).

The leader/organizer takes the personal need for power of the perpetrator and multiplies it over a larger group over which they rule (Jaquard, 2002). While the ‘foot soldiers’ tend to be young and poor, the leaders (like Bin-Laden and Al-Zawahiri) tend to be older and wealthy (Jaquard, 2002). The organizers may give direct orders and immerse themselves in planning details, or they may give only general directions or approve ideas that are brought to them by others – as is said to be the case with Osama bin-Laden (Jaquard, 2002). For example, Osama bin-Laden turns to his religious advisers (Al-Zawahiri and Al-Turabi, as well as the works of Sayid Qutb) for theological and ideological guidance and rulings (Jaquard, 2002). He is said to be hesitant and even a bit slow- not making decisions until he has received feedback and rulings from his religious council – or ulema (Jaquard, 2002).

Prior to examining the characteristics of terrorist leaders, we first must understand the societal context in which they arose: Many current terror leaders came of age during a time when the Muslim world was experiencing an awakening (Sahwa) – spurred on by the 1967 military defeat at the hands of the Israelis, which dealt a blow to Arab nationalism/socialism – which had been the dominant paradigm since the 1950s (Andersen & Aagard, 2005; Bergen, 2006; Jaquard, 2002). It was also spurred on by the assassination of Egyptian writer Sayyid Qutb – portrayed as a martyr – which motivated

the Islamist movement (Andersen & Aagard, 2005; Bergen, 2006; Jaquard, 2002). It peaked in 1979 with the overthrow of the Shah of Iran by Khomeini, the armed takeover of the mosque in Mecca by Saudi militants, Egypt's cease-fire with Israel and the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan (Andersen & Aagard, 2005; Bergen, 2006; Jaquard, 2002). The Awakening of Islam made it clear that it was not enough to observe the basic precepts of Islam, one needed to be involved in Dawa – missionary outreach to bring others to true Islam (Andersen & Aagard, 2005; Bergen, 2006; Jaquard, 2002). Al-Zawahiri calls Qutb's writings the spark that ignited the Islamic revolution 'against the enemies of Islam at home and abroad' (Bergen, 2006).

The Islamic awakening in general and terrorist leaders such as Osama bin-Laden in particular were very influenced by the writings of Sayyid Qutb – who had been executed in Cairo in 1966 (Bergen, 2006). Qutb argued that it was not enough for Islam to be a series of traditional observances; it needed to be an entire way of life - including a government by theocracy (Bergen, 2006). Qutb criticized Muslim governments as being caught in jahiliya – a barbaric state, contrary to true Islam (Bergen, 2006). Like the counterculture-revolution taking place at the same time in the U.S., it was a time of rebelling against an entrenched establishment (Bergen, 2006)). Bin-Laden attended lectures on education of children given by Qutb's brother who was a visiting professor at his university in the 70's (Bergen, 2006).

#### *Family Background and Radicalization of Terrorist Leaders*

While Sunni Islamist terrorist leaders are associated with radical Islam of the Wahabi/Salafist variety, their path to religious radicalization varies widely. Some terrorist leaders such as Abu-Musab al-Zarqawi became religious in adulthood (Brisard &



Martinez, 2005). Zarqawi was of a lower class background (Brisard & Martinez, 2005) and became radicalized while serving time for criminal offenses in local jails in Jordan as well as when he left to fight in Afghanistan. Radicalization in adulthood was also the case with hijacker Mohammed Atta, one of the organizers of the 9/11 attacks (McDermott, 2005). Atta was raised in a middle-class and upwardly mobile household. He and his siblings (sisters) were educated in Cairo University and Atta came to Hamburg Germany to attend graduate school. It was during his stay in Hamburg that Atta sought out the company of fellow Sunni Muslims at the al-Quds mosque. The al-Quds mosque attracted young men who were drawn to radical fundamentalist Islam. Although their backgrounds and countries of origin differed, they tended to be on the fringe in their home societies and did not fit in well with the western universities they attended or the permissiveness of western society. These young men, Atta among them, met the radical preacher Mohammed Fazazi. Fazazi was originally from Morocco, and he preached for the killing of all non-believers and the cultivation of a love of jihad, martyrdom and death (McDermott, 2005). This type of radical preaching was common in mosques around the world, as a new type of radical, militant, anti-Western and anti-modern fundamentalist Islam was on the rise (McDermott, 2005). The radical preaching at al-Quds produced not only Mohammed Atta, but two other hijackers – Marwan al-Shehi and Ziad Jarrah (McDermott, 2005). Unlike Atta and Zarqawi, Osama bin-Laden was brought up in a relatively religious household, though not all of his family remained religiously pious (Bergen, 2006). Bin-Laden was described as being quite religious when young – even disapproving of the actions and speech of the less pious members of his family. He also attempted to gather youth and preach to them about Islamic beliefs and political issues

such as the reclamation of Palestine (Bergen, 2006). Although bin-Laden attended university in Saudi Arabia, he was known even then for his religious and fundamentalist views – in contrast to those around him (Bergen, 2006). Nonetheless, the most significant radicalization of bin-Laden took place during the time that he was in Afghanistan and Pakistan to fight against the Soviet occupation (Bergen, 2006). While Bin-Laden is the most well-known example, many Islamist terrorist leaders/organizers are veterans of the anti Soviet uprising in Afghanistan – Arabs who traveled there to fight with the Afghan resistance and then returned (highly militarized and further radicalized) to their home countries (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). Some policy advisors caution that Iraq is performing the same function in militarizing and radicalizing that Afghanistan did in the past – i.e., creating a new generation of future terror leaders (Asia Pacific Foundation, 2006) – that may portend a coming threat outside of the Middle East, such as in Europe (BND, 2006).

#### *Organizational Style and Functions of the Terrorist Leader*

Organizational styles of terrorist leaders may vary widely. Bin Laden is described as a pragmatic strategist, while the late Abu-Musab al-Zarqawi is described as thuggish and violent (Brisard & Martinez, 2005). Bin Laden is credited with bringing people together – a master networker – and creating an orderly system, while Zarqawi is described as being exclusionary and creating chaos (Brisard & Martinez, 2005). Unlike the perpetrators that are indoctrinated towards martyrdom, Bin Laden is said to be obsessed with his own security – surrounding himself with bodyguards, multiple food-tasters and at one point searching for a double in the manner of Saddam Hussein (Jacquard, 2002). Bin-Laden is described as being low-key and non-authoritarian with his

children and wives – taking the time to teach his children how to grow up to be committed to jihad (Bergen, 2006). One of his three wives divorced him because she did not want to live in hardship in the Sudan. He did so without protest (Bergen, 2006). A reporter, Edward Giardet wrote (in 1989) of meeting bin-Laden, before he knew who he was. His impression in conversation with him was of a ‘spoiled kid playing at jihad’ – someone who wanted attention and to prove he was the boss (Bergen, 2006). Someone described that he seemed to enjoy the increasing media attention following his emergence as a leader in Afghanistan (Bergen, 2006). He is described as very soft-spoken – presenting himself as more of a clerical type than a fire-breathing leader (Bergen, 2006). However, Bin-Laden is also described as at times acting on impulse and overreaching without regard to consequences, out of a foolhardy egotism (Bergen, 2006). He tries to think strategically, but does not always do so. Against the wishes of the Taliban, he called for attacks on the U.S. while still in Afghanistan (Bergen, 2006). As the war with the Soviets was winding down in Afghanistan, against the advice of associates, he positioned al-Qaeda to fight a global jihad (Bergen, 2006). The 9/11 attack, far from strengthening his organization, caused its decimation as well as the destruction of the Taliban and the training bases for al-Qaeda (Bergen, 2006).

One of Bin Laden’s lieutenants described how he gained the trust of the Afghan fighters – cooking with them, eating with them, digging trenches with them (Jacquard 2002). He is elsewhere described as serious – avoiding raising his voice or laughing aloud (Jacquard 2002). He is described as being deliberate in decision making, and consulting his ulema (religious advisers) before making decisions (Jacquard 2002). He is described as non-domineering in character, not seeking to inspire fear in his followers;

spending much time with his disciples and joining them in their activities, sharing their meals and dressing like them (Jacquard, 2002). Far from being an irrational, fanatical visionary, Bin Laden is known to be a pragmatic politician, organizer and networker (Jacquard, 2002). On the other hand, Osama bin-Laden was described by Afghans as neither intellectual nor articulate, but rather someone who was impressionable and in need of mentors who knew more than he did about both Islam and the modern world (Rashid, 2000).

Bin-Laden is described elsewhere as eating simple food and sleeping on the ground (Bergen, 2006). He would eat small amounts – even the leftovers from guests (which he said was a blessing) and would wear simple clothes and shoes open at the back (Bergen, 2006). He was described as a hard worker on his father's projects – following his father's example in working and eating alongside the laborers (Bergen, 2006). Interestingly, others describe his humility – sending someone who asked him a question to one of his military commanders saying 'go ask Abu Hafs, who is more intelligent than me' (Bergen, 2006). They say that he had no pictures of himself around and people did not rise when he entered (Bergen, 2006). He was described as wanting only one thing – martyrdom at the hands of the Americans (Bergen, 2006). Hassan al-Turabi (defacto Islamist leader in Sudan during the 90's) described bin-Laden's temperament as 'very cold, very gentle, very cool' (Bergen, 2006).

Bin-Laden portrays himself as the 'purifier of the Wahabi kingdom' (Jaquard, 2002). He is supposedly backed by a large organized network of supporters and financiers in Saudi Arabia who would like to see the monarchy overthrown (Jaquard, 2002). While their goals may be specific, Bin Laden uses them for his wider goals of

world Islamicization (Jaquard, 2002). For the purposes of this broader goal, Bin Laden combines issues and grievances in order to co-opt them into his organization (Jaquard, 2002).

Bin-Laden also capitalizes on powerful historical references (Lewis, 2002). He refers to Americans, and Westerners in general as ‘crusaders’ (Bergen, 2000; Lewis, 2002) – casting his battle as a part of an ongoing fourteen century long rivalry between Islam and Christianity (Lewis, 2002). This struggle – which first had the Muslims in a more powerful position – culminated in the loss of Spain, the invasion of Islamic lands by European Christian armies and what bin-Laden refers to as the final humiliation: the defeat in 1918 of the Ottoman Empire – the last bastion of Muslim power (Lewis, 2002). Bin-Laden sees himself as launching a counterattack to first eject all non-Muslims from traditionally Muslim lands (including Spain), and the final battle that ends with Islam taking its rightful place as the world’s most powerful religion and dominator of the world stage (Lewis, 2002).

In contrast, the (late) leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi is described as having been a criminal when young – with a thuggish temperament (Brisard & Martinez, 2005). He was arrested and imprisoned in his home country of Jordan, and while in prison became something of a leader of the other criminals and also associated himself with radical Islam. Unlike bin-Laden, he gained leadership by demanding absolute loyalty and exacting heavy penalties on anyone who dared to disobey or challenge him (Brisard & Martinez). This same tactic of making a name for himself through fear and brutality worked well for him in Iraq, where he filmed himself beheading hostages and posted the videos on the internet (Brisard & Martinez, 2005).

While not as openly thuggish as al-Zarqawi, bin-Laden's top lieutenant, Ayman al-Zawahiri is nonetheless described as being quite cruel (Bergen, 2006). Description of al-Zawahiri (by Montasser al-Zayyat, a former friend): He said that the cruel life that Zawahiri has led has affected his character – to the extent that he executed a 15 year old son (who he suspected of leaking information to the Egyptian authorities) of one of his close associates in front of his father and other associates (Bergen, 2006). Al-Zayyat said that for Zawahiri, Jihad had gone from being a means to being an end in itself (Bergen, 2006).

### *The Indoctrinator*

The indoctrinator is the person who creates or promulgates an ideology that becomes the driving force for the perpetrator – and perhaps the leader/organizer as well (Mandel, 2002). Mandel (2002) terms these indoctrinators the terrorist 'instigators'. While these are not the direct perpetrators, they are specifically involved in creating motivation for those that do perpetrate terrorist acts (Mandel, 2002). This person generally does not directly plan attacks or organize followers (Mandel, 2002). Their role is to inspire, instigate and preach to others (Mandel, 2002). They may or may not hold a conventional clerical or academic position (Mandel, 2002). What do they use to appeal to their followers and create the drive necessary to carry out the attacks? Those who instigate others may appeal to feelings of religious duty and obligation – and use this in turn to motivate others (Mandel, 2002). Nationalism (in the case of Islamic terrorists this would be religious nationalism) is also used as a powerful motivator to instigate others (Mandel, 2002; Waller, 2002).

### *The Role of Ideology*

Ideology is a consciously held set of beliefs and values (North, 1981; Waller, 2002). Mass killing and genocide are often ideologically inspired (Waller, 2002). This is particularly true with ideologies of antagonism – us versus them - and ideologies of hate - often carefully created and nurtured through propaganda, laws, and social modeling and indoctrination (Waller, 2002).

However as we saw in the perpetrators of the Holocaust, ideology is only one variable, and not the only one (Waller, 2002). Levels of indoctrination or ideological commitment varied widely among those who perpetrated mass killing in the Holocaust (Waller, 2002).

North (1981) speaks of the forces that cause a person or a group to act in ways that seem to run counter to their basic interests and needs – such as for food, shelter or safety from danger. He emphasizes the role of ideology – the system of values, morals, ideas and principles that unite to create a coherent world-vision that then dictates a person's subsequent choices (North, 1981). Someone who identifies sufficiently with a particular ideology may be willing to act contrary to their individual interests (even the basic needs and drives mentioned above) and even risk or sacrifice life and limb (North, 1981). The creation of a strong motivating vision can override the natural propensity of people to act in ways that benefit them, but at the expense of the group (North, 1981). An ideologue will act for the group, even at the expense of self (North, 1981).

For a host of reasons (including the role of the radical teachers and preachers), the ideology of radical Islam is overshadowing more moderate forms of Islam throughout the Middle East (Benjamin & Simon, 2002).

Radical mosques are widespread, radical teachings and writings are promulgated, and religious education is taking the place of public education – creating a ‘generation of zealots’ (Benjamin & Simon, 2002).

There is a demand for sharia, a belief that the secular leaders are not proper upholders of Islam, that adherence to Islam will solve all, and a clear idea that the West has declared war against Islam (Benjamin & Simon, 2002). These ideas are the main subject of discussion – even though the Islamists may not have formal political power (Benjamin & Simon, 2002).

The mix of militarization and religious motivation that is exploited in order to recruit followers can be seen in the metamorphosis of the spiritual concept of Jihad (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). While originally cast as a struggle that included the inner as well as the outer enemies of Islam, it has evolved into a declaration of war against anything that is seen as not an expression of pure Islam (Benjamin & Simon, 2002). Originally (from the traditional texts) jihad was cast as an internal spiritual warfare against the forces of spiritual opposition, temptation and distraction; and only secondarily as a struggle against the outer enemies of Islam (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). During the war against Soviet occupation in Afghanistan, jihad was recast primarily as an obligation to wage militant warfare against an actual flesh-and-blood enemy (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). In this manner, young Muslim/Arab fighters were recruited to go to Afghanistan to defeat the Soviets (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). Once the fighters returned to their home countries (1989-1992), jihad now stood for the fighting against un-Islamic regimes (Arab and otherwise) in Saudi-Arabia and in other countries where the new enemy (the West/U.S.A) was seen as gaining a foothold or exerting influence (Andersen & Aagard,



2005). Fighters who had learned in Afghanistan (and tasted success with the withdrawal of the Soviets) were recruited to fight the larger battle of 'jihad' in other locations.

(Andersen & Aagard, 2005).

Ayatollah al-Sadr, a leading Shi'a cleric in Iran (not to be confused with Iraqi Sunni leader Muqtada al-Sadr) calls for the 'destruction of the West' so Islam can 'reconstruct the world' (Bodansky, 2001). Jihad was defined by Sheikh Muhammad abu-Zahra of al-Azhar University in Cairo as a 'perpetual and never-ending struggle until the day of judgment' (Bodansky, 2001).

Clerics who speak out against jihad are held in contempt by jihadists, and those Salafists who agree with the idea, but say that the time is not yet arrived have little impact amongst the jihadists – who believe that the time has indeed come and victory - ushering the world into the Era of Islam - is possible and has even begun (Benjamin & Simon, 2002).

Instigators may clothe themselves in a cloak of religious legitimacy in order to appeal to, recruit and motivate others (Benjamin & Simon, 2002). For example, Al-Qaeda leaders build on mainstream Islamic teachings to create their ideology (Benjamin & Simon, 2002). While their willingness to use violence to further their cause may differentiate them from other religious adherents, nonetheless they do not create their ideology out of whole cloth, but rather build it on a foundation of religious legitimacy and justification (Benjamin & Simon, 2002). They quote respected Islamic scholars in their speeches and writings, and are able to recruit from Islamic schools (Benjamin & Simon, 2002).

The type of radical Islam that is used to motivate the perpetrator is not necessarily the same as other forms of 'fundamentalist' Islam (Umnov, 2002). For example there are differences between the ideology of Al-Qaeda and the ideology of the Taliban (Umnov, 2002). The Taliban did not bring terrorism to Afghanistan – rather it was the terrorists who predated the Taliban (Umnov, 2002). The terrorists began using Afghanistan as a base in the '80s, while the Taliban did not rise to power until the 1990s and the Soviet retreat (Umnov, 2002). The Taliban base their philosophy on a desire to preserve tradition and history, worshipping saints and placing limits on radical resistance (Umnov, 2002). In contrast, terrorist groups in Afghanistan are in favor of revolution and an uprooting of the social order so that they can impose a strict Wahabi regime (Umnov, 2002). While the terrorists created a strategic alliance with the Taliban, they were motivated less by a desire to protect ancient traditions, and more by a desire to overthrow the U.S. (Umnov, 2002)

There is a need to avoid conflating fundamentalism with terrorism – while fundamentalism denotes a return to traditional faith and practice, it does not in itself imply any use of violence or radical overthrow (Mirskii, 2003). While the Taliban may be seen as 'fundamentalist', the philosophy that is used as a motivator by al-Qaeda and its indoctrinators is more radical and revolutionary (Mirskii, 2003).

Fundamentalist Islam is similar to fundamentalist Christianity in that it is loosely structured and non-hierarchical (McDermott, 2005). There are no absolute authorities – preachers interpret the Q'uran according to their views (McDermott, 2005). The fieriest preachers tend to gain the most popularity as they travel and speak publicly as well as circulating their sermons on audio and videotapes (McDermott, 2005).

There are specific political, societal and ideological issues that are capitalized on by those preaching radicalism as a means to indoctrinate and motivate terrorists from within the Muslim world. The following are factors that help inflame radical ideologues and which they use to recruit perpetrators (Mirskii, 2003):

1) Anti-Western sentiments, sometimes stemming from past histories of colonization in Arab/Islamic countries.

2) Anti-globalist sentiments – rage at the amount of power and wealth that has drained away from local powers and is now centered in transatlantic corporations.

3) Mass poverty. While individual terrorists are usually middle class, poverty allows for a scapegoating of those seen as responsible for the conditions – the wealthy and successful Western world.

4) Feelings of powerlessness – which may be due to forces within their own non-democratic countries, but are used by terrorist leaders to focus hatred on the more powerful Western world.

5) Anti-Americanism – particularly as the U.S. is seen as the corruptor of Islamic values and piety.

6) Anti-Israel sentiments – the perceived humiliation of Palestinian Arabs and occupation of Jerusalem becomes the focal point of larger feelings of Arab/Islamic humiliation (Mirskii, 2003).

#### The State Sponsor

The state sponsor may be a state government (Byman, 2006), or a failed, fractured or unstable state (Andersen & Aagard, 2005; Crocker, 2003). The sponsor may also be a specific party, officeholder or group within the government (Byman, 2006). Sponsors

may allow terrorist groups as a means to deflect criticism – since the radical/terror groups generally preach and incite against an outside enemy or other alien group (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). The sponsor may also allow the group because they do not have the resources to prevent them from using the territory (Andersen & Aagard, 2005; Crocker, 2003). The groups may terrorize or threaten the local populace, or alternately, they may promise stability and safety in a tumultuous system (Andersen & Aagard, 2005; Crocker, 2003). They may bring actual resources to the failed state (Andersen & Aagard, 2005; Bergen, 2006; Byman, 2006; Crocker, 2003). If they are a religious group, they may confer legitimacy to the rulers (Andersen & Aagard, 2005).

Sponsors may help import arms, make covert payments, assist operatives in avoiding arrest or going free (Bergen, 2006; Byman, 2006). They may raise funds, channel funds or other resources and serve as a source of communications (Bergen, 2006; Byman, 2006). They may help import arms, make covert payments to operatives of terror or their families once the operative is dead, or assist terrorists in either avoiding arrest or going free once arrested (Bergen, 2006; Byman, 2006). They may use others to carry out acts that they do not openly admit to - unlike the organizers who take public pride in their acts (Netanyahu, 2006).

The sponsor may see the need to straddle a fence – gaining and consolidating conventional political power and status (and preserving an image of respectability and ‘clean hands’) while at the same time advancing political, religious, ideological or criminal ends through unacceptable means (Ajami, 2003; Netanyahu, 2006). The sponsor may privately adhere to the terrorist ideology, but not openly acknowledge (at least on the international level) their terrorist sympathies (Ajami, 2003). They may use the

terrorist group or operative to carry out acts to which they do not want to publicly commit arms or men to fight – either to maintain the illusion of uninvolvedness, or to reduce risk, expense or casualties (Ajami, 2003; Byman, 2006).

The sponsor is not at odds with the radical factions - not only does he agree with them in principle, they serve his needs (Ajami, 2003; Netanyahu, 2006). The problem is that they can never be completely controlled. The radical group may begin calling all of the shots – and one of these may be to take over or completely overthrow the government of the state sponsor (Andersen & Aagard, 2005).

Another problem is related to the difficulty of controlling the radical groups. If the radical elements do not co-opt, swallow or kill the sponsor (Andersen & Aagard, 2005), the political world in which the sponsor is trying to appear respectable places strong pressure upon them to either disavow the radical groups, or risk isolation in every political sense (Andersen & Aagard, 2005; Benjamin & Simon, 2002).

This threat of political rejection or isolation by the world at large is untenable to the sponsor, because their conventional political position, power and status is of key importance to them (Benjamin & Simon, 2002) – to become a persona-non-grata in the larger political world is almost worse than death. Additionally, the political world may pressure them to prove that their present position of power is legitimate and was not coerced – by shifting to a democratic system (Byman, 2002). This is truly a Hobson's choice, because in allowing their people to make a democratic choice, they risk being ousted (Benjamin & Simon, 2002).

For the state sponsor the immediate risks are not as great as for the other two parties - the organizer and the perpetrator (Byman, 2006). While the organizer or

perpetrator can be killed, captured or driven underground (and then supplanted from within the ranks), the state sponsor is in many cases a passive facilitator (Byman, 2006). They do not really need to consider themselves with issues of radical involvement, because the radical factions are not directly connected to them - at least to the outer observer (Byman, 2006). All they do is fail to discredit them or fail to drive them out (Byman, 2006). While they would never be caught calling America the Great Satan or calling for suicide bombers to take action, all they need to do is remain silent (Ajami, 2003). The benefits are many – the risks (particularly for the larger state sponsor) few. What risks do exist are the threat that may be posed by the radicals, or the need to publicly disavow them or take action against them, but these risks are less extreme and over a much more extended time span (Byman, 2006).

A sponsor may be a non-democratic state government, such as Saudi Arabia or any one of the other more ‘moderate’ but non-free Arab regimes (Byman, 2006). This also may be a failed or unstable state such as Afghanistan or Chechnya (Crocker, 2003). For the failed or unstable state the situation is simple: either they do not have the power to resist the incursion of radical groups (Crocker, 2003), or they are receiving money from the groups that they give haven to (Bergen, 2006; Byman, 2006; Crocker, 2003). Often (as in the case of Afghanistan) it is both (Crocker, 2003). The radical groups may be willing to train their own fighters by fighting local battles on behalf of the host country (as in both Afghanistan and Chechnya), and in addition locals may be equipped and trained as well (Andersen & Aagard, 2005; Benjamin & Simon, 2002; Bergen, 2006; Byman, 2006).

For a larger state sponsor (such as Saudi Arabia), the relationship is more complex (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). As discussed above, the state is not democratic and its citizens hold little to no power (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). Authoritarianism has been the norm in the Middle East in both Islamist states such as Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, Sudan and Iran as well as non-Islamist governments such as Saudi-Arabia, Pakistan and Tunisia, Syria, Indonesia, Algeria and Egypt (Esposito, 2002).

Authoritarianism is not limited to one type of political ruler – authoritarian rule is perpetuated by kings and emirs in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco and Kuwait; and military and ex-military rulers in Sudan, Pakistan, Egypt, Libya and Saddam Hussein's Iraq (Esposito, 2002).

Economic conditions may be difficult for a majority of the populace - particularly those living outside of major cities (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). Throughout the Middle East (save for perhaps the small Gulf States) unemployment is widespread and increasing (Mockaitis & Rich, 2003). This causes unrest among the population that the rulers are under pressure to control, lest it become a threat (Ajami, 2003; Andersen & Aagard, 2005).

There is also an absence and a weakness of civil society institutions and associations - those that use power sharing, representation, rule of law and social justice (Esposito, 2002). This means that many governments in the Muslim world will follow religious or secular authoritarianism, since there are not structures and norms in place to provide other models (Esposito, 2002).

The challenge of the state is to retain a hold on power while simultaneously keeping a lid on the better educated who may hunger for more of a say in how they are

governed (or the degree of freedom under which they live), and controlling the poor masses who live in squalor while the rulers live in sprawling palaces (Ajami, 2003; Andersen & Aagard, 2005). The most effective way to accomplish both aims is to create a common enemy; whether that enemy is the brutal Israelis who occupy Palestinian lands and oppress the occupants, or the Great Satan whose corrupt values threaten all of Islam (Ajami, 2003; Andersen & Aagard, 2005). More generally the enemy can be secularism, or for that matter, moderate Islam (Andersen & Aagard, 2005).

In all cases, attention is diverted from the ruling regime and onto an outer target (Ajami, 2003; Andersen & Aagard, 2005). The Authoritarian government uses the fear of fanatic fundamentalism to argue against democratic reforms (Esposito, 2002). When a sponsoring state allows radical factions to grow within its boundaries, they focus the attention of the masses onto an outer enemy, while giving a pass to the ruling government that allows their existence (Ajami, 2003; Andersen & Aagard, 2005).

The character of the governments that oppose radical Islam strengthen the arguments of the Islamists: Egypt has become more authoritarian over the past decade (Andersen & Aagard, 2005; Benjamin & Simon, 2002); Saudi Arabia tries to appear more moderate without actually giving up any of its political power to the people it rules (Andersen & Aagard, 2005; Benjamin & Simon, 2002); Jordan has passed newly restrictive measures (Benjamin & Simon, 2002); Algeria is run by its army and Pakistan is ruled by a military dictator (Benjamin & Simon, 2002). Any liberalization has taken place mainly in the smaller Gulf States (Benjamin & Simon, 2002). All of this has fueled the rise of militant, radical Islam (Andersen & Aagard, 2005; Benjamin & Simon, 2002).



Because of the repression and lack of representation, these governments look for ways to increase their legitimacy in the eyes of the masses in order to increase their likelihood of survival (Andersen & Aagard, 2005; Benjamin & Simon, 2002). Despite these efforts, the strategy cannot continue forever. The state leaders will never gain credibility in the eyes of those who believe in the Islamist path. Their claims to religious authority are not accepted and their clerics are looked at as mouthpieces for the rulers (Andersen & Aagard, 2005; Benjamin & Simon, 2002). Efforts to secularize education are met with resistance (Benjamin & Simon, 2002). These countries also desire to modernize, keep pace and be accepted in the eyes of the international community (Benjamin & Simon, 2002). They also are pressured to assist in the war on terrorism post-9/11 which meant cooperating with the U.S. and the West – thereby deepening the contradiction (Benjamin & Simon, 2002).

United States is now part of a ‘uni-multi-polarity’ (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). This means that we are living in a unipolar world with the U.S. as the only major power; yet there are many minor shifting power centers and regional conflicts that create an unstable situation that is difficult for the U.S. to keep track of, much less control (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). This instability presents opportunities for terror groups such as al-Qaeda to capitalize upon in various ways (Andersen & Aagard, 2005).

These regional conflicts and failed (or tyrannical) states create instability that is conducive to the growth of both criminal and radical networks (Andersen & Aagard, 2005; Crocker, 2003). While the U.S. may feel unaffected by these small or low-level regional issues, nonetheless they provide fertile ground for radicalism bred by dissatisfaction and conflict (Andersen & Aagard, 2005; Crocker, 2003). These regional

issues attract foreign Jihadists who travel to join in and fight conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo, Kashmir, Central Asia and Chechnya (Esposito, 2002).

Poverty and the perception of the exploitation of the poor by the rich also provides fuel for violence (Ajami, 2003; Andersen & Aagard, 2005). Failed and unstable geographic areas also provide refuge and territory for training for radical groups (Andersen & Aagard, 2005; Bergen, 2006; Byman, 2006; Crocker, 2003). Even weak or failed states are sovereign and therefore others are limited in the extent that they will interfere in their internal affairs (Andersen & Aagard, 2005).

State sponsorship of terrorism goes back to the 1970s and 80s when almost every prominent terror group had a state sponsor (Byman, 2006). Lebanese Hezbollah was backed by Iran, The Tamil Tigers was given support by India and the PLO was supported by several Arab states - added to this were stranger alliances such as Libya with the Provisional IRA, Syria with the Japanese Red Army and the Soviet Union with several Palestinian and European terror groups (Byman, 2006). Nine of the 36 State Department-designated terror groups currently have significant state support (Byman, 2006). Others have less open forms of assistance from states, such as the state allowing money to be raised, preaching and recruitment and other activities to take place on their soil (Byman, 2006). Generally, groups that are sponsored by states are more willing and able to inflict large-scale damage (Benjamin & Simon, 2002; Byman, 2006). They are also much less vulnerable to countermeasures (Byman, 2006). Al-Qaeda first worked closely with Sudan (Bergen, 2006; Byman, 2006), and then Afghanistan's Taliban regime (Bergen, 2006; Byman, 2006) – this support was reported by investigators to have been necessary in the planning of 9/11 (Bergen, 2006; Byman, 2006).

While no state at present openly assists Al-Qaeda, states give tacit support by looking the other way while money is raised and other forms of assistance take place, such as recruitment activities (Byman, 2006). State support can transform a poor and disorganized group (such as pre-Iran Hezbollah) into an organized fighting force (Byman, 2006; Netanyahu, 2006). The rewards for the state are the ability to fight covertly against adversaries with a minimum of exposure, risk and loss (Netanyahu, 2006). It may also be a way to gain domestic support as well as foreign alliances (Byman, 2006). State-sponsorship of terrorism often takes the form of simply allowing radical groups to air their views on state-sponsored media (Byman, 2006; Guindy, 2006; Middle East Research Institute, 2006).

One current example is a clip from a children's program on Egyptian state-sponsored television (Middle East Research Institute, 2006). Egyptian cleric Sheik Muhammad Sharaf Al-Din appeared as a guest speaker on a children's program on Al-Nas television on June 21, 2006. The host of the program, Egyptian Sheikh Muhammad Nassar, of the Egyptian ministry of religious endowment, invited the children to "listen to a very beautiful story to learn about the courage of a child, and how, when a child is brought up in a good home, and receives proper education in faith, he loves martyrdom, which becomes like an instinct for him. He can never give it up."

The invited guest Egyptian cleric Sheik Muhammad Sharaf Al-Din then told a story from Islamic tradition in which a Jewish woman tried to poison Muhammad. After telling the story, in which the prophet of Islam is miraculously spared, the sheikh took a call from a child viewer.

"Ruqaya, what did you learn from today's show?" the sheikh, Muhammad Sharaf Al-Din, asked the child.

"I learned that the Jews are the people of treachery and betrayal...."

Sheikh Al-Din interrupted the caller, shouting, "Allah Akbar!" Turning to the children in the studio, he instructed:

"Say Allah Akbar! What did Ruqiya say? The Jews are the people of treachery and betrayal. May Allah give you success. We want mothers who teach their sons Jihad, the love of Allah and His messenger, sacrifice for the sake of Islam, and love for the countries of the Muslims. Loving the country of the Muslims. May Allah bless you, Ruqaya. That is the most beautiful thing I have heard - that the Jews are the people of treachery, betrayal, and vileness" (Middle East Research Institute, 2006).

An earlier episode (June 15, 2006,) of the program for children on the same television station promoted death in the course of Jihad against the 'infidels.' (Middle East Research Institute, 2006).

A report from the Center for Religious Freedom in Washington titled "Saudi Arabia's Curriculum of Intolerance" listed excerpts from Saudi Arabian textbooks which include the statements "Judaism and Christianity are deviant religions." "The unbelievers, idolaters and others like them must be hated and despised." "The apes are Jews, the people of the Sabbath; while the swine are the Christians, the infidels of the communion of Jesus" (Center for Religious Freedom, 2006). These excerpts date from the academic year of 2006 – which was after an effort to remove hatred from the textbooks in response to international pressure. The report that cited these quotes also found that in Saudi textbooks:

1) Non-Wahabists are condemned as deviants and Shiites and Sufis are called heretical (Center for Religious Freedom, 2006).

2) Muslims are commanded to "hate" Christians, Jews, "polytheists" and other "unbelievers," including non-Wahhabi Muslims (Center for Religious Freedom, 2006).

3) The forgery The Protocols of the Elders of Zion are represented as historical fact (Center for Religious Freedom, 2006).

4) It is taught that "Jews and the Christians are enemies of the [Muslim] believers" and that "the clash" between the two realms is perpetual (Center for Religious Freedom, 2006).

5) Students are instructed not to "greet," "befriend," "imitate," "show loyalty to," "be courteous to," or "respect" non-believers (Center for Religious Freedom, 2006).

6) The spread of Islam through jihad is taught as a "religious duty;"

7) It is taught that "Fighting between Muslims and Jews" will continue until Judgment Day, and that the Muslims are promised victory over the Jews in the end (Center for Religious Freedom, 2006).

8) Textbooks include a map of the Middle East that labels Israel within its pre-1967 borders as "Palestine: occupied 1948" (Center for Religious Freedom, 2006).

Kissinger (1982) states that in 1973 the petroleum embargo and subsequent sharp price increase suddenly gave Arab states a feeling of power against the United States and the West. All of a sudden there seemed to be a way to right the unbalance of power that existed between what had been the poor, weak Arab states and the West – their rich patrons and prior colonizers (Kissinger, 1982). In his own words: "'Never before in history has a group of such relatively weak nations been able to impose with so little

protest such a dramatic change in the way of life of the overwhelming majority of the rest of mankind" (Kissinger, 1982).

The rise of oil wealth brought about a destruction of the traditional societal structures in Arab states and an influx of western culture and material goods (Ajami, 2003). Along with those changes came a wide split between the poor and wealthy classes – along cultural, religious and economic fault-lines (Ajami, 2003). One result of this economic split was the rise of unemployment. In the Middle East, North Africa and Pakistan there are increasing numbers of unemployed Islamic youth (Mockaitis & Rich, 2003). Conditions of economic deprivation and unemployment tended to make the poorer, more traditional and less westernized sector of society feel resentment, not only of their wealthier citizens and rulers – but also those western nations that they saw as being responsible for those changes (Ajami, 2003).

Religious leaders, beginning with the Ayatollah Khomeini became both bastions of religious and cultural safety and points of pride and identity – but also sources of resentment and hatred against non-Muslims and the West (Ajami, 2003). State sponsorship of terror – both overt and covert, can be seen as a continuation of that desire to undermine the power of the West and settle historical grievances of conquest and subjugation (Ajami, 2003). New oil wealth also brought political instability and struggle to countries like Iraq – where Saddam Hussein eventually rose to power; Algeria, where oil brought bloody battles between western friendly groups and groups like Hezbollah; and Iran, where the Western leaning Shah was deposed by the Ayatollah (Ajami, 2003). Osama bin-Laden is a product of both that wealth, and the religious extremism that it gave rise to in response to society's upheaval (Ajami, 2003).

### *Specific States and Their Terror Involvement*

Saudi Arabia is a key ally of the U.S. due to its ability to counterbalance Iran (previously Iraq also), as a military staging area (until the U.S. removed its permanent military bases), and as a source of 25% of the world's oil resources – also as a key OPEC member (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). At the same time Saudi Arabia is an extremely repressive country as regards human rights – with freedom of speech, religion, assembly, press, voting, and free courts being completely lacking (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). The country is also quite repressive of women in particular (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). Violations are punished with incarceration (without fair trial), whippings, amputations and beheadings (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). Informers watch the behavior of the populace, and religious police patrol the streets (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). Internally, Saudi Arabia is struggling between the rulers and their allies who want to hold onto their dictatorial power, and a growing opposition to their policies (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). Despite its totalitarianism, and due to its strategic economic, military and political importance in the Gulf Region and elsewhere, Saudi Arabia has been able to manage its own affairs with only superficial criticism from the West (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). The internal struggle that is playing out in Saudi Arabia between the forces of traditional dictatorship, modern opposition and religious extremism has played out in the larger regional and now global arena (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). The Saudi government has tried to ensure its own legitimacy by supporting religious extremism within its own country and in Central and South Asia as well (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). This has been in the form of allowing for the spread of religious extremism (in Islamic universities, schools and missionary activities), as well as allowing for the collecting and spread of

funds to finance both extreme Islam as well as the violent groups associated with it (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). The U.S. has in the past allowed this to continue, because in the view of many, a (somewhat) stable Saudi Arabia was preferable to any alternative (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). The current connection between the royal Saudi family and religious extremism is quite entrenched in the country's political structure (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). It does not seem to be anything that will change any time soon – at least not willingly on the part of the rulers (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). One thing that does affect the situation in Saudi Arabia is the growth of a younger and better educated populace (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). There is also a demand for greater economic transparency and less corruption – along with more privatization and job creation (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). There is also an opposition created by both the Shiite minority within the country as well as Salafists who do not believe that Islam should be a part of government – believing rather that the Islamic clerics should choose the leaders - with the Taliban being the closest approximation of their ideal (Andersen, & Aagard, 2005).

Another prominent example of a state's involvement with radical Islam is Egypt (Guindy, 2006). In 2005, the militant Islamist group The Muslim Brotherhood (early radical influence on Osama bin-Laden) won a fifth of the parliamentary seats in a surprise upset in the elections (Guindy, 2006). This was a culmination of a process that had been occurring (with state assistance) for quite some time (Guindy, 2006).

While Gamel Abdel Nasser had flirted with socialism and 'Arabism', Anwar Sadat sought to reestablish ties with the Muslim Brotherhood (banned in 1954) and other Islamist groups (Guindy, 2006). He also stipulated in his 1971 constitution that Sharia



law be a main source of legislation in Egypt - in 1981 this was changed to 'the main source' (Guindy, 2006). This began the Islamicization of Egypt. Presently Islamic radical views are spread throughout Egypt – in the workplace (managers often serving as preachers), in apartment buildings where rooms are designated as prayer halls (and used by radical preachers), and even in subway cars that become audiences for preachers (Guindy, 2006). Professional organizations such as the bar association have become forums for radical anti-western views (Guindy, 2006). The government owned media has become a mouthpiece for those espousing anti-western and pan-Islamic viewpoints (Guindy, 2006). Religious schools serving all ages as well as mosques have increased in number and student population has increased as well - with the number enrolled as of 2005 at about 1.5 million (Guindy, 2006). Factoring in the student population of the Islamic universities would bring the number to at least 1.9 million (Guindy, 2006). Adding in those who attend radically religious mosques and support them would increase the number to 2.5 million people whose lives revolve exclusively around radical Islam (Guindy, 2006). The 'Ministry of Endowments' arm of the government funds these mosques and schools – whose views include the necessity of bringing Islam to others even by force, viewing non Muslims as inferior, hatred of the West, the oppression of women, and punishments such as stoning and amputation (Guindy, 2006). These views are stated by the official religious authorities in Egypt, and posted on their websites (Guindy, 2006). The intolerance of non-Muslims is seen in the violence against the country's Coptic Christian minority (both against people - such as the murder of 21 Copts in 2000, and churches) and the unwillingness of the government to bring to justice those that perpetrate these attacks (Guindy, 2006). Generally, the 'Great Islamic

Transformation' (as it is often termed) of Egypt has become a government sponsorship of radical, militant and coercive Islamist views – that spawn terrorist viewpoints and membership in terrorist groups – as well as anti-Western and radical views among the general populace (Guindy, 2006).

In Syria, Bashar Assad reaffirmed both his support for Hezbollah as well as the strategic ties between his country and Iran – condemning the United States, the U.N. and Israel in the process (speech to Syrian Journalist's Association, 8/15/06).

For Iran, support for both Sunni Hamas and Shiite Hezbollah create proxy arms with which to wage a slow war against the United States and its allies – where a direct conflict would carry unacceptable risks and costs (Netanyahu, 2006). From this perspective, state support for terror is another way to carry out a long-standing conflict (Netanyahu, 2006).

Pakistan (as well as the Afghanistan/Pakistan border area) has been named a major center for Al-Qaeda operatives and recruits (Benjamin & Simon, 2002; Bloom, 2005). Jihadists that were forced to flee their home countries are settling in Afghanistan and Pakistan – which are also becoming centers for training camps and madrassahs (Esposito, 2002). While Musharraf has taken some measures, he is criticized as being more interested in his own survival than the American war on terror (Benjamin & Simon, 2002). Many terror recruits are graduates from madrassahs in Pakistan (Benjamin & Simon, 2002; Bloom, 2005). The hatred and anti-Americanism in madrassas may be difficult to counter, or even quantify. Journalist Jeffrey Goldberg (2000) visited a prominent Pakistani madrassa and asked the madrassa's director if he was teaching about compulsory jihad to his thousands of students. The director responded: "My students are

taught Islam. This isn't a military school." Goldberg concludes (after spending an extended time at the school attending classes and talking to students old and young): "Haq's secret was not that the Haqqania madrassa is a training camp for terrorists. And the secret of the Taliban -- the secret of Talibanism (i.e., religious radicalism – MM) is not found (in religious sites such as) inside the Shrine of the Cloak of Muhammad. The secret is embodied in the two 11-year-olds cocking their fingers at me (and shouting 'Osama!' as they pulled the pretend trigger), and in the taunts of the students in the mosque who raised their hands for Osama bin Laden (in their approval of his actions and their hope that he would one day acquire nuclear arms), and in the person of Mullah Haji Muhammad, my 17-year-old minder in Kandahar who has no interest in any book but the Koran, and in the hundreds of thousands of young men like him at madrasas across Pakistan and Afghanistan. These are poor and impressionable boys kept entirely ignorant of the world and, for that matter, largely ignorant of all but one interpretation of Islam. They are the perfect jihad machines" (Goldberg, 2000). Ironically, this article was written one year prior to the attacks of 9/11.

Sudan: After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, bin-Laden's fighters who could not return to their home countries, regrouped in Sudan, where the National Islamic Front (NIF) had come to power (Bergen, 2006; Byman, 2006). Bin-Laden provide the poor country with money and men, and Sudan provided them with a safe haven (Bergen, 2006; Byman, 2006).

In the case of Afghanistan there is the issue of state sponsorship (Benjamin & Simon, 2002) along with the strategy of co-opting local struggles (Andersen & Aagard, 2005; Benjamin & Simon, 2002; Bergen, 2006; Byman, 2006). Bin-Laden made a close

alliance in Afghanistan with Taliban leader Mullah Omar (Bergen, 2006; Byman, 2006). It was with the forming of a geographic base that he launched his war against the West in earnest (Benjamin & Simon, 2002; Bergen, 2006). There was also the advantage of protection and security: Before arriving he had gotten a promise that Omar would protect him and never surrender him to others (Bergen, 2006). Bin-Laden's training camps in Afghanistan turned out many young combat trainees – the lesser of which were sent to die fighting the Northern Alliance and Massoud, the more promising of which were given advance training in terror tactics and the making of primitive weapons of mass destruction (Benjamin & Simon, 2002; Bergen, 2006). While he publicly professed loyalty to Omar, he ignored the requests to refrain from attacking the West (Bergen, 2006). Using his money to buy gifts for Omar and support the opposition to the Northern Alliance, bin-Laden created an advantageous position among the Taliban. (Bergen, 2006). Since the U.S. incursion into Afghanistan, al-Qaeda no longer is able to use it as a central base (Benjamin & Simon, 2002; Bergen, 2006).

#### *New Frontiers*

After 9/11, some of Al-Qaeda remains in Afghanistan, some are in Pakistan, some are in Iraq and some are in Iran (Benjamin & Simon, 2002; Bergen, 2006; Bloom, 2005; Byman, 2006). Al-Qaeda may regroup in Yemen; where bin-Laden has close ties (Benjamin & Simon, 2002). The state authority does not extend much beyond the capital of Sanaa, and there are large areas where Al-Qaeda can operate (Benjamin & Simon, 2002). Al-Qaeda may also settle in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon's cities of Sidon or Tripoli, and Somalia may also be an option (Benjamin & Simon, 2002).

State pressure against Islamist groups seen as a threat by various Middle Eastern rulers caused many who were not jailed or killed to seek haven in Europe, Southeast and Central Asia, East Africa, the Balkans and America – where civil liberties and human rights organizations as well as porous customs, corrupt officials and weak law enforcement helped them settle, and the lack of harsh laws provided no deterrence (Benjamin & Simon, 2002). Particularly in Europe, the large and insular Muslim community provided a ready place for them – as well as potential recruits (Benjamin & Simon, 2002; Fukuyama, 2005). Exacerbated by discrimination and exclusion (even by their own more successful elites), young European Muslims are angrier, more radical (Ates, 2006) and more open to being influenced by radical clerics who tell them that they live in a state of war – and that they are Muslims first, and Europeans only as a matter of convenience (Benjamin & Simon, 2002). Furthermore, their fellow citizens are really the enemy of Islam – against whom they must fight jihad (Ates, 2006; Benjamin & Simon, 2002). They can use the technological advances of their countries to train and take those skills anywhere in the world to fight jihad – with the eventual goal of the collapse of their ‘home’ countries as well (Benjamin & Simon, 2002).

In Afghanistan, the near-statehood enjoyed by Al-Qaeda gave it territory, an army, training facilities, authority, taxes and headquarters (Bergen, 2002; Byman, 2006), – but also rendered it more vulnerable to attack (Benjamin & Simon, 2002). In the future, ‘virtual statehood’ may be a more secure option – keeping leaders on the move, and no centers where people gather for any length of time (Benjamin & Simon, 2002). Communication would be by laptop, disposable cell-phones and data encryption, money would be moved by hawala networks or couriers, false passports would be used and long

distance relocation would be done whenever necessary (Benjamin & Simon, 2002). Al-Qaeda would become a flexible, adaptable, invisible network with no hierarchical organization – coming together when necessary (‘swarming’), then dispersing just as quickly (Benjamin & Simon, 2002). Al-Qaeda would have an advantage over hierarchical, slow and centralized entities, like law enforcement and intelligence (Benjamin & Simon, 2002).

#### The Non-State Supporter

This aspect of the system represents the source of the funding for the terror operations - the financiers (Andersen & Aagard, 2005; Winer, 2002). It also includes those who provide other forms of material, logistical, protective and psychological support to terrorists (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). This group may be made up of wealthy oil barons, governmental officials (acting in an unofficial capacity), narcotics traffickers, arms sellers and other rich and powerful people acting both within and outside of the bounds of local and international laws (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). It may also include poor or working class people in run-down neighborhoods or refugee camps throughout the Middle East, Asia and Africa (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). Increasingly, it also includes middle or working class European immigrant families and their British and French children (Andersen & Aagard, 2005; Ates, 2006; Fukuyama, 2005). It is from these people that terror recruits are also drawn (Fukuyama, 2005).

Across Jordan, according to a poll conducted by Jordan’s Centre for Strategic Studies, 67% believed that al-Qaeda was a ‘legitimate resistance organization’ rather than a terror group (Centre for Strategic Studies, 2006). Similar results have been found for perceptions of both Hamas and Hezbollah - designated as terror groups by the United

States (Centre for Strategic Studies, 2006). Nonetheless, according to reporters, when Abu Musab al-Zarqawi bombed hotels in Jordan, killing Muslim civilians, he was repudiated, even in his hometown of Zarqa (Butcher & McKinnon, 2005). Support amongst the population therefore seems conditional on the perception of the legitimacy of the movement (Evans, 2004; Telhami, 2004).

Terror groups capitalize on unresolved issues or grievances within the local population (Andersen & Aagard, 2005; Bergen, 2006; Bloom, 2005; Richardson, 2006): Suicide bombings are used as a strategy when there is a deadlock, stalemate, or unacceptable status-quo (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). At this point the locals may accept the cost of suicide attacks and see them as a means of breaking an unacceptable stalemate (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). The benefit of suicide bombings decreases markedly when the surrounding society strongly objects to civilian casualties - ex: ETA in Spain and The IRA in Ireland (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). The use of heavy-handed responses, while they may seem effective in the short term, may increase support and recruitment for the suicide attackers (Andersen & Aagard, 2005; Bloom, 2005; Richardson, 2006) – the battle is for the ‘hearts and minds’ of the larger society (Andersen & Aagard, 2005; Cronin, 2002; Evans, 2004; Telhami, 2004). Emphasizing positive measures (infrastructure, security, material benefits, autonomy) within the society and jailing leaders rather than carrying out assassinations (and other extreme tactics) may in the long term be more effective (Andersen & Aagard, 2005; Richardson, 2006). Basically the tactic is to ‘outbid’ the attackers in terms of what one can offer (Andersen & Aagard, 2005).

The American response in the past has been to combat or prevent specific acts rather than to address the conditions that create those acts (Bloom, 2005; Richardson, 2006). While some revolutionaries are ‘rebels without a cause’, many more are not unreachable (Bloom, 2005; Richardson, 2006). The finding of solutions to societal issues (where possible) erodes the foundation that the terrorists stand on (Bloom, 2005). While this may create a short-term rise in violence by those who oppose accommodation, in the longer term, the ability of the terrorist to rally others to their cause would decline (Bloom, 2005). Nonetheless, the U.S. needs to accept that because of the Third World view of the international system, the U.S. will always be a target, no matter how we try to portray ourselves (Bloom, 2005). While we cannot ignore violence, it is as important not to overreact, but to remain reasoned, appropriate and proportional – within the bounds (Richardson, 2006; Bloom, 2005). Efforts should be made to alleviate the conditions that fuel terrorist causes (Bloom, 2005).

Things that fuel anti-Americanism: The perception that the U.S. only becomes involved in international issues when its own interests are at stake (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). Also criticized is the apparent willingness of the U.S. to ally with corrupt, repressive or dictatorial regimes or groups when it serves U.S. purposes (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). The U.S. is also criticized for caring about Western, Christian or Caucasian concerns to the neglect of non-Western nations, peoples and issues (Andersen, & Aagard, 2005).

Regarding terrorist funding: Some of the funds used in the 9/11 attacks were traced to a bank account in Dubai (Winer, 2002). This was true even though at the time, Dubai was one of the only countries (with Cyprus and Israel) to have any laws against



accepting anonymous funds in anonymous accounts – which is legal in most of the rest of the Middle East (Winer, 2002). Dubai is also a major link in the hawala system of money transfer, as well as a major gold trading center (Winer, 2002).

Other than money laundering or concealing, the other ways available to finance terror in the Middle East include direct charitable sums donated by wealthy Gulf-State Muslims for resistance in various locations including Bosnia, Kosovo, Kashmir and Chechnya (Alexander & Swetnam, 2001; Andersen & Aagard, 2005; Winer, 2002). There is also money available from narcotics trafficking, siphoning of moneys for social services, document fraud, gun-running, stealing cars and even working (Alexander & Aagard, 2005; Alexander & Swetnam, 2001; Winer, 2002). This money has traveled through both informal systems of transfer, as well as the global financial structure (Alexander & Aagard, 2005; Alexander & Swetnam, 2001; Winer, 2002). Lack of adequate regulation has made these funds not traceable (Winer, 2002). Thus terror financing is part of a larger issue of non-transparency of finances worldwide (Winer, 2002). This is due to knowing acts, negligence and insufficient laws on the part of major financial institutions (Winer, 2002). While more oversight exists since 9/11 (including beginning efforts to oversee hawala transfers) nonetheless, the efforts are not yet sufficient on standards, implementation or enforcement (Winer, 2002).

In addition to Dubai, UAE had been linked to terror finance prior to 9/11 (Winer, 2002). The Dubai Islamic Bank was used to store and transfer funds used in the attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 (Winer, 2002). Diamonds mined in Sierra Leone are also purchased by terrorists (paid for with cash or weapons for use in the

local conflicts) and then taken and sold in global diamond markets such as Belgium (Winer, 2002).

While it is not known exactly how Al-Qaeda operations specifically are financed - since much of bin-Laden's inheritance is believed to have been frozen (Alexander & Swetnam, 2001; Andersen & Aagard, 2005) - it is thought that financing consists of that portion of the personal fortune of bin-Laden that has not been frozen, including the income of various companies set up by bin-Laden when he was in Sudan (Alexander & Swetnam, 2001; Andersen & Aagard, 2005). Contributions come from various sources in the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia, with money laundered thorough Saudi banks and charitable relief agencies, such as the Mercy International Relief Agency (Alexander & Swetnam, 2001; Andersen & Aagard, 2005). Funds have also been channeled from Dubai Islamic Bank in Dubai (controlled by UAE) and funneled through informal hawala transfer networks (Alexander & Swetnam, 2001; Andersen & Aagard, 2005; Winer, 2002). Narcotics trafficking is also thought to be a major source of funding (Alexander & Swetnam, 2001; Andersen & Aagard, 2005; Winer, 2002).

#### The Observer/Target

While we do not tend to think of observer/targets like the U.S., UK, or other states as being a part of the terrorist system, nonetheless every element in the system plays a part – whether active or passive, purposeful or inadvertent. For this reason it is useful to look at some of the characteristics of the observer/target. Terrorists are strongly motivated by a desire to influence others (Mirskii, 2003). From this point of view, a single terrorist target may not be the real focus – the real 'target' is those who are

watching, and who will be influenced (positively or negatively) by the terrorist actions (Mirskii, 2003).

The United States tends to be reactive rather than active – responding when attacks occur, but failing to have developed a long-term comprehensive strategy beforehand – or even after they are galvanized into action (Cronin, 2002). Even when aggression is responded to, the message can be mixed (Ajami, 2006).

We waged a war against Saddam in 1991 and then spared him. We established a presence in the Arabian Peninsula to monitor him, only to help radicalize a population with religious phobias about the "infidel" presence on Arabian soil. The most devout and the most religiously lapsed of the Arabs alike could see the feebleness of America's response to a decade of subversion and terror waged by Arab plotters and bankrolled by Arab financiers... This is a region with a keen eye for the weakness of strangers. (Ajami, 2006, p.1)

Regarding responses to terrorism specifically, it is not that warnings aren't given and policies developed (the Bremer Commission, Gillmore Commission and the Hart-Rudman Commission reports are primary examples), but that these are not given high enough priority against other, competing concerns (Cronin, 2002). The question of cost also arises – both in the political capital that would be needed to enact unpopular, risky, or controversial measures, as well as the actual cost in dollars, lives, time and energy (Cronin, 2002). It is hard to mobilize opinion and resources against an amorphous threat - actually judged as declining by some experts just prior to 9/11 (Cronin, 2002). Traditional ('rational man') cost/benefit analyses of military might and deterrence do not serve the terrorism issue, as the cost calculated by our historical adversaries – loss of men, power or territory – are not nearly as relevant to terror groups as attention, support (even coerced), sympathy and legitimacy (Cronin, 2002).

One of the difficulties of observer nations is that they can become (and are increasingly becoming) places where homegrown terrorists arise (Benjamin & Simon, 2002; Fukuyama, 2005). In the UK, France, Holland and the Netherlands, radicals responsible for planning and executing both mass (subway and train bombings) and targeted (the assassination of filmmaker Theo Van Gogh) violence are coming from native born citizens (Benjamin & Simon, 2002; Fukuyama, 2005). It is therefore possible that Western Islamist terrorism is a response to modernity, as well as an expression of an Islamic identity without the traditional moderating community, social and family constraints and supports (Ajami, 2003; Fukuyama, 2005).

In the words of a Turkish female lawyer, Seyran Ates, who was forced to close her practice (where she defended Muslim women and girls against forced marriage, beatings and honor killings) in the face of death threats, the terrorists of the future will be third- and fourth-generation Muslim immigrants who "under the eyes of well-meaning politicians have been raised to hate Western society from birth" (Ates, 2006, p. 1).

#### Al-Qaeda: A Case Study

The Al-Qaeda terrorist organization provides a useful example of many of the concepts discussed above. For this reason it will be examined in greater detail below to serve as a case study of previously discussed concepts.

##### *Al-Qaeda Origins*

One can see the seminal role of the terrorist leader/organizer in the formation of al-Qaeda: The group was originally a branch of the Afghanistan Foreign Service Office – formed by Osama bin-Laden and his mentor Abdullah Azzam, in order to coordinate the recruitment, absorption and training of Arabs who came to Afghanistan to fight Soviet

occupation in the 1980s (Bergen, 2006). Were it only for the influence of Azzam, al-Qaeda might have disbanded following Soviet withdrawal (Bergen 2006). However, because of a differing vision, Bin-Laden (following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989) stated that it would be a waste to send all the fighters back home and dismantle all that they had built (Benjamin & Simon, 2002; Bergen, 2006; Jaquard, 2002). He wanted to keep them as a force that would defend Muslim interests wherever needed (Benjamin & Simon, 2002; Bergen, 2006; Jaquard, 2002). This included overthrowing Middle Eastern regimes seen as not truly Muslim (Benjamin & Simon, 2002; Bergen, 2006; Jaquard, 2002). Some of the original fighters opposed this on the grounds that it did not have the legitimacy and religious backing of the uprising against the Soviets (Bergen, 2006). This included Bin-Laden's mentor, Abdullah Azzam (Bergen, 2006). Azzam was later assassinated in 1989 – removing the obstacle to the more extreme interpretation of Jihad favored by bin-Laden and his followers (Bergen, 2006). One can see clearly from this account that al-Qaeda was an expression of the vision of Osama bin-Laden (in opposition to Azzam and others) – and that without him it would not exist in its present form.

One can also see the strong influence of the indoctrinator - in this case the ideology of Sayyid Qutb and the Muslim Brotherhood; whose slogan is “The Koran is our constitution, the Prophet is our guide. Death for the glory of Allah is our greatest ambition” (Bergen, 2000, p. 199). As mentioned previously, bin-Laden was heavily influenced by the writings of Sayyid Qutb (Bergen, 2006). It may be that without the influence of Sayyid Qutb and those that influenced Qutb – such as Ibn Tamiyya and Hassan al-Bana (Esposito, 2002) bin-Laden might have channeled his piety quite differently. Terrorist leaders, like any leaders, are products of their influences – no matter

how powerful and self-directed they may appear. As an extension of this, bin-Laden is also very much influenced by Zawahiri who (along with several others) provide the religious authority for al-Qaeda (Esposito, 2002).

### *The Al-Qaeda Organization*

Al-Qaeda's structure and control system are an expression of the non-hierarchical nature of complex systems – what Barabasi referred to as the non-centralized locus of control within systems (2005). While in the past terrorist groups may have been under the centralized control of a single state, al-Qaeda represents a 'privatization of terrorism' (in the sense that it is not under the control of a particular state) – parallel to the modern trend for state sponsored industries to become privatized (Bergen, 2000). "(al-Qaeda) is as much a creation of globalism as a response to it" (Bergen, 2000, p. 196). On the contrary, al-Qaeda may control states (such as Afghanistan before the U.S. invasion and Sudan before its ouster) more than being controlled by them (Benjamin & Simon, 2002). In this case the 'state sponsor' is more of a weak host onto which the group attaches itself and takes over to the extent that it is able. Al-Qaeda is also described as an NGO with many 'franchises' that can survive even if the 'corporate parent' (its central leadership) is wiped out. Its ideas and motivation are more dangerous than specific leaders (Bloom, 2005). Again – though bin-Laden and Zawahiri fulfill important roles (and are certainly responsible for the form and vision that define al-Qaeda), nonetheless they do not control the organization in the manner of a traditional top-down bureaucracy.

Al-Qaeda and its followers are not monolithic even ideologically. Again – in the sense that a complex system is ever-adapting and evolving in a dynamic balance (Barabasi, 2002). Although the global jihad movement (including al-Qaeda) is sometimes

portrayed as a unified movement (particularly by its adherents); it is actually full of resentments, rifts and power struggles, both personal and in regards to vision, strategies and tactics (Bergen, 2006). For example, many Islamic militants feel that the al-Qaeda attacks of 9/11 damaged their cause (Bergen, 2006). Another example is the long ideological and personal struggle between Bin-Laden and Afghan leader Ahmed Shah Massoud. Bin-Laden wanted to enforce a Taliban-style Islam, and Massoud wanted cordial relations with the West and a more progressive, tolerant form of Islam - what Bergen terms a 'moderate fundamentalism' (Bergen, 2006). Bin-Laden ordered the assassination of Massoud two days before 9/11 – rumored as a possible peace-offering to Massoud's rival, Afghan leader Mullah Omar, to make up for keeping Omar in the dark about his 9/11 plans - which Omar would have opposed on the grounds that it would threaten his regime – which it did (Bergen, 2006). Again, what can be seen is that a complex system is not static in any sense of the word – it constantly evolves both in response to internal challenges as well as the demands of the outer environment (Barabasi, 2002).

While al-Qaeda was and is heavily dependent on its leaders and ideology – it would not have been able to be formed without the monetary support that it required to function. This is the category of non-state supporters. As mentioned above, it is not known exactly how Al-Qaeda operations specifically are financed - since much of bin-Laden's inheritance is believed to have been frozen (Andersen & Aagard, 2005; Alexander & Swetnam, 2001). Nonetheless it is thought that al-Qaeda financing consists of that portion of the personal fortune of bin-Laden that has not been frozen, including the income of various companies set up by bin-Laden when he was in Sudan (Alexander

& Swetnam, 2001; Andersen & Aagard, 2005). Contributions also come from various sources in the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia, with money laundered thorough Saudi banks and charitable relief agencies, such as the Mercy International Relief Agency (Alexander & Swetnam, 2001; Andersen & Aagard, 2005). Funds have also been channeled from Dubai Islamic Bank in Dubai (controlled by UAE) and funneled through informal hawala transfer networks (Alexander & Swetnam, 2001; Andersen & Aagard, 2005; Winer, 2002). Narcotics trafficking is also thought to be a major source of funding (Alexander & Swetnam 2001; Andersen & Aagard, 2005; Winer, 2002). Again – the terrorist system needs more than a leader and an ideology – it needs money and other types of support to function.

#### *Al-Qaeda Grievances*

As mentioned in the section on indoctrination, grievances are used by terrorist groups in order to recruit and train followers to act on behalf of a cause. This is certainly the case with al-Qaeda as well. Originally, one of the major grievances that was capitalized on by Osama bin-Laden was the decision of the Saudi Government to withdraw support for the Mujahedeen fighters in Afghanistan – even though when they did this in 1990 (under American pressure) the Soviets had retreated, but had not yet withdrawn (Bergen, 2006; Jaquard, 2002). Bin Laden felt strongly that he and his fighters had been betrayed, and the decade they had spent fighting along did not mean anything to the Saudis (Bergen, 2006; Jaquard, 2002). This became a rallying point used by bin-Laden to motivate his men, and to recruit new followers (Bergen, 2006; Jaquard, 2002). The Saudi government was accused by bin-Laden and his followers of being corrupt and failing to live up to the principles of strict Wahabi Islam (Bergen, 2006; Jaquard, 2002).



This included the Saudis allowing U.S. troops to be permanently based in Mecca and Medina – as well as their refusal of bin-Laden’s offer to help fight against Saddam Hussein (Bergen, 2006; Jaquard, 2002). At this point bin-Laden began raising funds for the fight to continue and reaching out to opponents of the Saudis in Syria and Iran – as well as speaking openly against the Saudi government (Bergen, 2006; Jaquard, 2002).

The official grievances of al-Qaeda are outlined in writing by Osama bin-Laden in his declaration of war against the U.S. in 1996. In this declaration bin-Laden laid out the following complaints, which have remained pretty consistent over time (Bergen 2006):

The killing of Muslims by the Zionist/Crusader (Israel/U.S.) alliance in Palestine, Iraq, Lebanon, Tajikistan, Burma, Kashmir, Phillipines, Somalia, Eritrea, Chechnya, Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The occupying of the Land of the Two Holy Places (Saudi Arabia/Mecca and Medina) by U.S. forces.

The general presence of U.S. forces in the Gulf States – threatening control of oil reserves.

The loss of Jerusalem to the Israelis in 1967.

The sanctions in Iraq that killed Iraqi children.

The injustices perpetrated on Muslims in Palestine by Israel, financed by the U.S. (Bergen, 2006).

#### *Al-Qaeda Goals*

The organizational goals are formulated by the leaders of the organization. In the case of al-Qaeda, this includes Osama bin-Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and the other members of the al-Qaeda ‘inner circle’ of advisors (Bergen, 2006). The organizational

goals are of key importance because they function as the vision that determines the strategy and tactics that follow. In the case of Al-Qaeda, the organization is in opposition to all nations and institutions not governed in accordance with the group's extremist interpretation of Islam (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). Stated objective of al-Qaeda is to "unite all Muslims and establish a government which follows the rule of the Caliphs" (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). This is through the overthrow of all Muslim governments that have been corrupted by Western influence (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). Eventually the borders of Muslim states will be replaced by a single, unified government under Caliph rule (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). What seems to hold the local/global al-Qaeda network together is an ideology that looks at anyone who does not adhere to its militant, radical and purist brand of extreme Islam as an 'infidel' (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). The battle of Al-Qaeda is seen as a battle of good versus evil - fighting for Islam and against the corruption and globalization of the West (Andersen & Aagard, 2005). This 'us versus them' is ironically similar to the 'us versus them' of the anti-terror camp). In many ways this is similar to the recruitment of middle-class, educated and disillusioned young people to communist/socialist causes in the 1970s – just that the more globalized world has allowed this to be larger in reach and size than the earlier movements (Andersen & Aagard, 2005).

In August 1996, Osama bin Laden issued a formal declaration of jihad against the U.S. and the Saudi Government rule (Alexander & Swetnam, 2001). Osama bin-Laden is not like earlier Arab or Palestinian militants (that had specific and limited aims) – his goal is to wage a widespread religious war against the West as a whole, all infidel Muslim regimes as well as the countries that support them (Bergen, 2000). One of the

ongoing goals of Bin-Laden (through him al-Qaeda as an organization) is to spark a revolution in Saudi Arabia and eventually overthrow key Islamic states such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia (Bergen, 2000; Mockaitis & Rich, 2003). In February 1998, Osama bin Laden along with Ayman al-Zawahiri issued a fatwah stating that Muslims should kill Americans anywhere in the world rule (Alexander & Swetnam, 2001).

### *Al-Qaeda Since 9/11*

Even if Al-Qaeda does not survive the combat in Afghanistan, two things will be certain: 1) another group or groups with the same ideology will arise, and 2) the United States will continue to be the main target (Benjamin & Simon, 2002). Since we do not know how big Al-Qaeda is, we have no idea how much of its infrastructure has been destroyed (Benjamin & Simon, 2002). Several high-level operatives just beneath Osama bin-Laden are unaccounted for (Benjamin & Simon, 2002). Little is known about the group's U.S. network – or even to what extent there is one (Benjamin & Simon, 2002). Some of Al-Qaeda remains in Afghanistan, some are in Pakistan, and some are in Iran (Benjamin & Simon, 2002).

Al-Qaeda may regroup in Yemen, where bin-Laden has close ties (Benjamin & Simon, 2002). The state authority does not extend much beyond the capital of Sanaa, and there are large areas where Al-Qaeda can operate (Benjamin & Simon, 2002). Al-Qaeda may also settle in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon's cities of Sidon or Tripoli, and Somalia may also be an option (Benjamin & Simon, 2002). The near-statehood enjoyed by Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan gave it territory, an army, training facilities, authority, taxes and headquarters, – but also rendered it more vulnerable to attack (Benjamin & Simon, 2002). In the future, 'virtual statehood' may be a more secure option – keeping leaders on

the move, and no centers where people gather for any length of time (Benjamin & Simon, 2002). Communication would be by laptop, disposable cell-phones and data encryption, money would be moved by hawala networks or couriers, false passports would be used and long distance relocation would be done whenever necessary (Benjamin & Simon, 2002). Al-Qaeda would become a flexible, adaptable, invisible network with no hierarchical organization – coming together when necessary (‘swarming’), then dispersing just as quickly (Benjamin & Simon, 2002). Al-Qaeda would have an advantage over hierarchical, slow and centralized entities, like law enforcement and intelligence (Benjamin & Simon, 2002). The more virtual, flexible and decentralized, and the more non-hierarchical that Al-Qaeda becomes, the less it will be affected by the loss of a leader or even its head (Benjamin & Simon, 2002). Bin-Laden’s 1998 fatwa will most likely remain in force even after he is gone (Benjamin & Simon, 2002). The success of 9/11 provides a lasting incentive (Benjamin & Simon, 2002). Support from radical clerics will reinforce its strength (Benjamin & Simon, 2002). “This is not a group that will stop attacking American interests as long as it has the power to do so” (Benjamin & Simon, 2002, p. 171). What is unknown is whether Al-Qaeda will focus more on the ‘far enemy’ (U.S. and the West), or will turn more attention to the ‘near enemy’ - secular Muslim rulers (Benjamin & Simon, 2002).

In examining the case of al-Qaeda, we can see how the various elements of the terrorist system delineated above (perpetrator, leader, indoctrinator, sponsor, supporter, observer/target) interact and connect with one another to create one terrorist organization. As a terror leader and organizer, Osama Bin-Laden was the original impetus (along with his mentor Abdullah Azzam) for the formation of al-Qaeda. It was due to both the

material resources of bin-Laden, as well as his considerable networking and organizational skills that al-Qaeda grew – first as a localized organization in Sudan and Afghanistan, and then as a globalized network (Bergen, 2006). It was also due to the personal grievances of bin-Laden against Saudi Arabia that al-Qaeda became more than just a base for Afghan Arab fighters (Bergen, 2006). Bin-Laden also oversaw (bringing together other radical leaders) the declaration of war with the West, and the formal setting down of al-Qaeda's grievances and goals (Bergen, 2006; Gunaratna, 2002). Without Osama bin-Laden, al-Qaeda would not exist in its present form. At the same time, one can also see the role of other al-Qaeda leaders such as Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Each has their own style and adds a different element to the organization. While Zawahiri is thought to be the strategic planner and spiritual head of the organization (Jaquard, 2002), Zarqawi specializes in sowing terror and gaining publicity with his methods of brutality (Brisard & Martinez, 2005). Organizationally, however, bin-Laden occupies the head position. While the leaders and organizers within al-Qaeda plan and approve attacks, they still need the perpetrators to carry them out. The perpetrators are expendable, the leaders are not. Note that, as mentioned before, bin-Laden scrupulously guards his own safety (Bergen, 2006) while preaching the glory of martyrdom to his followers. The leaders train and indoctrinate the perpetrators using various methods – including religious teachings, anti-Western propaganda and oaths of loyalty (often in training camps in Afghanistan or Pakistan - lately more the latter (Benjamin & Simon, 2002). The rank and file are sent to fight local battles – such as against the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan (Bergen, 2006), while the more promising are specially groomed for higher profile missions such as overseas attacks. The supporter

is also needed – such as those that give the financial support that is needed for the functioning of the jihad movement. This also includes those that assist in the spreading of jihadist ideology. The role of the state sponsor is seen in the function that was played by Sudan and later Afghanistan and Pakistan in giving a base for al-Qaeda to launch attacks and train their followers. The role of observer/target is seen in the roles played by the countries that have been the victims of al-Qaeda's attacks – including the U.S., Saudi Arabia, Europe and the U.K. and Jordan. Without a target, the terrorist's reason for being would not exist. What should be apparent from the above case is the essential nature of all of the elements of the system – the leaders, indoctrinators, perpetrators, state-sponsors, supporters and observer/targets. Without each of these elements, the system would not be able to exist in its present form.

### Terrorism in the Light of Systems Theory

Let us return to the use of Systems Theory to describe the terrorism phenomenon and relate it to the material thus far reviewed:

A shift from looking at terrorists as individual perpetrators and instead seeing them as part of a system that functions together as a whole

As we have seen from the above review, the terrorism system functions as a result of several interlocking elements:

There are the societies – hostile, poor, alienated, frustrated, repressive, powerless, anti-western, and authoritarian, structurally failing, radically religious, politically indoctrinated – from which terror recruits are drawn in both the East and West.

There are the terrorist perpetrators – either poor children educated in radical madrassas throughout the middle-east; young males (often unemployed and

undereducated with limited prospects) from various countries who are exposed to radical religious teachings or political rabble-rousing; middle-class professionals who have become either professionally frustrated, or religiously radicalized or both; the children of middle-eastern and north African immigrants in Europe and the UK who have never become absorbed into their host societies (for a variety of reasons) – these are some of the major categories of terror recruits. Other categories include women who have become either religiously radicalized or shunned by their families or society – or both, and those who join terror groups after being either personally subject to insult or injury at the hands of non-Muslims, related to someone who has been, or simply exposed to media images of non-Muslim abuses.

There are the terrorist leaders – people from poor backgrounds (like Zarqawi) or wealthy backgrounds (like Bin-Laden) who due to a combination of desire, talent, organizational ability, ambition, intelligence and ruthlessness rise through the ranks of the terror ‘corporations’ to assume positions of leadership – or like modern day entrepreneurs – form new ‘companies’ of their own that compete for the market share of recruits, money and publicity. These organizers take advantage of the frustrations of the potential recruits, or their religious aspirations, their desire to better themselves, their need for a sense of meaning and purpose – in order to use them to further their need for power, fame and conquest. Using sophisticated training and indoctrination techniques – not unlike a combination of western military boot-camps mixed with religious revival gatherings mixed with sales force type indoctrination mixed with the type of isolation and brainwashing techniques borrowed from Communism and Marxism. They use these

recruits as suicidal foot-soldiers (quoting religious texts to glorify self sacrifice, death and destruction) – even as they are quite careful about their own personal security.

There are the terrorist indoctrinators – these can be radical imams who travel from mosque to mosque preaching a mixture of religious theology mixed with hatred of the west and of non-Muslims (or even insufficiently religious Muslims – or Shiites), and incitements to violence (open or implied). They can also be teachers of children and teens in madrassas – who use texts that refer to non-Muslims as animals and heretics (and various other negative descriptions). They may encourage violence openly (as some of the examples cited earlier illustrate), or they may simply teach hatred, hostility, dehumanization and contempt of those who do not believe or practice like them. They may also be primarily political members of parties like Hezbollah, The Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas and the like – who spread indoctrination encouraging uprising and violence. They may also be prominent professors and teachers who use traditional teachings mixed with political views to espouse radicalism – these are the people who influenced terror leaders like bin-Laden and Zarqawi. Their motivational triggers are similar to the organizers – but they provide more of the impetus for terrorists – rather than the actual planning that is done by the organizer. They may also have a greater degree of religious/ideological motivation than the organizer (who may be more driven by a pure desire for power).

There are the people and societies that become supporters for terrorist groups. This support may take the form of millions of dollars donated to terror groups. It may take the form of a willingness to hide, protect or simply look the other way regarding terror perpetrators or activities. It may simply be the unspoken support for the ideologies



that are spread by terrorist groups or radical indoctrinators. It may also be the willingness to glorify those who give their lives to become suicide attackers, or to allow their children to join their ranks or become educated in their extremist schools.

There are the states that openly or tacitly are sponsors of terror groups and activities. This may take the form of actively helping and arming terrorist groups – as is the case with both Iran and Syria as regards Hezbollah, or it may take the form of allowing radical groups to grow, collect money, run schools, take over state run media and otherwise operate from the country – as is the case in Saudi Arabia and Egypt with al-Qaeda, the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups. It may also take the form of speaking against terror groups while at the same time using terrorism to further political aims - as is the case with Pakistan as regards terror groups operating against India and within Kashmir.

Lastly, there are the observer/targets – states who look on passively while terrorism grows either within their borders or in countries far away – either out of fear, paralysis, a sense of denial, an unwillingness to assimilate societies that live within their borders, a need to coddle and maintain ties to terror sponsoring states for economic or strategic reasons, an unwillingness to risk upheaval internationally or political capital domestically and a variety of other reasons.

All of these elements - some of which are primary factors (the organizers, for example), some of which are secondary, supporting factors (the conditions of societies from which recruits are drawn) – all function together to create, maintain and grow the terrorist system. Simply looking at terrorism as a person with an explosive is clearly oversimplified – and worse, will not give rise to effective counter-terrorism policy.

Even though these parts form a larger system – they need to be understood as smaller sub-systems each with its own unique elements and properties:

Much has been written about specific terrorist groups –such as al-Qaeda – and how they function as multi-faceted complex structures – with recruitment arms, training facilities, media departments, judiciary, money-raising sections, planning and organizational teams and a hierarchical structure of power and control.

Related to the actual terror groups are the educational systems that provide ideological and religious indoctrination – these are informal and wide-reaching systems that begin with schools for preschool age children, educate (and often feed, clothe and house) them up through young adulthood, and send the most promising to increasingly radical places for further learning (and more extreme levels of indoctrination). The educational system graduates some of these to be fighters, and some to be teachers – the imams that travel from place to place preaching extreme Islamist views, the virtues of Jihad, and the sins of the enemy – and sometimes the need for violence.

Societies from which terrorists are drawn are also sub-systems – each society (a poor village in Pakistan, or an alienated immigrant suburb of London or France) with its own challenges and factions – its links to terrorism and its internal issues of crime, lack of education, repression, alienation and poverty – all of which keep it mired in a cycle of helplessness, hopelessness and anger, making for easier terror recruitment. The wealthier (or even middle-class) elements of these societies form the economic backbone – sending millions of dollars annually to ‘help the mujahedeen in Afghanistan’ or ‘support the resistance in Iraq’.

Governments that sponsor terrorism are also systems. Each government – be it Baathist (officially secular) Syria, the Shiite Iran theocracy, Military-ruled Pakistan, the monarchies in Saudi Arabia and Jordan – is a system consisting of rulers who want to keep their wealth and power, control a restive (and often quite critical) populace, retain legitimacy in the face of religious radicalism and appease the pressures for human rights placed on them by the international community. Governments are also a collective system – Pakistan supporting terror groups to balance and wage a low-level, hot/cold war with India, Iran using Hezbollah in Lebanon to fight against Israel and thumb its nose at the United States with minimal risk – involving Syria as its patron and assistant. Saudi Arabia voicing support for the U.S., yet allowing Wahabi extremists to proliferate – not only to give it a sense of Islamic legitimacy – but also to serve as a balance against Shiite power in both Iran and Iraq.

Western societies/governments are also sub-systems. They consist of elected officials that want to protect their countries from terrorist attacks and internal terrorist proliferation – yet do not want to anger their constituencies by taking unpopular or risky measures. There are the citizens who want to see their elected officials take a hard stance, but object loudly at any measure that violates principles of freedom or tolerance – or costs money or lives. There are the economic interests – corporations and lobbies that speak for the oil and other interests (automotive manufacturers, transportation industries) closely tied in with the oil industries. There are the immigrant societies (in Europe and the UK) that call loudly for respect and inclusion – and simultaneously strongly resist taking on the characteristics of their home. There are the traditionalists in these same countries that call for tolerance and assimilation of their non-white (but native born)

countrymen – and yet do not fully accept them as truly ‘British’, ‘French’ or what have you. Lastly, there are the politicians and voters who call for get-tough prison sentences for law-breakers in the United States – but do not want to face that U.S. prisons (with their largely young male, disadvantaged, alienated and often minority populations) are newly fertile grounds for anti-U.S. indoctrination and religious Islamist recruitment. The parts of the terrorist system have properties – but so does the system as an entirety – it functions as a unified whole:

The terrorist system is a study of ‘necessary but not sufficient’ and ‘sufficient but not necessary’ factors. It goes without saying that without a specific, radical, destructive theology, (as well as preachers, teachers and mass-media to spread it), the radical Islamist terror system would not, could not (in its present form) exist. But it still needs the Organizers to translate these messages of extremism, hate and violence into specific organizational structures and organizational aims. These two elements are necessary to create the system – an ideology (with its carriers), and the people who make goals out of the ideology. But alone, even these two factors are not sufficient. They need foot-soldiers to carry out their aims and spread unrest, fear and violence. The system also requires money and support of various types (active, tacit) from societies and governments within which it grows, raises money, teaches and exports fighters. Without this support/sponsorship, terror proliferation would be much more difficult. The system also relies on the vulnerabilities of western societies that are open and also dependent on the very governments (for oil) that are also covertly and overtly funding and allowing terrorism to grow.

It is when all of these factors converge that a macro-system is created – with each part of the system supporting and allowing other parts of the system. Properties of the system as a whole then emerge: The system becomes robust, growing, self-sustaining, self-repairing – able to overtake new geographic and political territory with rapidity, able to assimilate new members and utilize new technology with ease. Efforts to eliminate the system are met with difficulty – as if the system is able to regenerate with no conscious planning or effort. These are the properties of the macro-system when all of its elements as described above function in unison. Every level/part of the terrorist system is important for the functioning of the system:

As stated above – while some elements are more crucial than others, all of the elements together create the entire system with its system-level properties. Using the internet as a useful example of a macro-system: No one would argue that it is the knowledge and data traveling through the internet that create its popularity and the demand and need for its existence. Nonetheless, without more pedestrian elements such as the user-friendly operating systems, affordable hardware and software and an increasingly tech-savvy populace, the worldwide Internet would not exist in its present form.

The organized quality of the terrorist system is not an indication that there is a centralized or top-down control in the system:

Terrorist networks (like all complex systems) are self-organizing – again, what Barabasi (2002) refers to as ‘a web without a spider’.

Efforts to eradicate terrorist systems in the past have been tied up in an erroneous perspective of how a system is constructed. Because we are familiar with centralized

organizations such as governments and corporations, law-enforcement, government, military planners and others have tended to see terrorist systems in the same way – as centralized, top-down, hierarchical systems. It is thought (as a result of this perspective) that if one gets ‘the head’ – or ‘the heads’ – that the system will be crippled. This view has some validity – but to a limited degree. Yes, it is true that parts of the system (a specific terrorist group, or more specifically – the organizational arm of a specific group) have centralized and hierarchical properties, and it is also true that elimination of some of these central elements can damage the system (or at least the sub-system), nonetheless, this is far from a complete understanding of the entire macro-system with all of its elements. The macro-system does not have any single center, any more than it has a single supporting element. It has many elements, many centers and sub-centers of power and resources, and these do not depend on any single source to maintain and proliferate. The terror system is composed of networks of linked elements - communication and resources travel along those links:

The issue of linked connections is crucial to understanding the way in which any system, including the terrorist system, operates. While (as stated above) the terror system does not have a single, central command, nonetheless it is dependent on the links that connect different elements of the system. Some of these links are obvious – like the links of communication between terror organizers and those that carry out their orders. Other links include the financial transfer links that supply money to terror operators. Links are also the preachers that travel from location to location, carrying ideas and making connections wherever they go – like bees traveling and cross-pollinating fields of flowers. Other links include flows of arms (large and small) through countries, systems

for ferrying fighters from one state to another. All of these links are channels through which resources (in the form of communiqués, money, arms, fighters, ideas, etc) travel. Some of the links are more crucial than others (more densely linked to the network):

Despite the above point – that complex systems in general and terror systems in particular – do not have a central locus of power, nonetheless all systems are also networks – composed of hubs and links. Some hubs have more dense linkages with other hubs. For example, a terror network has ‘foot soldiers’ that may have no contact outside of the small cell within which they operate. The cell may also have higher-level organizers that have contact with a few cells. Then there are high level organizers that have contacts all throughout the system. Before one uses this to refute the point that there is no ‘spider’ in the terror-web – let us look again at the example of the Internet (a commonly used model of complex systems): Even though it is doubtless that central links like Google or MySpace are much more densely linked than an individual webpage somewhere on the net, nonetheless – one cannot posit from that fact that the Internet has a central locus of power and resources. Even though some links are more dense than others – and hold more of the resources of the system, this still is not an indication that this is a centralized system. It simply means that any complex system has parts that are more isolated, and parts that are more linked throughout the system. The expression of this lack of a central link (in the Internet, in terrorist systems) is that if a ‘central link’ is disrupted, another will simply take its place. If Google disappeared tomorrow – another aspiring search engine (or more than one) would quickly become more predominant. When Zarqawi was killed in Iraq, within a week another leader had taken his place. The terrorist system is constantly changing and adapting:

As mentioned above, when one geographic location is eliminated for terror groups (for example Bin-Laden becoming unwelcome first in Saudi Arabia, then Sudan, then Afghanistan), the groups relocate to other areas (Asia, Africa, Europe, Canada). When Geography becomes logistically difficult to sustain (due to increased security measures, international pressures, greater vulnerability with a physical location), the groups move to more virtual modes of communication – conducting business with cell phones, staying in touch via the Internet. As Middle-Eastern males are increasingly targeted, groups begin to utilize women and those of non-Arab descent, including American, European and British citizens. All of these changes together are not a conscious process ordered from some central command (see previous point), but rather part of the natural process of change and adaptation that is characteristic of all complex systems.

The terrorist system operates with support from the larger environment – advertently and inadvertently:

It may be convenient and comforting to look at the terrorist system from an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ perspective. But this should not allow us to ignore the fact that all complex systems are inextricably linked to the greater environment within which they find themselves. In the case of the terrorist system (as mentioned above), without the money that flows into terror-supporting states from oil-dependent western nations, those states (and the groups they openly and tacitly support) could not exist in their present form. Without states like Russia and China who have complex trade and political relationships with terror supporting states, those states would not exist in the same form, nor would the groups that they support (for example, Russian Katyusha rockets being supplied to Iran, shipped through Syria and ending up in Lebanon in the hands of Hezbollah). Chinese



Russian and French support for African dictatorships like Sudan, Somalia and Zimbabwe keep them from punitive action from the United Nations Security Council. Without the complicity of the West in allowing repressive societies to exist, spread radicalism while oppressing their citizens, those societies would not exist in their present form – or at least the balance of the international system would not exist in its present form. The terrorist system is a function of the larger system within which it exists.

The terror system acts upon the environment, but the environment also has the potential to affect the terrorist system:

The negative news is that the terror system affects the environment. The positive side of the same issue is that the environment has a similar ability to affect the terror system. Just because it is obvious to us that our life changes when we fear terrorist attacks (the economy, travel, the general sense of safety and security suffer), nonetheless, the reverse is true to the same degree. The terrorist system is fully as affected by the environment as it is conversely able to affect the environment. Changes in policy, attitude, levels of support, political and religious climate – all of these can have an effect on the entirety of the terrorist system – which brings us to the next point:

Change in the terror system has a cumulative effect – at some point a threshold will be reached where the system will undergo a fundamental shift (a ‘phase transition’) – to a new form or a totally new system:

While it is true that complex systems are extremely durable and adaptable, nonetheless, they are susceptible to change and disruption. When enough change affects the system, it undergoes a fundamental shift and a new phase in the system begins – or the system as we know it changes to the point that it is no longer recognizable. As the

example (in the discussion of Systems Theory) of water turning in to ice crystals when a low enough temperature is reached, or boiling (a change) and then turning into steam (a complete form-transition) when a high enough temperature is reached, so also the terrorist system is quite susceptible to a sudden change in form when enough stimuli affect it. An international relations theory example of a phase-transition is the (seemingly sudden) dissolution of the worldwide communist system. Enough change (economic, political, human) had taken place that the system was no longer able to exist in its present form. Seemingly overnight, the system underwent an extreme shift. When this shift was over (actually over a few months time – a nanosecond in the terms of human history), the system was unrecognizable. While some remnants persist in certain locales (and ironically its ideas and methods have been co-opted by vastly different systems – like the modern terrorist system and the Baath secular Arab-nationalist system), the system as a system does not exist in its past form. The terrorist (or more broadly – the radical Islamist) system is similarly vulnerable to accumulated multiple changes throughout the system. This brings us to the next point:

If the terrorist system is addressed in terms of each/all of its component parts it is more likely to lead to the eventual dissolution of the system:

The key to addressing change in a system (trying to precipitate a ‘phase transition’ or dissolution within and across a complex system) is that policies need to create change throughout all of the elements of a system – ideally simultaneously. In terms of the terrorist system, this means policies that simultaneously focus on the transfer of funds throughout the international monetary system and wind up in terrorist operatives’ hands. It means creating educational systems that provide alternatives to the

extremist madrassahs that exist throughout the Middle East, and increasingly Asia and Africa as well. It means pressure on repressive regimes to allow their populations basic human rights and the ability to affect their economic and political futures – making them less vulnerable to extremism. It means that elections alone, in the absence of a fabric of political and social freedoms, will only become another tool for violent extremism – as has become the case in a number of countries. It means measures to address those that preach hatred both in the East and the West. It means finding ways to both encourage and pressure moderate Islamic societies in the East and West to speak out and take a stand against hatred and violence. It means placing pressure on states (like Saudi Arabia and Egypt) that play a double game when it comes to extremism) that openly and tacitly support terrorism and radicalism. It means exacting penalties on states like Russia and China that arm states that supply to terrorists. It means being willing to defy powerful lobbies and entrenched habits and create new energy policies and resources. It means protecting the lives and rights of women – who make up 51% of the Islamic population – and have a disproportionate ability to affect the attitudes of the next generation – if they have the power to do so. Obviously it means continuing to find ways to protect the citizens of free, open (and therefore vulnerable) countries from attack – with policies that make sense, as opposed to policies that just give the impression of effectiveness (searching every third 80-year-old grandmother's baggage, for example). These are only a few examples of what it might look like to simultaneously address change throughout a complex system.

The terror network can fail when enough linked elements are disrupted – especially the densely linked 'hubs':

Related to the above point – while no specific hub contains the central power and resources (for example, it is commonly accepted that eliminating Osama bin-Laden will not destroy the terrorist system), nonetheless, if measures are taken to target the elements of the terrorist system at all levels, it makes sense to target the most densely linked elements – while not ignoring the more isolated elements entirely.

Failure in one part of the terror system can cause a ‘cascade’ effect that will ultimately effect the entire system and cause it to fail (like the disruption of one link in a food chain disrupting the entire food chain):

Even though the prudent approach is to address as many aspects of the terrorist system simultaneously, nonetheless, if one single element (by conscious effort or fortuitous occurrence) is significantly compromised, this can cause a cascade effect that will have ramifications throughout the system. This is not the same as saying that one can target a single hub and destroy the system. What this refers to is that if a whole element of the system (and element, not a single hub) fails or is greatly disrupted; the entire system can be compromised to the point of failure. An example of this would be if the entire educational system is disrupted or major alternatives are put into place. Another example is if economic systems are blocked or regulated to the extent that they cannot transfer and transport funds. Another example is if there is a major change or uprising against the repression in Muslim societies – or an outcry by moderate Muslims against the legitimacy of violent extremism. Another example is if the energy policy of the U.S. is overhauled to the extent that we are no longer dependent on the Islamic countries. This is not a targeting of a hub (like eliminating a specific leader); it is rather a radical change in an entire element of the system

Just as the system developed over time, so will attempts to counter the system (even comprehensive efforts aimed at the entire system):

Systems that seem as if they have changed overnight (like the communist system, or like the adoption of the Internet) have actually accrued decades of slow changes and adaptations. These are not apparent to the observer because they take place in small measures and are often under the surface – for example, attitudes can change, but those whose attitudes have changed (in the Soviet Union) can be afraid to openly voice these changes until they feel safe to do so – and this can take many years. Another example is that the technology that created the Internet happened many decades before it became a worldwide phenomenon. To think in terms of changes over few years is an error. The best policy changes must be enacted consistently and maintained over many years – even decades until obvious change is apparent. It is not a ‘waiting game’, but it is a game of patient, coordinated measures that are sustained over the long haul. As long as it took for the terror system to develop decades – even more – so it will take almost as long to have a significant effect in changing the system.

#### Summation

The above points relating the terrorist system to modern Systems Theory is a proposed and preliminary model. It needs to be checked and verified by gathering data from those who are active in the field and have firsthand experience – or years of scholarly study of the phenomenon. A detailed model needs to be constructed of the terrorist system – not based on a piecemeal construction of bits and pieces of existing literature, but based on a true systems understanding as a cohesive train of thought and

reasoning – again based on the perceptions of those best able to construct and validate this model.

Additionally, and most importantly, specific policy recommendations (unlike the generalized policy ideas mentioned in brief above) need to be formulated based on validation of this model. Addressed in these policies need to be the obstacles to policy formulation and enactment – as it is not enough to create policy that sounds good on paper – it needs to target not only the ‘adversary’, but also those obstacles that stand in the way of enactment by those that need it the most.

#### Statement of Theory

It is theorized that terrorism is an interdependent system of variables and players and that a more complete understanding of the terrorist phenomenon can be gained by looking at it in a complex system manner.

While scientific research usually begins with some specifics of a topic and then seeks to gain from that a more generalized understanding; a system analysis begins with a the identification of a whole (a system); evaluating the properties of that larger whole, and then seeing the issue or phenomenon (along with all of its separate components) in its place within the larger whole (Wallman, 2001). In other words – a system analysis starts with the whole and then seeks to understand its parts in relation to the larger whole.

#### Proposed Research Questions

To what extent does Systems Theory model provide a useful structure upon which to create a comprehensive model of modern Islamist terrorism?

Do the above-mentioned elements of societies, perpetrators, organizers, indoctrinators, supporters, state sponsors, and observer/targets make up the key components within a Systems Theory model of the terrorist system?

Do the principles of Systems Theory provide explanatory value to understand the relationships of components within the terrorist system as well as the system as a whole?

Does a Systems Theory model of terrorism have specific and useful implications for policy? Additionally, can the individual principles of Systems Theory provide guidelines with which to construct a multi-faceted policy approach?

## CHAPTER III

### METHODS

#### Introduction

Articles and books have been written on the phenomenon of Islamic terrorism. Most of these writings focus on some specific aspect of terrorism. This may include a specific terrorist leader or terrorist group. It may focus only on the characteristics of the terrorist perpetrators. It may be a study of terrorist methods. It may examine terrorist ideology, education level, societal hardships or other contributing factors. It may be a study of the role of terrorist-sponsoring states. Much less exists that examines the terrorist phenomenon as a whole – an entire complex system of interlocking factors and components. This includes looking at both the system as a totality, as well as the separate influences, precipitators and exacerbating factors for each component. It also means looking at the connections ('links', in system-terminology) and interdependent relationships between the components.

The present study seeks to address that gap by looking at terrorism not as a single phenomenon (i.e., 'the terrorists'), but rather as a multi-component interconnected system composed of terrorist perpetrators, organizers, instigators, sponsors, local societies and observer/targets. If identified, additional components would be added to the systems model based on data gathered. Once a complete model has been constructed, implications



for policy will be explored based upon the characteristics of the model as well as the broad and specific principles of Systems Theory.

As stated above, it is theorized that terrorism is an interdependent system of interlocking and interdependent components that function together as a whole, and that a more complete understanding of the terrorist phenomenon can be gained by looking at terrorism in a complex systems manner.

The present study will be an exploratory research study that aims to create grounded theory of a multifactorial and systems-based nature, through sensitizing concepts and categories (rather than conclusively defining them). It will utilize expert or 'elite' interviews as well as a review of some secondary data.

#### Exploratory Research

Exploratory research is research that is "Broad-ranging, purposive, systematic, pre-arranged undertaking designed to maximize the discovery of generalizations leading to description and understanding of an area of social or psychological life" (Stebbins, 2001, p. 3). Exploratory research is utilized with a problem that is yet not clearly understood or defined. Through exploratory research, the issue becomes more familiar and hypotheses can be generated as well as other avenues for future (and perhaps more empirically conclusive) research (Stebbins, 2001). Through exploratory research the researcher purposefully puts themselves in situations where they might discover new ideas by exploring groups, processes and activities (Stebbins, 2001).

Corbin and Holt (2005) explain grounded theory as the development of an 'integrated theoretical formulation' that gives us an understanding of how people, groups or organizations operate, experience and respond. Grounded theory is based on data

gathered through qualitative research (Corbin & Holt, 2005). Grounded theory may reflect or acknowledge multiple realities or ways of interpreting a set of data (Corbin & Holt, 2005). In grounded theory, one identifies concepts or individual cases and then uses them inductively (i.e., in a progressively abstract fashion) to formulate an integrated way of understanding (Charmaz, 2001; Corbin & Holt, 2005). One seeks to synthesize, explain and understand the data through seeing patterns of relationships within the data, as well as the individual datum as emerging categories (Charmaz, 2001). Nonetheless, it is understood that this method of understanding is not an 'absolute truth', but a framework that has been constructed by one researcher out of the data they have analyzed (Corbin & Holt, 2005). For this reason, grounded theory is referred to as 'post-positivistic' (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994).

Bulmer (1984), in speaking of the development of Grounded Theory states that grounded theory does not produce total explanations, nor is it highly concerned with proof. Rather, grounded theory - through openness to data and an emphasis on induction, allows general and tentative categories to emerge - that can later be verified through further methods of research.

Silverman (1993) states in the fifth of his Six Rules of Quantitative Research: "Never appeal to a single element as an explanation" (p. 205). He goes on to say that a multifactorial explanation is likely to be more satisfactory than an explanation that is based upon a single element. He also suggests (as a corollary to the same rule) focusing on the processes through which relations between multiple elements are carried out. Although he did not articulate it as such, this emphasis on the need to explore multiple

influences, elements and explanations - along with the relationships between them, is definitely reflective of a systems approach.

Blumer (1984) speaks of the difference between 'defining' concepts and 'sensitizing' concepts. When defining a concept, one seeks to provide rigid parameters that will conclusively identify a particular instance of a phenomenon as belonging to a specific category. While at times, clear-cut definitions may be possible and useful, at other times they cause data to be forced to fit the definition rather than the definition fitting the data (Blumer, 1984). Clear-cut definitions also need to be fixed and solid – which may not always be practically accurate in a real world of data that may be fluid, emergent, and existing along a continuum rather than in discrete categories (Blumer, 1984). 'Sensitizing' a concept, on the other hand, while not providing a definitive set of parameters within which to categorize data, nonetheless gives a "general sense of reference and guidance in approaching empirical instances" (Blumer, 1984, p. 243). Defining concepts tells us what to see, sensitizing concepts suggest directions where to look (Bulmer, 1984).

#### *The “Elite” or “Expert” Interview*

Selecting specific subjects for focused data collection based upon their knowledge, position or experience is known as ‘elite’ or ‘expert’ interviewing (Kezar, 2003; Phillips, 1998). The subjects chosen for ‘elite’ or ‘expert’ interviews are chosen based upon the following characteristics:

- 1) The interviewee is known to have participated in or have specialized knowledge regarding a certain situation.

- 2) The researcher reviews necessary information to arrive at a provisional analysis.
- 3) The production of the interview guide is based on this analysis.
- 4) The result of the interview is the interviewee's definition of the situation (Dexter, 1970; Merton, Fiske, & Kendall, 1990).

The use of expert interviewing as a data collection method is widely used by journalists to gather information (Kezar, 2003; Phillips, 1998), but increasingly by researchers in the social sciences – including political science (Kezar, 2003; Phillips, 1998). Elite or expert interviewing is used for those wanting to construct a multi-faceted perspective that takes into account varying views of a particular reality (Whyte, 1984).

The interview is based upon the perspective of the interviewee and the specialized knowledge or experience that they have (Dexter, 1970), and therefore they are given wide latitude as to how the interview is structured, what they consider to be most relevant, and how they define and frame the topics (Odendahl & Shaw, 2002). Deviation is seen as valuable (Kezar, 2003).

Selection of interview subjects will be done by a combination of the above-mentioned elite or expert interviewing criteria as applied by the researcher, combined with a snowball-sampling method. Snowball sampling identifies relevant research subjects based upon their being identified by previous interview subjects. This sampling method particularly lends itself to the elite or expert interview method. This is because the initial goal is to identify those with specialized knowledge, position or experience regarding the research topic. It therefore is logical to suppose that those who have specialized knowledge, position or experience are well placed to identify others who do

as well. Those identified by interviewees will not be automatically included to the list of subjects to be interviewed, they will rather be included in a list of potential subjects who will be chosen if they are identified by the researcher as being likely to possess useful knowledge of the research topic – as well as being logistically available and willing to be interviewed. It can therefore be stated that the interview subject selection will also be based upon an opportunistic sampling method – i.e., depending upon their availability and willingness to be interviewed, as well as the ability of the interviewer to access them.

As much as possible, interviews will be conducted face to face. This is because, since the elite or expert interview method depends greatly upon the perspectives and knowledge of the subject; and the interview structure is semi-structured at most and sometimes completely open-ended (depending on the preference of the subject); therefore, conducting face to face interviews lend themselves best to developing a rapport and being able to pick up on more subtle verbal and non-verbal cues that will influence the direction of the interview as well as the processing of what has been said.

Note that the number of subjects and data sources accessed will depend on various factors such as the length of each interview, the ability to reach subjects and the amount of data collected before a complete picture begins to emerge. It is, however approximated that between 10 and 15 interviews will be conducted

#### Data Collection

The data will consist of:

- 1) Semi-structured interviews with persons involved in terrorism research and policy. These interviews will be face to face whenever possible.

2) Semi-structured interviews with those who have first or secondhand experience with terrorism and various aspects of the terrorist system (for example, growing up in a society from which terrorists are recruited, exposure to terrorist ideology, etc.). These interviews will likewise be face to face if possible.

3) Secondary interview data (tapes, transcripts, video) of terrorist perpetrators and leaders by others.

### *Interview Questions*

The interviews conducted will range from semi-structured to open-ended depending upon the preference and style of the interviewee (Odendahl & Shaw, 2002). For this reason, a set of interview questions have been developed that can be used as a tentative basis for the interview. While these questions may be used in full with some subjects, they may also be just a starting point for other interviewees, who will be free to either focus on one or more questions, or perhaps take the interview in an entirely different direction. Questions are made available to the interviewees either prior to the interview (by email), and/or at the time of the interview in printed form. Again, this depends on the preferences (stated or implied) of the interviewees. Nonetheless, the list of questions also functions as a conceptual framework for the researcher to organize data that is gathered during the interviews.

The following are the list of potential and tentative interview questions:

- 1) What are the separate components of the Islamist terrorist system worldwide?
- 2) What are the factors that fuel each component?
- 3) Are there primary versus secondary elements in the terrorist system? If so, which elements are primary and which are secondary?

- 4) What are the factors that fuel the existence of the system as a whole?
  - a) factors that create and strengthen connections between elements
  - b) factors that create and strengthen the entire system
- 5) What is the state versus non-state balance in the system now, and in the future?
- 6) In what way is the system evolving including both gradual developments and possible major shifts?
- 7) What might a comprehensive policy approach that addresses the entire system consist of?
- 8) What is currently most on your mind as regards terrorism (present concerns, lessons learned, puzzles remaining)?
- 9) What do you think is most needed currently in the counter-terrorism research arena?

### Data Analysis

Data will be examined for the purpose of discovering themes, perspectives and information that interlock together to create a nuanced picture of the larger terrorist system. Data will be examined in light of current knowledge regarding the terrorist system, social-science theory, organizational theory, psychological theory, and systems theory. Conclusions will incorporate counterterrorism recommendations and be a reflection of the picture that has emerged.

The data (information, themes, and perspectives) will be combined into a model that encompasses a large-system view of the terrorist phenomenon. Players in the terrorist system will be identified and defined; motivating factors, incentives, indoctrination mechanisms and exacerbating factors will also be discussed and delineated for all of the

separate players in the system. In addition, those interviewed will be solicited as to their recommendations for counterterrorism policy in light of what they have offered in the course of the interview. These responses will be examined in light of the final large-system model to identify those recommendations that are most consistent with the properties of the large-system picture that has emerged/been constructed. A final model of the terrorist system will be constructed with major system elements identified and described in light of the data collected. Recommendations for policy will be offered based on what has been offered by those interviewed, as well as what emerges from the model that has been constructed.



## CHAPTER IV

### RESEARCH FINDINGS

#### Introduction

The first section of this chapter will consist of an explanation of how the data were reported relative to the initial discussion of research methods. This will include a brief review of the research method and goals as well as an updated form of the research questions/themes. The second section of the chapter will consist of the research findings. These findings will be organized under general topic headings, which emerged out of the interview themselves.

#### Data Reporting Method

As was mentioned in the summation of Chapter II, a system analysis begins with the identification of a whole (a system); evaluating the properties of that larger whole, and then seeing the issue or phenomenon (along with all of its separate components) in its place within the larger whole (Wallman, 2001). It was theorized that more complete understanding of the terrorist phenomenon can be gained by looking at it in a complex system manner. This includes looking at the social, political and religious systems from

which the terrorism phenomenon springs – seeing it as an entire network of interdependent factors and components.

Data were gathered by interviewing people who had specialized knowledge or experience in the area of Islamic radicalism and/or the societies from which radicalism springs. They then recommended others to interview, and this process continued.

Data are reported in depth and detail – as this study is phenomenological in character. This means that the understanding of the subject emerges out of a wealth of complex detail and description, in this case self-reported by the person who has firsthand or scholarly knowledge of the phenomenon. To report findings in a brief or shortened manner would defeat the purpose of this study – that is it would prevent the subtle and multifaceted understanding of the topic that was intended. A summary review of major themes, organized according to subtopic, is found alongside policy recommendations in the final chapter

As mentioned previously in the methods section, because the interview is based upon the perspective of the interviewee and the specialized knowledge or experience that they have (Dexter, 1970), therefore they are given wide latitude as to how the interview is structured, what they consider to be most relevant, and how they define and frame the topics (Odendahl & Shaw, 2002). Deviation is seen as valuable (Kezar, 2003). Elite or expert interviewing is used for those wanting to construct a multi-faceted perspective that takes into account varying views of a particular reality (Whyte, 1984). While a set of tentative interview questions were formulated, the interviews were planned to be conducted in a style ranging from semi-structured to open-ended depending upon the preference of the interviewee (Odendahl & Shaw, 2002). For this reason, the questions

were planned to be used in full with some subjects, while with others they may also have been just a starting – with some subjects choosing to either focus on one or more questions, or perhaps take the interview in an entirely different direction.

#### Who Was Interviewed and Why They Were Chosen

As mentioned in the Methods section, people were chosen to be interviewed based on their knowledge of radicalism, terrorism, moderation and/or the societies and systems that give rise to these different trends. This included researchers, political leaders in the region, academics from both the Middle East as well as the West, religious figures and organizational activists. The word ‘distinguished’ is used when referring to university founders/presidents, authors of scores of academic books and those holding multiple high level degrees. Some ‘average’ members of society were included – when they had valuable insights based on being members of Arab/Islamic societies. Generally, subjects were recommended by other subjects (snowball method), though occasionally they were sought out by the author due to being previously known and identified as relevant to the research. When subjects are cited within the results, they are referred to by general position only without names or specifically identifying details such as affiliation or place of employment. While some subjects had no problem with being identified, some did prefer anonymity, and it was felt a single style would be preferable for the sake of consistency. Their religion (or non-Arab national origin, such as ‘American’, ‘Israeli’, etc.) is specified if they are not born Muslim. Listed in Appendix (number?) is a summary description of the subjects who were interviewed, along with brief information as to their relevance to the research – again without names or specific affiliation/place of employment.

## Research Questions

Given that this was the planned method of gathering data (semi-structured, open-ended and with questions serving as only a tentative starting point); and given that the end purpose was to construct a systems understanding based on the narratives of the interview subjects, therefore the interview questions are not used as a rigid structure for reporting and organizing the data. The data are self-organizing – that is, categories, topics and relationships are constructed based on the data – rather than organizing the data based on predetermined questions and categories. While the final structure presented in Chapter IV bears more than a passing resemblance to the original interview questions, it is not limited by them, but is rather determined by the data and narratives of the subjects. The purpose, after all, is to describe a system using exploratory research – not to do survey research with close-ended and unchangeable questions and parameters.

As the data were collected, it coalesced around the following thematic questions:

- 1) What are the elements of the larger system from which radicalism and terrorism emerge?
- 2) What are the characteristics of each of the elements of this system?
- 3) What trends are evolving within this system?
- 4) What are policy recommendations that would strengthen moderation and weaken extremism within the various elements within the system?

## Research Findings

The following topic headings emerged from the research interviews (further topic headings can be found in the detailed findings appendix):

Radical and Fundamentalist Islamist Groups  
Middle Eastern States and Extremism  
Extremism and the United States

Extremism in Europe and the UK  
Extremism and the Israel/Palestine Conflict  
Spread of Intolerance and Hatred  
Middle Eastern and Islamic Attitudes towards Sexuality and Gender and its  
Influence on Radicalism and Fundamentalism  
Hostility, Fear and Hatred of the West as a Correlate to and a Motivator of  
Radicalism  
The Inflammatory Role of Middle Eastern Media and the Role of the Internet in  
Spreading Radicalism  
Fundamentalist and Extremist Leaders and Preachers and their Role in Spreading  
Hatred and Violence  
The Link Between Wahabi-Type Fundamentalism and Extremism  
Educational and Religious Systems that Spread Hatred  
The Conflict Between Extremist and Moderate Perspectives in Islam

Please Note: The term ‘fundamentalist’ is used in this chapter to refer to those espousing a strict observance of Islam that may include coercion of observance and punishments for non-believers or those who practice insufficiently. It may also include negative or intolerant views of those who are not a part of the fundamentalist beliefs – including fellow Muslims. It may also include an acceptance of the subjugation of women. The term ‘extremist’ refers to those who harbor views that may include an acceptance of violence and a hatred of those that do not share one’s own views. The term ‘radical’ refers to those who are acting out on the fundamentalist or extremist beliefs in violent and destructive ways. The three terms have a lot of overlap and are not meant to imply discrete categorizations.)

(Perhaps use this in intro: The top things that predispose to radicalism in ranked order: ideology; rallying leaders, resources/bases; grievances. Lower down are alienated youth, state help (including passive), communications networks, and an influx of money.)

## Radical and Fundamentalist Islamist Groups

Radical and Fundamentalist Islamist groups arose in the Middle East in the 1970's, primarily in Egypt. This included the rise of Jemaa Islamiya, The Muslim Brotherhood (which has since evolved into more of a fundamentalist/Islamist group) and other Jihadi groups. It also was the foundation from which al-Qaeda later was formed. The age of al-Qaeda lasted from the mid 1990's (it was officially formed in 1998) until the attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent crackdown by the West. During the 1990's, al-Qaeda was the most influential of the jihadi groups and other smaller groups became absorbed into it. Now al-Qaeda is still operative (largely based in the Afghan/Pakistan border region), but is much less active as a structured, hierarchical organization. While it still exists and operates (and underestimating the ability of al-Qaeda to regenerate would be a mistake), it is less a source of direct commands and planning, functioning more as a source of ideas and inspiration for many smaller local groups, cells and individuals in countries across the Middle East and globally.

Nonetheless, the jihadi idea is still functioning – having as its ultimate ideal the spread of radical, violent and revolutionary ideology worldwide. This includes the goal of attacking and eventually overthrowing both Western governments as well as Middle Eastern governments that are seen as insufficiently Islamic. The groups want to establish a Pan-Islamic Caliphate throughout the Middle East and (according to many) even the West – with strict Sharia laws imposed on both Muslims and 'infidels'. Groups like the Muslim Brotherhood (and by extension, al-Qaeda and later groups) were influenced by totalitarian movements including Nazism, Communism and Fascism. The goal of all of these movements was total control of all of the elements of a society – something the

radical Islamist groups saw as their goal - in their case using religion as the linchpin of their ideology.

Groups like al-Qaeda have been able to co-opt local Islamist and insurgent groups and local conflicts and issues for their own purposes. In this way they function as both a top-down organization as well as a source of legitimacy, inspiration and information for other groups. They have been able to use various forms of mass-media including the internet to train, indoctrinate, recruit, and network with operatives.

This process of ideological spread has been taking place over the last twenty years or so but has not been sufficiently noted and countered by the West. One of the reasons for this is that many radical groups (with the exception of al-Qaeda) including the PLO, Fatah, Islamic Jihad, Hamas, Hezbollah, Hizb ut Tahrir, the Muslim Brotherhood and others, have made an effort to conceal their radical message from the public.

This can be accomplished in several ways: One way is by having one message that is spread to believers and those who speak Arabic, while having another message that is spread in English and to the Western press and Western political circles. Another way is by having a network of charitable, educational and social service branches that are presented as being the true nature of the group, while the violent and military arms operate in a more covert manner. This tactic has been used successfully by Hamas, Hezbollah, the PLO/Fatah, the Muslim Brotherhood and others. When violent attacks are carried out, the 'main arm' of the group simply disavows or claims ignorance of the actions of the military/violent arm of the group (which may call itself by a different name, or just operate namelessly in the shadows). This allows the 'main' group to

operate, build infrastructure, spread extremist ideology and raise funds, while claiming no connection to its more violent elements.

Another tactic used to both obscure the nature of a group as well as to raise funds, recruit and spread ideology is the creation of front organizations and groups. Particularly in the West, non-profit ‘charitable’ groups, campus organizations and advocacy-type organizations raise funds, spread ideas (or counter criticism), and even recruit members while all the while appearing as neutral ‘pro-Islam’ bodies. Groups such as CAIR (affiliated with Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood) and others may appear on Western television, speak at political and academic gatherings and hold meetings on college campuses while concealing their more radical affiliations. Because of the skill with which radical groups conceal their violent means or radical goals, the West has been less than vigilant in exposing and countering these groups in both the Middle East as well as the West.

An instructive example of both the spread of a radical group as well as its ability to conceal its nature is the case of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood is a group that has served as the inspirational foundation for most if not all of the modern radical Islamist groups – including al-Qaeda. Originally the Muslim Brotherhood was supported by the British, who saw it as a bulwark against Nasserism in Egypt. This is reportedly similar to some in the U.S. government who see the group as a possible counter to the radicalism of Shiite Iran. The Muslim Brotherhood makes moderate statements to the public, while its internal documents and statements are much more extreme – including its ultimate goal of the creation of an Islamist empire with Sharia observance imposed on the population. This ability to conceal its nature is aided by the



fact that many low-level members of the group see it as being more moderate than it really is. This is because the more radical and least democratic elements of the group tend to be the powerholders and senior members – who may take special care in promoting the moderate image to the public and to the members who do not hold power.

The group conceals its goals by making statements implying that they want to operate within a democratic process – while at the same time noting that all political decisions will be made in consultation with a religious advisory board. They also state that they want to carry out the will of the people – including the desire to enact laws that mandate Sharia observance – of course if this is the people's will.

The Muslim Brotherhood has waged concerted campaigns in countries throughout the Middle East (notably Egypt and Jordan) to influence the public perception of Islam, Muslims, and Islamic observance. This has had the effect of repressing and intimidating those who hold less fundamentalist views, or who want to have the freedom to observe as they wish. Reportedly, the widespread increase in veiling of women and the related lack of ability to dress in a modern western manner without being harassed (in the case of females) is directly related to these campaigns by the Muslim Brotherhood. Tactics like these to influence Muslim societies in a broad way have also been used by groups such as Hizb ut Tahrir in the UK, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Palestinian Territories and elsewhere. By coopting religious discourse and repressing religious freedom (through both propaganda as well as intimidation), the ability of the public to explore ideas freely has been highly reduced. This lack of religious freedom not only prevents the spread of more moderate ideas – it also directly assists the spread of more extreme ideologies –

such as the forcible imposition of observance on the public as a goal, hatred of the West and non-Muslims and an acceptance of violence as a means of reaching one's goals.

Unfortunately, when governments do not directly confront groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, their repressive ideologies are allowed to spread unchecked. The groups may also want to take over the political systems by majority rule. On the other hand, when governments crack down severely on these groups (such as was the case with Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood), the groups tend to become even more violent and radicalized. There is currently a major debate in the Middle East as to whether Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood should be outlawed or whether they should be allowed to take part in the political process. A balance between these two approaches has been difficult to find.

The Lebanese militant group Hezbollah presents different challenges. While it has definitely been linked to violent terrorist attacks in both the Middle East as well as the West, Hezbollah has been able to cultivate an image of religious, social, political and military legitimacy in Lebanon, its country of origin. Hezbollah is seen in Lebanon as a defense and resistance against Israeli aggression/occupation. Elsewhere in the Middle East, Hezbollah is seen as an organized group that is a role model to others. Hezbollah carries a lot of symbolic value in the region – even among Sunnis. Hezbollah's strength as a radical organization is maintained by support by Iran and Syria.

In the case of Palestinian groups such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Fatah, the issues are that these groups are seen as the only option to counterbalance the power of Israel within the Palestinian territories. These groups use the fear and hatred of Israel as a reason for spreading violent and extremist ideologies – actively recruiting followers from

the most poor and disenfranchised elements in the West Bank and Gaza. In this way, the worse life is seen to be by the inhabitants, the easier it is for the radical and violent groups to recruit followers and plan attacks. This becomes a vicious cycle, because the attacks on Israel result in counterattacks and crackdowns on the civilian population – which in turn gives the radical groups more fuel to recruit followers and justify their attacks.

### The Role of Middle Eastern States in Extremism

Currently Middle Eastern Society is in a state of upheaval and transformation, socially politically and religiously. This instability causes states to be more vulnerable to both religious fundamentalism as well as repression on the part of state regimes. Both reactions to instability result in populations that are vulnerable to extremism – because of the influence of rigid religious ideology as well as resentment at the actions of state regimes.

One of the major factors in the ability of the repressive and unpopular regimes in the Middle East to is the monopoly that the regimes hold over oil wealth. If the non-democratic regimes in the Middle East suffered a loss of economic power (such as an oil-market downturn), they and the extremists and fundamentalists that they support would become vulnerable. Oil wealth was the factor that originally brought Wahabism to prominence through the support of the Saudi government.

Because of the high levels of state surveillance and control, it is felt that if fundamentalism/radicalism exists in the population, to some degree the states are allowing it to exist. This was stated even in regards to states like Egypt and Jordan that position themselves as ‘moderate’ and ‘anti-extremist’. States allow extremist views and

groups as long as these views are not against the state itself – however if they are against America, the West, Israel (including violence against civilians) it is tolerated and even accepted. In this manner, states allow a level of fundamentalism and even radicalism (specifically in mosques, media and schools), because it pacifies and distracts the population, but they crack down harshly when it is seen as a threat to their security – or even as critical of their regime.

Generally the population is seen as being more fundamentalist and more radicalized than the governments. This is because the governments tolerate the fundamentalist and radical views – and even encourage them to some degree (as stated above) – while groups like the Muslim Brotherhood actively spread a fundamentalist view of Islam. The result is a fundamentalist population, some with radical views, and a government using repression to keep this on a level that does not threaten their existence.

Another factor that creates resentment of both the Middle Eastern governments and the West that supports them is the repression of democratic opposition movements by governments in the Middle East under the justification of cracking down on security threats. Another outcome of this repression is not only resentment (and therefore a focal point for radicalism) but also, due to repression of democratic opposition groups, the Islamist groups are the strongest non-governmental force (and also seen as less corrupt). This repression also creates a climate of fear, where citizens generally do not feel able to speak freely without repercussions. Again – this makes the fundamentalist and radical groups more attractive by comparison to the repressive governments, and also fuels resentment of the West – America in particular.

Radicalism and anger towards America is fueled by dissatisfaction with the level of progress in Middle Eastern states – especially in comparison to the West. This lack of progress was in part because oil dollars allowed Gulf countries to enter the modern era without truly modernizing, because they could afford not to and still survive, even thrive and gain power. America and the West are seen as propping up the regimes that do not invest in their population or infrastructure. The West is viewed with strong emotions (helplessness, resentment, need) because of its perceived superpower status (it is parentified – for better and worse). Historically, the Middle East felt superior to the West, and therefore it isolated from them. As mentioned above, trade – and later oil – wealth allowed the region to prevail/thrive without real progress. Currently globalism with its influx of foreign culture and values is seen by some as an encroachment or even assault.

Resentment towards the West is also in part because the departure of colonial powers was relatively recent – 1950's through 1970's. As a result, countries in the Middle East are still propelled by attitudes of anti-colonialism and national resistance/liberation, rather than responsibility and self-determination. This tends to create an adversarial and threatened point of view. The current phase in the Middle East can be seen as a transitory phase between the collapse of colonialism (which itself followed an age of Empire) and the advent of full modernity. Times of transition give rise to both repression and varieties of extremism.

Because of repressive governments, Middle Eastern countries that seem to be internally unified may actually be hiding multiple internal rifts. These rifts and tensions give rise to both resentment towards the ruling regime as well as identification with whoever the people see as being the strongest alternative – which is usually the extremist

or fundamentalist group. Radical groups are seen as being a viable solution to the regime particularly since radical groups have as a goal the overthrow of these regimes and ultimately the control of states for the protection that sovereignty provides, as well as the use of geography, infrastructure and resources.

There are states where the goal of these radical groups has already been partially realized. These Islamist or almost Islamist states currently include Iran, Somalia, Sudan, Lebanon, Palestine and Saudi Arabia. This is a dangerous phenomenon since there is a significant danger of radical states obtaining nuclear weapons and giving them to terrorist groups. Even larger Middle Eastern states are (some say 50/50%) vulnerable to Islamist takeover. The smaller Gulf States (Oman, Bahrain, UAE, Qatar) are seen as less vulnerable – due to less repression, better economies and better leadership.

One of the factors that is fueling instability, resentment, fear and a resurgence of fundamentalist-type religiosity is that currently Middle Eastern states are undergoing a huge cultural transformation. The influx of modernity (Western style and often the highly commercialized Hollywood version) has led to a backlash of fundamentalist religious revivalism that is both comforting for the population, but that also leads to more anti-Western and even extremist views. This is exacerbated by the fact that most Middle Eastern states lack a positive national/Islamic identity relative to the rest of the world. This lack of a positive and moderate Islamic identity stems from religious ignorance, lack of freedom and democracy, governmental corruption/incompetence/nepotism, and economic issues – but not from the Koran. However the ignorance about Islam (especially its more moderate forms) and the lack of freedom or trust in the government give rise to a negative view of Middle Eastern Muslims about themselves as well as in the

eyes of the West. The lack of a positive image of Muslims and Islam adds to negative beliefs and behaviors in the same way that a young person growing up without a positive self-image or positive role models will tend more to negative or destructive behaviors.

While past attempts at Pan-Arabism (an attempt to create a positive and unified Arab-Islamic world) created greater repression, conflict and instability, nonetheless, government can be inspired by Islam without being coercively Islamist (some Muslims point out that this is like the relationship between the U.S. and Christianity). They say that one can have a positive and even unifying Islamic identity while still being able to maintain a multitude of ideas, religious paths, historical and cultural identities. So far, Middle Eastern countries have yet to find this balance.

Traditionally in Islamic states the clerical leader was not the state leader. What this means is that the goal that many Islamist groups have – the state imposed observance of Sharia with concurrent punishments for transgression – is not in the spirit of classical and traditional Islam. Nonetheless, this state-imposed brand of Islam is seen as the ideal goal, and is in fact practiced to differing degrees in various parts of the Islamic world. Coercion, whether group or state imposed, is in itself a form of religious extremism and leads to excesses of both ideology and punitive action (such as stonings, beheadings and honor killings).

While some say that currently states are not the key factor in violent extremism (except Iran), it must be noted that states do play a role, though as mentioned above, the role may be indirect (such as inspiring resentment or spreading extreme and intolerant religious beliefs). State roles in extremism and terrorism are therefore varied. States can be sympathizers, sponsors, weak states, and even terror states. Some countries mentioned

as active sponsors are Iran, Saudi Arabia and Syria. A passive sponsor may be Egypt (for example in its tolerance of the spread of extreme and intolerant ideology in the religious and educational institutions). Weak or failed states may include Somalia, Sudan, Lebanon (Iraq on the borderline and in the past, Afghanistan and Algeria) – these are states where radical groups can actually control territory and build bases – or in the case of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Taliban in pre-9/11 Afghanistan – they can create an (extremist and militarized) state within a state.

In sum, while states may not be the only source of radicalism and terrorism, they – by actions of both omission as well as commission – do encourage and allow the growth of radicalism, extremism and intolerance as well as coercive fundamentalism.

#### Specific Middle Eastern States and Their Influence on Extremism

Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, and Iraq are Middle Eastern States which have an influence on extremism.

##### *Saudi Arabia*

Saudi Arabia has come under particular scrutiny for its role in promoting and spreading radicalism and anti-Western sentiment. One major reason is that Saudi Arabia has played a major role in funding Islamist extremism in the form of mosques, schools and books in countries throughout the Middle East and elsewhere. In addition, people who come to Saudi Arabia to work from countries like Egypt absorb its extreme brand of Islam and bring it back to their home country. Saudi Arabia also funds Islamist extremism in the West (including the U.S.) by funding research departments in universities, funding mosques and chaplains, lobbying governments and forming nonprofit organizations that are fronts for Islamist fundamentalism. Saudi Arabia floods



the market in both East and West with fundamentalist and extremist literature in both Arabic and English. The Saudi educational system plants seeds of hatred and intolerance that make people more sympathetic and vulnerable to extremism and radicalism. Saudi sponsored schools in the U.S. and EU are teaching the same types of thinking (and the West does not compel them to change their texts and teachings).

The general pattern is that Saudi Arabia allows and even supports (anti Western) Wahabi fundamentalism, but tries to crack down on extremism when it threatens the Saudi regime. Saudi Arabia also arrests and represses reform-minded dissidents under the pretext of fighting extremism. The Saudi government also uses religious leaders and tribal chiefs to silence liberal voices.

A deeper issue is that one of the bases for extremist thought – that Islam should be forcibly imposed on a population is expressed in the structure of the state government itself – as the Saudi government is based on Islamism – the forcible imposition of Islam. From this perspective, the Saudi regime is not at the mercy of religious extremists (as they have tried to portray themselves. On the contrary, the royal family may be using the religious fundamentalists and extremists to repress the population and excuse their abuses and excesses.

Widespread gender (women), religious (non-Sunnis and non-Muslims) and racial (non-Arab) oppression and discrimination is the norm in Saudi Arabia. It is taught in its religious academies and preached in its mosques. Severe punishments are meted out by the government for infractions such as theft, or (perceived) breaches of morality. This keeps the population in a state of fear, discourages anyone from stepping over the limits

of state-backed fundamentalism and fuels a tremendous amount of resentments towards the Saudi regime.

Despite these abuses, The U.S. government does not speak out against race/religious/gender discrimination by Saudi Arabia. The perception (by both Middle Easterners as well as researchers) is that this is because the U.S. government and U.S. economic interests are heavily invested in Saudi Arabia. The U.N. and international NGO's also have not spoken out against Saudis – perhaps because in the case of the U.N., its member nations are also economically tied to Saudi Arabia. It is doubtful that repressiveness of the government will in the long-term ensure the stability of the oil market (a major U.S. concern), as repression encourages anti-regime extremism. The Saudi regime will not change without external pressure because it does not have to. This is exacerbated by the Saudi regime presenting one face in the Western media and a different one in Arabic. This helps to obscure their support for intolerance, anti-Westernism and religious extremism. While overt Saudi support for violent and extremist groups has lessened since they were attacked in 2003, nonetheless they still support fundamentalism that preaches coercion, anti-Western violence, hatred and discrimination. This includes support for worldwide 'theaters of Jihad' that Saudi Arabia does not think counts as terrorism.

In sum, while Saudi Arabia proclaims itself against jihadi/al-Qaeda violent extremism, its actions (both past and present) have created a base of both support and funding for radical, extremist and violent views. For this reason, many jihadi fighters come from Saudi Arabia, as do many terrorists.

## *Egypt*

Another state that has received particular attention for its role in acting as a source of radicalism in the Middle East is Egypt. Egypt passively allows fundamentalism (including religious extremism and intolerance) within the society – though does not actively export it like Saudi Arabia. This includes allowing active campaigns by the Muslim Brotherhood to control the population and suppress moderate voices. The Egyptian regime also uses the need to crack down on extremism as a ploy to avoid democracy and suppress/punish dissidents. While U.S. pressure for democratization in Egypt post-9/11 was enough to open a space for fundamentalist extremism, it was insufficient to create real democratic change.

Egypt as a society does not have a plurality of viewpoints - the party line in Egypt is anti-Americanism and conspiracy theories. There is a real lack of intellectual sophistication. This encourages negative thinking and paranoia about the West and non-Muslims. The educational systems in Egypt are very sub-standard and do not teach any kind of critical thinking skills, nor do they expose people to a variety of ideas, which also creates negative and simplistic thinking – including an ignorance about the principles and plurality of views within Islam. Egypt was recently a much more cosmopolitan and diverse society – but this has changed radically in the last generation – some say this is due to the active repression and control of the Muslim Brotherhood on the population.

Women in Egypt have even less political power, little power in the culture, and are subject to ongoing harassment/hostility as well as pressure to conform religiously and culturally. This also causes a suppression of the moderation and tolerance that women's voices might bring within the society.

Because of the non-democratic nature of the regime, Egyptians do not have a sense of political power – they are de-politicized. Since 9/11 there has been a re-politicization – but this has manifested mainly as anti-Americanism, which fuels extremist and radical thinking. While this may not express itself in overtly violent jihadism (which would be quickly cracked down upon by the regime) nonetheless it is seen in fundamentalism and anti-Western sentiment.

If the U.S. were to withdraw its support of Mubarak's regime (or pressure a lot harder for change) it would increase the pressure for real democracy in Egypt. However the U.S. is reluctant to press too hard for real democratic change because it is thought that any chaotic situation in Egypt may result in a power grab by the Muslim Brotherhood, which has a large clandestine power base in Egypt especially among Egypt's 65% illiterate population.

So, while Egypt may decry violent jihadism of the al-Qaeda type, they do promote attitudes and concepts (anti-Western, anti-female, anti-non-Muslim, etc) that form the basis for later radicalization.

### *Iran*

The Iranian revolution was a major watershed in the spread of Islamist radicalism. Prior to the Iranian revolution there was no model for a modern-era Islamist state. While there might have been Islamist movements (most prominently the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots), nonetheless, no Islamist movement till that time controlled an entire state. This changed with the Iranian revolution in 1979. After the revolution, it became a major goal of Islamist movements of every type (Sunni as well as Shiite) to take over the reigns of a state. If this were not possible, the next best choice was to build a state within

a state – as was the case in Afghanistan and Lebanon (by the Taliban and Hezbollah, respectively). Due to its success in taking over an entire state and achieve some measure of international legitimacy, the Iranian Islamist message resonates throughout the region – with Sunnis and Shiites.

Sunni Islam was dominant in the Middle East prior to the Iranian revolution. The revolution itself was partially a response and a counterbalance to Sunni regional dominance. At the same time, the revolution inspired Sunnis as well – as the Soviet withdrawal did. In this manner, it galvanized the growth of Sunni-based extremism.

Both Sunni and Shiite fundamentalism in general are a reflection of radical Islam, and also of the Islamic awakening (Sahwa) that occurred after the collapse of pan-Arabism/Nasserism. Shiites (in general) have tended to see themselves as the underdogs/victims, which has exacerbated their desire to achieve dominance. However, the Saudi spread of Sunni Wahabism prevented more Shiite/Iranian influence. While Iranian Shiite extremists see the Sunnis as having had the advantage prior to the revolution, and they need to catch up in terms of power and influence. Each side had their ideologues, and there was also crossover – for example, Khomeini read Qutb. At times the two strands ally together for a specific purpose (like Iran funding Hamas) and at times they operate quite separately and compete and fight against one another (such as during the Iran/Iraq war). They both represent critical threats – both in different ways. Currently Sunni terrorism has been more of an immediate threat to the West. The major ideologues were also Sunni (Qutb, al-Banna, ibn-Taymiyah, etc.), Sunnis also outnumber Shiites (and it tends to be the Iranian Shiites that are radicalized). So at the present time (in terms

of terrorist ideology) Sunni-based groups have tended to get more attention as a threat on the international stage.

Nonetheless, the influence of Iran/Shiism on terrorism worldwide cannot be underestimated. With the aid of oil money and state infrastructure, Iran has supported, sheltered and funded various terrorist and insurgent groups in Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq. Some of these groups, notably Hezbollah, depend almost entirely on Iran for their survival. In addition to these groups, Iran has sheltered and aided al-Qaeda leaders especially after 9/11. Because of the protection of state sovereignty, the ability of the West to go after these leaders is severely constrained.

A major factor in the ability of Iran to remain a threat to the west as well as a supporter and sponsor of extremism and terrorism in the Middle East and elsewhere is the protection that would be a result of Iran achieving nuclear capability. Because of this, Iran acquiring nuclear weapons would radically destabilize the Middle East – creating new alliances and major new tensions. Unfortunately the choices that are available to the West to deal with this possibility are quite limited. Logistical difficulties aside, military action against Iran would likely unify the country and gain it regional support. Because of the awareness of what could be gained by nuclear power, Iran has been focused on this to the exclusion of other matters. This has cause Iran to recently decrease its support for terrorism globally (except Palestinian groups and Hezbollah) to focus on nuclear capability. It is thought that once nuclear capacity is reached (even for supposed ‘civilian’ uses), Iran will focus once more on spreading its ideology and desire for domination worldwide – directly and by supporting various proxy groups.

## *Iraq*

The American incursion into Iraq caused an upsurge in anti-American and pro-Islamist sentiment in the entire region. While the incursion into Afghanistan resulted in less of a reaction, the incursion into Iraq caused a much more intense reaction. Part of this was because of the clear link between Afghanistan and the attacks of 9/11, and part of this was because of the strong symbolism that Iraq possessed as a center of political power and religious/cultural significance in the region as a whole. Part of this significance can be seen by the fact that tensions in Iraq are not only internal (Sunni, Shiite, Kurd, etc.), but are also an expression of regional tensions between various Sunni and Shiite powers. Control over Iraq (its oil fields as well as its religious and cultural centers) is seen as central to control over the entire region. For this reason, Iraq is seen as a battleground between the larger Sunni and Shiite forces in the region as a whole. A major part of this was because of the removal of Saddam Hussein as a Sunni counterbalance to Iranian Shiism. Iranian influence increasing in the Middle East (in Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, etc) was a direct result of the American incursion into Iraq.

Whether or not the U.S. should or should not have gone into Iraq (keeping in mind that Saddam Hussein was determined to give the impression that he had WMD capability – mostly to hold off the threat of Iranian attack), the manner that it did so exacerbated tensions in the international and regional arena. The U.S. acted unilaterally in Iraq, which created problems – more consensus was needed. A lot of anger in the Middle East towards the U.S. is the result of this. Despite this, Shiites in Iraq see that the stakes for them are very high – so they are invested in success. Even for those who were opposed to the decision to invade Iraq, it is clear that if the U.S. were successful in

creating a free and democratic state in the center of the Middle East, it would have profound repercussions. It is also clear that failure to do so (given the instability created by Saddam's removal) would also have great repercussions – especially given the desire of Iran for regional dominance.

(Note: Specific information regarding additional states not mentioned here can be found in the Appendix.)

### Extremism and the United States

While the U.S. has tended to see itself as that victim as regards the rise of Islamist extremism, radicalism and anti-Western, anti-modern style fundamentalism, nonetheless, the U.S. has also contributed to the rise of this phenomenon, both by omission as well as commission. Some of the issues that involve the U.S. include:

There tends to be an acceptance on the part of the U.S. (or at least a lack of decisive condemnation) of extremism within Islam, which stymies Islamic reform. This may be due to a misguided sense of political correctness, naiveté, or fear of domestic political backlash. This lack of condemnation of the more extreme attitudes and actions of extremists and fundamentalists (whether on the part of governments, groups or individuals) allows these attitudes and actions to proliferate in both the Middle East as well as the West. The U.S. is seen as ignoring human rights abuses in the Middle East (due to selfish interests). This also causes a lot of resentment of the U.S. in the Middle East, which is used by extremists to rally people to their cause.

When it comes to condemning actions by governments (including overt government support of extremists and anti-Westerners) this tends to be squelched because the oil lobby in the U.S. is very pro-Saudi and has had an influence on politics as



well. In this manner, U.S. oil purchases in the Middle East fund extremism – in effect, the U.S. is funding its own enemies.

Not only does the support that the U.S. gives to non-democratic governments stand in the way of reform in the region, it also makes the U.S. government deeply unpopular among the population of the non-democratic states. This causes even moderate and non-political Muslims in these states to harbor anti-U.S. views, which ultimately serves as a rallying point for extremists.

Rather than speaking out against the more extreme elements within the Muslim Brotherhood, the U.S. is considering using the Muslim Brotherhood as a proxy force against Shiite extremists – a repeat of previous policies of backing dangerous/extremist forces. In addition to its lack of action regarding the Muslim Brotherhood, there is also a proliferation of organizations within the U.S. that are fronts for radical and fundamentalist groups – the U.S. government tends to be in denial about these groups.

Due to fundamentalist influence in the U.S., radical Islam is growing. This has included the importation of radical clerics (many from Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan) under so-called ‘religious visas’ that do not have a strong degree of oversight – or did not at the time the clerics entered. Once they are here is harder to obtain strong enough evidence to make them leave. These clerics exert influence in mosques, schools and as chaplains in U.S. prisons. For this reason, Islamists that learn to play by the rules and not stick out may be a greater danger. Islamists the US and EU want to encroach on Western values, freedoms and behavior – unless the U.S. and EU push back to prevent encroachment of Islamism and Sharia law, there will be a possible erosion of Western freedoms and values.

Another issue with the U.S. (specifically on the governmental level) has been its inability to find ways to reach out to and communicate with the Islamic world in a manner that does not come across as insensitive, abrasive, disrespectful or bullying. This is worsened by the lack of policymakers that have spent any substantive amount of time in the Middle East. It is also worsened by a perceived lack of even-handedness regarding the Israeli/Palestinian issue – which may be about both substantive policies as well as symbolic tone and gesture.

Because of the degree to which the governments of the Middle East are supported by oil, there is a widely held view that democracy will come to the Middle East only when and if the oil economies collapse. Those within the Middle East that resent the non-democratic, corrupt and abusive regimes also resent the United States because of the degree to which U.S. oil purchases support these regimes. It is possible that if the U.S. reduced oil purchases in the Middle East by 10%, oil prices would fall 50%. Because of the dependency of the U.S. on Middle Eastern oil as well as the benefit that Middle Eastern regimes accrue from this dependency, there is an increasing awareness on the part of policymakers within the U.S. government of the need to find alternate sources of fuel. Substantial progress in fuel alternatives is likely to become a priority in U.S. policy circles.

It is possible that as Middle Eastern countries are pushed to become more liberal (or as they crack down on extremism) radicals will increasingly find haven in the West, where naiveté and political correctness will allow them to operate.

Increasingly, the West is already becoming a haven for radicalism through nonprofit organizations, mosques, chaplains in prisons, and Islamic departments in

universities. Radical Islam is already overwhelming the ability of the EU to deal with it, and it is possible that it will present an increasingly existential threat to Western civilization. The first victims of radicalism were, and continue to be, moderate Muslims. The West is still reacting with passivity and naivete to the threat posed by radical Islam – other than Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. is not dealing with radical Islamists in Sudan, Algeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and elsewhere.

#### Extremism in Europe and the UK

Europe is a key area in the growth of Islamist extremism. This is in part because of high levels of immigration from Middle Eastern, Asian and North African countries, combined with a high birth-rate relative to the rest of the population. These communities tend to be isolated and economically depressed. To some extent these communities may have more in common with their countries of origin than they do with the EU. This causes tension and differences in societal norms and practices. In some areas of these communities, fundamentalist and extremist Muslims have set up parallel societies and legal systems.

Similar to the U.S., there is a proliferation of groups in Europe and in the UK that are connected with fundamentalism and radicalism – and they are allowed to operate freely. Some of them are recognized in EU political circles and take part in the political debate without being confronted as to extremist views and alliances.

Education and the exposure to modernity of women in some Islamic circles has caused (especially young) women to become more outspoken and independent – due to exposure to liberal ideas. This also causes tension within the community and has led to extreme practices such as physical abuse, forced marriages and honor killings. The

government has been accused of not doing enough to stop these practices. Those with radical views also use the perceived threat to women as a way to pressure and motivate others to follow a narrow and fundamentalist path – and impose it on their female family members. This discourages moderation and plurality by both the females as well as their male relatives.

While In France, unrest in Muslim immigrant communities is largely due to economic issues, in the UK, the issues have more to do with identity and alienation – a combination of not wanting to blend in and not feeling accepted within the larger society.

In the past the UK was very complacent regarding extremist views – as long as they were not the targets. This changed markedly after the 7/7 bombings – however it may be a case of too little too late, since once those with extremist views are in the society it is hard to identify them or make them leave (particularly if they are legal residents or even citizens).

In Germany, radicalism is also an issue of identity, with German Muslims (especially Moroccan) feeling very isolated from society. This is less true with Turkish Germans. Denmark is very aware of extremist issues – they are ahead of other Scandinavian countries – but they are also a target of extremists because of their willingness to push against the intimidation of extremists. Belgium has a problem of ‘creeping Sharia-zation’, as Sharia law influences the society. Belgium also has a lot of immigration, a large immigrant population and a big welfare state (seen as a significant part of the radicalization problem, as it creates an isolated sub-culture).

As in the U.S., a desire for political correctness holds back meaningful policies to fight extremism; the UK and the U.S. are seen as the most complacent, France is next, then the Scandinavian countries and Germany and Australia are the least complacent. Nonetheless, even with laws on the books, if a country is not enforcement oriented, even the best policies are ineffective.

In the EU and UK, Saudi Arabia spends millions of dollars to import fundamentalist, intolerant and extremist Islam. This is still ongoing. Due to this influx of ideology, and even aggressive recruitment of vulnerable young people, parents feel helpless to protect their children against radicalization (similar to parents feeling helpless in the U.S. against gang members recruiting their children). Parents may be horrified after the fact to see that their children have become fundamentalists, extremists or even violent radicals, but be unable to do anything about it.

This recruitment to radicalization takes place through social settings, organizations, universities, madrassahs, mosques, media (especially internet media), etc. The process begins by discrediting the tenets of traditional religious Islam and teaching intolerance towards non-Muslims. Then it may progress to an outright preaching of the need for violence. This radicalization is exacerbated by a concerted effort to discredit and repress moderate voices. This prevents moderate Muslims from uniting together in meaningful numbers to stand up against more extreme views.

Some predict Europe will be next major front in the battle against Islamist radicalism – with an increasing issue being the radicalization of native-born European youth. This will present a major security threat because of the freedom of travel throughout the EU and UK, as well as into the U.S. This has already been the case in the

EU and UK itself, with attacks planned, attempted and actually carried out by native-born radicalized European youth.

### Radicalism and the Israel/Palestine Conflict

There are differing perspectives on the extent to which the Israel/Palestine conflict substantively affects radicalism. Some state that what Israel and Palestine do to lessen tensions makes a big difference in the emotions of the surrounding Arab world (and needless to say, the Palestinian Arabs within Israel, Gaza and the West Bank). There are others who say that no matter what happens regarding the Israel/Palestine conflict, there will always be those who will seek to exploit it (and other issues) in order to inflame tensions in the region. According to one point of view, nothing that Israel (or the U.S. as an Israeli ally) can do would substantively affect the dynamics in the region – as they are functioning as an ideological scapegoat. The reality probably lies somewhere in between – there are issues that do increase radicalism, and those issues are exploited to the maximum degree possible by those who wish to increase radicalism (such as radical group leaders, indoctrinators and recruiters), undermine any possible rapprochement between the parties as well as those who are simply interested in sensationalism (Middle Eastern media outlets). So it makes sense to examine those things that inflame tensions as well as realizing that those things are magnified and used for sensationalism, propaganda and hate by those who have various things to gain by doing so.

Nonetheless there are definitely those who believe that if the Palestinian/Israeli issue were solved, the entire region would be affected, and certainly that radicalism would be lessened. This would be true regardless of whether the issue is being purposely used for propaganda purposes. Another way that this is stated is that if the Islamist

movement were to accept (and support) the Israel/Palestine peace process, this would change the political game in the region. At the present time, many Islamists (and certainly those who belong to radical groups) oppose any rapprochement, framing it as surrender of what is rightfully theirs (Israel – which they see as an illegitimate nation). This point of view is represented in the group Hamas. There may be elements within the group that would support a ‘long-term cease fire’ (hudna) with Israel, but these voices do not necessarily represent those that are in the main positions of leadership, nor do they conform with the written charter of the group. At this time, Hamas may have more pragmatic elements, but they do not represent the main leadership. For this reason, calls for the U.S., Israel or others to negotiate or recognize Hamas (stating that they have more moderate members that can be dealt with) may be simplistic and a bit naïve.

Generally speaking, the countries closest to Israel geographically are the ones that have tended to be the most radicalized by anti-Western and anti-Israel messages. This includes Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia. Countries that are geographically further away, such as Morocco, Yemen, the smaller Gulf States, Turkey, etc, are not quite as susceptible to this radicalization and hatred (though it definitely exists to a slightly lesser degree). Generally there is widespread support (or at least condoning) in the Arab world for the purposeful targeting of Israeli civilians. This is done even by those who decry terrorist violence in most of its other forms. This perspective is generally excused by saying that Israeli children will grow up to be soldiers (so that they represent a legitimate target), or that Israeli civilians are armed and serve in the reserves, etc.

Part of the hostility towards Israel on the part of Arab countries (which is then used to inflame radicalism and hatred) is due to envy at Israel’s economic, military and

technological advances compared to the rest of the Middle East. As mentioned above, this is exacerbated by the lag in development and progress in major Arab countries, which is due to failings in the regimes themselves – but which becomes a larger irritant when compared with neighboring Israel (which in turn is seen as being assisted to an unfair degree by the U.S.). In addition, Israel's defeat of Arab armies in various wars (especially the 6-day war) fueled an Islamic awakening and a strong anti-Israel sentiment.

Following this, the breakdown of the Israeli/Palestinian peace process and the intifadah that followed caused a re-politicization of the entire region (mostly against Israel and the West, rather than against their own regimes), which was used by radicals (including Osama bin-Laden in his 1998 declaration of war on the West) to further radicalization and justify attacks on the West. These anti-Israel, anti-America and anti-West sentiments have been heavily influenced by regional media - that stoke anti-Israel sentiments by heavy, repeated and one-sided coverage of Israeli attacks on Palestinians (as reported by those living in countries like Egypt and Jordan – a film of a particular attack or killing might be seen repeatedly over time, with no coverage of what context the attack occurred in, or what deaths were suffered by the other side).

Within the Palestinian territories themselves, there is definitely a connection between daily difficulties of life and the levels of hatred of Israel (which is then used to inflame radicalism). Travel restrictions, road-blocks and delays and daily small humiliations when dealing with Israelis are all mentioned as irritants that keep hatred alive. In this case the hatred is more practical than ideological – although long standing beliefs that Israel is occupying their land and that they have been disenfranchised also exist in tandem with day to day concerns. The lack of a decent life for Palestinians is due



to both failings on the part of Palestinian leaders (both Fatah and Hamas – who are seen as being more concerned with their own power rather than with the concerns of their people), as well as actions and failings of Israeli leaders – who fail to see the impact of even small and symbolic actions (such as the amount of time that Palestinians are delayed at checkpoints and roadblocks, or the insults that they sometimes endure from Israeli soldiers). There is also the fear of Israeli attacks and arrests, which are seen (rightly or wrongly) as random and unjust. Even within Israel, the Arab community feels that they are discriminated against and treated as second-class citizens – with less opportunity and less access to funds and resources. This stokes feelings of hate and separateness within Israel itself – even though in many ways (freedom of speech, freedom of religion and existence of moderate factions) Israel is one of the best countries in the Middle East for Muslims of every type.

Generally there is a strong feeling of powerlessness, fear, hopelessness, fatigue, rage, depression, anxiety, humiliation and helplessness among the Palestinian people towards the Israelis. Along with this is a growing recognition that the internal Palestinian society needs to become stronger, more unified and less corrupt – needs to take responsibility for its own future. There is an attitude that if positive change is not going to come from the political powers, it needs to come from the grass-roots efforts of the Palestinian people (and Israelis too). This includes ways to improve daily life and self-governance, reduce corruption and find ways to increase economic stability and security – seen as key to decreasing radicalization and increasing moderation within Palestinian society. These attitudes may also be connected to the level of maturity of the specific person, as Palestinians radicals who believe in violent measures sometimes go through a

phase change where they see resistance as also encompassing non-violent measures, and this may also include an acceptance of positive change from within the society

From a political perspective, among both Palestinians and Israelis there are those who want peace in the form of a two state solution; there are those who want peace in the form of a single, democratic and pluralistic state, there are those who see one as a precursor to the other and there are those who just want the destruction of Israel. Israelis (even those in favor of a peace settlement) tend to see a single-state solution as being a form of demographic destruction of the Jewish State.

Generally speaking, extreme and violent sentiments are very widespread in West Bank culture – and even more so in Gaza. This is consciously cultivated by radical groups, who engage in active propaganda and even brainwashing – for example, having kindergarten graduations where children dress up in fake suicide bomb-vests and dip their hands into red paint to simulate Israeli blood (this author has seen the actual videos and photographs from these Hamas-sponsored preschool ‘graduations’). As with other Arab societies, in the West Bank and Gaza, there is a lot of pressure for women to conform in dress and behavior – for cultural/familial reasons as well as religious ones. This pressure on women also tends to stifle them as independent actors that would speak out against radicalization and violence.

### Spread of Intolerance and Hatred

To some degree, radical Islam arose as a part of a backlash against the globalization of modern culture and morality. Even very religious Muslims are exposed to Western pop-culture through television and print media and this creates both a fascination as well as a repulsion in regards to modernity (or at least their view of it).

Exposure to media (cable TV, cell/camera phones, Internet) has brought modernity very quickly into the Middle East. Because the aspects of modern culture that have the resources to spread to other nations are often the most commercialized (think Hollywood and Coca Cola), this gives a rather one-sided view of the West in the eyes of these nations. While countries like Egypt and Jordan have pockets of westernized culture (Western Jordan for example) but these pockets do not represent the mainstream. Most of large Islamic countries in the Middle East are very traditional and being exposed to Westernization in its most commercialized form created a very strong negative reaction that increased religiosity, increased anti-Western sentiments and at times played into the hands of Islamist extremists – who warn about the effect of Western morality on traditional Islamic societies and families. Extremists paint a picture of the U.S. as weak and corrupt – and fundamentalism as the antidote to the encroachment of Western sinfulness. Muslims in the Middle East are exposed to Western culture at the same time as they lack a sense of their own identity – both culturally and religiously – so fundamentalist and radical forms of Islam are presented as the only viable alternative to Westernization. Part of the surge in fundamentalism is out of a desire to construct a cohesive, strong and modern sense of identity that is missing. While many people own computers in countries like Egypt and Jordan, they use them mainly for email and chat, rather than to increase their knowledge base. Others use them for self-indoctrination. As mentioned before, the Internet has become a very potent force for those wishing to spread radical Islamist ideas.

The poorer classes are especially vulnerable to extremism – due to education with unemployment (people are educated but then subsequently lack job opportunities),

exposure to fundamentalism, hatred of the West, hate for their governments, lack of Islamic knowledge, lack of exposure to ideas in general etc. Polls that show 20% support for Islamists (such as the Muslim Brotherhood) in the population may actually be underreporting because Islamist/fundamentalist attitudes may be much higher than official support.

While there is much sympathy for anti-American sentiments as well as condoning of terrorist violence throughout the Middle East (particularly against Israeli civilians), there are more outright Jihadists in countries like Algeria, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan than there are in Egypt and Jordan (due to government crackdowns). Governments rely on the use of secret police and surveillance to crack down on radicalism, rather than modernizing, democratizing and opening up the general culture.

Islamist extremists play on and create a sense of threat to identity rather than actual promises to improve day-to-day life. This is particularly true in regards to al-Qaeda – but less so in regards to Hamas, Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood – all of whom have consciously cultivated a social-service arm to present to the public.

Anyone who tries to modify or speak out against a strict Sharia code or intolerant attitudes is labeled as being heretical and against Islam. In this manner, those who might have represented a middle-of-the-road approach to Islam are intimidated into joining with the fundamentalist ‘mainstream’. Even those who are completely non-religious will take on the outer appearance of religiosity in order to escape rebuke. This is particularly true with women – often at the order/behest of their families.

Extremism in the culture arises out of a feeling of frustration and helplessness – this is particularly true in Palestine (though this is manipulated and used by

Radical/Islamist Groups). Extremist/violent beliefs are very widespread in Palestinian culture – in all areas, though more intensely in the Gaza Strip (due to both the Hamas takeover as well as the generally poor living conditions).

Politics entering into religious sphere tends to twist the religious texts and stifle growth. This is done by people who use the religion to exploit societal weakness and gain power. Poverty, lack of opportunity, powerlessness and resentment over local issues are societal weaknesses that tend to lead to support for radical groups promising solutions. The killing of Muslims by foreign forces also leads to anger that promotes radicalism.

#### Middle Eastern and Islamic Attitudes Towards Sexuality and Gender and Its Influence on Radicalism and Fundamentalism

Generally, women exert a moderating force on extremism when they are able to have an influence. Families where women are able to be a guiding factor in their children's upbringing are families where extremism is less likely to take hold – as the women want their children to succeed as a part of society in a positive way rather than joining with radical groups that may lead them into danger or death. Women who are educated are also more likely to insist on the education of their children, which is also a deterrent to radicalism (particularly when it brings about more well-rounded thinking or creates economic opportunity). When women are intimidated or suppressed by fundamentalist and radical beliefs, it silences one of the more potent sources of moderation that might exist in Islamic societies. For this reason it is instructive to examine the position of women as well as attitudes towards sexuality (which go along with attitudes towards women, as women are often portrayed as the bearers of sexual

temptation) in Islamic societies, as negativity towards women often goes along with a lack of moderation in general.

There is a pervasive sense of hostility towards and subordination of women in Middle Eastern cultures. Women tend to be seen as property or objects rather than as autonomous individuals – they are the acted upon rather than the actors in the society. Partially this is simply because many men in the culture have not had the chance to interact with women and therefore have not been able to humanize them and learn to respect them. Women in Middle Eastern culture tend to rely on their fathers and husbands for opinions. Women are unaware of what their rights are even in Islam – as this is not an aspect of Islam that is emphasized by those following a fundamentalist path. An increase of fundamentalist Islam in the society has been accompanied by an increase in negative attitudes towards women. Women are not openly pushing for change in negative attitudes and practices – they tend to try to achieve goals in more subtle ways (perhaps out of a sense of lack of power or fear of backlash). Women's rights to inheritance, choice in marriage, divorce and custody are also places where fundamentalist practices are accepted as the norm – resulting in a lack of basic rights (in some places even the right to drive, travel or vote) for women.

There is a tremendous amount of pressure placed upon women in Islamic societies to conform to religious norms in dress and behavior. The presence of women in the workforce is increasing – which is also tending to reinforce religious mores of dress and behavior as a counterbalance. This has been manifested in recent decades by the increase in women putting on the veil and religious outer garments. Women in the culture put on the veil not because they want to do it, or out of 'general religious trends' but because of

pressure – from their families, and from religious groups. The Muslim Brotherhood has waged a careful multifaceted campaign for about the last 14 years to influence women to put on the veil and for their families to insist on it. Wearing the veil is not an indication of religiosity, and also men who are quite non-religious will insist that their wives, girlfriends, etc put on the veil or even chador. Wearing the veil and dressing conservatively is a way that a Muslim family establishes and keeps its reputation.

Attitudes towards women often go along with attitudes towards sexuality in general (as mentioned above, women are seen as the bearers of sexual temptation). A large number of single men and women in Middle Eastern culture are not married and not having sex. This is often because a lack of employment or economic opportunities makes them undesirable as marriage prospects. This large number of unmarried and solitary young people contributes to both a sense of frustration as well as hostility towards the opposite sex (especially males towards females). Aside from the religious strictures on unmarried sexual activity, one cannot even easily meet people for sex, or even pay for sex – as there is nowhere to go to do so. People live with their families and hotels do not allow unmarried couples in. In the more modernized parts of society (in Western Jordan for example) girls will have oral or anal sex to keep their virginity, or have hymenoplasties. Safe sex is rarely practiced. Sexuality is kept hidden to the extent that it is even able to be practiced – and there is a lot of fear attached to it (especially by females) who can be ostracized or condemned if sexual activity comes to light. Frustration and confusion are increased by exposure to a Hollywood version of sexuality.

In addition to this, because of the high premium that is placed on males being the clearly dominant members of society, sexuality in the culture tends to have a predatory or

ownership attitude attached to it – with females being pursued and ‘acquired’ in the manner of possessions of the male. This has been magnified by fundamentalist preaching that spread negative attitudes towards both sexuality as well as females. Due to widespread attitudes of negativity and feelings of superiority, women in Middle Eastern culture are often harassed on the street – even when veiled. Harassment of women is not due to sexual frustration – it is just an accepted part of the culture. Women tend to ignore harassment or show fear, which encourages it to continue.

One of the more extreme manifestations of the desire to suppress and control women (in this case the suppression of female sexuality and the spread of fears of female misconduct) is the practice of female genital mutilation (FGM). Radicals are pushing to keep the practice of female genital mutilation in the culture (and in Egypt it is still quite widespread) even though it is decreasing due to pushes by civic organizations and governments – it exists as an ‘undercover abuse of women’. This practice is not presented to women as a choice – it is seen as a mandatory practice in the societies within which it is widespread.

Another manifestation of the suppression and intimidation of women is the practice of forced marriage – where women are married against their will to men who are often much older than they are – often the women are minors. The most extreme form of intimidation of women is the practice of stonings and honor killings. This may be practiced by families (in the case of honor killings – which take place in both the Middle East as well as the West) and by governments (in the case of stonings – which may be imposed for ‘crimes’ such as ‘immorality’ or even rape). In fundamentalist Islamic societies in both the Middle East as well as the West, stepping out of the norm in any



manner for a woman (or girl) can have deadly consequences. Unfortunately, even in the West, there is often a blind eye turned towards crimes carried out against women.

When there is tolerance and freedom granted to women – and their basic human rights are respected, there is often a corresponding respect for the rights of people in general. Where women are suppressed, intimidated and controlled, this is usually a barometer of what is taking place in the society as a whole. The treatment of women and freedom for women is a clear and simple way to gauge the level of moderation versus extremism in a society.

### Hostility, Fear, and Hatred of the West as a Correlate to and a Motivator of Radicalism

While hatred and/or resentment towards the West predates Islamic radicalism, nonetheless, it has been successfully used as a motivator to inflame extremism. The end of the Cold War and the establishment of the U.S. as the world's primary superpower intensified negative feelings towards the U.S. Feelings of political powerlessness are stronger than a resentment of Western culture. Therefore, the more powerful the West appears, the more it is resented. The position of the U.S. as the sole political superpower was then capitalized on by radicals to increase feelings of the West as a threat to Muslims. There tend to be more positive attitudes towards Western societies than Western governments (especially the U.S.). For this reason, when radicals want to inflame emotion, they often focus on the attitudes and actions of the U.S. government (accusing it of being anti-Islamic or anti-Muslim).

There is strong resentment towards the U.S. for its support of non-democratic, repressive and corrupt governments in the Middle East. This is seen as hypocritical, given

that the U.S. supposedly desires democracy and human rights in the region. It is thought that without U.S. support, regional governments would be forced to listen to the will of the people and become more democratic and responsive/responsible. So the more that Middle Eastern populations resent their leaders and governments, the more they resent the West, which is seen as being key to their survival.

U.S. policies in the region are seen as self-serving, and a continuation of colonialist exploitation and manipulation. Specifically, the U.S. is highly resented for its interference in the affairs of Middle Eastern countries – currently most seen in the case of Iraq. The U.S. is also seen as favorably biased towards Israel and against the Palestinian people, which is greatly resented, especially in countries with high numbers of Palestinians living in them, such as Jordan. The U.S. is seen as hypocritical for supporting groups at one time, and then labeling them as terrorist when they no longer serve U.S. needs (such as the case of the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan).

There are many conspiracy theories regarding the West that are widely believed in the Middle East. The preponderance of anti-Western conspiracy theories in the Middle East is seen as a sign of the low level of education, discourse and critical thinking in the region, as well as the absence of accurate and open sources of information – including a lack of transparency in government. Middle Eastern governments also do little to stem the tide of anti-Western propaganda that is spread in (often state-controlled) schools, mosques and media. This becomes the subtext for these societies, which leave their population very vulnerable to anti-Western radicalization – built on the perception that the U.S. and the West are evil and a threat to Muslims and Islam.

## The Inflammatory Role of Middle Eastern Media and the Role of the Internet in Spreading Radicalism

As mentioned previously, while many people in societies like Jordan and Egypt own computers, they are often used for email, chat and for religious study/indoctrination including radicalism. While some people use the Internet to increase their understanding of Islam and the current debates in Islam, for others, the Internet is a powerful format for radicalism and fundamentalism to spread – as is satellite television.

While extremist groups have been cracked down on in states like Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, nonetheless, Internet and satellite television have allowed people to self-indoctrinate with extremist, violent and intolerant religious messages. This allows the population to be vulnerable to an influx of extremism with the official state mechanisms powerless to stop it. This vulnerability exists in Western states as well. The communications revolution became an integral part of the spread of al-Qaeda and radicalism.

Satellite television and the Internet have also spread an awareness of Western liberal democracy and Western culture – which in some cases may contribute to an increase of radicalism and fundamentalism as a backlash. One example of this is how the use of cell-phones (especially camera phones) has begun breaking down some of the barriers between men and women in the culture - especially among the youth. In some countries this can have a deadly outcome (such as honor killing, or stoning), if a female is perceived as going outside of the bounds of what is considered proper.

There have been accusations that al-Jazeera deliberately and knowingly promotes extremism. Other television stations like al-Manar are fronts for radical groups (in that

case, Hezbollah). Stations like al-Jazeera, al-Arabiya and al-Manar contribute to radicalization by continuously playing coverage of the ‘crimes’ of Israel and the U.S. without providing a balanced viewpoint or contextual information. These stations also provide a soapbox for those spreading fundamentalist and extremist views (both political and religious). While they also provide information and various viewpoints, overall they tend to emphasize an anti-Western, anti-Israel, fundamentalist and sometimes extremist perspective.

### Fundamentalist and Extremist Leaders and Preachers and Their Role in Spreading Hatred and Violence

An extremist or fundamentalist is someone who wants to enforce Sharia law, particularly criminal Sharia law. An extremist justifies the killing of civilians and blames the West for Arab ills. Extremists and fundamentalists use the Koran and Islam to justify their viewpoints. According to one view, extremism comes from those desiring power twisting and interpreting religion to suit their purposes. These power seekers use outer issues to sway others to do what they want – be under their control. Others say that it is primarily the ideology – with the radical group serving as a function of the ideology and a vehicle for its spread. Some say that it is primarily motivated by sincere religiosity (to fulfill a divine command, to serve God) – not a desire for power, even by the leaders. Others say that it is an interplay between all three factors - religion, ideology and (desire for) power. Using the example of Bin-Laden and Zawahiri, one might say that they are motivated by (an extreme version of) religion, a violent ideology and desire for power. There are other extremists who do what they do just for fun and thrills – like professional terrorists – not at all religious, but who just enjoyed the role.

One cannot underestimate the role of the charismatic individual leader, teacher, preacher or organizer of a radical group – their vision, ideology and goals. For example, following the ideological path of teachers like ibn-Taymiya and Sayyid Qutb, Osama bin-Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri have as their goal to overthrow all Muslim leaders. They attacked the U.S. to undermine modern governments in the Middle East. So far the calculations of al-Qaeda and its leaders have not worked and they have no workable goals or political future – they are kind of stuck in a nihilistic corner. Nonetheless, their message has become the dominant voice among radicals – unlike the mentor of bin-Laden, Abdallah Azzam who just wanted to get non-Muslims out of Muslim lands (particularly Palestine, as he was Palestinian). One can therefore see the huge influence of specific ideologues, teachers and leaders.

While psychological profiles may be interesting, they are improvable – it is more clear just to listen to what individuals say and how they self-describe. While some try to find hidden motives behind the radical leaders, others say that to understand an individual leader, listen to what they say. Osama bin-Laden and Zawahiri speak mostly of religion, secondarily of politics. For this reason some call extremism primarily a religious ideology, that then became a strategy that became overwhelmed by nihilist tactics. Radicalization tends to be self-magnifying and self-reinforcing and self-multiplying – so what may have started out as sincere religiosity became distorted into something else.

The radical ideology does not translate well to broad-scale societal workability, as Most Muslims don't want to live under fundamentalist style rule. Once radicals take control of the instruments of state they tend to become very unpopular among the population – but by then it is often too late for the people to have any say in the matter.

Extremist leaders do not get people to follow them by command, out of simple fear or by reward, but rather by teaching and inspiring them – what has been called a ‘preceptor’ system. This does not lend itself to simple solutions as it is built on a base of loyalty and inspiration rather than coercion and fear. There is also the ‘self-indoctrination’ system that increasingly uses various media (primarily the internet) to spread the words of radical leaders and preachers to those who they would otherwise be exposed.

Outer circumstances (such as impoverishment or lack of opportunity), inner stress and a lack of a strong moral compass make youth vulnerable to recruitment by radicals. This is especially a problem with busy/absent parents and poor economic circumstances – such as in Palestine where economics is a big issue. Religion comes second to this. Unmarried boys/young men without wives, children or responsibilities are easier to influence. Children brought up by involved and guiding/supervising parents are less vulnerable. Youth who are given a firm parental education in the ethical aspects of Islam (honesty, equality, respect, tolerance, kindness) are less vulnerable to a twisted version of Islam.

In societies such as the West Bank and Gaza (and even in the EU and UK) sophisticated recruiters use grievances (legitimate and not legitimate) as manipulative tools to radicalize people. The issues are secondary to the recruitment, as the issues that are used are chosen and modified depending on the circumstance and setting of those that they wish to recruit. One can see this in that other societies that have grievances but not extremist recruiters don’t turn to radicalism. Specifically, the issues stated by bin-Laden grow and change – new ones are chosen (such as the war in Iraq) as old ones fade away

(such as army bases in Saudi Arabia). For this reason, while addressing issues may make recruitment harder, it will not deter the recruiters. Having said that, U.S. policies in the Muslim world make recruitment a lot easier.

### The Link Between Wahabi-Type Fundamentalism and Extremism

Wahabism is a type of Islam (widespread in the Gulf States, especially Saudi Arabia). It holds a belief that one can denounce and even act against one's fellow Muslims if they do not conform to its particular style of rigid practice. Non-Muslims can also be a target. It also believes in a society where rigid observance can be imposed by coercion and transgressions punished harshly. Western type rights such as freedom of speech, democratic governance and freedom of religion are not part of Wahabi beliefs.

Wahabism was denounced as heretical for many years by mainstream Islam. It was only with the founding of Saudi Arabia and the discovery of oil, that Wahabism was spread and accepted within Islam (helped by Saudi oil money and support). British alliance with the tribe of Saud (during WWI) also was a key factor in both the founding of Saudi Arabia as well as the spreading of Wahabism. Sending Wahabism abroad by the Saudis kept attention/criticism away from the regime, and was a bulwark against Iranian/Shiite expansionism.

The term Salafi ('root' or 'fundamental' Islam) is also used interchangeably with the term Wahabi. While there may have been a conceptual difference between Salafism and Wahabism at one time (such as the early Salafists who were of a more modern bent, but were later overwhelmed by more fundamentalist Salafists) at this point any distinction between Salafism and Salafi-Jihadism is an artificial one. Currently, Wahabi/Salafi ideology is the foundation of modern terrorism. The Muslim Brotherhood

in Egypt became fueled by Wahabi ideology (with the assistance of the British who wanted to use the Muslim Brotherhood against Nasser). From this perspective, all of modern day terrorist ideologies are an outgrowth of Wahabism (though the groups themselves stem from the Muslim Brotherhood). Wahabism as an ideology depends on the existence of an enemy ‘other’.

Widespread ignorance of the tenets of traditional Islam allows Wahabism to thrive. The Wahabi practice of labeling other Muslims as ‘heretical’ (kafir) is against the tenets of traditional Islam – this is true in regards to labeling any monotheistic believers. By declaring someone as heretical, the Wahabis then justify any action against them. Wahabis consider even traditional Sunnis to be heretical, as well as Shiites and Sufis. Because of this view, the Wahabis and their Saudi allies have a history of brutality even towards their fellow Muslims. The ultimate Wahabi goal is the control of Sunnis worldwide.

While it is important to note that not every Islamic Wahabi fundamentalist is a terrorist or is violent – but most if not all of violent terrorists are basing their ideology on a Wahabi fundamentalist foundation – because of its legitimization of violence and coercive action towards Muslims and non-Muslims alike.

#### Educational and Religious Systems That Spread Hatred

Many terrorists, including the 9/11 hijackers were not secular and westernized – they were a product of the Saudi/Wahabi educational system that teaches intolerance and hatred of the West and other religions. This education in some cases was absorbed in other Middle Eastern and even Western countries, but originally exported from Saudi Arabia



Arab/Islamic educational systems throughout the Middle East (and increasingly in the West) teach intolerance, religious extremism, hatred and the condoning of violence. Student bodies in the Middle East have become overwhelmingly Islamist. It is not religious control of the educational system that is a problem, it is state control. Because of the Wahabi fundamentalist views regarding coercion and the permissibility of violence (along with virulent anti-Western, anti non-Muslim and anti-Israel views), the spreading of fundamentalism is as big a concern as outright radicalism. Particularly the fundamentalist education of children is a problem throughout the Arab world. This foundation makes children later very vulnerable to radical indoctrination.

Educational systems in the Arab world tend to have low standards generally, and do not teach critical thinking skills or expose to a variety of ideas. The (state controlled and sanctioned) educational texts are full of materials that teach intolerance towards other religions, disregard for human rights and negative attitudes towards women. Wahabi texts are being used in both formal and informal educational settings in the West. In addition to this, the lack of in-depth education in traditional Islam (in many cases much more tolerant and pluralist) leaves Muslims vulnerable to radicalization in both the Middle East as well as the West.

#### The Conflict Between Extremist and Moderate Perspectives in Islam

While some characterize this as a war between religions or civilizations, others say that the war is primarily a war within Islam that spills over into a war between religions, cultures or civilizations. From this perspective, it is a battle for the future of Islam being waged by its adherents – those who want moderation, plurality and tolerance, and those who want coercion, a single mode of observance and zero tolerance for others.

Because Islam is not a religion built on central authority or even precedence – so it can be interpreted at any time by anyone claiming authority to do so. For this reason, movements can rise up in Islam and then fade away. At the present time, fundamentalism and extremism is the dominant voice in Islam, particularly in the Arab world, but increasingly exported to the Islamic world in general.

There are currently fierce internal debates about the proper observance of Sharia law and these debates are causing huge rifts in Islamic society – especially in the Middle East. Muslims in the West are taking their cues regarding observance of Sharia from the Middle East. While many countries have structures for the observance of civil Sharia law, it is the observance of criminal Sharia law that entails beheading, stoning, lashing, amputations. Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and parts of Africa (Sudan, Somalia, parts of Nigeria) observe criminal Sharia law.

A major demarcation between moderates and non-moderates, fundamentalists or extremists is state-enforced Sharia. While the goal of the Islamists is to have a ‘Sharia state’ but they are not really prepared to either define this or to go about the actual business of running a state. Additionally, a ‘sharia state has never really existed before in Islamic history, as the state/ruler and religious establishments were generally separate entities. The Islamists have tended to idealize a particular part of Islamic history, despite the fact that it was just as chaotic as the rest of history and they don’t know that much about it.

There is an attitude among fundamentalists that Sharia is unchanging, but in actuality, the interpretation and implementation of Sharia law (fiqh) has always evolved with the times. Those that say that Sharia law needs to be imposed do not understand that

from the Islamic perspective, Sharia was supposed to be up to the free choice of the individual. One becomes a Muslim by professing belief (Shahada) and leaves Islam by professing non-belief. The degree of observance of Sharia does not make or unmake a Muslim. According to Islam there is no compulsion in religious observance (including Sharia). Traditionally, Islam says that God looks at the heart, not the externals (unlike the fundamentalists). Fundamentalism and Extremism is built on looking at (and demanding) the external obedience of its adherents.

There are Muslims calling for reforms in the interpretation/implementation of Sharia to bring it in line with modern needs/times in areas like marriage, inheritance, custody etc. In some societies and in some Islamic circles (for example Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey and Indonesia) this is already taking place.

There was a rationalist/reformist movement in Islam that predated the rise of Wahabism/Salafism, but it was drowned out by the fundamentalist voices – there are those that are trying to bring back the ideas of that movement. There is a desire among some reformers for a secular democratic state that does not oppose religion and is inspired by it (but does not impose it) – modeled after the U.S.A. Also Israel has optional civil Sharia courts that Muslims can use – a good model. Additionally there are many pro-female hadiths in the Koran that are not being widely publicized. Nonetheless, at this time the loudest voices still belong to the fundamentalists and the jihadists.

Criminal Sharia law (huddud) - practiced in a few countries - actually predates the Koran and the Koran does not mandate the use of these practices. Sharia law (actually fiqh) can evolve and be modified to fit with the need of the times. There are those who insist that ‘true Islam’ is a moderate religion that respects all. These people say that Islam

does not need a reform, but rather a return to traditional tolerance and pluralism.

There is currently a struggle among moderates regarding the right of Israel to exist and solutions to the Israel/Palestine issue.

Even among moderate Muslims, there is a strong negative feeling towards the U.S. government and towards Israel. Despite this, moderates tend to draw criticism from more extremist Muslims – speaking out in the Muslim world can be costly. At the same time, moderates can come under criticism, scrutiny and suspicion from non- Moderates who speak out against a strict Sharia code or intolerant attitudes are labeled as being heretical and against Islam – which has the effect of silencing dissent.

Moderates may also feel afraid to speak out because of fear of scrutiny or reprisal from the governments of their home countries. The first victims of radicalism are moderate Muslims (especially women), because wherever radicals gain power, human rights are lost. Moderates in the Arab world are isolated from one another – unlike the extremists and fundamentalists that have clear unifying ideologies and are organized and united. It is problematic for moderates if they are perceived as being too close to the West or speak in completely Westernized language. Those who have nuanced views that deviate from the religious party line feel afraid to express them in public.

#### Conclusion to the Research Findings

While it may be tempting to see radicalism and terrorism as a few bad people armed with a bomb or other weapon – and the most direct way to address the problem is to find the bad people and kill or capture them – or sufficiently fortify and defend the home front - this approach has real limitations. While the simplicity of this approach is appealing, the effectiveness is short-lived, if effective at all. Terrorism is actually the

extreme manifestation of a much more complex system. This system is composed of repressed and insular societies that have been conditioned by long-term ideological and political messages, low-level recruits and perpetrators that arise out of these societies and the radical groups that operate within them; higher level group leaders and organizers that both believe in as well as cynically use religious and political ideologies; religious/political indoctrinators that may or may not be directly associated with the radical groups; indoctrination systems such as educational systems, training systems and internet/media forms of recruitment/indoctrination; societal supporters (giving money, morale, materials and materiel, motivation, etc.) as well as both active and passive state sponsors and the larger regional political systems in which they function. Lastly there are the Western governments and societies that are also a part of the system because of acts of both commission (economic ties, weak or absent policies, support of groups or leaders that meet short-term needs, policy decisions that exacerbate tension and hatred, etc.) as well as omission (absent will, fear of political backlash from opposing parties, lack of knowledge, lack of attention, misguided understanding, etc.).

The purpose of the present research is certainly not to condone or explain away the purposeful killing of innocents or the extremist hatred from which these actions arise. Rather it is to take the focus off the method and onto the causes and motivations, where meaningful discussion and strategic longer-term planning can take place.

This research has sought to understand in some small way why it is that people turn to extremism, radicalism and terrorism (or support it in many ways large and small, explicit and tacit), why are they drawn to seek out an enemy - to seek to wage war by whatever means - to strike out. When looked at from this perspective, the causes and

contributing factors are many: Educated men and women without any power or meaningful freedoms in the society they live in, who seek meaning in the most radical brand of Islam – or even those who remain secular, but find meaning in striking out at those they believe (and have been told) are responsible for the stagnation of their countries and cultures. Children raised in poverty and educated to hate and destroy – to equate their religion with revenge and death. Organizers who represent to their followers all the pride and glory that has been lost. Mid-level leaders who instigate and encourage, while simultaneously undermining any real reforms. State sponsors who covertly assist, passively facilitate and knowingly look the other way. Religious clerics who are afraid or unwilling to speak out. A religion greatly in need of modern/moderate articulation. Large pockets of wealthy supporters on an international scale. Observer nations who are too willing to overlook problems far away from them until they become a target.

We as a nation must understand that to defeat terrorism we must examine it at its roots. We must look at all the parties (including ourselves) that enable terrorism to exist – by commission, omission, fear and apathy. We need to stop taking refuge in a simple condemnation of violence that begs any closer examination. Our approach needs to be active, not just reactive – and one that takes a long-term large-picture approach to a complex issue that has as many solutions as it has facets to the problem. The final chapter will look at some of those policy solutions (or better – policy approaches) that take a complex, large-system approach to the phenomenon of extremism, radicalism and terrorism.

## CHAPTER V

### DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

#### Introduction

The previous chapter drew upon the interview data to provide depth and nuance to identify and define the many elements that make up the system that has given rise to Islamist fundamentalism, extremism, radicalism and terrorism. The purpose of this chapter is to review the research questions raised at the beginning of this work and to explore how the use of a systems framework may offer a fuller and richer understanding of the interconnectedness of the elements of extremism, radicalism, and terrorism.

#### A Systems Perspective on Terrorism

This system includes Middle Eastern states; which in the past have been quite active in funding and spreading Islamist fundamentalism, extremism, radicalism, and terrorism. While Middle Eastern states claim to pursue and prosecute extremists, this may refer only to those who oppose their regimes (including moderates and political opposition figures) – allowing the spread of hatred and intolerance to continue unabated. While the epicenter of active terrorist planning and operations has moved to areas far from these states and across the globe, nonetheless they remain the place from which intolerant, hateful, and radical Islamism originated and from which it still in large part still comes. These states also use religious fundamentalism to control the population and repress political activism. The regimes hold on to power and continue corrupt,

incompetent and sometimes abusive practices. The populations of these states are kept in a state where they find it hard to advance economically – and for many the standard of living is quite low. The people lack political power and continually feel at the mercy of the police, local government figures, security services, intelligence apparatus, and judicial systems. The states also exert control over media, schools, and mosques – stifling the free flow of ideas and information and helping to spread anti-West, anti-non-Muslim, anti-female, anti-Shiite, and anti-Israel attitudes.

With the tolerance and even support of the states, fundamentalist, extremist, and radical groups operate and spread their ideologies within Middle Eastern societies. Because the states do not allow or promote the free flow of information and ideas, the fundamentalist, radical, and extremist groups are able to dominate the cultural and religious discourse. The most radical and/or violent sections of these groups have been driven underground – where they recruit those willing to become trained to carry out attacks – often sending them out of the country to join terrorist groups or violent insurgencies across the globe. Outward elements of these groups may preach a more peaceful and pro-democratic position, while those elements that are more militant and anti-democratic are the power-holders and determine the real agenda for the group. These groups spread hatred towards non-group members (Muslims included) and the subjugation and mistreatment of women. They intimidate and punish those that do not conform to their standards and discredit those with more moderate views. Members of these groups impose their religious views on the population and actively campaign to have the population adhere to their fundamentalist standards of religious observance.



The societies within these states are deeply affected by the combined efforts of the states and the fundamentalist, extremist, and radical groups. The people within these societies feel helpless and disempowered regarding the political process. They are intimidated by the corrupt and abusive practices of the regime. Their economic prospects are not hopeful and their standard of living is low. While they may obtain an education, they have very high rates of unemployment. Women are highly repressed, harassed, and intimidated and moderates do not speak out freely. Economic privation and high rates of unemployment also create a large class of young males whose marriage prospects are not good and who have little access to females for companionship or socialization. This reinforces hostility towards females, a sense of social isolation and hopelessness and therefore a vulnerability to radical recruitment.

Western states also play a part. They support the regimes that allow and carry out repression and intolerance. The West is the largest provider of wealth to these regimes – making it unnecessary for them to progress or modernize in significant ways. The West also permits these regimes to spread (both directly as well as by way of fundamentalist, extremist, and radical groups) hateful, intolerant, anti-democratic, and anti-Western ideas within the Islamic societies of the West. This may take place in mosques, schools, campus groups, political advocacy organizations, prison ministries, etc. Western states do not make demands (or give assistance) to the extent that would create real change within the Middle East and they do not speak out forcefully enough regarding the encroachment on their own societies.

The present exploratory study sought to take an in-depth look at the larger system within which fundamentalist, extremist, and radical Islamism and terrorism proliferate –

looking also at the ways that moderation is both supported and repressed. It sought to explore what were the implications of a systems approach to policy within the system. It also sought to give some recommendations on policy from both a general as well as a specific perspective.

The four questions that this research sought to address were:

- 1) What are the various elements of the system within which fundamentalism, extremism, radicalism and terrorism grow?
- 2) What are the interrelationships between the various elements within the system?
- 3) What are the policy implications that arise from a systems approach both in general as well as specific recommendations?
- 4) What trends are evolving within the system?

#### System Elements

During the course of the research the following system elements (each with its own issues regarding radicalism, fundamentalism, extremism, and terrorism) emerged:

- 1) Radical Groups
- 2) Middle Eastern States
- 3) Western States (U.S., European Union, United Kingdom)
- 4) Middle Eastern and Islamic Societies

#### *Radical Groups*

According to the interview data, radical groups have become simultaneously more decentralized; more localized (in the case of 'franchise groups) and yet can still operate as top-down hierarchies. Additionally, radical groups tend to blur their radicalism by

either presenting a more moderate face to the public or by having political/social service elements that obscure more violent activities. Radical groups also present a religious face to obscure their ambition to obtain power and control. Radical groups opportunistically feed off of local grievances and are able to find new issues as old ones are resolved. This is particularly significant when it comes to the ability of Palestinian groups (particularly Hamas) to delegitimize and undermine the negotiation process with Israel, as well as the ability of radical groups to gain and maintain worldwide support from the difficulties in the lives of the Palestinian people – even as they work to undermine constructive progress. A further danger of radical groups is their ability to operate in democracies in covert ways – as has been seen in the European Union, United Kingdom, and the U.S. There is also the very real danger in the desire of radical groups to take over weak or failed states – which creates the possibility of co-opted states allowing radical groups to obtain mass-weapon capability.

#### *Middle Eastern States*

According to the interview data, one major issue is the involvement of states in allowing and even supporting an extremist brand of fundamentalism. This includes the Middle East states' involvement in the promotion, control, and imposition of religion, and also the subjugation of women. There is also the involvement of states in actively promoting/exporting extremist fundamentalism worldwide – including the spread of Islamism and fundamentalism to states outside the Middle East (such as European Union, United Kingdom, Africa, and Asia). States in the Middle East are also able to thrive from oil revenue without truly modernizing. There is a general lack of progress – including educational, technological, commercial, cultural, and structural progress. There is also the

poverty and near-poverty of Middle East populations – in part due to corruption and in part due to this lack of modernization. There is the dilemma of states democratizing yet fearing the instability that this might bring. Middle Eastern states also actively repress democracy and opposition voices and justify it as maintaining stability. There is the rampant corruption and incompetence of Middle East governments, as well as outright human rights abuses. Due to the repression of ideas and information, there is strong support for Islamism in Middle East states – and a corresponding lack of other opposing voices. Middle Eastern states suffer from internal instability, which is used to justify repression. Middle East states collude with Islamist groups in creating hatred of the West (due to promulgating anti-Western ideology)

#### *The United States*

According to the interview data, the United States has played a part in the growth of fundamentalism, extremism, radicalism, and terrorism in that U.S. foreign policies (both intentional and unintentional) create hatred of the U.S. government. Western oil purchases fund autocratic states and extremist activities. U.S. support of Middle Eastern regimes is also seen as an obstacle to progress and creates animosity. The U.S. is vulnerable to the influence of radical groups and fundamentalists, particularly within the U.S. Muslim community, when Islamic states fund the advocacy of extremist causes in the U.S. Also, the U.S. in the past and to some degree also in the present has utilized a strategy of support of one radical group to fight another – a strategy that has often backfired. In addition, there is the lack of decisive policy regarding standing up to extremism both within the U.S., as well as overseas.

### *The European Union and the United Kingdom*

According to the interview data, much as has happened in the U.S., Islamic states also fund programs and advocacy for extremist influences in the European Union and the United Kingdom. This has helped fundamentalist, extremist, and radical groups gain a foothold within the European Union and the United Kingdom – even influencing the mainstream political establishment. The European Union and the United Kingdom are seen as vulnerable to encroachment by those wanting to impose Sharia limits on the larger society. There is also the phenomenon of fundamentalist, extremist, and radical groups within the European Union and the United Kingdom influencing Islamic society, particularly within the poorly integrated and lower class immigrant society. Youths within these communities become recruited to radicalism – and then cause widespread unrest as well. These immigrant Islamic societies are also able to operate independently of the larger social and legal systems – carrying out abuses towards women, moderates, and those that do not conform. There is the perception of a lack of decisive policies to address the spread of extremism within the European Union and the United Kingdom. There is also a lack of a strong outspoken network of moderate Muslims – perhaps due to intimidation within the Muslim community.

### *Middle Eastern and Islamic Societies*

According to the interview data, economic disparity in the Middle Eastern societies (compared to the West, as well as compared to Middle Eastern elites) fuels anger and extremism within the population. There is also a lack of ability to speak openly and without fear in the Middle East, which creates resentment for governments and sympathy for fundamentalist, extremist, and radical groups. Because of government

repression and lack of modernization, there is a void of cultural, intellectual and technological/scientific sophistication in Middle Eastern societies. Within the society there is a general increase in religiosity being co-opted and promulgated by fundamentalists for societal control – which is helped by the states colluding and assisting in this control. Fundamentalist, extremist, and radical groups have also helped to create a feeling of assault at the influx of Western culture. There is a backlash created by the influx of modernity – which used by fundamentalists to stoke religiosity and hatred of the West within the society, as well. Groups also take advantage of societal weaknesses, prejudices, resentments and ignorance to spread radicalism. Media within the Middle East also tends to inflame political hatred, conspiracy theories, and religious intolerance in the region. Due to rigid fundamentalism there is a high degree of sexual frustration in the population. Sexual frustration is also exacerbated by Western sexual images. Because of gender attitudes, sexuality tends to have a predatory or ownership quality. Related to this is the view of women as bearers of sexual temptation. There is widespread hostility and harassment against women in the culture – fueled by fundamentalist ideology. Women's rights are violated in various ways – honor killings, veiling, genital mutilation, forced marriages, punishment of rape victims, stonings, etc.

#### *Interrelationships Among Elements Within the System*

As our review of the principles of a systems framework in Chapter II taught us, elements within a system do not operate in isolation from one another – they are interrelated. One way of understanding the interrelationships would be to organize the above elements into three strata: The State (both Muslim and Western), The Group (speaking in this case of fundamentalist, extremist, radical, and terrorist groups), and the

Society (referring to Middle Eastern and Islamic societies). The following emerged according to the interview data, and shows some of the ways that these elements are interconnected and relate to one another:

*Western States and Their Allies – Including Israel*

1) Tolerance for fundamentalist, extremist, and even covertly radical groups that operate within democratic/Western societies (the interconnection to non-Western states, societies in both Middle East and West and fundamentalist, extremist, and radical groups is because this tolerance allows these groups to operate, disseminate, and recruit within Western societies, as well as sending a message of tolerance and weakness to groups, societies and states in the Middle East).

2) Missteps, policy abuses, and gaps on the part of the West and Israel (the interconnection with non-Western states, societies in both Middle East and West and fundamentalist, extremist, and radical groups is because these missteps, gaps, and abuses give validation and support to extremist views and actions on the part of states and groups in the Middle East, as well as giving reasons for lack of progress on the part of states).

3) Willingness of Western states to tolerate or not speak out against intimidation, repression and abuse of women, dissidents, moderates within both Western and Middle Eastern societies (the interconnection with non-Western states, societies in both Middle East and West and fundamentalist, extremist and radical groups is because this willingness and toleration allows these practices to continue with near impunity in the West and a lack of censure or pressure to change in the Middle East. It also reinforces the fear and silence of women, dissidents and moderates).

4) Allowance of safe-havens and training areas for terrorist groups (the interconnection with non-Western states, societies in both Middle East and West and fundamentalist, extremist and radical groups is because this allowance which may be justified by reference to the need for 'sensitivity' in foreign policy – such as in Pakistan) allows groups to grow and plan attacks, as well as taking over or controlling weak, unstable or failing states – such as Lebanon, Somalia, etc.

5) States allowing the Israel/Palestinian conflict to be used as justification for terrorism and extremism (the interconnection with non-Western states, societies in both Middle East and West and fundamentalist, extremist, and radical groups is because this justification allows the states, groups and societies to use this as a continuing pretext for not taking responsibility for their own actions)

6) Western oil money supporting states that then support fundamentalist, extremist and radical groups (the interconnection with non-Western states, societies in both Middle East and West and fundamentalist, extremist and radical groups is because these states and by extension the groups would not be able to survive in their present state without the huge influx of oil wealth that allows them to hold power without responding to the needs of the people. The need for oil also constrains the foreign policy of Western states).

7) Western tolerance for hateful, discriminatory and intolerant ideas (as well as repression of ideas and information) in both Middle East and West – including the tolerance for complete access by the Middle East to the West with a corresponding lack of access to the Middle East by organizations, religious institutions, information and ideas (the interconnection with non-Western states, societies in both Middle East and



West and fundamentalist, extremist and radical groups is because this tolerance allows fundamentalist, extremist and radical ideas to be spread within the West, without free ideas, culture and information being spread by the West within the Middle East)

*The Islamic (Non-Democratic) State*

1) Suppresses and/or punishes dissidents, moderates, writers and journalists (the interconnection with fundamentalist/extremist/radical groups is because this suppression of moderates is aided, assisted and carried out by fundamentalists and extremists who also gain from the suppression of free speech).

2) Suppresses and/or punishes those who represent political opposition (the interconnection with fundamentalist/extremist/radical groups is because this suppression and/or punishment is aided, assisted and carried out by fundamentalists and extremists who also gain from the suppression of opposition voices)

3) Suppresses, intimidates and punishes women (the interconnection with fundamentalist/extremist/radical groups is because this suppression is aided, assisted, and carried out by fundamentalists and extremists who also gain from the suppression of women – who might undermine their authority, threaten their religiosity, and support moderation in both family and society).

4) Holds onto power in a non-democratic manner (the interconnection with fundamentalist/extremist/radical groups is because this holding onto power gives sympathy and support to the fundamentalist and extremist groups that oppose the regimes as well as stokes hatred against the West that supports the regimes).

5) Restricts ideas and information – including suppression of free speech/media, and control of mosque and schools (the interconnection with fundamentalist/

extremist/radical groups is that the restriction allows tolerant and diverse ideas to be scarce as well as stifling the growth of critical thinking – also allows the fundamentalists/extremists to control the discourse).

6) Carries out and tolerates violence and human rights abuses (the interconnection with fundamentalist/extremist/radical groups is that the violence and abuses allow the radical, fundamentalist and extremist groups to operate in the same manner – often with the approval and support of the regimes who look to the groups for religious legitimacy – or the converse - creates support for the groups who speak out against the abuses of the state).

7) Disempowers the population (the interconnection with fundamentalist/extremist/radical groups is that the disempowerment of the population makes the population then look to the radical and fundamentalist groups for a feeling of power).

8) Supports a perception of fear and threat from the West and/or non-Muslims (the interconnection with fundamentalist/extremist/radical groups is that this perception of threat is echoed and magnified by extremist/fundamentalist propaganda).

9) Encourages, tolerates and/or supports fundamentalism and/or extremism (the interconnection with fundamentalist/extremist/radical groups is that the encouragement and support gives fundamentalist/extremist groups freedom to operate and even support from the state – as long as they do not actually threaten the state regime).

10) Carries out violent crackdowns on those whose extremism threatens the state (the interconnection with fundamentalist/extremist/radical groups is that the violence on the part of the state encourages and inflames radicalism and extremism on behalf of both the group, its members and those in the population that support it).

11) Supports and/or tolerates the spread of hatred, discrimination and intolerance (the interconnection with fundamentalist/extremist/radical groups is that the support and tolerance allows the fundamentalists, extremists and radicals to do likewise without fear of censure by the state).

12) Carries out and/or tolerates religious coercion (the interconnection with fundamentalist/extremist/radical groups is that the state religious coercion validates the religious coercion of the groups and societies as well as echoing their religious views).

13) Is corrupt, non-transparent and incompetent (the interconnection with fundamentalist/extremist/radical groups is that the corruption creates and validates the support for the groups who speak out against the corruption and incompetence of the state).

#### *The Fundamentalist/Radical/Extremist Group*

1) Radical groups that blur their radicalism by presenting a more moderate face to the public (the interconnection with actions by states is that this deception is facilitated by the tolerance of state governments/regimes).

2) Radical groups having political/religious/social service elements that obscure more violent activities (the interconnection with actions by states is that this social service image is facilitated by the tolerance and/or support of states).

3) Radical groups that feed off of local grievances, and are able to find new issues as old issues are resolved (the interconnection with actions by states is that this use of local grievances is supported by states and matched by like propaganda from states).

4) Radical groups having the ultimate goal of the imposition of Sharia and the recreation of an Islamist Caliphate – along with the destruction of the West (the

interconnection with actions by state is that this goal of the groups is tolerated and supported by states as long as the group does not directly threaten the state regime).

5) Violent crackdown by non-democratic governments strengthening radical groups, while further suppressing democracy (the interconnection with actions by states is that this crackdown also serves as a part of the suppression of democracy).

6) The ambivalence of governments regarding Islamist groups operating in the political process (the interconnection with actions by states is that this ambivalence allows Islamist extremism that does not openly threaten the state regime).

7) The ability of radical/Islamist groups to have a disproportionate influence on the religious behavior of the population –along with co-opting religious discourse (the interconnection with actions by states is that this influence is with the tolerance, assistance and funding/support of states).

8) The lack of opposition voices other than the fundamentalist, radical and Islamist groups (the interconnection with actions by states is because opposition has been stifled and punished by states).

9) The degree of support within the population for radical, fundamentalist and Islamist groups (the interconnection with actions by states is because other voices have been suppressed by both groups and states).

10) The ability of radical groups to function in both a top down manner as well as a center of ideology and inspiration to far-flung members and admirers (the interconnection with actions by states is because this ability to be flexible and non-hierarchical/diffused is assisted by the support of states in spreading their reach outwards).

11) The ability of radical groups to use various forms of propaganda and mass-media to spread their message, recruit, indoctrinate, network and even partially train operatives (the interconnection with actions by state is because this propaganda is tolerated, allowed and even funded by states – as long as it is not a threat to the state regime).

12) The ability of radical groups to take advantage of unstable, weak and failed states to use as safe havens for training, planning and launching attacks (the interconnection with actions by states is because the existence of unstable, weak and failed states is because of weak and tyrannical regimes holding power and refusing to reform).

13) The ability of fundamentalist, extremist and radical groups to intimidate and indoctrinate the population as a whole (the interconnection with actions by states is because this intimidation and indoctrination is use to the states and therefore gains from the assistance and tolerance by states, as well as the refusal of states to allow a diversity of ideas, voices and information).

14) Radical groups being funded by states to wage proxy battles against West and Israel (the interconnection with actions by states is because this funding greatly strengthens these groups, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and others).

15) The ability of radical groups to gain support for their goals by exploiting the Palestinian/Israeli conflict while simultaneously blocking constructive progress (the interconnection with actions by states is because this support is assisted by states who also use the conflict to shore up support and deflect criticism outwards on a scapegoat issue).

16) The ability of extremist, fundamentalist and radical groups to co-opt the religious, ideological, political, and cultural discourse (the interconnection with actions by states is because this co-opting of the discourse is aided by states who stifle free speech, the flow of ideas, and the access to open information).

*Middle Eastern and Islamic Societies*

1) Are hostile towards moderates, dissidents and women (the interconnection with groups and states is because this hostility is aided, reinforced, and echoed by like actions on the part of both groups and states).

2) Intimidate moderates, dissidents and women (the interconnection with groups and states is because this intimidation is aided, reinforced, and echoed by like actions on the part of both groups and states).

3) Suppresses and punishes moderates, dissidents, and women (the interconnection with groups and states is because this suppression and punishment is aided, reinforced, and echoed by like actions on the part of both groups and states).

4) Is intimidated, repressed, suffers hostility and is punished for actions seen as moderate, dissident, non-conforming, or oppositional (the interconnection with groups and states is because these actions towards moderates and others is carried out by both groups and states as well as supporters within the population).

5) Hates, discriminates, and is intolerant of non-Muslims, non-fundamentalists, non-Sunni, and the West (the interconnection with groups and state is because this hatred is aided, reinforced, and echoed by like actions on the part of both groups and states).

6) Is ignorant, afraid, suspicious, angry (the interconnection with groups and states is because this fear and suspicion is created by both direct propaganda on the part

of both groups and states, as well as the suppression of free ideas, information and critical thinking by both groups and states).

7) Supports fundamentalism, extremism and radicalism – including violent radicalism (the interconnection with groups and states is because this support of extremism and violence is due to ideologies that are spread by both groups and states – as well as the suppression of moderate ideas).

8) Lacks hope or opportunity (the interconnection with groups and states is because this lack of hope or opportunity is due to the corruption, power and wealth hoarding, lack of real progress and incompetence of states which is used as a way to increase support for fundamentalist, extremist, and/or radical groups).

9) Spreads or supports fundamentalist, extremist, and/or radical religious, cultural and political ideologies (the interconnection with groups and states is because this spread is due to widespread propaganda by both groups and states as well as the suppression of viable alternative ideologies by both groups and states).

10) Is mistreated, abused or defrauded by state or group (the interconnection with groups and states is because this abuse is a reflection of abusive, non-transparent, incompetent, and corrupt states as well as abusive fundamentalist, extremist, and radical groups operating with or alongside of states).

11) Lacks access to the free flow of ideas, information, and critical thinking (the interconnection with groups and states is because this lack of access is due to the restriction of ideas, information, and critical thinking on the part of both groups and states).

12) Is single, unemployed, poor, unmarried, dissatisfied (the interconnection with groups and states is because this state of affairs is due to lack of economic, cultural and technological progress on the part of states, plus cultural restrictions on social expression and even marriage on the part of fundamentalist, extremist and radical groups – reinforced by ideologies that create restrictions on social expression and reinforce isolation).

This list offers an idea of the myriad ways that the subsystems interconnect and strengthen one another. It is important to note that not all of the above factors operate equally. Again – this has been an attempt to demonstrate how a system operates with all of the factors within the system connected with one another – creating, strengthening, weakening, and sustaining one another – as well as how a change within one aspect of a system can have a cascading effect upon the entire system. The interrelationships described above can also be seen in the related diagrams in the appendix (factors that strengthen extremism, repress moderation, etc).

#### General Policy Implications of a Systems Framework

One of the major implications of a systems framework approach to policy is an understanding that addressing one part of the system alone is insufficient. For this reason, the suggestions below will address many parts of the system. This approach reflects the understanding that the system operates in many ways at once, and addressing one aspect in isolation of others will not be effective. Another implication of a systems framework is the understanding that categories within a system are not discrete and absolute, but exist with many variables. This suggests that a simplistic ‘one size fits all’ approach to policy would not be effective and might even be counter-productive (such as treating policy



approaches to extremists, fundamentalists and radicals as if they were all the same – likewise for moderates, etc). A final implication of a systems framework to policy is the awareness of the negative ways in which policy can impact within a system – creating undesired and unforeseen effects within the system as a whole.

### *Specific Policy Implications of a Systems Framework*

Researchers have long identified the need for a different approach to counter-terrorism and counter-radicalism policy. Cronin (2004) called for “a comprehensive approach to understanding terrorism, an approach that would reach across conceptual, disciplinary, cultural and ideological divisions.” Roberts (2004) expressed a need for a new and fresh look at policy, including a fundamental rethinking of U.S. strategies – specifically the so called “grand strategies.” Others called for a long-term, big-picture approach to the issue (Alexander, 2000; Eikmeier, 2005) as well as a critique of U.S. over-reliance on military means (Chin, 2003). The point was made that classic counterinsurgency warfare includes economic, political and psychological measures integrated along with traditional military operations (Galula, 1964). They asserted that an approach that focuses only on capturing and killing insurgents and ignores the larger battle of ideas will be unsuccessful, because Islamist groups are not only military, but include political, social, cultural, and educational areas. Long-term strategy to counter violent and radical forms of Islam will not be military, but rather ideological - by challenging the misrepresentation and misinterpretation of the Koran – creating a powerful counter ideology (Gunaratna, 2002). There was also stated a need for a ‘hearts and minds’ strategy for use not with hard-core perpetrators, but among communities of supporters and potential recruits (Mockaitis, 2003; Richardson, 2006). Crenshaw (2004)

advocated a need to be flexible and adaptive – avoiding rigid, monolithic approaches. This also implies that the West needs to constantly be in touch with the trends and currents that create extremism (and the terrorism that is its most radical expression) as well as what creates and supports moderation.

From all of the above, it was concluded that a comprehensive look at the terrorism phenomenon that examines all of its aspects – for theoretical understanding as well as to inform policy - is greatly needed. The goal of the present research regarding the above was to look at the entire system that helps to create and sustain fundamentalism, radicalism, extremism, and terrorism – as well as suppress moderation. In this way, policy recommendations can be formulated that do not address only parts of the system (going after terrorists for example) but also address the larger system within which the phenomenon is found – in this case it means addressing the group, state, societal and individual levels of the system with a wider range of policies that are used in combination and coordination with one another. The goal is that the entire system be addressed, so that all of the factors that create, sustain and grow extremism are targeted, as well as policies that help to encourage moderation. At the same time, policy approaches need (as mentioned above) to be cautious as much as possible to avoid unforeseen negative side-effects that might unfold within the larger system.

With this approach in mind, the following policy suggestions are made. As was stated above, the approach cannot rely on military (or even law-enforcement) alone, but must address the ideological, religious, cultural, economic, governmental and other aspects of the system. The following recommendations will be subdivided into approaches targeting the group, state and society.

### *Policies Addressing the Level of the Group*

Since 9/11 various researchers and analysts have stated that radical groups like al-Qaeda are no longer centralized and have been unable to operate as they did prior to post-9/11 crackdowns. Regarding al-Qaeda, for example, there tends to be a certain level of disagreement within the community of counterterrorism policymakers and researchers concerning the current strength, structural intactness and operating ability of the group. Nevertheless, the consensus seems to be that it is necessary to operate and create policy that sees and treats al-Qaeda as a rapidly regrouping and dangerously functional organization. This means assuming that al-Qaeda is currently setting up new training camps and bases of operations on the Pakistan/Afghanistan border. It means not placing the responsibility for going after those (possible) bases completely in the hands of the government of Pakistan. This entails a delicate balance, because being either too aggressive or too laissez faire has its downsides. If Pakistan is left to deal with the al-Qaeda threat, it lessens the chance of a backlash against the U.S. for intervening militarily in yet another Middle Eastern country. However, it also increases the chances that al-Qaeda operatives will escape capture. The U.S. military intervening increases the chances of successfully routing al-Qaeda bases, but (especially if it is against the will of the Pakistan government) risks provoking a major backlash – by militants in Pakistan as well as elsewhere. It seems that a prudent approach (other than definitely not underestimating al-Qaeda's resurgent capabilities) would include assisting Pakistan in formulating a strong response, and placing enough diplomatic pressure on the Pakistani government that it accepts an (albeit subordinate but nonetheless) strong U.S. role in that response. Symbolism is everything in a case like this – the battle is for legitimacy. If the

U.S. responds in a manner that is seen as illegitimate (by the Pakistani government or populace – or the greater Middle East) any gains may be lost in the long run.

Al-Qaeda's ability to coopt local groups and regional insurgencies is a definite concern. For this reason, it is important for local governments and other institutions (international NGOs, the U.S., etc) to do whatever they can to help resolve simmering local issues. At times this help may be material in nature (helping poverty stricken regions to become self-sufficient, mediating and finding solutions to conflicts) and at other times, where issues are more resistant to solutions, it may involve opening up dialogue between parties – so at least there is a sense of movement. While this is not a cure-all, and certainly not all local issues lend themselves to easy answers, neither can the international community pretend that some conflict or injustice far away will not be used to create more radicalism. One way that the U.S. could handle this would be to assist organizations whose purpose is to mediate and resolve conflict situations. Direct involvement by the U.S. government may carry risks of being perceived as an unwelcome intrusion – again giving excuses for radical recruitment.

This point logically brings us to the issue of grievances used by radical groups (al-Qaeda in particular). Groups including al-Qaeda have lists of grievances that they use to justify attacks against both Muslim and non-Muslim governments. While some of these grievances (the killing of Muslims in Bosnia, or the treatment of Palestinians for example) seem understandable, it is still true that as one issue is resolved (the withdrawal of American troops from Saudi Arabia), another issue that is just as major in the eyes of the group (the American invasion of Iraq) takes its place. While it may be tempting to say that the U.S. constantly finds new ways to mess up, this view does not take a deeper point

into account: A group like al-Qaeda is committed to the removal of Muslim rulers that are in their eyes illegitimate. They also have a stated desire to reinstate an Islamist caliphate within Muslim (or previously Muslim) countries. They have a stated goal to break the dominance of the U.S. and to assert Islamist dominance over the state of Israel.

Keeping this in mind, the grievances given by al-Qaeda are justifications for the pursuance of their larger goal – subjugation of the West, destruction of the current state of Israel, and assertion of their own dominance over all Muslim (or like Spain, previously Muslim) lands. Removal of the justifications will not remove the larger goals. For this reason, grievances are more useful if seen as recruitment tools. To the degree that the U.S., Middle Eastern states, and the international community can address grievances, it makes recruitment a little more difficult – potential recruits just a little less vulnerable to radicalization. Of course, this perspective has its limits as well; as old grievances recede, new ones will be found to act as recruitment tools. Also, some people are vulnerable to radicalization regardless of what the current list of grievances is. Lastly, there are recruits who are attracted to the larger political and religious goals, and not to the grievances that act as their justification. It is necessary to address grievances to the extent possible, but at the same time, it is naïve to suppose that addressing (the current list of) grievances will substantively remove the terrorist threat. Needless to say, it makes sense for countries like the U.S. to try and prevent new grievances from arising.

A concern of policymakers has been the ability of Islamist groups to create a public face that is just acceptable enough to give them a cover of legitimacy. This enables them to claim that they are a part of the mainstream political structure – or a part of religious and civil society. In the case of political legitimacy, this may manifest itself in

several ways. Firstly, the group may have internal goals that are at odds with its public face. For example, stating that they are in favor of the democratic process, while having as a goal the establishment of a Sharia run state. Secondly, the group may have several factions within the group – the most moderate of which make statements to the press and general public, while the ones that hold the power do not make public statements. Thirdly, the group may state that they are purely a political group, and yet as part of their political platform they want constituents to adhere to religious law in matters of personal behavior. They may also say that they want to have a democratic government and then have the people choose whether they want to instate Sharia regulations on people's behavior (after much public campaigning and private pressure) and then if the people acquiesce, it will not (in their eyes) contradict living in a 'democracy' because – after all – the people chose these laws and regulations. There may also be other ways that the group undermines the democratic process once they have come into a position of power.

From the perspective of social legitimacy, a group may provide civil society services – educating children, giving money to the poor, providing medical services, job training, etc. They may fill a void that is really needed in the society. They use this to build a base of legitimacy. This may then be combined with efforts to control and influence the attitudes and religious/political behavior of the people that they service. This dovetails with political goals as well, because the services that the group provides create a sense of loyalty between the group and the population – to the extent that if the group is allowed to function as a political party, they have a strong base of support.

Governments have taken different approaches to the dilemma of Islamist groups wanting to take political power. Deciding that a group is a threat and must be violently

stamped out can further radicalize the group. A violently repressive approach may have negative consequences.

A government needs to have a strong and clearly delineated political process and constitutional structure that is stronger than a single group's desire to subvert it. This structure and process needs to have the support of the populace – which means that it needs to be nominally fair and representative – something which is currently lacking in most Arab countries. A government might allow a religiously inspired party to take part in the political process. However, there is a key difference between allowing a 'religiously inspired' group that abides by a separation of religion and state, versus a group that is purely religious in nature and wants to subjugate the state (and the people) to the religion. Again, this distinction needs to be clearly set down by the government and codified in the constitution. A state without a strong constitution and separation of religion from the state will not easily be able to make this distinction. So some of the answer lies with the nature of the government and some of the answer lies with the nature of the group.

From a less political perspective, there are ways to deal with semi-radical (or covertly radical) groups, such as the fundamentalist groups the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb ut-Tahrir. This includes dealing with the group when it is not a part of the political process, but is only a part of civil and religious society. When a group is trying to present itself as an acceptable part of a modern society, this desire for legitimacy needs to be used against the group. A semi-radical (or covertly radical) group wants one of two scenarios: the most desirable would be to be able to operate freely without constraint – able to mix religion, ideology and politics, and gain power in the system. The next most

desirable is to be attacked, labeled and vilified by the government (though not so successfully as to annihilate the group completely). Both approaches will result in support and legitimacy for the group, albeit in very different ways. Giving a group unfettered free reign is not a good approach, nor is labeling and stamping out a group a good idea – as it will radicalize and unify the group and increase its base of support as well as the attractiveness of its ideology. A better approach with a group that desires mainstream acceptance and legitimacy is to avoid labeling and outlawing a group by name. Instead of confronting a group per se, it is better to confront the group's statements, principles and ideas. Does the group have a set of ideas that it presents to the public (the West, the media, the host government, the general population) and another set of ideas, statements, principles and goals that it disseminates for internal consumption? When a group's messages are exposed to public examination, then the group can be debated and criticized – not as a group, but as a set of statements and ideas, which is much more gentle, and at the same time much more potent. This robs the group of the ability to play a double game – being simultaneously democratic and theocratic, pro-diversity and anti-diversity (women, non-Muslims etc.), peaceful and pro-violence, etc.

A similar form of this takes place when a non-violent, but perhaps fundamentalist or Islamist group is a part of a political process – again, the group needs to be exposed and confronted. In this case, the comparison is less between the internal and external statements/principles/goals of the group and more the comparison between the internal statements of the group and the requirements of the political structure within which the group wants to participate. This again requires a clearly delineated set of requirements and standards for political parties – and their acceptance by the society (such as the



exclusion of groups running on a religious platform, or not accepting democratic representation, or advocating violence, or discriminating against women or non-Muslims, etc.).

When a group is exposed as being inconsistent with its own statements, it risks a loss of support and legitimacy. When a group is exposed as being unable to conform to the requirements of political participation, it risks exclusion from the political process. These can be as potent inducements as capture, imprisonment and death are to clearly radical and violent groups like al-Qaeda. Both types of groups are out for power, but in different ways. Both types of repercussions deprive groups of power and the ability to operate.

Lastly, a way to combat fundamentalist and/or Islamist groups that traffic in ideas is to compete with them in the realm of ideas. This is potentially an effective way to combat an ideological group, but it has a few pre-conditions; in a semi-free or non-free society there needs to be an open marketplace wherein competing ideas flourish. One cannot wish for differing ideas and at the same time maintain a society where people are afraid to speak their mind freely, or think that their thoughts have no impact, or are not exposed to creative, critical and informed ways of thinking. In such societies, if one group makes a concerted effort it will be able to monopolize the discourse. A government cannot have it both ways – in order to combat an ideology, it needs to allow varied ideas to flourish.

In summation, in order to approach the issue of fundamentalist, extremist, radical and even terrorist groups, it is necessary to look at how they function from a complex system framework – an approach that looks at the multitude of factors that help to create

the radical system, each one interrelated with the other, and all of them strengthening one another. This needs to be addressed with a host of policies that address all of the different types of groups and the factors within the state and society that allow them to flourish and recruit. No single approach alone will be effective.

*The Level of the State: Middle Eastern States*

There has been a tendency to give states too much of a free pass when it comes to involvement in terrorism and radicalism. The question is – what can the West do without seeming to overly involve itself in the internal affairs of other nations? A systems framework perspective cautions against unintended negative consequences. One thing that can be done is for the U.S. and other nations to make the state involvement in the proliferation of radicalism and extremism a topic of discussion among countries at the highest levels of government. States allow this rhetoric to exist because they have been allowed to get away with it without censure. One does not have to force a state to comply in order to protest what is going on within the state. The U.S. needs to consistently monitor the level of hate speech within a society and bring it to the attention of the government of that society. Whether it is rhetoric against non-Muslims, Christians, Jews, Westerners, Women, Shiites, etc - embarrassment is a powerful tool. Western governments have underplayed the role of hatred, bigotry and intolerance in promoting radicalism. This needs to end. This includes state-run media, state-sanctioned textbooks, etc. If this alone is not sufficient, the West needs to start linking various perks and deals with an improvement in this area.

Another issue is the proper way to go about helping a country to democratize. A lot of criticism has been leveled against equating elections with the promotion of

democracy. This has at times gone as far as downgrading the role of democratization – as if the fear of doing it wrong excuses not doing it at all – or means that the entire concept is incorrect or unimportant. On the contrary, bringing freedom, empowerment and respect for human rights is crucial to stemming radicalism. This can be done without threatening the existence of a regime or unleashing radical forces. An aspect of democracy that is as essential as freedom is the just and equitable rule of law. Another aspect is a competent and honest government. Pushing governments to let go of their grip on power may be difficult and threatening – and may in fact unleash forces that will be destructive – giving the governments a ready excuse to crack down or not change in the first place. However, governments can be helped to become more competent. Mechanisms and structures that ensure transparency and honesty can be incorporated. Helping governments at all levels become more competent, more modern, more transparent and more responsive to the population may be an attractive proposition to a state – if it is offered in a spirit of respect and in a manner that does not make the regime feel threatened. This may be especially effective if the assistance targets one of the more influential parts of government: the police/security forces, the judiciary, or the educational system. This type of assistance needs to be concentrated – it is better to significantly update and improve one aspect of government, than to slightly affect a few different areas. Even one area – if it is sufficiently transformed – will have an affect on the entire society. An honest, law-abiding and just government is as much a part of democracy as are free elections. In the end, a secure and competent government will be more ready to eventually move towards more substantive changes – and will be able to weather those changes without succumbing to radical forces

States must allow organizations and opposition voices to speak out and operate freely. The reluctance of states to open themselves up to opposition voices and organizations needs to be understood before it can be addressed. To dismiss the concerns of a state over loss of power, or the unleashing of opposition forces would be foolish – even if it is objectively being used by the state to avoid needed changes, it is still important in the eyes of the regime and should be respected. On the other hand, to go to the other extreme and allow states to repress and block ideas, organizations and voices that are patently unconnected to radicalism and terrorism is not a good idea either. The point is to acknowledge the fears of states while simultaneously not letting them off of the hook. It is not enough to help and pressure states into lessening the negative ideas that proliferate in the society. One must also have a free and open flow of positive and varied ideas. The presence of a variety of ideas and information is crucial to the health of the system – the society.

The West has been much too silent and diplomatic in an area that they should be loudly speaking out. In this case, the consequences to the larger system are worse than not speaking out for fear of negative outcomes. When rape victims are sentenced to flogging or even death, when honor killings are carried out, when free speech is met with violence, the West needs to protest in any way that it can – the weapon of choice is disapproval and shaming – publicly and repeatedly. The U.S. cannot disparage the beheading of those sentenced to death when convicted of murder since we have a death penalty as well, but we can certainly speak up about the penalties and punishments that are clearly an affront to modernity and any sense of justice – as well as helping to create the radical system.

The approach to states needs to be a combination of sensitivity, respect, pressure, and assistance, setting limits and making demands. To ignore the ways in which states allow or promote radicalism and its predecessors (repression, disempowerment, inequity, coercion, mistreatment, stifling of ideas, control; allowance/encouragement of intolerance, hatred, discrimination and bigotry) is to pretend that radicalism, violence, and extremism arise fully formed like Venus on the half-shell. Again – understanding how the larger system functions is a key to addressing the issue. Ignoring the role of states is ignoring one of the most crucial aspects of the system from which radicalism evolves.

While it is in the interest of Middle Eastern states to conduct themselves as if intolerant and extreme brands of fundamentalism are not connected to radicalism and violence. It allows them to keep their societies unchanging and isolated – in the sway of simplistic and monolithic ways of thinking, uncritical, unquestioning and de-politicized. It allows the existence of reliable scapegoats in the form of secularism, the West and modernity. It is also in the interest of Middle Eastern states to equate the free flow of ideas, information and even informed opposition as tantamount to opening the doors to violent forces – it allows them to stifle the ones who would speak up and speak out, under the guise of preventing instability. The West needs to recognize that it is in the interests of Middle Eastern states to do all of these things, but it is not in the interest of the West to do likewise or even to passively allow this to happen. Lastly, our first and last alliances need to be to values and principles (expecting states to do the same) – doing otherwise may seem expedient in the short term, but it will weaken us and come back to hurt us in the long term.

### *The State Level: Israel/Palestine*

The Israeli Palestinian conflict is an issue on the level of states that has been quite successfully exploited by those wishing to spread extremism, radicalism and even violence. Solving this issue would have a profound effect on the larger system, nonetheless. One of the major reasons that it has resisted solutions is that there are so many parties competing in this region. At least in the near to medium term, a solution is unlikely, However, the symbolic value remains. For this reason, opening and maintaining a dialogue is valuable. While violent groups will still launch attacks of various kinds, responses should be kept to a level that is comprehensible to the public. This means that while suspending all military responses is neither practical nor desirable, large-scale operations should be carefully weighed to assess whether any gains would be worth the loss of whatever positive atmosphere has been created. The goal should be maintenance and suppression of violence – not victory. The combination of ‘reasonable’ military responses on the part of the Israelis (such as limited and targeted incursions into Gaza, versus large-scale invasions) along with an ongoing dialogue with those Palestinian leaders who are willing and able to talk will create a positive atmosphere. If the violent extremists want to find a reason to mount large scale terrorist attacks on Israel, or begin another popular uprising, they will find a way – this is the unfortunate reality. All of the above is not to say that a lasting political settlement cannot be made – just that this is not the scenario that should be banked on – and that attention needs to be paid to how to manage a semi- stable and positive atmosphere short of an actual settlement.

Another factor that is of great importance is quality of life issues for the Palestinian people and how they are dealt with by the Israelis. While dangers from

radicalized Palestinians are real and must be guarded against by the Israelis, this does not mean that there are not ways that life can be made easier for Palestinians. Ways can be found to monitor radicals while still allowing Palestinians to travel from town to town, be treated respectfully at checkpoints and be allowed and even encouraged to do business. Any ways that Israel can be perceived as making life easier reduces hatred and resentment by Palestinians. This is by no means an unlimited equation, however. There are many radical recruiters who will still have plenty of ammunition to sway people to their cause. Nonetheless, to the extent that Israel takes care to deprive them of reasons to hate, radicalism is lessened – even by a small amount. To the extent that Israel can find ways to make life easier for the average Palestinian they have lessened the overall amount of hatred and resentment in the atmosphere. For this reason, any counterterrorism strategies that rely on triangulation - the punishing of a third party for the actions of others – should be scrupulously avoided. Many Palestinians do not hate the Israelis for ideological reasons (after all, not all people are ideologues nor have the time to think that way), on the contrary, they resent the Israelis for very practical reasons. It is in these areas that Israel can make a difference. Good intelligence and covert operations are more valuable than large-scale military operations that further radicalize and generally result in an unacceptable level of both Palestinian (civilian) casualties as well as Israeli losses. Any assistance that Israel gives in the creation of schools (both in Palestine as well as in Israel) that teach humanistic and Islamic values of respect and tolerance for others and an eschewing of violence will help. The effect of schools such as the al-Qassemi College are profound in those that they are able to reach. A neutral education such as Israel tries to promote among Palestinians and Israeli Arabs is not enough to counter familial and

societal influences. Ways need to be found to increase the presence of educational institutions (both Islamic and secular) that actively teach values – especially to women, because of their disproportionate ability to influence others. There may be ways that the U.S. and the international community can help with this as well – with funding, support, logistics, etc. Israel also needs to be aware of currents of bottom-up positive change that are welling up from the Palestinian people – people who have become disillusioned with the ability of their governments (or the Israelis) to improve their situation. If there are ways to work with these (mostly non-political) groups on basic life issues, especially without damaging their credibility that would be a positive move. There are groups both Israeli and Palestinian (and joint groups) that are working for positive, bottom-up change. The best hope for Israeli and Palestinian societies may lie in these grass-roots groups. In summation, the Israeli/Palestinian issue has the potential to have a large impact on the system, but there are few easy solutions – and perhaps precisely for this reason, radicals want to keep the issue alive and unsolved.

#### *State Level: The West*

As has been mentioned before – the United States and the West are also a part of the system that allows fundamentalism, extremism, radicalism and terrorism to exist. The United States possesses a powerful “weapon” in its economic and trade relations in the Middle East. As noted before, There are a host of areas in which the U.S. can exert positive pressure upon Arab states. Access between countries cannot be one-sided. The U.S. needs to be aware of the influx of Wahabi (fundamentalist) oriented clerics coming into the country from Saudi Arabia, Egypt (often Saudi trained), Pakistan and elsewhere. In many cases it is already too late – with many clerical positions having been filled by



clerics who are not in tune with American values – or actually sympathetic to extremism and religious coercion. These clerics entered the country on religious visas, which is a category that allows for less scrutiny and easier entry into the country. As others have noted, this ‘religious visa’ category should be eliminated. Clerics already in the country should be monitored. This does not need to involve any outright invasion of privacy – often it is enough to just check out a mosque’s website or attend its services. Ways should be found to establish schools of Islamic learning that have an orientation in line with American values. The purpose would be to graduate clerics that can lead American Islamic institutions. American prisons are another area of vulnerability. To some extent this is already a problem. Chaplains that are allowed access to the prison system need to be very carefully screened and monitored – in ways that do not violate their civil rights, but also protect the prison population from fundamentalism and extremism. Another place that has been allowed to become a place for radicalization within the U.S. (in addition to mosques and prisons) are universities. This takes place in a couple of ways: there are Islamic studies departments that take a pro-Saudi, pro-fundamentalist, anti-Western and anti-Israel stance. There are also non-profit student organizations with ties to groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and others as well as varying degrees of fundamentalist and extremist sympathies. While free speech is a protected value, ways need to be found to insure that American laws protecting free speech do not mean that extremism proliferates on campuses. This can be done by carefully enforcing laws that already exist – for example laws against incitement, violent speech, hate speech, encroachment on freedoms. This should not require the creation of new laws or encroachment on the rights of U.S. citizens – just the willingness to actively be aware of

what is going on in our institutions and being willing to enforce laws that are already in existence. Extremism is growing in America – sheltered by democratic values, a tolerant atmosphere and laws protecting free speech and organization. As has been pointed out – the solution is simply to vigorously defend and protect the freedoms of the public from religious or cultural encroachment in the public sphere. Other cases consist of people being inculcated in values and sympathies that are inconsistent with American values. Here the solution is not to allow extremist clerics and professors into the country under religious or academic visas; carefully monitoring organizations allowed to operate on college campuses; screening of chaplains that are allowed into the prison population. Again – on the positive side – efforts need to be made to create more American institutions where moderate teachers and clerics can be educated.

In terms of American foreign policy, while it is true that there are some people, groups and states that will be hostile to the U.S. no matter what it does, nonetheless, this does not mean that the actions of the United States have no effect. In general, the U.S. needs to become more aware of the value of symbolism when it comes to foreign policy. In the past, symbolism was used by the U.S. to emphasize its power and the ways in which it saw itself as being a law in and of itself – apart from and above the rest of the international community. While there are certainly times where the U.S. needs to be willing to act differently from other nations and international institutions, there are many other times where more restraint and humility would be in order. This is not a suggestion that the U.S. change its foreign policy in substantive ways in order that others approve. It is a suggestion that the U.S. become more aware of the ways that it conducts itself – the style and tone that it sets with others – the impression that it gives. America has tended to

be tone-deaf to the ways in which its words and actions are received – or does not care even when it is aware. This means becoming more aware of how to deal with ‘honor cultures’. These are cultures where the perception of honor and respect are highly prized. Generally these are less democratic and more hierarchical cultures – since in a democratic culture power is distributed equally according to equitable principles and is less dependent on status, strength or the subjective respect and deference of others. In a more hierarchical and less democratic culture when respect or honor is lost, the actual position, power and perceived value of the person is lessened. While a number of the policy suggestions made thus far vis a vis states entail the exerting of pressure and setting of boundaries and conditions, this in no way contradicts the need for more sensitivity and respect in our relations with others. A large part of diplomacy is the art of making the bitter message palatable and using strength in subtle ways. The U.S. needs to find ways to get its message across in more palatable, respectful, inclusive and tone-appropriate ways. The reluctance to do this comes from two very different camps. Firstly there are those who think that any softening of tone or style on the part of the U.S. is a sign of weakness and capitulation. For this group, every action on the part of the U.S. needs to be a demonstration of overt strength and dominance. On the other hand, there are those who associate diplomatic strategy and subtle approaches with manipulation, an amoral realism, and covert deception. Just as the use of a more diplomatic style does not need to imply an abandoning of positions, it also does not need to imply an abandonment of principles and values. Respect, consultation, consensus building, inclusion, restraint and measured tones do not mean that one is weak. Being sensitive to the reactions and perceptions of others and acting accordingly so that others are not needlessly provoked,

disrespected, threatened or offended does not mean that one is being exploitative, manipulative or deceptive. In situations like this the issue is not to prove who is right (or how the accusations are wrong) but to allay the anger, offense and pain of the other side. It is not a time for argument or stonewalling. At the same time, when democratic values are threatened, such as free-speech, freedom from violence or the rights and safety of other human beings, the U.S. needs to be less careful and less restrained – more willing to speak up in protest, albeit in respectful and non-demeaning ways. These distinctions require wisdom and sensitivity – but that is what diplomacy (and relations between peoples and nations) is all about.

The U.S. needs to be willing to assist states in becoming more competent, transparent, effective and advanced. This should be offered in a spirit of helpfulness and not as an implied criticism or as a prelude to regime change. Governments may resist when they feel pressured to let go of power and allow the forces within their states free-reign (forces that they have previously radicalized and repressed), but they may accept assistance in becoming stronger (in positive and non-coercive ways) and more stable. Eventually this will result in governments that are more just and operate in a way that is more responsive and responsible to the population. In America, more attention tends to be put on the freedom and representation part of democracy, with less emphasis on how the structure of government and restraints of law (applied to all) also nurtures and protects democracy. We take for granted that (by and large) our governments are not corrupt; a rule of law equally applies to great and small; brutality is the exception and not the norm; checks and balances operate throughout the system, and our society and government is built on competence and responsiveness. This is the invisible structure

upon which we exercise our freedoms. Helping other governments to operate in effective and responsible ways will increase the stability of the government, the equitable rule of law and the willingness of the people to interact with their government – another path to a more democratic society. It is not enough to tell a government that they should not imprison, torture or ignore their citizens – it is more useful to help a government develop a modern judicial system, a trained and up to date police force and an administration built on competence and systems that are responsive to the needs of the population. While it is certainly necessary to speak out about bigotry and hate in educational texts, it is even more useful to help countries to set up modern educational systems within their countries. To some extent the U.S. needs to be willing to speak out against egregious practices – but in many other cases the need is to reach out and be willing to be a part of the solution.

Propping up tyrants without attention to democratization and the need for human rights is not a solution which will endear the U.S. to Middle Eastern populations. The U.S. needs to find ways to work with moderate forces wherever they are found; strengthening them, assisting them, speaking out for them and defending them whenever they can. This may mean moderate forces in religious groups, moderate forces in opposition and pro-democracy voices, and also moderate forces in governments – meaning rulers and leaders that are willing to accept assistance (and a little pressure) to change and develop in positive ways.

When it comes to dealing with belligerent and semi-belligerent states such as didn't anyone ever teach you the difference? Iran and Syria, and equivocating states such as Pakistan and Lebanon, the U.S. needs to set limits, state consequences and make sure that any deal-making is accompanied by mechanisms for verification and accountability.

It is never true that the only two choices are aggressive responses or outright naïve appeasement. There are ways to offer incentives, make requests/demands and set consequences that are firm and enforceable and yet still promote a non-volatile atmosphere where communication is clear and yet non-threatening. No nation is in and of itself evil and unredeemable. It is the behavior and policies of that nation and its regime that make it so. While nations need to be pressed (sometimes hard) to conform to international standards of human behavior, nonetheless, they should always be given a way in which they can redeem themselves (or condemn themselves to negative consequences, depending on their choices). Nothing is gained by calling a nation unredeemable or its leaders evil. Statements should always be about policies, and it is better to state a consequence that can be enforced, rather than an incendiary threat that may not be carried out. The West needs to start setting firm standards as to who they will and won't deal with within their own borders. The U.S. dealing with trade unions that do not allow members to visit Israel, political groups that exclude women, organizational or educational groups (such as universities) that have messages of hate in their materials, texts, leader's statements or internal documents should be stopped. The effect of this censure would be significant and would cause states to think twice about what they allow within their countries. There are times and places for shows of strength – but these need to be exercised with caution (and whenever possible as part of a regional/international group), lest the law of unintended negative consequences rear up its ugly head.

Relationships between nations are important, not only for the nations themselves, but for the effect that they have on radical groups within and outside of those nations – as

well as the general atmosphere (again – much of it symbolic) that makes a difference in how the West is perceived within the rank and file of non-Western populations.

*The State Level: The European Union and the United Kingdom*

Just as the U.S. has been a part of the system that has allowed extremism to proliferate, so has the European Union and the United Kingdom. Addressing all aspects of the system means addressing these states as well. For example, it is not necessary to resort to anti-immigration and xenophobic sentiments in order to realize that there is a problem. Immigration levels, high birth-rates and an ill-absorbed immigrant population have created a situation that has the potential to erupt in violent ways. A less obvious – but just as concerning – problem is that there is developing a ‘state within a state’ situation in the European Union and the United Kingdom, where communities have their own sets of laws and norms – which may run quite contrary to Western values. Perceptions are made in communities. When people within a community feel that they can get away with honor killings, child marriages, various extra-judicial punishments, female genital mutilation, religious intimidation, extremist and incendiary speech, rioting, rapes, etc., this encourages these types of behaviors, as well as the feeling that the community can operate as a separate entity. Dealing with this issue does not require that new laws be written. It does require that existing laws, freedoms and protections be enforced with less of a fear of offending others or political correctness. It is folly for security forces, intelligence and police to feel that they cannot operate freely within a community for fear of giving offense. However, a vigorous approach entails some caution. It is one thing to condemn ‘criminal’, ‘violent’ or ‘unlawful’ behavior. It is another thing to speak of people as ‘thugs’, ‘scum’, or even ‘Islamic extremists’.

Labeling people (rather than behaviors) is risky. Vigorous enforcement when accompanied by name calling, labeling or blackballing risks backlash. Strong enforcement does not have to mean alienating entire segments of a community. On the contrary, one of the most effective tools that security, intelligence and police forces have at their disposal is the cooperation of community members. Similar to what was said about fighting insurgencies – it should never be forgotten that the greatest prize of all when combating criminal and extremist behaviors is the support of the local population.

The lessons that Americans have learned in Iraq regarding the need to station forces within the community and gain the cooperation of the locals are just as true in London or Paris. Community policing, respectful involvement of local community members for the purpose of gaining information and the preservation of a secure and safe community environment are basic to fighting localized extremism. There is no substitute for familiar faces of police that are present in a community and walk its streets and go into its shops, cafes, and sports clubs. Coordination with community members does not mean giving authority to civilians, or deferring operations until permission is given by clerics or others. It does mean working together in ways that encourage communities to help and cooperate. Just as in Iraq – when the community members feel that their best chance at safety lies in the hands of gangs, extremist groups, religious fundamentalists or others, this is with whom they will cooperate. When a community perceives the police and security forces as being the key to their safety, well-being and ability to live in freedom, they are more likely to be willing to help with intelligence as well. If a community sees the police, security forces and intelligence organizations as hostile, weak or uninvolved, they are less likely to be able or willing to be of assistance. Also, a



community where moderates are supported and shielded from intimidation and condemnation and who have a good relationship with the authorities is a community where moderates are going to be more willing to make statements publicly against extremism and violence. In short, the working class immigrant neighborhoods of Birmingham, Rochdale and Manchester in England and the Banlieu outside of Paris are in their own way small states where counterinsurgencies need to be waged – with all of the planning and care that this entails.

As with the U.S., the European Union and the United Kingdom need to be aware of the people that they allow into the country and the organizations that are already operating within its borders. Based on the interviews conducted, there is already a proliferation of radically linked nonprofit organizations (student groups, religious and social service organizations, etc), semi-radical organizations and extremist-leaning schools, mosques and clerics. Within the bounds of existing laws and civil liberties, governments need to be more aware and vigilant about who is being allowed to operate freely within their borders. In cases where rules are being violated, rules can be enforced. In cases where is not as obvious legal recourse, groups can be confronted and embarrassed by publicizing their internal statements in ways that show the disparity between internal statements and external image, or internal statements and the values of the larger society.

#### *The Societal and Individual Level: The Extremists*

Understanding the extremists and their motivations – as well as what the influences are within the system that brings them to radicalism is not easy.. Anyone who is looking for a clear and limited set of motivators/influencers is going to be frustrated or

fooled into oversimplification. To further complicate the situation, in some settings, situations, phases or cultures, one variable may dominate, and in another situation, setting, phase or culture, another variable or set of variables may dominate. The emphasis also shifts depending on what type of extremist one is talking about – old, young, rich, poor, Western, non-Western, low-level, high-level, educated, non-educated, intellectual, emotional, violent, etc., etc. All of these factors should affect how extremists are conceptualized and policy is formulated.

*The Societal and Individual Level: The Moderate*

What is it within the larger system/society that either encourages or discourages moderation and what policies might assist in strengthening the forces of moderation within the societal system? When Westerners question why ‘moderates’ in Arab societies do not speak out against extremism, they ignore the conditions within the societies in which the moderates dwell. To a certain degree a moderate in a repressive society is more like a dissident. There are forces of various kinds that keep moderates silent. Often these are societies that do not encourage, or at times even allow, the free expression of ideas. They also do not allow or encourage an influx of information and a variety of opinions. The places where ideas might be exchanged – the media, religious and educational systems – are monitored and/or controlled by the state. A high value is placed on conformity and in being unobtrusive. State intelligence forces keep close tabs on citizens and report when they are engaged in any activity that draws attention. State police and security often engage in random arrests and acts of violence. The population is disconnected from the political process. The only sentiments that are completely acceptable within the society are those that either support the regime or disparage the

West and Israel. Moderates are isolated and gatherings of those outside of officially sanctioned groups is discouraged or actively blocked. These impediments are all taking place at the state level. Until there is an easing of state controls on ideas, assembly and the creation of various institutions, there will not be a fertile ground for various ideas to grow, be exchanged with others, to be transmitted. This is unlikely to happen without pressure and direction from the West. The West is being affected by the repression that is taking place in the Middle East, and the West needs to let states know that change needs to take place. It is no longer acceptable for states to be able to hide their repression and control under the guise of fighting extremism. The steps that need to be taken include allowing information to come in and internal voices to speak out. It also includes allowing institutions and organizations from outside the region (schools, religious institutions, non-profit organizations) to be able to be established. While this will not be desirable to these states it is time that the West began to link benefits to reciprocal actions on the part of these states.

The other forces that discourage moderates from both developing their views and speaking up to others are the internal non-state forces within Arab countries. Due to the above-mentioned actions of states, the fundamentalist religious groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood have been able to take control of the religious dialogue, including mosques and schools. The state governments have allowed this to happen. The fundamentalists have latitude and control within certain parts of society such as charitable, religious and educational systems, and they refrain from criticizing or attacking the government. To a large extent this bargain works and the regimes get the tacit approval of the fundamentalists. However, this situation results in an environment in

which anyone who departs from the fundamentalist line is branded as a traitor, pro-West, and/or anti-Islam. This is a powerful deterrent from anyone speaking out in dissent.

Consider that universities and trade unions are able to censure and even expel those that express what might be considered unacceptable views. The analogous situation was of the USSR during the communist era. Those who departed from the communist party line (or did not join the party) could suffer in many ways both obvious and subtle. In Arab societies, religious fundamentalism functions in ways similar to how communism did – as an overarching ideology and group (social, business, political) that united people together and discouraged dissent.

It can be asked, how do the above forces keep someone from speaking out against such obvious points as random violence or hatred? States do not have an interest in people supporting violence – as a matter of fact they make an effort to arrest and prosecute those who support violence, instability and hate. The problem is that what states proscribe is only rhetoric that is directly threatening to the regime. Those that speak against the West, Christians, Jews, and Israel are allowed to speak freely. Those that tacitly or overtly condone or excuse violence against civilians (Westerners or Israelis in particular) are allowed to speak and have their words accepted in the public discourse. Bigotry against non-Muslims or against the less than strictly religious (in the fundamentalist sense) is allowed. Discriminatory statements and beliefs about women are in the mainstream. In the course of speaking out against extremism, moderates will also be critiquing the governments that allows extremism to proliferate. Speaking out against extremism means speaking out against poor, repressed, societies with corrupted governments and brutal and unjust police and justice systems. Speaking out against

extremism means speaking out against societies that have been coopted by fundamentalism that is being bankrolled by governments and does not allow for religious pluralism. Speaking out against extremism means speaking out against hatred and intolerance against others that is echoed and supported in the society and the government. Speaking out against ‘extremism’ is a more complicated and risky venture than those in truly free societies realize. Even speaking out against extremist groups (or by extension their methods) can be looked at as disloyal. How can one speak out against indiscriminate violence on the part of al-Qaeda, Hamas terror attacks on civilians, Hezbollah bombing of community centers in South America and the kidnapping and killing of westerners in Lebanon, bombings in Bali, knifings in the Netherlands, if one is afraid that doing so will result in being seen as critical or disloyal to Islamist groups – or open one up to being in some way targeted – either by the group itself or by its local sympathizers.

These are attitudes that are not inevitable – they are cultivated and encouraged by governments at all levels. While some of the responsibility lies with Muslim leaders themselves, one must take into account the forces that conspire to silence people, or to not allow them to develop divergent views in the first place. Until the societies become places where ideas can be expressed freely and a variety of beliefs allowed, people will not speak freely, nor join together with others. There are areas where the West can speak out (and covertly assist) in support of moderates (actually ‘dissidents’) and there are areas where we can lead, demand, pressure, reward and encourage states to evolve in a multitude of ways that will not threaten the existing regimes.

In summation – it can be seen that the forces which encourage or discourage moderates within the system are many and varied – and policy approaches need to address all aspects of the system that prevent the strengthening of moderate forces.

*The Societal and Individual Level: Women in Society*

One of the significant ways that the West can help to stem the growth of extremism within the greater system is by supporting the rights of women. As was mentioned by several of the interview subjects, women who are educated, independent and able to speak for themselves will (more often than not) be a force of moderation. Women who are educated will encourage their children to be educated and informed. Women who believe in respect and tolerance of others will teach and bring up their families likewise. Women who have grounding in humanistic values (from either a neutral or specifically Islamic perspective) will teach their children those values, as well as influencing the rest of the family, husbands included. Women who are economically independent will be more likely to bring their own ideas and attitudes into the family and the society at large. This requires that women have the ability to become educated and independent. This is not likely to happen on its own to any major degree. The same unspoken bargain struck by states – allowing fundamentalist religious groups control over sectors of the society has also been struck with the fate of women. Allowing the religious groups to control women and determine what is acceptable for them and what is proscribed is a major prize. Control of women is a powerful way to keep a society in line. This is not something that will be easily relinquished. Again – The West needs to support rights for women (jobs, education, leadership roles, basic human rights, freedom from harsh punishments and extra-judicial killings) and speak out loudly when they are

mistreated. From this perspective, the flogging of rape victims, the stoning of ‘immoral women’, the genital mutilation and forced marriages of young girls, the inability of women in some societies to vote or drive, and the exclusion of women from leadership roles, is affecting the West profoundly by allowing extremism to fester without one of its most powerful deterrents – the voice and influence of educated, independent and ethical women.

Lest anyone think that these points regarding women (and moderates as well) apply only to societies in the Middle East, this is not at all the case. The same bargains and expressions of willful denial are taking place throughout the West. By not speaking out against extremism (except for its most egregious expressions of violence against governments), Western governments are allowing it to grow in their own borders. When Western governments allow organizations (religious, educational, non-profit) that are anti-West, anti-Israel, anti-Christian, anti-female and against basic human rights, the governments pay the price. When Western governments are less than vigilant in the prevention and loud condemnation of honor killings (which take place in Western societies), child marriages, female genital mutilation, etc, they are also creating an atmosphere where extremism will grow. When governments allow the growth of ‘states within states’ (for example the semi-closed Islamic communities especially in the European Union and the United Kingdom – or reported militia communities in rural areas of the U.S.) that have their own internal societal systems separate from the larger societies, the governments are creating situations where (like in the Arab states) moderate voices will be repressed. Even worse, when governments like the U.S. and United Kingdom give recognition to organizations and leaders that are linked with extremist

groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in the U.S. and Hizb ut-Tahrir in the United Kingdom, they are sending a message to the Islamic community that true moderates do not have a place and will not be protected or supported. This has a silencing effect on those who do not have the time, energy or willingness to take the risk of speaking out.

*The Societal and Individual Level: Fighting Ideology*

There are system-wide steps that can be taken that will lessen the appeal of radicalism in the eyes of the segments of the public that are most vulnerable – as well as lessening support for the extremists in the population at large. The United States and the Middle East can use respected figures to speak out against random violence and the perversion of Islam that has taken place at the hands of extremists. Respected figures may include those who are themselves religious fundamentalists – but who do not condone violence against civilians or less than fundamentally religious Muslims. The issue is less whether someone believes in strictly religious Islam, and more whether they are willing to speak up to fellow Muslims and tell them that violence is wrong and hatred is wrong.

It is not impossible to decipher who is a fundamentalist (who we may disagree with, but who is not violent or coercive), and who (while appearing outwardly modern) is actually harboring beliefs or ties that are dangerous. Firstly – does the person in question have ties to groups that are extremist? Do they have links to ‘neutral’ organizations that are linked to extremist? Are they on record anywhere as condoning or actually speaking out in favor of violence against civilians (yes, even Israeli civilians)? Are they on record as supporting an Islamist caliphate where Sharia law (including criminal law) is imposed on the population? Are they on record as speaking disparagingly against non-Muslims such as Christians or Jews?



A moderate fundamentalist may have negative views of the West or of the U.S. government and a moderate may follow Sharia law in their own life. This does not mean that they are necessarily harboring extremist views. People who have in the past been attracted to radical groups but have disavowed extremism can also be encouraged and actually assisted in speaking out. Sometimes these people are looked at with suspicion and not utilized when they could serve as vital voices in speaking out against violence. Religious Muslims can speak to those who are attracted to extremism and explain to them why it is in fact proscribed by traditional Islam. It is also possible to speak out against violent acts and extremist beliefs while at the same time not condemning people. This may not make sense – why not condemn those who have committed violent acts? The reason is that when people condemn others as people, they are labeling and condemning all of the non-actors who are sympathetic to the extremist cause. For example, when rioting French-Islamic youth were referred to as ‘scum’ by current French President Sarkozy, this caused an uproar. This was not on the part of the rioters themselves (a smaller subset of the population), but on the part of all of the French Islamic community (especially the youth) that identified with them. Words are important. Labeling and condemning people instead of beliefs or actions hardens the stance and increases support and sympathy in the population at large. Every care should be taken to avoid giving the impression that the West is trying to fight against Islam. Even segments of the religion that are clearly linked with extremism (such as Salafism, Wahabism and the like) should be critiqued in terms of specific tenets or beliefs – not as groups per se. It is not hard to speak out against the practice of declaring Muslims heretics without condemning Wahabis as a group (after all, not all Wahabis condone violence). It is important that this

not be seen as a battle against Islam. Even though Westerners may see this distinction as obvious, it is far less obvious to Muslims. Disagreements must be framed in neutral human-rights terms.

People within the Muslim community in the West who are actively working to dissuade youth from becoming involved with radicalism should be assisted by the government (perhaps in less than obvious ways). The goal is to speak to those who are not completely entrenched in radicalism and who can be reached. Like those who join criminal gangs in the U.S., just because someone has become involved in an extremist group does not mean that they cannot be influenced by others (especially their co-religionists or ex-extremists). Obviously those who are involved in planning or carrying out attacks need to be dealt with from a law and order perspective. Western governments should also be willing to consult with moderates and ask them what is needed.

Organizations in the West can work to help moderate Islam in several ways. This might include publishing and distributing literature that contains moderate ideas – from current as well as classical Islamic thinkers. It might mean collecting and bringing to Western attention the literature that is being distributed in both the West and the Middle East that promotes hatred, intolerance, discrimination and violence. It might mean bringing together moderate Muslims and moderate Islamic organizations to meet and network together in the Middle East. It might mean helping moderates to set up alternative forms of media such as Web pages, podcasts, internet radio, etc. One suggestion mentioned before by a counterterrorism researcher was for the U.S. to set up a ‘Marshall Plan’ for education - to assist Middle Eastern governments in setting up educational institutions that promote a diverse, tolerant and moderate curriculum

(including the promotion of critical thinking) for all ages. These are all things that organizations can do, but they need the help and support of government to do so.

#### *Policy Within a System Framework: Conclusion*

In the present research it was proposed that terrorism (which through the course of this research has been enlarged to include intolerant fundamentalism, extremism, radicalism and outright terrorism) is a complex system of variables operating on various levels and interacting to strengthen and sustain the larger system that includes all of the above – fundamentalism, extremism, radicalism and terrorism. As the researchers above stated, and as the wide range of policies suggested above illustrate, a comprehensive approach needs to include political, social, cultural, educational, economic, religious and ideological measures, rather than just a focus on military or law-enforcement. It needs to include the larger battle of ideas, creating a powerful counter ideology, a ‘hearts and minds’ strategy for use not with hard-core perpetrators, but among communities of supporters and potential recruits (i.e., the larger system). The above policies have sought to address the entire system, including the group, state, societal and individual levels with a wider range of policies (ideological, political, cultural, etc, etc) that are meant to be used in combination and coordination with one another. One policy alone, addressing only one aspect of the problem will not have the ability to substantively affect such a multi-faceted and complex system.

#### Trends

As mentioned above in the introduction, the epicenter for radicalism is changing. While its inception and subsequent support began in the Gulf Region, currently those countries are fighting a battle (however inconsistent, as noted above and throughout this

research) against extremism. Recently the BBC announced that Saudi Arabia has opened a center for the retraining of 40,000 religious leaders – to steer them away from Wahabi-style radicalism and towards a more tolerant form of Islam. While this is certainly hopeful, let us not forget that abuses, killings and extremism are still alive and well in Saudi Arabia. The religious establishment that gave rise to them and the state that supported and permitted them are still very much in existence. Nonetheless, extremism in the Gulf has seen its heyday. Radicalism, extremism and terrorism are undergoing a migration – out of the Gulf and into all areas of Europe Britain, Pakistan/Afghanistan, Africa, Asia, and the United States. To study current trends in fundamentalism, radicalism and extremism it would be necessary to go to where the extremists are going – where their ideologies are going.

The most significant trend within the system is not geographical, but rather ideological. Worldwide, Islam is undergoing a major shift. The battle that is now being fought is only secondarily between radicalism and the West. The primary battle is between two different forces within Islam. This division is by no means absolute – as has been pointed out before. Even non-extremists in the Middle East have very negative views about the West, Israel, Jews, Christians, the U.S. government, etc. Many of them condone violence against civilians or are willing to excuse the actions of extremists. They may have discriminatory views about women, non-Muslims etc. Moderation and extremism exist along a continuum. So while a struggle for the future of Islam is taking place, there are not clearly divided lines. One can even envision it as a struggle within each individual person as well – between tolerance and hatred, between diversity of ideas and rigid dogmatic religious ideology, between modernity and tribalism, between

empowerment of others and discrimination against others, between ignorance and informed thinking, between paranoia and a willingness to connect with others, between boldness and a safe or mindless adherence to whatever is easiest (mainstream dogma) and/or most alluring (violent extremism). It is doubtless that the forces of moderation within Islam will in the end win out. Eventually a new and stronger vision of Islam will emerge that will offer a range of choices, a clear proscription against violence, intolerance and coercion and a creative and rich flowering of philosophical thought. It is predicted that when this occurs, the Islamic world will undergo an explosion of thinking and creativity – as all of the pent-up positive energy finds constructive release. The analogy that seems to obtain the most is of Christian society after the Dark Ages and the Inquisition. There is much that the Islamic world (including its secular, religious, philosophical and creative aspects) has to offer the West. It is not a question that the force of modernity and moderation will in the end prevail – there is simply too much pressure within these societies as they come into contact with the West and liberal democracy and the contrasts that they provide. There is also the pressure that the societies within themselves exert in order to be able to express themselves freely and believe as they choose. Additionally, the excesses (both ideological and actual) of both the extremists as well as the repressive thinking of the religious establishments that has contributed to an increasing amount of disillusionment among Muslims, as well as a desire to both learn and become informed about the world of Islam and the world at large. So eventually the Islamic and Arab world will make its peace with modernity and with itself. The issue is how long this will take, and to what extent the extremism and fundamentalism (speaking here about the negative aspects of fundamentalism, such as criminal Sharia law,

discrimination against women, etc.) will have their life-spans prolonged because of the support of governments, their own ability to gain political power, and the neglect of vigorous and responsible policy approaches by the West.

#### Research Limitations

The purpose of the present work was to inquire about the ways that Islamist extremism functioned as a part of a complex system – with different elements operating in an interlocked and interdependent fashion – and to describe each of the different elements in detail as well as describing what strengthens or weakens each of these elements (with policy implications). The system that creates and sustains Islamic radicalism and terrorism is (as was mentioned many times) a complex system. Any efforts to understand this system in all of its facets will add to what is a very intricate combination of both larger societal factors and individual human psychological predisposing elements. Fifty people were interviewed, and the interviews were open-ended. They differed widely in scope and topic. There was no way to tell if the ideas and information being volunteered was accurate, biased, or deceptive. It is quite possible that interview subjects had strong ideas and feelings that they did not share, or did not share completely. A total of eight societal regions were visited for widely varying periods of time. The shortest was a day, the longest was a month. There was no way to gain a clear impression of what was going on in these societies during such a brief period of time. Some places yielded contacts more easily, while some were much more difficult (for various reasons, some completely practical, such as bad timing). To study current trends in fundamentalism, radicalism and extremism it would be necessary to go to where the

extremists are going – where their ideologies are going, and this is constantly changing. So, again – it is necessary to stress the limitations of the current project.

Needless to say – the information, analysis and conclusions are also filtered and seen through the lens of the researcher. While this is always the case – it is particularly relevant when one is speaking of research that relies on first person reporting and non-quantifiable information. At the same time, the current project allowed for a depth and subtlety of information gathering and processing that might not have been possible given other methods (such as survey questions, highly structured interviews, multiple information gatherers, non-face to face data gathering, etc.)

#### Future Research

This project was intended as an exploratory study. One of the purposes of exploratory research is to create pathways that others (by further and repeated research) can transform into well-traveled roads of knowledge. As such, it is hoped that the current project is continued, formalized, and expanded upon. Some hypotheses for future research might include:

1) Hypothesis: There are a multitude of pressures to which moderates and women are subjected that keep them silent and fearful.

2) Hypothesis: There are pervasive manifestations of extremist, radical and fundamentalist influences in the general population.

3) Hypothesis: The West allows fundamentalism, extremism, and radicalism both in the Middle East and West.

4) Hypothesis: Middle Eastern states are and were complicit in the growth and spread of radicalism.

In addition, as new information is gathered, more aspects of the system are understood and new conceptual models are formed. If the present author does further research in places like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, or Iran, new understandings and nuances will surely emerge. Likewise, if more research is done that focuses on actual bastions of radicalism and terrorism (perhaps by talking to more former radicals), the focus within these other aspects of the system will provide new models that will also be different. The goal in making new conceptual models of systems or visual diagrams is not to render the previous ones obsolete, but rather to show some new aspect, add proportion, or a closer and more detailed perspective.

### Conclusion

The present work looked at fundamentalism, radicalism, and extremism as it exists in a larger system; therefore, none of the above suggestions are meant to be looked at as discrete phenomena that can be used in isolation. Each of these is a sub-system and exists within a larger system. If the present work has accomplished anything, it is hoped that it is the concept that phenomena are complex, the systems within which they arise and grow are complex, and approaches that will be effective and not produce negative consequences are of necessity, also complex (and must be carefully balanced within the system within which they are undertaken).

One of the purposes of this research was to construct conceptual models and visual diagrams to better understand the complex system that is under examination. As was stated at the end of the introductory chapters, the models used at the beginning of the research (and illustrated by diagrams 1-3) were meant to be preliminary. These original conceptual models and visual diagrams were based on the research done from the



literature. They are (and were) accurate, but only based on various written materials. They lacked proportion, depth, texture and a sense of how it all came together. Like building a model of an elephant based on reading many books about elephants.

The models that were used in the diagrams and referred to in writing in later chapters are what emerged from firsthand perceptions of this writer as well as the firsthand perceptions of others – including discussing firsthand with the authors the research of others. It does not cancel out the prior ways of constructing models, but constructs new models based on the firsthand discussions, firsthand experience and the ability to weigh and measure, and give depth, proportion and texture. Much of the research that was done focused on Middle Eastern states and the societies within them. Much time was also spent talking to moderates and various people in the society. Even researchers and policy analysts were in many cases people who had either lived or spent significant amounts of time in these societies. For this reason later models were much more sensitive to the group, state and society interaction - for example, how extremism is formed by the group and state and filters down to the society where it then leaves societal members vulnerable to further radicalism. Models that were used were also much more focused on how specific members of the society (moderates, dissidents, women) were intimidated and silenced. There was also more focus on the specific role of the West in allowing extremism and fundamentalism - since there had been obtained much more specific information about it.

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## APPENDICES

## APPENDIX A

### WHO WAS INTERVIEWED AND WHY THEY WERE CHOSEN

As mentioned in the Methods section, people were chosen to be interviewed based on their knowledge of radicalism, terrorism, moderation and/or the societies and systems that give rise to these different trends. This included researchers, political leaders in the region, academics from both the Middle East as well as the West, religious figures and organizational activists. The word ‘distinguished’ is used when referring to university founders/presidents, authors of scores of academic books and those holding multiple high level degrees. Some ‘average’ members of society were included – when they had valuable insights based on being members of Arab/Islamic societies. Generally, subjects were recommended by other subjects (snowball method), though occasionally they were sought out by the author due to being previously known and identified as relevant to the research. When subjects are cited within the results, they are referred to by general position only without names or specifically identifying details such as affiliation or place of employment. While some subjects had no problem with being identified, some did prefer anonymity, and it was felt a single style would be preferable for the sake of consistency. Their religion (or non-Arab national origin, such as ‘American’, ‘Israeli’, etc.) is specified if they are not born Muslim. Listed in below is a summary description of the subjects who were interviewed, along with brief information as to their relevance to the research – again without names or specific affiliation/place of employment.

## Interview Subject List

- 1) American policy expert on Terrorism – has traveled extensively within the Middle East and interviewed radical as well as moderate leaders. Author of scholarly books on the topic.
- 2) Native of Middle East, living in West. Writes and lectures on extremism in both regions.
- 3) American Professor and moderate Islamic scholar. Writes on issues of extremism versus moderation in Islam.
- 4) Intelligence analyst and former U.S. government member. Specializes in Middle East and radicalism.
- 5) American Muslim and author of books on radicalism in Islam.
- 6) American writer, author and academic. Specialist in issues of radicalism and fundamentalism in Western countries.
- 7) Native of Middle East, now living in West. Head of think-tank focusing on radicalism in the Middle East.
- 8) Israeli military officer (ret.) now working as researcher and consultant on terrorism.
- 9) Israeli head of think tank dedicated to terrorism research.
- 10) Israeli-Arab professor/dept. chair and distinguished author of 50+ books on Arab language, culture and literature.
- 11) Israeli-Arab head of moderate Islamic university in Israel.
- 12) Young Israeli-Arab documentary filmmaker (Israel/Palestine topics).
- 13) Israeli-Arab social scientist and scholar – studies Israeli-Arab demographics.
- 14) Israeli-Arab feminist Muslim, teaches in Islamic university.
- 15) Israeli-Arab religious Muslim (moderate) and student in Islamic university.
- 16) Israeli-Arab feminist lawyer, head of organization for reform in Islam.
- 17) Israeli-Arab religious Muslim (Islamist) and student in Islamic university.
- 18) Israeli-Arab religious teacher and head of Sufi Mosque and school.
- 19) Jordanian distinguished academic – holds four Phd's (including from American Ivy league university). Lectures on moderation in U.S. and Jordan by invitation of both Jordanian king and U.S. president.
- 20) Jordanian Sufi scholar and professor in Arab history and religious thought.
- 21) Jordanian professor of Arab history and politics.
- 22) Jordanian religious feminist and political trailblazer. Member of government.
- 23) Jordanian head of organization for women – honored by U.N. for 30+ years of distinguished humanitarian work.
- 24) Jordanian Christian female worker in organization for women.
- 25) Jordanian head of research in large media company and writer on issues of moderation and radicalism. Former member of Muslim Brotherhood.
- 26) Jordanian distinguished academic. Author of multiple books and articles on Arab history and thought. Founded one university, president of another.
- 27) Jordanian son of famous radical leader and founder of major terrorist group. Speaks out against radicalism.

- 28) Jordanian professor and former cabinet minister – lectures in the U.S.A and Jordan on politics in the Arab world.
- 29) Egyptian founder of centrist/moderate political party and deputy head of U.N. non-governmental organization.
- 30) Egyptian academic and writer, lectures on moderation and extremism in Arab society in the U.S. and Egypt. Consults to U.S. government and think tanks.
- 31) Egyptian researcher on extremism in the Middle East – specifically the Muslim Brotherhood.
- 32) Egyptian head of major research organization – lectures in U.S. universities.
- 33) Egyptian researcher on Islam, extremism and moderation.
- 34) Egyptian founder and head of major moderate political party.
- 35) Egyptian member of the Muslim Brotherhood and political activist.
- 36) Egyptian founder of pro-democracy organization and alternative media source.
- 37) Egyptian worker in pro-democracy organization.
- 38) Lebanese member of communist political party and political activist.
- 39) Lebanese Christian worker in pro-democracy organization.
- 40) Lebanese-Egyptian researcher in international research organization based in Beirut.
- 41) Lebanese head of major international research organization based in Beirut.
- 42) Lebanese Christian head of nationalist/political television station – also award-winning documentary filmmaker.
- 43) Palestinian Islamic feminist.
- 44) Palestinian media executive and community activist/organizer.
- 45) Palestinian elementary school principal and former radical – member of PFLP.
- 46) Palestinian elementary school teacher.
- 47) Palestinian elementary school teacher and member of PFLP.
- 48) American-British researcher and consultant on issues of radicalism in the West.
- 49) British media owner and community activist – religious moderate Muslim. Consults to UK government on issues of radicalism.
- 50) American intelligence analyst and researcher – specializes in Iran.
- 51) British American journalist and author – has written books on terrorism.

## APPENDIX B

### RESEARCH FINDINGS IN DETAIL

#### Data Reporting Method

As was mentioned in the summation of Chapter II, a system analysis begins with the identification of a whole (a system); evaluating the properties of that larger whole, and then seeing the issue or phenomenon (along with all of its separate components) in its place within the larger whole (Wallman, 2001). It was theorized that more complete understanding of the terrorist phenomenon can be gained by looking at it in a complex system manner. This includes looking at the social, political and religious systems from which the terrorism phenomenon springs – seeing it as an entire network of interdependent factors and components.

Data were gathered by interviewing people who had specialized knowledge or experience in the area of Islamic radicalism and/or the societies from which radicalism springs. They then recommended others to interview, and this process continued.

Data are reported in depth and detail – as this study is phenomenological in character. This means that the understanding of the subject emerges out of a wealth of complex detail and description, in this case self-reported by the person who has firsthand or scholarly knowledge of the phenomenon. To report findings in a brief or shortened manner would defeat the purpose of this study – that is it would prevent the subtle and multifaceted understanding of the topic that was intended. A summary review of major

themes, organized according to subtopic, is found alongside policy recommendations in the final chapter

As mentioned previously in the methods section, because the interview is based upon the perspective of the interviewee and the specialized knowledge or experience that they have (Dexter, 1970), therefore they are given wide latitude as to how the interview is structured, what they consider to be most relevant, and how they define and frame the topics (Odendahl & Shaw, 2002). Deviation is seen as valuable (Kezar, 2003). Elite or expert interviewing is used for those wanting to construct a multi-faceted perspective that takes into account varying views of a particular reality (Whyte, 1984). While a set of tentative interview questions were formulated, the interviews were planned to be conducted in a style ranging from semi-structured to open-ended depending upon the preference of the interviewee (Odendahl & Shaw, 2002). For this reason, the questions were planned to be used in full with some subjects, while with others they may also have been just a starting – with some subjects choosing to either focus on one or more questions, or perhaps take the interview in an entirely different direction.

#### Who Was Interviewed and Why They Were Chosen

As mentioned in the Methods section, people were chosen to be interviewed based on their knowledge of radicalism, terrorism, moderation and/or the societies and systems that give rise to these different trends. This included researchers, political leaders in the region, academics from both the Middle East as well as the West, religious figures and organizational activists. The word ‘distinguished’ is used when referring to university founders/presidents, authors of scores of academic books and those holding multiple high level degrees. Some ‘average’ members of society were included – when they had

valuable insights based on being members of Arab/Islamic societies. Generally, subjects were recommended by other subjects (snowball method), though occasionally they were sought out by the author due to being previously known and identified as relevant to the research. When subjects are cited within the results, they are referred to by general position only without names or specifically identifying details such as affiliation or place of employment. While some subjects had no problem with being identified, some did prefer anonymity, and it was felt a single style would be preferable for the sake of consistency. Their religion (or non-Arab national origin, such as ‘American’, ‘Israeli’, etc.) is specified if they are not born Muslim. Listed in Appendix (number?) is a summary description of the subjects who were interviewed, along with brief information as to their relevance to the research – again without names or specific affiliation/place of employment.

### Research Questions

Given that this was the planned method of gathering data (semi-structured, open-ended and with questions serving as only a tentative starting point); and given that the end purpose was to construct a systems understanding based on the narratives of the interview subjects, therefore the interview questions are not used as a rigid structure for reporting and organizing the data. The data are self-organizing – that is, categories, topics and relationships are constructed based on the data – rather than organizing the data based on predetermined questions and categories. While the final structure presented in Chapter IV bears more than a passing resemblance to the original interview questions, it is not limited by them, but is rather determined by the data and narratives of the subjects.



The purpose, after all, is to describe a system using exploratory research – not to do survey research with close-ended and unchangeable questions and parameters.

As the data were collected, it coalesced around the following thematic questions:

- 1) What are the elements of the larger system from which radicalism and terrorism emerge?
- 2) What are the characteristics of each of the elements of this system?
- 3) What trends are evolving within this system?
- 4) What are policy recommendations that would strengthen moderation and weaken extremism within the various elements within the system?

### Research Findings

The following topic and subtopic headings emerged from the research interviews:

#### *Radical/Islamist Groups*

The Muslim Brotherhood  
Al-Qaeda  
Hezbollah  
Palestinian Groups  
States  
Egypt  
Saudi Arabia  
Jordan  
Pakistan  
Afghanistan  
Lebanon  
Turkey  
Qatar/Oman/UAE/Bahrain  
Iraq  
Iran  
Palestine/Israel  
United States  
Europe/UK  
Regional/Local Economics  
Culture  
General Culture  
Religious Culture  
Modernity in the Culture

Radicalism in the Culture  
Political Culture/Grassroots Reform  
Culture and Sexuality  
Culture and Gender  
Educational Systems  
Attitudes Towards the West  
Conspiracy Theories  
Media  
Positive Role of Media  
Negative Role of Media  
New/Alternative Media  
Islam  
Sharia  
Islamic Reform  
Radical Indoctrination  
Wahabism/Salafism  
Shi'a/Sunni Issues  
Jihad  
Understanding the Moderate  
Understanding the Extremist  
Developing Trends  
Positive Trends  
Negative Trends  
Policy Recommendations of Interview Subjects

#### Research Findings, In Depth:

##### *Radical/Islamist Groups*

(Egyptian writer and researcher) says that the 70s were when the movement of political Islam really took hold (though the Muslim Brotherhood had been founded back in 1928). The Islamist violent era in Egypt was from the late 70s until the mid-90s. This era saw the rise of jihadist groups like Jemaa Islamiya and other Jihadi groups. The age of al-Qaeda lasted from the mid-90s until the attacks of 9/11, (al-Qaeda having been founded officially in '98) and during that time it was the most influential group in the Islamic world – most local jihadist groups became coopted into it. Now we are living in the Salafi/Jihadi era – with most groups thinking the same way as al-Qaeda, but with no

official connections – it is more of an idea in the atmosphere. While al-Qaeda is still operative, it is not at all like it is before. The vertical structure does not exist as it once did. There are not commands issuing from al-Qaeda (for instance in Afghanistan) to carry out attacks in other countries. Groups are now isolated within their local societies in the Middle East – decentralized and independent.

(Israeli counterterrorism researcher) says that the goal of radical groups is to spread their brand of religious/ideological/fundamentalist ideology worldwide. This process started over 20 years ago but the West turned a blind eye. The group is just a vehicle/tool for the proliferation of the ideology. He also says that the terrorist group is defined by the religious leaders, not the operational leaders. Osama bin-Laden tries to style himself as both.

(American Muslim researcher) says that the emergence of radical groups (and fundamentalism in general) was a backlash against the Middle Eastern shift towards modernity the West and modernity. The rise of Sunni fundamentalism was also a response to the Iranian revolution – a triumph for Shiite power, which caused a counter-reaction among the Sunnis. This was then fueled by oil money, which enabled extremism to be spread worldwide.

(Israeli retired military officer and terrorism researcher) says that some radical groups have changed from preaching a violent/terrorist revolution to instead using a pragmatic approach. They purposely hide the violent/terrorist part of the organization and instead show the political and social side. This fools some people who just call them a political party or a social service organization.

He says that Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood and Hezbollah all are using this approach – and he thinks that it is very dangerous. These groups all have political and social sections and covert attack wings. In the past, the PLO used the same tactics. Fatah did as well, and to some extent still does. In this way, Terror groups are taking over political systems and putting on a pragmatic face.

(American intelligence analyst and researcher) says that the totalitarian ideologies like Nazism, Communism and Fascism also provided a valuable blueprint for societal control that influenced radical thinkers like Sayyid Qutb, Hassan al-Bana and the Ayatollah Khomeini. During the ascendancy of the totalitarian ideologies (70 years in the case of Communism) these ideologies demonstrated how a dictatorship can totally and completely control all of the societal elements – including the military, economic, educational and theological systems. This was an instructive lesson to the radical Muslims in the Middle East.

#### *Radical/Islamist Groups – Main Points Summarized*

Radical Groups are now decentralized and independent – not controlled from the top down by al-Qaeda (as was the case prior to 9/11). The goal of radical Islamist groups is to spread their ideology worldwide – including for many the establishment of an Islamist Caliphate in all Muslim lands (or worldwide). The group is secondary to the ideology. It is the ideological (rather than organizational/operational) leader that defines group. Radical groups may hide their agenda with a social service or political face. Major radical groups were directly influenced by totalitarian ideologies. Radical Islamic groups arose in response to a shift towards modernity and the West. Radical Sunni groups are also a response to the victory of Shiite radicalism in Iran.

### *The Muslim Brotherhood*

(American researcher) says that historically the Muslim Brotherhood began in Egypt (heavily influenced by Nazi/totalitarian ideology) and then spread and grew in Saudi Arabia, from where it spilled back into Egypt and outward to North Africa and abroad.

(Egyptian American writer) speaks of the Muslim Brotherhood as a group that is not moderate, but is just good at deceit. She says that they will use democracy to gain power, and then (like Iran) will stop the democratic process. She believes that in open elections, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt would win – especially since 65% of the population is illiterate (and therefore easy to manipulate and influence).

(American researcher) says that the Muslim Brotherhood preaches the destruction of the West and the imposition of Sharia law. He says that it is the parent group of almost all modern Sunni terrorist groups. He says that the State Department is becoming an apologist for the Muslim Brotherhood – hoping to use it to counterbalance Shiite radicalism. In addition – groups like CAIR (Council of American Islamic Relations) are propaganda front groups for the Muslim Brotherhood and yet operate freely within the U.S. – with even FBI members attending CAIR functions.

(Jordanian religious/feminist politician) says that in Jordan the Muslim Brotherhood was a mostly neutral and benign organization. When she was growing up the MB was the only organization for religious Muslims. She spent more than 25 years with them and said that it was an excellent experience. She said it taught her a lot about religion, educational work, etc and allowed her to meet many people. Her main criticism (and one of her reasons for leaving the organization) was that they did not operate in an

open way. She made suggestions to them that they should operate in a more international way – have open relationships with other countries. She wanted them not to be so secretive – they needed to operate openly. They responded that perhaps others would not like what they were doing and the time was not right. She felt that they were a bit paranoid.

(Jordanian distinguished professor and former government member) says that in Egypt the regime is very anti-Islamist – putting Muslim Brotherhood members in prison and seeing them as being against the regime. This is not true in Jordan where they are free to operate – they can also operate politically, though they recently withdrew from the elections citing tampering. In Lebanon the Islamist operate through Hezbollah and other Islamist groups. In Syria they are not so free. In Iraq there is chaos with all groups killing each other. In Turkey the Islamists just won 80% of the vote (he says they are Islamist despite protestations to the contrary). In Israel you can't win an election unless you have a good relationship with some of the religious groups. In Jordan the Islamist group is very powerful. The top leadership is pretty moderate. Jordan since its formation has always had a pretty decent relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood – despite some temporary disagreements. He hopes this continues – the ability to operate by the Muslim Brotherhood is not seen elsewhere in the Arab world. The Muslim Brotherhood is quite angry now because of accusations of electoral tampering in the municipal government. He hopes this difficulty is smoothed over, as he sees the Muslim Brotherhood as a source of stability in Jordan.

(Egyptian public figure) states that groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptian society tell women what they must do, issue harsh fatwas and generally dictate

to people how they have to behave and dress. He thinks this is true in Jordan and Syria, not only in Egypt. He says that what people have said that Muslim Brotherhood is benign in Jordan, for example, is not true. He feels that people must create stronger ideas than the voices of these groups (that are now controlling the dialogue). He says that the mix of religion and politics in the Muslim Brotherhood is very dangerous. He confides later that he is frankly scared of the Muslim Brotherhood.

(Egyptian writer and researcher) says that he is in favor of including ‘moderate Islamists’ in the political process. He defines moderates as anyone who is not taking power through violence. This includes the Muslim Brotherhood. He says – do not judge someone by hidden intentions – judge them by their words and documents.

He says that the issue is not the Muslim Brotherhood – but the regimes that do not allow these groups to operate openly. There is a historical relationship between the Egyptian regime and the Muslim Brotherhood. They are allowed to work on a grassroots level. Lately, however, this relationship has been breaking down.

He says that the Muslim Brotherhood has improved its ideas and has modernized over time. While some elements of the party have retrogressive ideas, others are willing to modernize, and have modernized. The party is not monolithic. There are those within the party that have problems with basic democratic issues – but others are pushing them to change and come in line with ideas of equality between Christians and Muslims, male and female – the right to run and hold office.

He says that the Muslim Brotherhood believes in nonviolent means of gaining power – wanting to participate in the political process using democratic tools. He says we need to study what their ideas are – I say we need to know what their plans are. He says

that they don't have any plans for the future. Most political actors just want to get rid of the present situation – the Mubarak era. After that they may start to think of the future.

He points out that one cannot separate between the Muslim Brotherhood and its environment. The way they think about human rights, women's rights, Christians, etc – is all a reflection of the thinking of the larger society. If you ask someone on the street if a Christian or a woman could run for office, they will say no. He continues – the Muslim Brotherhood is a mixture of bad and good. One needs to look at their platform. They have problems because they don't realize what democracy means. Do they believe in democratic values, freedom, equality? How will they deal with the consequences that freedom brings? Are they prepared for allowing Christians or women to run for office? This is an issue that they don't want to think about.

He says that the first step is to build a healthy society. He says that even now, the society is sufficiently strong that they could not simply usurp power and hold onto it. He repeats the statement that there is no example of a party coming to power through democratic means and then making a coup d'état.

He says that the party is untried because they haven't yet had to enter the political process. This gives them more appeal within the masses – they have never been tested. This is stupid of the government. Smaller parties have been strangled completely, and the Muslim Brotherhood has been driven underground.

He does think that if the Muslim Brotherhood comes to power in Egypt their more extreme end will split off because it will disagree with the mainstream of the party. They will not gain power until the country has a constitution that legitimizes them running. Article 5 of the constitution says that no party can run based on a platform of religion. At



this point in the party's present form they could not run according to the constitution. He does think that the party will become more flexible over time in order to survive – almost a reformist revolution within the Muslim Brotherhood. The people will demand it – because the context (the society) is growing at a faster pace than the group. Most of the members are more progressive than the leadership.

He says that within the Muslim Brotherhood one can find more conservative ideas – and these reflect ideas that are within the greater society – not just particular to the Brotherhood. he says that even in the ruling NDP party there are very conservative views – for example attacking a political figure that criticized the hijab.

He insists that the internal structure of the group within the last few years is governed by a democratic process. As to the Egyptians that have said off the record that they are scared of the Muslim Brotherhood, he says (particularly in the stage that they are in now) that he shares their concerns. But he also says that some of their fears are because they have assumptions about the Muslim Brotherhood that come from other areas – Saudi Arabia, the Taliban, etc. They don't have a model about the Muslim Brotherhood, because the Muslim Brotherhood has not been allowed to join the political process.

He thinks that if the political atmosphere is opened up, the first group that will suffer will be the Muslim Brotherhood – because the moderates will split and leave the group. For him the political/democratic structure and process in the country are more important than the individual political groups. He says let the societies develop their ideas – they may become more like Indonesia, or Turkey. But again –But he also says that it is a mistake to see the Muslim Brotherhood as monolithic – and we should give them the

chance to develop their ideas – and he thinks that the majority of the party will perhaps evolve in to a moderate direction.

(Egyptian academic) says that he thinks the Muslim Brotherhood are dangerous because they have statements that make them seem more moderate than they really are – so as not to shock the public with extreme views that the public would not accept, they go step by step. He nonetheless says that in a democracy one must integrate all parties, including Islamists. Right now the government does not have the capacity (it has outlawed the group) and the group is not sufficiently reformed to live in a democracy – their goal is to live in an Islamic state. Some factions are moderating – and these are deliberately brought forward by the leadership to make the group as a whole look moderate – which is not yet the case. The danger is that they will be able to deceive the public with what looks like moderate Islamic views and then hold on to power. How likely is this to happen? 15-20% - not unknown, but still low likelihood.

(Egyptian American author) says that she believes that in open elections, the Muslim Brotherhood would win 65% of Egypt illiterates. This is a much higher prediction than the polls cited above.

(Egyptian politician and moderate party co-founder) was a Muslim Brotherhood member for 18 years and then resigned from the party. He says that he thinks the Muslim Brotherhood is a problem for themselves and for society. They do not have an accurate idea of their role in the society. They want to have both a political role and a religious role and this is very dangerous. He says, if you want to be a preacher, be a preacher. If you want to be political, be political and stay out of religion. His party broke off from the Muslim Brotherhood and separated itself from religion – dealing only as a political entity.

He looks to change the situation to be a democratic situation, to open the door for moderate voices to be a part of political life – in this way the moderates in his party are going against both the Muslim Brotherhood and the regime. His party provides a model of moderate political discourse that is separated from the religious realm. They use Islam as a source of values (justice for example) – but not as a statement of specific actions.

(Muslim Brotherhood member) says that the Muslim Brotherhood has many aspects. Their membership is not monolithic. Yet their members have certain basic things in common – goals for change in Egypt. He sees a link between liberal ideas and Islamic values. He says that in the Middle East the references should be from Islam. But the people should be able to choose whatever they want. This is his point of view. There are others in the Muslim Brotherhood say that ‘no, people cannot choose, they must live according to Islam’. Between these two points are many different ideas.

He works with the Muslim Brotherhood because it is the only effective group in Egypt. They are in the game. They are very effective on the local and popular level – and would be even more effective if allowed to function politically. They galvanize people to vote for certain candidates – and in this way they have a political influence. Another way of saying it is that they present independent candidates that do not run under the label of the Muslim Brotherhood.

He says that there are choices in the movement. When someone joins the movement, they can work within it in any area that they want. The Muslim Brotherhood wants to make changes in Egypt but without armed change – they want to make change in political and legal ways. They want to help people that are poor, hungry, and need medical care. As to what would the society and political system look like if the MB got

their candidates in office, Mohammed says that they don't have an idea – and this is a big problem.

As far as whether they want a secular government or a non-secular government, He says that they want to leave the choice for the people. The people should decide whether they want Islam in the government and its laws or do they don't – it is up to the people to choose. He also says that the main goals of Islamic law in any Islamic government would be to ensure the 5 protected rights set down in the Koran – life, reputation, religion, etc

He also says that the MB has changed its ideas over the years. They have changed their language in the process of having to take general ideas and bring them down to practical application. Previously – before 2004 - they said that women can't join the political process – he personally challenged them to change this. Now they say that women must take more areas in the political life. The political office now has two female members. What happened to make this change? The political atmosphere in Egypt became more free, and the Muslim Brotherhood needed to change along with this to get and keep the people's support. So the Muslim Brotherhood changes along with the larger political environment.

He also points out that in Islam there is a general idea that can be explained or interpreted different ways by different people. This has been the case throughout history – there have been ideas that were applied in different ways (for better and worse) throughout history. For example, just because America kills a million (?) people in Iraq, does this mean that democracy is bad? Democracy is good. So when some people make a wrong application it does not mean that the idea is bad. Islam has many wrong

applications in this time – in Iran, Sudan – perhaps Saudi Arabia. We must separate between Islam and different people and settings.

When we want to understand the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt we need to understand that they want a democratic system. Coming into power by force is the wrong way – and the person who comes by force will not leave. Nasser, Sadat, Mubarak, all came by force and would not leave. If the Muslim Brotherhood came into power by democratic means they will respect the democratic process – give the people reason to choose them again – and if they don't choose them, they must leave (he makes some reference to an election in 1988 that they lost and they left).

If we have democratic change in Egypt (and the Muslim Brotherhood is able to come to power by free elections), there will be many systems to protect democracy. – especially if you are talking about 10 years from now.

If the Muslim Brotherhood has their ideal government, what will make it uniquely Islamic? He says that the details depend on people's needs – if the people have economic needs, the programs will be economic. If we have good solutions for economic and social programs then after that we can say that maybe we can incorporate Islam, and the people can choose their Islamic reference. He says Islamic does not mean that detailed rules have to be followed – it is more like general ideas of freedom and justice. As to whether there are people in the party that want to enforce Sharia law in areas of dress, moral deportment, etc., he says this is not the case.

He says that all of the various factions within the Muslim Brotherhood say that the people must choose the points of Islamic law that will govern the people. He says that 90% of the Muslim Brotherhood believe that the people must choose the law that they

want to be governed under. The remaining 10% says that in some areas the people can choose and in some areas it should be according to the Sharia law. He says that this 10% says that there should be an Islamic reference point – but as to how to express it, the people need to choose.

(Egyptian director of pro-democracy NGO) says that he does not agree that if the Muslim Brotherhood came to power they would peaceably leave when their term is up. He says that he recently met and befriended someone who was recruited into the Muslim Brotherhood when he was 10 years old. He says that this friend tells him that the Muslim Brotherhood does not just want to be in power in Egypt forever, the Muslim Brotherhood wants to create an Islamic empire. He says to look at Hamas as an example. They came into power in a democratic election, but have since made an almost coup d'etat against the president in what was supposed to be a power-sharing arrangement. He says that he completely disagrees with those who say that the Muslim Brotherhood will acquiesce to a democratic political process. He says that the goal of the Muslim Brotherhood is not political or economic reform, it is to impose and carry out their vision of what is God's will on the society. He says that the Muslim Brotherhood has their 'media talk' that doesn't at all represent their true aims. His friend left the Muslim Brotherhood because he started asking why the statements being made to the media were different from what they were told within the organization.

Their doctrine was no women in power, no Copts (Christians) and that the power should go to the most religious people ('el-wara, el-bara'). They say that the secular people are against religion and should be gotten rid of. The presence of two women in the political arm of the organization is, he says, just for media coverage. Internally they may

say that they want to retain power once it is achieved, but they would never make any statements of this sort to the public. Internally they say that controlling Egypt is God's will and a step on the road to the ultimate goal - the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate. His friend was tortured by the National Security Forces for being a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, and as he was being tortured he felt like a hero for helping to bring about the goal of an Islamic state. He says that his friend was expressly told that if the Muslim Brotherhood gains power they will hold it.

He says that the reason that people (even researchers) are so wrong about the Muslim Brotherhood is because researchers talk to the Muslim Brotherhood leadership and do not have the chance (or are not given the chance) to speak to members on the grass-roots level. He says that real research has not yet been done – meeting MB members from all over and asking them about what they have been told. When asked about the contention that there are different factions within the Muslim Brotherhood, he says (in so many words) 'nonsense'. As to members that say they sincerely believe in the democratic process and think that the Muslim Brotherhood respects the democratic process, He doubts this and says that the membership is not pushing for democracy – they are pushing for his group to come into power. He says that individual members and the group as a whole are Machiavellian. He does not think that there are moderate Muslim Brothers. He says to look at how the group is controlled from the inside and see how much they respect democracy. Regarding whether the group allows its members to choose where they work and on what issues, Ahmed says that this is not true. He says that if the leaders want someone to go to a particular place, or be in a specific position in the group, they can override any other opinions. The brotherhood members are told 'the

brotherhood is going (to succeed) with you or without you'. He says that Muslim Brotherhood members that believe otherwise are stupid (naïve) – and believe things that are not true.

As to whether the system would be durable enough to withstand pressure from different groups, he says that we do not have this system yet. He points to Turkey as a positive model – an Islamist party that is quite moderate and actually concerns itself with the real needs of the people. They have changed their agenda according to the evolution of the society. He says that contentions that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt will follow the same path as the Muslim Brotherhood in Turkey are not accurate. The Turkish society does not resemble the Egyptian society. Turkish society is quite modernized and wants closer relations with the West – as shown by its desire to join the EU. People in Turkey drink alcohol openly; there are human rights groups; he has friends in Turkey that fast for Ramadan and then join them over beers when the fast is broken. It is a very open-minded mentality that does not exist in Egypt.

He says that a democratic process that might be durable enough to deal with the Muslim Brotherhood does not yet exist. Even though the Muslim Brotherhood cannot be elected (because this process does not yet exist), that does not mean that the situation is currently safe. No one knows what will happen when the President is gone. There might be a power vacuum that only the Muslim Brotherhood is able to jump in and take advantage of. Currently the government does not allow an open environment politically – they do not allow for demonstrations, they persecute and repress the secular opposition, they do not allow other groups to get involved with the people – only when there is a truly open society for 5 or 10 years would he say that the society is in a place where



everyone can participate (including the Muslim Brotherhood) and the society can handle it and still remain open, free and democratic. This does not yet exist.

If he thinks that the situation is unstable enough that hypothetically any scenario could take place – what does he think is the best way to combat the extremist and non-democratic elements so that the less desirable scenarios do not become a reality? He says that there are two main ways. He says that firstly, one needs to convince the Western governments (particularly US democrats) that even talking to the Muslim Brotherhood is not good. He says that discussions with the Muslim Brotherhood will go nowhere. They will not change their agenda, and they will never truly reveal their agenda either – like Iran is currently doing vis a vis their nuclear program.

He says that the other thing that has to take place is that somebody somewhere – Egyptians – need to confront the Muslim Brotherhood on their words and ideas. Even if they just give a party line, they need to (as much as possible) be put into a corner and made to say clearly what their ideas and intentions are. They need to be asked questions that are more specific than their official party line (‘we will allow the people to choose’); they need to be confronted with quotes from their own leaders, internal statements and internal documents. What is said and done on a daily basis. For example, they pray at certain mosques. Each Friday the leaders of those mosques make speeches. What are the content of these speeches? What are they telling the people? He himself wants to do this but does not have enough resources – he can’t do everything.

(Lebanese Communist Party member) says that when he was in Turkey he saw the campaigns that the Muslim Brotherhood was waging (including paying people) to put

on the veil. He also says that the post-colonial liberation movements have taken on a religious face.

(Egyptian researcher working for international research organization) says she thinks that the Muslim Brotherhood has a right to be represented - like every other party in Egypt – they have a constituency and they deserve representation. It is less the group and more the strength of the political process within which they function. The issue also when it comes to groups is to talk with them not at them.

(Director of international research organization in Lebanon) says that the Muslim Brotherhood was the first organized mass movement that was successful. Earlier Salafi reformers were a bunch of thinkers with common ideas – but they were not a successful movement. The Muslim Brotherhood was the first successful organization – built on the model of the communist party. Their ideas were not new, but their organizational success in the Muslim world was. The Islamist movements modeled after the Muslim Brotherhood have also been successful. This includes both smaller and more extreme movements ( Hamas, al-Qaeda) as well as larger Islamic governments (Egypt, Algeria, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria – Hezbollah is a bit different). Al-Qaeda is a mix of the radicalized (jihadi) 60's version of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (reacting to the violent crackdown of Nasser) mixed with the Saudi style of Wahabism.

(American researcher and consultant based in London) says that in 1948, an Israeli soldier had an encounter with a member of the Muslim Brotherhood on the Lebanese border. This person told him that the Israelis should hope that they never have to fight with the Muslim Brotherhood, because they are true believers and don't give up.

He thinks that the key to ideologically based groups is the motivation of the follower, and the key to the motivation of the follower is having a leader that can impart a serious message. These people are led by teachers (he calls them ‘preceptors’) and says that you get people to follow you not by paying them or ordering them but by convincing them that your cause is right – it is not the command system or payment system of a Stalinist or even capitalist leader. The ‘preceptoralist’ system is an alternative to the command or payment system. He says that when someone truly believes in what they are fighting for, this is a different sort of battle. The key in this system is the link between the fighters and the leader. He therefore supports targeted assassinations – so that the leader can be taken out. For example, the Nazi movement could not have survived if Hitler had been killed. Now, however he is acknowledging that it is not just a one-way relationship. There is two-way preceptoralism – through the media, the Internet. There are people who seek out information (self-indoctrination).

(British Islamic media owner and community activist) says that very old Sufi scholars (some over 100) tell of how Hassan al-Bana (founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928) used to belong to the Sufi school and was kicked out of the Sufi order because of his beliefs. Harras calls getting kicked out of the Sufi order a ‘one in a million’ occurrence. Al-Bana’s sheikh said ‘this person (is so extreme that he) will get us killed’.

Who were the influences on Hassan al-Bana? Harras says that when he was younger he was reading the traditional classical texts, and then as he got older he was following ibn-Taymiyya – an early extremist (interesting, because at one time, ibn-Taymiyya was given the Sufi cloak of membership – until he started reading books from

the Khawariji (the earliest Muslim extremists who lived just after the death of the Prophet) – and a lot of what he said was what they said. So the Wahabi ideology (and the ideology of al-Bana) is not new – it goes back to Taymiyya and even further back to the Khawarij. The Khawarij were the ones who killed Ali for not being Muslim enough – which if you are a Muslim, you can't possibly believe that Ali (son in law of the Prophet) was not 'Muslim enough'.

*Muslim Brotherhood– Summary of Major Points*

Most if not all radical Islamist groups today trace themselves back to the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood was assisted in its early days by the British who wanted to use the group as a bulwark against Nasser. The Muslim Brotherhood is able to feign a greater degree of moderation than they really believe – this makes them dangerous. The Muslim Brotherhood says different things to the media versus what it states internally.

Muslim Brotherhood's goals are the destruction of the West, imposition of 'God's will' on the society and creation of an Islamist Empire (according to former members). The Muslim Brotherhood may take advantage of democratic process to gain power and then institute non-democratic changes. The Muslim Brotherhood leadership (i.e., powerholders) are more autocratic than followers – i.e., the leaders want eventual imposition of Sharia law on society.

U.S. government possibly being naïve about the Muslim Brotherhood, due to a desire to use group to counterbalance Iranian Shiite power. Violent crackdown (such as in Egypt) has in the past strengthened and radicalized the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood seeks to dictate the behavior of the overall society – especially women –

even in states (such as Jordan) where its image is more ‘moderate’. The Muslim Brotherhood has waged highly organized campaigns (such as regarding veiling) that have profoundly influenced societal behavior. Some call for the Muslim Brotherhood to be included in the political process, as long as the democratic process is strong enough not to be undermined – others disagree.

A country in which Islamist groups cooperate in the democratic process – Turkey – is much more diverse and tolerant society than most other Middle Eastern societies. If the Muslim Brotherhood is allowed into politics, it may cause the group to break apart into more radical and more moderate elements. The Muslim Brotherhood want to have both a political and a religious role in society, and this makes them dangerous. One of the things that makes the Muslim Brotherhood popular is the lack of other voices of opposition. Opening up the political discourse would lessen their monopoly.

The Muslim Brotherhood (especially its more moderate elements) evolves along with the larger political environment – it is a reflection of the larger society. It is necessary to confront the Muslim Brotherhood on their ideas, statements and principles – especially what is said away from the media (internal quotes, mosque sermons, documents, etc.). Polls that report 20-21% of support for the Muslim Brotherhood may be quite low. The Muslim Brotherhood is especially supported among Egypt’s large illiterate population.

#### *Al-Qaeda*

(Jordanian son of famous radical leader) thinks that al-Qaeda is wrong in the practices that they do. What is the way to make extremist and violent groups obsolete? He said that the US military and army has always given these groups justification to

continue their activities. Also, one cannot fight an ideology with guns – one must fight an ideology with an ideology.

(Director of international research organization in Lebanon) says that Al-Qaeda is a mix of the radicalized (i.e., jihadi) 1960's version of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (reacting to the violent crackdown of Nasser) mixed with the Saudi style of Wahabism.

(American Muslim researcher) says that the emergence of Al-Qaeda (and fundamentalism in general) was a backlash against the Middle Eastern shift towards modernity the West and modernity. The rise of Sunni fundamentalism was also a response to the Iranian revolution – a triumph for Shiite power, which caused a counter-reaction among the Sunnis. This was then fueled by oil money, which enabled extremism to be spread worldwide.

(American intelligence analyst and researcher) says that a major factor affecting al-Qaeda operations is that their command and control structure has been significantly weakened. There are claims that two thirds of its members have been captured or killed. If true, this would have a major effect on the ability of al-Qaeda as a centralized organizational core to operate or directly command attacks in the future. According to intelligence, Al-Qaeda now operates in a much more loose and decentralized fashion. It relies on the internet (and other types of long-distance communication such as cell-phones, faxes, etc) as a large-scale communications device. These distance communications methods tie together jihadi Muslims drawn from all over the world. Jihadists gain experience and training on battlefields all over the world, including Chechnya, Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda fighters go to these locations and

‘punch their ticket’ (i.e., gain battlefield experience), and then move on. This now experienced cadre of fighters has spread out - constantly shaping and reforming like the images in a kaleidoscope, shifting allegiances and cell-structure, and then going back to home countries.

While non-state groups such as al-Qaeda have been broken up and de-centralized, this does not mean that their threat is neutralized. It may be harder for the groups to plan and coordinate attacks, but this has not meant that attacks are not likely. Several recent terror attacks – both carried out (such as the attacks in Madrid and London) and planned but thwarted (such as the multiple airline bombing plot) – have been traced to al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda has regrouped to some degree in the Afghanistan/Pakistan area.

There is also the threat posed by localized groups, cells and individuals. These groups may be inspired by al-Qaeda, they may be loosely affiliated with al-Qaeda, they may be sympathetic to al-Qaeda, but operationally they act on their own.

Al-Qaeda needs to be understood as a bureaucratic organization – in some ways it has (or had) a very typical, corporate-style structure. A lot of what we knew about al-Qaeda came from the discovery of what turned out to be al-Zawahiri’s personal computer (written about in an Atlantic Monthly piece by Alan Cullison, titled "Inside Al-Qaeda's Hard Drive"). After the computer files were unencrypted and translated, a picture emerged of a somewhat bureaucratic, rather petty organization. There were concerns regarding how small sums of money were being accounted for – typical of any structured organization. Since the fall of the Taliban, West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center has released some documents that were seized during operations in Afghanistan (referred to as the ‘Harmony’ documents, because of the database into which they were entered prior

to declassification). One of these documents was the application paper that a person had to sign to be able to go to an al-Qaeda training camp; another was the application paper that one had to sign if one wanted to become a member of al-Qaeda. These were six or seven pages each and very detailed. So the picture that emerges of the organization around the era of 9/11 was an organization where people had vacations and salaries, took orders – it was quite organized.

The post-9/11 picture of al-Qaeda is of something quite different. The organization has taken on a different shape. It is not that it does not exist, but it is not at all the same organization that it was before 9/11. In summation – al-Qaeda is very much a product of its leaders, and at the same time it has undergone some major changes in the post-9/11 era.

The various pressures and crackdowns on al-Qaeda have caused it to increasingly shed its corporate structured model in favor of a decentralized and more loosely affiliated organization of cells around the world. However, this perspective, while accurate to some degree, can also be overdone. Generally speaking, al-Qaeda is reorganizing. Various issues, including the U.S. action in Iraq, have served to spread the ‘al-Qaeda virus’ to many locations in both East and West. Nonetheless, it is not enough to simply dislike the U.S. - one needs a functioning organization to turn someone into an effective terrorist. So a resurgence of al-Qaeda is of definite concern, because it is organizations that really have the ability to wreak damage – not simply people who hate. Evidence of an al-Qaeda resurgence and regrouping can be seen in the London subway bombings in 2005 (initially misinterpreted as the work of a bunch of homegrown UK ‘self-starters’) and likely the failed airline plot using liquid explosives as well. In contrast, the second wave of London



attacks – that followed two weeks after the initial bombings - were unsuccessful. This was likely because the operation was not under the operational supervision of al-Qaeda. The men who tried to perpetrate those attacks had never been to Pakistan, never gotten formal training, never went to Afghanistan, met with bin-Laden or learned to make bombs. Simple hatred and desire was not enough to launch a successful attack. It would be analogous to deciding that all U.S. military training would now take place over the internet because that is the best way to do it. Soldiers have to go to training camps, undergo indoctrination by people and be trained by people to do things.

Currently al-Qaeda is regrouping and running (perhaps smaller-sized) training camps in the border areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Recent operations in Afghanistan seem also to be a cooperative effort between the newly resurgent Taliban and al-Qaeda – a blending of both ideologies and operatives. This has caused an exponential increase of suicide attacks, as well as casualties. While Afghanistan has not reverted to its previous status as a state almost completely overrun (and run) by terrorists (the destruction of the Buddhist statues at Bamiyan being a completely Wahabist idea) nonetheless, the Taliban continue to be supported and influenced by al-Qaeda in many ways both ideological and practical. The geographical base that existed for al-Qaeda prior to 9/11 – the extensive network of training camps and bases – no longer exists, but al-Qaeda is still a significant presence in Afghanistan.

Al-Qaeda is also running training and operations in Iraq (overtly, not covertly – note the organizational name ‘al-Qaeda in Iraq’). Al-Qaeda is in fact the main group in Iraq waging suicide attacks – which have been successful in causing the U.N. to withdraw, the international community to withdraw (especially after the bombing of the

Jordanian embassy), various NGO's to withdraw, reconstruction to stop, a civil war to be started, etc. In this sense, al-Qaeda in Iraq has turned out to be quite a successful enterprise (notwithstanding the death of al-Zarqawi, who was quickly replaced by the Egyptian al-Masri – probably a longtime associate of fellow Egyptian Zawahiri). Another manifestation of the regrouping of al-Qaeda is the way in which they are joining with and co-opting other terrorist groups - such as the GSPC in Algeria which recently declared itself to be an arm of al-Qaeda. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, an Afghan warlord who commands a sizeable militia near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area has also recently declared his group to be a part of al-Qaeda.

So, in sum (regarding al-Qaeda), bin-Laden is still out there, Zawahiri is still out there. They do not need to give direct orders or make phone calls to people (especially since their communications have been curtailed) – they can just release a videotape or audiotape – thereby communicating with potentially millions of people.

#### *Al-Qaeda– Summary of Major Points*

Al-Qaeda no longer has the control of Radical/Islamist Groups in a top down manner (as it did in the 90s). Rather, decentralized and localized groups loosely affiliate with al-Qaeda and take inspiration from it. The U.S. needs to look at ways to not give groups like al-Qaeda justification by U.S. behavior.

Al-Qaeda is a mix of the radicalized Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (which was influenced by Nazi/totalitarian thought) along with Saudi style Wahabism. Al-Qaeda is based on an ideology and must be fought with ideology. Al-Qaeda relies on communication (Internet, cell, fax, video/audio tapes, couriers for more sensitive information) to indoctrinate and communicate with members worldwide. Al-Qaeda

training camps have been set up on the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Fighters travel to ‘theaters of jihad’ worldwide to get combat experience. Al-Qaeda (and/or its regional hubs) is likely still planning and carrying out attacks.

### *Hezbollah*

(Lebanese Communist party member) says that Hezbollah imposes Islamic observance the same way that all of the parties impose. If you are a Sunni, the Sunni party is the only choice you have for representation. Ditto for the Druze, ditto for the Shiite, Christians, etc. It is not like in Egypt where there is one party in control (Mubarak) and one opposition (the Muslim Brotherhood). No one is imminently in danger of imposing their will as a single power – this is not possible in Lebanon. Power is held in Lebanon by dividing it up with other groups – including drawing electoral districts in such a way to ensure repeated victories by the leading party in each district – with Parliament seats awarded to the victor. The Syrians invented this form of government so that they could control the political process and it remains in place after they are not here.

He goes on to say that Hezbollah is seen as part of a national resistance. ‘Resistance’ was not started by Hezbollah, but rather by several political parties together to oppose Israeli occupation over the years – most currently the occupation of the Shebaa farms. He does not support suicide bombings against civilians, but does not have a problem with strikes against military forces – even within another country’s sovereign territory (since they think that Israel has done the same thing). Hezbollah is seen as the defender of Lebanese territory and prisoners. They are trying to free the Lebanese people. He does not see them as bringing an unacceptable cost – he does not look at it from a cost

benefit (what he calls ‘machiavellian’) perspective. He says that Hezbollah should have studied the case more before acting – but this was not a fault on their part. Their motivation was to get the prisoners back and free the Shebaa farms. He does not accept that Hezbollah purposely shot rockets from residential areas to use civilians as cover and propaganda ‘victim’ targets of Israeli counterstrikes. He says that they shot rockets from their own villages and areas – they would not purposefully put their families in danger. He does concede that Hezbollah miscalculated – but he does not think that Hezbollah is a liability. He thinks that both sides will calculate more carefully in the future. I tell him that I don’t think that this is what Israel learned – I think that what they took out of it is that they need to hit harder next time.

He says that one cannot just look at Lebanon as if Hezbollah is the bad guy and Siniora is the good guy – this is a misunderstanding. He also does not think that Hezbollah will in the end be able to subvert the democratic process (by coercive measures) if there is a real democratic government. He clarifies this later to say that what he meant is that the support that Nasrallah has now is because there is a lack of open democratic parties and democratic processes. If there was a real democratic process and open choices, there would be a lot less support for Hezbollah.

(Lebanese Christian worker in pro-democracy NGO) says that she says that she sees Hezbollah as a part of the legitimate resistance against Israel. She is neither for them nor against them. She does not think that Hezbollah’s actions against Israeli soldiers caused the Israeli response in Lebanon. She is not concerned about future Hezbollah actions causing a cost to Lebanon.

(Christian Lebanese television station manager) says that whether there is a danger in Hezbollah taking over and imposing Sharia law depends on how Hezbollah is managed. Hezbollah can be a strength for Lebanon – because it protects from Israeli invasion. As to what if Hezbollah imposes a religious, coercive vision on the country – he says it cannot do so. Not because they wouldn't want to, but because they know that they cannot.

(PFLP member and teacher from Ramallah) says that while he does not agree with Hamas. Hezbollah is a different story – Israel stole land from the Lebanese and Hezbollah wants to get the land back. They build culture, unity and good technical tactics and they use many ways and then they get the point that they know that if they make war with Israel they will get it back. He is speaking about Shebaa farms – an area of about 10 miles. He says that he wants to get his land back even if it is just one meter. He says that the Israeli government has stolen land from Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Syria, and most importantly Palestine – it is a thief government. He goes on about the conflict in Lebanon and how many civilians were killed by the Israelis (more than 1000), and how many soldiers were killed by Hezbollah (100). He says that Hezbollah killed about one or two civilians - so who is the terrorist now? He thinks that because of the Israeli experience with Hezbollah, they won't go to war in Lebanon.

#### *Hezbollah (Lebanon) – Summary of Major Points*

Hezbollah is seen in the country as a defense and resistance against Israeli aggression/occupation. The more truly democratic Lebanon becomes, the less support a militant group like Hezbollah will have – and the more they will have to share power

with other groups. Hezbollah is seen as an organized group that is a role model to others. Presently Hezbollah carries a lot of symbolic value in the region – even among Sunnis.

*Israeli and Palestinian Groups ( Hamas, Fatah, PFLP, etc.)*

(Muslim woman from Ramallah) says Palestinians have to wake up and let Fatah and Hamas go to hell. They put the people's situation in hell – put them last. She says let the community function as a unit – one people, to live in a good city with their rights and traditions. When the people are a strong unit, no one will be able to destroy them. She says that she can't do anything – or even openly voice these ideas, because if anyone in the police hears her talk critically about Hamas or Fatah or their policies they will say that she is a spy, she is not Palestinian, she does not believe in anything. So the discussion that she is presently having, she could not say the same things freely in the society she lives in.

(Media executive and organizer originally from Ramallah) says that Fatah and Hamas are not able to get their shit together and are stuck in their rivalries (though he says the problems started long before Fatah and Hamas), therefore solutions need to come from the people, not from political groups.

(PFLP member and teacher from Ramallah) says the wrong things that Hamas has done in Gaza have made the people hate it. Not only killing Fatah members - he says that they are going to Israel with open arms, offering them peace and telling them that they will not allow any fighters to cross from Gaza into Israel. (They have caught people trying to fire on Israel and they shoot them behind the knee so that they are crippled – they have done this to about 20 people.) They have shut down the Palestinian media – not allowing any journalists, no satellites – the people hate this. They have taken down the

Palestinian flag and put up their flag instead. Who made Hamas? In 1987, there was no Hamas. Israel made Hamas to destroy the unity of the population. The same way that America made bin-Laden.

He says that in any case, once Hamas is gone, they will be able to better reach out to the Palestinians. He says that the people supported Hamas because Fatah was seen as corrupt and Hamas said that they would bring change and build. Everyone hated Fatah. They made a lot of problems, stole a lot of money. Now Hamas is hated, and he thinks that the people will want them to go. If there is an alternative choice he thinks that Hamas will get no more than 30% support. He thinks that Abbas will hold new elections and Fatah will come back to power – but this can only happen if Abbas is in Gaza to hold elections. In order for this to happen, Hamas needs to agree to allow elections – which would be in response to pressure from the people. This may occur because Hamas will not have the economic support from the international community. He does not think that Hamas will stage a coup to hold on to power. He does not think that Hamas will try to retain power against the wishes of the Palestinian people.

How does he think that Hamas should be dealt with? He says that Hamas must leave by itself. If Fatah comes to power, they may have new people that support Mohammed's goals of unity. Regarding this optimistic possibility, he says that you must look at what is beautiful, not what is sad – or you will just think about how to die.

Regarding PFLP, he says that PFLP did many things but did not make attacks on civilians. He justifies the killing of Rehavaam Zeevi (Israeli Minister of Transportation assassinated by PFLP) by saying that he was the first person to tell the Israelis that they needed to transfer the Arabs out of Palestine. The Israelis killed Abu Mustafa (second in

command at PFLP) who was also a civilian – and the PFLP picked the right person to get in retaliation. He continues about how the Israelis started this war, its their fault, they are bad, etc. But he insists that the goal that he is working for is an eventual sociopolitical shift - not eventual military action.

(Israeli Arab sociologist) says that Islamist movements are both political and social. He says that the Palestinian Islamic movement started within the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt – they told the people that they were not going in the right way and need to change. This eventually coalesced into a movement in Palestine and moved to the local governments and then even to the Knesset. Now two Knesset members are from the Islamist movement (joined with another party for political reasons). The Islamist movement in Israel and Palestine has its own organizations, newspapers, and websites. He feels this movement is fundamentalist and radical and doesn't like them.

In Israel, there are two Islamic movements in the North – they object to joining the government. The Islamist movement in the South does join the Israeli government. The Knesset Islamist party does not express its goals for Islamist reform openly. They speak about equality and improving society – but he knows them. He feels they started with ideology and now want to control local economics. They want to build organizational structures that will bring power. They also want to gain power using money as a tool. These Islamist organizations and parties get support from businesses and larger Arab world. In Israel (unlike Palestine) Islamic movement can't take over all of government – just Knesset seats and municipalities.

He says that they want members to do exactly as they say with no question, and that they want to discourage interaction and assimilation with modernity. Basically they



want the path of the Muslim Brotherhood – first with their own membership, then with the general Israeli Arab and Palestinian population.

When it comes to the Islamists, it's not the religion that he mistrusts (as most Muslims are religious), it is their narrow-mindedness and rejection of modernity. Also he mistrusts their desire to dictate to the population how they should observe Islam.

He says that the external religiosity of population is due to the influence of Islamic groups. Also there is a general shift towards Islamic identity due to feelings of cultural threat from West. Religious identity leaves free choice – but the Islamist movement is seeking power and control over the government and the population. They see Islam as a government power tool to carry out and enforce their ideology. They want to recruit, influence, and control others - not just governments but individuals too. This desire for power and control reverberates up through the levels, societal to governmental.

Islamists believe Muslims should change how they live. They try to convince and even sometimes force others to “true Islam”. Their basic core is imposing Islamist fundamentalist ideology – all their other goals are to achieve this.

They also want to build their own self-contained individual society. In Israel, they do not want communication with Israeli Society other than being citizens. They interact with the Islamic world more than with the larger Israeli society. In Israeli society there is only so far as they can go to coerce. Additionally, the majority of Israeli Arabs do not belong to Islamist groups. He feels that in Israel the Islamist groups are at their maximum size now and not a threat.

However, in Israel people (Arabs especially) are afraid to verbally attack groups that claim to represent Islam. He feels that one can't just leave the field to them, and

people must speak out. He thinks that this will increase on the part of Arab politicians and intellectuals, particularly once a cultural/societal impact is felt from the Islamists - something will at some point push people to speak out.

He says that regarding Hamas, they won a democratic election but they have no support in West or the Arab world. He says that Hamas is under siege and has no chance to govern. The West recognizes Fatah - even though they also have violent history.

All parties act violently – but because of fear of Islamists Hamas is singled out for isolation. Arab governments do not recognize Hamas because they fear the power of Islamists. In Egypt, having the Muslim Brotherhood in the political system will create checks and balances. Hamas did not have this opportunity (to be checked by the political system) because of being isolated by Israel and the West.

#### *Palestinian Groups– Summary of Major Points*

Both Hamas and Fatah are seen as caring more about their inter-group rivalry than the welfare of the Palestinian people. Hamas is deeply unpopular for both its treatment of the Palestinian people in Gaza, its killing of Fatah rivals, as well as its perceived reaching out to curry favor with Israel.

Palestinian groups originated as offshoots of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. There are Islamist groups in Israel – both within and outside of the Knesset. They tend to want to exert control over local governments and populations. A growth in the religiosity of the Palestinian Arabs can be traced to Islamist groups. Islamist groups in Israel tend to remain isolated/autonomous from the greater society.

Israeli and Palestinian Arabs are afraid to speak out against Islamist groups. Marginalizing groups (like Hamas) may strengthen them and protect them from

governmental checks and balances. In Israel, Islamist groups cannot gain widespread power above the local level.

*Attitudes Towards the West*

(Egyptian American writer) states that hatred of the West and of Israel predates Islamic radicalism in the population.

(Egyptian researcher) says that one needs to distinguish between positive opinions about life within the USA versus negative opinions (even among moderates) regarding U.S. foreign policy.

(Jordanian distinguished professor) observes that after the fall of the Soviet Union, the US was the only power in the world – and made no effort to hide their desire to impose an American and Western model of democracy, human rights, etc – basically to change the whole world. This caused a lot of negative feelings towards the U.S. The Americans had a great influence on the Arab countries – occupying Iraq, Afghanistan – threatening Syria and Lebanon, helping the Israelis to kill Palestinians. Other Arab regimes are basically obeying the desires of America and doing what they want – despite the fact that this is against the wishes of the populations of these countries. This creates a lot of anger within the Arab world. He says that on one hand, the U.S. preaches about democracy and human rights. However, in order to serve its own interests, it turns around and supports governments (Jordan – which he says falsifies municipal elections, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, etc) that have no free elections and no true democracy or human rights. This causes further hatred of the U.S. in the region. He says that the US does not want to promote real democracy in the region, because any country that becomes truly

democratic (reflecting the will of the people) will not be willing to carry out the wishes of the US.

He compares this to other countries in the West that in the past made promises to third world/Arab countries that they would help support human rights and democracy, etc. When they came into power they all were the same – and none of them fulfilled their promises. Even the fulfillment (or hoped for fulfillment) of promises to help is in itself problematic because it keeps the Arabs again in a passive and dependent mode vis a vis the West. He says that more people in the Arab world do not believe that the US can or will change its policies of supporting autocracies in contradiction to its stated beliefs. For this reason he says many people in the Arab world wish and want (and believe) that the US will disappear in 20 or 30 years entirely from the political arena. Similar to Great Britain, France, etc, who were once great powers but are no longer.

Without the interference of the U.S. (in propping up autocracies) there may be hope for the poor and oppressed people of the world to rise up for their rights. However, as a cautionary note he says that it is possible that if the US withdraws from Iraq and stops supporting Arab regimes, this might encourage the extremists to try and seize power from regimes that no longer enjoy the support of the US – though he does not see this scenario as likely. Arabs in general are moderate – the fanatics are less than one percent. He says that the vast majority of the Arab world is logical, wants to live in peace, wants a just and peaceful world – but he still says that they want America to fall – because they feel that the US is actively obstructing peace and justice in the Arab world. He says that he has personally heard this throughout the mainstream Arab world. If American would stay in the West, not send arms here, not support non-democratic Arab

regimes they will be loved here. Basically he does not want the US to conduct itself in a hegemonic manner. He feels that the US should not give the Arab world lessons about human rights or democracy. Every time the US invades another country, they have a justification for doing so – and excusing whatever crimes are committed in the process. He says that after WWII, there was hope that their relationship with the West would be on an equal basis. Peace, social justice, good education, technology, etc. The West, particularly the European countries did not allow this to happen. They interfered in the internal affairs, supported regimes that oppressed them (through military coups and dictators).

The West always preferred dealing with dictators because there was only one person to talk to – making things easier and more predictable. When Israel was created by the West, the Arab states concentrated on military affairs and diverted needed resources to oppose Israel. The money that should have been used for the population was subverted to the military to defend against Israel – or at least this was the reason given by the dictators to use all of the people's money for military purposes. The Western interference and the creation of Israel obstructed real change in human rights, democracy, social justice, culture, education, etc.

(Jordanian son of famous radical leader) does not have a definition for the word 'terrorism' that makes sense to him. The U.S. labels as a 'terrorist' someone who is legitimately defending themselves. There are others who commit massacres who are not labeled as terrorists, who should be. If a definition is given that applies to everyone (every organization in the world) he will accept it. The current definition(s) are used to condemn some people and excuse others. The U.S. also uses the term 'terrorist' to serve

its own interests. For example the US looked on the mujahedeen in Afghanistan as warriors when they opposed the USSR, but then later calls them terrorists and attacks them. Also states use this definition to apply to the actions of non-state entities that they do not like – when they do the same thing with impunity. In a war, when the actions of the state result in the deaths of civilians, this does not label them as terrorists – and he thinks that it should.

(Egyptian researcher working for international research) wishes that the US would not only support regimes that serve their selfish interests. There is a definite feeling of injustice in the Muslim world regarding the Western policies towards Israel; there are the hegemonic schemes of the U.S. All of these create strong feelings in the Islamic world. Even a feeling of cultural infringement and the threat of globalization – which is shared by other cultures (for instance the French). Saying that the battle is within Islam (and not between Islam and the West) is an oversimplification. While there is a dynamic that is taking place within Islam, Islamic societies do not exist within a vacuum. They are not isolated from the West. While there are internal factors – these are also in response to external factors. Both are taking place.

An example of Western infringement was when the Palestinians elected Hamas in a democratically elected government. Even Palestinian attempts to do the right thing were stymied by the West. Their attempts at democracy are not being accepted.

(Jordanian professor of comparative religion) says that a host of things (including but not limited to colonialism) led to a stagnation of the Middle East. He places much of the blame on external politics – including Israel. He says that the US allows Israel to do whatever it wants without veto. Dictators force Muslims to do what they want (implies that

the US is biggest). He says that some Westerners still see Islam as dangerous and like the 'anti Christ'. He says that neo-cons are like that. He talks about Zionist lobby – says they aren't normal people. He says he doesn't want Western pressure for democracy – he wants dialogue. He doesn't want freedom from the White House – wants to create his own freedom. He wants the US not to just deal with Middle East for its own benefits.

(Jordanian Sufi Professor) says that the U.S. and the EU caused many problems for Islamic society – mostly out of a desire to control the oil market. They did not allow the Arabs a chance to be good nations, because they just wanted to secure the oil supply. He says that when Arab nations became truly free, extremism will stop. The U.S. should be pressing Middle Eastern states to become free and open societies (in an Arab/Islamic way). People should have access to resources, choose their leaders, make free choices, and not live in fear (from the state).

(Jordanian distinguished academic) says that the U.S. involvement in WWI, WWII, and the Cold War (small wars) provoked a defensive response by the Islamic nations (who he says were not involved in WWI). After WWI, the Islamic countries were left without resources. The reaction to US military involvement included Islamic extremism. This reaction was exacerbated by French and English colonizing the Middle East after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Middle Eastern leaders cooperated with the colonial powers. All of this provoked a survivalist defensive reaction from Muslims. Defensive reaction is called "terrorism."

He says our parents (now) are America... we are waiting for them to do the right thing. He prays that God awakens America to the need for doing justice – not only to carrying out its will. The US has a (theoretical) feeling for justice, but this gets destroyed

on the ground. Wants the ME (with US proper action) to be the help and the peace of the world, not the problem of the world. (If left, it will be the “hell” of the world).

(American researcher and academic) says that Islamism is a modernist movement – a reaction to classical Islam and its relationship to the West. From this perspective, extremism/fundamentalism is essentially reactionary. He says that the early Islamist, Ibn Taymiya was reacting to Mongol conquests and conversion. Ibn Wahab was reacting to various issues taking place in Arabia. Both Hassan Al-Bana (Muslim Brotherhood founder) and Sayid Qutb (its main ideologue) were exposed to the West. Much of the past 200 years of Muslim history were a response to the West.

Regarding the West, Muslims felt superior (religiously, culturally, etc.) and felt that there was nothing for them to learn from West. The Islamic world was insulated and incurious about West. In the Middle Ages (till 1500) the Muslim world was a better place to live, however, after that (due to various changes and advances), Christendom was better. Crusader (inquisition) mentality was fleeting for Christendom, but it has proved endemic for Muslims.

He says that Globalist/American culture hits hard everywhere, but especially in the Middle East. He says that being forcibly pulled into a foreign culture was perceived as an assault by the Islamic world by the West – especially given their prior history of insularity.

#### *Attitudes towards the West– Summary of Major Points*

Hatred and/or resentment towards the West predates Islamic radicalism. There tend to be more positive attitudes towards Western societies than Western governments (especially the U.S.) The end of the Cold War and the establishment of the U.S. as the



world's primary superpower intensified negative feelings towards the U.S. Feelings of political powerlessness are stronger than a resentment of Western culture. There is strong resentment towards the U.S. for its support of non-democratic, repressive and corrupt governments in the Middle East. This is seen as hypocritical, given that the U.S. supposedly desires democracy and human rights in the region.

It is thought that without U.S. support, regional governments would be forced to listen to the will of the people and become more democratic and responsive/responsible/ U.S. policies in the region are seen as self-serving, and a continuation of colonialist exploitation and manipulation.

The U.S. is highly resented for its interference in the affairs of Middle Eastern countries – currently most seen in the case of Iraq. The U.S. is seen as favorably biased towards Israel and against the Palestinian people. The U.S. is seen as hypocritical for supporting groups at one time, and then labeling them as terrorist when they no longer serve U.S. needs (such as the case of the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan).

#### *Conspiracy Theories (Plausible and Implausible)*

(Egyptian moderate thinker and writer) says that in Egypt there is a single party line – anti Americanism and conspiracy theories. He says that history is from a conflict of interests and chance events, but it is certainly not a single conspiracy theory. He says the preponderance of anti-Western and anti-Israeli conspiracy theories and blame – even among high level academics is a sign of the low level of intellectual discourse in these countries. There is no real search for knowledge, no critical thinking, no asking of real questions. He thinks that a big failure is the collapse of the cultural life through the educational system. It is currently based only on memorization (this is a part of Arab

culture – to memorize poetry and history). The topics of study are not at all based in the twenty first century. It does not aim at all at enriching thinking and creativity.

(Jordanian distinguished academic) says that Israel left the West Bank and Gaza in order to covertly engineer Hamas and Fatah attacks.

(Christian Lebanese television station manager) says that the Japanese came to Egypt to see how the Egyptians were working to enter the modern world – to enter the industrial era. They wanted to learn from the Egyptian model. They wrote down some pointers. Japan improved dramatically, unlike Egypt. Unlike Japan, Egypt was so close to the Western countries – and Japan was far away. Some conspiracy theorists say that it was because of the similarities between Egypt and the West that Europe actively worked against Egyptian progress. They didn't care about Japan because it was different and far away. Militarily, the Europeans actively opposed Ibrahim Pasha to conquer the Ottoman Empire – even though he was a reformer and a modernizer. While the Arab world has a lot of problems, there are also external problems then and now that have stood in the way of Arab modernizers.

(Palestinian media executive and community organizer) says that the Israelis are controlling the entire Middle East – there are numbers and facts – for example, Israeli troops were in Iraq kicking Saddam Hussein out of power. He says “we know what the story is.”

(Mathematics teacher from Ramallah) says that all of the different people in the world that kill, the US, the Israelis, others – even Palestinians that have money, all do so because of a small group that controls the money.

### *Conspiracy Theories– Summary of Major Points*

The preponderance of anti-Western conspiracy theories in the Middle East is seen as a sign of the low level of education, discourse and critical thinking in the region, as well as the absence of accurate and open sources of information – including a lack of transparency in government.

#### *States*

(American intelligence analyst and researcher) says that Radical extremists would love to gain power in more nation-states. Iran has made a serious play for power in the state of Lebanon. They have already gained power in the Palestinian Territories. Radical Islamists are making a play for Somalia, and Sudan is already Islamist. Afghanistan, with all of the troubles it is experiencing (including a resurgent Taliban with funding provided by the drug trade), is not in danger of falling under the control of Islamists. This is in large part due to the force of NATO, the large investments in infrastructure building, as well as the strength of the central government under the leadership skill of Hamid Karzai. The economic numbers and social indicators in Afghanistan are largely hopeful.

Countries and the control of countries remain a highly desirable goal because to control a country is to have control over geography and all of the mechanisms of a nation-state, with all of the benefits that that brings. This means controlling money, land, natural resources, national identity documents such as passports – which are invaluable. All of these things are very useful to radical groups – which is one of the reasons that radical groups are trying so hard to control Iraq, even in the face of concerted opposition.

The present picture shows Somalia becoming Islamist, Sudan having been Islamist for some time, Lebanon on the brink, the Palestinian Territories basically under Islamist control, Iraq being fiercely fought over, Iran is firmly Islamist.

Regarding the future of larger states such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Jordan – all of them are vulnerable to Islamist takeover. For this reason, it is important to retain some measure of stability in these states, even as we (the West) encourage them to adopt democratic reforms.

The issues within these larger monarchies will probably be rising to a head within the next 10-20 years. This is unlike the situation in the aforementioned countries such as Iran, Lebanon, Somalia, Sudan, Palestine and Iraq – where the dangers are much more acute and immediate. King Abdullah of Jordan has stated that the Middle East could shortly be facing three simultaneous civil wars – in Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon, all of whom are in a state of violent (or near-violent) unrest. Iran (while not currently facing a civil war) is urgent for the internal reasons stated above, as well as its nuclear ambitions. Until the large monarchies resolve their internal conflicts between those who understand and want representative government, and those who are autocrats trying to hold onto power, these countries will all be in danger. Even if this conflict is resolved, the advent of democratic freedoms may just present more instability and opportunities for radicals to gain power. Is it better to have autocratic regimes creating a pressure cooker, or is it better to have reforms that can trigger a sudden release of pressure – or a power vacuum into which others rush to grab the power?

One philosophy calls for gradual and incremental reforms – like the valve on the top of a pressure cooker that lets out small amounts of steam as the pot cools down.

Examples of small reforms would be elections in municipalities and the creation of municipal councils with input into government, allowing women to vote, allowing the formation of labor unions, freedom of the press – rather than sudden large scale changes that can trigger power grabs or chaos, because the Islamist elements thrive on chaos. Even more importantly - what needs to be implemented at the same pace as gradual freedoms (and is as integral a part of democracy as its freedoms), is the fair rule of law. This means having judicial systems that themselves abide by the rule of law – rather than just imposing it on others. It also means that the rulers subordinate themselves to the rule of law as well – something that they are unlikely to do.

Overall, given these rather bleak issues, the likelihood of these large nations going into Islamist hands is at least 50/50. Islamists are powerful and they perceive themselves as being on the ascent. They think that things are going their way – and this may be the case. The issue with the large Middle Eastern states is that change is coming – the only question is how quick it will come, how violent it will be, and what outcome it will bring.

Slightly less vulnerable (than the large states) to Islamist takeover are the small Gulf States – Bahrain, Qatar, U.A.E. These states, though all monarchies, are more liberal in their societies (with therefore less internal pressures), and have relatively free presses, within limits. There is not a lot of repression of minorities, though they may have less opportunity than the majority – so there is less internal dissent. They have also had the luck of having had some very good quality leadership. These states are also quite wealthy and have more stable economies. One reason for this is simple scale. A smaller population creates less drain on the economy. The Gulf States are also centrally located

and take advantage of their geo-strategic locations to increase trade, travel and tourism. They are also blessed with abundant natural resources. For all of these reasons, the small Gulf states seemed to have sidestepped the looming changes and instability that face the larger autocratic states.

All of these regimes that are termed 'autocratic' (dynastic or monarchic) have both international as well as internal domestic pressures. Some of these pressures are for positive changes, such as elections, women's vote, freedom of the press, etc. Some of them are negative pressures for change that come internally and can be violent – such as terrorist cells within the country carrying out terrorist attacks. These two types of pressures may work at cross-purposes, for example if the international community is pressing for elections, free press or trade unions –the leaders in power may feel that allowing these freedoms might give more space to the radicals to try and take the leaders down. These competing pressures can place these leaders between a rock and a hard place. A strong, but fair rule of law – that might serve to constrain radical extremists, would also have to apply to the rulers themselves (regarding corruption, mandating and protecting freedoms) in order to be acceptable to the masses and the international community... effectively jeopardizing their hold on power.

This concept of subservience to the democratic will of the people (as expressed through regular elections), the rule of law and the constraints of civil society, as it is practiced by liberal democracies in the West, and as opposed to the rule of autocrats or radicals, is a new and strange concept for the Middle East – one that they have not yet bought into. The danger of radicals becoming elected is mitigated by the existence of laws that protect human rights/freedoms... and keep the government from being co-opted

by extremists. Again – the rule of just law is almost more crucial than representative government, which can be twisted.

(American Muslim researcher) says that Arab Muslims are culturally much closer to West than Far East. However many misconceptions exist – in part because few in West have actually lived in Islamic countries. He says that Muslim world in major transformation- greatest cultural upheaval since the French revolution.

(Egyptian American writer) says that states in the Middle East are autocratic and have highly developed ways of keeping track of the population, therefore if radicalism exists, it is because the states are allowing it to exist.

(Jordanian Christian female professional) says that the government in Jordan really keeps a close eye on radicalism – the secret service knows what everyone does – they are quite good at keeping it under control.

(Jordanian distinguished professor) says that in many Arab countries the intelligence machine is even stronger than the regime itself, sometimes thinking for the regimes – it is the governing force in many Arab countries. Nonetheless, he disagrees that governments support extremism to bolster their governments. In SA, the intelligence services watch the imams that are government functionaries – if any of them express any extremist ideas, they would be jailed. Also insists that the Jordanian regime does not support religious extremism or even fundamentalism.

(Egyptian American writer) says that on the other hand the population is often more extreme and radicalized than the ruling governments – although they may allow the radicalism to exist because it serves their purposes.

(Jordanian Christian female professional) says that if it was not for the government, Jordan would be as religiously conservative as Saudi Arabia.

(American researcher) feels that Middle Eastern states use extremism and radicalism as a way to keep the attention of the population away from their governments and focused on the evils of the West and Israel. He also says that If radical states get nukes, they will give them to Al-Qaeda.

(Jordanian distinguished professor) says that right now the only choices in the Middle East are between repressive regimes and extremism. Any democratic groups are being repressed. He does not have too much optimism for the democratic movements to work – he thinks it is more likely that extremism will take hold – because the regime does not even allow the democratic movements ability to breathe. The intelligence machine is even stronger than the regime itself, sometimes thinking for the regimes – it is the governing force in many Arab countries. Democratic movements are given just enough latitude to speak a little, but if the criticism gets too sharp, the person doing it would be put in jail.

(Jordanian son of famous radical leader) says that in the Middle East (unlike the West where people can say what they want without fear), people are not free and are afraid to speak and act openly.

(Jordanian distinguished professor and former government member) says that two factors affect the political and economic development of a country (speaking about the Middle East) – the internal dynamics and leadership within the country; and the second is the external pressures that the Middle East is undergoing and has undergone for centuries. The Arab world has many different types of governments – sheikhdoms, principdoms,



sultanates, hereditary monarchies – it is a chaotic form of existence. The Arab world has 22 different entities – each one unique to itself. In all of these 22 entities (without violent change from within) he does not think that there will be any substantive change in the style of government – much less democratic change. The legacy of the Arab country is the fact that the focus is on the top leader in the society – (it is a ‘top down’ model). He does not think that a republican form of government will occur at any time in the foreseeable future in the Middle East (this being a limited government, structured by a constitution; leaders with fixed terms). The possible exception to this within the Arab world might be Lebanon – depending on how its situation unfolds. Lebanon is a sectarian country divided along religious lines – unique among Arab countries. His analysis excludes Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Israel. He says there are forces (Islamist groups for example) that may cause instability, but they will not bring about a republican form of government. The Islamist groups are the strongest groups in any of the Arab countries right now – including Lebanon. Democratization in the American definition (an elected leadership with institutions) will not take place in Arab countries will not take place within his lifetime.

(Egyptian distinguished thinker and writer) wants to tell all of the politicians and policy makers in the West that they need to change their understanding of the Middle East. They vacillate between wanting to prop up dictators, then they want to talk to Islamists. They are both the same strategy – because they will both lead to Islamism. Propping up dictators will drive the people to Islamists as surely as talking to the Islamists directly. Islamism appeals to people because of the way that the societies have been managed by the autocrats. People have the impression that the Islamists are clean

and not corrupt like the present leaders. He tells them that the Islamists may be clean now, but they may change once in power. The people also find the current regimes to be totally incompetent and hope that the Islamists will be competent. He says that there is no sign that the Islamists will be competent by any modern definition. They will seem more competent in the short term because they will not yet be corrupt. Once they have become corrupted they will become just as incompetent as the previous rulers (because in the Middle East, incompetence is due to corruption).

(Egyptian researcher) says that one cannot deal with countries in the ME the same way that one deals with other nation-states. They are not typical nation-states. Even though they have been independent for 50-60 years, the political attitudes and mentality in the region are still ones of national liberation and anti-colonialism. It has not been transformed to the politics of typical nation-states where people seek reform, compromise, improvement - i.e., dialogue from a stance of self-determination. The existence of the Israeli/Palestinian problem both caused this feeling and was used by regimes to prolong the mentality of anti-colonialism and give them legitimacy as well as a free-pass from criticism

When the US tried to deal with governments by just pushing (and not hard enough) for political change – putting that in the framework of regime change – this was done by force in Iraq and would be done by other means elsewhere – this was the subtext of the US dialogue and pressure. You cannot bring reform in the region without winning the support and cooperation of governments. If they see their survival as being at stake they will not cooperate. They may make surface changes or diffuse the pressure but they will not cooperate. You will lose your governmental allies, destabilize countries, but not

bring a better reality to the region.: What is needed is to develop a strategy for reforming those regimes – not replacing them (or destabilizing them). Although the end point of reforming a regime is to reform it into oblivion – to the point that it becomes an open society. He says this is definitely true, but you don't state it that way.

(Director, international research organization in Lebanon) says that after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the French and British colonial powers set up a parliamentary system and constitutions in small local governments (though in the 50s and 60s this shifted to socialist style governments – the Baath Party in Syria and Iraq, the Nasserites in Egypt). This was against the wishes of the Arabs who wanted a single unified Arab state. This was since 1920 and Arabs have been living in this colonial system ever since.

He says that the Arabs historically have always wanted a single nation state. This is what they were promised (in the Eastern provinces that included Palestine, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon) by the British initially (in exchange for fomenting a revolt against the Ottoman Empire) but the British double-crossed them at the Paris peace talks. Instead of a single state (or even one in the East and one in the West) they chopped the nations up into little pieces. This really upset the Arabs at the time and still does. The Balfour Declaration that created Israel was after that, which greatly exacerbated the feelings of betrayal. The entry of the British into the ME after the Paris Peace talks in 1920 further increased the negative feelings. The setting up of secular states by the colonial powers instead of the previous Caliphate (that was at least marginally identified as Islamic) was another splitting off of the Muslims from their identity (in addition to the splitting up of their lands).

He is trying to understand how can it be that a society that in the 50's and 60's that was so enthusiastic about secularism Arab nationalism, could be followed by a new generations of youth that is just as pumped up by religious Islamic ideals – a total shift. (Other examples that he gives are the youth of Japan who were so committed to the cultural revolution – radical Maoist communist ideology, and then one generation later they are demonstrating for democracy at Tianenman Square – also Germany during the Third Reich as opposed to Germany now, which is commercialized and peace loving).

Social scientists say that these kinds of changes are a function of the stresses that take place when the society is transitioning from one type of economics and social structure to another. This is a very disturbed period - when people are moving from cities to towns, family structure is changing or being broken up, values are shifting. People are very afraid and feel very lost – and they look for a transitioning crutch – a psychological simplification that says that everything is okay and that explains what is happening and gives you a sense of place – fascism is very much like this. Also specific forces may arise that take advantage of this instability vulnerability and vacuum to put forth their ideas and try to take control. New means of communication and travel may also be arising that allow these forces to more easily communicate their ideas to the masses – radio, television, mass transit.

In the Arab world, from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire until the 70s was a time of everything changing. This was very traumatic and people were floundering around for a sense of identity, a sense of security and sense of understanding of what was going on, a sense of their future, a sense of their worth. All of these things can be catered to and manipulated in the political sphere.

There were a number of shifts that took place in the Arab world. From the 19<sup>th</sup> century world, a regional artisanal economy, village based, small towns, living under the Islamic caliphate and an Ottoman system that was 500 years old - to the 1960s where you had many independent secular states, new political parties – this major change, and all of the changes that took place in between (colonialism, the collapse of colonialism) were all very traumatic to the Arab world.

The big narrative of the Arab world: Imagine in the 1920's, the Arab armies overran North America and Europe, abolished the papacy, removed the states that existed at that time. They set up different states and governments for those states, and they also colonized some of the places in the region. They are still dominating North America and Europe and are still dominating the states there - and they just three years ago occupied California. This to us is unimaginable – but this is what happened. Imagine how heroically people, culture, religious movements, resistance groups would be portrayed. This resistance imagery is in the American psyche – in movies and TV. But we don't think that we are doing this to others. If we can imagine it we can understand the levels of rage and anxiety that exist in the Arab world.

The current century – the last 150 years, the West was the ones that were victorious, and the Arabs are angry. At other times the balance was the reverse. Right now that balance has tipped in the direction of the west which has caused a sense of victimization, powerlessness, rage, on the part of the side that feels like it is losing.

(Lebanese Christian television station manager) says that he wants to see an Arab/Middle Eastern society where Palestinian, Christian, Muslim, Jew, can all live together peacefully. A completely democratic society. He clarifies that he means the

entire Arab world – including Palestine, Israel and anywhere in the Arab world. He wants people to be able to live in peace everywhere. He does not separate between different parts of the Middle East – Lebanon, Palestine and Israel are to him one entity – where historically Arabs, Christians and Jews have lived together.

He also does not see the existence of subcultures in an area as being a negative issue – it is a positive issue, if it can be handled in a democratic way. The region has a history of diversity and is a cosmopolitan place – rich and diversified. Instead of creating small entities (i.e., nation states) that are ethnically, racially or religiously separated, making a larger (re) union of diverse groups would be of greater worth – similar to what exists in the U.S., or perhaps the European Union – diverse entities that are nonetheless united by a shared constitution or shared treaties. In some ways he is talking about a return to a pan-Arab caliphate – but a secular one within a democratic model.

Also he specifies that he does not want an artificial uniformity of culture imposed on the Arab world (unlike pan-Arab nationalism), but rather a diverse yet united group of states (again, like the EU or US). He says that the Arab nationalists tried to impose a single ‘Arabism’ on all of the cultures that existed within the Arab world. He also says that they were fascist and says that they are still ruling many Arab countries. The Arabs have never been a single nation. They have a diverse history and many cultures. He says that the concept of a single pan-Arab nation-state is wrong, but the concept of unity is not wrong. The idea of a union is something positive. A union is the understanding and acceptance of each culture’s sub-identity. If he can accept himself as Christian, and accept you as Muslim or Jew – this will lead to a new kind of Arab Nationalism.

Right now he says that there is a big problem, because the trend is to divide countries up according to sectarian lines – there is a push to do this in Iraq, and the same sectarianism is applicable in Lebanon. This desire to divide runs contrary to the idea of common interests. When one is talking about secular governments, there is instead a desire on the part of the religious parties to take over the governments. When one is talking about transparency, instead there is corruption, when you are talking about democracy; instead there is civil war (I imagine he is talking about Lebanon and Palestine).

Interestingly, he points out that as the divisions become stronger and stronger, the time for unity will come. The very presence of so much divisiveness pushes people to work towards unity. This is what happened in Lebanon in the late 80's. The Lebanese had divided their country into closed areas. These areas began to fight with one another. He thinks this prior divisiveness (which he says eventually will lead to war and dictatorships if left unchecked) has created a level of frustration among the people – as that level of divisiveness increases, the need and desire for unity increases as well.

How does he see places like Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia – where you don't have those same clashes? He says that there are internal forces and clashes within all of those countries but they are undeclared – they are under the surface. I ask him how does he see societies that don't have strong internal forces – he says that they express themselves politically on 9/11. This is what happens when there is an imposed order and the people cannot express themselves (like in SA) they will pay money and support Radical/Islamist Groups worldwide, and those groups will attack the U.S. His answer for

the high-conflict countries (Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, Syria, Iraq) is just to allow the struggle to sort itself out

The societies that have a single system imposed on the population need democracy. This includes Egypt, SA, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia. Iran is different because they have some kind of democracy – there are ways to make changes, and that is why the regime is strong. From this perspective, he thinks that Iran is more democratic than Jordan. How do you get democracy? It is not something that one can get from summer camp – one has to fight for it.

What can the West do? The US needs to stop supporting the authoritarian regimes or democracy will not happen. He also says that the will within each country for change is not strong enough. He says that those who say it is all the fault of the US or all the fault within the country both are wrong. He also says that the US is short sighted and does not act for the long term.

(Jordanian professor of comparative religion) says that Arab nations have a post-colonial weakness, and are not healthy. Most of the current political regimes are representatives of post-colonialism and are not representative of Islam. The West has an unhealthy degree of influence in Middle Eastern governments. Even intellectuals who study in West (and oppose the governments) just imitate Western model. Like the governments themselves, they don't have a current positive Islamic model. The post-colonial era is the main problem.

He says change must start from within – the Koran says a society must change itself. Problems include a lack of proper understanding of the religion, economic issues, a lack of democracy, a tribal mentality, nepotism vs. competence in governance, all of



these problems come from within. Islam is not the reason- because at other times Islam was the highest form of civilization.

One of the issues that created a problem within Islam historically was when many nations became one nation under Islam, this caused problems because it was too monolithic (like the Roman Empire). When Muslim community became like a kind of empire controlling other nations, rather than a unity of brotherhood, the emphasis was on top-down control and power instead of spiritual unity. From this desire for unified control also came a suppression of the marketplace of ideas. The proper way in the culture is that each person should be able to choose the way that is best for them – there should be a competition of ideas without internal force.

Internal conflict also arose from other religions that were subsumed under the Islamic Empire. When these other groups were not incorporated and integrated it caused problems. The Problems in Middle Eastern society are not just Islamic, they are Arab Christian too. The radicals take advantage of these various problems and weaknesses in the society to reach their goals.

Islam believes in religious coexistence – from the times of the Prophet. Christians and Jews (and Muslims) don't live the real meanings of their religion. When they do, we will all be able to live together. Extremism exists in all religions – not just Islam.

In Islam the Caliph (state ruler) is not supposed to be the religious authority. The Caliph is chosen by the people, not by God. The Unayads (descendents of Yayed) began treating Caliphate as a monarchy of descendents. Later ones (the Abassi) said the Caliph was appointed by God – which was even worse.

These various distortions, both historical and religious, created problems in the Islamic world. The Islamic world now needs to define itself in terms of its true identity – it needs to reach inside and create a positive modern identity. This process is happening, but there are obstacles, and a lot more progress (politically, economically, educationally) is needed (he notes that of the 500 top Universities – none are Arabic).

(Jordanian Sufi Professor) says that the government can't coerce observance, but neither is Islam separate from the public life – this understanding needs to be developed further. He clearly does not want a government that compels religious practices. He wants an Islamic inspired democracy – He does not want observance at the point of a gun.

(Israeli counterterrorism researcher) says that he does not think that states are the key factor in fueling violent extremism (other than maybe Iran – and he says that even Iran does not want total chaos. He says that terrorism began with both the Iranian revolution of 1979 (and Khomeini spreading his ideas worldwide) as well as Saudi Arabia spreading an extreme brand of Sunni Islam.

(Israeli retired military officer and terrorism researcher) says that states can be a) sympathetic to terrorism, b) sponsor terrorism c) be a weak state, d) be an actual terrorist state. He notes that weak countries have terror groups in enclaves and can't fight them because their central government/military does not have the capacity to do so.

(American intelligence analyst and researcher) says that the issue of state sponsorship can be both active and passive. To give some examples:

Saudi Arabia funds and supports terrorism all over the world with both its money and its Wahabi ideology. It funds the building of mosques and the staffing of those

mosques with radical preachers – in order to very deliberately and internationally spread the message of Wahabi Salafism – state religion in Saudi Arabia and the most radical form of Islam. This is in some measure done as a parallel and in opposition to the Shi'a radicalism spread by Iran – its doctrine of velayat e-faqih – the spread of Shiism and its clerical rule abroad. It is also a desire to export home-grown radicals abroad where they will not be a danger to the regime in Saudi Arabia, and last but probably belonging first, a belief in a radical ideology and a desire to spread it (evangelize) throughout the globe.

Iran is a direct state sponsor of terrorist groups - probably the worst and the most active of the state sponsors of radical Islamism today. Iran sponsors Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

Syria hosts the headquarters of Hamas leadership in Damascus. These are three states that can be called active sponsors of terrorism – each in a different way.

In Egypt the main concern of Mubarak is holding onto power and transferring this power to his son in a dynastic manner. For this reason, Egypt strongly fights Islamist extremism because of the concern that the extremists pose a threat to both Mubarak and his son. While Egypt permits and even sponsors fundamentalism – including al-Azhar University, which is a major source of Islamic extremism in Cairo spreading to the entire Islamic world – nonetheless this support is seen less as being for a particular terrorist group or organization, and more for the general resurgence of the Islamic faith.

Egypt is broadly Sunni (rather than Wahabi/Salafist) and its beliefs flow out of the four schools of Sunni jurisprudence and its corresponding philosophers that go back for centuries. Egypt is rooted in an Islam that is more broadly written. Egypt's state religious programs and sponsorship is seen less as a support for radicalism (though

certainly some of the preachers originating in Egypt do preach radicalism), less of an issue of export abroad (in the manner of Saudi Arabia) and more as a part of Islamic culture coming back and facing up to the West – what Samuel Huntington calls the ‘clash of civilizations’.

Another form of state sponsorship is provided by failed or borderline-failed states. These states offer the opportunities provided by a state infrastructure and territory for the use of terrorist organizations. In this category would be Somalia and perhaps Sudan – perhaps Lebanon, and in the past, Algeria and Afghanistan. Iraq is also an example of a state that is on the borderline.

#### *Middle Eastern States– Summary of Major Points*

Because of the high levels of state surveillance and control, it is felt that if fundamentalism/radicalism exists in the population, to some degree the states are allowing it to exist. Oil dollars allowed Gulf countries to enter the modern era without truly modernizing, because they could afford not to and still survive, even thrive and gain power. States allow a level of fundamentalism (and even radicalism towards the West), because it pacifies and distracts the population, but they crack down harshly when it is seen as a threat to their security.

Generally the population is more fundamentalist and more radicalized than the governments. Democratic opposition movements are repressed in the Middle East under the justification of cracking down on security threats. Due to repression of democratic opposition groups, the Islamist groups are the strongest non-governmental force (and also seen as less corrupt).

Citizens generally do not feel able to speak freely without repercussions.

Departure of colonial powers was recent – 1950's through 1970's. As a result, countries in the Middle East are still propelled by attitudes of anti-colonialism and national resistance/liberation, rather than responsibility and self-determination. Pushing for change in a manner that implies a desire for regime change will meet with resistance and hostility. Better to help governments improve and reform, so they can become more open and responsible - eventually reforming themselves into oblivion.

The current phase in the Middle East can be seen as a transitory phase between the collapse of colonialism (which itself followed an age of Empire) and the advent of full modernity. Times of transition give rise to both repression and varieties of extremism. Countries that seem to be internally unified may actually be hiding multiple internal rifts. Radical groups would like to gain control of states for the protection that sovereignty provides, as well as the use of geography, infrastructure and resources. Currently, Islamist or almost Islamist states include Iran, Somalia, Sudan, Lebanon, Palestine and Saudi Arabia. Larger Middle Eastern states are (some say 50/50%) vulnerable to Islamist takeover. The smaller Gulf States (Oman, Bahrain, UAE, Qatar) are seen as less vulnerable – due to less repression, better economies, better leadership. Because of the danger of takeover, stability is important, even while encouraging reforms

Competent government and equitable rule of law help promote both change and stability. Currently Middle Eastern states are undergoing a huge cultural transformation. There is a significant danger of radical states obtaining nuclear weapons and giving them to terrorist groups. Middle Eastern states lack a positive national/Islamic identity relative to the rest of the world. Problems stem from religious ignorance, lack of freedom/

democracy, governmental corruption/incompetence/nepotism, and economic issues – not from the Koran. Past attempts at Pan-Arabism created greater repression, conflict and instability – there is a need to maintain a multitude of ideas, religious paths, historical and cultural identities.

Traditionally in Islamic states the clerical leader was not the state leader. Government can be inspired by Islam without being Islamist (like U.S. and Christianity). Some say that currently states are not the key factor in violent extremism (except Iran). States can be sympathizers, sponsors, weak states, terror states. Active sponsors may include Iran, Saudi Arabia and Syria – a passive sponsor may be Egypt – weak or failed states may include Somalia, Sudan, Lebanon (Iraq on the borderline and in the past, Afghanistan and Algeria).

The West is viewed with strong emotions (helplessness, resentment, need) because of its perceived superpower status (it is parentified – for better and worse). Influx of foreign culture and values is seen by some as an encroachment or even assault. Historically, the Middle East felt superior to the West, and therefore it isolated from them. Trade – and later oil – wealth allowed the region to prevail/thrive without real progress.

#### *Saudi Arabia*

(Egyptian American writer) points to Saudi Arabia as funding radical madrassahs in Afghanistan and Pakistan. She and (American researcher) also talk about how Saudi Arabia has established and funded Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies departments in many U.S. universities.

(American researcher) says that Saudi Arabia is a bigger funder and exporter of extremism than Egypt.

(Islamic-American Professor) says that Saudi Arabia plays both sides – arresting terrorists (i.e., those that directly threaten or carry out attacks against the regime) but not reforming its government or its support of extremist religious fundamentalism. He also says that the government arrests reform-minded dissidents under the guise of protecting the government against ‘extremism’. He sees the prospect of reform within the Saudi government as a difficult prospect, given the marriage ties between Wahabis and the royal family.

(American researcher) says that Saudi Arabia pays off the Muslim Brotherhood as a way to stave off potential criticism from them of the royal family. He states that Saudi Arabia is using the Muslim Brotherhood as a way to extend its influence into Syria and perhaps Lebanon as well. He also says that Saudi Arabia tries to draw a distinction between Salafi and Salafi Jihadi – which he says is impossible. He states that Saudi Arabia is afraid of a Shiite coup in eastern oil field area (they represent 20% of the population) - and they also fear a Shiite rule in Iraq (where again they would control oil-resources).

(Egyptian distinguished thinker and writer) points out that Saudi Arabia has built 90% of the Islamic centers in the US, and endowed Islamic studies departments at the major universities. I bring up the presence of Saudi Arabia chaplains in US prisons converting young, alienated and violent inner city black males. He says that Pakistan and Afghanistan as radical centers is completely an invention of the Saudis. All of the universities and madrassas in Pakistan were financed by the Saudis. The entire idea of

fighting communism in Afghanistan through Islam was an invention of the Saudis – bought by America in the late 70s. The budget of the Islamic institutions in Saudi Arabia is double the overall educational budget in Saudi Arabia. They pay money to the Wahabis and expect them to be moderate. There are steps that are easily taken to make changes in Saudi Arabia – but the Americans do not take these steps.) He believes that the germ of militant Islam comes from Saudi Arabia.

(Christian Lebanese television station owner) says that Jeddah looks like Dallas - because of globalization. All of the city, its buildings, cars, stores, everything is imported. A Saudi who looks around him finds nothing that is related to his identity. If he wants to use his imagination he is going to invent a ‘Saudi’ identity – with traditions, costumes (coming out of his imagination of what Islam was or could be – not what it is). The Saudi who is dressed American (even the long robes may be designed by an American fashion designer), uses American computers, eats MacDonald’s – every single part of his life is related to the US (in fact, he says, the US manages the Saudi regime) – and yet he hates the US – this creates a real internal problem for him (what I call cognitive dissonance). He says that the relationship between the US and the Saudi royal family dates back to the founding of the SA regime. His point is that the average Saudi does not have a real concept of either Islam or his own identity – all he has is a made up ‘Islamic’ identity and a desire to consume American goods – encouraged by both the US and the regimes that want to pacify him – so that he does not rise up. They are consuming animals – if they are old they consume materialism, if they are young, they consume radicalism.

(British Islamic media owner and community activist) says that A CIA estimate recently stated that Saudi Arabia alone has (over the past 2 decades or so) spent over 80



billion dollars in exporting their ideology – the Wahabi dawa. The first page of the Koran says ‘God, lead us on the straight path – not the ones that have gone astray or transgressed’. The Wahabis put in brackets in this prayer ‘the Jews and the Christians’ – and this is the verse that supercedes the Koran. Its all about being separatist and being haters. Harras has stacks and stacks of books from ibn bin-Baz and (name?) that is Wahabi inspired dawa material collected in Great Britain.

(American Muslim researcher) says that he feels that Saudi king Abdallah is the first decent leader that Saudi Arabia has had – feels that he really wants reform, but is limited in his power by others in the royal family, as well as societal pressures. He believes that King Abdallah wants Saudi Arabia to become a constitutional monarchy like the UK. He notes that the Saudi regime is as much in the control of the princes as it is in control of the king. There is a state ideology (state control) that is more of a problem than religious control. He says there is tension between King Abdallah and the Sudairi princes (who believe in complete state control of the population and view the Wahabis as a useful tool for this). Note that (Saudi Arabian American director of Saudi think tank) disagrees with this assessment.

He thinks that Saudi Arabia will become a constitutional monarchy within 5 years – because of the rise of a large middle class, the spread of the Internet, satellite television and the use of cell phones (which is breaking down the barriers between the sexes – especially among the youth, who use camera phones to communicate and flirt).

He says that the answer is to pressure Saudi Arabia to break its links to Wahabism – like Spain did with Franco and the USSR did with Communism. He says that this link is breaking now in Saudi Arabia now – due to internal and external pressures (mostly

internal – the largely middle class population is sick of the Wahabis). He says that if the monarchy falls there will be violence and chaos, but not a rise of Wahabism, because they have already outlived their popularity among the population. He does caution, however, that while he does not think that the Wahabis can win, they still can put up a fight.

He says that there are no real Salafis today – only Wahabis calling the “salafis.” Salafis wanted to emulate moral example of early companions. They wanted to revive religion and bring it into 19th century (modern) reality. However, the fundamentalist/ extremist voices within Salafism drowned out the voices of the early Salafis.

(American researcher and academic) says that oil, rule over Mecca and Medina and the sheer size of the royal family are the assets of Saudi Arabia. He says that the major threat to Saudi Arabian monarchy is undiluted Wahabism . He says that while Saudis do not sponsor violent Jihad, they do sponsor its precursors – which are a very derogatory view of the West, apologies for violence and a forcible approach to the imposition of Sharia. The Saudi government is based on Islamism – the forcible imposition of Islam. It is hard for the government to contain Islamism within the system.

(Saudi American researcher) says that much of U.S. policy towards Saudi Arabia in the past was aimed at securing the U.S. access to oil. This caused The U.S. to turn a blind eye to much of what was done by the Saudis and their repressive government. However, he says that repressiveness does not increase stability of a county or its oil supply. He says that oil interests are actually threatened by lack of human rights and democracy. He says that Saudi Arabia has alot of lobbies and friends in US government – particularly in the White House and the State Dept.). He says that State department

officials are heavily invested in Saudi Arabia – they want power and access there. He says that Prince Bandar was even allowed in a U.S. government Roosevelt Room meeting – he thinks this may be a possible violation of U.S. law. He also says that U.S. NGO's are affected by the pro-Saudi tilt and tend to go out of their way to emphasize the positive regarding Saudi Arabia.

There is a space for the US government to push for women's rights. He thinks it is wrong that a powerful woman like Condoleeza Rice has not done anything for the women of Saudi Arabia, especially black and Shia women, who are even more highly oppressed than Sunni women. He says that Rice praised Saudi Arabian elections despite the fact that women were not able to vote – he says he finds this disgusting.

He points out that Saudi Arabia had slavery till 1964 – and the descendants of prior slaves (and other African migrants) are still there and highly discriminated against. Blacks and women are not allowed in government positions, and all women cannot vote – he says its like apartheid. He disagrees strongly that the Saudi Arabian regime is being controlled by the clerics. On the contrary, he says that the clerics hang out with the princes. Royals are not at mercy of Wahabis – rather, the Wahabi influence was created to be a tool of the royals. He says that the royal family uses the Wahabis as both a 'shield' (as an excuse against international pressure to reform) and a 'sword' (to control, intimidate and repress the population).

Saudi Arabia also finances Wahabis to do their dirty work – using them as a 'sword' against external forces. When the Wahabis attack someone, the Saudi government can say 'I didn't do it, the sword did it'. Disagreeing with others who says that King Abdallah wants change, he says that King Abdallah is just like all of them (the

rest of the regime), he just couches his words more carefully. He says that Abdallah is playing 'good cop' by blaming the Wahabis for lack of change within the country. While he lacks some power (relative to the rest of the royal family) nonetheless he is in broad agreement on the major issues. The main motive of the entire royal family (King Abdallah included) is the holding and expanding of political power by the Saudi Arabian government. Regarding motivation, he says that with the royals, ideology is important, but power is more important (it comes as a tight second).

He says that lack of change is not because of fear of the clerics. If the Saudi Arabian government wanted to they could do whatever they desired – while there might be some repercussions it would be nothing major. As a prime example, he says that when the Saudi Arabian government wanted to allow infidels into Saudi Arabia (Western military bases during the Gulf War), they had it overnight.

He says that the royal family are (what he calls) 'Whisky Wahabis' – meaning that they are pious in public and in their governmental policies, but completely licentious in their own lives. He says that the Royals are anti culture, anti West, anti American, anti Christian, anti Shia and anti Semitic. They are also repressive of women – including their own wives (though they allow them some 'looseness' - like in dress, dancing, drinking or driving – especially when outside of Saudi Arabia - in order to promote a modern image to the West) but not to be truly independent. They don't allow the royal women to do what they don't want for all women in the population, i.e., full rights, equality and independence. For example, Prince Naif allows his wife to drink and dance when she is in the U.S., but in Saudi Arabia he enforces bans on women – he directs the religious police.

Regarding the attitude towards women – the Saudi government (and the clerics) say that ‘a woman’s right is to be at home’. He says that the Royal Family speaks one message in English, and a different one in Arabic. He compares this to a good cop – bad cop game.

In Saudi Arabia they study about how wise and glorious the rulers and family are In accordance with a long-standing belief in the Sunni establishment that the ruler is semi-divine – meaning that God chose this person to be in this position. The rulers promote this perspective to keep them from scrutiny and accountability. The Wahabis emphasize this – that the ruler is a caretaker appointed by God, so we should not criticize him.

The Saudi Arabian educational system does not give an American style liberal arts education (as this would break the intellectual barriers and create real changes in thinking in the population). Contrary to what is said, the 9/11 hijackers were not secular and westernized. They were a product of the Saudi Arabian educational system, as well as the indoctrination (of hatred and intolerance) that they received from their family, mosque, teachers, and society. When it comes to radicalization, what looks like overnight change is actually a product of seeds of hatred and intolerance planted much earlier. These seeds provide an opening for later indoctrination. If they had been taught otherwise (against hatred and intolerance) the later indoctrination would not have been possible. The people are completely formed by their educational systems.

International pressure is needed to remove hatred and intolerance that exist in the Saudi Arabian educational system. Changing textbooks is minute thing to compel them to do in comparison to the benefits that they have from the international community.

The educational system also needs to be freed from state control. When it is freed from state control, it will naturally begin to respond to societal needs and influences, As well as the influence of other cultures and ideas.

Saudi Arabia pushes the idea that human rights, democratic elections, and governmental accountability are Western inventions. If you have a problem with the government or the clerics, they say to write to the governmental or religious figures – but do it nicely. Of course this is just ignored.

He says that while the regime and the clerics may seem different, in actuality they are all the same, but wear different hats. The regime is the same as the Wahabis – they just let the Wahabis say and do the regime's dirty work. He says that there are three different echelons of Wahabism: 1) the political echelon – which includes the Royal family 2) the ideological echelons – which include the radical indoctrinators 3) the tactical echelon – which includes those that organize and carry out violent attacks.

There is widespread discrimination against Shiites in Saudi Arabia. When Shiite shrines are attacked, none of the Saudi Arabian government speaks out. He says that Shiites generally do not opt for war (for example they did not totally crush the Wahabis when they had the chance). There was a point (1789) when the Ishmaelis had the Wahabis at the point of the sword, but the Wahabis convinced them that they wanted to make peace. The Ishmaelis decided to let the Wahabis live and accepted their offers of peace and gifts – at which point the Wahabis killed them. He notes that the first victims of abd el-Wahab were other Sunni Muslims.

One of the reasons for the Saudi hold on power in the Middle East is the fact that the country holds the Middle East's two most valuable assets – the oil fields of the

Eastern provinces and the spiritual centers of Mecca and Medina. Because of this hold on both material and spiritual power centers, the Saudi Arabian government will not change alone or with internal pressures (because it has no need to) rather, external pressure is needed.

Rather than changing, Saudi Arabia has been using its oil to influence the power centers of world, including London, Paris, the U.S., Moscow, and Beijing. There are pushes for change from within, but SA govt. can block school licenses for progressive schools, TV, and printing for progressive books. The government uses religious leaders and tribal chiefs to undermine liberal voices. The clerics are able to say that the liberals are not true Muslims.

In order to create changes in the religious establishment, the issue is not to separate mosque from state, but to liberate mosque from state control. At this time the state controls who is a religious leader (mufti), what they are able to say, what they can teach, etc. All of this is controlled by the State. The key is to let the mosque (the religious establishment) respond to the needs of the society – not the needs of the government. If the religious establishment is freed from control of the state, he says that they will become much more progressive. This is because the people are usually more progressive and varied than religious establishments or state control – but only when they are given the freedom to be. He says that if the religious establishment is freed from state control, it will pressure the state for change, not like now where the state pressures and controls the religious establishment. Again – he states that the religious establishment is a tool of Saudi Arabian state – they are not two partners, and the religion certainly does not control the state (though the regime claims that they do).

What is needed in Saudi Arabia is accountability of the government and the clerics to the people, opportunities for people, religious freedoms and flexibility in people's individual choices. He says that he wants to learn to deal with the Arabs with psychology – to attract them to new ideas, rather than them feeling pushed or coerced to change. He wants to find ways to mold their mentality, take away distorted thinking and support their natural human desires (like for freedom, individuality, empowerment, etc.).

He says that since Saudi Arabia is unlikely to change without international pressure, it needs to be isolated from the international community – to make the dictatorship too politically costly to maintain. He says that failure to deal with Saudi Arabia will prove costly to the West. He thinks that the U.S. and others need to fight Wahabis openly abroad – like Nazism. It cannot be allowed to send its ideas here.

He says that there are Saudi Schools that are spreading hate books to Muslims in Washington DC. So far little has been done. A Wahabi organization in Texas beamed messages from Saudi Arabia from bin-Laden supporters to a conference with Saudi diplomats attending. He publicized it and the diplomats were kicked out- however it didn't make the news. He believes that Saudi Arabia should be engaged and confronted by smart people – not idiots like in the State Department.

He believes that the U.S. should insist on reciprocity – if the Saudis want a mosque – we want NGO's in the Middle East. This includes varied religious institutions, educational organizations, human rights NGO's (especially the latter).

Also segregated (males only) bodies (like Saudi Arabia's consultant council) should be barred. He says that the US congress should pass a resolution saying that the US won't deal with segregated bodies. He says that one idea would be to convene a



summit of NGO's to discuss the issue of human rights in Saudi Arabia – but then he points out that the NGO's are very soft on Arabs governments and tend to an anti Israel bias.

He says that the UN has done nothing about human rights violations in Saudi Arabia. He thinks that the State dept is Shiite-phobic (because of Sunni influence in the government for the last 10 years.) He says that Sunni Islam (especially in Saudi Arabia) needs reformation the most. Other extremist Sunnis may not call themselves Wahabis, but the ideology is the same. For example, Jemaa Islamiya uses Wahabi ideology but does not call itself Wahabi. He says that the Muslim Brotherhood and Wahabism (which is based on the writings of Ibn Taymiya) meet in modern day violent terrorist groups and ideologies.

He notes that Saudi Arabia is the wealthiest country in the region. The country has religious, economic, cultural and political influence on all Middle Eastern countries (except Syria, which is a closed country). The Gulf is the center of power in the Muslim world. He says that Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, and Kuwait, are basically Saudi satellites.

(Israeli counterterrorism researcher) says that Saudi Arabia started to change their position because of attacks on them. They still straddle the fence when it comes to extremism, but they increasingly see it as a negative and as a danger.

(Israeli retired military officer and terrorism researcher) says that Saudi Arabia was and is still funding terror organizations (especially before they were attacked by extremists in 2003, but still continuing). By this he means the ministries and official NGO's give funds to charities and organizations that are either channels to fund terrorist groups/operations, or are themselves terrorist groups.

Since 2003 Saudi Arabia does not seem to fund terrorist groups, but they still exports the Dawa (extremist indoctrination programs) - this has not stopped. Also Saudi Arabia does not think that the ‘theaters of Jihad’ count as terrorism.

(American intelligence analyst and researcher) says that Saudi Arabia is currently fighting an intense battle against its own internal al-Qaeda cells, and for the moment, it is winning. Saudi Arabia, however, has many domestic problems aside from its insurgency issue. It is led by a group of octogenarians – who would be succeeded by a group of septuagenarians. The Saudi ambassador to the U.S., Prince Faisal, suddenly resigned his post and flew home – ostensibly over a succession battle. Some of the older rulers will probably not be around much longer – and the next generation is vying for leadership. There is tremendous corruption amongst the royals, as well as a proliferation of royals that are feeding at the public trough, which increases economic problems and poverty amongst the masses.

(British American terrorist researcher and author) says that he is a bit skeptical of how large a part is played by Saudi Arabia – although its name is often mentioned in conjunction with Islamic fundamentalism (particularly as bin-Laden is a Saudi and 15 of the 19 hijackers on 9/11 were Saudis). After all, one of al-Qaeda’s main aims is to overthrow the Saudi regime. People make the argument that the Saudis have funded many (fundamentalist) Wahabi proselytizing institutions and preachers, nonetheless, this does not necessarily indicate a specifically al-Qaeda or terrorist link with Saudi Arabia. There are tens of millions of people who have Wahabi and Salafist beliefs around the world – although one might disagree with these beliefs, that does not make the believers (or even the promulgators of those beliefs) terrorists – or anything remotely approaching

that. In fact, Bin-Laden wants to overthrow the Saudis, and the regime in Saudi Arabia has gone after the members of al-Qaeda in a fairly systematic way – killing or capturing several hundred people. This is particularly true since al-Qaeda linked terrorists launched attacks within Saudi Arabia in 2003, which caused a ‘turnaround’ or hardening of Saudi policy regarding al-Qaeda.

As regards the specifically Saudi branch of Islamic fundamentalism and how it relates to the purported Saudi-terrorist linkage: Although there is a school of thought that says that the Saudis are the source of all evil in the matter of terrorism (specifically since they are closely linked with Wahabist fundamentalism), this ‘blame it on the Saudis’ type of mono-causal explanation is actually rather weak and intellectually lazy. It is important to keep in mind that one of the key parts of the al-Qaeda doctrine is not from Saudi Arabia at all, but rather originated in Egypt. Sayyid Qutb of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was the person who laid the intellectual groundwork for the notion that one should overthrow Middle Eastern regimes. In 1994 bin-Laden was stripped of his Saudi citizenship, as well as being cut off by the government from any access to his family’s money (after which point he became even more radicalized – fueled by his resentment of the Saudi regime). So, while members of al-Qaeda may come from a Saudi background, the intellectual origins of the group are much more Egyptian. Not only the ideology, but also many of the top military leaders of al-Qaeda were Egyptian as well – including Ayman al-Zawahiri, Mohammed Atef, Saif al-Adl, and Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri. These were a much more militant bunch than the Saudis. Keep in mind that the 9/11 hijackers did not become radicalized in Saudi Arabia, but rather in a mosque in Hamburg.

Radicalization is clearly a much more complicated picture than simply a stream of fundamentalist or extreme ideas coming from one country – particularly Saudi Arabia. While it is true that the Saudi kingdom came into being originally because of a relationship with ibn-Wahab (founder of Wahabism) in the 18th century, and that relationship and political alliance has continued for 200 years, nonetheless, one cannot conflate Wahabism with violent extremism. Not only are all Wahabis not terrorists, there is also much violent extremism around the world that is done by Muslims that have nothing to do with Wahabism. For example, Algeria's civil war in which 100,000 people were killed did not have to do with Wahabi beliefs. While there have been allegations that various Saudi princes and government members have funneled money to terror groups, this has never been proven – even the 9/11 commission was not able to ascertain where funding for the attacks came from – they certainly were not able to trace it back to some Saudi royal family or government member. Additionally, when one fulfills the religious obligation to give at least 2.5% of one's income to charity, one is not supposed to broadcast one's generosity- which makes tracing financial contributions that much more difficult. Al-Qaeda has certainly benefited by either running or attaching themselves to Saudi-based charities and using them as cover, but this does not constitute official Saudi support in any way for al-Qaeda.

Another issue is the views of militant clerics who are based in Saudi Arabia (including two former mentors of bin-Laden). Saudi Arabia has imprisoned some of them, at least temporarily – but the degree to which the government can control them is somewhat limited. Ironically, it is precisely their conflicts with the mainstream Middle Eastern governments in Saudi Arabia (and elsewhere) that gives these militant clerics

credibility – proving that they do not toe the official government line. Clerics that are officially appointed or sanctioned by their governments generally echo whatever the government line is. In Saudi Arabia, this means that they condemn terrorism and the 9/11 attacks – particularly after Saudi Arabia itself was attacked. Mohammed Siddiq Khan and the others who planned the London terrorist attacks were British citizens. They were not supported by the Wahabi regime of Saudi Arabia, they never went to Saudi Arabia and they were not directly influenced by Wahabi ideas – there was no connection. However, a lot of the foreign fighters and suicide attackers that are dying in Iraq are from Saudi Arabia. These are not huge numbers, but significant nonetheless.

This may be part of the general view that the U.S. invasion of Iraq was a war against Islam. Nonetheless, bin-Laden is a Saudi, a lot of the original Muslim Brotherhood members that were expelled by Nasser from Egypt went to Saudi Arabia, and bin-Laden's two mentors were Saudis, and Abdallah Azzam (co-founder with bin-Laden of the MAK that eventually became al-Qaeda) moved to Saudi Arabia from Jordan when things got too difficult for him there. In addition the Saudis did proselytize an extremely conservative form of Islam – so perhaps (at least for a time – until they were attacked in 2003 and terrorism became a domestic problem for them), Saudi Arabia was perceived as a safe haven for those with extremist views, where they could be welcomed – at least on religious grounds. In terms of an active terror network, Saudi Arabia has not had a major al-Qaeda presence since 2003, when Saudi Arabia cracked down on al-Qaeda after being attacked. Most of the al-Qaeda members that the Saudi government could identify were captured, killed or driven out of the country to take refuge elsewhere.

### *Saudi Arabia– Summary of Major Points*

British alliance with the tribe of Saudi (during WWI) was a key factor in both the founding of Saudi Arabia as well as the spreading of Wahabism. Saudi Arabia funds Islamist extremism in countries like Afghanistan and Pakistan. Saudi Arabia also funds Islamist extremism in the West (including the U.S.) by funding research departments in universities, funding mosques and chaplains, lobbying governments and nonprofit organizations that are fronts for Islamist fundamentalism. Saudi Arabia arrests and represses reform-minded dissidents under the pretext of fighting extremism.

Saudi Arabia uses the Muslim Brotherhood as a proxy means of extending its influence into neighboring countries such as Syria and Lebanon. Saudi Arabia allows and even supports (anti Western) Wahabi fundamentalism, but tries to crack down on extremism when it threatens the Saudi regime. Saudi Arabia floods the market in both East and West with Wahabi/Salafist literature in both Arabic and English. Saudi Arabia fears a Shiite (20% of population) coup in its eastern oil fields and also fears Shiite rule in oil-rich Iraq.

The ideology of state control may be more of an issue than the ideology of religious control. Power is held by both the Saudi King as well as the princes (who may be more extreme).

Saudi Arabia has the largest middle class in the Middle East. The large middle class has given rise to cable television, internet, cell/camera-phones – all of which are breaking down traditional barriers in the society – especially the youth. Saudi Arabia may be able to be persuaded to break the official state/Wahabi link. Wahabism may have

outlived its popularity in the population. Regime change may bring chaos, but not necessarily Wahabi dominance.

Major assets of Saudi Arabia are its oil and its rule over Mecca and Medina.

Saudi Arabia definitely sponsors the precursors to violent jihadism – hatred of the West, willingness to coerce Islam and a condoning of violence. Saudi government is based on Islamism – the forcible imposition of Islam. Repressiveness of the government does not insure the stability of the oil supply. U.S. government and economic interests are heavily invested in Saudi Arabia. The U.S. government does not speak out against race/religious/gender discrimination.

The U.N. and international NGO's also have not spoken out against Saudis.

The royal family may use the Wahabis to repress the population and excuse repression. Some say that King Abdallah is an (albeit weak) reformer – others are more cynical. The Saudi educational system plants seeds of hatred and intolerance that make people more sympathetic and vulnerable to extremism and radicalism. Saudi sponsored schools in the U.S. and EU are teaching the same types of thinking (and the West does not compel them to change their texts and teachings). Saudi royals preach religiosity while living very loosely (but royal women still not free). Widespread gender/religious/racial oppression and discrimination is the norm in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi regime presents one face in the Western media and a different one in Arabic. Educational system needs to be freed of state control. Ditto for mosques. Both would respond to the needs of the population and marketplace if they were free of control.

The Saudi regime will not change without external pressure because it does not have to. Government uses religious leaders and tribal chiefs to silence liberal voices.

State department is possibly biased against Shiites and towards Sunnis/Saudis. Because of its wealth, Saudi Arabia has an influence throughout the entire region/world. The Saudi government has in the past funneled money to extremist/violent groups. This has lessened since they were attacked in 2003, but they still support fundamentalism. Saudi Arabia does not think that the ‘theaters of Jihad’ counts as terrorism. There are constant internal power struggles and corruption in the Saudi government. Some current terrorism experts do not see a link currently between Saudi Arabia and terrorism – they tend to draw a clear line between Wahabism/fundamentalism and terror. These same people see Egypt (and the Brotherhood) as more violent and radical than Saudi Wahabism – so they point to Egypt as the source of radical jihad. Nonetheless, many jihadi fighters come from Saudi Arabia, as do many terrorists.

### *Egypt*

(Egyptian American writer) says that Egypt and Pakistan are also exporters of radicalism – many radical clerics are trained in Egypt and Pakistan and then go to posts overseas.

(Muslim American Professor) sees Egypt as passively allowing extremism. He says that extremism is entrenched within the society and financed by society as well as government within the country (though not exported abroad as much as by Saudi Arabia).

(American researcher) says that Egypt uses the stated need to crack down on the Muslim Brotherhood as a ploy to avoid free elections – despite the fact that only about 20% of the population support the Muslim Brotherhood.



(Egyptian distinguished moderate thinker and writer) says that Egyptians are all alike – if you meet one, you have met many. This is one of the complaints that analysts make about the country and the society. In Jordan for example there are many more differences of opinions. In Egypt there is a single party line – anti Americanism and conspiracy theories. He says that history is from a conflict of interests and chance events, but it is certainly not a single conspiracy theory.

He adds that when he was brought up in Egypt in the 50s and 60s, Islam was a religion, full stop. It was like in America, where people go to church they go to work and do not discuss religious issues. Religion was separate from public life – this is not the case now. Nonetheless, he points out that Egypt is a Mediterranean society – it has been invaded by the Islamists, but originally (and still in underlying structure) it is a Mediterranean society. 30-40 years ago, Egypt was like being in Cyprus or Greece. Now it is completely different. 90% of the women cover up everywhere. In Egypt people are used to seeing Westerners and non-Muslims, but it is getting less so, they are getting closer to Saudi Arabia in their attitudes.

He says that currently, Egyptian society is partially Islamized with some remainders of a Mediterranean, cosmopolitan, multicultural society. There are 300,000 mosques in Egyptian, with a main prayer service every Friday – this is 300,000 podiums for Islamist preaching. I ask how is this different than 30-40 years ago? He says that then the Imams were Egyptian – they had an Egyptian state of mind. Now every Imam that he meets from al-Azhar has spent at least 4 years in Saudi Arabia, and has a Saudi and Wahabi state of mind.

(Egyptian writer and researcher) says that since 2004 lots of things are in a state of change – especially since the US has been pressing for democratic change. People are more free to criticize Mubarak and his regime. This is turning point in the political life of Egypt. Some people even think that the regime is dying – that Mubarak cannot manage conflict between the old guard and the new guard in the National Democratic Party – the ruling party. He disagrees that Mubarak wants his son to take over – says the son is pushing, not the father. The father has not allowed any likely successor to arise. The father is stable and cautious – his background is military – as a general. He is willing to sacrifice (or diminish) anyone who threatens his grip on power.

The constitution gives the President absolute power, but he cannot in practice use this power – certainly not in the current climate where there are many competing forces and he is not good at functioning as a conflict manager.

Other political actors are growing in their ideas, language and political discourse. But the problem is that the regime is using old tools to try and diminish and control this – and this is not working.

What has allowed this regime to exist for 25 years is Mubarak trying to strangle any individual, group or party that might oppose him. He doesn't have and doesn't want any competitors – he wants to be a one-man show.

He does not think, however, that Mubarak wants his son to succeed by authoritarian tools – he may want him to run along with other presidential contenders and have a chance to prove himself. He may also have doubts as to whether his son is competent enough to rule. People also see Gamal Mubarak as a regular person – nothing special.

It is also a reflection of how Egyptians think about power. They think of the President as half-god and half man (also as the beneficial and generous father figure that controls and distributes the resources among his children) – this attitude has existed on the part of the people for 5 thousand years. They want this figure over them more than they want freedom. They don't really want power. This is a major problem here.

Egypt is a centralized state – mainly because of the geography – 97% of the population is living in 3% of the land – in the Nile Valley and Delta.

Because the ruler has control over the Nile, the people see him as having the key to their life – water being necessary for life. There are three jobs of government:

- 1) Distribute the water, which is necessary for farming (hopefully according to some kind of social justice – as a father distributes resources among his children).  
(Harold Glasswell says this is main job of any political system – do decide and manage 'who gets what and how')
- 2) Maintain the social contract/social justice with the people.
- 3) Meting out of authority/punishment. Use violence sparingly – it is not necessary because the people already respect the ruler.

The first part of the contract is not being fulfilled. From the beginning of the 1990s – when Egypt began a program of privatization and de-nationalization. This made the people a victim of the private sector – an easy target. The people were excessively vulnerable because up until that time they were dependent on the national sector. In order to qualify for funds from the World Bank and IMF the country had to privatize. This was done without corresponding political freedoms. This caused some people to have a lot and a lot of people to have very little. There are no institutions for real justice or for

political change. There is a civil society but it is corrupt. So there is no structure for the fair distribution of resources. If someone wants to get a job as a new graduate they are dependent on who they know, not how educated or competent they are. This is particularly a problem given that Egypt is the most modernized country in the region – the people are educated, but the system is not fair to them and does not give them opportunities on a level playing field.

A ruler gets the loyalty of the people by being just and giving the people what they need. The infrastructure in Khaleel's village was established by Nasser in the 1960s. This is true of most of the Egyptian infrastructure – nothing has been improved since that time. This is seen as mistreatment by the ruler of the population. Everyone in the street thinks about the government every day. Firstly, because it is a centralized state. Second, because the people have to deal with the government every day. Thirdly, because the people see the government as their only protector and provider.

There are resources that can be used but are being withheld from the people. 'This country is very patient – it has been stolen by every government for the last five thousand years, and yet it is still alive'. The wealth is concentrated in the hands of a very few. (I say that the fact that the city is dirty, outdated and crumbling compared with Western cities is sad – He says he has to believe in the future or else he will die – he will freeze to his chair. So there are no jobs and the people are not afraid because there is nothing to take away from them.

Regarding the use of force – when you come to any security office you will find what it means to have no justice. There is torture (for any infraction), punishment and injustice. The use of force is a legitimate right of the state. However it is used not

according to justice by the state. It is not just used to establish the rule of law. The security forces act as if they have absolute power to impose their will on the people. The security officer is seen as being a representative of the ruler – but instead of serving the people, the people are forced to serve the security forces. Recently, someone was accused of a crime and when the security forces could not find him, they took his brother hostage and beat him to death. The village members then destroyed the office of the security forces.

In many villages there are water shortages. This is because the condition of the infrastructure is so poor. This transgresses the basic right of the people to live – to eat and drink and grow food. If people don't suffer from water they suffer from other kinds of deprivation. This causes disrespect of the ruler.

People do not fight for freedom – they fight for food and water. The problem is that no one till now has been able to link between democratization (political rights and freedoms) and the basic needs of the people.

The local politicians are elected because of their perceived ability to provide for the people. Basically, his point is that all of the three pillars of government are missing or corrupted.

People would normally elect local representatives to Parliament because they think they can provide the people what they need. But in the case of Egypt, the local government has no real power – people only look to the state. Local politicians are corrupted and the higher level rulers are corrupted. There is no accountability. No one holds the politicians responsible.

Other changes that have taken place since then. What if you are living with someone for years – you don't hate him, you feel that you can't move without him. If he suddenly appears weak, this is very hard to experience. For 25 years, the country was living under Mubarak and the NDP. Suddenly, Mubarak started to talk about change (modernization, privatization, democratization). He all of a sudden appears not quite as powerful as before. This encourages a lot of criticism from the people as well as the growth of other types of social and political movements. Most of these movements want to see some democratic change in the political life.

Also the Muslim Brotherhood – the main political group in opposition – started to develop its political discourse. There was a kind of explosion of the Egyptian consciousness – a lack of fear of criticizing. One key moment of this was when Mubarak was ill in 2004 and went to Germany for treatment. There was also a lot of conflict between the NDP old and new guards during this time. A new political movement for change arose also during this time. When he returned he let go some of the old guard and brought in some newer younger people. These slight changes made him look weaker not stronger and only fed the hunger for more change. People sensed a power vacuum and want to grab power while they can. They also see Mubarak as needing them – not the other way around.

Up until this time, the president was not elected by the people, but by the parliament. Since the NDP has always held power, they always elected Mubarak. Article 76 sought to change this to direct election of the president by the people. Mubarak made a deal with the opposition that this amendment would be considered but not until after the next elections – which were carried out in the old manner. After the elections Mubarak

suddenly called together Parliament and passed the amendment. However it was worded that only candidates with a majority approval (250 signatures of the assemblies, majority party and the local governments) could run. This effectively voided the ability of candidates to run freely as representatives of the people. This was a continuance of control by other means.

Mubarak does not think about what will happen after him (he is 79) – he just thinks about his present hold on power. If his son succeeds him, it may be as a puppet of the other players.

He says that Egypt is in a rational phase – there aren't any groups looking to get power through violent or coercive means. He does not see much Jihadis in Egypt – maybe Salafis. The Egyptians will arrest people that talk jihad. Egypt is not a bastion of salafi/jihadism. He says he thinks there are more Jihadis in Algeria, Morocco, SA – primarily because of American actions in the Middle East. Although many people want change, there aren't any strong enough actors to push for change.

Egypt has not had a democracy in 5,000 years. People don't really want democracy. People who are fighting for democracy are fighting in the wrong place. People don't take to the streets for freedom, fair elections or establishment of parties – they take to the streets for water. If you give them water, they will go back to their houses.

If anyone comes into office democratically and does not care about social justice, proper distribution of resources, judicious use of force, etc, nothing will change. Egyptians do not care about democracy – they care about justice. Democracy without justice will not be sufficient.

He thinks that the reason the PJD was successful in Turkey was because after it won the elections it concerned itself with the needs of the people and the infrastructure – not with the imposition of Islamic dress. China is another society where the people are more or less ok with a non-democratic government because their quality of life is okay. Nasser was tolerated because there was social justice (even with a harsh hand) and as a result people did not demand democracy during his reign.

People want bread, water and justice. There is a saying in Egypt that the government keeps the people just hungry enough to be distracted from seeking change. If they are comfortable they will ask for freedom. The genius is that they are kept just hungry enough to be distracted. (I say that I don't think it is a conscious plan – but the end fact is that the people are just a little bit hungry).

(Egyptian researcher) says that in the Middle East particularly there is no differentiation between global/regional and local politics – everything global is felt locally. Identity in the region is not about Egyptian identity – it is about the Arab/Islamic identity. This does not allow people to think in a healthy (and clear) way about their political reality. At the same time, particularly in Egypt, there is a large majority that is apolitical.

He explains that Egyptian society went through a deep process of de-politicization for the last few decades. Some of this was because of external factors, and some of it was consciously orchestrated by government. How does one de-politicize a society? If you can create a distance between what people face day to day in their lives and the decisions made by government, this is de-politicization. You make the people look in a kind of fragmented way so that they deal with their problems in a kind of case by case manner,



not relating them to an overall political situation or political reality. You raise the cost of making change to day to day issues using political channels, so that people use other means to deal with these issues outside of the political realm – by creating too much distance, to many obstacles, or just by ignoring people. Ignore the people's criticism or demands for long enough, and you make the cost of continuing too high – it is a waste of resources for a rational citizen. S/he will try to address whatever issues by other means. This level of de-politicization was quite characteristic of Mubarak's regime.

He says that it is not that Mubarak's regime is more autocratic – more that he came from a non-political background (military). As a political activist Nasser had the chance to develop political skills – how to address and balance the needs of the people (though at the same time he was more autocratic). Mubarak coming from a military background is used to telling people what to do and having them just listen. Developing a sense of responsiveness and sensitivity to the people's needs is/was not his strong point. 'We know what we are doing and we do it well – just leave us to do our business' .

He points out that a very formative event in the life of the Egyptian people was the 6 day war. In a matter of a few days the expectations of the Nasser regime was gone – promises that were not fulfilled. This created a distance between the people and government, politicians, politics – 1967 discredited politics in the country – it created an attitude that was quite conducive to not trusting politics and politicians. The defeat of the 6-day war also marked the beginning of the Sawa – the Islamic awakening. All of this contributed to the de-politicization process.

He says that lately the society in Egypt is becoming slightly more politically aware and mobilized. From the 2000s there have been increasing calls for reform – both

from inside and from outside the government. There were a series of developments that have led to the beginning of a re-politicization. The political strata is a very thin layer on top of society. This is starting to expand very slightly. The public is beginning to grasp political things – but just slightly.

He says that one of the things that led to this was the breakdown of the Israeli – Palestinian peace process and the intifadah that followed. This was felt regionally, not just locally – fed by pan Arab media and satellite TV stations. Some thing happens in Palestine and it is seen immediately all over the ME. Media also distort things – as a matter of fact, Palestinian colleagues have told him that in Cairo they see more Palestinians killed than are seen in Nablus. They may have someone killed every couple of days, but on the news you see someone killed every day – and over and over again. The media only shows one side of the story – not showing Palestinian attacks on Israelis. This creates a strong reaction throughout the region. This caused a sort of activism on behalf of the region(boycott Israeli goods, American goods etc.) – unfortunately re-politicization also leads to radicalization. This is the same in Egypt and Jordan and other countries as well (very much in the Gulf). In Egypt and Jordan particularly you tend to see these feelings expressed and allowed – by governments that then regret it, then use it for their benefit, then regret it/counter it, etc.

A year later was 9/11 and the new American policy towards the ME. This contributed towards re-politicization in a couple of contradictory ways: Firstly the assertive/aggressive US policy in the region (not the war in Afghanistan that did not have much effect) – the war in Iraq had a big effect. At the same time the US ignored what the Arabs considered the main problem in the region – the Arab/Israeli conflict – and instead

created new problems in Iraq. The largest demonstration seen in Cairo since 1977 was in 2003 against the invasion of Iraq. Young, old, Islamist, liberals, leftist, students, religious students, the upper class – there was a consensus against it. This was less support for Saddam Hussein and more for an Arab country being invaded. This was politicizing and radicalizing at the same time. These events were also de-legitimizing to the Arab regimes – who could not help their Arab brethren or stop the invasion. This was particularly felt by those who had close relations with the US or Israel – which is why Egypt and Jordan were more vulnerable. Those with more distance from the West – like Syria – were less targeted for criticism. It was ironic that US policy wound up hurting its allies. This criticism was also expressed as pressure for governments to change.

While there was US pressure enough to open up a space in the public arena (which was filled by radical activists) it was not enough to actually cause change. Perhaps more pressure would not have brought better results. The kind of advice that was given to the administration was all about political reform, human rights etc – this was reductionist. It's a system. You can't single out the political dimension and ignore If you don't pay attention to the economic, social, cultural educational – you may destabilize more than you help. Politics is a means of control. If you weaken the means of control without strengthening and reforming the society to be able to interact in a free way, you create instability and a power vacuum. So the US policy in Iraq combined with pressure to change (which made just enough space for restlessness and complaint) without sufficient change either in the government or in society – all created a (slightly) more mobilized society.

In terms of the reform process in Egypt – there is reform happening. There is economic reform – with resistance – but finally real economic reform. There are real attempts towards administrative reform – difficult when you realize that there are almost 6 million government workers in Egypt – a quarter of the total workforce. There is legal reforms for business and government apparatus that deal with business and investments. As far as political reform, there is some in-house (internal) reforms, but little change in the relationship (power structure redistribution) between the ruler and the ruled. The recent constitutional amendment that allows for direct election – article 76 and others – which reduced very slightly the powers of the president and increased the power of the Prime Minister's office, and most importantly, increased the power of the parliament vis a vis the government.

For the first time, the parliament has the power to amend the budget – creating the parliament's ability to oversee the performance of the government. This was done only this year – and he thinks it is a big deal. This is an example of internal changes – and is an example of capacity building. In the area of the relationship between the ruler and the ruled (direct elections) there is cosmetic but not substantive changes. Nonetheless, there is a demand for reform from within the regime. They need to create reform because they want to consolidate the legitimacy of the regime, reduce instability and radicalism, improve performance and ensure the survival of the regime. These came from political activists and reformers within the regime – but not the masses of the people. The people in the street are very far away from awareness of these changes. (I say that the reform comes because other players in the government want some of the cookies – their share of the power and resources). Some people in the government hold the power to grant

licenses for certain businesses – this was not okay with others – people felt that they had to grab their bit and run. Generally people started to understand that it is better to have a more transparent and fair system – the current system is not sufficient to maintain everyone's interests.

(Egyptian politician and moderate party co-founder) says that the situation in Egypt is poor – socially, economically, and religiously. He sees the political situation as the key. If there is a real democratic regime, all solutions to problems can be found. He says that this is a very important point in Egyptian history. Historically, Egypt has been a leader in the region. Potentially it could be again.

He says that the Egyptian regime can be called a 'semi-authoritarian regime'. In between a democratic regime and a dictatorship. He says that Egypt needs to change to become a democratic regime, but will not do so easily. They need pressure from many groups both political and civil to make this happen. There is a lack of freedom, economic issues, bad relationships with Christians, relations with the West, lack of human rights. There is a lack of freedom in the media (to own media), a lack of ability to form political parties and hold elections, and a negative attitude in the culture towards women (more than in the past). Women also have very little political power – though they have other rights in the society – to be educated, to work, etc.

He says he is trying to promote positive change, and that his party works together with all other groups to make the government more democratic. He says that the outcome of non-democratic regimes was not positive for Egypt in the end. They look towards the US as a model of democracy – as well as the EU – as an example of the way that people

can create a union, defer their interests, use resources wisely – all without control being imposed from above in an authoritarian manner.

(Egyptian head of pro-democracy NGO) says that in Egypt there is a younger generation that is uneducated and wants to understand the world better, but is not given the chance. He created the pro-democracy organization that he heads to spread ideas that will enlighten the generation – a generation that in his opinion is very poorly educated. Very poor standards and not exposed to a modern education. The university teachers give you a book that is basically copied from other books and you memorize the contents and pass the exams. One part of the society wants to take everyone back 1400 years to the age of the prophet. One part of the society wants to advance, and the last part wants things to stay the same. This idea extends to the internet. It is not that there aren't computers or internet access (he said that about 7 million people have internet), but everyone uses them in ways that reflect their own attitudes: some for radicalism, some for self-education, many more just for chatting and email.

(Egyptian researcher working for international research organization) says regarding her home country of Egypt that she was struck by the multiplicity of forces in Lebanon – something that is absent or has been repressed in Egypt for the last generation or so. When and if Egypt has a democratic regime, this type of multiplicity will likely return. As to what it would take to bring democracy back to Egypt – it would take strong leadership in the country, and the West lifting its hand from interfering with the rise of democracy in Egypt – by supporting the benign dictatorship of Mubarak. She wishes that the US would not only support regimes that serve their selfish interests. At the same time, change will come from inside. What is most needed is a viable alternative with strong

leadership. Leadership that does not suppress the many voices that exist there. People need to come up with creative ideas about how to peacefully bring about change. There is a democratic vein in Egypt, but it needs to get a lot stronger. She thinks that the MB has a right to be represented - like every other party in Egypt – they have a constituency and they deserve representation. It is less the group and more the strength of the process within which they function. The issue also when it comes to groups is to talk with them, not at them.

(Christian Lebanese television station owner) says that Egypt is a unique case. It is a country that has had the same name for the last 6k years. It is like a continent to itself. The (enduring) concept of centralized government in Egypt is related to its geography – the way that everyone is clustered around the Nile River. This is why Egypt has always retained its identity over thousands of years. However, even in Egypt there are internal forces and clashes but they are undeclared – they are under the surface.

(Saudi American researcher) says that in Egypt – as in Saudi Arabia, the leader is seen as appointed by God, and therefore semi-divine. This (divinity of the ruler) is one of the reasons why Egypt has had 25 years of rule by Mubarak and no one says anything (combination of religious and political control).

(American intelligence analyst and researcher) says that In Egypt there is a large segment of the population that is loyal to the Muslim Brotherhood. This group also has infrastructure, organized membership cells, clandestine militant organizations, and even a (proxy) presence in parliament. Even as President Mubarak throws scholars and journalists in jail, and we want him to adopt democratic reforms as soon as possible, nonetheless, we must keep in mind that democratic reforms are a double-edged sword. As

a country moves towards more representation and less oppression, it also becomes increasingly unstable. Even if a repressive country believes in reforming itself (which is doubtful), the period immediately following any lifting of oppression can be extremely dangerous and unstable. If the U.S. pushes for reforms too hard and too fast, there could be chaos. In a chaotic situation, the Muslim Brotherhood would take control. Even though they have supposedly foresworn violence – they are, in reality, extremists who are dedicated to an Islamist world.

*Egypt– Summary of Major Points*

Egypt passively allows fundamentalism within the society – though does not actively export it like Saudi Arabia. Egypt uses the need to crack down on the Muslim Brotherhood as a ploy to avoid democracy and crack down on dissidents. Egypt as a society does not have a plurality of viewpoints -the party line in Egypt is anti-Americanism and conspiracy theories. There is a real lack of intellectual sophistication. Egypt was recently a much more cosmopolitan and diverse society – but this has changed radically in the last generation. Religiosity in Egypt is due to military failures against Israel, influence of internal groups (MB), a general Islamic resurgence, resistance to the West, Gulf influence and a lack of influx of ideas.

Egypt is a centralized government in large part due to a geography that is centralized around the Nile and control of water resources. Egypt has a 5,000 year history of centralized autocratic rulership, with the ruler seen as semi-divine – as such there is not a strong desire for a Western-style democracy. People in Egypt will not fight for democratic freedom, but they will fight for food, water and basic justice/safety. The



government is seen as failing its contract to provide adequate resources and equitable justice to the people – but this lack distracts the people and keeps them dependent.

Currently Egypt is in a negative situation – economically, socially, politically and religiously – without real democratization, solutions will be hard to come by. People are feeling more insecure, and are more willing to criticize, but they do not yet have the will or ability to actively push for change to any meaningful degree. Egyptians do not have a sense of political power – they have become and been made de-politicized. Since 9/11 re-politicization has manifested mainly as anti-Americanism. Violent jihadism is not a prominent feature in Egyptian society – though fundamentalism and anti-Western sentiment is.

U.S. pressure for democratization post-9/11 was enough to open a space for fundamentalist extremism, it was insufficient to create real democratic change. There is some economic and inter-governmental reform happening in Egypt, but it is insufficient to have any significant effect on the greater society. Women in Egypt have little political power, little power in the culture, and are subject to ongoing harassment/hostility as well as pressure to conform religiously and culturally. Educational systems in Egypt are very sub-standard and do not teach any kind of critical thinking skills, nor do they expose people to a variety of ideas.

If the U.S. were to withdraw its support of Mubarak's regime (or pressure a lot harder for change) it would increase the pressure for change in Egypt. Insufficient pressure (combined with continued support) on the regime will result in superficial change only.

In Egypt (as in Saudi Arabia and Jordan) the king is seen as appointed by God. This tends to discourage criticism of the ruler. The Muslim Brotherhood has a large clandestine power base in Egypt. Any chaotic situation in Egypt may result in a power grab by the Muslim Brotherhood.

The Muslim Brotherhood has a large (underpolled) base of support – especially among Egypt's 65% illiterate population.

#### *Jordan*

(Jordanian Christian young professional) says that the government really keeps a close eye on radicalism – the secret service knows what everyone does – they are quite good at keeping it under control.

(Jordanian Christian female professional) says that the government and laws in Jordan are pretty liberal – women vote and there are more liquor stores than grocery stores on the streets (unlike other Arab states).

(Jordanian distinguished professor) says that those that wish for democracy are imprisoned or otherwise silenced. The Jordanian government does not allow for any other organized groups to arise because they are afraid of any opposition. (This includes the Muslim Brotherhood, who are quite moderate in Jordan). Middle Eastern regimes (Jordan included) have their secret police because they are afraid of the potential extremists in their midst. He says that this is not the right way to oppose extremism – you must have real reform and modernization – of the people and the government. Real democracy, justice, human rights, good education, etc. The late king talked about it, and the new king does also – but nothing of substance has taken place. He says that he is not jailed for these

words (though others have been) –because he was president of two universities and is too well known. Any other man who would say what he does would be put in jail

(Jordanian distinguished professor) says that in Jordan the local elections are corrupt – he went 2 weeks ago to vote in the municipal elections – and he saw the soldiers coming from somewhere else – not legitimate voters. 135 soldiers came and voted in front of their commander for whoever the commander told them to – all voting for the same person. There were riots later after that candidate won. He considers this stupid – because if a MB succeeds and becomes a mayor of Irbid – and does nothing for the people, this will be the surest way to have him scrutinized publicly by the population and lose support – make the people more cautious about supporting him. But the government does not allow the people this chance. If the US starts putting more pressure on the regime to democratize, they will make phony changes – as they have been doing since 1990. The real test of democratic change would be a change in how governments are formed and how they fall – i.e. complete structural change of the system. He says a liberal democratic regime is not a likely future alternative. What is most likely for Jordan would be a phony democracy – with the regime convincing the West that it is democratizing even though it will not really be the case. The regime will ask for more and more aid from the West based on these phony changes. He does not think it likely that extremists in the population will gain any real government power. However their popularity is increasing among the population.

(Jordanian distinguished professor and former government member) thinks that the polls that show 20-21% support for Islamism in Jordan is underreporting. The mental attitudes may be much higher in the state of mind of the people – which is very Islamist –

though maybe not in an official manner. When he first started teaching at the U of Jordan 25 years ago, hardly any women wore Sharia clothing. Now the trend is reversed. Student bodies throughout the universities in Jordan are overwhelmingly Islamist. Not only in the University but all throughout the country. Islamists gaining power is possible on the municipal level in Jordan. However the monarchy has very strong roots here. The Jordanian population is divided almost in half between traditional (upper class) Jordanians and Palestinian refugee families that now live in Jordan. The traditional upper class Jordanians are also strongly pro-monarchy. However even the Palestinian Jordanians who are poorer are becoming more pro-monarchy – especially as they see the bloodshed and chaos in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq and Syria. This scares the hell out of them and makes them become slowly more supportive of the monarchy. The vast majority of people in the country regardless of origin or class want stability in the country – they see the present system as being much better than the chaos elsewhere in the region – this includes the Islamist as well. These groups do not see any conflict between supporting the monarchy and being Islamist.

In Jordan there are many poor refugees – they are integrated but they are still poor. They are fully integrated – but they are very attached to the Palestinian issue and want it settled decently – which he says that neither the US or the Israelis are willing to do. This sense of political frustration causes them to be drawn to the Islamists. They see houses being blown up by the Israelis and it makes them very upset. They are refugees and deprived – some of them still live in camps. They are upset – they can see Palestine from where they live – but they can't go there, it's easier for them to go to Sydney Australia. This upsets the hell out of them. They are not relaxed – they are stressed on a

daily basis. Traditional Jordanians also feel this way – all Jordanians feel a sense of solidarity with the Palestinians and are upset with what goes on and want it to be better. Jordan is a poor country to begin with – with no oil, hardly any water and not too much land either (importing most of its food). And it has had 3 waves of refugees in several waves – 1948, 1967, and 1990 and now even more because of Iraq. Where does one find schools for these children, bathrooms for them to go? Bush creates problems that the Jordanians have to deal with. A problem is created in Palestine and all of a sudden the Jordanians have 75,000 refugees to deal with and no help from anyone. 20 million dollars is a meaningless drop in the bucket for people who have lived for 20 years in refugee camps. American political delegations come and visit but do not do anything substantive to help these refugees – to rehabilitate them and make them less angry. The monarchy does not have money that it is hiding to use for this purpose.

(Saudi American researcher) says that Jordan is where Iraqi insurgent leaders are based.

#### *Jordan– Summary of Major Points*

The government/secret service in Jordan keeps a careful eye on radicalism – at least the kind that would pose a threat to the regime. Compared to other Arab states, Jordan is relatively liberal. Jordan silences or imprisons people who speak out for democracy.

Pressure on Jordan to democratize will result in superficial change only. While the Muslim Brotherhood is not allowed in the political process, they are tolerated as a non-political group (unlike in Egypt), resulting in a sort of uneasy peace. While there is support for Islamism in Jordan, there is also strong support for the monarchy- which is

seen as a bulwark against instability. A large population of (poor) Palestinian refugees as well as heavy media coverage makes the Palestinian/Israeli issue very salient to Jordanians. It has been reported that Iraqi insurgent leaders are based in Jordan.

#### *Pakistan, Afghanistan*

(Jordanian son of famous radical leader) says that Afghanistan was more dangerous than Iraq – we were attacked on 9/11 from bin-Laden in Afghanistan. We need to focus on Afghanistan more than Iraq. Al-Qaeda is regrouping in Afghanistan – and this should be our priority.

(British Islamic media owner and community activist) says that a major catalyst for Islamic radicalization was the presence of the USSR in Afghanistan. Originally (according to a think tank study) 70% of the population of Pakistan were Sufi in origin – but they only control 19% of the mosques. Taking away 5-6% for Shia, the rest are controlled by Wahabi derivative-groups (Jemaa Islamiya and the like) fronted by the Deobands. How did we get to that situation? The USSR invasion of Afghanistan fueled the creation (assisted, armed and funded by the West) of a huge number of Mujahedeen warriors. The communist incursion of Afghanistan was seen as a huge threat by the West – given their recent takeovers of Bosnia, Chechnya, Uzbekistan, etc. Communist takeover was a problem for Muslims, for Christians, for Jews in those regions – since the communists wanted to do away with religion. This represented a political danger as well – since the Iron Curtain was being expanded. So the non-Eastern bloc needed to have local mujahedeen warriors to fight against the Soviets. General Zia el-Haqq (an anti Soviet fighter in Afghanistan) was a staunch supporter and practitioner of the Deobandi sect, which was Wahabi inspired (though at one time the Wahabis declared them as

heretics – and then subsequently infiltrated them a lot more so that their beliefs were closer to being the same). So expertise and weapons were supplied by the US, expertise was likely supplied by the UK, ideology (including the price of persuasion books and imams willing saying that jihad in Afghanistan was the ‘6<sup>th</sup> pillar of Islam’) and money were pumped in from Saudi Arabia and elsewhere (which then attracted the likes of OBL coming into Afghanistan).

#### *Afghanistan– Summary of Major Points*

Al-Qaeda is regrouping in the Afghanistan/Pakistan border area, and this should be a top priority for the West – in some ways it is a greater danger than that posed in Iraq. A major catalyst for Islamic radicalism was the presence of the USSR in Afghanistan. Another catalyst was the U.S. arming and supporting of large numbers of Afghans to fight the Soviets – who were later radicalized by Saudi fighters and propaganda.

#### *Lebanon*

(Lebanese Communist Party member – Beirut) says that the Communist Party is pushing for a secular, democratic, non-sectarian state. Its not about destroying political parties – or killing people. It’s about expressing ones own thoughts freely. The only democratic/secular parties are Syrian Nationalist Party, and the communists. You can say whatever you want in Beirut – but according to the ‘farm system’, power is distributed along sectarian lines. The elections in Beirut are just BS, because power is distributed according to predetermined regions, each of which are ruled by a leader.

The main political parties - Muslim, Christian, Druze, etc. have a leader that speaks for the whole party. These parties do not have democracy (non-sectarianism) as part of their political platform. While there is complete free speech, there is also rampant

corruption within each of these sectarian parties – each run like a minor fiefdom by its leader.

There are the Sunna with the al-Mustabal (Future Movement) led by Fouad Siniora; the Druze with the Progressive Socialist Party led by Michel Aoun; Hezbollah that leads the Shiites led by Hassan Nasrallah; Walid Jumblatt leading the Druze Party; The Communist Party (no seats in Parliament but they have a larger party membership than Druze Party). He says that he is a secular person and is not against any person because of their nationality – all nationalities are members of his party.

All of the major political parties have been in power for a long time and have been involved in corruption for a long time. All were complacent in his view with the Syrians. Those who see Lebanon through the lens of Western media (two opposing groups – the pro-Syrians and the anti-Syrians) are not seeing the accurate situation.

He says that even though there was the March 14 demonstration that was anti-Syrian, and there was a demonstration March 8<sup>th</sup> party that was pro-Syrian, it was UN resolution 1559 that got the Syrians out of Lebanon, not the protests. The protests were conducted by political leaders that from 1990 until 2005 were pro-Syrian – until the assassination of Hariri (when it became too much of a political liability to be pro-Syrian. All through the 90s the politicians used Syrian forces to suppress the people, put them in jail.

He says that when there is corruption there is no government. The Lebanese government is both coercive, corrupt and sectarian. A sectarian government is a bunch of 5 or 6 dictators ruling the government. Druze, Shiite, Sunni, Christian, Eastern Orthodox,



etc. Each group has a quota of seats that they are guaranteed in Parliament and a certain leadership post (such as the president must be a Maronite Christian, etc.).

(Is there another way that the electorate has no choices?) The Syrian Nationalist Party is not allowed any seats in Parliament despite the fact that they have 8% support in the population, compared to the 5% support that the Druze have and they have Parliamentary representation. So some of the parties are completely excluded.

He said that when he is in Turkey he saw the campaigns that the MB was waging (including paying people) to put on the veil. He also says that the post-colonial liberation movements have taken on a religious face – but both the governments and the religious opposition movements are coercive. There are very few strong democratic movements in the ME. He says that this weakness is the fault in part of the Democratic movements – they should be working together instead of each working in their separate countries.

He does not like the term moderate – it means to him a lack of change. He does not support coercion, but he does not want weakness either. He thinks this word is used to describe long-term dictatorships that are trying to hold onto power.

He says there needs to be a meeting of all non-coercive and modern political parties – to be able to support each other across the region with a common platform for their countries. There needs to be an alternate media that is not government controlled.

The key issue in Lebanon is sectarianism – government parties drawn along religious lines. It is not like other countries where the issue is general religious repression. A sectarian government means that power is distributed only along certain lines. Every province ‘belongs’ to a certain political leaders – all politics must be expressed through that leader and their party. The people in the province do not have a

free range of political choices, though it is not totalitarian. It is a cadre of power holders – a fiefdom – a bunch of mafia leaders – a barony.

(Is there an issue of anyone wanting to impose Islamic observance on others?). Hezbollah imposes the same way that all of the parties impose. If you are a Sunni, the Sunni party is the only choice you have for representation. Ditto for Druze, ditto for the Shiite, Christians, etc. It is not like in Egypt where there is one party in control (Mubarak) and one opposition (the MB). No one is imminently in danger of imposing their will as a single power – this is not possible in Lebanon. Power is held in Lebanon by dividing it up with other groups – including drawing electoral districts in such a way to ensure repeated victories by the leading party in each district – with Parliament seats awarded to the victor. This form of government was invented by the Syrians so that they could control the political process and it remains in place after they are not here.

The main issue in Lebanon is the lack of political choice. An Islamist takeover would not be a major danger, because it is not a democratic state or a dictatorship. Under the Lebanese system one political party cannot take over and impose their will on the others – it would destroy the existing political system. Even if a government official is corrupt, you cannot put them in jail because it would set off a civil war.

Hezbollah is seen as part of a national resistance. It was not started by Hezbollah, but rather by several political parties together to oppose Israeli occupation over the years – most currently the occupation of the disputed Shebaa farms. He does not support suicide bombings against civilians, but does not have a problem with strikes against military forces – even within another country's sovereign territory (since they think that Israel has done the same thing). (I say: People use three types of justifications for

illegitimate actions. The first type of justification that people use is – ‘its ok b/c its ok’. The second is that ‘they did just as bad or worse’. The third type of justification is that ‘this is the only avenue we have’). Hezbollah is seen as the defender of Lebanese territory and prisoners. They are trying to free the Lebanese people. He does not see them as bringing an unacceptable cost – he does not look at it from a cost benefit (what he calls ‘machiavellian’) perspective. He says that Hezbollah should have studied the case more before acting – but this was not a fault on their part. Their motivation was to get the prisoners back and free the Shebaa farms. He does not accept that Hezbollah purposely shot rockets from residential areas to use civilians as cover and propaganda ‘victim’ targets of Israeli counterstrikes. He says that they shot rockets from their own villages and areas – they would not purposefully put their families in danger. I say that I disagree – I think it was a lot more strategic than that. He does concede that Hezbollah miscalculated – but he does not think that Hezbollah is a liability. He thinks that both sides will calculate more carefully in the future. I tell him that I don’t think that this is what Israel learned – I think that what they took out of it is that they need to hit harder next time.

He says that one cannot just look at Lebanon as if Hezbollah is the bad guy and Siniora is the good guy – this is a misunderstanding. He also does think that Hezbollah will in the end be subordinate to the democratic process if there is a real democratic government. He clarifies this later to say that what he meant is that the support that Nasrallah has now is because there is a lack of open democratic parties and democratic processes. If there was a real democratic process and open choices, there would be a lot less support for Hezbollah.

(Lebanese Christian female worker in pro-democracy NGO) says that in Lebanon, the political parties do subdivide between two groups – one associated with Hariri and his party that says that it is clear that the assassinations were carried out by Syria; and one group that says that this is not clear. The first group was represented by the demonstrations on March 14 and the second by the demonstrations of March 8<sup>th</sup> (organized by Hezbollah). She decided not to go, because she felt that the demonstrations were going to be used by the politicians for their own ends. In the end, the political leaders did use the consensus of the first demonstration to campaign for their own political parties – for example, making speeches saying that ‘anyone who does not vote for us it is as if they are with the killers of Hariri’. They use the same types of slogans when anyone is assassinated.

Her sister jumps in and says that most Lebanese young people were against the assassination and against Syrian intervention. The politicians then turned against the Syrian regime – even those who were once working with them. They say that this is the way it is in politics – you go where your interest is best served.

She says that most of the people that organized the demonstration of March 8<sup>th</sup> were Hezbollah along with the Syrian Nationalist Party – and other more pro-Syrian parties. She says that the second demonstration was pro-Syrian but was not advocating for Syria to stay in Lebanon, they were more recognizing and defending Syria as an ally as opposed to an enemy. They don’t see it as having been engineered by Syria.

Her sister says there are two parts in Lebanon – the previous pro-Syrian regime and its supporters, and the present pro-Western anti-Syrian regime. The 8<sup>th</sup> of March and the 14<sup>th</sup> of March represent these two parts. Hezbollah was not in politics until recently.

She says that the 8<sup>th</sup> of March was about thanks to Syria for supporting the resistance and they are against foreign interference in the country (including Syria and including Westerners).

(Egyptian researcher working for international research organization) says regarding her home country of Egypt that she was struck by the multiplicity of forces in Lebanon – something that is absent or has been repressed in Egypt for the last generation or so.

(Christian Lebanese television station manager) says that as the divisions in a society become stronger and stronger, the time for unity will come. The very presence of so much divisiveness pushes people to work towards unity. This is what happened in Lebanon in the late 80s. The Lebanese had divided their country into closed areas. These areas began to fight with one another. He thinks this prior divisiveness (which he says eventually will lead to war and dictatorships if left unchecked) has created a level of frustration among the people – as that level of divisiveness increases, the need and desire for unity increases as well. He says that the struggle for coexistence among the different factions in Lebanon will eventually result in Lebanon democratizing – at which point it can become a model for the region.

(Lebanese pro-democracy activist) says that Lebanon is moving towards democracy after Syrian withdrawal. The country is slowly creating democracy from the previous tribal system. People are increasingly able to exercise citizenship.

Lebanon is a tactic in international conflicts – for example between the U.S. and Iran. He says that Lebanon experiences conflict cyclically. Also Israeli interests affect Lebanon. He says Lebanon needs to either create capacity to be less affected by this.

Perhaps also mobilize the Lebanese Diaspora to have more of a positive influence like Israelis or Armenians. However, he says that it's hard to find common themes amongst Lebanese (even expatriates). The Lebanese don't even agree on basic elements of government.

Fear among groups in Lebanon is nurtured to enable power holders to govern. This creates and sustains divisiveness. Those who promote sectarian politics and internal conflict are the winners – not the people.

This country will not survive without the help of international players. There is increasingly more violence in region between Sunnis & Shiites. There is a lot of attention in the Arab media regarding the Sunni/ Shiite relationship. The region in general is very heavily inundated with arms. Extremists (and dictators) use Israel to mobilize and to repress, also to excuse the lack of change in Lebanon.

Living through war gave him chance to reflect on all of these issues. Originally (as a child) he saw the world as polarized between bad Muslims and good Christians – because he was a Lebanese Christian during the Lebanese civil war. Now he believes in promoting unity between groups and actualizing and empowering individuals to have a positive impact on the entire system.

#### *Lebanon– Summary of Major Points*

Power in Lebanon is distributed according to sectarian divisions, and from that perspective, Lebanon does not have a true democratic system. Political parties in Lebanon operate more like corrupt, coercive fiefdoms than real representative parties. While there is strong anti-Syrian sentiment amongst some Lebanese, they are aware that almost all political parties made deals with the Syrians when it was in their interest to.

Power is held in Lebanon by division and distribution – like backroom deals among mafia families.

Hezbollah is seen as no more coercive than any other party in Lebanon – and is possibly seen as less corrupt. Hezbollah in Lebanon is seen as a counterbalance to Israeli aggression and occupation. Destruction by Israel is seen as a miscalculation by Hezbollah, but not as Hezbollah's fault (they are largely not seen as a liability, even by secular Lebanese). Islamist takeover in Lebanon is unlikely because of the way that power is distributed among groups. An attempt to take all the power would likely result in a civil war.

If there was real democracy in Lebanon, support for Hezbollah would decrease. The amount of divisiveness in Lebanon will (and is) causing a counter-movement towards coexistence that will eventually lead to a more democratic system. Lebanon tends to be a tool in international conflicts – a place to (and from which to) wage proxy wars.

### *Turkey*

(Egyptian director of pro-democracy NGO) says that contentions that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt will follow the same path as the Muslim Brotherhood in Turkey are not accurate. The Turkish society does not resemble the Egyptian society. Turkish society is quite modernized and wants closer relations with the West – as shown by its desire to join the EU. People in Turkey drink alcohol openly; there are human rights groups; he has friends in Turkey that fast for Ramadan and then join them over beers when the fast is broken. It is a very open-minded mentality that does not exist in Egypt.

He does point out, however that Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Turkey are waging a campaign to increase religious observance – (even paying people to put on the veil).

(American researcher and academic) says, however, that he thinks that (president) Tayyip Recip Erdogan is a bigger threat than Osama bin-Laden, because he can transform Turkey into an Islamist state.

#### *Turkey– Summary of Major Points*

Turkey is seen as a model of a modern Islamic society – tolerant and pluralist. Nonetheless, groups like the Muslim Brotherhood are actively waging campaigns in Turkey to increase religiosity. The president is seen by some as a threat to Turkey's status as a secular state.

#### *Qatar/Oman/UAE/Bahrain*

(Saudi American researcher) says that Qatar is the second Wahabi state – other than Saudi Arabia.

(Saudi American researcher) holds up Oman as a model in the Gulf – it is geographically close to extremist states but has not had terror attacks (he credits the king for this). He says that in Oman, women can be in government. It is traditional but laid back – religiously tolerant. The country of Oman is completely walled off from Saudi Arabia (they share a long border, but Oman keeps the border closed).

(American intelligence analyst and researcher) says that slightly less vulnerable (than the large states) to Islamist takeover are the small Gulf States – Bahrain, Qatar, U.A.E. These states, though all monarchies, are more liberal in their societies (with therefore less internal pressures), and have relatively free presses, within limits. There is



not a lot of repression of minorities, though they may have less opportunity than the majority – so there is less internal dissent. They have also had the luck of having had some very good quality leadership. These states are also quite wealthy and have more stable economies. One reason for this is simple scale. A smaller population creates less drain on the economy. The Gulf States are also centrally located and take advantage of their geo-strategic locations to increase trade, travel and tourism. They are also blessed with abundant natural resources. For all of these reasons, the small Gulf states seemed to have sidestepped the looming changes and instability that face the larger autocratic states.

### *Iraq*

(Jordanian Christian female professional) says that the Iraq War was one of the things that contributed to a rise in religiosity in Jordanian culture.

(Jordanian son of famous radical leader) says that when the cost in Iraq is too high in money and blood – America will leave, and leave the country to ‘go to hell’. A civil war will ensue. Not just because of Sunni and Shia – there are tensions within each of these groups as well. Turkmen, Yazidis and Christians are also a part of the tensions in the country. Also, Iraq is one of the richest countries in the world. Behind the Sunni are countries like Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Behind the Shia are Iran and Syria. He says that Iraq is a critical area since the time of the Caliphate in the early days of Islam. Iraq is a country that cannot be led without power – an iron hand. The Iraqis will resist conquerors unless they are conquered by brute force – something that the US will not be willing to do. Given that – the US should not have gone in with a clumsy and heavy hand – they should have taken a lesson from the British who were much more respectful – used a lighter hand.

(Egyptian researcher) says that bringing the Iranian influence to the heart of the Middle East region was a direct result of the US invasion of Iraq – because Saddam Hussein kept Iran busy and in check. Dismantling Iraq created a vacuum that allowed Iran to link with Syria and influence in Lebanon, Palestine and elsewhere.

(American researcher) says that the Bush administration acted too unilaterally in Iraq- he needed to build more of a consensus, and the anger in the Middle East regarding Iraq is a negative consequence of the lack of consensus building.

(American Muslim researcher) says that Iraq was a good idea - strike against dictators, easy target - done badly.

(American Muslim researcher and author) says that Iraq will in the end work out because the Shiites in the country realize that the stakes for them are extremely high.

#### *Iraq– Summary of Major Points*

The American incursion into Iraq caused an upsurge in anti-American and pro-Islamist sentiment in the entire region. Tensions in Iraq are not only internal (Sunni, Shiite, Kurd, etc.), but are also an expression of regional tensions between various Sunni and Shiite powers. Iranian influence increasing in the Middle East (in Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, etc) was a direct result of the American incursion into Iraq.

The U.S. acted too unilaterally in Iraq, which created problems – more consensus was needed. A lot of anger in the Middle East towards the U.S. is the result of this. Some in the West say that attacking Iraq was an originally good idea done badly. Shiites in Iraq see that the stakes for them are very high – so they are invested in success.

## *Iran*

(American intelligence analyst and researcher) says that prior to the Iranian revolution of 1979, the last person to take control of a state or empire and simultaneously hold the post of religious leader was Ali, son-in-law of the Prophet Mohammed, who was both a religious leader (Imam) as well as a political leader (Caliph). Since Ali, no other Islamic leader had assumed both political/state power and religious authority – until the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the ascension to power of the Ayatollah Khomeini.

This ideology of ‘cleric as ruler’ (velayat e-faqih) – created out of whole cloth by Khomeini during his early years – functioned as a tool for the assumption and maintenance of political power. In the present regime it also serves the further purpose of allowing for the expression of the geo-strategic territorial expansionist ambitions of the Shi’a Islamist rulers.

Interestingly, the ideology of Khomeini did not come solely out of a (albeit distorted) version of religious Shi’a Islam. There was also enormous input from twentieth century totalitarian ideology – including Nazism, Fascism and Communism. (This has continued up to current times – for example, the current president of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei, attended the Patrice Lumumba KGB school in Moscow).

She says that the ideology became, therefore, a tool of the rulers - whose entire objective was to hold onto power by suppressing any challenge or dissent at home and working to spread their geo-strategic expansionist ambitions abroad. It is because of the geo-strategic expansionism that the regime is so strongly focused on acquiring nuclear weapons; since it sees them as the “sine qua non” of leadership within the greater Islamic world as a whole.

She notes that The regime - with Khamenei as the supreme religious leader, and Ahmedinejad as the President forming a united front is not just thinking about internal control – it wants to export the revolution throughout the Middle East and further – to challenge Sunni domination of the Islamist revival (and through it the Arab World).

She says that Ahmedinejad as a leader is more of a tool of the clerical clique that surrounds Khamenei than someone who actually wields and holds power in Tehran. He has no real popularity in with the population in Iran, and any populist-sounding platform put forth during the elections has been completely scuttled since he took office.

She says that the threat posed by Iran is compounded by the fact that the Mullah's regime knows that its days are numbered. The regime is going to 'go down' (i.e., collapse or implode) in one way or another, likely in fewer than the next ten years. This is because of population demographics including a huge youth bulge that cannot be employed, and an economy that is not working at all. As mentioned previously, unemployment and homelessness are at very high levels, as is drug addiction and prostitution. From a purely economic perspective, the Central Bank of Iran is currently adopting extremely short-sighted and self-destructive measures to try and shore up the failing economy. This reality may make the likelihood of extreme actions on the part of the regime more attractive.

Some of the regional ambitions of the Iranian regime to gain influence wealth and power include its efforts to separate and 'peel off' Southern (Shi'a) Iraq – from the rest of Iraq – and thereby gain control of its enormous oil fields. During the Iran-Iraq war, the southern region was a major battlefield – precisely for this reason. If Iran achieves

dominance in that region – even short of rule, it achieves control over vast oil and natural gas reserves.

Iran also desires to increase its northern span of control – to project its power over any or all of the partially Muslim nations bordering the Caspian Sea (including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Southern Russia). Each of these nations possesses a mutually agreed upon sector of the huge oil reserves under the waters of the Caspian Sea. Control of even one of these nations along with its oil concession would greatly increase the economic resources of Iran.

Looking eastward to the largely Muslim nations of central Asia (the ‘Stans’) – these nations have major natural resources of not only oil and gas, but minerals – both precious and industrial. Iran is very involved economically in this area – building an infrastructure of roads tunnels, and pipelines of various kinds – including water and natural gas.

All of these measures and actions are signs of the fact that the Iranian regime is willing to take radical action now to gain power, wealth and influence – while they still have the ability to do so, and before their clock runs out. This means that while al-Qaeda may be the more immediate threat, since they are larger and geographically more widespread as well as being more globally influential (as well as the fact that they will probably outlive any projected regime change in Iran) – nonetheless, within the next 10 years, give or take, Iran will quickly become the most acute threat – particularly given their potential nuclear capability

(American researcher) says that Iran is using (and funding) Palestinian groups like Hamas to fight against Israel. He says that Iran funds both Sunni and Shiite militant

groups in Iraq. In addition, Iran has aided al-Qaeda and given haven to some of its leaders since 9/11. He says that if it wasn't for Iranian support, Al-Qaeda would be much worse off since the post-9/11 crackdown. He thinks that the US is blind to the degree of danger that Iran presents.

He says that China and Russia are supplying arms to Iran in exchange for oil. Alternative sources of energy would cause China to drop Arabs too. He says that if the Iranian regime obtains nuclear weapons, this would make a big difference in Middle East – possibly set in motion forces that would ultimately result in a third world war.

He feels that while military action would unify the Iranians as well as the greater Arab world, smart measures (like the U.S. refusing to do business with international banks that do business with Iran) could be more effective – possibly causing a major economic downturn in Iran and sparking regime change. He cautions that the U.N. needs to be utilized to build consensus for any sanctions.

(Egyptian researcher) says that bringing the Iranian influence to the heart of the Middle East region was a direct result of the US invasion of Iraq – because Saddam Hussein kept Iran busy and in check. Dismantling Iraq created a vacuum that allowed Iran to link with Syria and influence in Lebanon, Palestine and elsewhere.

He says that ironically, Iran invests a lot less resources than the US to try and influence Middle Eastern politics, but their radical message is more received and more credible in the region. It is not a matter of resources – it is a matter of who captures the hearts and minds of the people (and this is with Iran/the Shiite not being a very much-loved entity in most Middle Eastern countries), who can deal with them in the issues that mean the most to them – issues of identity and pride.

(American Muslim researcher and author) says that Al-Qaeda and Wahabism represent a bigger threat than Iran, because Iranian Shiites are disliked by both Arab Sunni as well as other Shiite Muslims. He says that the regime pushed the 'Twelver' (messianic) doctrine in order to quiet the Shiite masses.

Khamenei is the real power holder in Iran, while Ahmedinejad is a (failed) figurehead. He thinks that the US made a terrible mistake by not taking Khatami seriously and helping him. He says that in the end reform will win and the regime will be ousted. He also says that the vast majority of people in Iran want normal relations with US. From a policy perspective, he says that the US needs to strengthen the intellectual, literary and cultural society in Iran, and recognize and support reformists (but don't name them!).

(Israeli counterterrorism researcher) says that the Iranian revolution and the Khomeini's spreading his radical brand of Islam worldwide was a major starting point for Isalmist terrorism. He says that Iran is less involved lately because they want to concentrate on their nuclear programs. They will again increase their involvement when they acquire nuclear capacity. They still support Palestinian terrorist groups like Hezbollah and Hamas, however, as a way of keeping the heat on Israel.

#### *Iran – Summary of Major Points*

The Iranian revolution was a major watershed in the spread of Islamist radicalism. The Iranian Islamist message resonates throughout the region – with Sunnis and Shiites. Iran funds various Sunni and Shia radical groups in Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq. Iranian influence increasing in the Middle East (in Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, etc) was a direct result of the American incursion into Iraq. Rule by a religious leader has not been

the norm in Islamic history. Khomeini created the concept of clerical rule in order to grab and hold power. Khomeini was also very influenced by totalitarian ideologies/methods. The Iranian regime has the goal to spread its dominion throughout the Middle East. The regime definitely wants to acquire nuclear weapons to ensure regional dominance. Ahmedinejad is a tool and figurehead of the clerical rulers – especially Khamenei. Ahmedinejad is very unpopular in the population because of domestic failings and extremist rantings that have isolated Iran from the international community. Economically and demographically the Iranian regime is very unstable and headed for worse times – this encourages drastic rhetoric and perhaps actions as well.

Iran desires power in Southern Iraq (oil fields), Caspian nations (undersea oil) and Central Asia (oil, gas, mineral resources). Iran has sheltered and aided al-Qaeda leaders especially after 9/11. China and Russia arm and support Iran in exchange for oil (also block sanctions). Iran acquiring nuclear weapons would radically destabilize the Middle East.

Military action against Iran would likely unify the country and gain it regional support. Smart sanctions and regime change measures (helping opposition) would be more useful.

Iran pushes the messianic Shiite ‘twelver’ doctrine to quiet and control the population. The majority of the Iranian population wants normal relations with the West and freedom. Iran has lately decreased its support for terrorism (except Palestinian) to focus on nukes.



### *Palestine/Israel*

(Egyptian American writer) points out that the areas that are most radical are the ones that are geographically closest to Israel, as the populations there have been exposed to generations of messages of hate towards Israel and the West. She feels that the Palestinians have been socialized and conditioned to adopt a culture of ‘drama and victimhood’ and that they need to ‘put the past behind them and work for the future’. She also does not think that there is anything that Israel can do differently that would substantively change the way that they are perceived in the region.

(American researcher) also states that – unlike Russia, China and France – Israel is unimportant in Middle East dynamics (except for its use as a scapegoat by various parties). He says that Palestinians themselves have said that Palestinian extremists are killing and damaging one another (and sabotaging any chance for peace) more than Israelis. He says that moderate Palestinians are horrified at the radicalization that is taking place within their society and they are leaving if they can.

(Muslim American Professor) states that he hears widespread support by Arabs in both Middle East and West for targeting Israeli civilians.

(Jordanian female NGO director) says that if the Palestinian crisis could be solved, all of the other problems in the ME would be able to be solved.

(Egyptian researcher) says that if the Islamist movement accepted the Israel/Palestinian peace process it will change the political game in the region. Hamas old-line leadership does not even accept a withdrawal to 1967 boundaries and the right of Israel to exist – despite the fact that many of their more pragmatic members would do so.

(Jordanian distinguished professor and former government member) says that the Israelis need to give the Palestinians a decent life or they will continue to be a problem – but he says that the Israelis live in their own mental isolation oblivious to what is going on in the region and the part that they play in it. The US is also oblivious to what it creates through its actions in the region – directly or by its support of Israel. He wishes that the other countries got as much aid (proportionate to their population size – per capita) as Israel. Bush sells the Arabs in the region 20b dollars worth of weapons, and 30b goes to Israel. (By the way, he says that generally Jordanians are not negative towards Jews as a people – they see them as being their cousins.) He says that a settlement of any kind between Israel and the Palestinians would settle the region considerably.

The 1917 Balfour declaration was when only 3% Jews in Palestine – now 70% of Palestine is occupied by Jews. This took place under war – allowing Jews from all over to come. Native Palestinians were ignored and disenfranchised. In the Middle East, the reality is occupation, and defense is called “terrorism”. One in 1 million have a bad reaction. Someone sees their relative killed, land taken, no resources – so they will do anything. Give him chance for life before you judge him as a “terrorist”. As far as terrorism in UK where these injustices do not exist, he says all cases are not the same. When a Palestinian makes a defense it is called terrorism – but he clarifies that he is not talking about those who attack women and children – only those who attack fighters.

He says the Arab Israeli problem is the main problem of the last 100 yrs. The only country currently under occupation is Palestine (or maybe Iraq). He does not think that Muslim governments are democracies because they are led by the US & the EU. When

the West looks out only for its own interests in Middle East and allies with dictators (ignoring human rights) this creates problems.

Step 1: separate Israel and Palestine with a UN force in between. Can't talk peace until Palestine and Israel are separated. The US gives weapons to Middle East, and then wants them to talk peace. The US as the main superpower is like the parent – who should separate the fighting children. Peace for the world starts from Jerusalem and Palestine. WWII will start from Jerusalem and Palestine. He wants a one-state solution ultimately as the ideal.

(Egyptian distinguished thinker and writer) quoting Abba Eban 'The Arabs do not miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity'. One of the prominent Arabs who was present at the UN creation of Israel said: 'My plea for all of you is that you accept the UN resolution of the partition of Israel. Do not be as I expect you to be – seeking the possible and losing the impossible. I have been working for the Jews and they are born not to fight, but to trade. However if they are forced to fight, they will do it like everything else they do – they will excel. They are a people that have been sharpened by history'. He confirms that many of the Arabs left Israel/Palestine in 1948 because they were told by their leaders that the Arab armies were going to flatten the Israelis and they should leave... which they did.

He goes on - why such hatred of the Jews? Over the course of history the Jews have had a disproportionate amount of advances and the Arab countries have not necessarily kept pace with this. This creates antipathy. The Arabs also consider the Jews as a part of the Western world and part of the occupation of the twentieth century and hate them along with all of the Western world. He says 'why were we occupied? We

were weak...' Also the Ottoman Empire was occupying Eastern Europe and was beaten back. So the issue of occupation went both ways.

(Egyptian researcher) points out that a very formative event in the life of the Egyptian people was the 6 day war. In a matter of a few days the expectations of the Nasser regime was gone – promises that were not fulfilled. This created a distance between the people and government, politicians, politics – 1967 discredited politics in the country – it created an attitude that was quite conducive to not trusting politics and politicians. The defeat of the 6-day war also marked the beginning of the Sawa – the Islamic awakening.

He says that one of the things that has led to a slight re-politicization of Middle Eastern (and particularly Egyptian) society was the breakdown of the Israeli – Palestinian peace process and the intifadah that followed. This was felt regionally, not just locally – fed by pan Arab media and satellite TV stations. Something happens in Palestine and it is seen immediately all over the Middle East. Media also distort things – as a matter of fact, Palestinian colleagues have told him that in Cairo they see more Palestinians killed in Egyptian media than are seen in Nablus. They may have someone killed every couple of days, but on the news you see someone killed every day – and over and over again. The media only shows one side of the story – not showing Palestinian attacks on Israelis. This creates a strong reaction throughout the region. This caused a sort of activism on behalf of the region (boycott Israeli goods, American goods etc.) – unfortunately re-politicization also leads to radicalization. This is the same in Egypt and Jordan and other countries as well (very much in the Gulf). In Egypt and Jordan particularly you tend to

see these feelings expressed and allowed – by governments that then regret it, then use it for their benefit, then regret it/counter it, etc.

He also says that there are lots of sources of the troubles in the region – but the factor that if controlled will have the greatest effect in the region is the Palestinian problem. What is the link between domestic reform and the Palestinian problem?

Political reform is always tied up with liberalization – the ability of the people to express themselves freely. But if the environment around the people drives them to be haters, radicals – there is no benefit to the governments to allow the people to express themselves – all they are doing is unleashing radicalism. He says that he does not think that an Israeli Palestinian solution is that difficult. Abbas needs to have the appearance of being able to bring a solution – as having a light at the end of the tunnel. Ironically, he points out that Hamas is a result of the US pushing for elections among the Palestinians.

He points out that reaching a settlement is also frightening. Even though the current situation is miserable, it is known. A promised peace might look better, but we don't know it. There is a great deal more uncertainty about peace than about the current situation – which we at least know the parameters of. Any leader prefers certainty over uncertainty. This is why the role of a third party is so important – to assure the people about the uncertainties of the peace. This is something that neither the Europeans and more so the Americans do very well.

An example of the effect of uncertainty: Arafat took the risk of making a peace deal with Israel, recognizing their right to exist. But because he wasn't sure that he would get what he wanted and could defend for the people – so he nurtured Hamas so that the resistance option would be there as a retreat or a pressure tool if the negotiations required

it. This is the role of the third party. The last time there were negotiations between Israel and Syria was in 2000 with Clinton and the late Assad in Geneva. The negotiations failed because of 3k of territory that were completely symbolic – the shore of the lake Tiberis. The Syrians wanted to regain their territory – have it fully restored. The Israelis rejected this saying they needed control over the lake Tiberis. They said that the water use would not be affected for the Israelis. This had no strategic value for the Israelis, but tremendous value for the Syrians. There was a chance to cut a peace deal – and deny the Iranians a role in the Middle East – limiting their radical role. Limiting the radicals among the Palestinians as well. But (because the negotiations were not successful) now they think they are a part of a bigger club – together with the Syrians and other non-peaceful actors in the region. This is why the third party role is so important – to provide assurance.

There has been a change within the last year regarding American policy in the I/P conflict – as seen in the Baker-Hamilton report's emphasis on solving the I/P issue, and as seen by the fact that Condi Rice has been back and forth to the ME several times over the last few months (without which Abbas and Olmert would not have been sitting down with each other). Palestine is seen as being important – a little late. He sees hopeful signs.

Regarding the fact that Hamas has the ace cards of power and militancy: When Rabin first signed the Oslo agreement with Sadat, he said 'we are going to negotiate as if there is no terrorism, and fight terrorism as if there are no negotiations'. This is difficult to operationalize, but it is nonetheless an important mindset. (I say 'well said! – a good answer'). If you don't do this you allow the radicals to hold the peace process hostage. You need to neutralize the impact that these players have on the process by keeping alive a vision of what a peace between the parties could look like – a peace that would spill

over to the rest of the region; also by creating economic and societal (positive) facts on the ground. All of this creates a hopeful climate – even in advance of any permanent situation being found. It is the existence of a positive process that is almost as important as the final outcome.

(Lebanese Christian television station manager) says that he wants to see the Palestinians having an independent and sustainable state. He says that what stands in the way of this is the corrupted times that we are living in. Palestinian societies are corrupted – how can a corrupt society manage to resist the Israelis? He says that because Arab societies are corrupted, they are not hard workers. Corruption does not necessarily mean money under the table – it can simply mean people looking out for their own self-interest at the expense of others. Eliminating corruption will make the societies stronger. When the societies are stronger they can take their rights. Arab societies in general, and this includes the Palestinians, are lazy and corrupt. Even internal differences are not a problem if they are handled properly – on the contrary, differences are a source of legitimacy. At this time the societies are not capable of handling differences. His ideal vision of Palestine/Israel is a united society where Palestinian, Christian, Muslim, Jew, can all live together peacefully, a completely democratic society. He says that he wants to tell Benjamin Netanyahu that he is missing living with Arabs – they have good food, good music. The only hope for Israel is to have an open and pluralistic society. Otherwise he will be sidelined. He is isolated – how tragic and sad – when he could be enjoying Lebanese cuisine and visiting with the people that wear the funny clothes – he is missing out on a lot.

He is anti the 'Israeli project' because he is pro diversity and pro democracy. He thinks Israel should be opposed because they are not allowing for diversity and democracy, not because a particular group (the Shiites) is opposed to them. He repeats that Israel should become an open pluralist state - basically lose its character as a Jewish state. He says because the religious identity of Israel is enlarged in such a way that it impinges on other. He says that one's religious identity is not the only source of identity and that the state should be built on tolerance and pluralism rather than a specific religious identity.

(Muslim woman from Ramallah) says that in her society there are different classes – a bourgeois class and a poor class – but there is not anything in between. She says that there are religious people in every class. She says that others will never know how much people suffer here because of the occupation. Every day she comes here from Jericho to see her friends, look for work. She has to pass through three checkpoints – each one taking about 20 minutes. She gets her papers looked at and asked where she is from. It has an effect on people. She can't have good friends because she cannot easily travel to see people. She can't find work easily – although she thinks that she will feel much better if she finds work.

She says the checkpoints are not about security – why does there need to be checkpoints between Jericho and Ramallah (two Arab villages)? If someone wanted to make a problem, they would do it by going from Jericho or Ramallah to Jerusalem or Tel Aviv – not from Jericho to Ramallah – two Palestinian towns. So what kind of security is this? She does not see the security value. She says that she thinks it is a way of generally oppressing the people – keeping them down. Perhaps they want to catch people that are



security risks that are traveling between one Palestinian town and another. But there still seems to be ways that this could be made easier for the people.

She says that extremism is quite common. People talk about violence, religion, the Israelis, the checkpoints – it has all become part of life, part of the dialogue because of what is happening every day in Ramallah, Jenin, Jericho. Perhaps part of it is because of what Hamas or Fatah is preaching, but it is also because of what they hear that is (actually) happening every day – exacerbated by negative messages from the media.

What could be done within the society itself to improve the situation? She says that they have to wake up and let Fatah and Hamas go to hell. They put the people's situation in hell – put them last. She says let the community function as a unit – one people, to live in a good city with our rights and traditions. When the people are a strong unit, no one will be able to destroy them.

She says that she can't do anything – or even openly voice these ideas, because if anyone in the police hears her talk critically about Hamas or Fatah or their policies they will say that she is a spy, she is not Palestinian, she does not believe in anything. So the discussion that she is presently having, she could not say the same things freely in the society she lives in.

(Muslim media owner and community activist from Ramallah) says everyone in Palestine is looking for positive change at this point in time – in security, in the society, politically, in all of the aspects of life, people are tired, they are sick. He defines positive change as security – having a secure income, kids in decent schools, having stability. The minimum requirements of well being don't exist in Palestinian society – though its true that it doesn't exist in many of the less developed countries in the world. Perhaps even in

some neighborhoods in the US. However, in Palestine people have been suffering since the first intifadah began, and then again when the second one began in 2002 and the invasion began. He said in every conflict it takes two and both sides suffer. The Palestinian lands were occupied by the Israelis and then the Palestinians react to the occupation – which is very normal. As to whether he considers suicide bombing and blowing up buses as a normal reaction - he says that he does not think it is right.

He says that the problem with politics is when it affects the comfort of people's ability to live a normal life. Palestinians seek peace – more than anything else. Majority of Americans, Israelis do as well. But people also want a just peace – a feeling that they have been treated fairly in the conflict. He says if you become as equal then you can negotiate. When you do not have the power, you cannot negotiate your future and change your life – the other party has the power and can impose it on you.

This sense of powerlessness affects people's day to day life. He says that the Israelis can invade at any moment and close down the town or arrest people. If the town closes down the shopkeepers may not have any income for that day. If someone goes to school in Jerusalem they might get stuck at the checkpoint for two hours and have to turn around. If someone works in Jerusalem they might not be able to go to work and get money to feed their children. Every political aspect impacts the people of Palestine. The disconnection between the different parts of Palestine – between Ramallah and Nablus, Between Ramallah and Gaza, between Ramallah and Hebron affects people. He says that there should be a piece of land connecting the West Bank and Gaza at the very least.

He says that the best solution would be to have a single land for everyone. The people who grew up here and the people who have historical claims to the land –

everyone should be able to live together. This includes Muslims, Christians and Jews – let them have a single parliament with everyone having their representation. Let them call the land ‘Holy Land’ or something like that – but it will be a land for everyone. As to the Jewish character of the state, he says the existence of Jewish groups would retain the character. It does not have to be a specifically Jewish state. One can have Judaism as a religion – you don’t have to have it as a nationality. He says that Israel is everyone’s land – you cannot separate Palestinians from belonging to the land just because the Israelis want to have a Jewish state. He says that it is understandable for the Israelis to want a Jewish state, but the Palestinian’s claim to the land needs to be taken into consideration. He says – why not make it like the American model? There are many kinds of people in Israel – from America, from the Middle East, from Ethiopia - there are Jews and Christians and Muslims – why not have it function like the American model where they all live comfortably together and the state takes care of its citizens?

As far as a state wanting to have a particular national (religious or ethnic) character – he says that the state can say whatever it wants to say, but it depends on the will of the majority to determine and decide what kind of state they want to live in. He says that governments do not generate people, people generate governments. Whatever kind of state the people want to have is what they should be able to have. There are other models elsewhere in the world where the government tries to impose the character of the state on the people and they are unstable states because of this. He says you can call it Palestine/Israel – you need to be fair to all sides in the current conflict.

Who would have a right to live in this land? Would everyone who says they have a claim to the land be able to live there? He says that it has to be evaluated – there would

have to be rules. He doesn't think that just because someone is Jewish and comes from the former Soviet Union they should be able to automatically live in Israel. Similarly, if three million Arabs say that they want to live in Israel, they cannot – it is as simple as that. Some people are entitled to it and some are not.

Given the state of affairs being what they are –Fatah and Hamas not being able to get their shit together and stuck in their rivalries (though he says the problems started long before Fatah and Hamas), or because the Israelis are whatever they are... ... What can be done by regular people in the present situation?

He believes that a positive group outcome is based on a collective individual positive outcome. He says, first of all, people have to see hope on the horizon. They have to see Israelis are ready to give the Middle East part of what they see is theirs. People need to see that there is a serious determination to come to some sort of a deal. He says that based on what he has seen, the obstruction is on the Israeli side – because if Israel determines tomorrow that Palestine should be given the land from pre 1967 borders – which is agreed upon by everyone – with East Jerusalem as its capital – then by tomorrow the whole issue would be solved. He says that if the Palestinians get their rights, 'we will fight the extremists'. As to past deals that were offered by the Israelis that included 97% of what the Palestinians were asking for (that were refused), he says that the 97% was of 45% that was originally asked for of historical Palestine (he says that the entire West Bank is 35% of historical Palestine).

He says there needs to be collective work to create pressure on politicians so people can believe in peace – because their experience in the past has been that efforts towards peace have failed. What the Palestinian people themselves can do is become one

unit to fight for their rights, to resist peacefully and educate themselves, put themselves back on track. The people are divided, they don't share the same cause (not just because of infighting). There are many negative elements that became part of the society because of the situation – there is no sense of culture, no movement. There are people in Palestine who are 25 years old who have never left the country. 95% of the people who live in the West Bank are not allowed to go to Gaza. Imagine that you are trapped in your own city. At least you can bring back hope to people – you cannot lead demoralize people – you have to give them the basic requirements.

As far as the Israelis, he says: Be sincere – sound sincere. Act in a way that shows that you sincerely want peace. Tear down the wall, to start with. I say that they won't do it, because the numbers of casualties from suicide bombings have dropped a lot since the wall was constructed. He says that the wall is like the Berlin wall (and the int'l community celebrated when it was torn down) – why would anyone justify a wall that changed the whole map?

So the Israelis need to come across as more sincere. However e says – sincerity needs to be followed up with actions. He says they have to tear down the wall. As to whether he is being maximalist, he says – we are not asking the Jews to go back to where they came from – that would be maximalist. He says it is not maximalist to ask that people not be walled in, the checkpoints are not logical, the suppression on the Palestinian people is not logical, putting people in cities that are like sealed cages unable to travel, this is not logical. If people are in sealed cages and I hold the key to your cage, what can be done? Nothing. The way the cities are walled in and you have to have permission to come and go – this is an actual jail. As to whether the Israeli side has security issues, he

does not think this is true and he says that the Israelis are controlling the entire Middle East – there are numbers and facts – Israeli troops in Iraq kicking Saddam Hussein out of power. He says ‘we know what the story is’.

He says that the Palestinians need to see a sign from the Israelis that there is a chance for peace – that there is something to work for. But since the Israelis hold all of the power, all that the Palestinians can do is beg for mercy. He says that the Israelis are in control of everything – they control our lives, they control our economy, we have no exposure to the outside world unless we go through the Israelis, our phones go through the Israelis, our borders are controlled by the Israelis, our cities are closed off by the Israelis, the wall is surrounding all of our cities, our documents are issued by the Israelis, our security clearance comes from the Israelis, our day to day earnings are controlled by the Israelis – what can we do other than beg for mercy? We are not in a position to ask for anything that we are not in control of (all we can do is beg). Forget making demands - what demands can someone make of their jailer – ‘set me free?’ – it doesn’t work like that.

He says this is his land, his people. He has compromised enough. They have compromised martyrs, prisoners, land, security. He says that he does accept the concept of incremental change – signing the Oslo agreements was enough of an acceptance of compromise. He is not willing to look for minor improvements from the Israelis because he does not think he should have to beg for his rights. He thinks it is amazing how people ask the people under occupation to take an initiative when the initiative is not there for them to take. It makes more sense to ask the occupiers to take the initiative to ease and give hope for peace to the people whose land they took away. He wants the right to

freedom of speech, travel, the right to plant his land and not have it blocked and cut into pieces. One's dignity as a human being is the issue – and all they can do is beg - the Palestinians have no power to ask or demand

He says a group of people that he is a part of are working on improving their internal lives. There is a movement that they have established that is working to improve the internal living situation of the Palestinians. They want to make sure that internal laws are respected and enforced. They want a strong police force that can actually arrest the criminals and protect people (he says currently the police throw away their weapons when the Israelis come in because they are afraid of being arrested by the Israelis – so there are certain things that are not in their hands, they are not in control of). Nonetheless there are things that they are working on to try to create more comfort for people by providing the basics. This movement does not have a name yet –they are putting it together – it is a group of people from all over the West Bank. It is not a political movement, it is a social movement. People feel hopeless from the politicians and from the Israelis. They feel hopeless from the whole world. They feel a lack of security in the society – which is a result of the occupation and the whole chaos that they went through.

This social movement will have demonstrations and protests if someone is attacked by a criminal or a gang and the attackers are not brought to justice as they should be. The emphasis is on the security and peace of the individual, not on the political peace. Peace in individual terms means dignity when you are walking down the street that you are not harassed, being able to walk safely in the streets with one's wife or child. Taking guns off the streets and enforcing justice in a way that is equal on everyone. Even just being able to pick up the garbage. He says it is not just him, it is a group of

people – they started this movement three years ago. They are ready now to put this vision into reality and to get it started. He is only one individual in a very big group. They originally started as a political movement; however they felt that there was no space and that it was not the time to launch such a thing. People are sick of politics and 60% of them do not identify with a political party – they only react based on how each group is behaving at a particular time. The people do not think that a political movement can do anything because of the (quality of life) distractions in the street. The better way of gathering and uniting the people is through working on the social demands and needs of people. This is why they diverted the movement from a political movement to a social one. You cannot create an expanded base from a political movement, but you can create a very huge base from a social movement. They have groups in each town and they are preparing to officially launch their movement. There was a lack of social movements for a very long time – actually there was none. How does he think a social movement might make changes? He says that any change is the idea of creating a majority – people are already socially and politically educated. One just needs to unite the people that feel a certain way and have them make their voices heard.

(Principal Elementary School, Ramallah) says his students are from 13-18. It is a government run non-religious school. The curriculum is determined by the government (Palestinian government curriculum overseen by Israel). Everything is determined by the government. He does not like anything that the government mandates for the curriculum. He would give Arabic more importance, because it is the mother language here. He would also change what they want him to teach in history and geography. All of the students in the elementary school need to learn more to feel strongly about their country.



In the curriculum from the government the information about the country (Palestine) is limited. On the map there is no 'Palestine' on the map – only Israel. He said that he quietly diverges from the curriculum that he is given to teach. He talks to the students about being proud of being Palestinian, about their history, about the right that they have to the land. He does not call for violent struggle, but he does not teach pacifism either – he feels that to do so would be to do a disservice to the youth, who may one day need to defend themselves.

When he finished school and went to University, Israelis put him in prison because he spoke to others about Palestinian rights to the land. He says that he struggled for freedom for the Palestinians, but does not go into further detail. He says that anyone who speaks out for freedom for Palestinians, they will put him in prison. He says that spent 5 years in Israeli prison (in two shifts). He wanted to live in freedom on his land. He says that he is not afraid of anyone in the world. He says that he just wants his students to be able to learn without any interference. He wants to be able to go to his village and not have to follow orders from (Israeli?) soldiers. He laughs when America is mentioned because he says the main source of Israeli support is from US – it is like the 53<sup>rd</sup> state and they need to put another star in the American flag...

He says that he just wanted freedom for Palestinians. He wants freedom from guns, freedom of speech, Anything he did was for freedom. He also tried to teach the people in his village about freedom. He says that he wants Palestinian lands for the Palestinians and the Israelis don't have any claim to the land. He says that he wants one country for all – Palestinians and Israelis. This includes all of the Palestinians that are currently in Jordan, Syria, etc – and also all of the Israelis (Jews?) outside of the country.

He says that he was put into prison in '94 because the Israelis don't want anyone talking about freedom. He says that he wanted one country for the two people to live in equally, not one under the control of the other. He wants to have rules that are set by the Israelis and the Palestinian leaders, not just the Israelis. Nabil says that the Israelis know that the Palestinian people hate the Israelis. Because Arafat said that they would 'push the Israelis into the sea', therefore the Israelis think that all of the Palestinians think this – that the Israelis should go into the sea. Nabil assures me that he does not think this.

He says that when he was a young man, he thought that the way to get things was through power (probably meaning force). Now that he has children, he wants to live quietly with his children. If he goes to prison, he will lose his children. Anyone who has children has this fear. If he would not have children he would not be afraid of prison or of anything else. He pulls out a postage stamp sized picture of his children and says 'this is the reason why I stopped being that person (the angry young rebel).

He says that the world has changed (since the end of the Cold War) and the international political situation has changed. The US has become the police for the entire world. The Palestinian people do not have any way to continue the struggle and get what they are looking for. America is with Israel and the Palestinians are alone. At one time there were two choices – a struggle with guns and the peaceful struggle for their own country. However now the Palestinians are alone in the world- they have no allies among the Europeans, or in America. Since the Palestinians have no real power, the only solution for them is to influence other people to push their governments to make change.

Does he see people trying to encourage others to use violence? He says that some people believe in violence and some people don't. Some (mostly young) people are

taking this path. He says that when he wants to go to his village it takes him an hour to go to his house because of all of the checkpoints in the street. He says that these difficulties push people towards violence.

He says that he was (and is) associated with the PFLP and its aims. At first he (and they) wanted a two state solution; but now they want a single, democratic country. He was put into prison because of his association with the PFLP. He says in the past he was calling for change through forceful means and now he is calling for change through peaceful means. This is his thought and his aim. He says that all of the Palestinians want his goal, but the Israelis do not agree with this goal. He says that 70% of Palestinians accept a single Israel, while 30% of Israelis do.

(Mathematics teacher, Ramallah) says that in West Bank society people are going about their lives – talking, walking, swimming, and everything else that they do, but their feelings are destroyed. All of the people are very sad and they have no hope. He says they live here and they die in the same place. He does not see any conflicts between Christian, Muslim or other types of Palestinians – he says they love one another.

He says that personally he feels happy because he is with his family, his mother, father and brothers; however he doesn't see others smile. When he walks on the street all that he hears is about someone getting killed, put in prison, his home destroyed. When he comes out from his house he has a feeling in his head – he asks himself if he will return to his home that day. He says that the Israelis could come at any moment. Sometimes the soldiers come to take someone and what happens to him is not known. He says that he is able to go to Jordan to visit his sister. He has also gone to Greece. He says that (unlike

some others in the West Bank) he can travel elsewhere – Europe, if he wants. He says that he hasn't because he has responsibilities to his mother - she is alone and not working.

Regarding America, he says 'why do they do that to us?' He says that he does not hate the Americans – he hates their politics. He says that in his school the students are taught that the Palestinians should live and the Israelis should live. However he says that in the Israeli books, the Palestinians are not even mentioned. He says that he saw that on television. He says why is it that if you ask if there is a country named Israel, everyone says that there is – but if you ask the Israelis if there is a country named Palestine, they do not say that it exists. He says in the war of 1948 his father's mother was left in Ramallah and she saw Israeli soldiers killing women and children. At this point she left. He says that this is his country and this was their country – why can't his uncle in Jordan return? He says that some children ask him 'where are you from?' and he says 'Ramleh' (an Israeli village), because his family originally came from there. They ask him, why don't you live there now? What can he tell them?

As to why he has the feeling that he will leave his house and not come back, he says that about four years ago (during the intifadah) he saw with his own eyes Israeli soldiers kill a young man at a checkpoint. He says that sometimes the soldiers would tie a rope across the checkpoint and tell him to go under it. If he wanted to go across he had to crawl under it. He says that the children would ask him why is he so late? He said it is because of the checkpoints (at that time a 40 minute trip took 2-3 hours because of checkpoint delays – but he says that he was going from his village to Ramallah – why does he need to be checked?). He says that (during the intifadeh the children threw stones on their own and it was because they saw everything like what he said above and this

built their ideas. Hassan says that even the existence of terrorist leaders is an expression of the will of the people. He says that if Israel leaves the West bank and Gaza, and there is peace, these people (leaders who advocate violence) will be sidelined.

He tells me that a group of soldiers was talking to a young Palestinian guy. The Palestinian wanted to go through the checkpoint and the soldiers were talking to him – he was about 20 – he was arguing with the soldiers and he grabbed one of them. The soldier that was standing on the rock picked up his rifle and killed him. They took him into a tent. Everyone went. After two hours they heard that he died. The children hear about things like this every day. When he says ‘Israel’ the children feel hate. Sometimes he tries to tell the children about peace. The children ask him if he can save them. And he says ‘no’. They ask him if he can keep them from the soldiers. And he says ‘no’. Can he stop them from getting shot at if they are playing? He says ‘no’. I ask if they saw people getting killed. He says that they hear about it on television. The children see at the checkpoint how the soldiers spit (I think this is what he said) – or they hear the soldiers call their father ‘donkey’ or ‘cow’ this gives them these ideas (about hating the Israelis and feeling hopeless).

He says that we need to encourage the children and give the children hope in the future. He says that when we don’t love ourselves, there can be no peace. We have to love ourselves and then there will be peace. When he sees someone and they are bad – he doesn’t just look for bad things – he looks to see good things in him. What he sees in the soldier that shot the young Palestinian? He says that he sees freedom. Why? Because he feels that the soldier was forced to do this work and he hates it and that is why he acts this way – and sometimes people will refuse to serve. The feelings change – they don’t stay

the same. Maybe in the beginning he (Hasan) hates him, but after a few years, he loves him. This is what he sees for the country. The bad will not continue. He says that all of the life and all of history is a series of good and bad events.

(PFLP member and teacher from Ramallah) says that no one goes down the path of violence who does not want to. Their life is very hard. He says that in this country if you walk with the Palestinian flag, you will get shot at by the Israelis and you will die. He tells me that this happened to a friend of his in 1987. He says that if Israel wants to close off the air, she will do this. The Israelis control the flow of the water that comes from their land. The land that belongs to the Palestinians is controlled by the Israelis. They destroyed Gaza, they killed people. They are like animals in a zoo that cannot move from one cage to another without the zookeeper. It takes two hours to get to Turkey, one hour to get to Amman – and four hours to get from Ramallah to Nablus (a neighboring town).

He makes the point that people in the resistance in Palestine tend to go through a phase change as they get older – they still want to make resistance but they have a different conception of how to do it. They see that there are different ways to make resistance (i.e., not only violent resistance). In any case, he definitely states that blowing up women and children is not the way to make resistance. Although he says that he is against terrorism, he says that teaching non-violence is impossible in his country. He is against violence and says that no more killing is needed on either side – there has been enough. However they have to see what will be in the future. If he teaches people ‘we must be peaceful’ – this means like the Christians who say that if someone hits you on one cheek, you have to turn the other cheek to him. This is not peace.

He is also a part of the group being started. He says that the goal of this new group is to make change – this will come with the individual first, then the society, then with the larger political picture. The change that starts with the individual is for people to believe in their goals, talk about them to their friends and family, do something (positive) in their small circle and then go out of the circle.

All of the Palestinian people want to change the situation in the land. The ways of Fatah and Hamas are the same (i.e., negative). The Palestinian people want a different kind of change. They want to take care of their education, to take care of their community, to teach themselves to be one unit. They want to keep their country clean, to keep their streets clean. They want freedom for their personality to express itself – to do what they want to do. Religion is not separate from this – because their religion is a part of their beliefs.

When asked about (Muslim woman from Ramallah) who is under familial and societal pressure to conform in the name of religion. He says that some of the pressure (Muslim woman from Ramallah) is under is from a lack of communication in her family. When her father does not want her to do something, he just says that it is ‘haram’, instead of talking to her about it. He does admit that there is a lot of pressure on family members (females?) to dress or act in a certain way – even in other towns, lest their dress or behavior bring a bad name to the family. He says that this is a bad thing in this country. He believes that this cultural attitude requires education – to tell people that what someone else does or how they dress is not their business – it is how they want to live their life. Its not something to talk about – its not your responsibility to talk about any girl. He says that they need to educate people about health, sexuality, their community,

how to treat women equally, they must do job skills training, not just academics, the curriculum needs to teach people how to think. He emphasizes that the goals he wants to work for with this new group are individual freedom of expression; acting together as a unit; education; functioning as a society; pride in who you are; and staying with one's religion – taking values from it in a good way (not using it for terrorism and bad things – Islam is not like this).

He wants to educate – but with a new curriculum – one that will bring them to their goals. The present curriculum will not even lead them to half a goal. How can they reach their goals, if the curriculum in the schools will destroy it? First they must teach religion in the right way. This means that they don't want to tell others how to pray, go to Mecca or observe the dietary laws without teaching people how to communicate properly with others. The religion is not just to pray – and certainly not to kill others if they aren't Muslim. They must teach how to communicate, help others, build their country – not just to pray and observe rituals. Examples of communication include between males and females: Everyone needs to learn that a woman has her own personality – to learn, to work, to do what she wants to do. This does not mean that she can do anything – there are some limits within the religion, as there are for men also. What is incumbent on the woman is also incumbent on the man.

Another issue of communication is treating and speaking to others equally. Black, white, yellow, rich, poor - they are all the same. There is also the issue of jobs – no one should be able to get a particular job because they know someone. The job should be available to the person with the proper training and certification. Another issue is how to always speak the truth – to stop lying. This is what they need. They have to help one



another – if he sees a blind man, he needs to take his hand and help him across the road. Our religion tells us that we must do this. Politics needs to be separated from religion. A particular political group should not be able to tell everyone whether they know God or not.

Regarding PFLP and the attacks that they made on people – he said that the PFLP did many things but did not make attacks on civilians. He justifies the killing of Rehavaam Zeevi (Israeli Minister of Transportation assassinated by PFLP) by saying that he was the first person to tell the Israelis that they needed to transfer the Arabs out of Palestine. The Israelis killed Abu Mustafa (second in command at PFLP) who was also a civilian – and the PFLP picked the right person to get in retaliation. He continues about how the Israelis started this war, its their fault, they are bad, etc. But he insists that the goal that he is working for is an eventual sociopolitical shift - not eventual military action.

He says that while he does not agree with Hamas. Hezbollah is a different story – Israel stole land from the Lebanese and Hezbollah wants to get the land back. They build culture, unity and good technical tactics and they use many ways and then they get the point that they know that if they make war with Israel they will get it back. He is speaking about Shebaa farms – an area of about 10 miles. He says that he wants to get his land back even if it is just one meter. He says that the Israeli government has stolen land from Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Syria, and most importantly Palestine – it is a thief government. He goes on about the conflict in Lebanon and how many civilians were killed by the Israelis (more than 1000), and how many soldiers were killed by Hezbollah

(100). He says that Hezbollah killed about one or two civilians - so who is the terrorist now?

What will happen after the Palestinians are stronger, better and more unified? He says that after they are doing well – agriculturally, economically, industrially, after they are unified – then they can go to the Israelis and they will talk. If they have their country, they want to control their borders with Palestinian soldiers. Israelis can't come into their country any time they want and kill people. If the Israelis refuse to respect their borders, they will tell them that they do not need them – they can make their money on their own. If the Israelis refuse this (surely they will oppose Palestinian unity), then the Palestinians can tell them that 'this is our land' – because they will be powerful. Maybe they can get some big country to back them – like China, Iran or Korea. The world will see that they have a big powerful country allied with them. When they are equal with others, then they can talk about peace. If they refuse a permanent peace, if they do not respect the borders, if they do not respect whoever is allied with them – then perhaps the end will be war. But he thinks the Israelis are more clever than this – especially given the experiences of Israel with Hezbollah. They won't go to war. He thinks that there will be peace – when they are on the same level. West Bank and Gaza need to be unified – perhaps with underground trains – there must be communication between Gaza and the West Bank. But this will happen when the Palestinians themselves are unified. How would he reach out to Gaza now?

He says it is not possible to unify with Gaza now. He says that he gives Hamas two more months in Gaza and he thinks that Hamas will leave by itself. The wrong things that Hamas has done in Gaza have made the people hate it. Not only killing Fatah

members - he says that they are going to Israel with open arms, offering them peace and telling them that they will not allow any fighters to cross from Gaza into Israel. (They have caught people trying to fire on Israel and they shoot them behind the knee so that they are crippled – they have done this to about 20 people.) They have shut down the Palestinian media – not allowing any journalists, no satellites – the people hate this. They have taken down the Palestinian flag and put up their flag instead. Who made Hamas? In 1987, there was no Hamas. Israel made Hamas to destroy the unity of the population. The same way that America made bin-Laden.

In any case, once Hamas is gone, they will be able to better reach out to the Palestinians. He says that the people supported Hamas because Fatah was seen as corrupt and Hamas said that they would bring change and build. Everyone hated Fatah. They made a lot of problems, stole a lot of money. Now Hamas is hated, and he thinks that the people will want them to go. If there is an alternative choice he thinks that Hamas will get no more than 30% support. He thinks that Abbas will hold new elections and Fatah will come back to power – but this can only happen if Abbas is in Gaza to hold elections. In order for this to happen, Hamas needs to agree to allow elections – which would be in response to pressure from the people. This may occur because Hamas will not have the economic support from the international community. He does not think that Hamas will stage a coup to hold on to power. He does not think that Hamas will try to retain power against the wishes of the Palestinian people.

How does he think that Hamas should be dealt with? He says that Hamas must leave by itself. If Fatah comes to power, they may have new people that support

Mohammed's goals of unity. Regarding this optimistic possibility, he says that you must look at what is beautiful, not what is sad – or you will just think about how to die.

He says that the issue in Palestine is not only the fault of the government. He says that the leaders were put in power by the people.' They had a lot of choices and these are the leaders that they chose.

Would he want to come to any agreements with the Israelis until he is able to get everything that he wants? Or would he want to wait? He says that he can speak to the Israelis at any time. Would he be willing to come to interim agreements in the meantime or only wait till he can get big agreements? He says that anyone who wants to get to his goals, he must go step by step. His ultimate goal is a single unified country with no divisions between Israel and Palestine. He hopes that if this happens, the Palestinians will dominate politically because in both the society and the government they will outnumber the Jewish Israelis. What if they have a unified country and the Palestinian parties don't get a majority – will he be able to live with that reality? He says yes, why not.

(Arab Israeli sociologist) says that he feels Arabs in Israel are discriminated against regarding resources. He wants to study Palestinian population demographics connected to public health. He thinks that researchers needed from within the society (in public health, medicine, biotechnology) – not just government studies. There is a need for a proper base of knowledge to create better policy. However it is difficult to connect with upper level policy makers – he says that he has tried. Local governments are easier to connect with and cause a positive effect. Also it is possible to work with schools and organizations within Arab-Israeli and Palestinian.

(Arab-Israeli filmmaker and IT worker) says that he created documentary movies about Arab-Jewish conflicts in Israel. He lived in Tel Aviv and Haifa and had close Jewish friends. He says that at times they could forget their differences and just be friends. However, Israeli society fluctuates – sometimes they can forget and sometimes in a moment it all comes back (possible because of some negative media story).

He says that violence is like a cycle – he wants to stop it. He says that we all breathe same air and have same blood. We need to be together and help one another.

He points out that conflicts in Israel are within groups, not just between groups. Additionally, there is struggle between Christians and Muslims, not just with Jews. Government does not have ability to create unity – this must come from the people themselves.

He feels that Religion is the source of the problem - especially mixed within nationalism. He himself holds his own beliefs and tries to live a proper life. He disagrees with those who are violent and disregard human life. He thinks the economic situation is key to moderation. Those who live with economic security much less likely to be vulnerable to radical views He thinks that students/academics need to unite and do research and prove that Islamic autocracies are bad and hurting people. But they need help from the West to do this.

(American Muslim researcher and author) says that Muslims do not realize (or don't want to recognize) that Israel is one of the best countries in the world for Muslims.

#### *Palestine/Israel– Summary of Major Points*

The countries closest to Israel geographically are the ones that have tended to be the most radicalized by anti-Western and anti-Israel messages. According to one point of

view, nothing that Israel can do would substantively affect the dynamics in the region – as they are functioning as a scapegoat. This point of view also states that Palestinian radicals damage chances of peace and injure Palestinians far more than Israelis do. Others say that if the Palestinian/Israeli issue were solved, the entire region would be affected, and certainly that radicalism would be lessened.

Another way to state this is that if the Islamist movement were to accept the peace process, this would change the political game in the region. Moderate Palestinians are horrified at the radicalization within their societies, and those who can leave, do so. There is widespread support (or at least condoning) in the Arab world for the purposeful targeting of Israeli civilians. Hamas may have more pragmatic elements, but they do not represent the main leadership. There is a need to give the Palestinians a decent life – the lack of this is due in part to the Palestinians (especially the leadership) and part of it is due to actions by the Israelis.

Part of the hostility towards Israel on the part of Arab countries is envy at Israel's economic, military and technological advances compared to the rest of the Middle East. Israel's defeat of Arab armies in various wars (especially the 6-day war) fueled an Islamic awakening and a strong anti-Israel sentiment. The breakdown of the Israeli/Palestinian peace process and the intifadah that followed caused a re-politicization of the entire region. Regional media have stoked anti-Israel sentiments by heavy, repeated and one-sided coverage of Israeli attacks on Palestinians.

The presence of a third party serves to lessen feelings of uncertainty and fear among the negotiating parties – as sometimes people go with a known evil rather than an unknown. There have been hopeful signs lately regarding American policy towards the

Israeli/Palestinian peace process – that the U.S. is seeing it as more of a priority. The influence of anti-peace groups like Hamas can be lessened by the very act of talking – as this serves to increase the presence of hope (and positive vision) among the people. Internal corruption and rivalry in Palestinian society has lessened the chances for peace and made life miserable for the Palestinian people. Both Fatah and Hamas are blamed.

There is a growing recognition that the internal Palestinian society needs to become stronger, more unified and less corrupt – needs to take responsibility for its own future. There is a strong feeling of powerlessness, fear, hopelessness, fatigue, rage, depression, anxiety, humiliation and helplessness among the Palestinian people towards the Israelis. There are those who want peace in the form of a two state solution; there are those who want peace in the form of a single, democratic and pluralistic state, there are those who see one as a precursor to the other and there are those who just want destruction of Israel.

Israelis (even those in favor of a peace settlement) tend to see a single-state solution as being a form of demographic destruction of the Jewish State. There is an attitude that if positive change is not going to come from the political powers, it needs to come from the grass-roots efforts of the Palestinian people (and Israelis too). Palestinian radicals who believe in violent measures sometimes go through a phase change where they see resistance as also encompassing non-violent measures. Palestinians see American hegemony as ensuring support for Israel and preventing positive change. Small quality of life issues created by the Israelis have a large impact on Palestinian attitudes towards Israel and push people towards violence.

The three issues that came up most often were lack of ability to travel freely (in and out of Palestine), Israeli humiliation and disrespect and the fear of Israeli attacks/arrests. There is a lot of pressure internally in Palestinian society for women to conform in dress and behavior – for cultural/familial reasons as well as religious ones. Extremist/violent sentiments are very widespread in West Bank culture – even more so in Gaza. Israeli Arabs feel discriminated against in Israel regarding access to resources. Larger Arab/Israeli problems drive a wedge between Israeli Arabs and Jews. Muslims do not realize that Israel is one of the best countries in the world for Muslims. Economic stability and security would promote moderation and discourage radicalism.

#### *United States*

(American researcher) says that Arab Muslims are culturally much closer to West than Far East. However many misconceptions exist – in part because few in West have actually lived in Islamic countries.

(Egyptian American writer) is concerned that the U.S. stymies the reform movement within Islam by accepting extremists and their views and by being indecisive in responding even when they clearly see something as being unacceptable. This is seen as being due to a mixture of fear of political backlash, a misguided political correctness as well as desire to be seen as multiculturally tolerant, and the effect of Saudi Arabian money and influence.

(Egyptian American writer) and (American researcher) say that a lot of pro Saudi research takes place in the U.S. because of Saudi oil money that flows into U.S. universities. There are many Middle Eastern Studies and Islamic Studies departments at U.S. universities that are founded and funded by Saudi Arabia.



(American researcher) says that the oil lobby in the U.S. is very pro-Saudi and this has influenced politics – especially as many ex-politicians obtain work as lobbyists. He says that extremism comes from the U.S. buying oil that then funds extremism – in effect, the U.S. is funding its own enemies.

(Muslim American Professor) says that the U.S. props up repressive governments within the Middle East – which stands in the way of societal, political and religious.

(American researcher) says that the U.S. government (specifically the State Department) is presently considering using the Muslim Brotherhood – Sunni radicals - as a possible future means of fighting Shiite radicalism. He feels that this is misguided, dangerous and a repeat of previous U.S. attempts to make use of 'bad guys' that later went awry. He points to the proliferation within the U.S. of groups like CAIR (Council of American Islamic Relations) that essentially operate as propaganda fronts for Radical/Islamist Groups like the Muslim Brotherhood. He and Nonie (Egyptian American writer) feel that the US. is in a dangerous state of denial regarding the existence and free operation of radical front groups like CAIR.

(Jordanian distinguished professor and former government member) says that the US is also oblivious to what it creates through its actions in the region – directly or by its support of Israel. He also says that he wishes that the other countries got as much aid (proportionate to their population size – per capita) as Israel. Bush sells the Arabs in the region 20b dollars worth of weapons, and 30b goes to Israel.

(Egyptian politician and moderate party co-founder) says that the U.S. administration uses a double standard when it comes to the Middle East compared to other countries. For example, the US ignores human rights and democracy abuses in the

Middle East while making them a priority in places like Eastern Europe. They ignore democracy in the Middle East and are only concerned about oil supply and other economic issues that serve their short-term interests.

(Elementary school principal from Ramallah) says that the main source of Israeli support is from US – it is like the 53<sup>rd</sup> state and they need to put another star in the American flag... He says that the world has changed (since the end of the Cold War) and the international political situation has changed. The US has become the police for the entire world.

(British Muslim media owner and community activist) says that the influence of fundamentalism in the West has grown exponentially – even in the States you can see organizations like IMPAC and CAIR and IQNA and IFNA (check spellings). It is possible that demographically these organizations actually do represent the Muslim population of the US (certainly more than the UK). He has read reports that say that 25% of the Muslims in the US are of Arab origin, 30% are of African American origin, 20% are from the Indian subcontinent, and the rest are a mixture. So maybe these organizations do represent US Muslims (more than the UK) from a nationalistic perspective, but they never used to represent them from a religious/ideological perspective. However now, because of the work that governments including the U.S. and the UK have done with organizations such as these, the Islamist (a word that he says is used by the Muslim Brotherhood themselves on their website) strain of thinking is growing within the Muslim population at large.

(American Muslim researcher) says that he thinks that in both governmental as well as public opinion Saudi and Wahabi influence in US has declined since 9/11.

However he also says that extremists don't need to send their clerics here – they are already here. (Egyptian American author) concurs with that last point.

(American researcher and academic) says that In the US, Islamists who learn to stay clean and play clean are more dangerous than those that stick out. Violent individuals and organizations with violent ties are much more vulnerable to being exposed and being cracked down on by the U.S. government.

He is concerned that Islamists can impose their cultural restraints on the West. He says that physical damage/loss of life (even large scale – he uses the example of hurricane Katrina) is fleeting, while encroaching on a system is lasting. He notes that forcible approaches (like attacks) and creeping approaches (encroaching on a system) can be used simultaneously. An example of a group using this combined approach is Hamas. Terrorism and soft encroachment have same goal – to impose Sharia law. He is very concerned about what he calls 'creeping Sharia-zation'. This can be seen throughout the EU & UK – less so in the U.S. at present. He does think that this could be an increasing problem in the U.S. because of the large Muslim population, multicultural values, and a victim mentality among Muslims. He says that 'organized, pushy, threatening, and 'victimized' is the recipe for Sharia encroachment.

He felt that the U.S. should have pushed back harder in cartoon issue – by a lack of firm response, the U.S. showed that they were willing to mute freedom of speech. He also points to a lack of strong response in the Rushdie affair. Regarding pushing back against the influence of Sharia, he says that the U.S. and Australia are best (though not enough) in staving off Islamism. He cites as a success, an incident where Muslim cabdrivers were refusing to pick up passengers with dogs or alcohol. After a protest, they

had to back down. Creeping Islamism is a general issue and is not only from Wahabism, Iranian Shiism or the Muslim Brotherhood.

He says that the US could follow route of EU and the UK – with appeasement, loss of their own heritage, and a surrender to multiculturalism to an extreme degree. He says that this will be a serious issue for a long time to come in US. The way to protect the freedoms in the system is to make it clear that Muslims need to work within the U.S. system, and not erode it. This means that Sharia needs to be a) optional, b) always trumped by existing US laws.

He says that people and governments need to speak up against creeping Islamization and for their own cultures and values. This is similar to what is being promoted in the Netherlands – where it is being made more clear (through specific publicity campaigns) that the native culture (liberalism, a respect for women, etc) must be respected. He also says that the U.S. needs to make clear to friendly Middle Eastern governments that they are facing a major ideological movement not a bunch of criminals. He also says that Moderates need to offer something compelling as an alternative.

(Israeli retired military officer and terrorism researcher) says that states in the West (including but not limited to the U.S.) do not see that there is a problem with an international encroachment by increasingly sophisticated types of radical indoctrination. They tend to think more about preventing specific attacks than seeing the real scope of the problem.

#### *United States– Summary of Major Points*

U.S. acceptance (or lack of decisive condemnation) of extremism within Islam stymies Islamic reform – due to misguided political correctness, naiveté, or fear of

backlash. The oil lobby in the U.S. is very pro-Saudi and has had an influence on politics as well. U.S. oil purchases in the Middle East funds extremism – in effect, the U.S. is funding its own enemies. The support that the U.S. gives to non-democratic governments stands in the way of reform in the region and makes the U.S. government deeply unpopular.

The U.S. is considering using the Muslim Brotherhood as a proxy force against Shiite extremists – a repeat of previous policies of backing dangerous/extremist forces. There is a proliferation of organizations within the U.S. that are fronts for radical and fundamentalist groups – the U.S. government tends to be in denial about these groups. Due to fundamentalist influence in the U.S., radical Islam is growing. The U.S. is seen as ignoring human rights abuses in the Middle East (due to selfish interests) while making a big deal about them elsewhere. Americans have misconceptions about the Middle East because few have lived there.

Extremist clerics are not in danger of coming to the U.S. because they are here already. Islamists that learn to play by the rules and not stick out may be a greater danger. Islamists in the US and EU want to encroach on Western values, freedoms and behavior. U.S. and EU needs to push back to prevent encroachment of Islamism and Sharia law. West needs to speak up for and protect freedoms and values (enforce existing laws).

### *Europe*

(American consultant and researcher based in London) tells an interesting story about the second and third generation Algerian French. They live in a very patriarchal society, but they also emphasize education – for the daughters as well as the sons. The women go out and get all of this education and then when they come back into the home

and the father tries to tell them what to do, they cannot do it any more, because the women have been exposed to European societal values. So he says to empower women in order to fight Islamism.

In France, the issue that drives Muslim immigrants to negative actions and associations is primarily economic. Many of the Muslim population is in ghettos (the banlieu) – i.e., in underprivileged circumstances. The French say that everyone is equal. If you get an education you can get ahead. Then the kids get educated and find that the economic opportunities that they promised were not there. That was what caused the riots. They burned cars because they did not have cars. Now under Sarkozy the system is opening up to a more capitalist system that is less restricted. France has 7 million Muslims and a bad economic system – but they have a robust legal system to find and deport extremists. This is better than in the UK, which is more law enforcement oriented.

In the UK the problem is not so much economic – there is much more opportunity. The issue is more one of identity – immigrants not feeling British, not being allowed to be totally British (the traditional British are more anti-dark than anti-Muslim – anti non bluebloods). Until the bombings of 7/7, the multicultural ‘live and let live’ philosophy in the UK created a very hands off approach to extremists. The feeling was as long as they don’t attack the UK they let them live and preach as they want. The UK was also willing to take in a lot of extremists from abroad. Mubarak warned before the bombings that this was going to be dangerous. The worst problem with radical Islamism is in the UK – the population has a large volatile element. If the population is not de-radicalized more incidents could happen. However the British security (surveillance and intelligence) is very vigilant.

The German issue is like the British – it's an issue of identity. There are suburbs in Germany where Turkish Muslims never see other types of people – they are very isolated from the mainstream, by choice and because of attitudes in the larger society. Nonetheless, he says that Turkish immigrants are more moderate than the Moroccans - who suffer from a combination of gang-type criminality and even greater levels of cultural isolation. The Germans have a public that is very scared so their efforts are getting better all of the time.

Something is going on in Denmark – a bunch of people were just picked up there for plotting some kind of attacks. The Danes are way ahead of the Norwegians though in terms of their awareness of the issue of radicalization. He mentions a problem of 'creeping Sharia-zation' in places like Belgium Antwerp and Brussels. (another community activist said that people who emigrate from more rural and less educated areas are more susceptible (as are their children) to radicalization. They are less educated and less sophisticated and they don't know how to educate their children.)

Italy has the least Islamist problem because the Muslims there are less and dispersed – though this is increasing due to immigration from Morocco and Pakistan (going to Spain as well).

Belgium has a skyrocketing Muslim population, a large welfare state and a lot of emigration by non-Muslims out of the country. It could be that the welfare state is as big a problem (in creating an Islamic underclass) as the radicalization alone.

It's not just about radicalization – it is also about the demographics. Many European countries have a very low native birth rate and a high level of Islamic immigrants who have a very high birth rate. He says that fighting extremism is

sometimes held back in the West because of a desire to be politically correct. He says that the least politically correct countries are Germany and Australia. The most politically correct is Britain. This gets in the way of them being able to combat extremism. America is pretty politically correct as well. The pro of this approach is that you don't stigmatize people. The con is that things are allowed to stay under the surface and people will push as long as there is no resistance. People like Tariq Ramadan (a well-known Islamist) want to create a Muslim territory within the country and people don't push back. No demands are put on immigrants who get subsidies (like learning the language). So there is a lack of assertiveness on the part of the majority community which is perhaps starting to change a bit (especially in the UK after the bombings). It is also about being up front about European values (and American values). Even the Pope has recently talked about Catholic values.

In terms of European anti-terrorism policies, he says that anti-terror legislation sometimes becomes more or less effective depending on how law and order (i.e., enforcement-oriented) the government is. He states that assertiveness can combat the creeping Sharia-zation – one must push back (before it becomes set in and calcified – with the potential for backlash once you try to make changes.). There is also a fear of a backlash from the lower class whites in places like Rochdale to Muslims if another incident takes place.

Not only prevention is important but also resiliency – not having knee jerk reactions to attacks. Useful policies include: 1) Having mainstream Muslims speak out right after an incident unequivocally against terrorism 2) Community/Police relations so there is a good exchange of information and cooperation 3) Education, socio-economic



measures – things that inoculate against extremism. He says that A CIA estimate recently stated that SA alone has (over the past 2 decades or so) spent over 80 billion dollars in exporting their ideology – the Wahabi dawa – to the West. He has stacks and stacks of books that are Wahabi inspired dawa materials collected in Great Britain. He says that Muslims in the UK have a process where they will go after school to a mosque for a couple of hours, 6 days a week for 3-4 years to get instruction. When Harras was young, this was done in the Pakistani Urdu language – a language that he was not that comfortable with. So he only learned two things at the mosque – how to incorrectly pronounce the Koran, and how to perform their daily obligations such as prayer, fasting and the like. So as he got older he was subjugated to the Wahabi/Deobandi texts – along with the Jemaa Islamiya which was and is very big in Pakistan – so he was slowly brainwashed a little bit as well with their ideas. Some examples that he gives is being told that you cannot take a Jew or a Christian as a friend, that it is more sinful to wish someone a ‘happy birthday’ than it is to kill somebody – these things were a part of a three-phase radicalization process (about which he has done a lot of research). So at some point he began to do his own re-examination – which eventually led to him becoming both a religious Muslim in the Sufi tradition as well as an outspoken moderate.

In the UK they have the same phenomenon (and he has names to prove this) – he and his moderate friends call this group ‘the Bangladeshi Mafia’. For example in the Foreign Office there is someone who is a key member of Jemaa Islamiya (a prominent Islamist group in London) and the Muslim Brotherhood, who is now a key advisor to the government on Muslim issues. There is also the Department for Communities and Local Government – which is responsible for all of the faith-based communities in the UK –

they have a member who is a member of Jemaat Islamiya and the Muslim Council of Britain who is a consultant and chief advisor. In the Treasury there is an advisor who was on the Islam Channel (a local Islamist TV station in the UK) about four months ago – praising and putting the case forward as to why Iran should have nuclear weapons. There are many more like this.

The common link is that their original heritage is Bangladeshi, and they are all members of either the Muslim Brotherhood or Jemaat Islamiya. As to why specifically Bangladeshi as opposed to Saudi or Pakistani? He says that there was a Lord Patel who was very close to Jack Straw when Straw was Home Secretary and when he became Foreign Secretary as well. Jack Straw was the key here. Where he lives, the majority of Muslims are Wahabi-based Deobandi, Salafi or Jemaat Islamiya (an anomaly for a British town). If Jack wanted to get re-elected he had to have these people on his side. Some of his advisors became leaders at the MCB – the Muslim Council of Britain – a body that the UK gov't uses for consultation on Islamic issues – including someone who wrote articles praising bin-Laden. A lot of money flowed into this body from Middle Eastern charities (three – names?) some of which are banned in the US and all of which have ties to either Wahabism or the Muslim Brotherhood. These monies were able to be utilized by Lord Patel and his advisors (all of whom are Bangladeshi) because they were in the government or consultative bodies (like the Muslim Council of Britain) receiving the funds – and also because they had political connections with Jemaat Islamiya – a recognized political party in Bangladesh.

In this way the Bangladeshi Wahabis have become almost a ruling clique within the UK – all connected with Jemaat Islamiya. These figures were appointed to head what

was called the Preventing Extremism Together Task Force after 7/7 – a task force headed by 80% people with extremist ties to Jemaat Islamiya, Muslim Brotherhood, Wahabism and Salafism. He was in this task force and resigned when he saw that there was no way to counter the extremist influence in the task force. He went on media all over the UK at the time to protest ('I became a little bit of a fly in the ointment'). .

Unlike in the US, in the UK most of the mosques are from a Sufi perspective. When people came over from Pakistan or India, the Sufi sheikhs always sent over with them their representatives (called 'Pir' – the Persian/Turkish word for 'sheikh') to build mosques. In this way many small mosques were built throughout the UK. While some of these mosques were taken over by Saudi money, other people heading mosques were quite stubborn – not letting the younger elements get involved in running the mosque, which in effect also kept out the Saudi extremists (which would tend to try and influence the youth). Lately there is so much money coming in from the ME to set up mosques that their resistance is being overwhelmed.

He tells of meeting a man in Manchester a few years older than he, who when they started to speak, broke down and started crying. When he composed himself, Harras asked him why he was crying he began to tell Harras about his son. In the Pakistani community there is a huge amount of kudos attached to one's child becoming a doctor. From the perspective of that society, If you have raised a doctor, you have been successful. His son had gone to a British University (name?) to become a doctor. While in the University he joined an Islamic society. His son started coming home and praying a lot more. At first the father was very happy because he felt that his son was becoming a better Muslim than he – without what the father saw as his own his spiritual

shortcomings. He thought his son was becoming closer to God. The son started growing a beard and doing various things. This was the first year he was away.

During the second year he started dressing differently – wearing clothes that were above his ankles (a misinterpretation of a Hadith saying that anyone who covers his ankles will burn in hellfire – actually a Wahabi mistranslation – but exposing the ankles is a sign of someone adopting Wahabi ideology). The father then noticed that the son would take a plate of food, split it in half, eat one half and leave the other half alone. When his wife asked her son why he wasn't eating half of his food, the son answered that he believed his father was an apostate – a heretic. This was because he celebrated the birthday of the Prophet – forbidden according to Wahabism. Therefore the food that the father provided was 'haram' - not allowed. However, because he was a poor student, he had to eat in order to survive. Therefore, he would eat from the plate only what he needed to survive (since allowing oneself to die by neglect or suicide is a greater sin according to Islam, than eating food that his 'haram'). At some point his son just disappeared – left the UK to go and 'fight jihad'. The father does not know where his son is, or even whether he is alive or dead. He says that these kinds of stories are not unique – he hears them all of the time.

Experiences like this led him and his researchers to analyze what is the radicalization process in the UK. They found that this process has three steps: The first step is getting a person to believe that the past 5-6 centuries of classical Islamic scholarship is wrong – which starts by getting them to believe that the Islam that their parents and grandparents have been practicing is wrong. Wahab set up four categories of practices – biddah (innovation), haram (not allowed), shukh (false association to a deity)

and kufar (infidel practice). Wahabis set up madrassahs, they infiltrate universities, they use magazines, internet, TV channels – a whole range of resources – to teach that traditional Islam falls into these four categories. In this way, traditional Islam that people have been used to is discredited. People who do not have a lot of grounding in Arabic Islamic ideology or theology believe this. In addition, the extremists promote a victim mentality by focusing on the rhetoric of social injustice. The second step is to form organizations that operate in different parts of civil society – including the political arena - and claim to speak for the Muslim community. They use these organizations as a channel for their rhetoric and ideology.

For example (what Harras calls ‘the IRA versus the Sinn Fein syndrome’): If you draw a triangle, one corner represents a young Muslim who is a bit violent and always ready to get into a fight. Groups like al-Mujahiroun, al-Ghuraba and others like them operate in this corner – pulling people in who are quite thuggish, quite violent, and they indoctrinate them with their ideology straight away. In another corner of the triangle are the sorts of kids that just want to grow up, play sports and have a bit of fun. In this corner are groups like YMO and the like that set up clubs and social activities and send recruiters to meet and indoctrinate young people in gyms. Mohammed Siddiq Khan who blew himself up on 7/7 was operating out of a gym. At the third corner of the triangle are organizations like the MCB (allied with organizations elsewhere such as ISNA and CAIR) – composed of people that block mainstream Muslims from operating in the media, civil society or in politics as well as people that actively spread extremist ideology. Supporting the entire triangle are NGO’s that move money around – groups such as WAMI, the Muslim World League, like Muslim Aid and Islamic Relief.

Additionally to add a fourth category (the triangle is starting to look more like a square – MM), there are university-based groups that take advantage of educated youth who are politically and ideologically motivated to take up a cause. The many iterations of Hezb al-Tahrir (officially banned in the UK, but existing under many cover names) are an example of this type of group.

(American intelligence analyst and researcher) says that the next battlefield in the arena of Islamist extremism that is going to erupt – and this will likely be in the next ten years – is Europe. The reason for this is that there are huge concentrations of immigrant Muslims that have flooded into European countries over the past decade. These immigrants have not been assimilated or integrated into their host societies, and they are becoming ever more numerous. Ten percent of France is now Muslim. The sheer numbers of France's immigrant Muslim community as well as the locations that the immigrants come from – primarily Northern Africa, Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria - make it particularly volatile. These French-Muslim immigrants live in what are called the banlieu – the suburbs around the major cities in France, such as Paris, Marseilles and Lyon. These suburbs are not similar to suburbs in the U.S., but are more like ghettos, housing developments or low-income apartment blocs. Currently France is reporting a situation that is on fire – exploding beyond the capacity of the police and the security services to control. Despite this, the French press and police do not want to say that it is Muslim youths (often second and third generation native born children of immigrants) causing the destruction - tending rather to report the violent immigrant unrest as 'criminal elements' or 'vandals' that set cars on fire and attack and burn buses, destroying property, injuring police and civilians and causing widespread chaos. One statistic states that there

are at least a dozen French police that wind up in the hospital every single day with injuries because of these conflicts.

This potential for exploding violence is true not only in France, but in any country where immigrant numbers have overpowered the local system's ability to either assimilate them or control them. Scandinavia has, for example, been very welcoming to immigrants that come from Muslim countries. However, due to the lack of ability to assimilate them into the society, there are now enclaves – notably Malmö Sweden and Oslo Norway where the police just do not go. In these places Sharia law is in effect. There have been stonings in Norway. There is a tremendous incidence of domestic abuse throughout all of these communities. There have been honor killings as well. Up until now, the elected politicians in these countries have spoken of these issues as 'social phenomena' that require increased sensitivity to the immigrant populations, more multiculturalism.

This is the type of reasoning that leads to thinking that if someone's faith and culture uphold that men should be able to beat their wives, then we have no right to interfere. This is the tone that is currently being taken. It has come to the point that in late September of '05 the police and security services in Britain made a pact with local Muslim clerical leaders stating that if they were going to plan a raid for suspected terrorist activities in any Muslim community, enclave or apartment bloc, they would first clear it with a council of Muslim elders – in order to make sure that they were being culturally sensitive.

(British American terror researcher and author) says that a factor that is going to become an increasing problem is the alienation of Muslim youth in the West. This is an

issue that is not going to go away – in fact it is likely to get worse. For an especially chilling example; the pilots of 9/11 were young Muslim immigrants living in Hamburg. While they may have been somewhat militant before coming to the West, they definitely became more militant while living in the West. Another case is the planners of the London subway and bus bombings. These were people who became militarized while living in the North of England and who had never left the country. Given the demographics in Europe – where Muslim immigrants and their offspring are basically outnumbering native/ethnic Europeans - this is likely to become even more of a factor in the future.

This is a supply and demand situation fueled by the dysfunctional economies in the Middle East and North Africa which causes many people to want to move to the West for economic reasons – while the European countries are running out of people (especially those willing to perform cheap, manual labor). These foreign workers (and even their children) are not being integrated into European societies as would be the case in the U.S. or Canada – and this lack of integration causes a level of alienation that encourages the turning to violent ideologies – expressed in the attacks of London and Madrid. These sorts of attacks by the native population may increase in the future. They are fueled by an underlying condition that is not going away.

#### *Europe– Summary of Major Points*

Just like in the U.S., there is a proliferation of groups in Europe and in the UK that are connected with fundamentalism and radicalism – and they are allowed to operate freely. Education of women in some Islamic circles (such as the Algerian French) has caused the women to become more outspoken and independent – due to exposure to



liberal ideas. In France, unrest in Muslim immigrant communities is largely due to economic issues. In the UK, the issues have more to do with identity and alienation – a combination of not wanting to blend in and not feeling accepted within the larger society. The UK was very complacent regarding extremism – as long as they were not the targets. This changed markedly after the 7/7 bombings.

In Germany, radicalism is also an issue of identity, with German Muslims (especially Moroccan) feeling very isolated from society. This is less true with Turkish Germans. Denmark is very aware of extremist issues – they are ahead of other Scandinavian countries.

Belgium has a problem of ‘creeping Sharia-zation’, as Sharia law influences the society. Belgium also has a lot of emigration, a large immigrant population and a big welfare state (seen as a significant part of the radicalization problem, as it creates an isolated sub-culture).

Generally EU countries have a low native birthrate and many Islamic immigrants with a high birthrate. Political correctness holds back meaningful policies to fight extremism; UK and the U.S. are the worst, France is next, then Scandinavia and Germany and Australia are the least.

If a country is not enforcement oriented, even the best policies are ineffective. Useful policies include: Moderate Muslims speaking out; good community/police cooperation; preventive/educational measures. Saudi Arabia spends millions of dollars to export fundamentalist, intolerant, Wahabi Islam to the UK, U.S. and Europe. This is still ongoing. In the UK, parents are helpless to protect their children against radicalization (similar to parents feeling helpless in the U.S. against gang members recruiting their

children). The radicalization process takes place by discrediting the tenets of traditional religious Islam and teaching intolerance towards non-Muslims. Radicalization takes place through social settings, organizations, universities, madrassahs, mosques, media (especially internet media), etc.

Some predict Europe will be next major front in the battle against Islamist radicalism. This is because of large concentrations of (poor) poorly assimilated immigrants. Fundamentalist Muslims have set up parallel societies and legal systems. Honor killings, stonings and other crimes have been committed in these societies. Vandalism and violence are wreaked by radicalized Muslim youth – esp. in France. Increasing issue will be radicalization of native-born European youth. Moderate Muslims are horrified at the radicalization of their youth.

#### *Educational Systems*

(Egyptian American writer) speaks of the teaching of hatred and violence in both the Middle East as well as the West. She sees Muslims as being passive in regards to allowing negative teachings and practices. She sees this as allowing a perversion of Islam to be promulgated.

(Egyptian researcher) says that extremist education of children is a big problem not only in groups like Hamas, but all over the Arab world.

(Egyptian distinguished thinker and writer) thinks that a big failure is the collapse of the cultural life because of the educational system. It is currently based only on memorization (this is a part of Arab culture – to memorize poetry and history). The topics of study are not at all based in the twenty first century. It does not aim at all at enriching

thinking and creativity. He blames the preponderance of conspiracy theories in the Arab world on this lack of training in critical thinking.

(Egyptian director of Pro-democracy NGO) says that his generation is an uneducated generation that wanted to understand the world better, but did not have the chance. He (created his organization because he) wanted to spread ideas that would enlighten the generation – a generation that in his opinion is very poorly educated. Very poor standards and not exposed to a modern education. The university teachers give you a book that is basically copied from other books and you memorize the contents and pass the exams.

(Egyptian female who works for pro-democracy NGO) says that the educational system and the content of its textbooks (and presumably books in general) are full of material that is against human rights – against other religions, against women. Women are always shown cooking in the kitchen while the father goes away to work.

(Principal Elementary School, Ramallah) says that in the government run non-religious school that he runs in Ramallah the curriculum is determined by the government (Palestinian government curriculum overseen by Israel) He says that he does not like anything that the government mandates for the curriculum. He would give Arabic more importance, because it is the mother language here. He would also change what they want him to teach in history and geography. All of the students in the elementary school need to learn more to feel strongly about their country. In the curriculum from the government the information about the country (Palestine) is limited. On the map there is no 'Palestine' on the map – only Israel.

He said that he quietly diverges from the curriculum that he is given to teach. He talks to the students about being proud of being Palestinian, about their history, about the right that they have to the land. He does not call for violent struggle, but he does not teach pacifism either – he feels that to do so would be to do a disservice to the youth, who may one day need to defend themselves.

(British Muslim media owner and community activist) says that Muslims in the UK have a process where they will go after school to a mosque for a couple of hours, six days a week for 3-4 years to get instruction. When Harras was young, this was done in the Pakistani Urdu language – a language that he was not that comfortable with. So he only learned two things at the mosque – how to incorrectly pronounce the Koran, and how to perform their daily obligations such as prayer, fasting and the like. So as he got older he was subjugated to the Wahabi/Deobandi texts – along with the Jemaa Islamiya which was and is very big in Pakistan – so he was slowly brainwashed a little bit as well with their ideas. His general point is that a lack of in-depth education about Islam made him very vulnerable to fundamentalist ideas.

(Student at moderate Islamic college in Israel) says that the college teaches people to respect other points of view and has students meet with other types of people.

(Originally this college had a fundamentalist orientation but it changed to be moderate.)

She says that she is different than she used to be before this. She changed her attitude towards Jews, Christians, and non-Muslims. While her previous education (in a local Arab-Israeli school) was neutral, they never met other types of people. All of her ideas were from the local environment and community – and some of these ideas were very radical. The local school was just neutral – it did not directly counter these ideas. Her

parents (and brothers) encouraged her to attend the Islamic college. Her brothers are studying at Jewish Universities in Israel. She says that her brothers studying at Jewish Institutions has affected her parents also.

It is easier for her to live in the world since her attitude has changed. Especially in the Arab community, women are mothers and teachers – if they are radical it is much harder to promote moderation. Women are the key – we need to education them in moderate ways. She herself wants to be a lecturer, to write books, get a Ph.D. Perhaps start institution to do programs and projects to inculcate values for women and children. Religious Muslims – women in particular - will play a key role in promoting positive image. The public needs a better understanding of the Koran – especially the youth need to be taught the real meaning of the Koran. She wants to be a teacher – to create similar experience as she had at the moderate Islamic college.

(Israeli Arab teacher at Islamic college) says that when families educate their girls, they generally don't like to send their girls away from home. The families are more willing to send their girls to the Islamic college because it is local – making the families feel that the girls are safe. In Arabic society girls are looked at as weak and more influenced. She is personally against these distinctions. She studied at Technion in Haifa herself and will allow her own daughters to study abroad. Also her sisters will do the same. In Israeli society, Arab women are getting more education and choices. She has both Arab and Jewish Friends – she worked and studied together with them.

She got some religious education as a girl in Israeli Arab village. Her education was of a pretty neutral type – more focused on practices for everyday and less on ideology. The Israeli govt. oversees education to ensure it is neutral (does not teach

intolerance or hatred). The combination of education and financial independence is key to female power. This is an increasing process in Arab societies. Governments need to help this by encouraging female empowerment. Educated women will educate their children to do good. Even if the father is educated, an uneducated mother will result in less educated children. Uneducated children will be more vulnerable to radicalism.

(Saudi American researcher) says that contrary to what is often stated, the 9/11 hijackers were not secular and westernized. They were a product of the Saudi Arabian educational system, as well as the indoctrination (of hatred and intolerance) that they received from their family, mosque, teachers, and society. When it comes to radicalization, what looks like overnight change is actually a product of seeds of hatred and intolerance planted much earlier. These seeds provide an opening for later indoctrination. If they had been taught otherwise (against hatred and intolerance) the later indoctrination would not have been possible. The people are completely formed by their educational systems.

International pressure is needed to remove hatred and intolerance that exist in the Saudi Arabian educational system. Changing textbooks is minute thing to compel them to do in comparison to the benefits that they have from the international community.

The educational system also needs to be freed from state control. When it is freed from state control it will naturally begin to respond to societal needs and influences, As well as the influence of other cultures and ideas.

#### *Educational Systems– Summary of Major Points*

Arab/Islamic educational systems throughout the Middle East (and increasingly in the West) teach intolerance, religious extremism, hatred and the condoning of violence.

Particularly the extremist education of children is a problem throughout the Arab world. Educational systems in the Arab world tend to have low standards generally, and do not teach critical thinking skills or expose to a variety of ideas. Educational texts are full of materials that teach intolerance towards other religions, disregard for human rights and negative attitudes towards women. Wahabi texts are being used in both formal and informal educational settings in the West. A lack of in-depth education in traditional Islam leaves Muslims vulnerable to radicalization in both the Middle East as well as the West.

Student bodies in the Middle East have become overwhelmingly Islamist. A moderate, tolerant education can definitely change people's attitudes. A value-neutral education is insufficient because of other negative influences. The moderate education of women is especially able to create positive change. When education is available close to home, women will be more likely to attend.

In Israel/Palestine the education is supervised to ensure neutrality. Education alone is not enough to empower women – it must lead to financial independence. 9/11 hijackers were not westernized and secular – they were a product of the Saudi educational system which teaches intolerance and hatred. Saudi educational system needs to be purged from hatred and intolerance. Saudi schools need to be freed from state control.

## General Culture

(American Muslim researcher) says that Arab Muslims are culturally much closer to West than Far East. However many misconceptions exist – in part because few in West have actually lived in Islamic countries. He nonetheless concedes that Arab and African (Muslim) cultures can be primitive and tribal – though this does not represent Islam or the Islamic culture worldwide. He does not like that Arabs are currently setting the tone for Islam (and the image of Islam) worldwide. He says that many Arabs are illiterate – even the Saudi royal family is largely illiterate.

According to him, Islamic contribution to worldwide culture stopped after the Mongolian invasion. He says that the wealth of the Muslim world (originally because of their control of the slave, silk, spice and gold trade routes and later because of oil) caused the region to become lazy. Muslim wealth was concentrated in increasingly stagnant, overcrowded, uneducated and insular societies that did not feel that they needed to compete by becoming a part of the modern world. The Christian world discovered the Americas as a way to vie for trade in response to this dominance.

He says that the Islamic world is presently entering the world of capitalism and democracy – fueled by its own economic growth Saudi Arabia has the largest middle class of the entire Arab world – and middle classes generally don't like extremism) as well as media exposure to the larger modern world. He says that the emergence of Al-Qaeda (and fundamentalism in general) was a symptom of these changes – a backlash against the movement towards the West and modernity. The rise of Sunnis fundamentalism was also a response to the Iranian revolution – a triumph for Shiite power, which caused a counter-reaction among the Sunnis. This was then fueled by oil



money, which enabled extremism to be spread worldwide. He says that the West can either help with the transition to modernity, or become a backlash target because of it.

(Jordanian son of famous radical leader) says that in the Middle East (unlike the West where people can say what they want without fear), people are not free and are afraid to speak and act openly.

(Egyptian distinguished thinker and writer) says that his work in management at a top-level corporation (as well as his studies in Public Administration and management) made him aware of the contrast between the modern world and the not-yet-modernized world. (He was influenced also by Kant and the notion of human progress and the movement towards the ideal state – and the necessity to work for the ideal, even if it is unattainable). He says that in his experience the corporate world demonstrated a very high level of Western Civilization – in particular the corporation that he worked for represented the best of everything the corporate world stands for. The contrast between this and the (less developed) world that he lived in was a big influence on his thinking. He is therefore a strong believer in (so called) Western Civilization – which he does not think is purely ‘western’ – but rather an amalgam of the music, mathematics, philosophy, etc, of many civilizations – both Western and non-Western.

#### *General Culture– Summary of Major Points*

In the Middle East, unlike the West, people are not free to speak openly without fear. Cultural lag in the Middle East affects all areas of society – government, corporate, etc. Oil dollars allowed Gulf countries to enter the modern era without truly modernizing, because they could afford not to and still survive, even thrive and gain power.

### *Religious Culture*

(Egyptian American writer) points to a general increase in Islamic religiosity in both the Middle East as well as the West. She speaks of growing up in Egypt when there were more religious choices open to the population and women moved about more freely. She says that this freedom of movement, belief and dress has all but disappeared in present day Egyptian society.

(Egyptian distinguished thinker and writer) says that when he was brought up in Egypt in the 50s and 60s, Islam was a religion, full stop. It was like in America, where people go to church they go to work and do not discuss religious issues. Religion was separate from public life – this is not the case now.

(Jordanian Christian female professional) says that even her most non-religious Muslim friends see wearing the veil as an ideal, despite the fact that none of them do it. All see it as a possibility in their future. Many go to religion classes here in Jordan. She also says that the Iraq war contributed to a rise in religiosity as a kind of reaction to what was seen as a U.S. invasion. She says that all of the wealth and Westernization caused an Islamic backlash. Seeing the girls walking in Western dress on the streets along with other Western influences created an opposite reaction. Parents wanted to shelter their kids and keep them away from these influences. It is more cultural than political. The government and laws in Jordan are pretty liberal – women vote and there are more liquor stores than grocery stores on the streets (unlike other Arab states). But the people are very religious – if it wasn't for the government, the country would be like Saudi Arabia. Especially since 2003 and the U.S. occupation of Iraq, the people have become much more conservative and religious. The government really keeps a close eye on this – the

secret service knows what everyone does – they are quite good at keeping it under control.

(Jordanian distinguished professor and former government member) thinks that the polls that show 20-21% support for Islamism in Jordan is underreporting. The mental attitudes may be much higher in the state of mind of the people – which is very Islamist – though maybe not in an official manner. When he first started teaching at the U of Jordan 25 years ago, hardly any women wore Sharia clothing. Now the trend is reversed. Student bodies throughout the universities in Jordan are overwhelmingly Islamist. Not only in the University but all throughout the country. Islamists gaining power is possible on the municipal level in Jordan. However the monarchy has very strong roots here.

(Israeli-Arab student in moderate Islamic college) says that she decided on her own to put on the hijab. She says that her mother did also. She says that people in general are more religious than they were before. Younger people care more about religion – maybe because of religious TV programs. Watching religious TV (moderate) channels made her more religious. It made her much better informed about Islam.

#### *Religious Culture– Summary of Major Points*

There is a general increase in Islamic religiosity in both the Middle East as well as the West – this began in the aftermath of the 1967 war with Israel. Religiosity is also an effect of a huge amount of oil money being used to fund religious fundamentalism, both in and out of the Middle East (by both groups and governments). Freedom of movement, dress and belief has all but disappeared in Middle Eastern society. The people tend to be more religious than the governments – while the governments try to monitor and control the level of religiosity so that it does not become radicalized.

Encroachment of Western culture has also contributed to a religious counter-movement. A significant amount of the religiosity in the population is due to a concerted and organized effort on the part of Islamist groups (primarily the Muslim Brotherhood) to influence and control the population – then claim that the people want it. Religious television programs have made people more informed about Islam (some in a moderate way, and some in a more extremist way – depending on the programming).

### *Modernity in the Culture*

(Jordanian Christian female professional) says that Western Jordan is quite different than Eastern Jordan. It is much less religious than Eastern Jordan. People are still somewhat religious and conservative (especially the older generation), but the younger generation (16-24) are more into MTV and are quite Americanized – in some ways more than the Americans themselves. In downtown Jordan, most of the people are from Eastern Jordan - poorer and religiously conservative – the Western Jordan girls won't even go downtown

(Christian Lebanese television station owner) says that Jeddah looks like Dallas - because of globalization. All of the city, its buildings, cars, stores, everything is imported. A Saudi who looks around him finds nothing that is related to his identity. If he wants to use his imagination he is going to invent a 'Saudi' identity – with traditions, costumes (coming out of his imagination of what Islam was or could be – not what it is). The Saudi who is dressed American (even the long robes may be designed by an American fashion designer), uses American computers, eats MacDonald's – every single part of his life is related to the US (in fact, he says, the US manages the Saudi regime) – and yet he hates the US – this creates a real internal problem for him (i.e., cognitive dissonance). He says

that the relationship between the US and the Saudi royal family dates back to the founding of the regime. His point is that the average Saudi does not have a real concept of either Islam or his own identity – all he has is a made up ‘Islamic’ identity’ and a desire to consume American goods – encouraged by both the US and the regimes that want to pacify him – so that he does not rise up. They are consuming animals – if they are old they consume materialism, if they are young, they consume radicalism.

(American Muslim researcher) says that the exposure to media (cable TV, cell/camera phones, Internet) has brought modernity quickly into the Middle East.

#### *Modernity in the Culture– Summary of Major Points*

In Egypt, while many people own computers, they use them mainly for email and chat, rather than to increase their knowledge base. Others use them for self-indoctrination. Countries like Egypt and Jordan have pockets of westernized culture (Western Jordan for example) but these pockets do not represent the mainstream. Even very religious Muslims are exposed to Western pop-culture and this creates both a fascination as well as a repulsion in regards to modernity (or at least their view of it). Muslims in the Middle East are exposed to Western culture at the same time as they lack a sense of their own identity – both culturally and religiously.

Part of the surge in fundamentalism is out of a desire to construct a cohesive, strong and modern sense of identity that is missing. Exposure to media (cable TV, cell/camera phones, Internet) has brought modernity very quickly into the Middle East.

#### *Radicalism in the Culture*

(American Muslim researcher) says that the emergence of Al-Qaeda (and fundamentalism in general) was a backlash against the Middle Eastern shift towards

modernity the West and modernity. The rise of Sunni fundamentalism was also a response to the Iranian revolution – a triumph for Shiite power, which caused a counter-reaction among the Sunnis. This was then fueled by oil money, which enabled extremism to be spread worldwide.

He also says that extremists don't hate the US, rather they have contempt for them as being weak. He says that people tend to see Muslims as a subset of Arabs, rather than the other way around – despite the fact that the greatest Muslim theologians were not Arabs. He says that 90% of terror operations are directed against Arabs. Islam does not need a reformation; they need a restoration of pluralism. (He notes that the Protestant reform was violent and Luther was anti-Semitic).

(American researcher and academic) says that in the 1950s a lot of energy and resources were devoted to trying to figure out who was vulnerable to indoctrination (in that case it was communism) and they couldn't find any clear prototype of who was most vulnerable – it cut across demographic and socioeconomic categories.

(Arab Israeli distinguished author and academic) says that the Iranian revolution increased fundamentalism in Arab societies. Also Saudi Arabia distributing large amounts of free Wahabi literature – which he said was done in order to divert attention away from their own regime. He also says that a perceived hostility against Islam contributes to radicalism out of defensiveness. Arab difficulties in daily life contribute to a sense of frustration and powerlessness that also gives rise to radicalism.

(Egyptian American writer) states that often in the Middle East the people are more radical in their attitudes than the governments. The governments fear the radicals because of the threat of overthrow or assassination. For example, she says that the Saudi

culture is full of hatred, radical ideas and oppression of women. Hatred of the West and of Israel predate Islamic radicalism in the population. She also mentions Pakistan and Egypt as having cultures of radicalism that are separate from their governments. To illustrate this she mentions that most terror perpetrators come from Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

(Muslim American Professor) states that he hears widespread support by Arabs in both Middle East and West for targeting Israeli civilians.

(Jordanian distinguished professor) feels that Jordanians (and Arabs in general) are at this time quite vulnerable to extremism. Specifically in the poorer classes – which is 50% of the population (300 dinar or less a month, which is 400-500 dollars). In these classes, extremism is taking hold. There are hundreds of thousands of young people that are educated but do not have work. This is a dangerous combination which will make them easy prey for extremism. I ask what makes them extreme besides for the obvious – the Sharia dress. He says support for Al-Qaeda, hatred of Americans and the West, hatred for the governments in their countries, etc. They will not marry liberal thinkers, considering them like atheists. They may not act violently, but they are potential extremists. Leaders like Zarqawi and others in Al-Qaeda came from Jordan. This demographic (many young educated unemployed people) and its potential for extremism is not only true in Jordan – it is true everywhere in the Arab world. This is why the regimes have their secret police – because they are afraid of the potential extremists in their midst. He says that this is not the right way to oppose extremism – you must have real reform and modernization – of the people and the government. Real democracy, justice, human rights, good education, etc. The late king talked about it, and the new king

does also – but nothing of substance has taken place. He says that he is not jailed for these words (though others have been) –because he was president of two universities and is too well known. Any other man who would say what he does would be put in jail

(Jordanian distinguished professor and former government member) thinks that the polls that show 20-21% support for Islamism is underreporting. The mental attitudes may be much higher in the state of mind of the people – which is very Islamist – though maybe not in an official manner. When he first started teaching at the U of Jordan 25 years ago, hardly any women wore Sharia clothing. Now the trend is reversed. Student bodies throughout the universities in Jordan are overwhelmingly Islamist. Not only in the University but all throughout the country.

(Egyptian distinguished thinker and writer) says that Islamicization happened because of a confluence of factors: Oil was discovered in SA in 1938, but production was deferred until 1945, after the end of World War II in. Petrodollars began to flow in the late 1940s. The Arab countries were occupied – with the occupying forces leaving between 1950s and the 1970s. The sons and daughters of these societies began to take over the societies for the first time - and they had a record of mismanagement and corruption. Instead of the people saying they were poorly managed, they said that we were not following God's word, the Koran. This was fed to them by the Wahabis.

The Wahabi/Islamist message was repeated with greater strength in the shade of the defeat of 1967 at the hands of the Israelis in the Six Day War. When this happened Egyptians asked – how can a tiny state of 3 million destroy the armies of 200 million people? Many Egyptians said to themselves (unconsciously) the following: 'We tried the liberal, secular, nationalist approach, we tried the socialist pro-Soviet Union approach,



and both of them did not get us anywhere. Why? – and then the answer comes from the Islamists – because you didn't follow the rules of God. When you were following the rules of God a thousand years ago, you were a superpower.' He answers to this – 'Gentlemen, we never had a golden time. If you have one in your mind, come up and discuss it with me. For example, the (widely cited) age of the four righteous Caliphs – He points out that three of them were assassinated (while praying, no less). The whole of Arab history (like all of medieval history in general) was filled with violence, conspiracy, and bloodshed. The only time that they had a good time was with the Jews in Andalusia – until they and the Jews were kicked out in 1492. Any 'good time' was a medieval good time – people killing each other for power, money wives, etc. There is no imagined paradise in Mecca and Medina – the minute Mohammed died (even before he was buried) the conflicts among his followers had started.

He says that now Egyptian society is partially Islamized with some remainders of a Mediterranean, cosmopolitan, multicultural society. There are 300,000 mosques in Egyptian, with a main prayer service every Friday – this is 300,000 podiums. I ask how is this different than 30-40 years ago? He says that then the Imams were Egyptian – they had an Egyptian state of mind. Now every Imam that he meets from al-Azhar has spent at least 4 years in SA, and has a Saudi and Wahabi state of mind.

(Egyptian writer and researcher) does not see much Jihadis in Egypt – maybe Salafis. The Egyptians will arrest people that talk jihad. Egypt is not a bastion of salafi/jihadism. He says he thinks there are more Jihadis in Algeria, Morocco, SA – primarily because of American actions in the Middle East.

(Egyptian researcher) says that extremism in the Middle East is all about Islamism – and Islamist extremism is all about identity. He says that the mechanisms that activists use to mobilize others is playing the card of identity. When people feel that their identity is hurt (threatened) they are very susceptible to radicalization. What is happening in Iraq and Palestine fuels this sense of having one's identity under attack. At the same time, these people live in political realities that are not that promising. Politics is not delivering on its promise to make the people's lives better – their children better educated, etc. – it does not deal with the day to day problems of the people... and at the same time the identity of the people feels like it is under attack... These factors combined wind up with the radicalism and terrorism that you find in the region.

Radicalism is coming from the schools, the mosques and the media. There are many reasons for people to feel frustrated and alienated. There is the deep divide between rich and poor, there is police brutality, there is no democracy. All of these things cause people to feel frustrated and seek answers. There are an abundance of answers that are provided by the radicals in the schools mosques, and media. This is created by various Islamic movements – not just the Muslim Brotherhood. This includes not only Islamic groups, but also extreme Islamic groups (i.e., Wahabi or jihadi groups). The publications coming from the Saudis into the Egyptian culture are terrible. They have influenced the Islamic movement in Egypt. The Saudis spend a lot of money to promote these extremist groups – also spreading publications to promote these ideas. They begin with a strict moral code and this is linked with the government's need to apply Sharia law, then they go into ranting and raving about the West, etc, they say that anyone who seeks to change traditional/fundamentalist practices is trying to undermine Islam. This is true even of

practices that are not purely from Islam. There is also a lot of influence being brought back into Egypt from those going to SA to make a living and being exposed to this culture.

(Christian Lebanese television station owner) the average Saudi does not have a real concept of either Islam or his own identity – all he has is a made up ‘Islamic’ identity’ and a desire to consume American goods – encouraged by both the US and the regimes that want to pacify him – so that he does not rise up. They are consuming animals – if they are old they consume materialism, if they are young, they consume radicalism.

(Muslim woman from Ramallah) says that extremism is quite common in West Bank culture. People talk about violence, religion, the Israelis, the checkpoints – it has all become part of life, part of the dialogue because of what is happening every day in Ramallah, Jenin, Jericho. Perhaps part of it is because of what Hamas or Fatah is preaching, but it is also because of what they hear that is (actually) happening every day – exacerbated by negative messages from the media.

(Elementary school principal from Ramallah) says that some people (in Palestine) believe in violence and some people don’t. Some (mostly young) people are taking this path. He says that when he wants to go to his village it takes him an hour to go to his house because of all of the checkpoints in the street. He says that these difficulties push people towards violence.

(Mathematics teacher from Ramallah) says that even the existence of terrorist leaders is an expression of the will of the people. He says that if Israel leaves the West bank and Gaza, and there is peace, these people (leaders who advocate violence) will be

sidelined. He says that he saw with his own eyes the Israeli soldiers kill a young man at a checkpoint. The children hear about things like this every day. He says that (during the intifadeh the children threw stones on their own and it was because they saw everything like what he said above and this built their ideas. When he says 'Israel' the children feel hate. Sometimes he tries to tell the children about peace. The children ask him if he can save them. And he says 'no'. They ask him if he can keep them from the soldiers? And he says 'no'. Can he stop them from getting shot at if they are playing? He says 'no'. I ask if they saw people getting killed. He says that they hear about it on television. The children see at the checkpoint how the soldiers spit (I think this is what he said) – or they hear the soldiers call their father 'donkey' or 'cow' this gives them these ideas (about hating the Israelis and feeling hopeless.) he says that we need to encourage the children and give the children hope in the future.

(PFLP member and teacher from Ramallah) says that no one goes down the path of violence who does not want to. Their life is very hard. He says that in this country if you walk with the Palestinian flag, you will get shot at by the Israelis and you will die. He tells me that this happened to a friend of his in 1987. He says that if Israel wants to close off the air, she will do this. The Israelis control the flow of the water that comes from their land. The land that belongs to the Palestinians is controlled by the Israelis. They destroyed Gaza, they killed people. They are like animals in a zoo that cannot move from one cage to another without the zookeeper. It takes two hours to get to Turkey, one hour to get to Amman – and four hours to get from Ramallah to Nablus (a neighboring town).

He makes the point that people in the resistance in Palestine tend to go through a phase change as they get older – they still want to make resistance but they have a different conception of how to do it. They see that there are different ways to make resistance (i.e., not only violent resistance). In any case, he definitely states that blowing up women and children is not the way to make resistance. Although he says that he is against terrorism, he says that teaching non-violence is impossible in his country. He is against violence and says that no more killing is needed on either side – there has been enough. However they have to see what will be in the future. If he teaches people ‘we must be peaceful’ – this means like the Christians who say that if someone hits you on one cheek, you have to turn the other cheek to him. This is not peace.

(Jordanian Sufi professor) asks: Where does extremism come from? When politics enters religion, people read the text as they wish. The text cannot be understood just with the mind (by simple reading) – its language and context must also be taken into account. Political movements used the holy texts for their own purposes. The twisting of the texts is caused by people who want power. This is exacerbated by difficulties experienced at that time from the outside. Power seekers use the context (outside issues) to seek power from others. Power seekers capitalize on people feeling vulnerable and afraid.

(Israeli Arab sociologist) says that poverty (the existence of low status groups) and resentment over local politics and issues, gives support to radical groups holding out the promise of solutions. He also says that the killing of Muslims in Iraq by foreign forces was also a very powerful symbol. Baghdad specifically was the capital of the Islamic world for 4 centuries. There was also a lot of support for fighting Soviets and

resisting the Soviet occupation. Al-Qaeda spread out from there. Generally the rallying theme is some imposition by the West. So, he says, terrorism is partly motivated by the West's actions, but it is also an "enigma". If the West stops seeing Islam as the enemy and stops being antagonistic, this will make recruitment harder. He feels the best thing he can do is just not join in with radicals. He also tries to raise awareness of the problem of radicalization.

(Arab-Israeli school principal) says that when young people feel misunderstood and controlled by others, they turn to fundamentalism. The lack of rights given to Palestinians leads to fundamentalism. Extremists tell frustrated young people that Islam calls for violence, which is not true. His school tries to promote tolerance and dialogue.

#### *Radicalism in the Culture– Summary of Major Points*

The population tends to be more religious/radicalized than the governments – this is in large part due to campaigns by radical/fundamentalist groups. Middle Eastern governments both use/encourage and try to curb fundamentalism in the culture. Governments rely on the use of secret police and surveillance to crack down on radicalism, rather than modernizing, democratizing and opening up the general culture. There is widespread acceptance of purposeful violence towards Israeli civilians in the culture. The poorer classes are especially vulnerable to extremism – due to education with unemployment, exposure to fundamentalism, hatred of the West, hate for their governments, lack of Islamic knowledge, lack of exposure to ideas in general etc. Polls that show 20% support for Islamists in the population may be underreporting because Islamist/fundamentalist attitudes may be much higher than official support. There are more outright Jihadists in countries like Algeria, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan than

there are in Egypt and Jordan (due to government crackdowns). Islamist extremists play on and create a sense of threat to identity rather than actual promises to improve day to day life. Anyone who tries to modify or speak out against a strict Sharia code or intolerant attitudes is labeled as being heretical and against Islam.

Extremist/violent beliefs are very widespread in Palestinian culture. Extremism in the culture arises out of a feeling of frustration and helplessness – this is particularly true in Palestine (though this is manipulated and used by Radical/Islamist Groups). The rise of fundamentalism and radicalism was partly a backlash against modernity. Extremists have contempt for the U.S. which they see as weak and corrupt. The West tends to see fundamentalist/primitive Arabs as representative of Islam. The majority of attacks by radicals have other Muslims as their targets.

Some say that Islam does not need a reformation, but a return to tolerant pluralism. Iranian revolution and Wahabi spreading were largely responsible for rise of radicalism. Politics entering into religious sphere tends to twist the religious texts and stifle growth. This is done by people who use the religion to exploit societal weakness and gain power. Poverty, lack of opportunity, powerlessness and resentment over local issues are societal weaknesses that tend to lead to support for radical groups promising solutions. The killing of Muslims by foreign forces also leads to anger that promotes radicalism.

#### *Political Culture/Grassroots Reform*

(Jordanian Christian female professional) says that in the Middle East, the subject of politics always comes up .She notes that Americans don't like to talk about politics that much.

(Egyptian researcher) says that in the Middle East particularly there is no differentiation between global/regional and local politics – everything global is felt locally. At the same time, particularly in Egypt, there is a large majority that is apolitical. He explains that Egyptian society went through a deep process of de-politicization for the last few decades. Some of this was because of external factors, and some of it was consciously orchestrated by government. How does one de-politicize a society? If you can create a distance between what people face day to day in their lives and the decisions made by government, this is de-politicization. You make the people look in a kind of fragmented way so that they deal with their problems in a kind of case by case manner, not relating them to an overall political situation or political reality. You raise the cost of making change to day to day issues using political channels, so that people use other means to deal with these issues outside of the political realm – by creating too much distance, too many obstacles, or just by ignoring people. Ignore the people's criticism or demands for long enough, and you make the cost of continuing too high – it is a waste of resources for a rational citizen. S/he will try to address whatever issues by other means. This level of de-politicization was quite characteristic of Mubarak's regime.

He says that it is not that Mubarak's regime is more autocratic – more that he came from a non-political background (military). As a political activist Nasser had the chance to develop political skills – how to address and balance the needs of the people (though at the same time he was more autocratic). Mubarak coming from a military background is used to telling people what to do and having them just listen. Developing a sense of responsiveness and sensitivity to the people's needs is/was not his strong point. 'We know what we are doing and we do it well – just leave us to do our business'.



He points out that a very formative event in the life of the Egyptian people was the 6 day war. In a matter of a few days the expectations of the Nasser regime was gone – promises that were not fulfilled. This created a distance between the people and government, politicians, politics – 1967 discredited politics in the country – it created an attitude that was quite conducive to not trusting politics and politicians. The defeat of the 6-day war also marked the beginning of the Sawa – the Islamic awakening. All of this contributed to the de-politicization process.

(Egyptian researcher) observes that people are very caught up in the political situations of the time. Religious, cultural and social reform does not take up their attention. People tend to listen to the loudest voices – against their own non-democratic governments, against the West, against the USA. The loudest voices tend to belong to the MB and the Jihadists.

(Jordanian distinguished professor) says that in Jordan the local elections are corrupt – he went two weeks ago to vote in the municipal elections – and he saw the soldiers coming from somewhere else – not legitimate voters. 135 soldiers came and voted in front of their commander for whoever the commander told them to – all voting for the same person. There were riots later after that candidate won. He considers this stupid – because if a MB succeeds and becomes a mayor of Irbid – and does nothing for the people, this will be the surest way to have him scrutinized publicly by the population and lose support – make the people more cautious about supporting him. But the government does not allow the people this chance. He says that he is not jailed for these words (though others have been) –because he was president of two universities and is too well known. Any other man who would say what he does would be put in jail

(Jordanian religious/feminist politician) says that prior to 1993 women were not allowed to be candidates for the shura governing council. When she protested they said 'not now'. She said 'now and always! - it is a right from Islam'. She felt that something was wrong when teachings from the Koran regarding women's rights were not being implemented. She was told that women should work on women's issues. She said that women need to work on all issues – women's rights are part of all human rights. In 1993 she staged a campaign for election to the Shura council – many men voted for her and she was elected to be the first woman in her party's shura council. She made her campaign at the last minute so that others did not have time to obstruct her candidacy. Later, however, they did what they could to stop her and put difficulties in her path – but did not succeed. She went on to become the first female senator in Jordan. She then joined together with other like-minded people to create the Islamic Centrist (Moderate) Party. The goal was to spread a moderate and international vision of Islam. This included educating others that Islam is a moderate religion and is not represented by extremism and terrorism. She thinks that she and others who think like her need to be a model to the world of what Islam is all about. They have to translate the Islamic teachings into action. The Islamic Centrist (Moderate) Party has a dialogue with a lot of other countries. They have relationships with many international NGOs.

She also points out that in order to be accepted by international NGO's they must represent a moderate image. They encourage women to participate at all levels of the party. They work together with the Jordanian government to promote positive policies. If they disagree with a governmental policy they discuss it with them. They do not accuse (or boycott) or become negative. They try to concentrate on positive aspects and create

common understandings with others. They accept both commonalities with others and also respect the differences with others. They believe in an exchange of views in a positive dialogue of mutual respect. Even if another has only 1% that they agree on and have in common, they will focus on that 1%. In terms of personal religious practice, the party members are the same as other religious Muslims – even including the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. The difference is in their vision, understanding of Islam and methods of carrying it out. I ask about whether she is interested in having criminal Sharia law as the law of the land. She says that the Islamic Centrist (Moderate) Party believes in *ishtihad* – discussion and debate within Islam. She believes that every time has its own circumstances. The verses of the Koran need to be studied to see what is the best for the people (of that time). One must make a balance without distorting the principles of the Koran. nowadays we need to review our thinking about many parts of Islam – without sacrificing the basic foundational principles of Islam. She says we need a new dialogue in Islam that takes into account the new circumstances and understandings in our present times. The new dialogue that is needed in Islam means that Islam is relevant to each time and place. We need to renew our understanding of Islam according to our current circumstances. Even fatwas need to be reviewed every few years. If there we cannot find an answer, it is in our understanding, not in the religion. I ask about whether she is interested in having criminal Sharia law as the law of the land. She says that we need to explore other ways of dealing with people who have committed crimes. There needs to be different ways. A modern Islamic state does not need to amputate anyone's limbs, stone an adulterer or behead anyone. As a matter of fact, in the times right after the Prophet there was a ruler who did not implement these types of punishments in his time because

he studied the circumstances and decided it was not best for that time. The religion allows for flexibility.

(Egyptian politician and peace advocate) describing his (newly formed) moderate political party – says that it is very focused on the political participation of youth, the poor and women. It encourages them to join in political conferences and to know their rights. Those people did not think about their rights and freedoms for a long time, but recently this has changed. He says that President Mubarak wants to encourage more development in Egypt – he wants the country to become more modern and competitive on the international scene. Since Ahmed is a politically minded person, he took this call for development as it related to the political sphere. Two years ago he helped to form his new moderate party.

(Egyptian politician and moderate party co-founder) says that the situation in Egypt is poor – socially, economically, and religiously. He sees the political situation as the key. If there is a real democratic regime, all solutions to problems can be found. He says that this is a very important point in Egyptian history. Historically, Egypt has been a leader in the region. Potentially it could be again. He says that his party works together with all other groups to make the government more democratic. He says that the outcome of non-democratic regimes was not positive for Egypt in the end. They look towards the US as a model of democracy – as well as the EU – as an example of the way that people can create a union, defer their interests, use resources wisely – all without control being imposed from above in an authoritarian manner.

(Egyptian co-founder of pro-democracy NGO) says that he was very influenced by reading the UN Declaration of Human Rights. Although he came from a political

family, he began to think that human rights were more important than politics. A shift from (albeit liberal) ideology to actually trying to do something. He then created his organization in order to spread the culture of human rights, tolerance and democracy in the new generation – his generation. He saw an uneducated generation that wanted to understand the world better, but did not have the chance. He wanted to spread ideas that would enlighten the generation – a generation that in his opinion is very poorly educated. Very poor standards and not exposed to a modern education. The university teachers give you a book that is basically copied from other books and you memorize the contents and pass the exams. One part of the society wants to take everyone back 1400 years to the age of the prophet. One part of the society wants to advance, and the last part wants things to stay the same. This idea extends to the internet. It is not that there aren't computers or internet access (he said that about 7 million people have internet), but everyone uses them in ways that reflect their own attitudes: some for radicalism, some for self-education, many more just for chatting and email.

He wanted to give to the society alternative education and alternative media – which is why he created the organization. He feels that education and media can affect people very quickly – especially from someone who does not hold formal power. He says that the government does not like ideas at all – not from the Muslim Brotherhood, and not from liberal sources. He says the government uses the pretense of quashing radical ideas to repress all ideas. He tells of a project run by his organization called the 'Democratic Parliament'. This is where he and the participants run a mock Egyptian parliament according to a fully democratic process – not like it is at present where the NDP holds all of the power. Other parties in the model can create their own initiatives and try to block

the NDP (which in his model holds 51% instead of the present situation where it holds all of the power). This idea simple and not a security risk to the regime, but the security forces refused permission to them to run the program inside the universities. In order to get around this restriction, they either train and support students to run the program inside the universities by themselves, or they gather the students at outside locations to run activities.

He is running an online radio station. He calls it 'putting the poison in the honey'. Getting messages across in a palatable fashion. One example of this is that they play Shakira music (which is quite popular) and follow it with anti-sexual harassment messages (done in the form of a humorous skit). They have independent news (not just focused on what the president did today), some politics, a lot of humor, some music, some poetry, some celebrities, news about student activities, talent showcases. They started 6 months ago and have increased listenership from 4k listeners to 25k listeners. This was without ads (which they cannot afford – and which may be blocked by the government, as some of their programs have been). They keep their publicity a bit under the radar to keep it simple and not attract negative attention. Even though he says that 25k is great, he says his target is 7m.

(Lebanese Communist Party member) says that when he was in Turkey he saw the campaigns that the Muslim Brotherhood was waging (including paying people) to put on the veil. He also says that the post-colonial liberation movements have taken on a religious face – but both the governments and the religious opposition movements are coercive. There are very few strong democratic movements in the ME. He says that this weakness is the fault in part of the Democratic movements – they should be working

together instead of each working in their separate countries. He says there needs to be a meeting of all non-coercive and modern political parties – to be able to support each other across the region with a common platform for their countries. There needs to be an alternate media that is not government controlled.

(Lebanese Christian female worker in pro-democracy NGO) says that the organization was formed progressively, beginning in January 2005, and began projects in that July. Its purpose is to encourage active, responsible and informed citizenship. So many people on the street complain but feel powerless – they want to tell people that they have responsibility and they can do something about it.

The organization started as a diverse group of friends that wanted to be a part of the changes that were taking place in the country even before the Hariri assassination. They wanted to be a part of change without being a part of any political party. The changes that were taking place were the Syrian withdrawing from the political system (after the resolution 1559 from the UN). It was thought that if the same people remained in power under the same systems as existed under Syrian influence, the government would not change. Some friends got together to discuss issues that were happening. After the Hariri assassination, it stirred up strong and differing feelings within the group as to who was responsible for the assassination. This was okay with her, as she saw the ability to have divergent opinions within the group as healthy. Their group shrunk to a core group of members – meeting monthly and having a project to get Syrians and Lebanese youths to dialogue with each other working on ways to deal with prejudgement and constructive dialogue. One of the members had contacts in Syria and they gathered about 10 people and had a dialogue. After this they had two workshops and then they had to

temporarily stop because of the upheaval caused by a spate of political assassinations – Gemayal, Hariri, Tueni and others.

For her, getting involved in the organization meant finding a place where she belonged. This meant finding a place where she could express her ideas and find a place where she belonged. She wanted to get involved in changing her society – changing her local society first. The changes she wanted to see was to encourage more activism within the society – more people thinking that they could be active and make a difference. Before, you had to be a part of a political bloc or you would be marginalized.

Her organization wants to promote awareness of people's rights and duties as citizens, as well as how they can become engaged in the political process. The fundamental change that she wants to see is that people should feel like they are citizens with rights – no matter what my beliefs or religion. For example they are making a project now teaching young people that they can go to the parliament and make known their desires and complaints. She does not feel that the system is really democratic, even though they have elections. On a continuum, she would give it less than a 5 on a scale of 10 – with 10 being completely democratic. Certain politicians always run the elections – often they are people that inherited their authority or they were a part of a militia group, or part of a family. The parties are not really built around ideas, political programs or agendas. It is based around who one's family usually votes for, who is from the same religion or culture, or who can deliver services to me. Many people who don't feel represented, simply don't vote. When you get people involved and aware, they will vote to change the system – especially when they see that the present system and its politicians will not bring improvement to their lives.



She says that she is looking for ways to expand the organization and reach larger numbers of people. They implement projects in different regions all over the country – not just in Beirut. The organization has two employees, eight workers, a board, and many volunteers and supporters. Their membership is about 50 core people and 100 less intensely involved.

(Palestinian media owner and organizer) says a group of Palestinians that he is a part of are working on improving their internal lives. There is a movement that they have established that is working to improve the internal living situation of the Palestinians. They want to make sure that internal laws are respected and enforced. They want a strong police force that can actually arrest the criminals and protect people (he says currently the police throw away their weapons when the Israelis come in because they are afraid of being arrested by the Israelis – so there are certain things that are not in their hands, they are not in control of). Nonetheless there are things that they are working on to try to create more comfort for people by providing the basics. This movement does not have a name yet –they are putting it together – it is a group of people from all over the West Bank. It is not a political movement, it is a social movement. People feel hopeless from the politicians and from the Israelis. They feel hopeless from the whole world. They feel a lack of security in the society – which is a result of the occupation and the whole chaos that they went through. This social movement will have demonstrations and protests if someone is attacked by a criminal or a gang and the attackers are not brought to justice as they should be. The emphasis is on the security and peace of the individual, not on the political peace. Peace in individual terms means dignity when you are walking down the street that you are not harassed, being able to walk safely in the streets with one's wife or

child. Taking guns off the streets and enforcing justice in a way that is equal on everyone. Even just being able to pick up the garbage. He says it is not just him, it is a group of people – they started this movement three years ago.

They are ready now to put this vision into reality and to get it started. He is only one individual in a very big group. They originally started as a political movement, however they felt that there was no space and that it was not the time to launch such a thing. People are sick of politics and 60% of them do not identify with a political party – they only react based on how each group is behaving at a particular time. The people do not think that a political movement can do anything because of the (quality of life) distractions in the street. The better way of gathering and uniting the people is through working on the social demands and needs of people. This is why they diverted the movement from a political movement to a social one. You cannot create an expanded base from a political movement, but you can create a very huge base from a social movement. They have groups in each town and they are preparing to officially launch their movement. There was a lack of social movements for a very long time – actually there was none. How does he think a social movement might make changes? He says that any change is the idea of creating a majority – people are already socially and politically educated. One just needs to unite the people that feel a certain way and have them make their voices heard.

(PFLP member and teacher from Ramallah) says that he is also a part of the group being started by Mu'taz and others. He says that the goal of this new group is to make change – this will come with the individual first, then the society, then with the larger political picture. The change that starts with the individual is for people to believe in their

goals, talk about them to their friends and family, do something (positive) in their small circle and then go out of the circle. He says that all of the Palestinian people want to change the situation in the land. The ways of Fatah and Hamas are the same (i.e., negative). The Palestinian people want a different kind of change. They want to take care of their education, to take care of their community, to teach themselves to be one unit. They want to keep their country clean, to keep their streets clean. They want freedom for their personality to express itself – to do what they want to do. Religion is not separate from this – because their religion is a part of their beliefs. When asked about Lucine who is under familial and societal pressure to conform in the name of religion. Mohammed says that some of the pressure Lucine is under is from a lack of communication in her family. When her father does not want her to do something, he just says that it is ‘haram’, instead of talking to her about it. He does admit that there is a lot of pressure on family members (females?) to dress or act in a certain way – even in other towns, lest their dress or behavior bring a bad name to the family. He says that this is a bad thing in this country. He believes that this cultural attitude requires education – to tell people that what someone else does or how they dress is not their business – it is how they want to live their life. It’s not something to talk about – its not your responsibility to talk about any girl. He says that they need to educate people about health, sexuality, their community, how to treat women equally, they must do job skills training, not just academics, the curriculum needs to teach people how to think. He emphasizes that the goals he wants to work for with this new group are individual freedom of expression; acting together as a unit; education; functioning as a society; pride in who you are; and

staying with one's religion – taking values from it in a good way (not using it for terrorism and bad things – Islam is not like this).

He wants to educate – but with a new curriculum – one that will bring them to their goals. The present curriculum will not even lead them to half a goal. How can they reach their goals, if the curriculum in the schools will destroy it? First they must teach religion in the right way. This means that they don't want to tell others how to pray, go to Mecca or observe the dietary laws without teaching people how to communicate properly with others. The religion is not just to pray – and certainly not to kill others if they aren't Muslim. They must teach how to communicate, help others, build their country – not just to pray and observe rituals. Examples of communication include between males and females: Everyone needs to learn that a woman has her own personality – to learn, to work, to do what she wants to do. This does not mean that she can do anything – there are some limits within the religion, as there are for men also. What is incumbent on the woman is also incumbent on the man.

Another issue of communication is treating and speaking to others equally. Black, white, yellow, rich, poor - they are all the same. There is also the issue of jobs – no one should be able to get a particular job because they know someone. The job should be available to the person with the proper training and certification. Another issue is how to always speak the truth – to stop lying. This is what they need. They have to help one another – if he sees a blind man, he needs to take his hand and help him across the road. Our religion tells us that we must do this. Politics needs to be separated from religion. A particular political group should not be able to tell everyone whether they know God or not.

### *Political Culture (including grassroots reform) – Summary of Major Points*

Generally in the Middle East politics is not spoken about as much as it is in the West – a sign of a feeling of detachment that the people feel from any sense of political power. At the same time, regional/global politics resonate much more in the Middle East than they do in the West – certainly more than in the U.S. To some degree there was a conscious process of depoliticizing the population – making any ability to affect political change too costly so that the people eventually give up.

People tend to listen to the loudest voices in the culture – which usually belong to the Islamists like the Muslim Brotherhood and (to a lesser degree) the jihadists. There is a slow but increasing push by women to be included in the political process – more in relatively liberal countries like Jordan. Pro-democracy groups exist in many Middle Eastern countries, but they are isolated from one another and repressed by the government (difficulties in operating to outright arrests) Pro-democracy groups have turned to alternative media (internet and internet radio). In Palestine, there are grassroots movements for improvement of the lives of the people.

### *Culture and Sexuality*

(Jordanian Christian female professional) says that (at least where she lives in Western Jordan) boys and girls date – and sleep together. It is still taboo (because the parents would be quite angry), but most of her peers are sexually active. Lots of girls have anal sex so that they will not lose their virginity. They also have oral sex – but it is more the girls to the boys than vice versa. Young Jordanians don't worry about HIV and do not use protection when having anal sex. The girls can't carry condoms for fear that the parents would find them. The boys don't carry condoms that much, though some do

(and they use them for regular sex). The girls who have sex before marriage sometimes have hymenoplasties to restore the appearance of virginity. Many men in Jordan pay for sex. She says about 30% are getting their needs met.

(Jordanian professor of comparative religion) says that there are difficulties for men in getting married (mostly economic), so men are frustrated. Many men are unemployed. In Islam, the only way to deal with sexual frustration is with marriage. The culture does not allow for girl friends. He says that Jordan is flooded with images from western movies and cable television – which is very confusing. In most conservative societies, children are married off young. This is not possible in Jordan because of economic issues. While some of the young men want to live their lives according to Western model, because of exposure to Western culture, usually this is the exception, and the economy is a bigger factor (as a barrier to marriage).

#### *Culture and Sexuality – Summary of Major Points*

A large number of single men and women in Middle Eastern culture are not married and not having sex. This contributes to both a sense of frustration as well as hostility towards the opposite sex (especially males towards females). One cannot even easily meet people for sex, or even pay for sex – as there is nowhere to go to do so. People live with their families and hotels do not allow unmarried couples in. In the more modernized parts of society (in Jordan for example) girls will have oral or anal sex to keep their virginity, or have hymenoplasties. Safe sex is rarely practiced. Sexuality in the culture tends to have a predatory or ownership attitude attached to it. There is a difficulty in people getting married (due to unemployment). This increases frustration. Frustration and confusion are increased by exposure to a Hollywood version of sexuality.

## *Culture and Gender*

(Jordanian Christian female professional) states that girls here are often harassed on the street – even those with covered heads. It is normal here – many guys do it. The harassment is not out of sexual frustration. Sexual harassment on the streets is normal here – just what guys do. She thinks it has to do with the attitudes towards women in the country. Many of the men have not had any chance to interact with females. They haven't had the chance to see that they are normal human beings worthy of respect. This statement is echoed by (female worker in Egyptian pro-democracy NGO) who says that women are routinely harassed – even molested, whether veiled or not.

(Jordanian religious/feminist politician) says that Islamic women in her society suffer from a lot of disadvantages. They don't have their own opinions and they depend too much on their husbands. They are afraid of their husbands and fathers and they can't say what they feel. They would constantly say that they need to ask their husbands – not knowing what their rights are within Islam. She studied CIDAW – the UN treaty on women's rights – and article by article she saw that it was comparable with women's rights as stated in Islam and the Koran. She would tell the women that they had rights within Islam and that what their husbands would tell them was what their husbands liked or wanted – not necessarily what their rights were according to international treaties or according to Islam.

She says that some of the Muslim Brotherhood members were involved in activities that women were not included in – such as sitting in the Shura (the party's parliament) council. Women were not allowed to be candidates for the council. When she protested they said 'not now'. She said 'now and always!' – why do they refuse - it is a

right from Islam. She felt that something was wrong when teachings from the Koran regarding women's rights were not being implemented. In 1993 she staged a campaign for election to the Shura council – many men voted for her and she was elected to be the first woman in her party's shura council. She made her campaign at the last minute so that others did not have time to obstruct her candidacy. Later, however, they did what they could to stop her and put difficulties in her path – but did not succeed. She says that women need to be educated to participate in political life. They cannot be decision makers if they are not well educated. If they are educated they will think about whether they want to follow a conservative or moderate path – she thinks that especially women will go with the moderate path. (I point out that a woman who is not properly educated who is given power may just become an extremist herself – as has been the case in some terrorist organizations who recruit and propagandize females with ideas of female empowerment through extremism and violence.

(Egyptian distinguished thinker and writer) says the men in Arab societies are encouraged (to harass women) by the perception that the women are afraid. He says that his female employees say that the way males look at them – their arms, legs – makes them ashamed for having limbs... as if it is their fault. He shares that it is like wolves looking hungrily at the deer and blaming the deer for their desire to attack it. He was brought up in a household where he struggled to keep up with his older sister; married a woman he loved and respected; had daughters who were brought up to be free and powerful women. It enrages him when women are looked at as 'semi-creatures'.

(Egyptian researcher) says that with the rise of Islamism and conservative values there has been a rise of a certain hostile (even aggressive) attitude towards women in the



society. He says it is because of the attitude that comes with the Islamicization of the society. Meaning propaganda that has the worst interpretations of Islam. Years ago women would walk around in Western dress. They would be able to walk around by themselves. The most they would get in the 60s or 70s was a compliment. Now the message being spread by the Islamists is that women should stay at home, not work, not be in the streets, and stay veiled. The Islamists have downgraded the status of women in the society, put a lot of pressure for women to hide. They also legitimized the younger generation of males to harass women – as if just by being out in the streets they are putting themselves in that situation – blaming the victims.

The government has generally failed to address this issue of the status of women – though it has started speaking out lately about the abuse (i.e., sexual harassment) of women in public places. In the past, if someone would abuse or molest a woman, the police would shave his head to shame him in public. This was a form of disgrace. Nothing like that is done today – this is one of the manifestations of the breakdown of the police – they no longer see it as their job to protect women. The women have to protect themselves – which they do by covering up (which doesn't really help – they still get harassed - or staying out of the public sector – or relying on the protection of males)

What is causing the radicalization in regards to attitudes towards women? He says that it is happening mostly among middle classes - high school and college graduates. Religious conservatism in general is also mostly among the middle classes. The general dress code has nothing to do with religious conduct – it is just a code that the generation has taken on. It is not a sign of religiosity at all. It is more an issue of conformity. This is conservatism in the society in general and women are just going along with it.

Women generally are not rebelling or pushing for change – they are trying to meet their goals in more subtle ways. To see women pushing the limits I need to go see private universities and the upper class neighborhoods – where women are more westernized, there is less abuse and disrespect, etc. There is also a lot of tolerance – some women (especially in the upper middle classes) will be totally covered up and they will be walking with women (even family members) that are totally westernized – there is a lot of tolerance.

The radicalization takes place in the middle and lower classes, in the urban centers, less in the lower and higher classes, less in the rural areas. FGM (female genital mutilation) is widespread among the lower classes and rural areas, but is decreasing. The radicals are pushing to keep the practice – and do so even in the urban areas, where it is otherwise not widespread. The civic organizations are pushing for change of this practice, as is the government – which is succeeding (except among the radicals/fundamentalists) particularly in the urban areas.

At the same time, there are larger numbers of women from the lower classes in the workforce – and the level of schooling is increasing – mostly because of economic needs. In the conservative upper classes, the women work but do so because they are pushed. They don't want to work – they feel that women should not have to work –and they can afford not to. So the President's wife who is trying to encourage women to work is speaking to the middle and upper classes. He also mentions that the divorce is going up – and the number of unmarried men and women is increasing – which may be a sign of encroaching modernization. He says that divorce is no longer seen as the tragedy that it once was.

(Female worker in pro-democracy NGO) shares that the educational system and the content of its textbooks (and presumably books in general) are full of material that is against women. Women are always shown cooking in the kitchen while the father goes away to work. She shares that she used to wear the veil for 6 years – she thought that she had to do this according to her religion. She was told that it was a way of protecting women from harassment – and protecting society. She no longer feels this way. Safa says that took off the veil after her marriage (a bit less than a year before). She says that she did it because she wanted to, but did it with the support of her husband.

She says that women are putting on the hijab not because it is their culture or their choice – but because they have to do it. Women are told that they must do it. She says their family, neighbors, and friends tell them. The society tells the women and they really don't have a different choice. The average woman can't just say no, I don't want to. Rarely can a woman just do what she wants – especially when it comes to the veil. Her sister wears the hijab still and her mother just put it on four months before this. Her mother went to Mecca in Saudi Arabia - and that was that. The Saudi society put indirect stress on her to put on the veil – it wasn't explicitly said. It is very difficult to go on pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia and not put on the veil, and after she returned she kept it on.

(Egyptian director of pro-democracy NGO) disputes what others have asserted – that veiling of women is just a part of the culture. He says that this is just a propaganda answer – a Muslim Brotherhood answer. He also disputes the other common answer - that people are doing it 'because they choose to – because they want to be more religious'. He attributes the widespread pressure to put on a veil to the Muslim Brotherhood. They have been doing all sorts of activities to try and get women to put on

the veil – posters, preachers, even going door to door. Meeting girls in various places in the society, recruiting girls to speak to other girls... Even the teachers in the schools who are members of the Muslim Brotherhood talk to the little children. Focusing on the hijab was their major activity for about 14 years – and they were quite successful. It also allowed them to try out new techniques for mobilization, using the hijab campaign as a model. This was particularly useful because it showed them how they could influence people outside of the realm of politics. He says that Egyptian people are afraid to talk politics. If you ask them how they like the president or the government they do not like to answer. Sending people out to talk to girls and boys about how wearing hijab saves women from sexual harassment and saves society in general from the influences of the West. They use very simple arguments such as ‘do you accept if your wife, mother, sister or daughter would be harassed? Although these arguments are quite simplistic, they resonate in a powerful way in the Egyptian culture, which is quite conservative and becoming more so. His youngest uncle for example forces his wife to wear a chador – the head to toe black tent that reveals only the face. At the same time he doesn’t pray, smokes hashish and watches pornography on his computer.

They both say that there is a lot of sexual harassment (both verbal and physical) in the society. She was actually touched many times, in crowded streets, in train stations (along with verbal harassment) – even when she was veiled. He says that sexual harassment happens everywhere. Egypt is a young society – 70% of the society is under 35 years old – and there is a lot of sexual frustration. He says that this is different than the average American society –at least in American society it is possible – there is a chance that one can meet someone and have a relationship. In Egyptian society, there is no

chance. In America, at least at the end of the day there is a brothel somewhere. In Egypt there aren't even any prostitutes or places to take them. (Ahmed says that if there was, the secret police would get them quickly). He says that even if one has the girl, most of the people (he says 99%) live with their families. Even if one pays for a hotel, one has to show proof with documents that they are married. This does not extend to Western tourists.

He also says that FGM is widespread everywhere, even though the government tries to stop it. The people accept it just like hijab – and it is spreading, even in Cairo (the less modern neighborhoods). It is a widespread undercover abuse of women. He says it is a way to take the weapons from the woman – her hair (covered), her sex organs (not functioning as a pleasure organ so that she does not mess around and bring shame to the family), her breasts (covered).

(Muslim woman from Ramallah) says that her brothers are very religious and always pray. Their wives wear the hijab and jilbab. Her brothers tell her that she should wear the hijab and jilbab – they say that ‘this is a fucking society and you have to wear this dress – you can't go there looking like this because all of the guys will be looking at you’. She says that she doesn't care about people – she just wants to do what she believes in. So there is a lot of stress and pressure, because of the society. She says that her family gives her the trust to do whatever she wants – to wear a bikini, to sleep with whomever she wants. But they talk about the society, and they say that people will talk about you, noone will want to marry you – they say that people will think she is a bitch (slut?) because of the way she dresses. She says that there are a lot of families like her family (who would be liberal except for societal pressures and expectations).

When she walks in the street she does get a lot of attention from guys – telling her that she looks so sexy, etc – and she says ‘what the hell is this?’ She notes that she could wear the hijab and jilbab and sleep with guys every day. When she is on the street she wears a jacket – only taking it off if she goes out together with a group of friends. Sometimes she says she feels like just putting on the hijab, because every morning her brothers say ‘why are you going like this?’ But her father and mother are cool – her mother is Lebanese. When she goes to Jordan her parents let her dress however she wants, because no one knows them there. It’s not about religion at all – it’s about the kind of people that are in Palestine. Everyone knows her here and knows her family and they will talk about her and her family. So here she can’t (easily) dress however she wants. If it weren’t for the support of her father (who has lived all over the Middle East and is not particularly religious) she would not be able to be so free. She says that she is probably looking for a man with an outlook similar to her father (he works for the PA – in the police department). She says that it is very hard here because when you have a boyfriend, he doesn’t mind and lets her wear whatever she wants. But once he marries her, he wants to change her. She says that her solution to this will be to come to some sort of compromise.

She works now with blind children – volunteering. She is looking for paid work. She likes social work and wants to do something that will help society. She has recently graduated college. She believes that everything that she believes in she will do – she respects herself, her family and everything in the society but she still believes in her right to act and dress as she pleases – despite the desire of the society that she dress and act in

a certain way. Sometimes family and societal limits pressure someone to be a certain way, but she does not care.

(Jordanian professor of Comparative Religion) says that in Islam, a Muslim is allowed to marry out of the religion (men) One human being (male) can live with another of different religion. This is a reflection of the fact that Islam wants Muslims to believe and respect other prophets and religions. (Nevertheless, he believes that the Koran is at the top of the pyramid of religious books.) He says non-Muslim wives do not have to convert. Two of Mohammed's daughters were with non-Muslim men. Islam wanted to destroy old ideas of religious separatism. Nothing in Koran says to kill or punish a convert from Islam. Even has choice to believe in God or not. There may be cultural proscriptions against intermarriage, but its not in the religion. The Koran says: God can make all people Muslim, but wanted it to be free choice. Issue of woman not marrying out of religion is not in Koran, but is a reflection of the culture.

There are other things that affect and influence the interpretation, understanding and practice of religion. Idea of woman obeying man is also a cultural reflection of the interpreters. Polygamy is also an aspect of Judaism – it's a cultural barrier. He says that he believes that when the people are living the right spirit of their religion issues of cultural backwardness will take care of itself.

He believes that the head covering of women comes from Sunna (the instructions for living taken from the Prophet, his family and followers) nonetheless, men also have rules about dress (not tight or immodest). He says the veil is like a box for jewels – the spirit of a woman is like a jewel. Modest dress promotes peaceful dealings between men

and women. But people need to keep in mind that a Muslim woman who does not cover head may be a better Muslim than someone who does cover their head.

(Jordanian Sufi professor) says that the Sufi path encourages learning and accomplishment by women.

(Israeli-Arab Sufi leader) says that there is a negative perception that Islam (as a religion) does not encourage rights of women. His brand of Sufism (al-Chalwatiyah) wants to prove this is not the case by empowering women. He speaks against the disinheriting of women – and the arranging of marriages. He also says that children should stay with their (divorced) mother till they are 18 – even boys – even if she remarries. Says those that do otherwise are making mistakes. Most of people in his path practice women's rights – though he can't speak for all of Sufism. Sufism in general does work for empowerment of women. But especially the Sufi path that he follows and preaches.

(Israeli-Arab Lawyer and feminist reformer) says that she was exposed to the thinking of an Islamic feminist reformer in Morocco. She then decided to start an organization in Israel to promote Islamic reform. Since Islamic society (and women's choices) are structured within the religion and this is not changing, the solution therefore, is to find a space within Islam – where women's rights and choices can be honored.

In many families women don't work outside the home – and the men say that this is a religious issue. In the Koran this is not true. She needs to work to bring this to the knowledge of the people. While there are religious authorities who will support them, their stance is that they do not want to be dependent on the authority of men or any religious “authority.” They say they want to have their own knowledge and authorities.



Nothing in Koran prohibits women from reading text and interpret themselves. There is a need to distinguish between culture/society, and religion. Sociologically (not religiously) women were prohibited from reading and interpreting.

She says, “We (women) do not have the answers, but we have the right to ask the questions and have a voice within the religious discussion”. In the Islamic world women have tended to be objects – acted upon (passive), rather than actors. Women have to take control of their lives – this is legitimate within Islamic. Social codes, not religious codes have kept women from control. Her organization (for the feminist reform of Islam) lectures and gives courses across Israel and Jordan. They had a recent campaign for women to assert rights of inheritance. There tends to be family/social pressure for women to sign away inheritance rights across the Islamic world (except in West Bank, where proximity to Israel has had a modernizing influence). Women are shamed into relinquishing their inheritance rights – this is true in Egypt, Yemen, Morocco, etc. Lawyers are complicit – preparing withdrawal papers for women. This creates economic oppression for women – poverty keeps women out of republic domain. Even if family wants to keep land, they could give money instead. Women need to inherent an equal share. The Koran says half, the organizational campaign says: start with the basic legal right, then reexamine half issue. In modern times, half is not applicable. Women are now working, supporting families, and the economics are different now. There are also verses that say people can bequeath equally. Israeli civil courts would give them equal share but there is still societal pressure on women not to. There is also a campaign for parents to will equal shares to their children (both male and female) which is currently not the default option. The organization has gotten generally good feed back from Arab

community, very good from women. Some men have accused them of trying to divide families. These men say they will support women – but not give her inheritance.

Other women's rights that her organization wants to work for : University studying, choice of husbands, no teen marriage, equal inheritance, not losing custody of children on remarriage, ability to be in the public domain, not have honor killings (not a common occurrence in Israel). Women tend to lose sons on divorce, may lose daughters on remarriage, even in Israel in Sharia courts. Remarriage may be used in court as a custody consideration (boys after 7 and girls after 9). Israeli courts tend to not like intervening in Sharia courts.

There is only one Islamic school that believes in this – the Hanafi School. This is the main school followed in Israel – but other schools could be used as a guide instead. Her organization wants more modern schools and interpretations used for family laws. Will look in Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon and Syria for more modern models, esp. in Morocco. Ironically, because Israel is non Islamic, less change has taken place – since there is no authority to make changes.

Means: Raise awareness, create dialogue, and provoke action. Creating action needs long work – not just a couple of months. They drew up a call to action and distributed it amongst lawyers regarding ethical issues and inheritance withdrawal. It stated that lawyers should not be a facilitator to coercion and economic disempowerment of women. The lawyers need to let her know of other options. They need to know that it is unethical to be a party to a woman signing away her rights. In the future the organization wants to work on father's automatic right to demand custody, as well as the specific arguments he makes to gain custody – This issue is not from Koran.

Regarding the veil: The veil issue is one of control. The prophet says ‘dress modestly’ – cover chest and torso (but this does not refer to dress length or hair). Some say covering the hair was a given in Islamic society at that time – so it needs to be observed even if not explicitly stated in the Koran. Others say that women can cover what they want according to their understanding. She says, “I’m a believer and this gives me the right to question all of what I am taught and practice”. Men do not have to be perfect – women also don’t have to be. Just because we are imperfect, we don’t forfeit the right to question. Men claim authority that women have to earn.

Honor killings make sense because women are chess pieces to move around. There are organizations that concentrate solely on honor killings. Her organization focused on more acceptable issues to start. Honor issues may get less support for change because it’s seen as a family moral issue.

Islamic institutions use and expect women to keep and preserve the religion and identity – be mothers, stay home, raise the children. Women’s issues in Arab community are very sensitive and important. Extremism tries to promote/coerce a narrow understanding of religion. Denies legitimacy and rights to those with any other kind of understanding. When women raise their voices against extremism and change the social practices, they make less space for extremism to grow.

Western females tend to see themselves as the only bearers of modernity. When they pity or condescend to Islamic women, the chance for collaboration is blocked. Each side has something to teach the other – both East and West. Western feminists also see women in the Middle East as ‘acted upon’ and needing to be ‘acted upon’. The tendency is for both sides (the extremists as well as the modernizers) using women as objects- not

as active choosers. They use ‘veils versus bathing suits’ to make a points – neither side is sensitive to women’s rights – seeing women as actors. The goal of the organization is to promote the voice of women as independent actors.

They are writing book, “Women’s status in Islam, Christianity, and Judaism.” They specifically want to reach out to those that influence others. The organization is trying to create cross-cultural feminist dialogue of Muslim women in order to create a different image. The colonial image is that Arab women are passive, need help, need modernity. Their organization says that we have a feminism that is rooted in Islam and respects today’s women – with models currently in development in Morocco, Malaysia and Indonesia. She wants to connect and collaborate with other feminist Islamic movements. She says that liberal, feminist Islam is better known now.

(Female teacher at Islamic college in Israel) says that in Arabic society girls are looked at as weak and more influenced and are therefore discouraged from going away from home to study or work. She is personally against these distinctions. She studied at Technion in Haifa herself. Also, excuses are allowed for boy’s behavior, but not for girls. This attitude (of stricter standards for women) stems from ancient culture. Generally Arab society judges the women more strictly than the men. Her husband’s friends would drink and have girlfriends (from abroad). This was accepted – even when bringing girlfriends home to family. Males traditionally had more power, and with power comes more choices. Giving females more responsibility is advantageous to the males. Also telling girls that they are the guardians of the faith is advantageous to males. She says that she will allow her own daughters to study abroad. Also her sisters will do the same. Strong and special women in society will teach their daughters to be strong as well.

FGM is not (to her knowledge) practiced in Israeli Israeli/Palestinian society. Domestic violence is there in Israeli Arab society but not massively so. In Israeli society, Arab women are getting more education and choices. These girls/women also wear tight, attractive two-piece outfits (not loose wide jilbab) even when their hair is covered.

Islam is religion of tolerance, peace, acceptance and respect for women. She personally prays (reads Koran, fasts, etc.) five times a day (even with bare head and modern dress.) She sees religion as a good and positive thing.

One thing that she thinks of as crucial for the role of women in Arab/Islamic society is the education of women – especially the kind of education that allows them to be economically independent with their own car and money. If a woman is financially free, she can act with out dependency on a man. Education will give her the ability to negotiate with the outside world, but even more important than education is financial independence. Again – combination of education and financial independence is key to female power. This is an increasing process in Arab societies. Governments need to help this by encouraging female empowerment. Educated women will educate their children to do good. Even if the father is educated, an uneducated mother will result in less educated children. Uneducated children will be more vulnerable to radicalism.

#### *Culture and Gender – Summary of Major Points*

Women in Middle Eastern culture are often harassed on the street – even when veiled. There is a pervasive sense of hostility towards women in Middle Eastern cultures. Women tend to be seen as property or objects rather than as autonomous individuals. Harassment of women is not due to sexual frustration – it is just an accepted part of the culture. Women tend to ignore harassment or show fear, which encourages it to continue.

Many men in the culture have not had the chance to interact with women and therefore have not been able to humanize them and learn to respect them. Women in Middle Eastern culture tend to rely on their fathers and husbands for opinions. Women are unaware of what their rights are in Islam.

An increase of fundamentalist Islam in the society has been accompanied by an increase in negative attitudes towards women. Women are not openly pushing for change – they tend to try to achieve goals in more subtle ways (perhaps out of a sense of lack of power or fear of backlash). Radicals are pushing to keep the practice of Female Genital Mutilation in the culture (and in Egypt it is still quite widespread) even though it is decreasing due to pushes by civic organizations and governments – it exists as an ‘undercover abuse of women’.

The presence of women in the workforce is increasing – which is also tending to reinforce religious mores of dress and behavior as a counterbalance. Women in the culture put on the veil not because they want to do it, or out of ‘general religious trends’ but because of pressure – from their families, and from religious groups. The Muslim Brotherhood has waged a careful multifaceted campaign for about the last 14 years to influence women to put on the veil and for their families to insist on it. Wearing the veil is not an indication of religiosity, and also men who are quite non-religious will insist that their wives, girlfriends, etc put on the veil or even chador. Wearing the veil and dressing conservatively is a way that a Muslim family establishes and keeps its reputation.

The subordination and domination of women is largely cultural, not specifically Islamic. Sufi Islam tends to encourage rights, learning and accomplishment by women.

Polygamy is as much cultural as religious (can change) – was once a part of Judaism also.

Women in the (Arab) Islamic world tend to be acted upon (objects) rather than actors.

Lack of mixing between men and women contributes to the dehumanization/disrespect of women. Female genital mutilation is a covert widespread abuse of women – and a form of control. Women's rights to inheritance, choice in marriage, divorce and custody need to be spoken about and examined.

Honor killings are a way to protect the family name using the woman as an object to do so. Women are seen as the protectors and guardians of the religion – convenient for the men. Men get away with behavior that would have a woman be in danger of being killed. Palestinian society is more tolerant of women due to its proximity to Israel. Education that leads to earning ability is the key to independence and for women.

### *Media*

(Egyptian director of Pro-democracy NGO) says that in Egypt, it is not that there aren't computers or internet access (he said that about 7 million people have internet), but everyone uses them in ways that reflect their own attitudes: some for radicalism, some for self-education, many more just for chatting and email.

(American Muslim researcher) says that the exposure to media (television, Internet and cell/camera phones) has broken down many barriers to modernity - causing a big shift.

### *Positive Role*

(Egyptian American writer) speaks of the Internet as a means by which people are becoming more knowledgeable about Islam. They also can read and find out about current debates in Islamic law, critiques regarding Islamic observance and different approaches to the interpretation of the Koran and Hadith. This opens up a world of

learning and self-examination that was previously closed to the average Muslim, or even Muslim scholar.

### *Negative Role*

(American researcher based in London) says that increasingly, instead of a direct teacher-student relationship – what he calls a ‘preceptor’ form of radicalization, the Internet is serving as a source of self-radicalization and self-recruitment (even self-training).

(Egyptian researcher) says that one of the things that led to radicalization in the Middle East was the breakdown of the Israeli – Palestinian peace process and the intifadah that followed. This was felt regionally, not just locally – fed by pan Arab media and satellite TV stations. Some thing happens in Palestine and it is seen immediately all over the Middle East. Media also distort things – as a matter of fact, Palestinian colleagues have told him that in Cairo they see more Palestinians killed than are seen in Nablus. They may have someone killed every couple of days, but on the news you see someone killed every day – and over and over again. The media only shows one side of the story – not showing Palestinian attacks on Israelis. This creates a strong reaction throughout the region.

(Saudi American researcher) says that Al-Jazeera deliberately and knowingly promotes extremism. He also contends that Al-Jazeera has very good relations with Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Hamas.

(British American terrorism researcher and author) says that a factor that is a part of the terrorist system is the influence of the communications revolution. If bin-Laden had emerged in the 1940s, 50s or even the 1960s, he would have been a person with



perhaps a high profile in one localized region or one country. It is interesting to note that al-Jazeera (representing the birth of Arab-Islamic mass communication) came into being in the same year (1998) that bin-Laden declared war against the U.S. Not that al-Jazeera is responsible for bin-Laden, but mass communications networks mean that when bin-Laden puts out videotape, hundreds of millions of people see it. This fact alone renders the opinion that ‘since 9/11, bin-Laden is no longer important’ rather puzzling. This might be true if he had not said anything since 9/11 – but this is not the case. We have had 20 or more statements from him since 9/11 – all broadcast through the mass media networks.

Specific actions called for by bin-Laden in these communiqués have been followed by others carrying these orders out - such as attacks on Saudi oil facilities, attacks on the coalition forces in Iraq, and attacks in London and Madrid. Bin-Laden’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri has been lately calling for attacks on Musharraf – with an assassination attempt against Musharraf as the result. Another example - Abu-Musab al-Zarqawi - went from being a marginal figure in the Iraqi resistance to becoming a central figure – largely due to his use of the internet to spread images of gruesome violence (Bergen begins to tap on his computer keyboard at which I exclaim in alarm “You aren’t going to pull up a beheading video now are you?!” – he demurs, to my immense relief). For this reason, debates about whether television networks such as al-Jazeera (that do show videos from bin-Laden and Zawahiri) are a good or bad thing are actually moot – the existence and wide use of Jihadi websites spreading uncensored and unedited material on the internet have made this discussion meaningless. In sum, the communication

revolution has certainly been a critical part of the success and growth of al-Qaeda – both prior to and since 9/11.

*The Role of Media– Summary of Major Points*

While many people in societies like Jordan and Egypt own computers, they are often used for email, chat and for religious study/indoctrination including radicalism. Some people use the Internet to increase their understanding of Islam and the current debates in Islam – which has taken these debates much more into the public sphere. The Internet is a powerful format for radicalism and fundamentalism to spread – as is satellite television. Satellite television and the Internet have also spread an awareness of Western liberal democracy and Western culture- causing a big modernizing shift in the society. The use of cell-phones (especially camera phones) has begun breaking down some of the barriers between men and women in the culture - especially among the youth. Some say that al-Jazeera deliberately and knowingly promotes extremism. Other television stations like al-Manar are fronts for radical groups (in that case, Hezbollah). The communications revolution became an integral part of the spread of al-Qaeda and radicalism.

*Islam*

(Muslim American Professor) is concerned that bad practices give a bad image to Islam as a whole.

(American Muslim researcher) says that because few Westerners have actually lived in Middle Eastern countries, there are many misconceptions about Islam. At the same time, Arab, African and Kurdish societies can be very primitive and tribal – however this is far from a representation of the majority of Muslims – or even Middle Eastern Muslims. He says that there is currently a big battle going on as to the underlying

philosophical foundations of Islam – Islamic self-definition. He says that while Sunnis are generally philosophically ignorant, Shiites are comfortable with philosophical debate, and fundamentalists/extremists are hostile to it. He says this philosophical debate is the most important development taking place in Islam today.

(Egyptian distinguished thinker and writer) says that Judaism – the talmudic laws – remind him so much of Sharia law – in general as well as in particular. He finds it so ironic that the two religions are so similar – believing in a single unified God (unlike the trinity of Christianity) and yet there is so much hostility between them. They both find the idea of a human god dying on the cross to be ludicrous – they both actually laugh at it. What he likes about Christianity is the way that they separated between church and state. The Jews did not have to do this because they never had a state to begin with and therefore did not have to grapple with the problems of church and state. In more recent history in Israel they have had to deal with it – and have done so in an somewhat uneasy fashion.

(Jordanian professor of Comparative Religion) says that the Prophet teaches that God does not look at externals, he looks at the heart. Also you can't find God in religion if you didn't find him in your heart first. Many religious people are not living the true spirit of their religion. Mohammed had peaceful and welcoming spirit to all – unlike what present day Muslims are doing to one another. We need to know the real problems in our community, and understand the real message in our religion regarding Muslims and also their dealings with others. God is merciful – we need to live with love and mercy. If you want to know what your religion with God is – look and see if your dealings with others are with love and mercy.

(American intelligence analyst and researcher) says that Islam is a religion without a hierarchy, without a pope and a counsel of cardinals and bishops, because it is a religion that is based on the direct relationship between the faithful and Allah – God, with no intermediaries, therefore it is a religion that can become whatever the believer wants it to be. The Koran, along with the body of the Hadith and the Sunna, which date from the origin of Islam, are, of course, seen as immutable. Other than those scriptures, Islam is in essence, whatever the believers make it to be – and no authority, no counsel of mosque elders can intervene and say “no – you’ve got it wrong, this isn’t Islam”. Unlike Christianity, in Islam there was never a group of “faithful elders” that, in essence, codified the religion – saying ‘in order to be a Moslem this is what you need to believe, and this is what you may not believe’. While earlier revered, acclaimed and respected leaders are referred to for teaching and inspiration, it is not a given that their words and rulings automatically supersede those that came later. While this lack of rigidity was historically a strength, it left the religion open to interpretation by extremists as well.

For the reasons above, when radical thinkers or philosophers arise, such as Ibn Tamiya during the thirteenth century, or Ibn Wahab who was the founder of the extreme Wahabi version of Islam in present-day Saudi Arabia; or in modern times Sayid Qutb (a very influential anti-western cleric and writer) – or Hassan al-Bana (founder of the Egyptian group The Muslim Brotherhood) before him, or Maulana Mauduti (the ideological predecessor of al-Bana and Qutb) in Pakistan; these individuals can become very influential and attract large followings – even form a modern movement – and yet they don’t necessarily speak for all of Islam, all of historical Islam, or for all of Islam yet

to come. A particular strand or movement within Islam may exist for a period of time and then disappear completely – or it may be referred to for later emulation.

### *Islam – Summary of Major Points*

Muslims are concerned that negative practices in Islam are giving a bad name to Islam as a whole. When Westerners don't live in Islamic societies they have many misconceptions – especially if all they know about are the more primitive and fundamentalist societies. There is currently a big battle going on in Islam as to its philosophical foundations. Muslims say that God looks at the heart, not the externals (unlike the fundamentalists). Muslims say that the basis of Islam is love, mercy, peace and tolerance of others. Islam is not a religion built on central authority or even precedence – so it can be interpreted at any time by anyone claiming authority to do so. For this reason, movements can rise up in Islam and then fade away.

### *Sharia*

(Jordanian distinguished professor and former government member) says that the goal of the Islamists is to have an 'Islamist state' but they are hard put to define this – as they have not really had this outside of the life of the prophet and the early caliphs. The life since then has revolved around the caliph, the sultan, etc – who did not interfere in the lives of the people (and their religious observance). There was never (hardly ever) a 'sharia state'. The caliph did not build schools, roads, oversee economic development – the people were responsible for themselves. The concept of a Sharia state is an ideal – not one that has existed in most of the history of the Middle East. When the average person sees the chaos that now exists in the Middle East, he says that (the lack of civil and democratic institutions) it is not good – and he looks for an alternative model. Since the

people are religious in their lifestyle, they immediately jump to the model that was during the prophet and the four caliphs following him. The fact that this was 1500 years ago and they really don't know much about it is just a minor point. So they say – why can't we have a government that is Islamic and just like those times – unlike what we have now? This type of thinking is exemplified by the Islamist slogan 'Islam is the solution' – which means going back to the 'ideal state' (which is impossible).

According to (Egyptian American writer), Islamic countries are undergoing fierce internal debates about the proper interpretation and observance of Sharia law - in large part due to both the spread of mass communications and the exposure of people to modern liberal societies. She sees people as being split between those who want a 'sharia state' and those who are willing to debate and examine Sharia. She doesn't think most people want a Sharia state, and she herself sees modernity as being incompatible with Sharia practices. She does, however distinguish between the practice of family/civil Sharia law governing marriage, divorce, inheritance and the like, and criminal Sharia law which would impose capital punishments, lashings, amputations and the like. While many states in the Middle East practice some form of civil Sharia law, only a few countries (Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, parts of Nigeria) practice criminal Sharia law.

According to her, an extremist is someone who wants governments to enforce criminal Sharia law (stonings, beheadings and amputations). She points out that the debates that are currently being carried out regarding Islam and its observance are not peaceful - rather, 'careers are being destroyed, people are being threatened and lives have been lost'. In this debate, the Muslims in the West are taking their cues from the

messages emanating from the Middle East. This point (about a huge internal debate currently being waged in the Muslim world) is echoed by (American Muslim researcher).

(Egyptian writer and researcher) says that those that want to impose Sharia on others do not understand it. Islam says that everyone is free – punishment comes from God. Religion is a personal choice of each individual – it is between them and God.

(American Muslim researcher) echoes this, saying (quoting the Koran) ‘there is no compulsion in religion.’

(American Muslim researcher) says that there are big misconceptions in West about Islam. The practice of criminal Sharia law (huddud) exists only in Iran, Saudi Arabia, some parts of Pakistan and some parts of Africa. Huddud is not in the Koran – some of the practices are from tribal societies (Bedouin Arab, African,) predating the Koran. For example, he notes that the prophet abolished female infanticide, which was a pre-Islamic practice. He notes that Israel has optional Sharia courts for civil law – he notes that this is not widely known among Muslims and feels that it is a good model. In general, he feels that Sharia courts should exist as optional places for property/civil dispute mediation.

(Saudi American researcher) says that Sharia is man made and can be modified (like any other laws). He points out that U.S. and EU law is derived from originally from the bible, but it was as modified continually over time. Therefore, its not the source of the law (religious or otherwise), its the crafting and interpretation of the law. Personal freedoms take precedence over political freedoms.

(Israeli-Arab Sufi religious leader) says that the practices of Iran and Saudi Arabia (like stonings and amputation) are not Islam. There is no current state that is proper in its

implementation of Sharia. He therefore prefers to live in a Democracy – though he does not consider this the ideal. His ideal would be to obey God, not humans. No difference between life, religion and government in a state governed according to true Islam. He says if poor and rich (thieves) were punished equally he would support amputations of thieves. Say during early Islam only 13 amputations were done. As to this is being practiced nowadays in the name of Sharia (he disagrees). He says it's not "the real Islam."

(Israeli-Arab student and teacher) says that she wants to disseminate Islam "how it is." She wants the people to go back to God. The Koran says Muslim must return and be real Muslims – not how it is now, with many not listening to the orders of God and His Prophet, such as women not covering their heads. She says that when you want to understand the Koran, only ask Koran specialists – not just people in the street. Those who don't observe have a responsibility to observe, and those who know have the responsibility to explain. She says she has a responsibility to instruct others regarding proper observance.

How about Muslims that become Christian? She (in this current day and age) would just talk to them to understand why. However in the Koran it says that a convert gets killed. Says again that ideas about Islam must come from experts. We do not carry this out, however, because we do not have an Islamic state. When asked if she wants an Islamic state she responds –"yes of course". Should the Muslim who converts then be killed? She says that when we have an Islamic state, we will see then.



### *Sharia– Summary of Major Points*

The goal of the Islamists is to have a ‘Sharia state’ but they are not really prepared to either define this or to go about the actual business of running a state. A ‘sharia state’ has never really existed before in Islamic history, as the state/ruler and religious establishments were generally separate entities. The Islamists have tended to idealize a particular part of Islamic history, despite the fact that it was just as chaotic as the rest of history and they don’t know that much about it. There are fierce internal debates about the proper observance of Sharia law and these debates are causing huge rifts in Islamic society – especially in the Middle East.

Muslims in the West are taking their cues regarding observance of Sharia from the East. While many countries have structures for the observance of civil Sharia law, it is the observance of criminal Sharia law that entails beheading, stoning, lashing, amputations. Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and parts of Africa (Sudan, Somalia, parts of Nigeria) observe criminal Sharia law. There is an attitude among fundamentalists that Sharia is unchanging, but in actuality, the interpretation and implementation of Sharia law (fiqh) has always evolved with the times. Those that say that Sharia law needs to be imposed do not understand that from the Islamic perspective, Sharia was supposed to be up to the free choice of the individual.

One becomes a Muslim by professing belief (Shahada) and leaves Islam by professing non-belief. The degree of observance of Sharia does not make or unmake a Muslim. There are Muslims calling for reforms in the interpretation/implementation of Sharia to bring it in line with modern needs/times in areas like marriage, inheritance, custody etc. In some societies and in some Islamic circles this is already taking place.

There are many pro-female hadiths in the Koran that are not being widely publicized. Moderates who speak out against a strict Sharia code or intolerant attitudes are labeled as being heretical and against Islam – which has the effect of silencing dissent. According to Islam there is no compulsion in religious observance (including Sharia). Criminal Sharia law (huddud) - practiced in a few countries - actually predates the Koran. Israel has optional civil Sharia courts that Muslims can use – a good model. Sharia law (actually fiqh) can evolve and be modified to fit with the need of the times. U.S. and EU law evolved from biblical law, but it evolved over time. A major demarcation between moderates and non-moderates is state-enforced Sharia.

### *Islamic Reform*

(Muslim American Professor) sees the need for reform within Islam. He was brought up in a pluralistic and tolerant Islamic society outside of the Middle East – one where indigenous practices freely mixed with Islamic religion. He sees one solution as the segmenting of Islam into different factions that each accept the existence of the other (like Protestant and Catholic Christians – or Orthodox, Conservative and Reform Jews, who in America at least are tolerant of each other's existence). Even with the acceptance of Sharia law, it is possible to interpret laws in modern ways: He gives as examples the use of prenuptial agreements that protect women from dowry extortion during divorce as well as the disallowance of polygamy – both accepted in some Islamic societies, such as Morocco. Unlike (Egyptian American writer), (Muslim American Professor) sees reform as more likely taking place in the West rather than the Middle East, because of the repressive nature of Middle Eastern governments.

(American researcher) points out that there are a lot of pro-female Hadiths – including many that originated with the Prophet’s daughter Aisha. Spreading these Hadiths would be a very positive step in countering anti-female interpretations that currently are widespread.

(Egyptian researcher) says that Salafiya has many faces. There was a reformist Salafi movement that lasted from 1900 until about 1950. He refers to it as Nationalist or Reformist Salafiya. The reformist or nationalist Salafiya supported a renewal of the Islamic discourse, giving the rational mind more space in Islamic thought. They wanted to ‘re-inspire’ Islam and bring it into the modern world. This type of Salafiya is associated with Rashid Riddah and ibn Badiz in Algeria. Other types of Salafists arose during this time – especially in Saudi Arabia. They were more closely associated with Wahabiya. The Wahabist branch of Salafiya did not spread throughout the Arab world until the oil revolution of the 70s and 80s. They differed a lot from their predecessors, the reformists. After the Wahbist branch of Salafiya there was the Jihadi Salafiya, which is related to al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. This arose during the later 80’s and 90’s till the present. Everyone focuses on the radicals, the terrorists – but noone focuses on the moderate reformers.

(Egyptian researcher) thinks there is arising a new understanding of the Islamic state, human rights, freedoms, women’s rights, etc – even the right of someone to convert away from Islam. There is a desire for a ‘democratic state with religious texts’ – or an Islamic inspired democracy. Another way of saying this is a secularism that does not oppose religion. They even use the American conservative model – where those who oppose certain practices on religious grounds are able to incorporate these beliefs into the

national dialogue without subverting the democratic process. This is in line with Islamic history, where the clerics advised the leaders without taking power themselves.

Nonetheless, reformists at this time are not popular – people are very caught up in the political situations of the time. Religious, cultural and social issues do not take up their attention. People tend to listen to the loudest voices – against their own non-democratic governments, against the West, against the USA. for political reform, etc. The loudest voices tend to belong to the MB and the Jihadists.

(Egyptian politician and peace advocate) says that Islam is a very good religion and it should not be stuck in a mode from 1000 years ago. Some Arab countries have problems with old ideas about Islam and its relationship with other religions. There are habits and traditions that are not accepted – are problematic – especially in the eyes of the West. He wants to change these ideas. For example he wants to change old habits and traditions regarding clothing rules in Islam - for both men and women. Women should be able to dress in a modern manner. Women should be able to live in a free society with free ideas and be able to choose how they dress – covering their heads only if they choose. They need freedom of choice in their religious observance.

(Egyptian distinguished thinker and writer) says that he does not want religion to impinge on public life. For example, when religious leaders tell doctors when death occurs – this is a matter that should be left to doctors, not imams.

(Muslim American researcher and author) says that Islam does not need a reformation, they need a restoration of pluralism. (Protestant reform was violent and Luther was anti-Semitic.

### *Islamic Reform – Summary of Major Points*

There was a rationalist/reformist movement in Islam that predated the rise of Wahabism/Salafism, but it was drowned out by the fundamentalist voices – there are those that are trying to bring back the ideas of that movement. There is a desire among some reformers for a secular democratic state that does not oppose religion and is inspired by it (but does not impose it) – modeled after the U.S.A. The loudest voices still belong to the fundamentalists and the jihadists. Some say that Islam does not need a reform, but rather a return to tolerance/pluralism. There are those who insist that ‘true Islam’ is a moderate religion that respects all.

### *Radical Indoctrination*

(American researcher based in London) says that in 1948, an Israeli soldier had an encounter with a member of the Muslim Brotherhood on the Lebanese border. This person told him that the Israelis should hope that they never have to fight with the Muslim Brotherhood, because they are true believers and don’t give up. He thinks that the key to ideologically based groups is the motivation of the follower, and the key to the motivation of the follower is having a leader that can impart a serious message. These people are led by teachers (he calls them ‘preceptors’) and says that you get people to follow you not by paying them or ordering them but by convincing them that your cause is right – it is not the command system or payment system of a Stalinist or even capitalist leader.

The ‘preceptoralist’ system is an alternative to the command or payment system. He says that when someone truly believes in what they are fighting for, this is a different sort of battle. The key in this system is the link between the fighters and the leader. He

therefore supports targeted assassinations – so that the leader can be taken out. For example, the Nazi movement could not have survived if Hitler had been killed. Now, however he is acknowledging that it is not just a one-way relationship. There is two-way preceptorialism – through the media, the Internet. There are people who seek out information (self-indoctrination). He also says that He says that the term ‘violent extremism’ is more useful than ‘radical Islam’ because the term offends people.

(Director of Jordanian NGO for empowerment of women) says that true Islam is a moderate religion- based on forgiveness, moderation, based on human rights. Terrorists are distorting true Islam – Extremists have nothing to do with Islam. Extremists are well known – but Islam has nothing to do with them. They are exceptions and not true Muslims. Every country and religion has its extremists. There are those who use the Koran and Sharia as guides for their lives, and there are those who interpret (distort) the Koran and Sharia to meet their selfish needs. They say that those who kill enemies will go to heaven and they use these distortions to brainwash others.

Young people who do not have a strong set of beliefs are vulnerable to this practice. In Palestine – she knew people in her family who used to be moderate, but with the pressures of outer circumstance and inner stresses caused them to be able to be influenced by extremists and many wound up losing their lives. It’s not just a tragedy for the family, but for the whole society and Islamic world.

She says that Recruiters know that these boys are living in very different financial conditions and living conditions – win them over by offering money to them for their families – they target those whose families are needy or who have psychological pressures. You don’t see them target wealthy or even comfortable families. Especially in

Palestine because there are no jobs and the people can't travel. They take advantage of the boys needs "you will go to heaven, and we will stay here and take care of whatever your family needs.

Usually the ones who are targeted are unmarried teen boys because they don't have kids, wives, or responsibilities and are easier to influence. Sexual frustration comes into it – but it is not primary because they are young teens, they can't see beyond what they are promised to the truth of the situation. Economics comes first as a factor – poverty has a profound effect on people – their souls and minds. The second motivation would be the religious aspect – dying, going to heaven, being with God (and beautiful women, etc.)

What is it that makes some boys not vulnerable to radicalization? These boys are more aware than other boys their age – perhaps living in a stricter family – one where they feel a stronger sense of belonging to a family and there is more supervision. Families that are more religiously conservative tend to be more careful with how they raise their kids and look after them more strongly. Those that are religious in the right way and are taught the moderate ways of Islam – the true teachings of Islam (undistorted by extremism). Those that use the Koran (in the right way) as their guide for life and rules to live by are not easy to be manipulated. Specifically teaching of equality inside the family between males and females teaches respect for others. Generally teaching the kids from a very young in the ways of Islam such as honesty and equality based on the true religion is a preventive to radicalism and manipulation. When boys and girls grow up together with the same status and both are equal and both play equally and both have expectations and duties from the parents and observe the 5 pillars, this is a set of ethical

beliefs that will not be easy to change. They learn to live Islam the way they are supposed to live it. A family that gives the child an ethical foundation will be hard to effect.

(Israeli retired military officer and terrorism researcher) says that the biggest concern is not the carrying out of specific attacks, but rather the Dawa infrastructure (religious and social service outreach that often also functions as a way to spread extremism) – he considers this the factory for creating new terrorists.

(Saudi American researcher) says that contrary to what is often stated, the 9/11 hijackers were not secular and westernized. They were a product of the Saudi Arabian educational system, as well as the indoctrination (of hatred and intolerance) that they received from their family, mosque, teachers, and society. When it comes to radicalization, what looks like overnight change is actually a product of seeds of hatred and intolerance planted much earlier. These seeds provide an opening for later indoctrination. If they had been taught otherwise (against hatred and intolerance) the later indoctrination would not have been possible. The people are completely formed by their educational systems.

(American intelligence analyst and researcher) says that the role of grievances is interesting. While some issues would be great if solved – the Arab/Israeli conflict, for example – would this stop violent jihadis from blowing up cars in downtown Baghdad? Probably not. Local grievances (such as the Arab/Israeli issue), if not taken care of and addressed, can become co-opted by the bigger, broader, ambition-driven, caliphate-wanting International Jihad movement. This is what is happening in places like Palestine or Somalia. Somalia, for example is a place with local issues, such as warlords that are fighting over areas of control and power in the country. Because this situation was left



untended and unresolved for so many years, creating in effect a lawless and stateless nation without a functioning government; al-Qaeda is now moving in and sensing the opportunity within the chaos to bring Somalia within the International Jihad movement. This is the situation that is created by failed states and unresolved grievances. These grievances deserve to be resolved for the sake of the local populations – left unresolved, they form an attraction and an opportunity for co-opting by the International Jihad movement. The interaction between the local population with its grievances and the larger groups with their ambitions becomes a ‘push me, pull you’ situation. While there may be local grievances in a place like Western Europe, for example, where first, second and third generation young people feel unassimilated – both by their own choice as well as by the fault of the societies in which they live – and find themselves socio-economically underprivileged, unemployed and generally alienated from society and its opportunities. However, these very same grievances exist in Latin America, Africa (where the poverty is unimaginably more acute), and other locations. In these other locations, however, the opportunity has not been presented to draw these populations into the International Jihad.

The International Jihad groups such as al-Qaeda, Muslim Brotherhood, Hizb al-Tahrir, have very highly sophisticated and developed recruitment mechanisms that are used by their organizations. They go where the young people are; utilizing the internet, other technologies, music, videos, local-life issues to attract recruits. When these grievances (that exist in other places as well) meet up with a highly sophisticated campaign to recruit people, using the large-scale organization’s grievances and agenda, then the organization gains its foot-soldiers and recruits. One can almost divide

grievances into two separate categories; the local issues that are held by local populations and represent sincere problems that need to be addressed, and the large-scale generalized ‘grievances’ that are actually radicalization and recruitment tools used consciously as a tactical and deliberate campaign by international groups to gain soldiers, sympathy and support. These meet and reinforce one another.

(British American terror researcher and author) says that a factor fueling the rise of violent ideologies amongst Muslims are the U.S. policies in the Middle East. The planner of the first World Trade Center bombing, Ramzi Yousef, stated that he acted because of U.S. support for Israel. Bin-Laden has made statements that were similar. However, U.S. policy in the Middle East is something that is unlikely to change to any great degree. Both U.S. political parties have a pretty consistent view of what our foreign policy in the Middle East should be (particularly as regards Israel and the Palestinians). Since the U.S. is not going to pull back their support for the state of Israel any time soon, this is likely to be an ongoing issue. Likewise (other than the withdrawal of U.S. military from Saudi Arabia) the U.S. is unlikely to reduce its presence in the Middle East – again an underlying irritant. One can see that Bin-Laden’s list from his 1998 fatwah does not speak about Madonna, or Hollywood, or feminism or homosexuality or alcohol – his list of grievances (which although it has changed over time) is essentially a critique of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. However, just because the policies of the U.S. are a source of grievance within the Muslim world, this does not mean that from the point of view of al-Qaeda and bin-Laden that this is a situation that can be fixed.

While one major item on his list – U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia – no longer exists as a grievance, this does not for him constitute a full resolution. A complete

victory for bin-Laden would consist of the end of the existence of the state of Israel. It would mean an end of any American presence in the Middle East – which is where we are getting all of our oil. It would mean Taliban-style theocracies from Indonesia to Morocco. It would mean the Russians out of Chechnya, the Indians out of Kashmir, perhaps Southern Spain reverting back to Islam. This is not a ‘do-able’ list. These are not like the more limited and rational demands of a group such as the IRA – whose main goal was to get the British out of Northern Ireland. Bin-Laden’s list would involve a fundamental redrawing of the map of a good chunk of the world – which is not going to happen. The addressing of any particular grievance of bin-Laden is unlikely to make a difference, because he has quite a lengthy laundry list. While most Muslims are satisfied with the fact that the U.S. no longer has a presence in Saudi Arabia, bin-Laden is not really looking at the affairs of specific nation-states (he never even acknowledged the U.S. withdrawal). Bin-Laden sees issues as being within the Arabian Peninsula – or even the Muslim world as a whole. In this sense, his grievances are not really a reasonable or rational set of (even possibly do-able) ideas. From one perspective, however, this is understandable – because instead of 20,000 troops stationed in Saudi Arabia, we now have 100,000 troops in Iraq – considered a central location in the history of the Islamic empire. Our presence in Iraq only seems to confirm bin-Laden’s narrative that the U.S. is only interested in Middle Eastern oil and the conquest of Muslim lands. Nonetheless, it is true that bin-Laden’s principal single complaint (U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia) has been addressed and it did not seem to make a difference – or even merit a mention by bin-Laden.

Another way of looking at this (leaving aside the issue of the lengthy list of demands – as well as the strongly held religious views) is that bin-Laden and his followers have locked themselves in to this rather nihilistic position with nowhere else to go – other than just continuing their campaign. One person whom Bergen interviewed stated that ‘the tactics took over the strategy’. So again, bin-Laden’s list is unlikely to be a real source of political solutions for the West to follow.

Another factor influencing al-Qaeda after 9/11 is the Iraq invasion. Strategically, after 9/11, al-Qaeda suffered huge reverses, the Taliban were largely defeated, most of the organization was decimated. There was even a lot of internal criticism of bin-Laden and of the 9/11 attacks because of the subsequent negative results. Unfortunately, however, while this might have been the case shortly after 9/11, subsequent actions in Iraq have provided a fresh ‘proximate cause’ for al-Qaeda – and dampened the internal criticism. Currently, U.S. and coalition presence in Iraq is definitely an irritant to Muslims, both radical and non-radical. For example, Mohammed Siddiq Khan – the London attacker – said in his suicide tape that it was about Iraq. In Iraq and Afghanistan there have been large increases of both terror attacks and radicalization. So (largely due to the actions in Iraq) the post-9/11 situation has gotten somewhat worse, where one might have expected it to get slightly better. In Jakarta and Karachi the pro bin-Laden demonstrations after 9/11 would draw 20,000 people – but anti-Iraq demonstrations have drawn hundreds of thousands of people.

From the perspective of Islamic jurisprudence, some of the people who condemned 9/11 (including prominent clerics at centers of Islamic study such as al-Azhar University) have stated that fighting against coalition forces in Iraq is legitimate

defensive jihad. It seems clear enough that when you have a group of non-Muslims attacking Muslim lands under somewhat uncertain international legal norms, this would qualify as a situation requiring (and legitimizing) defensive response. No-one declared the war against the United States in Afghanistan a defensive jihad. As a matter of fact, it was the first time in history that article 5 (the collective right of a nation to self-defense) was invoked. Unlike Iraq, this did not generate a huge amount of opposition (criticism not only in the Middle East, but within the West, and even the U.S. as well). The war in Afghanistan was generally regarded as a legitimate war of self-defense. Terrorist groups (including al-Qaeda) tend to draw strength from insurgencies – and the local resistance in Iraq provides much of this to draw upon. In this sense, the conflict in Iraq has been very useful for al-Qaeda.

When looking at all of the factors that predispose to terrorism arranged hierarchically in an order of priority: At the top would be religious ideology, the charismatic leaders (who he feels are more motivated by religion than power – with a possible exception being Zarqawi who seemed to simply revel in violence), and safe-haven/territory/infrastructure for training and organization. Grievances (against both the West as well as the East – remembering that one of bin-Laden's initial goals was the overthrow of the Saudi government, and Zawahiri's initial goal was the overthrow of the Egyptian government) might also belong in the top level. On a lower level of significance would be the presence of disaffected, alienated lower-middle and middle-class youth, some level of passive state sponsorship, communications networks, and money.

### *Radical Indoctrination– Summary of Major Points*

Radicals do not get people to follow them by command, or by reward, but rather by teaching and inspiring them – what has been called a ‘preceptor’ system. There is also the ‘self-indoctrination’ system that increasingly uses various media. ‘Violent extremism’ may be a better term than ‘radical Islam’ which may be offensive. Those who use Islam to justify violence are twisting it for their selfish needs. Outer circumstances, inner stress and a lack of a strong moral compass make youth vulnerable to recruitment by radicals. Children brought up by involved and guiding/supervising parents are less vulnerable. Youth who are given a firm parental education in the ethical aspects of Islam (honesty, equality, respect, tolerance, kindness) are less vulnerable to a twisted version of Islam. Especially a problem with busy/absent parents and poor economic circumstances – more true in Palestine where economics is a big issue. Religion comes second to this. Unmarried boys/young men without wives, children or responsibilities are easier to influence.

Spreading of Dawa (fundamentalist outreach) is as big a concern as outright radicalism. 9/11 hijackers were not secular and westernized – they were a product of the Saudi educational system (that teaches intolerance and hatred of the West and other religions.) It is not religious control of the educational system that is a problem, it is state control.

Sophisticated recruiters use grievances (legitimate and not legitimate) as manipulative tools to radicalize people. The issues are secondary to the recruitment. Other societies that have grievances but not extremist recruiters don’t turn to radicalism.

Specifically, the issues stated by bin-Laden grow and change – cannot be satisfied. While addressing issues may make recruitment harder, it will not deter the recruiters. First, U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia was the biggie, then when that was removed, Iraq became the big issue. If Iraq ends, something else will be focused on as the major issue. Having said that, U.S. policies in the Muslim world make recruitment a lot easier. The top things that predispose to radicalism in ranked order: ideology; rallying leaders, resources/bases; grievances. Lower down are alienated youth, state help (including passive), communications networks, money.

#### *Wahabism/Salafism/Jihadism*

Regarding the prominence of Wahabism in the Middle East – (American researcher) points out that traditionally Wahabism was denounced as a heretical movement amongst religious Muslims. If it were not for the support of Saudi oil money, Wahabism would not have spread or been accepted in the way it is at present. He says that the distinction between Salafi and Salafi Jihadi is an artificial one. Furthermore, he says that Wahabi/Salafi/Deobandi ideology is the foundation of modern Islamist terrorism. He also states that widespread ignorance of Islam allows Wahabism to thrive.

(Lebanese director of international research organization) says that when you look at something like terrorism – this is an expression of an extreme form of frustration, aggression and powerlessness. You resort to terrorism when can't do it any other way, or when you are so angry, so frustrated – and you don't have the tools. Terrorism is a form of tactical warfare. When America is frustrated, it has an air force, it has an army – it doesn't have to use terrorism. When Israel is frustrated it has things it can do – it doesn't have to use terrorism. One must understand the context that gives rise to this kind of

frustration and aggressivity – as well as some of the ideological categories that try to justify and make use of these types of actions. To understand this you really need to look at the larger story – historically and regionally.

(British media owner and community activist) says that Wahabism arose when a tribal leader named Ibn abd el-Wahab wanted to fight the Ottoman Empire to gain power. But according to Islam one couldn't fight another Muslim, or even one of the other 'peoples of the book'. So to circumvent this, Wahab came up with a new concept – the idea of 'takfir'. Christians and Jews were also declared 'kafir' - which as people of the book they were not supposed to be. Up until then, (according to traditional mainstream Islam) no human being could declare another person 'Kafir' (even a pagan). Humans were divided into two realms – those who had accepted the message and those who did not yet accept the message. Muslims believe that anyone at any time can become a believer – so one cannot give someone the status of 'kafir' – heretic. If my neighbor doesn't pray 5 times a day, I can't call him takfir – i.e., not a Muslim. Even someone who breaks the law and is a homosexual – one cannot declare him a takfir. You become a Muslim by accepting the Shahada (declaration of belief in the Prophet and the Koran); and you become a non-Muslim by explicitly disavowing the Shahada. One who has not disavowed the Shahada is simply a Muslim who is breaking a law. One cannot declare this person a takfir.

Another sign of the difference between Wahabism and mainstream Islam was them putting a finite limit on God – by saying that he sits on a throne. The majority of Muslims say that there is no way that they can put a finite limit on God – like saying that He sits on a throne. Another issue is that there is a Hadith calling the Prophet light –



another says that the spirit of the Prophet was created when Adam was just between water and clay. Both of these Hadiths stress the saintly and godly nature of the Prophet. In contrast, the Wahabis say that he was just a man – even just a ‘postman’ – a messenger. The Wahabis also don’t believe in the existence of saints – holy men. These are some of the main differences between Wahabism and mainstream Islam.

Because of his (unacceptable) ideas, Wahab was kicked out of his village and went to Najd – modern day Riyadh. Mecca and Medina were called Hijaz (which some still call it today – as a way refuse to identify with the Wahabis and Saudi Arabia). Ibn abd el-Wahab then struck a deal with the House of Saud in Najd. He married a daughter of the Saud tribal leader and they joined together to rise up against the Ottomans. They agreed that if they won, Wahab would get Hijaz. He wanted this to be able to spread his version of Islam.

When the Saudis rose up against the Ottomans they were crushed. Then WWI started – at this time there was still the Ottoman Caliphate. The Ottomans decided to back the Germans in WWI. The Europeans and the British were allies and they struck a deal with the House of Saud (along with some Palestinian and other tribal groups that wanted independence from the Ottomans). The deal was that the Saudis would ally with the British and fight the Ottomans in the Middle East. This would then prevent the Ottomans from being able to send their entire army to fight in Europe against the Brits and their European allies. This alliance with the West (against fellow Muslims) was able to be justified religiously by the House of Saud using the Wahabi concept of takfir to do so.

One can understand what a great departure this (fighting against the Ottomans by the Saudis) is from mainstream Islamic belief if one considers that if one is an Muslim

one believes that God is the ultimate creator. If one is a Muslim one believes that the ultimate representative of God is the Prophet Mohammed. The representative of the Prophet is the Caliph. The Caliph is the ruler - whether he is good or bad is a different matter. According to traditional Islam one is only able to fight the Caliph (or even any non Muslim ruler) if he prevents you from practicing your faith. To say that one can fight the Caliph – in this case the Ottoman ruler - (who Islam considers to be the Prophet's and God's representative) is a huge theological departure from traditional Islam. It is interesting to note that Ibn el-Wahab was denounced during his lifetime by his father, his brother and his teacher.

For this reason it is a mistake when commentators say that the Wahabis are a part of the Sunna school of Islam. As a matter of fact, the Wahabis consider many traditional Sunni (especially those that practice Sufism) to not be Muslims. To take all sorts of groups (Traditional Sunnis, Salafis, Wahabis, MB, Jamaa al-Islamiya, etc, - many of whom are fighting each other and telling each other that they are 'not a real Muslim') and put them all into the same box, seal it up and call it 'Sunni' is a big mistake. Crucial distinctions are not being made. Not making these distinctions has prevented many commentators (especially non-Muslims) from getting to the root causes of problems within Islam.

After the British won against the Ottomans, the question arose as to who would get Hijaz? There were several groups and tribes allied with the British. The Brits said 'we can't really decide, so you guys have a fight and sort it out amongst yourself'. The house of Saud won – they were able to defeat the Hijazis (and ostensibly the other claimants as well), and in 1933 Saudi Arabia was created. In 1934, oil was discovered in the region. If

Britain had held onto the region for another year, they would have held the oil – a huge loss, in retrospect.

Once the Saudis (along with their Wahabi partners) gained control of Hijaz they gained a reputation for being quite merciless in the region. Harras has friends that are Sufi and high up in the Muslim hierarchy who tell of how when the Wahabis used to come to Mecca and Medina they were quite brutal to the other occupants – who did not follow their brand of Islam. They were also known for attacking and looting caravans of pilgrims on their way to Hijaz (Mecca). Because of this treatment (as mentioned above), some residents of Hijaz refuse even today to identify themselves as living in Saudi Arabia.

This ideology (Wahabism) that became the backbone of all modern-day extremist movements is not able to exist without having an enemy to fight. This is a key thing to note – because Wahabism was created to fight an enemy. All of the derivatives of Wahabism – be they Muslim Brotherhood, Jemaa al-Islamiya, Salafism, etc – all have this belief in an enemy to fight inside the very heart and essence of their belief. For example, how did they justify the looting, the killing, the fighting against the Caliph? They had to do this from a religious, theological and ideological perspective. It was a lust for (wealth and) power that created this ideology originally, but now that this ideology has been formed it has become much bigger than the (original) sect itself.

Eventually the Wahabi ideology migrated from Saudi Arabia to Egypt looking for political/religious allies and political justifications. Politics played a big part in the growth of the ideology – because it was founded around the belief in resistance to an enemy ‘other’. In Egypt the Wahabis connected with Sayyid Qutb – who was then the

leading thinker in the Muslim Brotherhood. They found in Qutb someone who was very receptive to their theology/ideology – and able to rally support for it. Britain was again involved – they (along with the Saudis who were their allies) supported the Muslim Brotherhood and Qutb because of their dislike for Nasser. So Qutb and the early growth of the Muslim Brotherhood was to some degree a monster of Western creation. (Harras says that this is just another case of the British, the British Foreign Office and Chatham House and the like appeasing Islamic fundamentalists – similar to criticism leveled at the State Department in the U.S.). The outcome was that in Egypt the Muslim Brotherhood became politically and ideologically fueled by the Wahabi ideology.

While some call for a ‘modern Islam’, his call (along with his fellow Sufis) is to go back to traditional classical Islam, which is at ease with everyone. No new processes or interpretations have to be created. New interpretations are needed if some new invention comes along – obviously we don’t ride around on camels anymore. But no changes are needed in the spirit, the belief, the theological, the ideological. It was an attempt to ‘reform’ Islam (the Wahabi/Salafi movement) that got us into this mess 200 years ago. It was by Wahab calling himself a ‘reformer’ (along with the alliance between him, the house of Saud and the British Empire against the Ottomans) that he got validation that he may otherwise never have had. It is interesting to note that Ibn el-Wahab was denounced during his lifetime by his father, his brother and his teacher.

(American intelligence analyst and researcher) says that The link between Saudi Arabia and Wahabism goes back to the 18th century when the Saudis formed a historical pact with Ibn Wahab – the founder of Wahabism. That alliance gave the powerful Saud family the religious backing of Ibn Wahab and the Wahabi clergy in their desire to unite

all of the tribes under Saud rule. When the Wahabis became a threat to the Saudi regime (criticizing the rulers for corruption and lack of Islamic observance), the Saudi's attempted to export the Wahabis abroad for whatever reason they could – to focus on foreign adversaries such as the Serbs in Yugoslavia, the Russians in Chechnya and in Afghanistan. This export involved a bit of “cognitive dissonance” on the part of the Saudis, as Wahabism was still the official religion of Saudi Arabia. Nonetheless, the sending abroad of Wahabis for both religious and military reasons did provide a bulwark against Shi'a expansion in the greater Arab world, especially after the Iranian Revolution. Up to and including the present day, Saudi Arabia funds many Wahabi clerics and preachers throughout Europe and the U.S. – fore example, many of the Islamic clerics that operate within the American prison system are Wahabis funded by Saudi Arabia.

(American Muslim researcher) says that the Saudi ties to Wahabism are weakening because Saudi Arabia has the largest middle class of the entire Arab world, and the increasingly sophisticated and independent Saudi population is becoming sick of Wahabi controls. He feels that with enough pressure (internal and external) the Saudi regime would break ties with the Wahabis – like Spain did with Franco or the Soviet Union did with Communism. He notes that the ultimate goal of the Wahabis is to control all Sunni Muslims worldwide. He notes in connection with this that Sunnis tend to be conformist, while Shiites tend to be more revolutionary.

He also notes that it is a misnomer to call Wahabis ‘Salafis’. There is no real ‘Salafism’ today - only Wahabis calling themselves ‘Salafis’. The original goal of Salafism (this point is echoed in a bit more detail by (Egyptian researcher)) was to emulate the moral example of the early companions of the prophet. They also wanted to

revive religion and bring into 19th century reality in way that would be compatible with modernity. He says that in his estimation, Wahabism and the philosophy of Ibn-Taymiya upon which it was based, was more ideologically important than the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood. He says that the Muslim Brotherhood plus the writings of Sayid Qutb just added the idea of revolution. He says that totalitarianism began in the 1700s with Wahabism, not with fascism or communism.

(British American terrorism researcher and author) says regarding the general link between Islamic fundamentalism and Islamist terrorism, although all Islamist terrorists might be fundamentalists, that does not make all Islamic fundamentalists terrorists. This would be similar to saying that all Christian fundamentalists are extremists who bomb abortion clinics – which is clearly not the case. In fact, about 20% of Americans identify themselves as ‘fundamentalist’, but very few of them turn to violence in the name of God. While the numbers of those in Islam who are turning to violence in the name of God is obviously higher (than is the case with Christian fundamentalists), nonetheless it is still a very minute percentage of even fundamentalist Muslims. If everyone with Wahabist or Salafist ideas – or anyone who has been a part of the Muslim Brotherhood was a potential terrorist, we would be looking at millions of people – which does not make any sense. Being a Wahabi means that one probably thinks that Shi’as are heretics, one wouldn’t celebrate the prophet Mohammed’s birthday, one might not listen to music and one might not have paintings in one’s house – and one’s children will not be named ‘Ali’ (a typical Shi’a name). It does not follow, however, that these beliefs will create a terrorist. An obvious example of this is that bin-Laden is one of 54 siblings. Only one of these siblings (Osama) went down the terrorist path. On the contrary, most of the people who grew up

in the bin-Laden family became rabid capitalists who are very pro-American. So equating a fundamentalist upbringing with terrorism is a large oversimplification.

*Wahabism/Salafism– Summary of Major Points*

Wahabism was denounced as heretical for many years by mainstream Islam. It was only with the founding of Saudi Arabia and the discovery of oil, that Wahabism was spread and accepted within Islam (helped by Saudi oil money and support). British alliance with the tribe of Saud (during WWI) also was a key factor in both the founding of Saudi Arabia as well as the spreading of Wahabism.

The distinction between Salafism and Salafi-Jihadism is an artificial one. Wahabi/Salafi/Deobandi ideology is the foundation of modern terrorism. Widespread ignorance of the tenets of traditional Islam allows Wahabism to thrive. The Wahabi practice of labeling other Muslims as ‘heretical’ (kafir) is against the tenets of traditional Islam – this is true in regards to labeling any monotheistic believers. By declaring someone as heretical, the Wahabis then justify any action against them. Wahabis consider even traditional Sunnis to be heretical, as well as Shiites and Sufis. The Wahabis and Saudis have a history of brutality towards their fellow Muslims. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt became fueled by Wahabi ideology (with the assistance of the British who wanted to use the Muslim Brotherhood against Nasser). From this perspective, all of modern day terrorist ideologies are an outgrowth of Wahabism (though the groups themselves stem from the Muslim Brotherhood). Wahabism as an ideology depends on the existence of an enemy ‘other’.

Sending Wahabism abroad by the Saudis kept attention/criticism away from the regime, and was a bulwark against Iranian/Shiite expansionism. Ultimate Wahabi goal is

the control of Sunnis worldwide. Calling Wahabis ‘salafis’ is a misnomer, because Salafism was a movement for ethical reform. Others say that extremists are not ‘Wahabis’, they are ‘Qutbists’ (followers of Qutb – who based his ideology on ibn-Taymiya and the Khawarijis – early extremists). Some say that the ideology of ibn-Taymiya and Wahabism was more important than Qutb and the Muslim Brotherhood – who just added the revolutionary element. Totalitarianism may have begun with Wahabism (in the 1700s) rather than Wahabism being influenced by totalitarianism. Not every Islamic fundamentalist is a terrorist or is violent.

#### *Regional Shi’a/Sunni Tension and Competition*

(American intelligence analyst and researcher) says that prior to the Iranian revolution in 1979, the Sunni’s had dominated the Islamic revival throughout the Middle East. This had begun with the founding of the Egyptian Brotherhood Islamist group in Egypt in the 1920s and had continued throughout the twentieth century. This was manifested in the formation of many Sunni fundamentalist and revivalist groups that were offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood such as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas and others, down to the present day with al-Qaeda. After the Iranian Revolution, the Shi’as wanted to gain leadership of the Islamic revival, and the revival became an arena of competition in the age-old rivalry between the Sunni and Shi’a strands of Islam. This desire continues with the current regime in Iran under the religious leadership of Khomeini – who is intent on gaining dominance within the Islamic world.

The desire of the Shi’a to lead the Islamic revival was, however stymied in large part by the efforts of the Saudi monarchy that actively sponsored and funded the export of the Wahabi ideology. This was both to get the extremists “out of their backyard” as



well as to provide a front against Shi'a religious expansion. The Saudis sent and sponsored Wahabi preachers and clerics worldwide, funded missionaries and madrassah schools throughout the Middle East and greater Muslim world, built Wahabi mosques, and dispatched Wahabi/Mujahedeen fighters to staff Muslim battlegrounds throughout the world – for example in Afghanistan.

All of these efforts tend to fuel the Iranian Shi'a perception that the Sunnis are ahead of them in the battle for leadership within the Islamic world. This perception may have been an original motivating factor in the Iranian Revolution – which was fueled not only by the modernity and repression of the Shah, but also by the rise of Sunni fundamentalist Islam in the Middle East as a whole. The revolution (which was inspired in part by the rise of Sunni fundamentalism) in turn gave rise to a “push back” by those Sunnis, such as Saudi Arabia, that wanted to stop the rise of Shi'a power that had begun with the revolution. So the rise of fundamentalist Islam in the Middle East was both a parallel movement of two independent strands of Islam (Sunni and Shi'a), as well as a competition between them for predominance.

Each strand has its own thinkers: On the Sunni side, the revivalist/fundamentalist thinkers included people such as Ibn Tamiyya, Ibn Wahab, Hassan al-Bana, Maudouti and Qutb (who was famous for taking the Sunni-Islamic struggle from the ‘near enemy’, i.e., the secular dictators of Muslim lands such as the rulers of Egypt and Saudi Arabia; to the ‘far enemy’ – all non-Muslim rulers everywhere) – and later Abdul-Azzam (mentor of Osama bin-Laden) and Ayman al-Zawahiri (who followed in the steps of Qutb). On the Shi'a side were a totally different set of thinkers, prominently the twelve Imams

referred to previously – the twelfth being the ‘Mahdi’ – whose return is expected to usher in a golden era in Islam.

She says that there is a division among current theorists as to the relative threat-level of Sunni-based terrorism versus Shi’a-based terrorism. This may be due in part simply to what a particular theorist studies or teaches. Overall, however, what we should be focusing on is neither Sunni nor Shia, but rather a radicalized, politicized Islam. The real threat comes from the two movements working together. As we see today, Iran, which is Shia, has formed an alliance with al-Qaeda, which is Sunni. When it comes down to it, the divisions can disappear – subsumed under the purpose of working together (perhaps driven by a specific circumstance) against a common enemy such as the U.S., Europe, etc. – and leaving the sectarian differences for later.

For the purposes of comparison: In Iran today, there is a serious Shi’a threat. Al-Qaeda led Sunni extremism elsewhere in the Arab world and beyond is also quite threatening. When comparing the two, one must take into account that the al-Qaeda/Sunni threat is currently bigger and more geographically widespread. For this reason the al-Qaeda/Sunni threat may currently be the greater immediate danger of the two. However, over the next several months to several years, the Shi’a regime and movement in Iran (led not so much by Ahmedinejad but by the Supreme Leader Khamenei) which is both geo-strategically expansionist and determined to spread its ideology – represents an acute and critical threat in the immediate neighborhood of the Persian Gulf as well as the broader Middle East.

(British American terror researcher and author) says that looking at the larger regional and international system and its influences - the rise of these individuals

(especially the large-scale leaders) coincided with the general widespread Islamic religious awakening that was sweeping over the Middle East in the 1970s and 1980s. Going even further back, the Islamic awakening was sparked in part by the defeat of the Arab armies in the 1967 war with Israel (where one country defeated several Arab countries simultaneously in a matter of a few days) – which was seen as a blow not only to the Arab world, but the death knell to Arab nationalism and Arab socialism as viable ideologies. Not only were these states failing to live up to their nationalist and socialist promises – they were being defeated by the Jews. So if nationalism and socialism were not the answer, perhaps Islam was going to be. Then in 1979, Khomeini and his followers ousted the Shah and proved that you could have violent Islamist overthrows of powerful Western-style dictatorships. Even though the Islamist revolution in Iran was Shia, nonetheless, it provided a pretty powerful model for people like Zawahiri and bin-Laden. Suddenly, Islamist revolutions seemed to not be a ‘pie in the sky’ type fantasy, but actually do-able. The revolution in Iran (as stated above) provided a powerful incentive and model for Shia as well as Sunni Islamists throughout the Arab and Islamic world. So while the Sunnis may see the Shia’s as heretical, they are also taking lessons from their leaders. Until recently, bin-Laden and Zawahiri kept criticism of Shias to a minimum. Iran and the Taliban almost went to war in 1998 – so there was no love lost between the Taliban and the Iranian government – particularly with one being Sunni and one being Shia.

Nonetheless, there have been contacts between al-Qaeda and various Shia groups (including a purported meeting between bin-Laden and the planner of the Marine barracks attack). So there have been both conflicts as well as various desultory contacts

between the leadership of the two groups over time. Bergen sees Shia based radicalism as largely confined to Iran – along with Iran’s support of Hamas and Hezbollah. The last significant instance of Shia-based terrorism (the bombing of the Marine barracks in 1983) was during the Reagan administration. When the U.S. pulled out of Lebanon, the attacks stopped. Attacks against the U.S. have not taken place at all. The members of Hezbollah in Lebanon are largely focused on issues having to do with Lebanon – the last thing that they would do would be to ally themselves with al-Qaeda – it would be a distraction and would not help to further their aims in Lebanon. Conflicts in Iraq are deepening, not lessening the Shia-Sunni divide. In Pakistan there is also quite a bit of Sunni versus Shia violence (mostly perpetrated by al-Qaeda related Sunni groups on Shia targets). This has been going on for years – it just has not gotten a lot of coverage. So the bulk of anti-American terrorism at present is largely a Sunni phenomenon – as well as being independent of Sunni/Shia tensions or rivalries. Instead of two factions fighting each other and each trying to ‘get ahead’, we have been attacked multiple times by different groups and branches of a Sunni radical movement. This may be because the major ideologues (ibn-Tamiyya and Qutb) were Sunni, but on a more simple level, most of the Middle Eastern regimes are Sunni. The Shia are a minority everywhere except Iran, Iraq and Bahrain. So if one desires to overthrow a (secular or corrupt) Muslim regime, it will be Sunnis trying to overthrow a Sunni regime. Just by numbers in the entire Muslim world, the Sunnis vastly outnumber the Shia. So numbers of radicals will tilt towards the Sunni based on numerical proportions alone.

### *Sunni-Shia Tension and Competition – Summary of Major Points*

Sunni Islam was dominant in the Middle East prior to the Iranian revolution. The revolution itself was partially a response to Sunni regional dominance. At the same time, the revolution inspired Sunnis as well – as the Soviet withdrawal did. The rise of both Sunni and Shiite fundamentalism was also just two separate movements. Both in general are a reflection of radical Islam, and also of the Islamic awakening (Sahwa) that occurred after the collapse of pan-Arabism/Nasserism. Shiites (in general) have tended to see themselves as the underdogs/victims. Saudi spread of Sunni Wahabism prevented more Shiite/Iranian influence. Iranian Shiite extremists see the Sunnis as having had the advantage prior to the revolution, and they need to catch up in terms of power and influence.

Each side had their ideologues, and there was also crossover – for example, Khomeini read Qutb. At times the two strands ally together for a specific purpose (like Iran funding Hamas). They both represent critical threats – both in different ways. Currently Sunni terrorism has been more of an immediate threat to the West. The major ideologues were also Sunni (Qutb, al-Banna, ibn-Taymiyah, etc.) Sunnis also outnumber Shiites (and it tends to be the Iranian Shiites that are radicalized).

### *Jihad*

(Muslim American Professor) points out that the word ‘jihad’ (even when taken in the military sense) refers to a defensive war. In order to sanction the waging of jihad there needs to be a central religious authority to declare that a defensive war is justified according to Islamic law.

### *Economic Issues*

(Egyptian American writer) points to oil wealth as a factor that props up extremism. She says that a loss of oil power will create vulnerability for extremists and the governments that both passively and actively support them.

(American researcher) supports this by saying that democracy will come if Middle East economies collapse (which would happen if oil prices fall suddenly due to a shift in demand). He says that even 10% less U.S. oil purchases would cause Middle Eastern oil prices to drop by 50%. He states that oil wealth was the factor that originally brought Wahabism to prominence through the support of the Saudi Arabian government. He says that economic forces are the most important variable in Middle Eastern politics. He says that an economic downturn in the Middle East would cause a de-funding of Al-Qaeda worldwide. He points out that Al-Qaeda is still funded with Middle Eastern money, which goes to pay for training camps in Pakistan, professional recruiters worldwide, various forms of media propaganda, actual operational costs (both administrative and attack related) etc.

Some in the U.S. policy establishment are trying to spearhead a campaign for “terror-free oil” consumption. He says that China and Russia are supplying arms to Iran in exchange for oil. Alternative sources of energy would cause China to drop Arabs too.

### *Economic Issues– Summary of Major Points*

Oil wealth props up extremism. If countries suffered a loss of economic power, they and the extremists that they support would become vulnerable. Democracy will come to the Middle East if the oil economies collapse. If the U.S. reduced oil purchases in the Middle East by 10%, oil prices would fall 50%.

Oil wealth was the factor that originally brought Wahabism to prominence through the support of the Saudi government. Increasingly, the U.S. government is aware of the need to find alternate sources of fuel. Substantial progress in fuel alternatives is probably going to become a reality soon. Economic forces are the most important variable in Middle Eastern politics. An economic downturn in the Middle East would cause a de-funding of Al-Qaeda worldwide.

Al-Qaeda is still funded with Middle Eastern money, which goes to pay for training, recruiters worldwide, media propaganda, operational costs (both administrative and attack related) etc. Some in the U.S. policy establishment are trying to spearhead a campaign for ‘terror-free oil’ consumption. China and Russia are supplying arms to Iran in exchange for oil. Alternative sources of energy would cause China to drop Arabs too.

#### *Understanding the Extremist*

According to (Egyptian American writer), an extremist is someone who wants governments to enforce criminal Sharia law (stonings, beheadings and amputations); someone who justifies the killing of civilians; and someone who blames and criticizes the U.S. for all Arab and Islamic ills.

(Egyptian distinguished thinker and writer) says that when he meets with ‘moderate Muslims’ he always wants to meet the wife because he feels that the wife is a good benchmark

(American researcher based in London) says that the term ‘violent extremism’ is more useful than ‘radical Islam’ because the term offends people. Where does extremism come from? When politics enters religion, people will read text as they wish. Text cannot be understood just with the mind (by simple reading) – language and context must

also be taken into account. Political movements used the holy texts for their own purposes. The twisting of the texts is caused by people who want power. This is exacerbated by difficulties experienced at that time from the outside. Power seekers use the context (outside issues) to seek power from others. People feeling vulnerable and afraid are capitalized on by power seekers.

Relationship between religion and politics is complex. Does not think gaps are purely religious/ideological motivated. It is an interplay between religious ideology/ politics/ and a desire for power within the person. Khawarij was a military movement, Ibr Taymija was a religious thinker with his own opinions. Said Qutb was into politics and power (within his religious ideology). Wahab did want political power... Only Ibu Taymiya was free of desire for political power (even though he disagrees with him.) Ibn Taymiya was just misguided in his religious opinions. Bin Laden and Zawahiri are both motivated by religion and power. Politics mixed with religion and a desire for power, leads to mistakes.

(Israeli counterterrorism researcher) says that the primary factor in fueling terrorism is a combination of religious/ideological/fundamentalist ideology and radical groups that function as a tool to spread the ideology. The formation of a terrorist group is a function of the ideology, not the other way around. He also notes that ideology is not static but is rather a developing process that resides in different people.

He also says that terrorism is not a war between religions, but rather a war inside a religion that then spills over into a war against other religions. He says that terrorism is a tool to win a religious war – a war fueled primarily by ideology. He does not think that it is fueled by a desire for power, because most terrorists (even higher level leaders) live



modestly. Their desire it to fulfill a divine command, to do the right thing, to serve God. Even on the level of leadership he thinks that they are sincerely motivated.

(British American terrorism researcher and author) says regarding ideology that a key part of the terror system is a set of ideas. These ideas essentially came from the writings of Sayyid Qutb (20th century intellectual head of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood – who is considered the father of modern Islamic fundamentalism), and also Ibn Tamiyya (a prominent 13th century theologian who also influenced Qutb). So to varying degrees the founding ideas of al-Qaeda have been around for a quite some time. While bin-Laden in particular is linked with the ideas of his mentor, Abdullah Azzam (a Palestinian co-founder of Hamas, as well as the MAK which later became al-Qaeda), in actuality their goals differed. While Azzam's idea was essentially to get non-Muslims out of Muslim lands, Ayman al-Zawahiri and bin-Laden wanted to advance a much more radical set of ideas (held by Zawahiri from the beginning) – which included not only getting Muslims out of Muslim lands, but also overthrowing every Muslim government (which al-Zawahiri saw as illegitimate, secularized and corrupt). So where Azzam wanted to essentially roll back what he saw as non-Muslim occupation of Muslim lands, Zawahiri and bin-Laden took his ideas a step further and said that all regimes in Muslim countries were not actually 'Islamic' and therefore should be overthrown. This idea came in part from Sayyid Qutb, though enlarged and improved upon by al-Zawahiri and then bin-Laden – to the point that these ideas are now seen as a routine part of the al-Qaeda ideology.

(British American terror researcher and author) says that in order to understand terrorism we need to try and understand terrorism on the individual level: In regards to

the relative importance of a specific individual to a terrorist movement, it is undeniably important. Without Ramzi Yousef, there would not have been the first World Trade Center attacks. Mohammed Siddiq Khan largely planned the London attacks of 2005. With any large-scale attack, there is usually a ringleader who organizes it and ‘flips the switch’. In terms of the larger movement, likewise, the role of the individual is crucially important. Al-Qaeda at the outset needed both the money as well as the organizational ability of an Osama bin-Laden. Bin-Laden also provided a compelling ‘back story’ as a Saudi prince who left his comfortable life to fight for fellow Muslims in Afghanistan. This was pretty unusual, and caused him to be lionized and made into a hero. By the time he connected with Zawahiri, he already had quite an image and reputation. Bergen points out that modern Islamist terrorism and specifically al-Qaeda cannot be explained without bin-Laden (or his deputy al-Zawahiri), because to a large degree al-Qaeda was their idea and their execution. Bin Laden, and Zawahiri changed history, and we (the West) did not know very much about them. (It is because of their centrality to al-Qaeda and terrorism that Bergen decided to write a second book about bin-Laden and by extension, Zawahiri, in 2006.)

So from one perspective, the story of terrorism and al-Qaeda is a tale of individuals and their ideology, vision and goals. It is therefore quite important to try and understand these individuals and their motivations – particularly when speaking of the large-scale leaders. One might therefore ask - to what extent is someone like bin-Laden motivated by sincere religious sentiments and to what extent is he motivated by ambition and a desire for power and status – like many charismatic but destructive leaders of the past? The implication of this question is that a person who is motivated by ambition and a

desire for (negative) power over others will likely not be satisfied by some set of specific circumstances. Bergen feels that the religious element is key to an understanding of bin-Laden. It was his religious feelings that led him to abandon the life of a Saudi aristocrat and go to fight the Soviets in primitive conditions in Afghanistan. Because of the strategic disparity between the Afghans and their allies and the Soviet army, it was unlikely that he waged this battle out of some military calculation. Rather he felt that God was telling him to do this, and if he refused, he would be punished in the afterlife. This was the explanation given by people who knew bin-Laden for years and spent a lot of time with him.

This explanation fits with the description of bin-Laden in his teenage years – a boy who was extremely pious and would pray seven times a day, fast twice a week – sort of a hyper-religious zealot. Ayman al-Zawahiri was similar – joining the Egyptian jihadists when he was fifteen. If one asked the leaders themselves, they would state unhesitatingly and unequivocally that the reason for what they do is religious obligation. Although it is true that the religious and the political are not so far apart, nonetheless, the motivation in this case seems to be largely religious. People with a psychological orientation have characterized bin-Laden as a narcissist – but Bergen sees the term as lacking in significant meaning (or presumably, explanatory power). Psychological labels may be interesting, but if one looks at bin-Laden's statements, his references are religious. While his list of grievances may sound political, the basis for the particular grievances is religious – U.S. bases in Saudi Arabia, persecution of Muslims, etc. As to whether a hunger for power can be so enmeshed with religion that the two become indistinguishable, Bergen declines to hazard a guess about something that is difficult to

see and therefore to analyze. It is more useful to go on what we do know, and what bin-Laden and Zawahiri have said in clear statements. So the best way to understand the motivation of the individual leaders of al-Qaeda is to listen carefully to what they say.

Unfortunately, as was said before, what might have started as a religious ideology and then strategy has become overwhelmed by nihilistic tactics. Strategically, the approach of al-Qaeda and its leadership does not really translate into broad-scale workability. Most Muslims do not want to live under Taliban-style living conditions and regulations. Bin-Laden and Zawahiri did not establish a social welfare structure; there will not be al-Qaeda nursery schools or universities – it is just not going to happen. So, al-Qaeda and its leaders have become boxed in by their approach and tactics – becoming ‘professional terrorists’ with little ability to turn themselves into a political movement. Even those who might want to negotiate with them at this point, cannot – because they are not like ‘typical’ terrorist groups of the past that had limited aims and wanted more people watching them than people dying...

So it's not just that their list of demands is long – it is also that one cannot really sit down and negotiate with them at all. This is a result of a few reasons including the nature of their ideology, the living conditions from which they arise and the maximalist nature of their grievances. They are also very much affected by a process of increased radicalization that is self-multiplying and reinforcing. An example of this is the 9/11 hijackers who came from Saudi Arabia with some degree of fundamentalist or radical sentiments, but who connected with teachers who radicalized them to a much greater degree – at which point they reinforced one another as well. This transformation can be seen in the statements of al-Qaeda as a whole over the years – in relation to targeting the

infidels in Muslim lands, to targeting the secularized Muslim leaders, to targeting innocent civilians – to the point that al-Qaeda has become boxed into an ideological cul-de-sac with no way out. So, what might have begun as sincere religious motivation on the part of the organization's leaders and its followers, has become a self-destructing cycle of ever-greater radicalization and nihilism.

Much of this debate is actually a civil war taking place in the Muslim world – between people who want Taliban-style theocracies and those who don't. From this perspective, the hostility against the West is a collateral effect of this internal struggle, since from the perspective of those who wanted to replace current regimes with strict theocracies, it is the support of the U.S. that keeps these governments in power. The radicals felt that if the U.S. was attacked, it would withdraw its support for the Middle East regimes, which would then crumble. This equation was a part of the complex strategic plan of bin-Laden which lay behind the 9/11 attacks. As a matter of fact, this analysis proved incorrect – instead of reducing our support for the Saudis, Egyptians and others post 9/11, we increased it.

This point alone shows that terrorist attacks have multiple causes (some systemic, some consciously strategic), and it is not clear that any policy approaches can account for all of them. Without bin-Laden and his ideas, and without Zawahiri and his ideas (including the above-mentioned strategic calculations and decisions) it is not at all clear that we would have had a 9/11 at all – even given all of the issues discussed regarding Islam and the West. There certainly would have been an ongoing struggle within the Islamic world, and there certainly could have been clashes with the West – but they may have taken a very different form than the 9/11 attacks.

What strikes him is the increasing degree of nihilism in the worldview of bin-Laden and Zawahiri. Their strategies and calculations (as mentioned above – to trigger the downfall of Muslim governments by attacking the West) have not worked, and they are currently somewhat stuck. They cannot morph into a political movement, because they will not be taken seriously as such. Political-style overtures made by al-Qaeda (generally in taped messages from bin-Laden or Zawahiri) in the recent past (talks of conditions, offers, truces, etc.) have not been taken seriously by the West or their Muslim allies. Therefore, with no political future, no large-scale military or strategic successes, bin-Laden and Zawahiri have effectively boxed themselves in with nowhere

The other thing that really strikes him at this point in time is that some people are engaging in terrorism for no other reason than because it is fun – or because they don't really have any other options (i.e., a desire for thrills, and a feeling of boredom and lack of other choices, rather than out of strong ideological convictions.) Into the 'just for fun' category, Bergen places someone like Ramzi Yousef, who was responsible for the planning of the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993. While he may (as he stated) been motivated by anti-Israel sentiments, he was also just a professional who enjoyed what he was doing, and was good at it. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed – planner of 9/11, and several other attacks – is another example. Both of these men had girlfriends and seemed to enjoy playing around – not at all like the strictly religious bin-Laden or Zawahiri. They just seemed to enjoy being professional terrorists. Obviously, over people like this one is not going to have very much control.

### *Understanding the Extremist – Summary of Major Points*

An extremist is someone who wants to enforce Sharia law, particularly criminal Sharia law. An extremist justifies the killing of civilians and blames the West for Arab ills. Extremism comes from those desiring power twisting and interpreting religion to suit their purposes. These power seekers use outer issues to sway others to do what they want – be under their control. Others say that it is an interplay between religion, ideology and (desire for) power. Bin-Laden and Zawahiri are motivated by both religious ideology and desire for power. Others say that it is primarily the ideology – with the radical group serving as a function of the ideology and a vehicle for its spread.

War is not between religions, but primarily a war within a religion that spills over to be a war between religions. Some say that it is primarily motivated by sincere religiosity (to fulfill a divine command, to serve God) – not a desire for power, even by the leaders. As to whether religion can be fused with power, that is difficult to see or analyze. Following Taymiya and Qutb, bin-Laden and Zawahiri wanted to overthrow all Muslim leaders – unlike Azzam who just wanted to get non-Muslims out of Muslim lands (he was Palestinian). We also cannot underestimate the role of the charismatic individual leader – ringleader of an attack or leader of a radical group – their vision, ideology and goals. Between religion and politics, religion seems a more primary motivator.

To understand an individual leader, listen to what they say (bin-Laden and Zawahiri speak mostly of religion, secondarily of politics). While psychological profiles may be interesting, they are unprovable – it is more clear just to listen to what individuals say and how they self-describe. Some call this a religious ideology, that became a strategy that became overwhelmed by nihilist tactics. The radical ideology does

not translate well to broad-scale societal workability. Most Muslims don't want to live under fundamentalist style rule.

Radicalization tends to be self-magnifying and self-reinforcing and self-multiplying – so what started out as sincere religiosity became distorted into something else. The hostility to the West is a side point to a larger debate over religion in the Muslim world – almost a civil war between modernity and fundamentalism. Radicals attacked the U.S. to undermine modern governments in the Middle East. So far the calculations of al-Qaeda and its leaders have not worked and they have no workable goals or political future – they are kind of stuck in a nihilistic corner. There are other extremists (K.S. Mohammed, R. Yousef) who do what they do just for fun and thrills – like professional terrorists – not religious, just enjoyed the role.

#### *Understanding the Moderate*

(Egyptian researcher) says that one needs to distinguish between positive opinions about life within the USA versus negative opinions (even among moderates) regarding U.S. foreign policy. Also need to realize that not all moderates have the same view about the right of Israel to exist and the peace process and the Palestinian problem. There is a struggle right now regarding these questions within the moderate camps. Nonetheless, reformists at this time are not popular – people are very caught up in the political situations of the time. Religious, cultural and social issues do not take up their attention. People tend to listen to the loudest voices – against their own non-democratic governments, against the West, against the USA. for political reform, etc. The loudest voices tend to belong to the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jihadists. As a writer he has spoken about looking and modeling after the Justice and Development Party in Turkey –



the MB has responded that because this party is friendly with the West and not against peace with Israel, they are therefore not able to be looked at as a model.

(Jordanian son of famous radical leader) says that in the Middle East (unlike the West where people can say what they want without fear), people are not free and are afraid to speak and act openly. Since he was 19 years old, the Jordanian intelligence has been tracking his words and actions. He has lost his people - the friends that were with him in Afghanistan - because he has spoken out and said in media interviews that he thinks that what al-Qaeda is doing is wrong and is against Islam. His words against al-Qaeda have earned him criticism from others – he is called ‘anti-Qaeda’ and accused of working for the Americans. This is why he feels that telling the truth costs a person a lot.

(Egyptian distinguished thinker and writer) says that moderates in the Arab world are segregated and isolated. The Islamists are united and organized. Liberals do not have an ideology – that is their ideology. He also says that there is a moderate part in a lot of people (not just a moderate group of people). He wants to have a meeting of moderates to take place in the Middle East.

(Egyptian writer and researcher) says that one must speak in terms that the public relates to – it is problematic when Arab moderates speak in completely Westernized language. It is also an issue when moderates are perceived as being too close to the US. He is in favor of including ‘moderate Islamists’ in the political process. Khaleel defines moderates as anyone who is not taking power through violence. This includes the Muslim Brotherhood. He says – do not judge someone by hidden intentions – judge them by their words and documents. Khaleel says that the issue is not the Muslim Brotherhood – but the regimes that stifle them and don’t allow them to operate openly. There is a historical

relationship between the Egyptian regime and the Muslim Brotherhood. They are allowed to work on a grassroots level. Lately, however, this relationship has been breaking down.

(Arab-Israeli teacher in Islamic Israeli college) says that she has both Arab and Jewish friends – she worked and studied together with them in Israel (Technion). Her husband, family, and friends are moderate – no contact with extremists. People who don't know what real Islam is are vulnerable to extremism. Islam is rel. of tolerance, peace, acceptance and respect for women. Abir personally prays (reads Koran, fasts, etc.) five times a day (even with bare head and modern dress.) Sees religion as a good and positive thing. She got some religious education as a girl in Israeli Arab village schools. She personally decided to focus more on internal values and practices and less on external dress. Her education was of a pretty neutral type – more focused on practices for everyday and less on ideology. She says that the Israeli govt. oversees education to ensure it is neutral (does not teach intolerance or hatred).

(Distinguished Arab-Israeli Academic and author) says that he is traditional – meaning that he prays on Fridays, but isn't very religious. He was secular as a teen, but then reconciled himself with a belief in God (he was very influenced by al-Ghazali's famous 'The Mised'). He puts God first and specific dogmas secondary. He feels free to give his own interpretation to verses. For example, a verse that says "Keep me from the damned" is interpreted by some to refer to Jews and Christ, but he does not accept this interpretation. He believes in religious pluralism and tolerance, and he does not try to change others. Sometimes he does not have the courage to express these views. He is afraid of being de-legitimized by his fellow Muslims. A prior theorist said that

Mohammed wrote the Koran in his own words – he couldn't say this today. He says that his own son in law cautions him on what to say.

He says that interfaith dialogue in general is extremely important, along with all things that promote open mindedness. Moderates (such as himself) need to write articles and speak out against extremism and terrorism. He does this and also speaks about love, and tolerance. He says that he writes and speaks freely despite the risk of doing so.

*Understanding the Moderates– Summary of Major Points*

Even among moderate Muslims, there is a strong negative feeling towards the U.S. government and towards Israel. There is currently a struggle among moderates regarding the right of Israel to exist and solutions to the Israel/Palestine issue.

Moderates tend to draw criticism from more extremist Muslims – speaking out in the Muslim world can be costly. At the same time, moderates can come under criticism, scrutiny and suspicion from non-Muslims and the West. Moderates may also feel afraid to speak out because of fear of scrutiny or reprisal from the governments of their home countries.

The first victims of radicalism are moderate Muslims (especially women), because wherever radicals gain power, human rights are lost. Moderates in the Arab world are isolated from one another – unlike the extremists and fundamentalists that have clear unifying ideologies and are organized and united. It is problematic for moderates if they are perceived as being too close to the West or speak in completely Westernized language.

It is possible to be religious (pray, fast,) and yet be completely modern and religious. Those who do this have family, friends and education (with values) that

supports it. Those unfamiliar with Islam are more vulnerable to distortions of it. Those who have nuanced views that deviate from the religious party line feel afraid to express them in public.

### *Developing General Trends*

(Jordanian distinguished professor) says that the whole Middle East is presently in a very delicate and crucial transformative period – politically, socially and religiously. He says that if the US starts putting more pressure on the Jordanian regime to democratize, they will make phony changes – as they have been doing since 1990. The real test of democratic change would be a change in how governments are formed and how they fall – i.e. complete structural change of the system. He says a liberal democratic regime is not a likely future alternative. What is most likely for Jordan would be a phony democracy – with the regime convincing the West that it is democratizing even though it will not really be the case. The regime will ask for more and more aid from the West based on these phony changes. He does not think it likely that extremists in the population will gain any real government power. However their popularity is increasing among the population. If the US withdraws from Iraq and stops supporting Arab regimes, this might encourage the extremists to try and seize power from regimes that no longer enjoy the support of the US – however he does not think this is very likely.

(Jordanian distinguished professor and former government member) says that two factors affect the political and economic development of a country (speaking about the Middle East) – the internal dynamics and leadership within the country; and the second is the external pressures that the Middle East is undergoing and has undergone for centuries. The Arab world has many different types of governments – sheikhdoms, princedom,

sultanates, hereditary monarchies – it is a chaotic form of existence. The Arab world has 22 different entities – each one unique to itself. In all of these 22 entities (without violent change from within) he does not think that there will be any substantive change in the style of government – much less democratic change. The legacy of the Arab country is the fact that the focus is on the top leader in the society – (it is a ‘top down’ model). He does not think that a republican form of government will occur at any time in the foreseeable future in the Middle East (this being a limited government, structured by a constitution; leaders with fixed terms). The possible exception to this within the Arab world might be Lebanon – depending on how its situation unfolds. Lebanon is a sectarian country divided along religious lines – unique among Arab countries. His analysis excludes Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Israel. He says there are forces (Islamist groups for example) that may cause instability, but they will not bring about a republican form of government. The Islamist groups are the strongest groups in any of the Arab countries right now – including Lebanon. Democratization in the American definition (an elected leadership with institutions) will not take place in Arab countries will not take place within his lifetime.

(Egyptian politician and moderate party co-founder) says that the situation in Egypt is poor – socially, economically, and religiously. He sees the political situation as the key. If there is a real democratic regime, all solutions to problems can be found. He says that this is a very important point in Egyptian history. Historically, Egypt has been a leader in the region. Potentially it could be again. He says that his party works together with all other groups to make the government more democratic. He says that the outcome of non-democratic regimes was not positive for Egypt in the end. They look towards the

US as a model of democracy – as well as the EU – as an example of the way that people can create a union, defer their interests, use resources wisely – all without control being imposed from above in an authoritarian manner.

(Palestinian media owner and organizer) says that a group of Palestinians that he is a part of are working on improving their internal lives. There is a movement that they have established that is working to improve the internal living situation of the Palestinians. They want to make sure that internal laws are respected and enforced. They want a strong police force that can actually arrest the criminals and protect people (he says currently the police throw away their weapons when the Israelis come in because they are afraid of being arrested by the Israelis – so there are certain things that are not in their hands, they are not in control of). Nonetheless there are things that they are working on to try to create more comfort for people by providing the basics. This movement does not have a name yet –they are putting it together – it is a group of people from all over the West Bank. It is not a political movement, it is a social movement. People feel hopeless from the politicians and from the Israelis. They feel hopeless from the whole world. They feel a lack of security in the society – which is a result of the occupation and the whole chaos that they went through. This social movement will have demonstrations and protests if someone is attacked by a criminal or a gang and the attackers are not brought to justice as they should be. The emphasis is on the security and peace of the individual, not on the political peace.

Peace in individual terms means dignity when you are walking down the street that you are not harassed, being able to walk safely in the streets with one's wife or child. Taking guns off the streets and enforcing justice in a way that is equal on everyone. Even

just being able to pick up the garbage. He says it is not just him, it is a group of people – they started this movement 3 years ago. They are ready now to put this vision into reality and to get it started. He is only one individual in a very big group. They originally started as a political movement, however they felt that there was no space and that it was not the time to launch such a thing. People are sick of politics and 60% of them do not identify with a political party – they only react based on how each group is behaving at a particular time. The people do not think that a political movement can do anything because of the (quality of life) distractions in the street. The better way of gathering and uniting the people is through working on the social demands and needs of people. This is why they diverted the movement from a political movement to a social one. You cannot create an expanded base from a political movement, but you can create a very huge base from a social movement. They have groups in each town and they are preparing to officially launch their movement. There was a lack of social movements for a very long time – actually there was none. How does he think a social movement might make changes? He says that any change is the idea of creating a majority – people are already socially and politically educated. One just needs to unite the people that feel a certain way and have them make their voices heard.

(Egyptian researcher) says that in terms of the reform process in Egypt – there is reform happening. There is economic reform – with resistance – but finally real economic reform. There are real attempts towards administrative reform – difficult when you realize that there are almost 6 million government workers in Egypt – a quarter of the total workforce. There is legal reforms for business and government apparatus that deal with business and investments. As far as political reform, there is some in-house

(internal) reforms, but little change in the relationship (power structure redistribution) between the ruler and the ruled. The recent constitutional amendment that allows for direct election – article 76 and others – which reduced very slightly the powers of the president and increased the power of the Prime Minister's office, and most importantly, increased the power of the parliament vis a vis the government. For the first time, the parliament has the power to amend the budget – creating the parliament's ability to oversee the performance of the government. This was done only this year – and he thinks it is a big deal. This is an example of internal changes – and is an example of capacity building.

In the area of the relationship between the ruler and the ruled (direct elections) there is cosmetic but not substantive changes. Nonetheless, there is a demand for reform from within the regime. They need to create reform because they want to consolidate the legitimacy of the regime, reduce instability and radicalism, improve performance and ensure the survival of the regime. These came from political activists and reformers within the regime – but not the masses of the people. The people in the street are very far away from awareness of these changes. (I say that the reform comes because other players in the government want some of the cookies – their share of the power and resources). Some people in the government hold the power to grant licenses for certain businesses – this was not okay with others – people felt that they had to grab their bit and run. Generally people started to understand that it is better to have a more transparent and fair system – the current system is not sufficient to maintain everyone's interests.



### *Developing General Trends in the Middle East– Summary of Major Points*

The Middle East is currently in a transformative period – politically, religiously and socially. Insufficient pressure on Middle Eastern governments to democratize will just result in phony cosmetic changes. Pressure for regime change will have an opposite effect (even if this is just implied). It is unlikely that extremists will gain political power in countries like Egypt and Jordan – but they are gaining popularity among the population.

Nonetheless, the Islamist groups are the strongest opposition voice at the present time. A total loss of U.S. support might cause regimes to fall and extremists to take over. Arab countries function with a ‘top down’ form of government – this is unlikely to change radically in the near future. A change in the oil economy (for example the discovery and development of alternate fuel sources) might have a major effect in the Middle East. People desiring reform in the Middle East look to the U.S. and the EU as models of diverse yet unified democracies cooperating for the common good without top-down control.

### *Developing Positive Trends*

(Egyptian American writer) thinks that societies in the Middle East will become more liberal, due to ongoing debates about Islam, exposure to Western/democratic values, and governments that crack down on extremism as they slowly become less autocratic in response to pressure both internal and from the West. (She points to Egypt in particular as being both a trendsetter and currently in the process of change). According to her, and in large part due to both the spread of mass communications and the exposure of people to modern liberal societies, Islamic countries are undergoing

fierce internal debates about the proper interpretation and observance of Sharia law. She sees people as being split between those who want a 'sharia state' and those who are willing to debate and examine Sharia. She doesn't think most people want a Sharia state, and she herself sees modernity as being incompatible with Sharia practices. She does, however distinguish between the practice of family/civil Sharia law governing marriage, divorce, inheritance and the like, and criminal Sharia law which would impose capital punishments, lashings, amputations and the like. While many states in the Middle East practice some form of civil Sharia law, only a few countries (Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, parts of Nigeria) practice criminal Sharia law. She points out that the debates that are currently being carried out regarding Islam and its observance are not peaceful - rather, 'careers are being destroyed, people are being threatened and lives have been lost'. In this debate, the Muslims in the West are taking their cues from the messages emanating from the Middle East. As a cautionary note, Nonie she believes that the debate will not be won by the side with the most philosophical or theological merits, but by whoever holds the most money and power in the Middle East.

*Developing Positive Trends – Summary of Major Points*

Middle Eastern countries that have stagnated politically nevertheless have grassroots movements for positive change. The existence of the Internet and satellite television has allowed people to be exposed to debates taking place within Islam as well as becoming more educated about Islam. The Internet and satellite television have also allowed people to become exposed to liberal and democratic values as well as becoming more aware of human rights norms. Political reform is happening in countries like Jordan and Egypt, though the changes are slow and are more administrative – affecting the

internal governmental workings. There is optimism that there will soon be substantial progress (even perhaps breakthroughs) in alternative fuels sources such as fuel cells.

### *Developing Negative Trends*

(Egyptian American writer) believes that as the Middle East becomes more moderate, radicals will increasingly find haven in the West. She thinks that the combination of U.S. naiveté, political correctness and a desire to be seen as tolerant and multicultural will make the U.S. more blind to and therefore more vulnerable to radicalism. Nonie (Egyptian American writer) also believes that the tolerance for radicalism in the U.S. will stunt the process of reform by taking pressure off of radicals and giving them a blanket of legitimacy.

(Egyptian American writer)'s greatest concern is that the West will become (and to some extent has already become) a haven for radicals and extremists. She feels that U.S. policies to combat extremism are indecisive because of fears of domestic backlash. She feels that radical Islam presents an existential threat to the West and Western liberal democratic civilization. Having said this, she also believes that Muslims are the first victims of radicals, because wherever radicals gain power, human rights are lost.

(Egyptian distinguished thinker and writer) says that Islam is heading on a collision course with the rest of humanity – we could be heading to another world war. If there is another action in the West like 9/11 this could provoke an overall confrontation between the Arab countries and the West. He says that the West will not swallow another 9/11 easily. (We could be making changes now instead of later). Other than our actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US is dealing with political Islam as if nothing has happened. Algeria is full of Islamists, as is SA, Egypt, Sudan – and the US is turning a blind eye.

*Developing Negative Trends – Summary of Major Points*

Internet and satellite television have allowed people to self-indoctrinate with extremist, violent and intolerant religious messages. It is possible that as Middle Eastern countries are pushed to become more liberal (or as they crack down on extremism) radicals will increasingly find haven in the West, where naiveté and political correctness will allow them to operate. Increasingly, the West is already becoming a haven for radicalism through nonprofit organizations, mosques, chaplains in prisons, and Islamic departments in universities. Radical Islam is already overwhelming the ability of the EU to deal with it, and it is possible that it will present an increasingly existential threat to Western civilization. The first victims of radicalism were, and continue to be, moderate Muslims. The West is still reacting with passivity and naivete to the threat posed by radical Islam – other than Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. is not dealing with radical Islamists in Sudan, Algeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and elsewhere.

*Policy Recommendations From Interview Subjects*

(Founder of Egyptian centrist political party) says regarding the Muslim Brotherhood that people must create stronger ideas than the voices of these groups (that are now controlling the dialogue).

(Egyptian American writer) says that immediately after 9/11, immigration from Islamic countries should have been halted. In particular (Egyptian American writer) states that so called ‘religious visas’ should be halted and foreign clerics should not be allowed easy access into the U.S.

(Egyptian American writer) also believes that the U.S. should follow a policy of ‘access for access’ – meaning that for every mosque, school or university department that

Saudi Arabia or other Islamic country creates in the U.S., the U.S. or an international NGO should have permission to build an organizational office, school, Western Studies department or religious center. (Egyptian American writer) also states that the West needs to actively support the voices of moderate Muslims.

(Director of Jordanian NGO for female empowerment) says that the West needs to support institutions (often non-profit organizations) that work towards combating extremism in the Middle East.

(American researcher) says that government experts that he has consulted with have stated unequivocally that the U.S. must end its dependence on foreign oil. He says that even 10% less U.S. oil purchases would cause Middle Eastern oil prices to drop by 50%. John (American researcher) says that democracy will come if Middle East economies collapse (which would happen if oil prices fall suddenly due to a shift in demand from the U.S.). John (American researcher) sees fuel cell technology as a possible area of breakthrough.

(Director of Jordanian NGO for female empowerment) says that if the Palestinian crisis could be solved, all of the other problems in the ME would be able to be solved.

(Jordanian religious/feminist politician) says that Moderate Muslims need to raise their voices in all parts of life – political, educational, social. They must also raise their children in this way. (Jordanian religious/feminist politician) says that the West also needs to help the countries that do have moderate visions to strengthen them. (Jordanian religious/feminist politician) says that NGO's need to have programs that teach people before marriage, after marriage and during parenthood on how to raise their children in

an ethical and moderate way. She says that at this time, special programs like this do not yet exist.

(Jordanian religious/feminist politician) says that women need to be educated to participate in political life. They cannot be decision makers if they are not well educated. If they are educated they will think about whether they want to follow a conservative or moderate path – she thinks that especially women will go with the moderate path.

(Jordanian son of famous radical leader) says: What is the way to make extremist and violent groups obsolete? He said that the US military and army has always given these groups justification to continue their activities. Also, one cannot fight an ideology with guns – one must fight an ideology with an ideology. People that extremists respect must speak out against the use of violence against civilians. He speaks to extremists daily and tells them that the Prophet Mohammed says ‘dealing with the people peacefully means that you will convince them and they will follow you out of love. If you talk with them tough, and your heart is hard, the people will leave you and go away – even your followers will leave you’. He also tells extremists that when the British army went into Iraq, the biggest demonstrations against this were in Great Britain – by the British people. So why would one want to make the British people pay for the actions of others? It is important to target those who are responsible – not those who are not responsible, and even represent the opposite side. He has had much success in changing people’s minds. He finds these people quite pliable – after all, they were not always al-Qaeda sympathizers. Someone once convinced them, and they can be convinced otherwise. As a matter of fact, He has found it quite easy to change their minds. He is willing to do this,

and would do it even more - but because of his (familial) links to radicals, he is not allowed to travel freely in either the Middle East or the West.

(Egyptian distinguished moderate thinker and writer) wants to tell all of the politicians and policy makers in the West that they need to change their understanding of the Middle East. They vacillate between wanting to prop up dictators, then they want to talk to Islamists. They are both the same strategy – because they will both lead to Islamism. Islamism appeals to people because of the way that the societies have been managed by the autocrats. People have the impression that the Islamists are clean and not corrupt like the present leaders. He tells them that the Islamists may be clean now, but they may change once in power. The people also find the current regimes to be totally incompetent and hope that the Islamists will be competent. He says that there is no sign that the Islamists will be competent by any modern definition. They will seem more competent in the short term because they will not yet be corrupt. Once they have become corrupted they will become just as incompetent as the previous rulers (because in the Middle East, incompetence is due to corruption).

He is here to tell them that there is a third option: Impose on the regimes what will make them more efficient and competent. First identify what is needed – politically, economically, educationally – then impose it on them – especially those regimes that rely on the US for aid. If you don't, these regimes will go down the drain and you will be giving power to the enemies. If the US gives 2 billion dollars over the past 30 years and does not relate this to benchmarks – they are idiots. He emphasizes that the US needs to: Demand accountability from Arab states, protect itself internally from Islamicization.

For example, everyone agrees that the Egyptian educational system needs an overhaul – it is full of intolerant and biased content. This is where the children of Egypt begin hating Westerners and Jews – he can point out exactly in the curriculum where it comes from. Are the Americans aware of what their primary strategic ally in the ME teaches their children in the schools? That the spreading of Islam is not complete until every last Jew and Christian has converted. That Jews and Christians are not pure creatures, they are dirty and should not be allowed into the kingdom as much as possible. Jews are the worst. Israel is guilty of stealing Arab land – as if there is no relationship between Jews and Jerusalem for thousands of years – centuries before the life of Mohammed.

Before Egypt falls into the hands of the Islamists, study why the Islamists are popular and what can be done to improve the situation. Another example is when the head of Al-Azhar U (a government financed institution) refers to the ‘Zionist enemy’. Since Egypt has an agreement with Israel, he should not be allowed to say this, he should be sacked. Then he can write articles as a private citizen as he wishes. Israel signed an agreement with the government in 1978 – and yet half the newspapers refer to the ‘Zionist enemy’. Also the trade unions have carte blanche to expel any of their membership that visits Israel. This also should not be allowed. All of these things are an impediment to a modern democratic state.

He feels that a government should be run like a corporation. The difference between a government and a corporation has been narrowed by countries like Singapore, Thailand Indonesia, and South Korea. In these countries, competence came before democracy – and then democracy followed. These leaders were autocrats – but the



people, now prosperous, demanded change. By inviting prosperity and enriching the middle class, democracy followed shortly. Competence will eventually evolve into democratic reforms. Part of this is the problem with the involvement of the government in the economy. Egypt has made an incomplete transition to a partial market economy – and they need to transition to a completely modern market-economy model. The middle class asks ‘according to what rules are you governing us’ and ‘where is the money going?’. It is called accountability. One who has money then develops a concern about money.

He says that Egypt gets away with all sorts of garbage and the US lets them get away with it. If Egypt falls into the hands of the Islamists, America will live with an enemy like bin-Laden for centuries. Egypt has been a trend-setter in the Middle East for the past 200 years. When Egypt was pro-Europe, the Middle East trended that way. Most of the teachers and professors in SA are Egyptians. Egypt has a disproportionate influence on the Arab world. The Saudis are trying to create a pocket of influence and power – but not through intellect – through money. It is Egypt that really sets the tone in the Middle East.

He says that the solution is with visionary leaders. He thinks that even the (widespread) hostility towards the Jews can be remedied very easily. All it takes is some visionary leadership. Like Sadat, who was not allowed to complete even ten percent of his mission. He felt that the Arabs, Muslims and Jews could live together. He was killed – as was Rabin. A visionary leader can tell the masses ‘Israel does not want to swallow you – it cannot swallow you – it needs the Arab world.’ He says that he can tell that Jews

and Israelis get along very well with Arab Muslims that are free from hostility. They give them a lot of warmth.

(Egyptian writer and researcher) asks - what can the US do to lessen the motivation of terrorists to attack? Balance between the values of democratic change and the desire to use hard power. Using soft power is a more effective and less provocative use of its influence. Withdraw from Iraq – shouldn't have gone in in the first place. Stop trying to isolate Syria – this moves it closer to Iran. Open talks with Syria. Persuade Israel to return the Golan Heights.

He also says that the way to combat the extreme thinking is to strengthen the moderates. Turkey provides a good model of Islamic moderation. He thinks the salafi/jihadi era will stop when the US stops invading other countries. Their main justification is external. They are fighting an external enemy. If they are fighting an internal enemy it is as part of fighting an external enemy. They, by and large, do not want to overthrow their local regimes – they want to punish them for supporting the US. The moderate mainstream is working hard in most Arab countries – there are many organizations with names like 'moderate' and 'centrist'. He thinks that extreme thinking will be diminished. He thinks that in the next few years we will witness an era of moderation. This is true no matter what the US does – because it is in the interests of the societies to encourage moderate thinking – and they know it. The US can complicate this by its actions, or encourage this change. The key is how much freedom the government gives for the moderate groups to operate.

The key question is: will the regimes in the Middle East allow moderate groups to move freely and participate or not? He does not think that the governments will allow

moderate groups to operate if they think that the groups will generate mass appeal and upstage them. However the societies will become more open because the people will push for change – since their needs are not being met. This will cause a decline in the popularity of salafi/jihadist groups. Moderates want to correct what they see as a bad image placed on Islam by the extremists. He adds that the natural mood of the Egyptian society is moderate – as is most of the Middle East. He also says that if the moderates introduce a pragmatic agenda for change, this will make a difference. If they have an open mind to allow all different ideas to enter the discourse. Also at issue is whether the people push hard enough to force the government to implement democratic change (such as allowing these groups to operate freely and enter the political life). He says that he does not see much Jihadis in Egypt – maybe Salafis. The Egyptians will arrest people that talk jihad. Egypt is not a bastion of salafi/jihadism. He says he thinks there are more Jihadis in Algeria, Morocco, Saudi Arabia – primarily because of American actions in the Middle East.

(Egyptian researcher) says that if he could go back to the point that the US was having a dialogue with governments about reforms (immediately post 9/11) he would have advised them that states in the Middle East are not like other countries. They are fragile and must be handled with care. There is a very deep legitimacy problem in the area. There are also transnational movements – pan Arab, pan Islamic – that affect peoples perceptions, loyalties etc. This is why the regional dimension is so important in the Middle East.

He also says that there are lots of sources of the troubles in the region – but the question is – what is the factor that if controlled will have the greatest effect in the

region? It is the Palestinian problem. What is the link between domestic reform and the Palestinian problem? Political reform is always tied up with liberalization – the ability of the people to express themselves freely. But if the environment around the people drives them to be haters, radicals – there is no benefit to the governments to allow the people to express themselves – all they are doing is unleashing radicalism.

He says that a third-party needs to lead the (Israeli and Palestinian as well as other) governments in a dialogue and an interaction that leads to a real strategic understanding of the issues – something that goes far beyond an arms deal or a few clauses in an agreement – what kind of vision do we have for the Middle East for 10 years time. If, however the vision includes the US saying that in ten years time we envision a Middle East in which you dictators are no longer there – this obviously will not work.

He says that there are spoilers, but governments and regimes in power are not sure about their future and so they avoid committing themselves to one policy fully. They talk peace but have doubts about it. He doesn't think that it is just about scapegoats. While this is a factor, he does not think it is the major issue. He points out that reaching a settlement is also frightening. Even though the current situation is miserable, it is known. A promised peace might look better, but we don't know it. There is a great deal more uncertainty about peace than about the current situation – which we at least know the parameters of. Any leader prefers certainty over uncertainty. This is why the role of a third party is so important – to assure the people about the uncertainties of the peace. This is something that neither the Europeans and more so the Americans do very well.

He thinks that there are things that could be done in the I/P process – for example

the series of dialogues that are now taking place between Abbas and Olmert – discussing final status issues. The support that the US and EU (and the Japanese) is giving to the population of the West Bank is allowing people to choose between two crystal clear models of society and government for their future. As long as those economic and administrative assistance and reforms are associated with addressing political issues through dialogue with continuous American attention (– which has not always been the case. ‘Americans do the right thing after all other options have been exhausted’)

There has been a change within the last year regarding American policy in the I/P conflict – as seen in the Baker-Hamilton report’s emphasis on solving the I/P issue, and as seen by the fact that Condi Rice has been back and forth to the ME several times over the last few months (without which Abbas and Olmert would not have been sitting down with each other). Palestine is seen as being important – a little late. He sees hopeful signs.

One needs to negotiate despite the fact that Hamas has the ace cards of power and militancy. When Rabin first signed the Oslo agreement with Sadat, he said “we are going to negotiate as if there is no terrorism, and fight terrorism as if there are no negotiations.” This is difficult to operationalize, but it is nonetheless an important mindset. (I say ‘well said! – a good answer’). If you don’t do this you allow the radicals to hold the peace process hostage. You need to neutralize the impact that these players have on the process by keeping alive a vision of what a peace between the parties could look like – a peace that would spill over to the rest of the region. Also by creating economic and societal (positive) facts on the ground. All of this creates a hopeful climate – even in advance of any permanent situation being found. It is the existence of a positive process that is almost as important as the final outcome.

When the US tried to deal with governments by just pushing (and not hard enough) for political change – putting that in the framework of regime change – this was done by force in Iraq and would be done by other means elsewhere – this was the subtext of the US dialogue and pressure. You cannot bring reform in the region without winning the support and cooperation of governments. If they see their survival as being at stake they will not cooperate. They may make surface changes or diffuse the pressure but they will not cooperate. You will lose your governmental allies, destabilize countries, but not bring a better reality to the region. He says – Egyptians are idiots. Its unfortunate, but so far in most Middle Eastern countries the people have been faced with only two choices – repressive regimes or radical extremists. So they see the only option as either going with the radicals or getting rid of the regimes. Some (the less liberal) go with the extremists, the more moderate see the only option as getting rid of the regimes – and they blame those that deal with and help the regimes – the US.

There is actually a third option: What is needed is to develop a strategy for reforming those regimes – not replacing them (or destabilizing them). Although the end point of reforming a regime is to reform it into oblivion – to the point that it becomes an open society. He says this is definitely true, but you don't state it that way.

The strategy is for Western governments to assist in capacity building for the state to be able to manage an open society. This capacity is something that was lacking when Mubarak came to power in the 70's. It is also something that is lacking at present in the societies of the Middle East. The corruption and despotism that one sees in the Middle East – he is most familiar with Egypt. One reason for this is simply the presence of corrupt people. The other thing is the lack of ability of the society and government to do

things any other way. If you help the government to have the capacity to do things the right way, eventually they have the ability to get rid of the corruption – and not just look like they are surviving, but look like they are reforming.

Capacity building – administrative, educational, judicial, security – if you create more efficient governments you will create regimes that are not so afraid of opening up and competing in an open arena. This is a different way of looking at foreign aid. The typical answer he gets when he talks to aid agencies or those in the US government is that if you give Egypt 800 million a year it will help it a lot. But this aid is very diffused and does not have a noticeable impact. However, if you put all of that money in one sector, it will make more of an impact, be apparent, be seen. Instead of making it spread out over large numbers of sectors – it is about bureaucracy – needing large lists. It becomes like a drop in the bucket that has no apparent effect. If it was put into a limited number of areas the effect would create a single clear model to look at. One is not building capacity over the entire society – but in one area that then becomes the model – the locomotive engine – that pulls forward the rest of the society.

The three sectors that he feels are most important are the judicial, security, education. There are a lot of violations of (‘terrible violations’) of human rights in the society largely against regular citizens and has nothing to do with politics. The police system is set up so that it cannot handle these situations differently – a lack of education, a lack of resources. If the police deliberately violated the rights of the opposition political actors but not the regular citizens – this would already be a large improvement. When you open up the system, when the system is ready for democracy and integrating everyone, these issues will be easily solved. But the violations have nothing to do with

politics. when a crime is committed, the police round up a lot of people – workers, building guards, etc, then they beat them all up until someone says that they did it – sometimes just to stop the violence. They cannot pursue and find the actual perpetrator (sine they have no training in proper police work) so they cannot deter people with the fear that they will be caught. So they deter (or try to deter) people with the threat of violence afterwards).

They need a lot of resources, a lot of education a lot of training, etc. This will make a tremendous difference – instead of hurting and humiliating a lot of people, they will be creating a more positive attitude of people towards their government. It will make people less vulnerable to manipulation by radicals and extremists. It is also important that people know these changes came about with help and training from the West. It is not enough that now some people in a far off village know that the US helped their village to build a sewage system – or improve the quality of their environment. But every other part of life stays the same. You haven't created sufficient critical mass to change the attitudes of people and their reality. (From a systems perspective, this means affecting the hubs, not just the nodes.) (So this seems that it is not just a choice between bad governments and regime change – there is a whole middle phase – of significant government improvement on the way to complete reform.)

He said that he suggested a program whereby schoolteachers in Egypt would come and visit the US – substituting this for piecemeal efforts at curriculum improvements here, building a model classroom there – he says – just concentrate on sending the largest possible groups of schoolteachers to visit classrooms in the US, even if they don't understand the language. Let them see how the teachers teach, how they deal



with the students - that's all. If 50-60% come back talking less aggressively about the US that is a big deal. If 30% come back with some ideas to implement in their classes – or new ways to treat the students – that is a major accomplishment. There are 60-70 million students, about 3 million teachers. Most are not properly qualified – both in terms of content as well as methodology. The system turns out students that are vulnerable to extremism – by the attitudes towards the West, extreme religious interpretations, the cultural attitudes of the teachers – exposing them to a more positive model will have a significant effect.

It is not about helping those in power – it is about building the capacity of the societies to live in a free world. This is done by helping the regimes to reform (not talking about 'regime change') – not reducing it to 'human rights' or 'democracy' which is entirely too simplistic and does not recognize the complexity of the societies. Stability and order are the foundation of healthy societies. It is a matter of helping the societies towards stability and order without resorting to violence or repression. Right now the societies are not able to do that. So if you only focus on democracy and opening up the public sphere without strengthening the basic capacities of the society, you risk greater chaos and radicalism, because right now the societies are not capable of self regulation without government suppression. And without stability and order you have a failed state.

The more power that the people have, the more socioeconomic success, the better the civil society and the less regional tensions, the less vulnerability to radicalism. The West needs to help by educating and helping governments to reform. What does he recommend for people in the West who want to help? He suggests making low cost books available (perhaps for students on the last day of school) that are inspiring and

widely accepted according to average Muslim values. Books that raise answers to the questions that they may have. These writings are well-respected but are no longer read and discussed – philosophy, literature. Mahfouz – westerners can put resources to allow writers to abridge versions for different ages... Things like that. This can be done with the help of the government. Things can be put into coffee shops and other venues like corner booksellers.

The media are the least moderate of the Egyptian population – as surveyed. The public at large are much more so. You need to convey hope and optimism to the people. That there is sufficient optimism, that the society can handle the issues at hand, that there is progress happening. If you discuss even trivial things from a hopeless perspective, this makes the people feel so pessimistic that they are driven to the arms of extremists. Modernity is about progress – that people can improve their conditions – if you don't have hope in this, you are leaving your life in the hands of God and waiting for the afterlife. This is a subtle point, but people in the media either have radical views about the West, the ME, market economy – they are very extreme, very suspicious – and when they talk about even trivial things they do so from a helpless and hopeless perspective. Media figures would be very important to work with – cultural exchanges. We are only talking about a small number of people – its not that hard.

(Egyptian politician and moderate party co-founder) says that the situation in Egypt is poor – socially, economically, and religiously. He sees the political situation as the key. If there is a real democratic regime, all solutions to problems can be found. He says that this is a very important point in Egyptian history. Historically, Egypt has been a leader in the region. Potentially it could be again.

(Egyptian director of Pro-democracy NGO) says regarding the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt that Egyptians – need to confront them on their words and ideas. Even if they just give a party line, they need to (as much as possible) be put into a corner and made to say clearly what their ideas and intentions are. They need to be asked questions that are more specific than their official party line ('we will allow the people to choose'); they need to be confronted with quotes from their own leaders, internal statements and internal documents. What is said and done on a daily basis. For example, they pray at certain mosques. Each Friday the leaders of those mosques make speeches. What are the content of these speeches? What are they telling the people? He himself wants to do this but does not have enough resources – he can't do everything.

He also talks about the lack of education in the Egyptian public – even about Islam. He suggests getting out simplified versions of Arabic and Muslim writings and recordings (classical novels, works of Islam, classical philosophers) – things that represent a moderate perspective. He says that money is an obstacle to this. He says that he has people that can do this – simplify writings – the printing here is much cheaper as well. He says that if you give it to people for free they will love it even more. This is also a way of getting it to a larger society quickly. You cannot sell media cheaper than the Muslim Brotherhood sells their materials – also giving it for free to the taxi drivers and micro-bus drivers who play it all of the time. It gets their ideas out to many people.

Part of the model might be commercial (as cheap as the Muslim Brotherhood would be 1.75 or 2 EP), but much of it would have to be given away – especially at the outset. He could coordinate the selection and translation of materials. It needs to be materials that are completely non-controversial (such as Rushd and Mahfouz – literature

and philosophy that is non-controversial). What is needed is to start a war of ideas – ideas against ideas. He also talks about using multimedia – videotapes, music – not just books. The educational system does not give people the chance to read too many books. As a result, the people here hate books.

He also speaks of the idea of cultural exchanges – teachers and media people among others. He said that they need to come over for more than 2-3 weeks (he will be in the US with Freedom House in October for 2 months). Also one needs to pick the participants well – people who really want to learn, not just to judge and criticize the US. He is more into quality than quantity. Not someone who hates the US and the West. They need to have a good interview and screening system for participants.

He says that people in both East and West need to push for freedom of expression and freedom for groups to operate. He says that the government needs to allow aid money to go directly to NGO's without government interference (a law that was signed in 2002 has all aid to registered NGO's going through the government). He avoids this by not registering with the social services. The new law that is being discussed would eliminate this loophole. He wants to start a new NGO in the US and have a branch operate in Egypt. Also US aid should not be stymied by too much bureaucracy. Westerners need to advocacy for Egypt – which could now go in either direction – to the left or to the right. He says to send international observers to monitor all elections – using the UN.

He underscores the importance of more and better jobs for women. If the financial situation of women is better that will give a chance for the women to escape the societal pressures.

(Female worker in pro-democracy NGO) says: what is needed is good education for everyone, fair media, more chances for employment (very important), more hiring of women, more open mindedness, dealing with women as human beings.

(Lebanese Communist Party member) says that there are very few strong democratic movements in the Middle East. He says that this weakness is the fault in part of the Democratic movements – they should be working together instead of each working in their separate countries. He says there needs to be a meeting of all non-coercive and modern political parties – to be able to support each other across the region with a common platform for their countries. There needs to be an alternate media that is not government controlled.

(Egyptian researcher working for international research organization) says that she was struck by the multiplicity of forces in Lebanon – something that is absent or has been repressed in Egypt for the last generation or so. When and if Egypt has a democratic regime, this type of multiplicity will likely return. As to what it would take to bring democracy back to Egypt – it would take strong leadership in the country, and the West lifting its hand from interfering with the rise of democracy in Egypt – by supporting the benign dictatorship of Mubarak. She wishes that the US would not only support regimes that serve their selfish interests. At the same time, change will come from inside. What is most needed is a viable alternative with strong leadership. Leadership that does not suppress the many voices that exist there. People need to come up with creative ideas about how to peacefully bring about change. There is a democratic vein in Egypt, but it needs to get a lot stronger.

(Lebanese director of international research organization) says that the instability

and frustration in the Arab world has its causes, and to lessen the instability and anger, one must address the causes. For example, having the US army in Iraq. This should be ended as soon as practically possible. Maybe not immediately (which could cause a backlash) but in a year, two or three.

Then there is the Palestinian issue – which is such a focus of anger and frustration. He says that taking land during even a defensive war (1967) is not legitimate. The West Bank is more of an issue because the Israelis got out of Gaza. This all becomes a part of the big narrative that began in 1920 with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the Caliphate. He does not feel very hopeful about a solution in Israel. There is no easy solution at this point. Pro-American media and pro-Israel policies have also painted a picture that it is too complicated to solve. He says that the US and Israel won't do it, the Arabs are a mess. There is no easy solution. Iranian/American relations have been poor since 1979 and have remained so ever since. If the US and the Soviet Union could learn to coexist – at least have a cold war instead of a hot war, certainly the US could learn to deal with Iran for the sake of regional stability. The US has pretty good relations with most of the other Arab states, just Iran and Syria. But Iran and the US have maintained high levels of hostility and propaganda instead of doing something different. (I say that I have heard that the friendly relations between the US and the Arab dictatorships have been counterproductive according to people I have spoken to.) He thinks that the repression is an Arab problem – less an outcome of policies of the West – whereas Iran, Syria, Iraq and Palestine are situations that the West is definitely exacerbating if not creating. Patterns of authoritarian governments are not created by the US and cannot be fixed by the US – US support is just one element of these governments – there are a lot of

other reasons, historical and cultural for the existence of these authoritarian governments. The cause is that 'we are sort of like that' – the Americans just help prop them up.

He is a proponent of democracy – he believes that all groups should have a chance to participate in government – and it is a mistake to do otherwise. We need more stability in the region if we want to democratize. It is difficult to democratize in a region with several wars at once. Iraq, Palestine, Iran – deal with these issues – security always trumps all other considerations and must be taken care of first – this must be taken care of before democratization.

(Christian Lebanese television station manager) says that the US needs to stop supporting the authoritarian regimes or democracy will not happen. He also says that the will within each country for change is not strong enough. He says that those who say it is all the fault of the US or that all the fault lies within the country are wrong – as both are a part of the problem. He also says that the US is short sighted and does not act for the long term.

(Muslim woman from Ramallah) says that the Palestinian people need to wake up and let Fatah and Hamas go to hell. They put the people's situation in hell – they put their own power and rivalry first and put the people's needs last. She says let the community function as a unit – one people, to live in a good city with our rights and traditions. When the people are a strong unit, no one will be able to destroy them.

(Mathematics teacher from Ramallah) says that even the existence of terrorist leaders is an expression of the will of the people. He says that if Israel leaves the West bank and Gaza, and there is peace, these people (leaders who advocate violence) will be sidelined. Hassan says that we need to encourage the children and give the children hope

in the future. He says that when we don't love ourselves, there can be no peace. We have to love ourselves and then there will be peace.

(American researcher based in London) tells an interesting story about the second and third generation Algerian French. They live in a very patriarchal society, but they also emphasize education – for the daughters as well as the sons. The women go out and get all of this education and then when they come back into the home and the father tries to tell them what to do, they cannot do it any more, because the women have been exposed to European societal values. So he says to empower women in order to fight Islamism.

He also says that (regarding European anti-terrorism policies), anti-terror legislation sometimes becomes more or less effective depending on how law and order (i.e., enforcement-oriented) the government is.

He states that assertiveness can combat the creeping Sharia-zation – one must push back (before Islamist changes within a society become set in and calcified – with the potential for backlash once you try to roll back the concessions to Sharia law). There is also a fear of a backlash from the lower class whites in places like Rochdale to Muslims if another incident takes place.

Not only prevention is important but also resiliency – not having knee jerk reactions to attacks. Useful policies include: 1) Having mainstream Muslims speak out right after an incident unequivocally against terrorism 2) Community/Police relations so there is a good exchange of information and cooperation 3) Education, socio-economic measures – things that inoculate against extremism.



(American Muslim researcher) says regarding Iran that while military action would unify the Iranians as well as the greater Arab world, smart measures (like the U.S. refusing to do business with international banks that do business with Iran) could be more effective – possibly causing a major economic downturn in Iran and sparking regime change. He cautions that the U.N. needs to be utilized to build consensus for any sanctions.

He says that the U.S. needs to boot Wahabi clerics out of US prisons and military chaplain positions. He says that Middle Eastern governments need to ban Jihadist parties and hang their top leaders. He says that there is a need to create normal Sunni Community in US – that are a model of peaceful coexistence and that believe in obeying US laws. He says that the most important thing is to highlight moderate Muslims.

(Jordanian Sufi Professor) says that to counter extremism, people need to understand one another and break misconceptions about each other, become more flexible. By changing books, schools, etc., make people more open-minded. Move from the particular and personal to the general – seeing you not as the other, but as part of me as well. He also says that when Arab societies become truly free, extremism will stop. The US should be pressing Middle Eastern states to become free and open societies (but in an Arab/Islamic way). People should have access to resources, choose their leaders, make choices, and not live in fear from the state.

(Principal of Arab-Israeli School) says that the empowerment of women is most important thing to prevent radicalism in a society. A mother can prevent her son from becoming an extremist. She can also make her husband understand the proper way.

However, this is only if the woman is educated. Education (especially of women) is the most important thing to counter radicalism.

To resolve the problems of humanity (in the Arab/Islamic world in general) we must resolve the problems of women. Women need to be in positions of leadership in the Middle East. Poverty, insecurity, and lack of education (of women) leads to terror. Rather than looking the other way, the West must sanction states that oppress women. Why does the West support states that oppress women? Money for terrorist fighting should be used to empower women. The answer lies with Arab women – who need help with Western pressure. Education of women will lessen violence and terrorism, so women must be a priority. Need to help moderates and women – give women education and chance to be leaders, support institution that stress dialogue.

If we train and educate women to lead, problems will be solved. If a woman is educated, she will educate her children. If she educates her children, she will educate her children away from violence.

(Arab-Israeli teacher in Islamic college) says that the education of women is crucial to stemming radicalism and encouraging moderation. Even if the father is educated, an uneducated mother will result in less educated children. Uneducated children will be more vulnerable to radicalism.

(Distinguished Arab-Israeli academic and author) says that interfaith dialogue in general is extremely important, along with all things that promote open mindedness. Moderates (such as himself) need to write articles and speak out against extremism and terrorism. He does this and also speaks about love and tolerance. He says that he writes and speaks freely despite the risk of doing so.

(Israeli counterterrorism researcher) says that the West needs to emphasize the need for international organizations in the Middle East. He says that there needs to be emphasized the rights of Arab women. He says that the promotion of rights for women will fight extremism. One idea that he suggests is a website to exchange ideas among Arab and Western women.

Another key focus is education: He says that formal education has been taken over by radicals. There is a need to change negative trends in Middle Eastern/ Arab/Islamic education to promote tolerance, pragmatism, and human rights (including gender rights) issues. He believes that it is better to attack the radical concepts in an indirect non religious way – more from a perspective of general human rights. He says that Middle Eastern governments are starting to realize that extremism is dangerous to them – but this is taking place incrementally. Westerners need to support this trend.

He says that the West needs to make a pragmatic education ‘Marshal Plan’. Create an international consortium to affect Islamic education and Dawa (religious and social service outreach). We need to imitate the Dawa of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas – combining moderate educational and social welfare.

Nations will support the informal education and social service networks – but money cannot go towards corruption or extremism. There is also a need to affect Islam within the U.S. and EU – especially ways to integrate the communities within the larger society and educational institutions.

We need to ask Islamic moderates what they think is needed. Ask how the West can support moderate trends. Look at different states as different cases: the Gulf Region, Egypt/Jordan, Indonesia/Malaysia - see in each country how moderates are taking a stand

and what there needs are. He cautions that Westerners can't take the lead or preach, teach, etc. We can only help.

(Israeli retired military officer and terrorism researcher) says that because terrorism is global phenomenon, therefore we need to create global tools, laws, and bodies to counter it. He says that in order to counter radical ideology, you must use Muslim liberals. Currently there are no groups powerful enough in Islamic society to do this. He says that the West has to be careful not to discredit people by helping them – making it seem as if they are too closely allied with the West. He thinks that the solution is more in the hands of the regimes – they need to invest in changing the education that takes place within their countries. He says that Egypt and Jordan are especially important because their regimes are evolving. He thinks that new discourses are more likely to arise in Egypt and Jordan.

(American intelligence analyst and researcher) says that policy begins with recognizing the threat from Iran. This is one of the most serious threats in existence today. It must not be brushed off or disregarded. This regime must be stood up to – including its efforts to export terrorism, and its efforts to influence and dominate other countries including Southern Iraq, Lebanon and other neighbors.

The U.S. needs to stand up to Iran regarding its rhetoric regarding there having been no Holocaust. “Standing up” is an entire agenda that includes the President of the United States using his position and the position of all of his top diplomats in public forums like the United Nations and Presidential addresses to state explicitly that we the United States do not recognize the legitimacy of the regime that dominates Tehran today. We will do everything we can to support the people of Iran to reform their governments

and take charge of their own futures in a democratic manner. The U.S. needs to use its leadership position to make firm statements regarding these issues.

The U.S. also needs to use the tools of diplomacy, for example choosing to recognize or not recognize an entity (such as the non-recognition of Hamas – a group whose charter calls for the destruction of the State of Israel and the spread of radical Islamism - despite its electoral victory), distinguishing an unlawful or terrorist group or rogue regime from a democratic government that stands on the rule of law and civil society.

Using diplomatic tools to block accession of certain entities, groups or countries into international organizations such as the World Trade Organization. Imposing certain sanctions on a regime such as the very targeted and effective sanctions imposed by our Commerce and Treasury Department on the regime of Kim Jong-Il regarding his ability to purchase and import luxuries for his own personal consumption.

Another example of specific sanctions (a little higher up the ranks) is forbidding the airlines of certain countries to land in our territory. Forbidding their ships from entering our territorial waters. Forbidding their sports teams from competing in international events and competitions. Recently the International Federation of Soccer banned Iran from competing at its international games – a huge impact in a soccer-mad country. These measures, along with boycotts of goods are under the category of “coercive diplomacy.”

Further up the chain of sanctions – particularly regarding the failure of Iran to cease uranium enrichment – would be oil bans. Cutting the export of Iranian oil would cause the price of oil on the market to shoot up to 100\$ a barrel (necessitating short term

copied measures on our part, such as conserving energy, opening up new pipelines, securing the straits of Hormuz, investing in alternative energy sources) – but the Iranian economy would collapse within three months. This would be the ultimate hammer.

Some have called for strikes against suspected nuclear facilities in Iran. While this is the ultimate option, and should never be taken off of the table, this measure should only be used as a last resort. Our efforts now should be focused on undermining the regime, helping its already catastrophic economic, demographic, and social policies to collapse the regime as quickly and as painlessly as possible, before there is any more damage. This can and should take place within the next two years at most.

If the regime topples and is replaced by a democratic and free society, the danger posed by any nuclear gains is no longer. It is not the existence of nuclear technology – but in whose hands it is held. If, in the worst-case scenario, strikes become a necessity, it would be better off coming from a Western nation or coalition of nations rather than by Israel – though they have been directly threatened with calls for their destruction. This is because of all of the added anti-Israel and anti-Semitic enmity that would be stirred up in the Arab world by action on Israel's part.

Lastly in regards to Iran is the necessity of supporting the process of bringing sanctions from the U.N. Security Council – to force Iran to come into compliance with the International Atomic Energy Commission (IAEA). Sanctions are not the only policy measures that can be taken to stem the tide of extremism in the Middle East.

Organizations, people, individuals and groups who stand up for moderation throughout the Muslim world can be empowered. For example, if a group of sheikhs comes together and signs a fatwa (declaration or ruling), that says that they denounce suicide bombing

and think that it is anti-Islamic, these people should be promoted, supported, and congratulated. While this may cause a backlash, these are people who are already showing the courage to take a stand against the violent extremists. They are standing up for something within Islam that needs to be supported and they deserve our verbal and moral recognition and assistance. We need to make clear statements that we applaud their efforts to take Islam back from the radicals and allow the moderates within Islam to claim back their own faith. This recognition may not only not be hurtful, the moderates may benefit from it.

We (the West) need to offer visits, exchanges, scholarships for young Muslim scholars, academics and professionals who are willing to work for a moderate Islam. While there is a fear that this may ‘tar’ them and make them unacceptable to their own more radical constituents – that is a possibility. But what we are trying to do in such a case is build up a constituency that will stand against the radicals (i.e., not bow to them). If that constituency is seen by the radicals as allied with the West, so be it – we are at war with the radicals anyway. We need to assist in the creation of a critical mass that will oppose them. For those moderates who do not want to be seen as aligned with the West, there are ways to work with people quietly – it does not all have to be done publicly.

Non-governmental organizations and other kinds of civic organizations can also be used to teach people at the village level how to conduct an election, how to form a political party, how to form a grass-roots organization, how to present demands to a council or other leadership body. Again, using an NGO or other voluntary organization (i.e., not directly from the U.S. government), moderates can be equipped with basic supplies to gather, organize and publicize their activities and ideas. They can be given a

room within which to meet, chairs and a table, a whiteboard. On a higher scale, they can be given a fax machine or other equipment. Groups that are working for change can be clandestinely given large numbers (several hundred thousand) inexpensive and pre-loaded Mp3 players, full of news, editorials, position statements, information, ideas – ironically in the same manner as was done by Khomeini in 1979 when he flooded the universities with cassette tapes of his speeches. Prepaid cell phones can be given to student opposition groups in countries like Iran so that they can organize gatherings and rallies (perhaps even simultaneously in major cities) in support of freedom and democratic reforms – and later elude those that may be trying to stop the demonstrations and throw them into prison. This type of coordination is impossible to do without secure communications.

These are all simple measures that can have a major impact. Daily broadcasts can be beamed in (by satellite so that they cannot be jammed) – not pop music, but broadcasts similar to what was done by Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union prior to the fall of communism. These broadcasts could contain local news – reported objectively so that the Mullahs cannot twist it to suit their ideological purposes with no other sources of informational input for the population. This would help them to see the world from the eyes of those who are outside of their country.

It is also necessary to do outreach in the countries that have not (yet) been radicalized – or not in a widespread manner. Indonesia, Muslim India, Turkey and other places are fronts that need support for moderates so that they will be less susceptible to radicals seeking to make inroads. Despite this, the critical areas that have already been radicalized cannot be ignored and must be dealt with, because of the existential threat that



they pose. Simply declaring that a country or area has ‘gone over to the dark side’ and lets deal with the ‘light side’ would be foolhardy.

The critical areas (like the present Iran and al-Qaeda threats as well as countries that are currently battlegrounds for extremism) cannot be ignored, because what they are planning to do, or are already doing, would be so dangerous and destabilizing in the region and elsewhere that the threat must be met right now.

Moderate countries need to be encouraged to prevail over extremism – but this alone does not meet the dangers of the present situation. After the measures outlined above (in the categories of sanctions, boycotts and ‘coercive diplomacy’, as well as assistance to moderates and those opposing radical regimes) have exhausted their usefulness; there are other kinds of more active destabilization, covert action and clandestine activities that can be used against radical regimes and terror groups. This includes Special Operations Forces, sabotage actions – perhaps against oil refineries in the case of Iran, targeted killings of regime leaders (perhaps key IRGC commanders) in Iran, perhaps key scientists that run their weapons of mass destruction programs, biologists that run their biological weapons programs and nuclear scientists that run their nuclear weapons programs. These killings would be extra-judicial but not extra-legal. While the targets would not have had the opportunity of being tried in a court of law, they are persons who are guilty of crimes against humanity – planned or already carried out. These policy options are not being recommended – they are simply being listed in a scale of options of increasing severity.

Another policy option that may already be being utilized in the case of Iran is the stirring up of ethnic minorities that are already being persecuted – to take up arms and

revolt. Again, these are not necessarily recommended options, just a list of possible options.

In Iraq, policy options against extremist/insurgent attacks may include a ramping up of U.S. forces, especially to deal with and bring down al-Sadr and his Mahdi army, which is becoming an increasing threat to the democracy trying to take shape in Iraq. A surge in forces would also allow the central Iraqi government to assume control in Baghdad – it being crucially important that a government have control over its capital. A surge would also be a demonstration of power. In many Middle Eastern cultures there is a respect for power- when the hammer comes down, when the power is shown, challengers back down. The United States needs to show that it is the strong one, not Osama bin-Laden and others like him. In these cultures, people get behind whoever they see as being the ‘strong horse’. Some of this is just a matter of image and perception, some is based on substance. The U.S. has to create the perception that they have the initiative, they have the power, and they will respond forcefully to those who challenge them.

The United States also needs to face up to the fact that regional neighbors such as Iran and Syria are not on the side of success in Iraq. They may not want a total collapse of the Iraqi state with large numbers of refugees on their borders, but they do want a certain simmering level of chaos – which is what they have accomplished. We need to acknowledge that the regional neighbors want either chaos in Iraq – or they want to dominate it. These countries need to be unequivocally told to back off – or they will suffer negative consequences. They need to be told that just as they are creating instability in Iraq, instability can be created in their nations as well. This type of forceful language has never been used – and it is the type of language that this region understands.

The third approach is to continue placing emphasis on the training of Iraqis so that they can provide the security that the country needs and so that our troops can go. As long as there is an insurgent threat to what we build, we need to stay – but when the area is secure, we can leave.

Regarding policies to address the al-Qaeda/Sunni terrorist threat: As geography is denied to terrorist organizations; as at-risk nations become stabilized; as moderate Muslims from all groups begin to speak out and take back the initiative; this will squeeze out al-Qaeda all over the place. They will no longer be able to dominate the region, the geography, the village mosques, the newspapers – all of these will be in the hands of the moderates.

There has been much talk about the sympathy for extremism in the Islamic world – as well as the antipathy towards the West. This may be partly due to ideology (religious, political and historical), but it is also due to who is seen as being the most powerful player in the game. There are many in the Muslim world today who will (for many reasons) follow whoever they perceive as being the ‘strong horse’. We need to show through our actions that we are strong, and (with our support) that the moderates are strong. This will cause those who are in the middle to be encouraged to join with those that they see as being the strong ones. Those who are already allied with extremists (or at least sympathetic to their cause) will be isolated and ‘left out to dry’. Once the greater majority of their co-religionists move in the direction of moderation, and the small numbers of real radicals are under attack at every turn; the ‘extremist sympathizers’ will be left to make a choice. In other words, one deals with the middle by taking actions at the poles – dealing with the wafflers and the sympathizers in the middle by supporting

the moderates on one hand, and pursuing and attacking the violent extremists on the other. The middle is persuaded (indirectly) by what happens to those at the two poles of moderation and fanatic extremism.

On the defensive end we need to continue policies on the home front that have been working, such as listening in to phone conversations from suspected terrorists, and stopping the electronic transfers of money to and from suspected parties. On the offensive end, we need to continue the targeting, capturing and killing of terrorist individuals. If any of these policies are stopped or weakened, we will start losing ground to al-Qaeda. Our approach thus far has been the right one, and we need to keep it going strong.

States like Saudi Arabia that sponsor extremists and extremism need to be stood up to and told that we will not tolerate it. What we don't realize is that a lot of this type of talk is probably already going on. When private talks go on between the U.S. and the King of Saudi Arabia, many of these things are probably being said – they are just not said in front of the cameras and microphones. There are even covert military actions – such as the destruction of a target where terrorists are suspected of hiding – that we find out about later or even not at all.

(British American terror researcher and author) says that initially the role of money in getting al-Qaeda started was very important; even though bin-Ladens' purported 300 million dollar fortune may have been 20 million (or even less, given that his international assets were frozen). People's salaries needed to be paid, infrastructure needed to be built and maintained. However, at this point, from a policy perspective, the idea that 'all we need to do is get rid of terrorist financing and we will no longer have a

problem’ underestimates the power of religion in the issue. From a tiered perspective when speaking of policy, money would be on a second-tier level of importance.

He places on a first-tier level an equitable Israeli-Palestinian peace process and a real peace process in Kashmir. While neither of these things are easy – and may have no effect on people like bin-Laden who really can’t be dealt with – these issues do resonate with the masses (what he calls ‘the swing voters’). Other policy priorities would include the U.S. becoming less dependent on these regimes for energy – enabling less dependence on corrupt and tyrannical regimes and a stronger (and less hypocritically selective) democratization policy.

One of the strongest and yet simplest things that the U.S. can do regarding democratization is just being willing to speak out regarding inequities in the Arab world (such as the recent jailing of opposition candidates in Egypt – regarding which the U.S. was conspicuously silent – which was especially ironic given our lack of dependence on Egypt for oil – and their need for U.S. aid dollars). It is powerful when the U.S. is willing to step forward and say ‘this is wrong’. Even though at present we may have little leverage with an oil-rich country like Saudi Arabia, nonetheless, we still have an obligation to consistently speak out.

Another issue is being willing to speak to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt – because this is a group that will likely come to power in the future. Generally speaking, the idea of democratizing authoritarian regimes as a way of dealing with radicalization is very important – and Bergen supports (at least in theory) President Bush in this area. If there were more space for political expression in these countries (which certainly entails more than just holding elections) and they were more accountable, open and democratic,

some of the attraction that radicalism holds might weaken. Some of the criticism against the regimes might also be less intense.

This is not, however, a cure-all. Britain is one of the oldest democracies, and that is where the London bombings took place. The existence of an (albeit imperfect and interrupted) level of democracy in Pakistan has not prevented that country from being a hotbed of radicalism. So, by itself, democratization is not the single solution.

It may have a positive effect on the (aforementioned) ‘swing voters’, but if someone is truly attracted or connected to radicalism, it will not deter or persuade them. For this constituency, there is really only two solutions – death or capture.

From this perspective, one can see that counterterrorism policy has two discrete elements: The multitude of things that one can do with the ‘swing voters’ to make violent radicalization less likely, and the capture/kill policy with those who are already violently radicalized (and therefore unreachable). These two approaches are largely separate and distinct from one another.

Another important point as regards policy is ‘first, do no harm’. Do not engage in policy measures (like the invasion of Iraq, or the abuses in U.S. prisons) that are clearly counterproductive. Even though the story in Iraq is far from over, nonetheless, it has proven (till now) quite useful to al-Qaeda and other radicals.

Ultimately, when it comes to those who actually engage in attacks, the number is not large and there is no magic bullet. Neither will there be a declaration of victory – a ‘gosh, we won!’ moment. If one looks at terrorism as a (albeit globalized) insurgency; studies have shown insurgencies to have about an eleven-year life span on average. While this may be cause for future optimism, it is no comfort from an American national-

security perspective. In the current moment there are also reasons for concern: instability in many areas in the Middle East and other Muslim regions, the propensity for Sunni insurgencies to fuel al-Qaeda and like-minded groups, the continuing conflict in Iraq (which is very beneficial to al-Qaeda), etc.

While it is tempting to blame the fundamentalist religious education – the madrassah system, nonetheless, none of the terrorist operatives have been graduates of madrassahs. Madrassah graduates are generally not entrusted to higher-level operations – having neither the linguistic nor the technical skills to succeed as operatives. In the past madrassah graduates were sent off to serve as ‘cannon-fodder’ fighting against the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan – not even being considered as recognized members of al-Qaeda. (An exception to this is Indonesia, where madrassah graduates have become involved in terrorist groups).

Most of the al-Qaeda operatives were university-educated professionals from middle-class and upper middle-class backgrounds (Zarqawi being an exception that proves the rule). Similar to the way that people think of Christian fundamentalists as being uneducated, poor, unsophisticated and backwards – which is obviously not the case, so people tend to think of Muslim fundamentalists (including the radical minority) as being poor, backwards, unsophisticated madrassah graduates. This is not the case at all – and hasn’t been the case historically with other terrorist groups in other times.

One area that the West needs to be quite careful about is associating violence with Islam as a religion. At this point, many clerics (including those from Saudi Arabia) are condemning the idea of violence in the name of religion – even engaging in dialogue with the jihadists and trying to get them to change their approach. This is taking place in

Yemen as well. There has been a lot of condemnation of the London attacks and various kidnappings carried out by al-Qaeda and jihadist groups. While it is clear that the Koran does not allow the killing of civilians, it does not behoove the U.S. to become involved in nuanced religious debates about what is or is not permitted – both because we do not know that much about the religious fine points and also because we have killed many civilians in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Much of this debate is actually a civil war taking place in the Muslim world – between people who want Taliban-style theocracies and those who don't. From this perspective, the hostility against the West is a collateral effect of this internal struggle, since from the perspective of those who wanted to replace current regimes with strict theocracies; it is the support of the U.S. that keeps these governments in power. The radicals felt that if the U.S. was attacked, it would withdraw its support for the Middle East regimes, which would then crumble. This equation was a part of the complex strategic plan of bin-Laden which lay behind the 9/11 attacks. As a matter of fact, this analysis proved incorrect – instead of reducing our support for the Saudis, Egyptians and others post 9/11, we increased it.

This point alone shows that terrorist attacks have multiple causes (some systemic, some consciously strategic), and it is not clear that any policy approaches can account for all of them. Without bin-Laden and his ideas, and without Zawahiri and his ideas (including the above-mentioned strategic calculations and decisions) it is not at all clear that we would have had a 9/11 at all – even given all of the issues discussed regarding Islam and the West. There certainly would have been an ongoing struggle within the



Islamic world, and there certainly could have been clashes with the West – but they may have taken a very different form than the 9/11 attacks.

[I point out that it may not be possible to prevent people like bin-Laden and Zawahiri from arising, but it may be possible to affect the context within which they arise. Giving an example from U.S. history; in the past we might have had mafia leaders that arose and gained power by killing large numbers of people to eliminate competition – nowadays we might be more likely to see an unscrupulous business leader aggressively taking over other companies and destroying their competition from a financial standpoint. The aggressiveness, ambition, lack of scruples and desire for power may be the same, but the context (and therefore the manner) in which they are expressed has changed. We may not be able to prevent the rise of such people, but we may have the ability and the responsibility to affect the context (the surrounding society, its mores, norms and conditions) within which these people operate and express their desires.]

He points out that (given that we cannot prevent the phenomenon of people like bin-Laden arising) it is crucially important that Muslim leaders stand up and condemn his actions. This has much more impact than condemnations by the West and non-Muslims. Part of this means understanding that the enemy is not Muslim fundamentalists, but people who have very violent ideas. On the contrary, if we label ‘Muslim fundamentalism’ as the problem, we have just generated 1-200 million more enemies than we had with just the violent radicals alone. It is therefore clear that the problem is not religion; it is with a certain kinds of violent ideologues that are fueled and flavored by religion.

He says that the only people who can really defeat the violent radicals are Muslim fundamentalists – because they are the ones who can truly engage with them. An analogy Bergen gives is that if there is anyone who can persuade a violently radical Christian that it is wrong to bomb abortion clinics, it is probably a fundamentalist Christian. Much better (in terms of acceptability and credibility) than a liberal humanist, for example. As mentioned before, increasing numbers of quite traditional clerics are speaking out against violence – particularly since (and including) 9/11. This condemnation has not extended to insurgents fighting coalition forces in Iraq, or Palestinians waging suicide bombings against Israel – because both cases are seen as legitimate defense of Muslim lands against attack, and Islamic jurisprudence tends to support this view. Summing up his policy approaches in order of significance:

- 1) Democratization
- 2) Addressing various grievances
- 3) Resolution of the Iraq conflict
- 4) Progress in the Arab/Israeli conflict and the Kashmir peace process
- 5) European countries dealing with their immigrant populations
- 6) Creating a rapid-response capability to disrupt internet communications by Jihadis.
- 7) Denying the all-important safe-haven to the terrorists

Granted, in some of the above areas we (the West) have more control and input than in others. As regards other areas - such as internal debates in the Muslim world - we don't understand the situation completely since we are on the outside looking in. Some of our approach may involve being willing to create dialogue with (and perhaps co-opt) those in the Muslim world who we may disagree with, but who are not violent Jihadis (such as Muslim Brotherhood members). There is also the impact of our actions in foreign countries (such as in Indonesia after the tsunami) that were helpful in changing

the perception of the West for the better. In sum, the idea that there is nothing that we can do to change the situation for the better is wrong. Again, since what we do can also be very counterproductive, we need to be quite careful in the actions we take, so that we do not make the situation worse – in regards to counterterrorism policy it is wise to remember the Hippocratic oath: “First, do no harm”.

(American intelligence analyst and researcher) says regarding the future of larger states such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Jordan – all of them are vulnerable to Islamist takeover. For this reason, it is important to retain some measure of stability in these states, even as we (the West) encourage them to adopt democratic reforms.

One philosophy calls for gradual and incremental reforms – like the valve on the top of a pressure cooker that lets out small amounts of steam as the pot cools down. Examples of small reforms would be elections in municipalities and the creation of municipal councils with input into government, allowing women to vote, allowing the formation of labor unions, freedom of the press – rather than sudden large scale changes that can trigger power grabs or chaos, because the Islamist elements thrive on chaos. Even more importantly - what needs to be implemented at the same pace as gradual freedoms (and is as integral a part of democracy as its freedoms), is the fair rule of law. This means having judicial systems that themselves abide by the rule of law – rather than just imposing it on others. It also means that the rulers subordinate themselves to the rule of law as well – something that they are unlikely to do.

The danger of radicals becoming elected is mitigated by the existence of laws that protect human rights/freedoms... and keep the government from being co-opted by extremists. Again – the rule of just law is almost more crucial than representative

government, which can be twisted. A strong, but fair rule of law – that might serve to constrain radical extremists, would also have to apply to the rulers themselves (regarding corruption, mandating and protecting freedoms) in order to be acceptable to the masses and the international community... effectively jeopardizing their hold on power.

(Jordanian professor of comparative religion) says change must start from within – the Koran says a society must change itself. Problems include a lack of proper understanding of the religion, economic issues, a lack of democracy, a tribal mentality, nepotism vs. competence in governance, all of these problems come from within. Islam is not the reason- because at other times Islam was the highest form of civilization.

When Muslim community became like a kind of empire controlling other nations, rather than a unity of brotherhood, the emphasis was on top-down control and power instead of spiritual unity. From this desire for unified control also came a suppression of the marketplace of ideas. The proper way in the culture is that each person should be able to choose the way that is best for them – there should be a competition of ideas without internal force.

Historical and religious distortions created problems in the Islamic world. The Islamic world now needs to define itself in terms of its true identity – it needs to reach inside and create a positive modern identity. This process is happening, but there are obstacles, and a lot more progress (politically, economically, educationally) is needed

(Jordanian Sufi Professor) says that the government can't coerce observance, but neither is Islam separate from the public life – this understanding needs to be developed further. He clearly does not want a government that compels religious practices. He

wants an Islamic inspired democracy – He does not want observance at the point of a gun.

(American Muslim researcher) says that the answer is to pressure Saudi Arabia to break its links to Wahabism – like Spain did with Franco and the USSR did with Communism. He says that this link is breaking now in Saudi Arabia now – due to internal and external pressures (mostly internal – the largely middle class population is sick of the Wahabis). He says that there is a space for the US government to push for women's rights. He thinks it is wrong that a powerful woman like Condoleeza Rice has not done anything for the women of Saudi Arabia, especially black and Shia women, who are even more highly oppressed than Sunni women. He says that Rice praised Saudi Arabian elections despite the fact that women were not able to vote – he says he finds this disgusting.

(Saudi American researcher) says that international pressure is needed to remove hatred and intolerance that exist in the Saudi Arabian educational system. Changing textbooks is minute thing to compel them to do in comparison to the benefits that they have from the international community.

The educational system also needs to be freed from state control. When it is freed from state control, it will naturally begin to respond to societal needs and influences, As well as the influence of other cultures and ideas.

In order to create changes in the religious establishment, the issue is not to separate mosque from state, but to liberate mosque from state control. At this time the state controls who is a religious leader (mufti), what they are able to say, what they can teach, etc. All of this is controlled by the State. The key is to let the mosque (the religious

establishment) respond to the needs of the society – not the needs of the government. If the religious establishment is freed from control of the state, he says that they will become much more progressive. This is because the people are usually more progressive and varied than religious establishments or state control – but only when they are given the freedom to be. He says that if the religious establishment is freed from state control, it will pressure the state for change, not like now where the state pressures and controls the religious establishment. Again – he states that the religious establishment is a tool of Saudi Arabian state – they are not two partners, and the religion certainly does not control the state (though the regime claims that they do).

He believes that the U.S. should insist on reciprocity – if the Saudis want a mosque – we want NGO's in the Middle East. This includes varied religious institutions, educational organizations, human rights NGO's (especially the latter).

Also segregated (males only) bodies (like Saudi Arabia's consultant council) should be barred. He says that the US congress should pass a resolution saying that the US won't deal with segregated bodies.

He says that one idea would be to convene a summit of NGO's to discuss the issue of human rights in Saudi Arabia – but then he points out that the NGO's are very soft on Arabs governments and tend to an anti Israel bias.

(American intelligence analyst and researcher) says that even if a repressive country believes in reforming itself (which is doubtful), the period immediately following any lifting of oppression can be extremely dangerous and unstable. If the U.S. pushes for reforms too hard and too fast, there could be chaos. In a chaotic situation, the Muslim

Brotherhood would take control. Even though they have supposedly foresworn violence – they are, in reality, extremists who are dedicated to an Islamist world.

(American researcher) says that regarding Iran, while military action would unify the Iranians as well as the greater Arab world, smart measures (like the U.S. refusing to do business with international banks that do business with Iran) could be more effective – possibly causing a major economic downturn in Iran and sparking regime change. He cautions that the U.N. needs to be utilized to build consensus for any sanctions. From a policy perspective, he says that the US needs to strengthen the intellectual, literary and cultural society in Iran, and recognize and support reformists (but don't name them!).

(Jordanian distinguished professor and former government member) says that the Israelis need to give the Palestinians a decent life or they will continue to be a problem. He says that the U.S. should separate Israel and Palestine with a UN force in between. Can't talk peace until Palestine and Israel are separated. The US gives weapons to Middle East, and then wants them to talk peace. The US as the main superpower is like the parent – who should separate the fighting children.

(Arab-Israeli filmmaker and IT worker) thinks the economic situation is key to moderation. Those who live with economic security much less likely to be vulnerable to radical views He thinks that students/academics need to unite and do research and prove that Islamic autocracies are bad and hurting people. But they need help from the West to do this.

(American researcher and academic) says that the way to protect the freedoms in the system is to make it clear that Muslims need to work within the U.S. system, and not erode it. This means that Sharia needs to be a) optional, b) always trumped by existing

US laws. He says that people and governments need to speak up against creeping Islamization and for their own cultures and values - that the native culture (liberalism, a respect for women, etc) must be respected.

(Female teacher at Islamic college in Israel) says that crucial for the role of women in Arab/Islamic society is the education of women – especially the kind of education that allows them to be economically independent with their own car and money. If a woman is financially free, she can act with out dependency on a man. Education will give her the ability to negotiate with the outside world, but even more important than education is financial independence. Again – combination of education and financial independence is key to female power.

(Distinguished Arab-Israeli Academic and author) says that interfaith dialogue in general is extremely important, along with all things that promote open mindedness. Moderates (such as himself) need to write articles and speak out against extremism and terrorism. He does this and also speaks about love, and tolerance. He says that he writes and speaks freely despite the risk of doing so.

#### Review of Topics/Subtopics With Their Main Points Summarized

The following paragraphs review each of the topics and subtopics summarizing their main points.

#### *Radical/Islamist Groups*

Radical/Islamist Groups now decentralized and independent – not controlled from the top down by al-Qaeda (as was the case prior to 9/11). The goal of radical Islamist groups is to spread their ideology worldwide – including for many the establishment of an Islamist Caliphate in all Muslim lands (or worldwide). The group is secondary to the



ideology. It is the ideological (rather than organizational/operational) leader that defines group. Radical groups may hide their agenda with a social service or political face. Major radical groups were directly influenced by totalitarian ideologies. Radical Islamic groups arose in response to a shift towards modernity and the West. Radical Sunni groups are also a response to the victory of Shiite radicalism in Iran.

*Muslim Brotherhood– Summary of Major Points*

Most if not all radical Islamist groups today trace themselves back to the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood was assisted in its early days by the British who wanted to use the group as a bulwark against Nasser. The Muslim Brotherhood is able to feign a greater degree of moderation than they really believe – this makes them dangerous. The Muslim Brotherhood says different things to the media versus what it states internally. Muslim Brotherhood's goals are the destruction of the West, imposition of 'God's will' on the society and creation of an Islamist Empire (according to former members). The Muslim Brotherhood may take advantage of democratic process to gain power and then institute non-democratic changes. The Muslim Brotherhood leadership (i.e., powerholders) are more autocratic than followers – i.e., the leaders want eventual imposition of Sharia law on society. U.S. government possibly being naïve about the Muslim Brotherhood, due to a desire to use group to counterbalance Iranian Shiite power. Violent crackdown (such as in Egypt) has in the past strengthened and radicalized the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood seeks to dictate the behavior of the overall society – especially women – even in states (such as Jordan) where its image is more 'moderate'. The Muslim Brotherhood has waged highly organized campaigns (such as regarding veiling) that have profoundly influenced societal behavior. Some call for the

Muslim Brotherhood to be included in the political process, as long as the democratic process is strong enough not to be undermined – others disagree.

A country in which Islamist groups cooperate in the democratic process – Turkey – is much more diverse and tolerant society than most other Middle Eastern societies. If the Muslim Brotherhood is allowed into politics, it may cause the group to break apart into more radical and more moderate elements. The Muslim Brotherhood want to have both a political and a religious role in society, and this makes them dangerous. One of the things that makes the Muslim Brotherhood popular is the lack of other voices of opposition. Opening up the political discourse would lessen their monopoly. The Muslim Brotherhood (especially its more moderate elements) evolves along with the larger political environment – it is a reflection of the larger society. It is necessary to confront the Muslim Brotherhood on their ideas, statements and principles – especially what is said away from the media (internal quotes, mosque sermons, documents, etc.). Polls that report 20-21% of support for the Muslim Brotherhood may be quite low. The Muslim Brotherhood is especially supported among Egypt's large illiterate population.

*Al-Qaeda– Summary of Major Points*

Al-Qaeda no longer has the control of Radical/Islamist Groups in a top down manner (as it did in the 90s). Rather, decentralized and localized groups loosely affiliate with al-Qaeda and take inspiration from it. The U.S. needs to look at ways to not give groups like al-Qaeda justification by U.S. behavior. Al-Qaeda is a mix of the radicalized Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (which was influenced by Nazi/totalitarian thought) along with Saudi style Wahabism. Al-Qaeda is based on an ideology and must be fought with ideology. Al-Qaeda relies on communication (Internet, cell, fax, video/audio tapes,

couriers for more sensitive information) to indoctrinate and communicate with members worldwide. Al-Qaeda training camps have been set up on the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Fighters travel to ‘theaters of jihad’ worldwide to get combat experience. Al-Qaeda (and/or its regional hubs) is likely still planning and carrying out attacks.

#### *Hezbollah – Summary of Major Points*

Hezbollah is seen in Lebanon as a defense and resistance against Israeli aggression/occupation. The more truly democratic Lebanon becomes, the less support a militant group like Hezbollah will have – and the more they will have to share power with other groups. Hezbollah is seen as an organized group that is a role model to others. Presently Hezbollah carries a lot of symbolic value in the region – even among Sunnis.

#### *Palestinian Groups– Summary of Major Points*

Both Hamas and Fatah are seen as caring more about their inter-group rivalry than the welfare of the Palestinian people. Hamas is deeply unpopular for both its treatment of the Palestinian people in Gaza, its killing of Fatah rivals, as well as its perceived reaching out to curry favor with Israel. Palestinian groups originated as offshoots of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. There are Islamist groups in Israel – both within and outside of the Knesset. They tend to want to exert control over local governments and populations. A growth in the religiosity of the Palestinian Arabs can be traced to Islamist groups. Islamist groups in Israel tend to remain isolated/autonomous from the greater society. Israeli and Palestinian Arabs are afraid to speak out against Islamist groups. Marginalizing groups (like Hamas) may strengthen them and protect them from governmental checks and balances. In Israel, Islamist groups cannot gain widespread power above the local level.

*States– Summary of Major Points*

Because of the high levels of state surveillance and control, it is felt that if fundamentalism/radicalism exists in the population, to some degree the states are allowing it to exist. Oil dollars allowed Gulf countries to enter the modern era without truly modernizing, because they could afford not to and still survive, even thrive and gain power. States allow a level of fundamentalism (and even radicalism towards the West), because it pacifies and distracts the population, but they crack down harshly when it is seen as a threat to their security. Generally the population is more fundamentalist and more radicalized than the governments. Democratic opposition movements are repressed in the Middle East under the justification of cracking down on security threats. Due to repression of democratic opposition groups, the Islamist groups are the strongest non-governmental force (and also seen as less corrupt). Citizens generally do not feel able to speak freely without repercussions. Departure of colonial powers was recent – 1950s through 1970s. As a result, countries in the Middle East are still propelled by attitudes of anti-colonialism and national resistance/liberation, rather than responsibility and self-determination.

Pushing for change in a manner that implies a desire for regime change will meet with resistance and hostility. Better to help governments improve and reform, so they can become more open and responsible - eventually reforming themselves into oblivion. The current phase in the Middle East can be seen as a transitory phase between the collapse of colonialism (which itself followed an age of Empire) and the advent of full modernity. Times of transition give rise to both repression and varieties of extremism. Countries that seem to be internally unified may actually be hiding multiple internal rifts. Radical

groups would like to gain control of states for the protection that sovereignty provides, as well as the use of geography, infrastructure and resources. Currently, Islamist or almost Islamist states include Iran, Somalia, Sudan, Lebanon, Palestine and Saudi Arabia. Larger Middle Eastern states are (some say 50/50%) vulnerable to Islamist takeover. The smaller Gulf States (Oman, Bahrain, UAE, Qatar) are seen as less vulnerable – due to less repression, better economies, better leadership. Because of the danger of takeover, stability is important, even while encouraging reforms

Competent government and equitable rule of law help promote both change and stability. Currently Middle Eastern states are undergoing a huge cultural transformation. There is a significant danger of radical states obtaining nuclear weapons and giving them to terrorist groups. Middle Eastern states lack a positive national/Islamic identity relative to the rest of the world. Problems stem from religious ignorance, lack of freedom/democracy, governmental corruption/incompetence/nepotism, and economic issues – not from the Koran. Past attempts at Pan-Arabism created greater repression, conflict and instability – there is a need to maintain a multitude of ideas, religious paths, historical and cultural identities. Traditionally in Islamic states the clerical leader was not the state leader. Government can be inspired by Islam without being Islamist (like U.S. and Christianity). Some say that currently states are not the key factor in violent extremism (except Iran). States can be sympathizers, sponsors, weak states, terror states. Active sponsors may include Iran, Saudi Arabia and Syria – a passive sponsor may be Egypt – weak or failed states may include Somalia, Sudan, Lebanon (Iraq on the borderline and in the past, Afghanistan and Algeria).

The West is viewed with strong emotions (helplessness, resentment, need) because of its perceived superpower status (it is parentified – for better and worse). Influx of foreign culture and values is seen by some as an encroachment or even assault. Historically, the Middle East felt superior to the West, and therefore it isolated from them Trade – and later oil – wealth allowed the region to prevail/thrive without real progress.

*Saudi Arabia– Summary of Major Points*

British alliance with the tribe of Saud (during WWI) was a key factor in both the founding of Saudi Arabia as well as the spreading of Wahabism. Saudi Arabia funds Islamist extremism in countries like Afghanistan and Pakistan. Saudi Arabia also funds Islamist extremism in the West (including the U.S.) by funding research departments in universities, funding mosques and chaplains, lobbying governments and nonprofit organizations that are fronts for Islamist fundamentalism. Saudi Arabia arrests and represses reform-minded dissidents under the pretext of fighting extremism. Saudi Arabia uses the Muslim Brotherhood as a proxy means of extending its influence into neighboring countries such as Syria and Lebanon. Saudi Arabia allows and even supports (anti Western) Wahabi fundamentalism, but tries to crack down on extremism when it threatens the Saudi regime.

Saudi Arabia floods the market in both East and West with Wahabi/Salafist literature in both Arabic and English. Saudi Arabia fears a Shiite (20% of population) coup in its eastern oil fields and also fears Shiite rule in oil-rich Iraq. The ideology of state control may be more of an issue than the ideology of religious control. Power is held by both the Saudi King as well as the princes (who may be more extreme).

Saudi Arabia has the largest middle class in the Middle East. The large middle class has given rise to cable television, internet, cell/camera-phones – all of which are breaking down traditional barriers in the society – especially the youth. Saudi Arabia may be able to be persuaded to break the official state/Wahabi link. Wahabism may have outlived its popularity in the population. Regime change may bring chaos, but not necessarily Wahabi dominance.

Major assets of Saudi Arabia are its oil and its rule over Mecca and Medina.

Saudi Arabia definitely sponsors the precursors to violent jihadism – hatred of the West, willingness to coerce Islam and a condoning of violence. Saudi government is based on Islamism – the forcible imposition of Islam. Repressiveness of the government does not insure the stability of the oil supply. U.S. government and economic interests are heavily invested in Saudi Arabia. The U.S. government does not speak out against race/religious/gender discrimination. The U.N. and international NGO's also have not spoken out against Saudis. The royal family may use the Wahabis to repress the population and excuse repression. Some say that King Abdallah is an (albeit weak) reformer – others are more cynical.

The Saudi educational system plants seeds of hatred and intolerance that make people more sympathetic and vulnerable to extremism and radicalism. Saudi sponsored schools in the U.S. and EU are teaching the same types of thinking (and the West does not compel them to change their texts and teachings). Saudi royals preach religiosity while living very loosely (but royal women still not free). Widespread gender/religious/racial oppression and discrimination is the norm in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi regime presents one face in the Western media and a different one in Arabic. Educational system

needs to be freed of state control. Ditto for mosques. Both would respond to the needs of the population and marketplace if they were free of control. The Saudi regime will not change without external pressure because it does not have to.

Government uses religious leaders and tribal chiefs to silence liberal voices. State department is possibly biased against Shiites and towards Sunnis/Saudis. Because of its wealth, Saudi Arabia has an influence throughout the entire region/world. The Saudi government has in the past funneled money to extremist/violent groups. This has lessened since they were attacked in 2003, but they still support fundamentalism. Saudi Arabia does not think that the ‘theaters of Jihad’ counts as terrorism. There are constant internal power struggles and corruption in the Saudi government. Some current terrorism experts do not see a link currently between Saudi Arabia and terrorism – they tend to draw a clear line between Wahabism/fundamentalism and terror. These same people see Egypt (and the Brotherhood) as more violent and radical than Saudi Wahabism – so they point to Egypt as the source of radical jihad. Nonetheless, many jihadi fighters come from Saudi Arabia, as do many terrorists.

#### *Egypt– Summary of Major Points*

Egypt passively allows fundamentalism within the society – though does not actively export it like Saudi Arabia. Egypt uses the need to crack down on the Muslim Brotherhood as a ploy to avoid democracy and crack down on dissidents. Egypt as a society does not have a plurality of viewpoints -the party line in Egypt is anti-Americanism and conspiracy theories. There is a real lack of intellectual sophistication. Egypt was recently a much more cosmopolitan and diverse society – but this has changed radically in the last generation. Religiosity in Egypt is due to military failures against



Israel, influence of internal groups (MB), a general Islamic resurgence, resistance to the West, Gulf influence and a lack of influx of ideas.

Egypt is a centralized government in large part due to a geography that is centralized around the Nile and control of water resources. Egypt has a 5,000 year history of centralized autocratic rulership, with the ruler seen as semi-divine – as such there is not a strong desire for a Western-style democracy. People in Egypt will not fight for democratic freedom, but they will fight for food, water and basic justice/safety. The government is seen as failing its contract to provide adequate resources and equitable justice to the people – but this lack distracts the people and keeps them dependent. Currently Egypt is in a negative situation – economically, socially, politically and religiously – without real democratization, solutions will be hard to come by. People are feeling more insecure, and are more willing to criticize, but they do not yet have the will or ability to actively push for change to any meaningful degree. Egyptians do not have a sense of political power – they have become and been made de-politicized. Since 9/11 re-politicization has manifested mainly as anti-Americanism.

Violent jihadism is not a prominent feature in Egyptian society – though fundamentalism and anti-Western sentiment is. U.S. pressure for democratization post-9/11 was enough to open a space for fundamentalist extremism, it was insufficient to create real democratic change. There is some economic and inter-governmental reform happening in Egypt, but it is insufficient to have any significant effect on the greater society.

Women in Egypt have little political power, little power in the culture, and are subject to ongoing harassment/hostility as well as pressure to conform religiously and

culturally. Educational systems in Egypt are very sub-standard and do not teach any kind of critical thinking skills, nor do they expose people to a variety of ideas. If the U.S. were to withdraw its support of Mubarak's regime (or pressure a lot harder for change) it would increase the pressure for change in Egypt. Insufficient pressure (combined with continued support) on the regime will result in superficial change only.

In Egypt (as in Saudi Arabia and Jordan) the king is seen as appointed by God. This tends to discourage criticism of the ruler. The Muslim Brotherhood has a large clandestine power base in Egypt. Any chaotic situation in Egypt may result in a power grab by the Muslim Brotherhood. In Egypt (as in Saudi Arabia and Jordan) the king is seen as appointed by God. This tends to discourage criticism of the ruler. The Muslim Brotherhood has a large clandestine power base in Egypt. Any chaotic situation in Egypt may result in a power grab by the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood has a large (underpolled) base of support – especially among Egypt's 65% illiterate population.

#### *Jordan– Summary of Major Points*

The government/secret service in Jordan keeps a careful eye on radicalism – at least the kind that would pose a threat to the regime. Compared to other Arab states, Jordan is relatively liberal. Jordan silences or imprisons people who speak out for democracy. Pressure on Jordan to democratize will result in superficial change only. While the Muslim Brotherhood is not allowed in the political process, they are tolerated as a non-political group (unlike in Egypt), resulting in a sort of uneasy peace. While there is support for Islamism in Jordan, there is also strong support for the monarchy- which is seen as a bulwark against instability. A large population of (poor) Palestinian refugees as

well as heavy media coverage makes the Palestinian/Israeli issue very salient to Jordanians. It has been reported that Iraqi insurgent leaders are based in Jordan.

*Afghanistan– Summary of Major Points*

Al-Qaeda is regrouping in the Afghanistan/Pakistan border area, and this should be a top priority for the West – in some ways it is a greater danger than that posed in Iraq. A major catalyst for Islamic radicalism was the presence of the USSR in Afghanistan. Another catalyst was the U.S. arming and supporting of large numbers of Afghans to fight the Soviets – who were later radicalized by Saudi fighters and propaganda.

*Lebanon– Summary of Major Points*

Power in Lebanon is distributed according to sectarian divisions, and from that perspective, Lebanon does not have a true democratic system. Political parties in Lebanon operate more like corrupt, coercive fiefdoms than real representative parties. While there is strong anti-Syrian sentiment amongst some Lebanese, they are aware that almost all political parties made deals with the Syrians when it was in their interest to. Power is held in Lebanon by division and distribution – like backroom deals among mafia families. Hezbollah is seen as no more coercive than any other party in Lebanon – and is possibly seen as less corrupt. Hezbollah in Lebanon is seen as a counterbalance to Israeli aggression and occupation. Destruction by Israel is seen as a miscalculation by Hezbollah, but not as Hezbollah's fault (they are largely not seen as a liability, even by secular Lebanese). Islamist takeover in Lebanon is unlikely because of the way that power is distributed among groups. An attempt to take all the power would likely result in a civil war. If there was real democracy in Lebanon, support for Hezbollah would decrease. The amount of divisiveness in Lebanon will (and is) causing a counter-

movement towards coexistence that will eventually lead to a more democratic system.

Lebanon tends to be a tool in international conflicts – a place to (and from which to) wage proxy wars.

#### *Turkey– Summary of Major Points*

Turkey is seen as a model of a modern Islamic society – tolerant and pluralist. Nonetheless, groups like the Muslim Brotherhood are actively waging campaigns in Turkey to increase religiosity (even paying people to put on the veil).

#### *Qatar/Oman/UAE/Bahrain – Summary of Major Points*

Qatar is the second Wahabi state – other than Saudi Arabia. Some say that Oman is a model in the Gulf – it is geographically close to extremist states but has not had terror attacks. It is traditional but laid back – religiously tolerant. Oman is completely walled off from Saudi Arabia (they share a long border, but Oman keeps the border closed). The king of Oman is looked at as a model of good governance.

#### *Iraq– Summary of Major Points*

The American incursion into Iraq caused an upsurge in anti-American and pro-Islamist sentiment in the entire region. Tensions in Iraq are not only internal (Sunni, Shiite, Kurd, etc.), but are also an expression of regional tensions between various Sunni and Shiite powers. Iranian influence increasing in the Middle East (in Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, etc) was a direct result of the American incursion into Iraq. The U.S. acted too unilaterally in Iraq, which created problems – more consensus was needed. A lot of anger in the Middle East towards the U.S. is the result of this. Some in the West say that attacking Iraq was an originally good idea done badly. Shiites in Iraq see that the stakes for them are very high – so they are invested in success.

### *Iran – Summary of Major Points*

The Iranian revolution was a major watershed in the spread of Islamist radicalism. The Iranian Islamist message resonates throughout the region – with Sunnis and Shiites. Iran funds various terrorist and insurgent groups in Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq. Iranian influence increasing in the Middle East (in Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, etc) was a direct result of the American incursion into Iraq. Rule by a religious leader has not been the norm in Islamic history. Khomeini created the concept of clerical rule in order to grab and hold power. Khomeini was also very influenced by totalitarian ideologies/methods. The Iranian regime has the goal to spread its dominion throughout the Middle East. The regime definitely wants to acquire nuclear weapons to ensure regional dominance. Ahmedinejad is a tool and figurehead of the clerical rulers – especially Khamenei. Ahmedinejad is very unpopular in the population because of domestic failings and extremist rantings that have isolated Iran from the international community. Economically and demographically the Iranian regime is very unstable and headed for worse times – this encourages drastic rhetoric and perhaps actions as well. Iran desires power in Southern Iraq (oil fields), Caspian nations (undersea oil) and Central Asia (oil, gas, mineral resources). Iran has sheltered and aided al-Qaeda leaders especially after 9/11. China and Russia arm and support Iran in exchange for oil (also block sanctions). Iran acquiring nuclear weapons would radically destabilize the Middle East. Military action against Iran would likely unify the country and gain it regional support. Smart sanctions and regime change measures (helping opposition) would be more useful. Iran pushes the messianic Shiite ‘twelver’ doctrine to quiet and control the population. The majority of the Iranian population wants normal relations with the West and freedom

Iran has lately decreased its support for terrorism (except Palestinian) to focus on nukes.

#### Palestine/Israel– Summary of Major Points

The countries closest to Israel geographically are the ones that have tended to be the most radicalized by anti-Western and anti-Israel messages. According to one point of view, nothing that Israel can do would substantively affect the dynamics in the region – as they are functioning as a scapegoat. This point of view also states that Palestinian radicals damage chances of peace and injure Palestinians far more than Israelis do.

Others say that if the Palestinian/Israeli issue were solved, the entire region would be affected, and certainly that radicalism would be lessened. Another way to state this is that if the Islamist movement were to accept the peace process, this would change the political game in the region.

Moderate Palestinians are horrified at the radicalization within their societies, and those who can leave, do so. There is widespread support (or at least condoning) in the Arab world for the purposeful targeting of Israeli civilians. Hamas may have more pragmatic elements, but they do not represent the main leadership. There is a need to give the Palestinians a decent life – the lack of this is due in part to the Palestinians (especially the leadership) and part of it is due to actions by the Israelis.

Part of the hostility towards Israel on the part of Arab countries is envy at Israel's economic, military and technological advances compared to the rest of the Middle East. Israel's defeat of Arab armies in various wars (especially the 6-day war) fueled an Islamic awakening and a strong anti-Israel sentiment. The breakdown of the Israeli/Palestinian peace process and the intifadah that followed caused a re-politicization of the entire region. Regional media have stoked anti-Israel sentiments by heavy, repeated and

one-sided coverage of Israeli attacks on Palestinians. The presence of a third party serves to lessen feelings of uncertainty and fear among the negotiating parties – as sometimes people go with a known evil rather than an unknown. There have been hopeful signs lately regarding American policy towards the Israeli/Palestinian peace process – that the U.S. is seeing it as more of a priority. The influence of anti-peace groups like Hamas can be lessened by the very act of talking – as this serves to increase the presence of hope (and positive vision) among the people.

Internal corruption and rivalry in Palestinian society has lessened the chances for peace and made life miserable for the Palestinian people. Both Fatah and Hamas are blamed. There is a growing recognition that the internal Palestinian society needs to become stronger, more unified and less corrupt – needs to take responsibility for its own future. There is a strong feeling of powerlessness, fear, hopelessness, fatigue, rage, depression, anxiety, humiliation and helplessness among the Palestinian people towards the Israelis. There are those who want peace in the form of a two state solution; there are those who want peace in the form of a single, democratic and pluralistic state, there are those who see one as a precursor to the other and there are those who just want destruction of Israel.

Israelis (even those in favor of a peace settlement) tend to see a single-state solution as being a form of demographic destruction of the Jewish State. There is an attitude that if positive change is not going to come from the political powers, it needs to come from the grass-roots efforts of the Palestinian people (and Israelis too). Palestinians radicals who believe in violent measures sometimes go through a phase change where they see resistance as also encompassing non-violent measures.

Palestinians see American hegemony as ensuring support for Israel and preventing positive change. Small quality of life issues created by the Israelis have a large impact on Palestinian attitudes towards Israel and push people towards violence. The three issues that came up most often were lack of ability to travel freely (in and out of Palestine), Israeli humiliation and disrespect and the fear of Israeli attacks/arrests. There is a lot of pressure internally in Palestinian society for women to conform in dress and behavior – for cultural/familial reasons as well as religious ones.

Extremist/violent sentiments are very widespread in West Bank culture – even more so in Gaza. Israeli Arabs feel discriminated against in Israel regarding access to resources. Larger Arab/Israeli problems drive a wedge between Israeli Arabs and Jews. Muslims do not realize that Israel is one of the best countries in the world for Muslims. Economic stability and security would promote moderation and discourage radicalism.

*United States– Summary of Major Points*

U.S. acceptance (or lack of decisive condemnation) of extremism within Islam stymies Islamic reform – due to misguided political correctness, naiveté, or fear of backlash. The oil lobby in the U.S. is very pro-Saudi and has had an influence on politics as well. U.S. oil purchases in the Middle East funds extremism – in effect, the U.S. is funding its own enemies. The support that the U.S. gives to non-democratic governments stands in the way of reform in the region and makes the U.S. government deeply unpopular. The U.S. is considering using the Muslim Brotherhood as a proxy force against Shiite extremists – a repeat of previous policies of backing dangerous/extremist forces. There is a proliferation of organizations within the U.S. that are fronts for radical and fundamentalist groups – the U.S. government tends to be in denial about these



groups. Due to fundamentalist influence in the U.S., radical Islam is growing. The U.S. is seen as ignoring human rights abuses in the Middle East (due to selfish interests) while making a big deal about them elsewhere. Americans have misconceptions about the Middle East because few have lived there. Extremist clerics are not in danger of coming to the U.S. because they are here already.

Islamists that learn to play by the rules and not stick out may be a greater danger. Islamists in the US and EU want to encroach on Western values, freedoms and behavior. U.S. and EU needs to push back to prevent encroachment of Islamism and Sharia law. West needs to speak up for and protect freedoms and values (enforce existing laws).

#### *Europe– Summary of Major Points*

Just like in the U.S., there is a proliferation of groups in Europe and in the UK that are connected with fundamentalism and radicalism – and they are allowed to operate freely. Education of women in some Islamic circles (such as the Algerian French) has caused the women to become more outspoken and independent – due to exposure to liberal ideas. In France, unrest in Muslim immigrant communities is largely due to economic issues. In the UK, the issues have more to do with identity and alienation – a combination of not wanting to blend in and not feeling accepted within the larger society. The UK was very complacent regarding extremism – as long as they were not the targets. This changed markedly after the 7/7 bombings.

In Germany, radicalism is also an issue of identity, with German Muslims (especially Moroccan) feeling very isolated from society. This is less true with Turkish Germans. Denmark is very aware of extremist issues – they are ahead of other Scandinavian countries. Belgium has a problem of ‘creeping Sharia-zation’, as Sharia law

influences the society. Belgium also has a lot of emigration, a large immigrant population and a big welfare state (seen as a significant part of the radicalization problem, as it creates an isolated sub-culture). Generally EU countries have a low native birthrate and many Islamic immigrants with a high birthrate.

Political correctness holds back meaningful policies to fight extremism; UK and the U.S. are the worst, France is next, then Scandinavia and Germany and Australia are the least. If a country is not enforcement oriented, even the best policies are ineffective. Useful policies include: Moderate Muslims speaking out; good community/police cooperation; preventive/educational measures. Saudi Arabia spends millions of dollars to export fundamentalist, intolerant, Wahabi Islam to the UK, U.S. and Europe. This is still ongoing. In the UK, parents are helpless to protect their children against radicalization (similar to parents feeling helpless in the U.S. against gang members recruiting their children). The radicalization process takes place by discrediting the tenets of traditional religious Islam and teaching intolerance towards non-Muslims. Radicalization takes place through social settings, organizations, universities, madrassahs, mosques, media (especially internet media), etc.

Some predict Europe will be next major front in the battle against Islamist radicalism. This is because of large concentrations of (poor) poorly assimilated immigrants. Fundamentalist Muslims have set up parallel societies and legal systems. Honor killings, stonings, and other crimes have been committed in these societies. Vandalism and violence are wreaked by radicalized Muslim youth – esp. in France. Increasing issue will be radicalization of native-born European youth. Moderate Muslims are horrified at the radicalization of their youth.

### *Economic Issues– Summary of Major Points*

Oil wealth props up extremism. If countries suffered a loss of economic power, they and the extremists that they support would become vulnerable. Democracy will come to the Middle East if the oil economies collapse. If the U.S. reduced oil purchases in the Middle East by 10%, oil prices would fall 50%. Oil wealth was the factor that originally brought Wahabism to prominence through the support of the Saudi government. Increasingly, the U.S. government is aware of the need to find alternate sources of fuel. Substantial progress in fuel alternatives is probably going to become a reality soon.

### *Culture– Summary of Major Points*

In the Middle East, unlike the West, people are not free to speak openly without fear. Cultural lag in the Middle East affects all areas of society – government, corporate, etc. Oil dollars allowed Gulf countries to enter the modern era without truly modernizing, because they could afford not to and still survive, even thrive and gain power. Religious television programs have made people more informed about Islam (some in a moderate way, and some in a more extremist way – depending on the programming).

### *Religious Culture– Summary of Major Points*

There is a general increase in Islamic religiosity in both the Middle East as well as the West – this began in the aftermath of the 1967 war with Israel. Religiosity is also an effect of a huge amount of oil money being used to fund religious fundamentalism, both in and out of the Middle East (by both groups and governments). Freedom of movement, dress and belief has all but disappeared in Middle Eastern society. The people tend to be more religious than the governments – while the governments try to monitor and control

the level of religiosity so that it does not become radicalized. Encroachment of Western culture has also contributed to a religious counter-movement. A significant amount of the religiosity in the population is due to a concerted and organized effort on the part of Islamist groups (primarily the Muslim Brotherhood) to influence and control the population – then claim that the people want it.

*Modernity in the Culture– Summary of Major Points*

In Egypt, while many people own computers, they use them mainly for email and chat, rather than to increase their knowledge base. Others use them for self-indoctrination. Countries like Egypt and Jordan have pockets of westernized culture (Western Jordan for example) but these pockets do not represent the mainstream. Even very religious Muslims are exposed to Western pop-culture and this creates both a fascination as well as a repulsion in regards to modernity (or at least their view of it). Muslims in the Middle East are exposed to Western culture at the same time as they lack a sense of their own identity – both culturally and religiously. Part of the surge in fundamentalism is out of a desire to construct a cohesive, strong and modern sense of identity that is missing. Exposure to media (cable TV, cell/camera phones, Internet) has brought modernity very quickly into the Middle East.

*Radicalism in the Culture– Summary of Major Points*

The population tends to be more religious/radicalized than the governments – this is in large part due to campaigns by radical/fundamentalist groups. Middle Eastern governments both use/encourage and try to curb fundamentalism in the culture. Governments rely on the use of secret police and surveillance to crack down on radicalism, rather than modernizing, democratizing and opening up the general culture.

There is widespread acceptance of purposeful violence towards Israeli civilians in the culture.

The poorer classes are especially vulnerable to extremism – due to education with unemployment, exposure to fundamentalism, hatred of the West, hate for their governments, lack of Islamic knowledge, lack of exposure to ideas in general etc. Polls that show 20% support for Islamists in the population may be underreporting because Islamist/fundamentalist attitudes may be much higher than official support. There are more outright Jihadists in countries like Algeria, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan than there are in Egypt and Jordan (due to government crackdowns). Islamist extremists play on and create a sense of threat to identity rather than actual promises to improve day to day life. Anyone who tries to modify or speak out against a strict Sharia code or intolerant attitudes is labeled as being heretical and against Islam. Extremist/violent beliefs are very widespread in Palestinian culture. Extremism in the culture arises out of a feeling of frustration and helplessness – this is particularly true in Palestine (though this is manipulated and used by Radical/Islamist Groups).

The rise of fundamentalism and radicalism was partly a backlash against modernity. Extremists have contempt for the U.S. which they see as weak and corrupt. The West tends to see fundamentalist/primitive Arabs as representative of Islam. The majority of attacks by radicals have other Muslims as their targets. Some say that Islam does not need a reformation, but a return to tolerant pluralism. Iranian revolution and Wahabi spreading were largely responsible for rise of radicalism. Politics entering into religious sphere tends to twist the religious texts and stifle growth. This is done by people who use the religion to exploit societal weakness and gain power. Poverty, lack of

opportunity, powerlessness and resentment over local issues are societal weaknesses that tend to lead to support for radical groups promising solutions. The killing of Muslims by foreign forces also leads to anger that promotes radicalism.

*Political Culture/Grassroots Reform – Summary of Major Points*

Generally in the Middle East politics is not spoken about as much as it is in the West – a sign of a feeling of detachment that the people feel from any sense of political power. At the same time, regional/global politics resonate much more in the Middle East than they do in the West – certainly more than in the U.S. To some degree there was a conscious process of depoliticizing the population – making any ability to affect political change too costly so that the people eventually give up. People tend to listen to the loudest voices in the culture – which usually belong to the Islamists like the Muslim Brotherhood and (to a lesser degree) the jihadists. There is a slow but increasing push by women to be included in the political process – more in relatively liberal countries like Jordan.

Pro-democracy groups exist in many Middle Eastern countries, but they are isolated from one another and repressed by the government (difficulties in operating to outright arrests) Pro-democracy groups have turned to alternative media (internet and internet radio). In Palestine, there are grassroots movements for improvement of the lives of the people.

*Sexuality in the Culture– Summary of Major Points*

A large number of single men and women in Middle Eastern culture are not married and not having sex. This contributes to both a sense of frustration as well as hostility towards the opposite sex (especially males towards females). One cannot even

easily meet people for sex, or even pay for sex – as there is nowhere to go to do so.

People live with their families and hotels do not allow unmarried couples in. In the more modernized parts of society (in Jordan for example) girls will have oral or anal sex to keep their virginity, or have hymenoplasties. Safe sex is rarely practiced. Sexuality in the culture tends to have a predatory or ownership attitude attached to it. There is a difficulty in people getting married (due to unemployment). This increases frustration. Frustration and confusion are increased by exposure to a Hollywood version of sexuality.

### *Gender in the Culture– Summary of Major Points*

Women in Middle Eastern culture are often harassed on the street – even when veiled. There is a pervasive sense of hostility towards women in Middle Eastern cultures. Women tend to be seen as property or objects rather than as autonomous individuals. Harassment of women is not due to sexual frustration – it is just an accepted part of the culture. Women tend to ignore harassment or show fear, which encourages it to continue. Many men in the culture have not had the chance to interact with women and therefore have not been able to humanize them and learn to respect them. Women in Middle Eastern culture tend to rely on their fathers and husbands for opinions. Women are unaware of what their rights are in Islam. An increase of fundamentalist Islam in the society has been accompanied by an increase in negative attitudes towards women.

Women are not openly pushing for change – they tend to try to achieve goals in more subtle ways (perhaps out of a sense of lack of power or fear of backlash). Radicals are pushing to keep the practice of Female Genital Mutilation in the culture (and in Egypt it is still quite widespread) even though it is decreasing due to pushes by civic organizations and governments – it exists as an ‘undercover abuse of women’. The

presence of women in the workforce is increasing – which is also tending to reinforce religious mores of dress and behavior as a counterbalance. Women in the culture put on the veil not because they want to do it, or out of ‘general religious trends’ but because of pressure – from their families, and from religious groups.

The Muslim Brotherhood has waged a careful multifaceted campaign for about the last 14 years to influence women to put on the veil and for their families to insist on it. Wearing the veil is not an indication of religiosity, and also men who are quite non-religious will insist that their wives, girlfriends, etc put on the veil or even chador. Wearing the veil and dressing conservatively is a way that a Muslim family establishes and keeps its reputation. The subordination and domination of women is largely cultural, not specifically Islamic. Sufi Islam tends to encourage rights, learning and accomplishment by women. Polygamy is as much cultural as religious (can change) – was once a part of Judaism also.

Women in the (Arab) Islamic world tend to be acted upon (objects) rather than actors. Lack of mixing between men and women contributes to the dehumanization/ disrespect of women. Female genital mutilation is a covert widespread abuse of women – and a form of control. Women’s rights to inheritance, choice in marriage, divorce and custody need to be spoken about and examined. Honor killings are a way to protect the family name using the woman as an object to do so. Women are seen as the protectors and guardians of the religion – convenient for the men.

Men get away with behavior that would have a woman be in danger of being killed. Palestinian society is more tolerant of women due to its proximity to Israel. Education that leads to earning ability is the key to independence and for women.



### *Educational Systems– Summary of Major Points*

Arab/Islamic educational systems throughout the Middle East (and increasingly in the West) teach intolerance, religious extremism, hatred and the condoning of violence. Particularly the extremist education of children is a problem throughout the Arab world. Educational systems in the Arab world tend to have low standards generally, and do not teach critical thinking skills or expose to a variety of ideas. Educational texts are full of materials that teach intolerance towards other religions, disregard for human rights and negative attitudes towards women. Wahabi texts are being used in both formal and informal educational settings in the West. A lack of in-depth education in traditional Islam leaves Muslims vulnerable to radicalization in both the Middle East as well as the West. Student bodies in the Middle East have become overwhelmingly Islamist. A moderate, tolerant education can definitely change people's attitudes. A value-neutral education is insufficient because of other negative influences. The moderate education of women is especially able to create positive change. When education is available close to home, women will be more likely to attend.

In Israel/Palestine the education is supervised to ensure neutrality. Education alone is not enough to empower women – it must lead to financial independence. 9/11 hijackers were not westernized and secular – they were a product of the Saudi educational system which teaches intolerance and hatred. Saudi educational system needs to be purged from hatred and intolerance. Saudi schools need to be freed from state control.

### *Attitudes towards the West– Summary of Major Points*

Hatred and/or resentment towards the West predates Islamic radicalism. There tend to be more positive attitudes towards Western societies than Western governments

(especially the U.S.) The end of the Cold War and the establishment of the U.S. as the world's primary superpower intensified negative feelings towards the U.S. Feelings of political powerlessness are stronger than a resentment of Western culture. There is strong resentment towards the U.S. for its support of non-democratic, repressive and corrupt governments in the Middle East. This is seen as hypocritical, given that the U.S. supposedly desires democracy and human rights in the region. It is thought that without U.S. support, regional governments would be forced to listen to the will of the people and become more democratic and responsive/responsible. U.S. policies in the region are seen as self-serving, and a continuation of colonialist exploitation and manipulation. The U.S. is highly resented for its interference in the affairs of Middle Eastern countries – currently most seen in the case of Iraq.

The U.S. is seen as favorably biased towards Israel and against the Palestinian people. The U.S. is seen as hypocritical for supporting groups at one time, and then labeling them as terrorist when they no longer serve U.S. needs (such as the case of the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan).

#### *Conspiracy Theories– Summary of Major Points*

The preponderance of anti-Western conspiracy theories in the Middle East is seen as a sign of the low level of education, discourse and critical thinking in the region, as well as the absence of accurate and open sources of information – including a lack of transparency in government.

#### *The Role of Media– Summary of Major Points*

While many people in societies like Jordan and Egypt own computers, they are often used for email, chat and for religious study/indoctrination including radicalism.

Some people use the Internet to increase their understanding of Islam and the current debates in Islam – which has taken these debates much more into the public sphere. The Internet is a powerful format for radicalism and fundamentalism to spread – as is satellite television. Satellite television and the Internet have also spread an awareness of Western liberal democracy and Western culture. The use of cell-phones (especially camera phones) has begun breaking down some of the barriers between men and women in the culture - especially among the youth.

Some say that al-Jazeera deliberately and knowingly promotes extremism. Other television stations like al-Manar are fronts for radical groups (in that case, Hezbollah). The communications revolution became an integral part of the spread of al-Qaeda and radicalism.

#### *Islam – Summary of Major Points*

Muslims are concerned that negative practices in Islam are giving a bad name to Islam as a whole. When Westerners don't live in Islamic societies they have many misconceptions – especially if all they know about are the more primitive and fundamentalist societies. There is currently a big battle going on in Islam as to its philosophical foundations. Muslims say that God looks at the heart, not the externals (unlike the fundamentalists). Muslims say that the basis of Islam is love, mercy, peace and tolerance of others. Islam is not a religion built on central authority or even precedence – so it can be interpreted at any time by anyone claiming authority to do so. For this reason, movements can rise up in Islam and then fade away.

### *Sharia– Summary of Major Points*

The goal of the Islamists is to have a ‘Sharia state’ but they are not really prepared to either define this or to go about the actual business of running a state. A ‘sharia state’ has never really existed before in Islamic history, as the state/ruler and religious establishments were generally separate entities. The Islamists have tended to idealize a particular part of Islamic history, despite the fact that it was just as chaotic as the rest of history and they don’t know that much about it. There are fierce internal debates about the proper observance of Sharia law and these debates are causing huge rifts in Islamic society – especially in the Middle East. Muslims in the West are taking their cues regarding observance of Sharia from the East. While many countries have structures for the observance of civil Sharia law, it is the observance of criminal Sharia law that entails beheading, stoning, lashing, amputations. Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and parts of Africa (Sudan, Somalia, parts of Nigeria) observe criminal Sharia law.

There is an attitude among fundamentalists that Sharia is unchanging, but in actuality, the interpretation and implementation of Sharia law (fiqh) has always evolved with the times. Those that say that Sharia law needs to be imposed do not understand that from the Islamic perspective, Sharia was supposed to be up to the free choice of the individual. One becomes a Muslim by professing belief (Shahada) and leaves Islam by professing non-belief. The degree of observance of Sharia does not make or unmake a Muslim. There are Muslims calling for reforms in the interpretation/implementation of Sharia to bring it in line with modern needs/times in areas like marriage, inheritance, custody etc. In some societies and in some Islamic circles this is already taking place. There are many pro-female hadiths in the Koran that are not being widely publicized.

There was a rationalist/reformist movement in Islam that predated the rise of Wahabism/Salafism, but it was drowned out by the fundamentalist voices – there are those that are trying to bring back the ideas of that movement.

There is a desire among some reformers for a secular democratic state that does not oppose religion and is inspired by it (but does not impose it) – modeled after the U.S.A. The loudest voices still belong to the fundamentalists and the jihadists. Moderates who speak out against a strict Sharia code or intolerant attitudes are labeled as being heretical and against Islam – which has the effect of silencing dissent. According to Islam there is no compulsion in religious observance (including Sharia). Criminal Sharia law (huddud) - practiced in a few countries - actually predates the Koran. Israel has optional civil Sharia courts that Muslims can use – a good model.

Sharia law (actually fiqh) can evolve and be modified to fit with the need of the times. U.S. and EU law evolved from biblical law, but it evolved over time. A major demarcation between moderates and non-moderates is state-enforced Sharia.

#### *Islamic Reform – Summary of Major Points*

There was a rationalist/reformist movement in Islam that predated the rise of Wahabism/Salafism, but it was drowned out by the fundamentalist voices – there are those that are trying to bring back the ideas of that movement. There is a desire among some reformers for a secular democratic state that does not oppose religion and is inspired by it (but does not impose it) – modeled after the U.S.A. The loudest voices still belong to the fundamentalists and the jihadists. Some say that Islam does not need a reform, but rather a return to tolerance/pluralism. There are those who insist that ‘true Islam’ is a moderate religion that respects all.

### *Radical Indoctrination– Summary of Major Points*

Radicals do not get people to follow them by command, or by reward, but rather by teaching and inspiring them – what has been called a ‘preceptor’ system. There is also the ‘self-indoctrination’ system that increasingly uses various media. ‘Violent extremism’ may be a better term than ‘radical Islam’ which may be offensive. Those who use Islam to justify violence are twisting it for their selfish needs. Outer circumstances, inner stress and a lack of a strong moral compass make youth vulnerable to recruitment by radicals. Children brought up by involved and guiding/supervising parents are less vulnerable. Youth who are given a firm parental education in the ethical aspects of Islam (honesty, equality, respect, tolerance, and kindness) are less vulnerable to a twisted version of Islam. Especially a problem with busy/absent parents and poor economic circumstances – more true in Palestine where economics is a big issue. Religion comes second to this. Unmarried boys/young men without wives, children or responsibilities are easier to influence.

Spreading of Dawa (fundamentalist outreach) is as big a concern as outright radicalism. 9/11 hijackers were not secular and westernized – they were a product of the Saudi educational system (that teaches intolerance and hatred of the West and other religions.) It is not religious control of the educational system that is a problem, it is state control. Sophisticated recruiters use grievances (legitimate and not legitimate) as manipulative tools to radicalize people. The issues are secondary to the recruitment.

Other societies that have grievances but not extremist recruiters don’t turn to radicalism. Specifically, the issues stated by bin-Laden grow and change – cannot be satisfied. While addressing issues may make recruitment harder, it will not deter the

recruiters. First, U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia was the biggie, then when that was removed, Iraq became the big issue. If Iraq ends, something else will be focused on as the major issue. Having said that, U.S. policies in the Muslim world make recruitment a lot easier. The top things that predispose to radicalism in ranked order: ideology; rallying leaders, resources/bases; grievances. Lower down are alienated youth, state help (including passive), communications networks, money.

#### *Wahabism/Salafism– Summary of Major Points*

Wahabism was denounced as heretical for many years by mainstream Islam. It was only with the founding of Saudi Arabia and the discovery of oil, that Wahabism was spread and accepted within Islam (helped by Saudi oil money and support). British alliance with the tribe of Saud (during WWI) also was a key factor in both the founding of Saudi Arabia as well as the spreading of Wahabism. The distinction between Salafism and Salafi-Jihadism is an artificial one. Wahabi/Salafi/Deobandi ideology is the foundation of modern terrorism. Widespread ignorance of the tenets of traditional Islam allows Wahabism to thrive. The Wahabi practice of labeling other Muslims as ‘heretical’ (kafir) is against the tenets of traditional Islam – this is true in regards to labeling any monotheistic believers. By declaring someone as heretical, the Wahabis then justify any action against them.

Wahabis consider even traditional Sunnis to be heretical, as well as Shiites and Sufis. The Wahabis and Saudis have a history of brutality towards their fellow Muslims. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt became fueled by Wahabi ideology (with the assistance of the British who wanted to use the Muslim Brotherhood against Nasser). From this perspective, all of modern day terrorist ideologies are an outgrowth of

Wahabism (though the groups themselves stem from the Muslim Brotherhood).

Wahabism as an ideology depends on the existence of an enemy 'other'. Sending Wahabism abroad by the Saudis kept attention/criticism away from the regime, and was a bulwark against Iranian/Shiite expansionism. Ultimate Wahabi goal is the control of Sunnis worldwide.

Calling Wahabis 'salafis' is a misnomer, because Salafism was a movement for ethical reform. Others say that extremists are not 'Wahabis', they are 'Qutbists' (followers of Qutb – who based his ideology on ibn-Taymiya and the Khawarijis – early extremists). Some say that the ideology of ibn-Taymiya and Wahabism was more important than Qutb and the Muslim Brotherhood – who just added the revolutionary element. Totalitarianism may have begun with Wahabism (in the 1700's) rather than Wahabism being influenced by totalitarianism. Not every Islamic fundamentalist is a terrorist or is violent.

#### *Shi'a/Sunni Issues – Summary of Major Points*

Sunni Islam was dominant in the Middle East prior to the Iranian revolution.

The revolution itself was partially a response to Sunni regional dominance. At the same time, the revolution inspired Sunnis as well – as the Soviet withdrawal did. The rise of both Sunni and Shiite fundamentalism was also just two separate movements. Both in general are a reflection of radical Islam, and also of the Islamic awakening (Sahwa) that occurred after the collapse of pan-Arabism/Nasserism. Shiites (in general) have tended to see themselves as the underdogs/victims. Saudi spread of Sunni Wahabism prevented more Shiite/Iranian influence.



Iranian Shiite extremists see the Sunnis as having had the advantage prior to the revolution, and they need to catch up in terms of power and influence. Each side had their ideologues, and there was also crossover – for example, Khomeini read Qutb. At times the two strands ally together for a specific purpose (like Iran funding Hamas). They both represent critical threats – both in different ways. Currently Sunni terrorism has been more of an immediate threat to the West. The major ideologues were also Sunni (Qutb, al-Banna, ibn-Taymiyah, etc.) Sunnis also outnumber Shiites (and it tends to be the Iranian Shiites that are radicalized).

#### *Jihad– Summary of Major Points*

The term ‘jihad’ in the military sense refers to a defensive war. In order to declare a defensive war justified, one must have a central religious authority in place.

#### *Understanding the Moderates– Summary of Major Points*

Even among moderate Muslims, there is a strong negative feeling towards the U.S. government and towards Israel. There is currently a struggle among moderates regarding the right of Israel to exist and solutions to the Israel/Palestine issue. Moderates tend to draw criticism from more extremist Muslims – speaking out in the Muslim world can be costly. At the same time, moderates can come under criticism, scrutiny and suspicion from non-Muslims and the West. Moderates may also feel afraid to speak out because of fear of scrutiny or reprisal from the governments of their home countries. The first victims of radicalism are moderate Muslims (especially women), because wherever radicals gain power, human rights are lost. Moderates in the Arab world are isolated from one another – unlike the extremists and fundamentalists that have clear unifying ideologies and are organized and united. It is problematic for moderates if they are

perceived as being too close to the West or speak in completely Westernized language. It is possible to be religious (pray, fast,) and yet be completely modern and religious. Those who do this have family, friends and education (with values) that supports it. Those unfamiliar with Islam are more vulnerable to distortions of it. Those who have nuanced views that deviate from the religious party line feel afraid to express them in public.

#### *Understanding the Extremist – Summary of Major Points*

An extremist is someone who wants to enforce Sharia law, particularly criminal Sharia law. An extremist justifies the killing of civilians and blames the West for Arab ills. Extremism comes from those desiring power twisting and interpreting religion to suit their purposes. These power seekers use outer issues to sway others to do what they want – be under their control. Others say that it is an interplay between religion, ideology and (desire for) power. Bin-Laden and Zawahiri are motivated by both religious ideology and desire for power. Others say that it is primarily the ideology – with the radical group serving as a function of the ideology and a vehicle for its spread.

War is not between religions, but primarily a war within a religion that spills over to be a war between religions. Some say that it is primarily motivated by sincere religiosity (to fulfill a divine command, to serve God) – not a desire for power, even by the leaders. As to whether religion can be fused with power, that is difficult to see or analyze. Following Taymiya and Qutb, bin-Laden and Zawahiri wanted to overthrow all Muslim leaders – unlike Azzam who just wanted to get non-Muslims out of Muslim lands (he was Palestinian). We also cannot underestimate the role of the charismatic individual leader – ringleader of an attack or leader of a radical group – their vision, ideology and goals. Between religion and politics, religion seems a more primary motivator. To understand

an individual leader, listen to what they say (bin-Laden and Zawahiri speak mostly of religion, secondarily of politics). While psychological profiles may be interesting, they are unprovable – it is more clear just to listen to what individuals say and how they self-describe. Some call this a religious ideology, that became a strategy that became overwhelmed by nihilist tactics. The radical ideology does not translate well to broad-scale societal workability. Most Muslims don't want to live under fundamentalist style rule. Radicalization tends to be self-magnifying and self-reinforcing and self-multiplying – so what started out as sincere religiosity became distorted into something else. The hostility to the West is a side point to a larger debate over religion in the Muslim world – almost a civil war between modernity and fundamentalism.

Radicals attacked the U.S. to undermine modern governments in the Middle East. So far the calculations of al-Qaeda and its leaders have not worked and they have no workable goals or political future – they are kind of stuck in a nihilistic corner. There are other extremists (K.S. Mohammed, R. Yousef) who do what they do just for fun and thrills – like professional terrorists – not religious, just enjoyed the role.

#### *Developing General Trends in the Middle East– Summary of Major Points*

The Middle East is currently in a transformative period – politically, religiously and socially. Insufficient pressure on Middle Eastern governments to democratize will just result in phony cosmetic changes. Pressure for regime change will have an opposite effect (even if this is just implied). It is unlikely that extremists will gain political power in countries like Egypt and Jordan – but they are gaining popularity among the population. Nonetheless, the Islamist groups are the strongest opposition voice at the present time. A total loss of U.S. support might cause regimes to fall and extremists to

take over. Arab countries function with a ‘top down’ form of government – this is unlikely to change radically in the near future. A change in the oil economy (for example the discovery and development of alternate fuel sources) might have a major effect in the Middle East. People desiring reform in the Middle East look to the U.S. and the EU as models of diverse yet unified democracies cooperating for the common good without top-down control.

*Developing Positive Trends – Summary of Major Points*

Middle Eastern countries that have stagnated politically nevertheless have grassroots movements for positive change. The existence of the Internet and satellite television has allowed people to be exposed to debates taking place within Islam as well as becoming more educated about Islam. The Internet and satellite television have also allowed people to become exposed to liberal and democratic values as well as becoming more aware of human rights norms. Political reform is happening in countries like Jordan and Egypt, though the changes are slow and are more administrative – affecting the internal governmental workings.


*Developing Negative Trends – Summary of Major Points*


Internet and satellite television have allowed people to self-indoctrinate with extremist, violent and intolerant religious messages. It is possible that as Middle Eastern countries are pushed to become more liberal (or as they crack down on extremism) radicals will increasingly find haven in the West, where naiveté and political correctness will allow them to operate. Increasingly, the West is already becoming a haven for radicalism through nonprofit organizations, mosques, chaplains in prisons, and Islamic departments in universities. Radical Islam is already overwhelming the ability of the EU

to deal with it, and it is possible that it will present an increasingly existential threat to Western civilization. The first victims of radicalism were, and continue to be, moderate Muslims. The West is still reacting with passivity and naivete to the threat posed by radical Islam – other than Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. is not dealing with radical Islamists in Sudan, Algeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and elsewhere.

## APPENDIX C


### DIAGRAMS






# Terrorism As A Complex System

Miriam E. Mendelson



**Figure 3**  
**The Terrorist System from an Operational Perspective**

(Center of circle is level closest to actual operations)



**Regional/Int'l System**

Isolation  
 Economic stagnation  
 Historical humiliation  
 Sense of victimization  
 Regional competition  
 Void after colonialism  
 Multiple areas of instability  
 Externalization of Blame

**Perpetrator**

Frustrated  
 Repressed  
 Alienated economically/politically  
 Discriminated against  
 Sense of grievance  
 Exposure to radicalism  
 Desire for meaning  
 Religious idealism  
 Trained/indoctrinated to violence

**Leader/Organizer**

Ambitious  
 Desires Power  
 Organizational ability  
 Access to resources  
 Access to recruits  
 Ideology of grievance  
 Cloak of religious legitimacy

**Categories and their characteristics:**

**Indoctrinator**

Clerical position or recognition  
 Access to population  
 Access to media  
 Message of religious radicalism  
 Ideology of grievance  
 Legitimization of violence  
 Legitimizes terrorist leaders  
 Politicized religion as law of state

**Non-State Supporter**

Exposure to religious/political radicalism  
 Lives in repressive/discriminatory society  
 Local unresolved issues  
 Has legal or illegal resources  
 Generalized sense of grievance  
 Hostile to own or other governments  
 Sense of isolation or alienation

**State Sponsor**

Tyrannical/unstable/corrupt government  
 Sense of threat  
 Need for resources  
 Need for support or legitimization  
 Desire to fight non-local proxy conflicts  
 Desire for support in local conflicts  
 Possesses resources/infrastructure/territory  
 Restive population  
 Desire for external scapegoat

**Observer/Target**

Open system or transitioning system  
 Multiple areas of vulnerability  
 Weak, piecemeal or inconsistent policy  
 Causality/risk averse  
 Has actual or symbolic value as target  
 Economic/political ties to state sponsors  
 Tends to be reactive rather than proactive  
 Constrained by public opinion/approval

(2007) M. Mendelson



**Figure 4. Dissertation Structure - Current Revised Version**






Figure 5. Dissertation Structure – Simplified Version



**Creating a 'Counter-Extremist System'  
Policies that Can be Implemented by the West  
to Counter Extremism and/or Terrorism**

Figure 6.



**The System that Creates, Encourages and Sustains Extremism and/or Terrorism\***  
 \* includes sympathy, support and practice (a partial and tentative list)

Figure 7.







Figure 8. Moderation to Terrorism - a Continuum



**Figure 9. The Extremist - Variables along the Environmental as well as the Individual Axes**




**Figure 10. Systemic Factors that Discourage, Repress and/or Intimidate Islamic Moderates and Moderation**



## Creating a System of Violent Extremism: A Simple Recipe

Climate of Fear

Climate of Hatred & Intolerance



Presence of Inciting Ideology



## Extremism in State/Group/Society: Its a Layer Cake - Its a Trickle Down

### State

Suppresses/Punishes Women  
 Suppresses/Punishes Dissidents/Moderates  
 Suppresses Opposition/Holds on to Power  
 Suppresses Ideas and Information  
 Carries Out and/or Tolerates Violence & Abuses  
 Disempowers Population  
 Encourages/Tolerates Fundamentalism/Extremism  
 Supports Perception of Fear and Threat  
 Supports/Tolerates Spread of Hatred and Intolerance  
 Carries Out/Tolerates Religious Coercion

### Group

Recruits  
 Indoctrinates  
 Trains  
 Intimidates  
 Punishes  
 Represses  
 Deceives  
 Attacks

### Society

Is Hostile to Moderates, Dissidents, Women  
 Intimidates Moderates, Dissidents, Women  
 Represses Moderates, Dissidents, Women  
 Is Intimidated, Repressed, Targeted by Hostility  
 Hates, Discriminates, is Intolerant to 'Other'  
 Is Ignorant, is Afraid, is Suspicious, is Angry  
 Supports Radicalism, Condone Violence/Terrorism  
 Lacks Hope or Opportunity  
 Spreads or Supports Extremist Religious/Ideological Ideas  
 Is Mistreated, Abused, Defrauded by State or Group  
 Is Single, Unemployed, Poor, Repressed, Dissatisfied

### **The Fundamentalist to Extremist/Radical Continuum - from Less to Most Extreme Beliefs**

**Belief in single, fixed standard of practice that conforms as closely as possible to earlier standards.  
Does not tolerate or validate more flexible or modernized standards of practice**

**Belief in superiority of own group or its beliefs over others  
Belief in inferiority of other groups or their beliefs**

**Does not believe that group members have the ability  
to choose other religious beliefs or paths**

**Belief in theocratic rule by state or religious leaders  
Belief in ability of state to coerce religious observance**

**Belief in non-democratic, non-pluralist, non-representational political  
system that does not recognize individual rights or choices**

**Belief in subordination, intimidation, repression and punishment of  
women, dissidents, non-conformists and non-observers**

**Willingness to levy harsh punishments, including death on those who  
transgress religious or moral rules**

**Belief in the evil of free expression and the willingness to suppress or  
punish free expression (by both group and non-group members)**

**Has identified an evil and threatening 'other' to whom different  
standards of treatment and mistreatment apply and are justified**

**Has feelings of threat, humiliation and grievance against  
other groups or states**

**Has vision of conquest, domination and subordination of other  
places and people, religiously and historically justified**

**Condone, preaches and/or rewards violent acts towards others,  
particularly those identified as the evil 'other' - including civilians**

**Plans and carries out violent acts towards others - particularly those  
identified as the evil 'other' - including civilians**