Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2014, Philosophy

Although the idea that emotions can be rational has come to be widely accepted by philosophers, theories of emotional rationality are generally wedded to particular theories about the nature of emotions. In contrast, I develop a theory of emotional rationality that is applicable to a broad range of theories of emotions in both psychology and philosophy. Emotional rationality is excellence in exercising one's emotional capacities in one's practical endeavors. From this definition of emotional rationality, I develop some rationality assessments of agents with respect to their emotions. The project is organized around three assessments: warrant, imprudence, and acumen. Emotion theorists commonly discuss three distinct static emotion assessments (fit, warrant, and benefit); I call this group, the traditional assessments. For each of these assessments, emotion theorists have claimed that it is an assessment of rationality. Roughly, an agent's emotion is (i) fitting in a certain situation if the emotion corresponds to the relevant features of her situation, (ii) warranted in a certain situation if she has evidence that for the fittingness of the emotion, and (iii) beneficial in a certain situation if the emotion contributes to her well-being. I argue that none of the traditional assessments, as commonly understood, count as a rationality assessment. One problem with thinking that warranted emotions are rational is that an agent's emotion may be accidentally warranted. In response, I introduce warrant*; roughly, an agent's emotion is warranted* if the agent has evidence for the fittingness of the emotion and the emotion is grounded in that evidence in the right way. I introduce the assessment of imprudence in Chapter Three. An agent is imprudent with respect to a pattern of emotion tokens of the same emotion type felt in similar situations roughly if the agent fails to take steps to regulate her emotion tokens properly in light of actual relevant feedback providing e (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Justin D'Arms (Advisor); William Cunningham (Committee Member); Richard Samuels (Committee Member); Sigrun Svavarsdottir (Committee Member) Subjects: Philosophy

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), Wright State University, 2009, Human Factors and Industrial/Organizational Psychology PhD

This research aimed at understanding bounded rationality – that is, how simple heuristics result in satisfactory outcomes – in a naturalistic setting where agents have to meet environmental demands with limited resources. To do so, two methodological approaches were taken, an observational and an experimental study of U.S. emergency physicians who have to provide a satisfactory level of care while simultaneously coping with uncertainty, time and resources constraints. There are three major findings. First, based on observations of 12 resident and 6 attending physicians at two Midwestern emergency departments (ED), ED physicians use at least two general heuristics. One heuristic exploits symptom-disease relationships with the goal to rule out ‘worst cases' that would require immediate medical attention. The other heuristic aims at identifying diseases that are commonly associated with a set of symptoms. Thus, whereas the former heuristic emphasizes medical safety by aiming at identifying even unlikely ‘worst cases,' the latter stresses efficiency by aiming at separating typical worst from common benign cases to allocate resources appropriately. Second, the selection of general heuristics is situated in an environmental context. This context is reflected in epidemiological constraints that delimit the range of patients' potential medical problems as well as sociocultural constraints that delimit the range of potential, desirable, or required care solutions. ED physicians' exploit these constraints to actively (re)formulate the problem to-be-solved and select strategies that satisfy requirements for safe and efficient care. Third, based on observations and data from 39 clinicians-in-training who participated in the experimental study, emergency care delivery is the solution of medical problems in a socially dynamic setting. ED physicians aim at understanding their patients' needs and circumstances to obtain salient information about potential (medical) problems and, ul (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: John Flach, PhD (Advisor); Glenn Hamilton, MD, MSM (Committee Member); Valerie Shalin, PhD (Committee Member); Scott Watamaniuk, PhD (Committee Member); Tamera Schneider, PhD (Committee Member) Subjects: Psychology

Master of Arts, The Ohio State University, 2022, Bioethics

This project is a critique of the concept of consensus and its relation to secular moral reasoning. Proponents of public deliberation argue that achieving consensus is crucial to informing moral norms in secular pluralist societies. Without a transcendental basis for morality, ascribing authority to moral norms requires a process of deliberation. Many bioethicists are concerned with formulating ways to ensure discourse is tolerant, non-coercive, mutually respectful, and grounded in intersubjective understanding. The problem is that secular discourse is fraught with varying conceptions of human rights, ethical principles, and what constitutes a morally authoritative consensus. Bioethicists acknowledge the tyranny of the majority problem, but secularism lacks a sufficient rationale to identify when a majority is wrong. Since competing visions of the good comprise bioethics and consensus does not necessarily indicate moral truth, moral uncertainty is the logical result of secular pluralism. Some moral scientists argue that science can inform moral norms, but a careful reading of their work suggests that what is being espoused is moral nihilism. From determinism to deep pragmatism, many scientists are inadvertently supporting a view of reality that obliterates the possibility of values. In secular pluralist societies, consensus is required to establish basic norms, but no account of consensus can indicate when moral truth is known. Consensus is necessary to fulfill the visions of moral scientists, but such scientists implicitly endorse nihilism. What secularists are discovering – by their own reasoning – is that moral truth is elusive, science cannot inform human values, and bioethical dilemmas are incapable of being resolved. The conclusion to this project offers an Engelhardtian solution. Not only is the principle of permission the only viable basis for secular pluralism – the principle coincides with moral scientists' own account of human nature.

Committee: Matthew Vest (Advisor); Ryan Nash (Committee Member); Ashley Fernandes (Committee Member) Subjects: Ethics; Philosophy; Philosophy of Science

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2022, Agricultural, Environmental and Developmental Economics

The timely availability of accurate forecasts plays a vital role in informing decisions by farm sector stakeholders. In this dissertation, I evaluate the rationality, accuracy, and informativeness of a range of agricultural forecasts and projections published by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and other agencies and examine ways to improve them. The findings have implications for future revisions of the forecasting processes and for policymakers, agricultural businesses, and other stakeholders who use these forecasts. In Chapter 1, I show that some of the reported biases and inefficiencies in USDA forecasts may be due to an asymmetric loss of the forecaster. Many previous studies suggest that many USDA forecasts are biased and/or inefficient. These findings, however, may be the result of the assumed loss function of USDA forecasters. I test the rationality of the USDA net cash income forecasts and the World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates (WASDE) production and price forecasts between 1988-2018 using a flexible multivariate loss function that allows for asymmetric loss and non-separable forecast errors. My results provide robust evidence that USDA forecasters are rational expected loss minimizers yet demonstrate a tendency to place a greater weight on under- or over-prediction. As a result, this study provides an alternate interpretation of previous findings of forecast irrationality. Agricultural baselines play an important role in shaping agricultural policy by providing information about the farm sector for a ten-year horizon, yet these projections have not been rigorously evaluated. In Chapter 2, I evaluate the accuracy and informativeness of two widely used baselines for the US farm sector published by the USDA and the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) in three steps. First, I examine the average percent errors of the projections and perform tests of bias. Second, I use a novel testing framework based (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Ani Katchova (Advisor); Wuyang Hu (Committee Member); Brian Roe (Committee Member); Todd Kuethe (Committee Member) Subjects: Agricultural Economics

Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.), Bowling Green State University, 2022, Philosophy, Applied

It is commonly accepted that suspension of judgment, together with belief and disbelief, are the three doxastic attitudes a person may hold toward a proposition. While there have been decades-long discussions on norms for belief and disbelief, philosophers have only started to work out the norms for judgment suspension in recent years. In this dissertation, I aim to contribute to this discussion by looking into the standard of correctness for judgment suspension, some of the possible norms for judgment suspension, as well as the possible obligations when one suspends judgment. I argue that rationality norms play an important role in determining the norms for judgment suspension and the norms for responding to disagreements. Chapter 1 focuses on the meta-normative aspects of judgment suspension and discusses how the Reasoning View of normative reasons together with the Knowledge Standard correctness for beliefs can accommodate normative reasons for judgment suspension. Chapter 2 focuses on one epistemic norm of judgment suspension called conciliationism. According to conciliationism, one ought to suspend judgment on whether p when one faces disagreements from an epistemic peer about p. I argue that conciliationism depends on a problematic principle called Independence, and offer an alternative principle that does not rely on Independence yet still captures our conciliatory intuitions. Chapter 3 focuses on the cases where one suspends judgment on the permissibility of some action. I argue that when one ought to suspend judgment on whether an action φ is permissible, then φ-ing and ~φ-ing are both permissible. Chapter 4 goes beyond the discussion of judgment suspension and discusses cases where one faces disagreement from a moral expert on a moral issue. I argue that contrary to what pessimists about moral deference claim, one is rationally required to defer to the moral expert in those cases. Though some moral considerations may count against moral deference, they (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Christian Coons Ph.D. (Advisor); Michael Weber Ph.D. (Committee Member); Sara Worley Ph.D. (Committee Member); Christopher Kluse Ph.D. (Other) Subjects: Philosophy

Doctor of Philosophy in Engineering, University of Toledo, 2021, Engineering

The applications of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) range from military to filming. Soon pizza and post-delivery services will utilize UAVs. Being airborne, UAVs can be a target of physical or cyber-attacks. UAVs depend on continuous communication with the ground control station (GCS), a global positioning system (GPS), and other UAVs within the UAV Network (UAVNet). UAVs connected in ad-hoc manner are called Flying Ad hoc Networks (FANETs). They depend on protocols and communication models quite similar to preexisting ad hoc networks such as MANETs, VANETs, etc. Recent cyberattacks have revealed severe loopholes and vulnerabilities in drone networks. Hence, a detailed study demands to recreate the attacking scenarios and improvise on the vulnerabilities for developing strong security measures- this is achievable by simulating accurate attacks and then employing a security model. This work considers the simulation and implementation of the security model in three stages: In Stage-I, we identify a comprehensive UAV simulator's characteristics and simulate attacks; In Stage II, we utilize game theory and Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) for the prevention of DDoS attack; and in the Stage-III we implement Bounded rationality for the security of delivery systems. The majority of the available drone simulators focus on the designing, gaming, or military aspects. But from a cybersecurity standpoint, an effective simulator demands the inclusion of accurate mathematical modeling, correct representation of path and terrains, fly zones, easy to handle user interface, and, most importantly, the communicative elements of the Flying ad hoc network (FANETs). Learning about UAVs as networking devices is essential from a security perspective because hackers aim to attack a communicating network's vulnerable aspects. Therefore, in Stage I of our work, we studied several application-specific UAV simulators and then proposed an ideal drone simulator's characteristics. Later (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Ahmad Y. Javaid (Committee Chair); Vijay Devabhaktuni (Committee Co-Chair); Weiqing Sun (Committee Member); Devinder Kaur (Committee Member); Mohammed Y. Niamat (Committee Member) Subjects: Computer Engineering; Computer Science; Engineering; Information Science; Information Systems; Information Technology

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2019, Business Administration

Strategic supply chain planning under uncertainty has obtained significant attention in both practice and academia over the last few years. While there have been a number of analytical studies, empirical research on the effect of uncertainty in different dimensions on individual decision-making is rather limited. In three essays, we model how human decision-making gets affected by various aspects of uncertainty on both upstream and downstream level. Numerous studies have separately examined either the impact of demand or supply uncertainty on ordering decisions, although little empirical work has focused on distinguishing these effects when both are present. Accordingly, in our first essay we focus on settings in which both uncertainties exist simultaneously, with the intent of shedding light on these possible distinctions. We leverage a controlled laboratory experiment in a modified newsvendor setting with two suppliers of varying levels of dependability and cost. While the impact of demand uncertainty appears consistent with prior results, the impact of supply uncertainty is more nuanced. Decision‐makers are drawn to the reliable supplier in the high‐supply‐uncertainty case, subsequently simplifying order decision making and decreasing deviation from optimality. Supply uncertainty also appears to impose limits on the extent to which experiential learning benefits optimal ordering choice. In the second essay, we study the effect of a service-reward mechanism – an endogenous relationship between prior service level and current demand – on managerial decision-making in both single-period newsvendor and a multi-period serial supply chain activity. We conduct two controlled laboratory experiments using two fundamental supply chain models: the newsvendor and the beer game. Our empirical results suggest that the service-reward mechanism significantly and systematically elevates order levels and order variability in a manner that increases departure from optimal orderin (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Elliot Bendoly (Committee Chair); Ken Boyer (Committee Co-Chair); Nathan Craig (Committee Member) Subjects: Business Administration

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2018, Economics

Mechanism Design Theory, introduced by 2007 Nobel laureates Hurwicz, Maskin, and Myerson, has guided economic institutions worldwide to achieve desirable goals in allocating scarce resources. However, most of the literature on Mechanism Design Theory that guides its application, in reality, assumes that people are fully rational; this omission of people's bounded rationality raises doubt over the reliability of the theory's empirical implications. To bridge this gap between theory and reality, we introduce new formalizations to characterize new types of boundedly rational behavior that is missing in existing models but supported by experimental evidence. NLK, the first formalization we propose, is a new solution concept in Game Theory that connects two existing ones, Nash Equilibrium (NE) and Level-K model. Of these two, NE, introduced by 1994 Nobel Laureates John Nash has revolutionized the economics of Industrial Organization and has influenced many other branches such as the theories of monetary policy and international trade. However, there is mounting and robust evidence from laboratory experiments of substantial discrepancy between the predictions of NE and the behavior of players. Among all the alternative models that retain the individual rationality of optimization, but relax correct beliefs, Level-K model is probably the most prominent. Absent in NE, Level-K model explicitly allows players to consider their opponent as less sophisticated than themselves. But Level-K does not allow players to use an important element of strategic thinking, namely, “put yourself in the others' shoes” and believe the opponent can think in the same way they do. Bridging NE and Level-K, NLK allows a player in a game to believe that her opponent may be either less- or as sophisticated as they—a view supported by various studies in Psychology. We compare the performance of NLK to that of NE and some versions of Level-K by applying it to data from three experimental papers pub (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: James Peck (Committee Member); Dan Levin (Committee Member); Paul Healy (Committee Member) Subjects: Applied Mathematics; Behavioral Psychology; Behavioral Sciences; Cognitive Psychology; Economic Theory; Economics; Epistemology; Ethics; Experimental Psychology; Neurosciences; Philosophy of Science; Psychology

PHD, Kent State University, 2017, College of Education, Health and Human Services / School of Teaching, Learning and Curriculum Studies

The purpose of this study was to examine the influences of various facets of middle school mathematics teachers' practical rationality on their instructional decision making as they plan to enact the Common Core State Standards for Mathematical Practice, CCSS-MP1 (perseverance in problem solving) and CCSS-MP3 (communicating and critiquing). The study expands and confronts some of the literature that lacks specifics to instructional decisions made by middle school mathematics teachers, particularly with regards to their disposition, the operationalization of their MKT, and the connection to the institutional obligations affecting their practical rationality. This study provides insight into three facets impacting middle school mathematics teachers' instructional decision making with regards to CCSS-MP1 and CCSS-MP3. First with regards to teacher disposition, a facilitative role using a problem solving approach is preferred. Secondly, curricular choices are made directly tied to the teachers' MKT. Finally, although the teachers recognized that they had certain obligations to the institution, they also held the belief that the institution was obligated to them as well. The two main obligations required from the institution were the need for professional development provided by the district and appropriate resources that promote problem solving and communication. These results suggest the need for professional development for in-service and preservice teachers in the facilitative approach to mathematics instructions, more time for teachers to work collaboratively in professional learning communities (PLCs), professional development for district administrators, board members and parents with regards to a more rigorous and investigative approach to mathematics instruction.

Committee: Karl Kosko (Committee Co-Chair); Joanne Caniglia (Committee Co-Chair); Jay Jahangiri (Committee Member) Subjects: Mathematics Education; Middle School Education; Teacher Education; Teaching

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2016, EDU Teaching and Learning

This dissertation examines how dialogic views of rationality might be employed in the teaching of argumentative writing in ways that lead to the development of sophisticated argumentative writing. The theoretical framing of the study was grounded in social constructivism, micro-ethnographic discourse analysis, a social practice approach to literacy, and multiple views of dialogic rationality. The setting for the study was two high school language arts classrooms in the Midwest of the United States focusing on argumentative writing over a period of one academic year from Autumn 2013 to Spring 2014. The methodology employed in the study was a formative and design experiment in which dialogic views of rationality were incorporated into classroom argumentative practices in iterative cycles that were performed for the purposes of generating questions and conjectures, designing interventions, engaging in interventions, and conducting retrospective analyses. Using micro-ethnographic discourse analysis, the video files of the classroom interactions and interviews with the teachers and students were analyzed to contextualize students' argumentative writing and to clarify our understanding of their improvements and struggles. Findings from the study include that argumentative practices that developed from dialogic views of rationality positively affected students' development of sophisticated argumentative writing. In particular, taking an explorative stance toward complexity made a difference by extending students' ways of dealing with complexity. Students' products showed that they were able to heuristically construct tensions, progress in their ideas from exploring tensions, and integrate the insights they gained from exploring tensions into their thesis. Based on these findings, theoretical constructs were generated about the system of evidence, the system of warrants, response to complexity, the development of a thoughtful thesis, and the role of these constructs in the (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: David Bloome Dr. (Advisor); George Newell Dr. (Committee Member); Richard Voithofer Dr. (Committee Member); Cynthia Selfe Dr. (Committee Member) Subjects: Education

Master of Arts (MA), Ohio University, 2016, Philosophy (Arts and Sciences)

In this thesis, I aim to reconcile Evidentialism about epistemic justification with a version of Pragmatic Encroachment on the epistemic. Evidentialism about epistemic justification is the thesis that the necessary and sufficient condition for a given subject's epistemic justification is that subject's available evidence. Pragmatic Encroachment is characterized by any claim which entails that facts about the practical stakes of a situation influence the existence of epistemic facts. At least one prominent account of so-called Pragmatic Encroachment entails the falsity of Evidentialism; a subject's available evidence alone is not sufficient to ground epistemic justification, and rather what that subject ought to do practically is construed as a necessary condition on epistemic justification. Though diagnoses of certain cases involving a subject's epistemic justification with respect to the existence of practical stakes appear prima facie plausible, the deal of Evidentialism is steep. In this thesis, I hope to reconcile these two theses which are apparently in competition.

Committee: John Bender (Committee Chair) Subjects: Philosophy

Master of Science, The Ohio State University, 2016, Environment and Natural Resources

After the development of the National Organic Standards, scholars began to observe increasing consolidation and reliance on less sustainable production practices in organic agriculture. Scholars argued that these industrial forces – consolidation and conventionalization – could push small and midscale farmers out of production by altering the economic incentives of organic production. Previous scholarly work indicates that a farm household's decisions are often motivated by multiple and complex goals, and a household may prioritize remaining in agricultural production because of its social and personal benefits despite economic pressures to exit. To remain economically viable farm households sacrifice short-term economic gains or diversify their operation so it remains financially sustainable. However, there is limited work on the non-economic motivations and diversification strategies of organic farm households. To fill this gap in the literature, I expand on previous work on substantive rationality, agriculture at the rural urban interface (RUI) and Meert et al.'s (2005) model of farm diversification. I found that organic farmers expressed higher non-economic motivations, engaged in less local sales, off-farm employment, and greater commodity diversification than their conventional counterparts. These results provide mixed support for previous assumptions about the differences between organic and conventional farmers, and raise several questions about the structure of organic farming at the RUI.

Committee: Linda Lobao (Advisor); Sharp Jeff (Committee Member); Clark Jill (Committee Member) Subjects: Sociology

Master of Science (MS), Wright State University, 2015, Human Factors and Industrial/Organizational Psychology MS

Can humans discriminate whether strings of events (e.g., shooting success in basketball) were generated by a random or constrained process (e.g., hot and cold streaks)? Conventional wisdom suggests that humans are not good at this discrimination. Following from Cooper, Hammack, Lemasters, and Flach (2014), a series of Monte Carlo simulations and an empirical experiment examined the abilities of both humans and statistical tests (Wald-Wolfowitz Runs Test and 1/f) to detect specific constraints that are representative of plausible factors that might influence the performance of athletes (e.g., learning, non-stationary task constraints). Using a performance/success dependent learning constraint that was calibrated to reflect shooting percentages representative of shooting in NBA games, we found that the conventional null hypothesis tests were unable to detect this constraint as being significantly different from random. Interestingly however, the analysis of human performance showed that people were able to make this discrimination reliably better than chance. Hence, people may also be able to detect patterned/constrained processes in a real-world setting (e.g., streaks in basketball performance), thus supporting the belief in the hot hand.

Committee: John Flach Ph.D. (Advisor); Kevin Bennett Ph.D. (Committee Member); Joseph Houpt Ph.D. (Committee Member) Subjects: Psychology

Master of Arts (MA), Ohio University, 2015, Philosophy (Arts and Sciences)

In this paper, I first assess whether Rosalind Hursthouse's evaluation structure is warranted for the evaluation of non-rational social animal good. I argue that when Hursthouse's concept of “characteristic way” is identified with Michael Thompson's concept of “natural history”, her evaluation structure is warranted in the context of non-rational social animals. But this warrant does not transfer to the human ethical context. Rationality destroys the determinate link that exists between the four ends and the human characteristic way. If her evaluation structure is to be warranted for the evaluation of human good, then Hursthouse must either be a foundationlist about the normative status of the four ends or eliminate competing conceptions of the human good that are in tension with the unity of the four ends. I show that neo-Aristotelian ethical foundationalism is false in the case of rational animals. Thus, Hursthouse must justify why the four ends “really do constrain” what can pass reflective scrutiny as a possible virtue, despite not ruling out alternative conceptions of the human good. Until she does this, Hursthouse's evaluation structure is not fit to serve as an objective criterion for the classification of human virtues.

Committee: James Petrik PhD (Committee Chair); Mark LeBar PhD (Committee Co-Chair); Ishida Yoichi PhD (Committee Member) Subjects: Philosophy

Doctor of Philosophy, Case Western Reserve University, 2015, Management

Evidence-based management (EBMgt) has been advanced as a way to utilize empirical research findings to propose an `optimal' solution to a problem within a centralized authority structure. In shared leadership settings, decisions are typically complex and punctuated by divergent perspectives emerging from within the organization. In these circumstances, the substantively rational decisions advanced by EBMgt must also be infused with commitment for coordinated action among diverse and often conflicted interests. Is EBMgt a viable approach in these circumstances? This thesis reports on a three-phase mixed methods research project into evidence-based shared decision making in organizations, and the conditions under which EBMgt practices can bring about commitment to a decision. In the first phase, we conducted an inductive, grounded analysis of interviews with community college leaders to find that it is the process of inquiry, rather than the evidence itself, that emerges as the important driver of commitment to a decision. In this study we propose a fundamentally different view of evidence in management decisions—evidence not as a predetermined solution to be implemented but instead as a boundary-object to focus attention and dialogue throughout the process. In the second study, we conduct a cross-sectional comparative survey of 139 public community college faculty, staff and administrators. We find support for the importance of the collaborative process in driving commitment when using research evidence in shared decision making groups where conflict is present. In conflicted environments, the use of evidence in group decision making may actually erode the commitment necessary for decision implementation. However, we also discover that a process of joint inquiry involving collaborative search for and analysis of evidence can be effective in bolstering commitment. As such, this study identifies novel facilitative and restrictive conditions for implementing EBMgt (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Kalle Lyytinen Ph.D. (Committee Chair); Richard Boland Ph.D. (Committee Member); Paul Salipante Ph.D. (Committee Member); Nicholas Berente Ph.D. (Committee Member) Subjects: Educational Leadership; Management; Organization Theory; Organizational Behavior

Doctor of Philosophy, Miami University, 2014, Psychology

Four experiments tested the Probability Theory + Variation model of probability judgment. The model posits that judgments follow the rules of probability theory. Errors occur because otherwise normative judgments are perturbed with noise. Experiment 1 found some evidence for the model's account of noise and errors. However, no support was found for a prediction derived from the variance sum law and the integration rules of the model. Experiment 2 found some support that noise is associated with more errors in conditional probability judgment and judgments adhered stochastically to Bayes' theorem. Experiment 3 reformulated the model as a simple process model in which judgments are formed through the dynamic accumulation of exemplars. Noise was increased through a response deadline, but only resulted in less semantic coherence for conditional probabilities. In Experiment 4, three interventions based on the model and variants the wisdoms of crowds effects were largely ineffective in reducing errors.

Committee: Christopher Wolfe Dr (Committee Chair) Subjects: Cognitive Psychology; Psychology

Master of Arts, The Ohio State University, 2013, Political Science

Theories and models of political behavior, while sometimes predicated on methodological individualism, routinely fail to consider the possibility and potential impacts of human free will—or the implications if humans lack free will. I argue that all models of social behavior, whether individualistic or holistic, must take at least an implicit position on whether individuals can make free (i.e., autonomous) cognitive and behavioral choices. However, social scientists' everyday agnosticism on the question of free will threatens theoretical falsehood and practical irrelevance. I discuss the consequences for political science—focusing on international relations—of the existence or absence of free will. I use metapreferences as a modeling technique to help us conceptualize how free will and causation interrelate, and from this develop the argument that free will elevates the importance that natural science and technology play in creating preferred social outcomes. I close by applying the preceding arguments to the study of war.

Committee: Randall Schweller (Advisor); Alexander Wendt (Committee Member) Subjects: International Relations; Philosophy; Philosophy of Science; Political Science

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), Wright State University, 2013, Human Factors and Industrial/Organizational Psychology PhD

Classical perspectives on judgment and rationality view heuristics as erroneous, leading to suboptimal judgments. Conversely, ecological perspectives view heuristics as smart mechanisms that result in good judgments in the face of uncertainty. Our research focused on the hot hand heuristic and examined it using non-linear analysis methods. This research attempted to answer two questions. The first question concerned the applicability of frequency analysis methods for detecting constraints (such as the hot hand) or structure in a time series of binary data, which we attempted to investigate through Monte Carlo simulations. We found that this method was sensitive enough to detect structure. The second question was concerned with whether humans are able to discriminate random series from constrained (structured) series. We conducted an experiment which investigated whether time series validated by the frequency analysis as constrained were detectable by humans. Our results showed that humans have an ability to recognize a constrained series more often than chance. A link between the strength of constraints in the spectral analysis with performance in discrimination of the task was demonstrated, suggesting that the higher the strength of constraint (according to the spectral plots) the easier it is to discriminate. The spectral plots might hold validity to index the psychophysics of pattern detection in humans. Our results gives credence to the ecological justification for the use of heuristics (such as the belief in the hot hand), especially in a skilled situation, such as sports performance.

Committee: John Flach Ph.D. (Committee Chair); Kevin Bennett Ph.D. (Committee Member); Valerie Shalin Ph.D. (Committee Member); Clark Shingledecker Ph.D. (Committee Member) Subjects: Psychology

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2013, Philosophy

In this dissertation, I will defend the thesis that emotions are reasons for actions. I defend this thesis against the standard account of action, for which only belief/desire pairs are reasons for action. As preliminaries, I defend an embodied appraisal view of what emotions are, and I present a Burge-style entitlement view of how emotions, which are nonpropositional, can be reasons. I begin my main argument by considering purely expressive actions, those actions which, according to Rosalind Hursthouse, are intentional, not done in order to achieve some further goal, and cannot be explained without reference to emotion. In chapter 4, I argue that all attempts to save the standard account from this challenge fail. In chapter 5, I argue against two attempts to explain expressive actions outside the standard view, and then I present my own view. Then in the last chapter, I present a more broad view of how emotions rationalize actions in non-expressive ways.

Committee: Abraham Roth (Advisor); Justin D'Arms (Committee Member); Timothy Schroeder (Committee Member) Subjects: Philosophy

MARCH, University of Cincinnati, 2003, Design, Architecture, Art, and Planning : Architecture

Industrial architecture typically values efficiency over sensation, therefore time and again in factory design, little attempt is made to reconcile the pragmatic nature of the manufacturing process with the often expressive character of the goods produced. This thesis negotiates the rift between process and image in the manufacturing facilities for one such product – chocolate. The design for this chocolate factory is rooted in the examination of the building type – the rational factory; appreciation of the particular character of the product to be manufactured – sensual chocolate; and analysis of case studies in which these polemic properties peacefully co-exist – as in the Barcelona Pavilion and Chapel Guell.

Committee: Dr. Aarati Kanekar (Advisor) Subjects: Architecture