PHD, Kent State University, 2017, College of Education, Health and Human Services / School of Teaching, Learning and Curriculum Studies

The purpose of this study was to examine the influences of various facets of middle school mathematics teachers' practical rationality on their instructional decision making as they plan to enact the Common Core State Standards for Mathematical Practice, CCSS-MP1 (perseverance in problem solving) and CCSS-MP3 (communicating and critiquing). The study expands and confronts some of the literature that lacks specifics to instructional decisions made by middle school mathematics teachers, particularly with regards to their disposition, the operationalization of their MKT, and the connection to the institutional obligations affecting their practical rationality. This study provides insight into three facets impacting middle school mathematics teachers' instructional decision making with regards to CCSS-MP1 and CCSS-MP3. First with regards to teacher disposition, a facilitative role using a problem solving approach is preferred. Secondly, curricular choices are made directly tied to the teachers' MKT. Finally, although the teachers recognized that they had certain obligations to the institution, they also held the belief that the institution was obligated to them as well. The two main obligations required from the institution were the need for professional development provided by the district and appropriate resources that promote problem solving and communication. These results suggest the need for professional development for in-service and preservice teachers in the facilitative approach to mathematics instructions, more time for teachers to work collaboratively in professional learning communities (PLCs), professional development for district administrators, board members and parents with regards to a more rigorous and investigative approach to mathematics instruction.

Committee: Karl Kosko (Committee Co-Chair); Joanne Caniglia (Committee Co-Chair); Jay Jahangiri (Committee Member) Subjects: Mathematics Education; Middle School Education; Teacher Education; Teaching

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2010, Philosophy

In my dissertation, I develop and defend a new version of the Kantian theory of action and practical rationality. According to the Kantian theory of action, action is behavior that is genuinely guided by a series of representations which reflect the agent's understanding of what he is doing – namely, judgments about reasons for action, best judgments and choices. Moreover, one significant claim of the Kantian theory of practical rationality is the claim that rational action is action that accords with one's best judgment, and irrational action is action that goes against one's best judgment - where acting in accordance with one's best judgment is taken to be a necessary (and not sufficient) condition of rational action, whereas acting against one's best judgment is taken to be a sufficient condition of irrational action. While these claims are taken for granted by Kantians, they have recently come under significant fire. In a well-known paper, Nomy Arpaly presents a character named “Sam”, an agent who allegedly acts rationally even though he acts against his best judgment. In light of Sam, Arpaly concludes that we should reject the aforementioned claim of the Kantian theory of practical rationality. Now, while Arpaly's main target is the Kantian theory of practical rationality, the argument has repercussions for the Kantian theory of action as well. As it happens, the Kantian theory of action makes a further claim that makes accommodating the case of Sam quite difficult - it claims that the agency in action is manifested in the role that conscious representations play in action. In light of the problems associated with this claim, Arpaly suggests that we dispense with the Kantian project in its entirety. In contrast with Arpaly, I am less pessimistic about the Kantian enterprise. I develop a theory of action and practical rationality that coopts much of the Kantian framework, but revises the Kantian claim about agency in action. Specifically, I claim that unconsci (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Timothy Schroeder PhD (Committee Chair); Sigrún Svavarsdóttir PhD (Committee Member); Piers Norris Turner PhD (Committee Member) Subjects: Philosophy