Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.), Bowling Green State University, 2009, Philosophy, Applied/Institutional Theory and History

This dissertation presents a perfectionist argument for viewpoint neutral free speech. It is argued that developed states ought to maintain or adopt the Viewpoint Neutral Principle: As a matter of public morality, any public institution is disqualified from intentionally aiming to hinder the expression of any viewpoint by suppression except for purposes of temporary censorship to prevent clear, present, and imminent danger. This principle allows for regulation but does not allow for censorship due to objectionable viewpoints. After demonstrating how the standard justifications for free speech are not sufficient for the viewpoint neutral principle, I construct a Millian self-development argument drawing from the oft neglected justification of freedom of speech in On Liberty. Mill argues that a person is not deserving of confidence in his opinion unless he has engaged in certain practices of justification for his own opinions. These practices are the only way to acquire the intellectual virtue of justified belief-forming, and censorship undermines these practices. Furthermore, the intellectual virtue of justified belief forming informs moral virtues which include dispositions to express praise or blame. Censorship can undermine and, in some cases, make impossible the practices of justification. If the state engages in viewpoint specific censorship of public speech, it undermines the individual pursuit of justified opinion to the extent that it hinders critical reflections, adjustment, and exposition of opinions. After explicating the argument itself, I apply the justified opinion argument to one contemporary example. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights under the auspices of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations has passed articles 7/19 and 7/20. These resolutions violate the viewpoint neutral principle. It is argued that developed nations should reject these resolutions in order to preserve (among other things) inte (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Daniel Jacobson PhD (Advisor); Fred Miller PhD (Committee Co-Chair); Steven Wall PhD (Committee Member); Ellen Paul PhD (Committee Member); David Jackson PhD (Committee Member) Subjects: Philosophy

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2021, Political Science

Serving to preserve sovereignty, guarantee survival, and facilitate freedom of action, national security is arguably the lead objective of the state. In contrast, moral norms are commonly held international rules built on morality that, among other effects, can inhibit states in their pursuit of that primary goal. The question posed here, then, is why states would willingly make national-security sacrifices for moral-normative reasons. And yet they do. In numerous wars, militaries have chosen to forego attacks on tactically and operationally valuable targets to protect civilian lives. Additionally, in militarized conflicts from World War I to the Gulf War and beyond, political and military leaders have selected their weapons not only by military value but also by categorization, what some scholars call “taboos.” These moral norms of civilian immunity and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) taboos appear to play a substantial role in state conduct, as shown by the wide-ranging statements of policymakers and commanders and real-world practical constraint. However, experimental research indicates a striking willingness among the public to both violate civilian immunity and use weapons of mass destruction if they appear militarily effective. In prior studies where participants make ex ante and post hoc evaluations of norm-violating attacks on terrorist and conventional adversaries, large numbers of participants—in some cases, well over half—endorse civilian-killing nuclear strikes. This discrepancy in findings derives in part from incomplete specification of how moral norms exist and function at the decision-making level, where adherence to, or violation of, the moral norm is determined. This dissertation uses a dual-process theory of affect and cognition to describe decision-makers' moral-normative and national-security attitudes and their effects on wartime decision-making. Moral norms appear as affect-dominant attitudes, supported overwhelmingly by feelings an (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Richard Herrmann (Advisor); Christopher Gelpi (Committee Member); Alexander Wendt (Committee Member) Subjects: International Relations; Military Studies; Political Science

Doctor of Psychology (Psy.D.), Xavier University, 2020, Psychology

Prior work in the field of psychology has demonstrated that people do not always think or act autonomously: People tend to obey relevant authority figures (Milgram, 1963), conform to social norms (Asch, 1951), and behave uncharacteristically when playing a social role (Haney et al., 1973). These landmark studies have demonstrated how social forces – an authority figure, a social group, or situational role – can influence decision making. The purpose of this study was to understand the potential relationship between political prejudice (i.e., Political Manichaeism, or PM), political orientation, and moral conformity. In addition, PM's relationship to various personality factors was explored. The primary result was that partisan participants were most likely to conform with political ingroups under morally ambiguous circumstances, but participants did not deviate from other groups in their evaluation of the basic morality of unambiguous situations. Results for the second set of hypotheses indicated that participants with higher absolute PM tended to have higher negative emotionality (neuroticism), lower ambiguity tolerance, and lower agreeableness when compared to lower PM participants. The current study demonstrates that moral conformity and/or moral distancing can occur with relatively little external pressure. However, other factors, including the content of the dilemmas, may make it more- or less-likely for conformity to occur. Future research in this area might elucidate the conditions under which moral conformity is likely to occur.

Committee: Karl Stukenberg Ph.D., ABPP (Committee Chair); Tammy Sonnentag Ph.D. (Committee Member); Morrie Mullins Ph.D. (Committee Member) Subjects: Psychology; Social Psychology

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2014, Political Science

Scandals occur frequently in American politics. In this dissertation, I attempt to explore the concept of scandal in the post-Watergate era, by both creating a large database of political scandals and by exploring individual reactions to constructed scandals. I find that scandals tend to occur in bodies where politicians have greater access to power, that incumbency generally tends to protect politicians from electoral defeat, and that shared partisanship between individuals and the politicians involved in scandal protects the politician, but that this relationship is mediated by the role of emotions. Throughout, I discuss the potential role the media may play in the creation and mediation of scandal.

Committee: Kathleen McGraw (Advisor); Thomas Nelson (Committee Member); Nathaniel Swigger (Committee Member) Subjects: Political Science