Master of Arts (MA), Ohio University, 2023, Philosophy (Arts and Sciences)

In the meta-ethical debates about moral knowledge, there are many theoretical positions to consider. If one is to have an account of moral knowledge, that will inevitably be affected by how one thinks about knowledge in general. I will be transferring a general theory of knowledge and epistemic justification to the more specific domain of ethics, through the lens of epistemic fallibilism. My goal, in applying this epistemic framework to moral discourse, is to outline how moral fallibilism (my theory) can provide a unique and attractive account of moral knowledge. I will accomplish the application of epistemology to ethical theory by implementing Stewart Cohen's account of fallibilism (with its central notion of “relevance”), and by highlighting the aim and position of moral fallibilism by contrasting it with Mackie's error theory. Finally, I will illustrate moral fallibilism by applying it to contemporary moral concerns; the debate about abortion, in particular. Ultimately, I propose a fresh theory of moral knowledge that emphasizes the varying degrees of justification for our ethical beliefs while defending, at the same time, a moderate account of moral objectivity.

Committee: Christoph Hanisch (Advisor) Subjects: Epistemology; Ethics; Philosophy

Master of Arts (MA), Ohio University, 2013, Philosophy (Arts and Sciences)

I critically examine and evaluate the cogency of four kinds of evolutionary debunking arguments in the literature. Specifically, I focus on Alvin Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, an argument aimed at establishing the conclusion that naturalism and evolution lead to an epistemic defeater that renders the conjoined belief in both irrational; Michael Ruse's Evolutionary Ethics, aimed at establishing that an evolutionary genealogy of our moral sentiments proves morality to be an illusion; Sharon Street's Darwinian Dilemma Against Realist Theories of Value, which aims to establish the implausibility of natural selection having produced cognitive faculties that accurately track the sort of moral facts posited by moral realists; and Richard Joyce's Evolutionary Debunking of Morality, an argument to show that our moral judgments are unjustified and we ought to therefore adopt moral agnosticism. I argue that Alvin Plantinga fails to prove that the conjunction of naturalism and evolution lead to radical skepticism. Second, I argue that Michael Ruse draws the wrong conclusions from his evolutionary genealogy of morals and as a consequence fails to give a compelling argument against moral realism. By contrast, I defend Richard Joyce's and Sharon Street's arguments against various criticisms and conclude that they present a compelling epistemic challenge to justifications for moral realism.

Committee: James Petrik (Advisor); John Bender (Committee Member); Alfred Lent (Committee Member) Subjects: Epistemology; Ethics; Philosophy

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2019, Philosophy

This dissertation develops and defends a view of the relationship between knowledge and norms on action. The view I defend is an impurist one; on this view, whether a person knows that p can depend on factors that are unrelated to the truth or likelihood of p. On my impurism, normative facts about actions and options—including, for instance, the costs of relying on a belief in action—are among the non-truth-related factors that can make a difference to knowledge. My view is distinctive, in part, because of the further claim that moral facts about actions and options are among the normative considerations that can make a difference to knowledge. In a slogan: epistemic norms are sensitive to moral considerations. In an even shorter slogan: there is moral encroachment in epistemology. The first half of the dissertation defends the claim that there is moral encroachment in epistemology. In chapter 1 (“Pragmatic Encroachment and Moral Encroachment”), I argue that moral encroachment is at least as well-motivated as a more familiar view: the view that there is pragmatic encroachment in epistemology. In chapter 2 (“Uncertainty, Belief, and Ethical Weight”), I draw on insights from moral psychology to provide an original argument for moral encroachment. The second half of the dissertation starts from the assumption that there is moral encroachment in epistemology. It is devoted to describing in detail how moral encroachment works. In chapter 3 (“Moral Encroachment and Reasons of the Wrong Kind”), I distinguish between a radical and a moderate version of moral encroachment. I raise a problem for the radical version: it threatens to erase the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic norms on belief. This problem, I note, does not afflict the moderate version of moral encroachment. In chapter 4 (“Knowledge and the Many Norms on Action”), I show that it is no trivial task to explain why knowledge is sensitive to both moral norms and norms of practical coherence. In (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Tristram McPherson (Advisor); Declan Smithies (Committee Member); Justin D'Arms (Committee Member) Subjects: Philosophy

Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.), Bowling Green State University, 2018, Philosophy, Applied

We all say that certain moral views – true or false, agreed to or not – are reasonable, rational or justified. When we say this, we mean, roughly, that the agent who has come to these views has answered her ethical questions in a responsible way and that her beliefs are defensible from her own perspective. Whether or not these beliefs turn out true, they have some epistemic merit. This work is an investigation into that notion of epistemic merit. It asks, "What makes a moral belief justified?"

Committee: Christian Coons (Advisor); Michael Weber (Committee Member); Michael Bradie (Committee Member); Daniel Fasko (Committee Member) Subjects: Epistemology; Ethics; Philosophy