Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.), Bowling Green State University, 2015, Philosophy, Applied

Resentment is widely held to be central in moral practice and moral theory, perhaps even the key to understanding concepts like moral wrongness and moral responsibility. Despite this, philosophers pay relatively little attention to resentment itself. For the most part, it is often simply assumed that resentment is a kind of anger, where resentment is differentiated from anger by a belief, judgment, or thought that one has been morally wronged by the object of one's emotional response. However, this assumption gives rise to problematically circular accounts of our moral concepts, since it involves characterizing resentment in terms of the very concepts that moral philosophers were hoping to explain in terms of resentment. And while some philosophers have claimed that the circularity inherent in such accounts is unproblematic, I contend that such accounts are not informative enough to help us understand our moral concepts. My dissertation explores the implications of the assumption that resentment is simply a moral form of anger, and argues that this account of resentment is both inaccurate and not well-suited to the role that resentment plays in moral philosophy. First, I argue that despite prevailing assumptions to the contrary, resentment should not be thought of simply as a moral version of anger. Instead, I argue for a non-cognitive, adaptive account of resentment as an emotional response to violations of the interpersonal norms of one's social group. This account is both empirically well-grounded and consistent with evolutionary and developmental accounts of emotion. It also avoids the circularity inherent in contemporary characterizations of our moral concepts, when given in terms of resentment. Finally, it allows for a ready-made response to the charge that resentment is an immoral or imprudent emotion that we would be better off without. Resentment, on this account, is an adaptive response with deep biological roots, and it plays a crucial rol (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Michael Weber Ph.D (Advisor); Howard C. Cromwell Ph.D (Committee Member); Christian Coons Ph.D (Committee Member); Neal Tognazzini Ph.D (Committee Member); Sara Worley Ph.D (Committee Member) Subjects: Ethics; Philosophy

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2014, Philosophy

Although the idea that emotions can be rational has come to be widely accepted by philosophers, theories of emotional rationality are generally wedded to particular theories about the nature of emotions. In contrast, I develop a theory of emotional rationality that is applicable to a broad range of theories of emotions in both psychology and philosophy. Emotional rationality is excellence in exercising one's emotional capacities in one's practical endeavors. From this definition of emotional rationality, I develop some rationality assessments of agents with respect to their emotions. The project is organized around three assessments: warrant, imprudence, and acumen. Emotion theorists commonly discuss three distinct static emotion assessments (fit, warrant, and benefit); I call this group, the traditional assessments. For each of these assessments, emotion theorists have claimed that it is an assessment of rationality. Roughly, an agent's emotion is (i) fitting in a certain situation if the emotion corresponds to the relevant features of her situation, (ii) warranted in a certain situation if she has evidence that for the fittingness of the emotion, and (iii) beneficial in a certain situation if the emotion contributes to her well-being. I argue that none of the traditional assessments, as commonly understood, count as a rationality assessment. One problem with thinking that warranted emotions are rational is that an agent's emotion may be accidentally warranted. In response, I introduce warrant*; roughly, an agent's emotion is warranted* if the agent has evidence for the fittingness of the emotion and the emotion is grounded in that evidence in the right way. I introduce the assessment of imprudence in Chapter Three. An agent is imprudent with respect to a pattern of emotion tokens of the same emotion type felt in similar situations roughly if the agent fails to take steps to regulate her emotion tokens properly in light of actual relevant feedback providing e (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Justin D'Arms (Advisor); William Cunningham (Committee Member); Richard Samuels (Committee Member); Sigrun Svavarsdottir (Committee Member) Subjects: Philosophy