Master of Arts in Psychology, Cleveland State University, 2023, College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences

A large body of research has investigated the role of religious belief within terror management theory and the cognitive science of religion, with interesting results emerging for atheists as compared to religious individuals. While atheists explicitly disavow religion, implicit measurement techniques have revealed an intuitive belief in religious concepts, particularly following reminders of death (Jong et al., 2012). However, to date, no studies have directly observed the cognitive processes that underlie these effects. In response to this gap in the literature, the present study seeks to propose and test a model of the cognitive pathways utilized by religious and atheistic individuals as they manage existential concerns. Specifically, this model proposes that following mortality salience (MS), both religious and atheistic individuals experience intuitive religious belief due to evolutionary cognitive biases. These intuitions are then consciously shaped in accordance with explicitly endorsed ideologies, leading religious individuals to accept intuitive religious belief and atheistic individuals to override their intuitions with a more analytic orientation. As such, the present study hypothesized that MS (compared to pain) would lead to decreased need for cognition (NFC) in Christians but increased NFC in atheists. In a sample of 248 adults, an ANOVA indicated that Christians primed with MS reported lower NFC than those primed with pain, while the opposite effect emerged for atheists, providing compelling evidence for the proposed model. Limitations and future directions are discussed.

Committee: Kenneth Vail III (Advisor); Kathleen Reardon (Committee Member); Michael Horvath (Committee Member); Eric Allard (Committee Member) Subjects: Psychology; Religion; Social Psychology

MA, Kent State University, 2023, College of Arts and Sciences / Department of Psychological Sciences

Understanding the diverse ways people prefer to think and make decisions about their health can inform research on health behavior engagement. The current study sought to understand the type of person who prefers to make health decisions based on their own body and intuition, including what sociodemographic factors, health-related individual differences, and self-reported health behavior engagement are associated with these preferences. A cross-sectional correlational study design was conducted using a sample that was representative of the U.S. population in terms of age, sex, and ethnicity (N = 315). Women, younger participants, and those with lower educational attainment reported a greater preference for health intuitive thinking. Further, participants who held a health intuitive thinking style reported greater medical mistrust (p < .001), lower numeracy (p < .001), lower health literacy (p < .001), and were more likely to endorse cognitive causation (p < .001). Participants with a health intuitive thinking style also reported lower adherence to several health behaviors. After controlling for sociodemographic factors, a health intuitive thinking style appeared to be most consequential to engagement in cancer screening behaviors, particularly cervical cancer screening uptake (p = .020). Future work should continue to examine the characteristics of people with health intuitive thinking style preferences and how these preferences influence uptake of cancer screening behaviors.

Committee: Jennifer Taber (Advisor) Subjects: Social Psychology

Master of Arts (MA), Bowling Green State University, 2021, Psychology/Developmental

Studies examining age differences in the Ultimatum Game, an economic bargaining game, have produced mixed results regarding which age group is more likely to accept unfair offers. One possible explanation for age differences in the Ultimatum Game is that emotions differentially affect young and older adults' decision to accept or reject unfair offers. Research has found that emotions play an important role in decision-making, and that discrete emotions may lead to distinct thoughts, actions, and goals. Additionally, studies have shown that older adults rely on emotions to make decisions to a greater extent than younger adults. According to the discrete emotion theory of affective aging (DEA), discrete emotions have different adaptive advantages at different ages (Kunzmann et al., 2014). Specifically, the DEA proposes that anger motivates younger adults to achieve age-normative tasks, while sadness is adaptive in older adulthood, when loss is common and time left to change unfavorable situations is limited. The present study examined discrete emotions experienced by young and older adults during the Ultimatum Game as a possible explanation for age differences in acceptance and rejection decisions in the Ultimatum Game. Young and older adult MTurk workers (n = 113) participated in a modified version of the Ultimatum Game that was designed to increase emotional salience and ecological validity. Young adults reported higher levels of discrete negative emotions, partially supporting the DEA. Interestingly, young adults were also more likely to accept unfair offers in the Ultimatum Game. Anger and disgust were significant predictors of Ultimatum Game decision; however, no significant interactions between age and discrete emotions emerged. Implications and future directions are discussed in light of these findings.

Committee: Yiwei Chen Ph.D. (Advisor); Richard Anderson Ph.D. (Committee Member); Dara Musher-Eizenman Ph.D. (Committee Member) Subjects: Psychology

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2021, Political Science

Serving to preserve sovereignty, guarantee survival, and facilitate freedom of action, national security is arguably the lead objective of the state. In contrast, moral norms are commonly held international rules built on morality that, among other effects, can inhibit states in their pursuit of that primary goal. The question posed here, then, is why states would willingly make national-security sacrifices for moral-normative reasons. And yet they do. In numerous wars, militaries have chosen to forego attacks on tactically and operationally valuable targets to protect civilian lives. Additionally, in militarized conflicts from World War I to the Gulf War and beyond, political and military leaders have selected their weapons not only by military value but also by categorization, what some scholars call “taboos.” These moral norms of civilian immunity and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) taboos appear to play a substantial role in state conduct, as shown by the wide-ranging statements of policymakers and commanders and real-world practical constraint. However, experimental research indicates a striking willingness among the public to both violate civilian immunity and use weapons of mass destruction if they appear militarily effective. In prior studies where participants make ex ante and post hoc evaluations of norm-violating attacks on terrorist and conventional adversaries, large numbers of participants—in some cases, well over half—endorse civilian-killing nuclear strikes. This discrepancy in findings derives in part from incomplete specification of how moral norms exist and function at the decision-making level, where adherence to, or violation of, the moral norm is determined. This dissertation uses a dual-process theory of affect and cognition to describe decision-makers' moral-normative and national-security attitudes and their effects on wartime decision-making. Moral norms appear as affect-dominant attitudes, supported overwhelmingly by feelings an (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Richard Herrmann (Advisor); Christopher Gelpi (Committee Member); Alexander Wendt (Committee Member) Subjects: International Relations; Military Studies; Political Science

MA, Kent State University, 2019, College of Arts and Sciences / Department of Philosophy

While studying psychology is helpful in moral theorizing, we must ensure that it is done properly and that conclusions are not drawn too hastily. Joshua Greene uses research about how people make moral judgements as a part of his defense of utilitarianism. Greene claims that competing moral judgement systems create the tension between utilitarianism and deontology, a tension that has caused widespread moral disagreement. In this thesis, I will argue that Greene's dismissal of deontological moral theory is premature insofar as the relationship between the dual-process theory and moral theory is weak. In order to illustrate this, I begin by explicating Greene's argument as well as highlighting philosophical origins and presuppositions in his theory. Next, I examine the research applying Greene's method of study and model of moral judgement applied to psychopaths. Applying Greene's model to psychopaths raises questions about his methodology that extends to typical individuals. These issues concern the nature of his thought experiments, coding scheme, and underlying philosophical commitments. In the final chapter, I examine how these methodological issues function to weaken Greene's overall argument in favor of utilitarianism. I will argue that some of these flaws raise issues for incorporating empirical psychology into moral psychology more broadly.

Committee: Deborah Barnbaum (Advisor); Andreea Smaranda Aldea (Committee Member); Polycarp Ikuenobe (Committee Member); John Dunlosky (Committee Member) Subjects: Ethics; Philosophy; Psychology

Master of Arts in Psychology, Cleveland State University, 2018, College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences

The scenario of the atheist in the proverbial foxhole has been a topic of discussion in religious circles for centuries. Building on prior research utilizing terror management theory (TMT), a dual process model of cognition, and previous work suggesting that humans are intuitively wired for teleological and religious concepts, the researchers set out to examine atheist's religiosity when confronted with the reality of one's impermanence. To explore this idea, the present experiment recruited a sample of atheists, manipulated their awareness of mortality, manipulated their ability to employ analytic thinking, and measured various intuitive cognitions (e.g., teleological reasoning) alongside religious belief. Results suggest that atheists in the speeded conditions reported higher agreement with teleological items; but the same did not happen for religious items. Additionally, atheists primed with mortality salience (vs. control) reported lower agreement with religious items in the un-speeded condition, but not in the speeded condition; a similar interaction was not observed for the teleology items. Limitations and potential directions for future research are discussed.

Committee: Kenneth Vail (Advisor) Subjects: Experimental Psychology

Doctor of Philosophy, Case Western Reserve University, 2018, Management

Overall healthcare spending in the U.S. is in the trillions and more than 15% of GDP, yet outcomes rank below the top 25 in most quality categories when compared to other OECD countries. The majority of spending is directed toward small patient populations with chronic diseases. Within the context of access to insurance coverage and a certain level of health literacy, experts believe increased patient–physician shared decision making (SDM) should result in better care and lower cost. However, the study of the physician's role in facilitating SDM is limited. By understanding what factors predict when physicians will implement SDM during the treatment of specific chronic diseases, we can begin to understand the dynamics that most influence behaviors and offer recommendations to improve certain aspects of healthcare in the United States. A sequence of three studies was completed by interviewing or surveying 369 physicians who treat hemophilia and primary immune deficiency (PID). The study used dual process theory to explain the relationship between patient-centered care and SDM within a wider framework of power balance, patient/physician traits, and organizational context. These studies were supplemented by an analysis of 1) survey of 33,162 individuals across theU.S.; 2) 25 million hospitalization records from New York State comparing two (2) five-year periods; and 3) data from 200 million individual-level, de-identified enrollment data and health insurance claims across a continuum of care (both inpatient and outpatient). The first study qualitatively explored decision making between hemophilia physicians in the U.S. and U.K. and found U.S. physicians to be more patient-centric and less rule-based. The second study quantitatively tested the relationship between slow/rational vs. fast/intuitive decision making by U.S. physicians treating PID and SDM as mediated by patient-centric care; results showed a statistically significant relationship between slow/rational deci (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Kalle Lyytinen Ph.D (Committee Chair); Adrian Wolfberg Ph.D (Committee Member); Yunmei Wang Ph.D (Committee Member); J. B. Silvers Ph.D (Committee Member) Subjects: Health Care

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), Ohio University, 2014, Curriculum and Instruction Mathematics Education (Education)

Deciding on the truth value of mathematical statements is an essential aspect of mathematical practice in which students are rarely engaged. This study explored undergraduate students' approaches to mathematical statements with unknown truth values. The research questions were 1. In what ways and to what extent do students use intuition and analysis to decide on the truth value of mathematical statements? 2. What are the connections between students' process of deciding on the truth value of mathematical statements and their ability to construct associated proofs and counterexamples? 3. What types of systematic intuitive, mathematical, and logical errors do students make during the proving process, and what is the impact of these errors on the proving process? Clinical task-based interviews utilizing the think-aloud method revealed students' reasoning processes in depth. Twelve undergraduate students each completed four mathematical tasks requiring them to decide on the truth value of a statement and prove or disprove it accordingly. Through analysis of the data, I developed a framework for distinguishing among types of reasoning based on their cognitive and mathematical properties. The framework identifies four distinct categories of reasoning – intuitive, semantic-empirical, semantic-deductive, and syntactic – each with subcategories. The students in this study used all four types of reasoning for deciding on the truth value of the statements in the tasks. Their use of semantic-deductive and syntactic reasoning mirrored mathematicians' use of these reasoning types for decision-making. With the exception of one task, the students' decision-making and construction processes were generally connected. Connections in which the construction process was based on decision-making process mostly facilitated proving. However, simultaneous decision-making and construction processes often led to overturned decisions. Regarding intuitive decision-makin (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Robert Klein (Committee Co-Chair); Allyson Hallman-Thrasher (Committee Co-Chair) Subjects: Mathematics Education

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2010, Psychology

The present study tests sequential sampling models of processing in the flanker task. In a standard flanker task, participants must identify a central target that is flanked by items that indicate the same response (congruent) or the opposite response (incongruent). The standard finding is that incongruent flankers produce interference that primarily affects the early component of the decision process. The goal was to contrast different mechanisms of visual attention and to identify a simple processing model that can be used to augment analyses of this task. Several models were contrasted in their ability to account for flanker data from experiments that manipulated response bias, speed/accuracy tradeoffs, attentional focus, and stimulus configuration. Models that assume dynamic focusing of attention provided the best overall account of the behavioral data. Among the dynamic models, a spotlight model that assumes gradual narrowing of attention provided the best balance of fit and parsimony, though dual process models that assume discrete selection of the target also captured the main trends in the data when only standard congruent and incongruent conditions were used. Importantly, the experimental manipulations were reflected by the appropriate model parameters, supporting future use of these models to decompose behavioral data from the flanker task into meaningful psychological constructs. The results of this study also indicate that standard flanker experiments do not provide strong evidence for contrasting gradual versus discrete target selection, and consequently they do not provide strong evidence to support or refute theories of the underlying mechanisms of dynamic attention models.

Committee: Roger Ratcliff PhD (Advisor); Simon Dennis PhD (Committee Member); Alex Petrov PhD (Committee Member); Gail McKoon PhD (Committee Member) Subjects: Psychology

Master of Science (MS), Ohio University, 2011, Recreation Studies (Health and Human Services)

This research identifies trends in both good and poor decisions made by a population of expert alpine climbers. The researcher conducted 13 interviews resulting in 24 identified decision points. Each semi-structured interview used the critical decision method. The model of goal directed behavior was used as a theoretical framework to look at potential motivators and influences in decision making. The constant comparison method and line by line coding was used to generate emerging themes. The results section was organized based on Heuristic Traps; seven previously identified traps and one previously unidentified trap were found in the data. The results align with Hammond's cognitive continuum theory, which suggests decisions will fall somewhere between intuitive, and rational, depending on factors present in the situation. The strongest trend in poor decision making was a lack of emotional attachment.

Committee: Bruce Martin (Committee Chair); Andrew Szolosi (Committee Member); Leon Anderson (Committee Member) Subjects: Recreation

Doctor of Philosophy, Miami University, 2008, Psychology

Extensive research has demonstrated outcome differences between judgments based on feelings and judgments based on reasons. Dispositional preference for feelings- or reasons-based judgment may guide the use of implicit and explicit attitude information in evaluation and judgment when contextual cues are not available. Two studies examined the effect of implicit theories of judgment on the use of implicit and explicit attitudes to make judgments of a target. In Study 1, implicit attitudes were influenced by explicit evaluative information for feelings-based theorists, but not reasons-based theorists. Implicit attitudes correlated with explicit attitudes and judgment for feelings-based theorists, but not for reasons-based theorists. Study 2 replicated this correlational pattern especially when situational theories of judgment were congruent with dispositional theories of judgment.

Committee: Amanda Diekman PhD (Committee Chair); Heather Claypool PhD (Committee Member); Maria Cronley PhD (Committee Member); Kurt Hugenberg PhD (Committee Member); Allen McConnell PhD (Committee Member) Subjects: Social Psychology