Master of Science (MS), Ohio University, 2020, Journalism (Communication)

Although previous research has been targeted at the aspects of journalistic cultures within nations through the views of their population, such as the multinational Worlds of Journalism Study (2019), other avenues of study can offer a new perspective on these differences. To this end, the study provides a comparison of journalistic codes of ethics. Such codes (while differing in structure, implementation, and reach) share a common purpose in providing and defining standards of ethical action within the field of journalism. By making note of what standards are discussed within journalistic codes of ethics with national reach, and in what manner the ethical rationale is constructed and defended within said ethical codes, the study aims to provide insight into the similarities and differences of the journalistic cultures in which they are set. The study found that the 25 ethical codes examined discussed over 100 distinct generalized ethical situations, the documents often stretched beyond outlining the practice of ethical journalism. The codes of ethics were also found to primarily make use of deontological and virtue-based justifications, although examples of the other selected ethical frameworks were found in small numbers. Additionally, both the deontological and virtue-based justifications occurred dominantly within the examined codes of ethics with such frequency as to be considered ethical norms within the standards set by the study. In both cases, the findings provide a means to critique and point to ways these ethical codes could be improved in order to better relate to both the journalists they hope to guide and the public they hope to educate while laying the groundwork for similar examinations in the future.

Committee: Bernhard Debatin (Committee Chair); Aimee Edmondson (Advisor); Rosanna Planer (Committee Member); Bill Reader (Committee Member) Subjects: Journalism; Mass Communications

MA, Kent State University, 2019, College of Arts and Sciences / Department of Philosophy

While studying psychology is helpful in moral theorizing, we must ensure that it is done properly and that conclusions are not drawn too hastily. Joshua Greene uses research about how people make moral judgements as a part of his defense of utilitarianism. Greene claims that competing moral judgement systems create the tension between utilitarianism and deontology, a tension that has caused widespread moral disagreement. In this thesis, I will argue that Greene's dismissal of deontological moral theory is premature insofar as the relationship between the dual-process theory and moral theory is weak. In order to illustrate this, I begin by explicating Greene's argument as well as highlighting philosophical origins and presuppositions in his theory. Next, I examine the research applying Greene's method of study and model of moral judgement applied to psychopaths. Applying Greene's model to psychopaths raises questions about his methodology that extends to typical individuals. These issues concern the nature of his thought experiments, coding scheme, and underlying philosophical commitments. In the final chapter, I examine how these methodological issues function to weaken Greene's overall argument in favor of utilitarianism. I will argue that some of these flaws raise issues for incorporating empirical psychology into moral psychology more broadly.

Committee: Deborah Barnbaum (Advisor); Andreea Smaranda Aldea (Committee Member); Polycarp Ikuenobe (Committee Member); John Dunlosky (Committee Member) Subjects: Ethics; Philosophy; Psychology

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), Ohio University, 2019, Experimental Psychology (Arts and Sciences)

Prior research suggests that people perceive scientists as having both humanizing (e.g., trustworthy, rational) and dehumanizing (e.g., robotic, emotionless) qualities. The present research examined if cultural stereotypes of scientists as utilitarian decision- makers predict evaluations of scientists' humanness. In a series of studies, participants evaluated how they believed scientists and other target groups would resolve different moral dilemmas. Participants perceived scientists (relative to other target groups) as more likely to make utilitarian decisions (Studies 1-5), an effect predicted by scientists' greater perceived competence (Study 2). Further, scientists who were perceived to make appropriate utilitarian decisions were dehumanized less and trusted more than other target groups (Studies 3-4). Finally, dehumanization ratings had downstream consequences on people's acceptance of scientific evidence and solutions for two real world problems: climate change (Study 6a) and support for vaccinations for children who have mild illnesses (Study 6b). Implications for perceptions of scientists in moral decision-making are discussed.

Committee: Keith Markman (Advisor) Subjects: Psychology

Master of Humanities (MHum), Wright State University, 2013, Humanities

This thesis examines Mahatma Gandhi's ethical views on nonviolence from the perspective of contemporary philosophical ethics. Gandhian nonviolence is situated in the field of contemporary ethics by using the concepts and terminology from Shelly Kagan's work, Normative Ethics. Three questions are asked that classify and clarify Gandhian nonviolence. First, is nonviolence primarily instrumentally or intrinsically significant? This question is closely tied to the second, does Gandhian nonviolence belong to which type of ethical theory, consequentialism or deontology? And third, is nonviolence an absolutist constraint or a high threshold that allows for exceptions? Gandhi views nonviolence as both instrumentally and intrinsically valuable; however, of the two, Gandhi considers nonviolence to be primarily intrinsically significant. As such, Gandhian nonviolence is properly considered a deontological constraint. Even though he admits that nonviolence is often an impossible mandate, Gandhi considers the moral law of nonviolence to be absolute. This work concludes that Gandhian nonviolence should properly be considered as an absolutist deontological principle.

Committee: Scott Wilson Ph.D. (Committee Chair); Donovan Miyasaki Ph.D. (Committee Member); Arvind Elangovan Ph.D. (Committee Member); Valerie Stoker Ph.D. (Committee Member) Subjects: Ethics; History; Philosophy; Religion; Religious History

MA, Kent State University, 2013, College of Arts and Sciences / Department of Philosophy

The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing (DDA) is the ethical principle that doing harm is morally worse than allowing harm. The objective of this thesis is to show that the DDA is not a viable principle without supplementation. Deontological and consequentialist approaches to the DDA are explored in this thesis. Both approaches are rejected due to the limitations of the binary approach to harms---the binary approach to harms is the assumption that the badness of harms is best captured by two strict categories of doing and allowing. This thesis develops a sliding-scale approach to harms. This approach is developed by using axiology---value theory. Value theory is used by consequentialism to determine what goods should be maximized by action and how those goods are ranked. This thesis uses the axiological methodology of Fred Feldman to create a more complex account of the badness of harms. The final chapter of this thesis applies the sliding-scale approach to harms to three end-of-life, medical cases.

Committee: Deborah Barnbaum Ph. D. (Advisor); Linda Williams Ph. D. (Committee Member); Kimberly Garchar Ph. D. (Committee Member); Manacy Pai Ph. D. (Committee Member) Subjects: Ethics; Medical Ethics; Philosophy

Bachelor of Arts, Miami University, 2009, College of Arts and Sciences - Philosophy

The vast majority of moral theorists either assumes or accepts that moral status is an all or nothing concept. One either has full moral status, or one has no moral status. The problem with having an all or nothing approach to moral status becomes apparent when one wants to open the moral community to non-humans. Although many people might agree that animals deserve moral consideration, a significant majority of even those sympathetic to animals' suffering still resist putting animals and human beings on an equal moral footing. The “dog on the lifeboat” thought experiment lays bare this pro-human moral intuition. In this essay, I explore the ways in which Tom Regan, Peter Singer, R.G. Frey, and Ruth Cigman attempt to make sense of this pro-human moral intuition without denying the need for some moral consideration for animals. All of them justify the moral intuition that we must protect the life of a human over the life of an animal if forced into such a situation. They do this by arguing, in some way or another, that death is, generally speaking, more harmful for human beings. I reject this approach to justifying the pro-human moral intuition because I favor a view of the harmfulness of death where it makes little sense to make comparative judgments of death's harmfulness across species lines. In contrast, I argue that the all or nothing concept of moral status needs to be revised. I argue that moral status should adopt a sliding- scale model based on the distinction between moral agents and moral patients. This approach does not deny moral status of some degree to many animals, and the implications of this approach are not as wide reaching as to justify much of the current ways humans treat animal beings. This project is important because it takes on the task of making coherent a strong animal rights position that still holds on to a limited pro-human view. Many people might initially view these two views as contradictory or in tension. I am arguing that one does (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Asher Seidel PhD (Advisor); Gaile Pohlhaus PhD (Committee Member); Bryan Bannon PhD (Committee Member) Subjects: Animals; Philosophy