Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), Ohio University, 2018, History (Arts and Sciences)
This dissertation analyzes the role of the United States in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) dual-track decision, which called for the deployment of 572 intermediate-range missiles in Europe and simultaneous arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. Tracing the evolution of U.S. theater nuclear policy from 1977 to 1987, it demonstrates that President Jimmy Carter was an effective manager of the Atlantic alliance. In the wake of the neutron bomb fiasco in April 1978, Carter learned from the episode and implemented those lessons during intra-alliance consultations about theater nuclear modernization and arms control. In contrast to existing historiography, Carter was the chief architect of the dual-track decision, proposing the essential framework for the initiative on the sandy beaches of Guadeloupe in January 1979. Unable to make progress on the arms control track, Carter secured the passage of a program that allowed President Ronald Reagan to approach the arms talks with the Soviet Union from a position of strength. At first cold to the inherited dual-track policy course, Reagan, a bona fide nuclear abolitionist, improvised throughout the intermediate-range negotiations in Geneva, Switzerland. Reagan, who never exerted the effort required to master the arcane substance of nuclear strategy, listened to different advisers at key moments during the talks, which reflected his evolving approach to the negotiations. Between 1981 and 1983, he primarily leaned on the counsel of hardliners in Washington, especially Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and his cunning deputy, Richard Perle, who reinforced Reagan's inclination to distrust the Soviet leadership and press for the maximalist zero option, which required the liquidation of U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range missiles. After the Soviets stormed out of Geneva in November 1983, Reagan increasingly heeded the advice of Secretary of State George Shultz, who encouraged him to compromise, abolish n (open full item for complete abstract)
Committee: Chester Pach Dr. (Committee Chair); Kevin Mattson Dr. (Committee Member); Ingo Trauschweizer Dr. (Committee Member); James Mosher Dr. (Committee Member)
Subjects: History; Modern History