Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2023, Philosophy

This dissertation is about what is called a conception of scientific explanation. A conception of scientific explanation concerns some ontological questions about scientific explanation. Two related but distinct questions have been investigated: (1) What type of entity is an explanans? (2) In virtue of what, is a thing of that type explanatory? There are two competing conceptions of scientific explanation. One is the ontic conception and the other is the non-ontic conception. A conception is ontic if it says that (a) a type of thing that explains is primarily a thing in the world that is responsible for a target of explanation (ontic explanation) and (b) a type of entity explains if and only if it is either ontic explanation or accurately represents the relevant ontic explanation (ontic determination). A conception is non-ontic if it denies either (a) or (b) or both in one way or the other. The aim of this thesis is to propose and defend a new non-ontic conception. The three chapters are designed to proceed toward the said aim. In Chapter 1, I challenge claim (a) of the ontic conception, i.e., the existence of an ontic explanation. I examine the existing reasons to believe in ontic explanations and argue against them. The conclusion of this chapter is tentative, for all it shows is that no good reason has yet been proposed to support our commitment to an ontic explanation. Still, the conclusion is strong enough to lend support to the non-ontic conception denying ontic explanations in that it is better not to posit something if not necessary for the ontological parsimony. In Chapter 2, I deal with claim (b) of the ontic conception, i.e., the ontic determination. To this end, I examine Angela Potochnik's non-ontic view, according to which whether something is explanatory is determined not only by what the relevant part of the world is like but also by some cognitive factor of those seeking an explanation. I agree with Potochnik in that some cognitive facto (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Christopher Pincock (Advisor); Richard Samuels (Committee Member); Stewart Shapiro (Committee Member) Subjects: Philosophy of Science