M.A. (Master of Arts in English), Ohio Dominican University, 2020, English

This work compares and contrasts the Atticus of Harper Lee's novel, To Kill a Mockingbird, with the Atticus of Lee's later novel, Go Set a Watchman. Although Atticus appears to be a defender of equal rights and justice in one and a staunch segregationist in the other, this work argues that Atticus is essentially the same man in both novels, and supports this perspective with an examination of Atticus' positions on racism, the law and justice. This work also examines Atticus and racism in the South from a regional point of view during the time period of both novels, and asks relevant questions as to the universal moral obligations the characters may have to one another.

Committee: Kelsey Squire Ph.D. (Advisor); Martin Brick Ph.D. (Committee Member) Subjects: African Americans; American History; American Literature; Law; Literature; Regional Studies

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2011, Political Science

While some behavior on the United States Supreme Court is formally required, other choices are wholly up to the discretion of each individual justice. One such discretional choice is the choice to author a concurring opinion, which agrees with the outcome of a case but add to, subtract from, or emphasize a point within the legal doctrine provided by the majority opinion. Thus, choices about concurring opinions provide a valuable opportunity for examining judicial motivations. This dissertation examines justices' motives for both whether and when they circulate a concurrence to their colleagues, as well as whether they choose to publish it along with the Court's opinion. The hypotheses are derived from two types of motivations – individual and collective. Tests of these hypotheses were conducted using data from the 1970 through 1979 Court terms, collected primarily from the personal papers of Justices Harry Blackmun and William Brennan. I use a split population event history model to test hypotheses about whether and when a justice first circulates a concurring opinion. I then use a logistic regression model to test hypotheses about whether a justice chooses to withdraw a written concurrence; this analysis is, of course, dependent upon the justice already having written a concurring opinion. In both sets of analyses I find that Supreme Court justices are motivated not only by their individual preferences about legal policy, but also by individual non-policy preferences, such as workload, and collective preferences about the institutional status of the Court, such as maintaining the Court's legitimacy.

Committee: Lawrence Baum (Committee Chair); Janet Box-Steffensmeier (Committee Member); Gregory Caldeira (Committee Member) Subjects: Political Science