MA, Kent State University, 2023, College of Arts and Sciences / Department of Philosophy

This thesis will assess whether Laurence BonJour's foundationalism is a viable internalist theory of epistemic justification. BonJour's view seems to require a higher order awareness that the content of a basic belief accurately describes what is empirically given. One worry is that an analogue of Sellars' dilemma will arise with respect to this higher order state. A related concern is that such higher order states may not always be reliable. Where they are not reliable, it is hard to see how the basic belief would be epistemically justified. A similar concern arises with respect to non-basic beliefs. Only beliefs that follow from justified beliefs via objectively truth conducive inferences will be inferentially justified. However, whether or not a given inference is objectively truth conducive is a matter external to the agent. As such, it is difficult to see how a purely internalist view can account for the epistemic justification of non-basic beliefs.

Committee: Deborah Smith (Committee Chair); Robert Trogden (Committee Member); David Pereplyotchik (Committee Member); Polycarp Ikuenobe (Committee Member) Subjects: Epistemology; Philosophy