Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 1982, Graduate School

Committee: Not Provided (Other) Subjects: Psychology

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 1978, Graduate School

Committee: Not Provided (Other) Subjects: Philosophy

Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.), University of Dayton, 2016, Theology

The principal goal of this dissertation is to demonstrate that the Confucian interpretation of xiao (“filial piety”) provides a fruitful hermeneutical lens for Christology in two respects. Most immediately, I argue the early Confucian xiao is a salutary resource for understanding, appreciating, clarifying, and amending the Christology of Hans Urs von Balthasar, who gave profound importance to Christ's obedience in his thought. More generally, I argue the Confucian reading of xiao can help theologians enter into the mysteries of the Church's Christological dogmas and doctrines in new and expansive ways. Consequently, the main argument of the dissertation is that through Balthasar and the early Confucian tradition, we arrive at a rich and compelling orthodox account of Christ's filial love and obedience. After situating the dissertation's theological approach to incorporating Confucian philosophy in chapter 1, the dissertation develops two sets of studies. The first is devoted to examining and exploring Balthasar's Christology on its own terms. The second is similarly devoted to analyzing themes in the Confucian treatment of xiao on its own terms. The final chapter of the dissertation undertakes a theological synthesis of these two studies, showing how the combination of Balthasar's theological vision and the Confucian philosophical distinctions produce fruitful reflections on how Christ's filial obedience functions within and expresses his life as eternal Son.

Committee: William Portier Ph.D. (Advisor); G. Alexus McLeod Ph.D. (Committee Member); Peter Casarella Ph.D. (Committee Member); Jana Bennett Ph.D. (Committee Member); Dennis Doyle Ph.D. (Committee Member) Subjects: Comparative; Philosophy; Theology

MA, University of Cincinnati, 2004, Arts and Sciences : Political Science

This paper uses attitudes toward traditional authority as a proxy for moral worldviews. Traditional authority is then used to predict attitudes toward the culture war battles abortion, homosexuality, birth control and euthanasia. The moral worldview construct of traditional authority and Biblical literalism provide more explanatory power than social groups, providing further proof of a culture war. Traditional authority is also studied as a predictor of attitudes toward science and science knowledge in novel ways. It appears that science may be an emerging battle in the culture war. Capital punishment and affirmative action are also studied, but no evidence of a culture war is found. In all cases, traditional authority captures unique variation not tapped by attitudes toward Biblical literalism, and together they appear to form a larger construct of the source of moral authority and worldview.

Committee: Stephen Mockabee (Advisor) Subjects: Political Science, General

Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.), Bowling Green State University, 2013, Philosophy, Applied

My dissertation aims to solve a puzzle, a paradox, and a problem. The puzzle is to explain why people act in uncharacteristic (i.e., seemingly cruel) ways in a number of social psychological experiments, such as Stanley Milgram's obedience experiment, in which 65% of the participants complied with the experimenter's demands to issue a series of increasingly powerful "shocks" to an unwilling recipient. I argue that owing to features of the experimental design participants were made to feel: out of their element, confused, disoriented, pressured, intimidated, and acutely distressed, and that the "experimenter" (actually a confederate) exploited these factors, which is the central reason why the majority of participants complied with his demands despite being reluctant to do so. The paradox is that, although ordinary people seem to be good, bad, or somewhere in between, evidence (again from social psychology) seems to suggest that most people would behave deplorably on many occasions and heroically on many others. This, in turn, suggests the paradoxical conclusion that most people are indeterminate—i.e., no particular character evaluation appears to apply to them. I argue to the contrary that the social psychological evidence fails to support the claim that people would behave deplorably on many occasions. Milgram's participants, for example, faced extenuating circumstances that should mitigate the degree to which they were blameworthy for their actions, and this, in turn, challenges the claim that they behaved deplorably. The problem is that no existing theory has been able to adequately account for the connection between possessing certain character traits and performing certain actions. Commonsense suggests that there is a connection between, for instance, being a truthful person and telling the truth, but it has been challenging for philosophers to capture precisely what the connection is in an empirically defensible way. I argue that there is a strong (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Daniel Jacobson (Committee Chair); David Shoemaker (Committee Member); Christian Coons (Committee Member); Judith Zimmerman (Committee Member) Subjects: Philosophy