MA, Kent State University, 2021, College of Arts and Sciences / Department of Philosophy

Benevolent government is the central theme of Jeong Do-jeon's political philosophy, which in turn is primarily inspired by the Mencian view of human morality. Mengzi believed that all humans equally possess the capacity to become virtuous, and the role of the state will resemble that of a benevolent father, in that its primary function is to nurture and educate the people so they can adequately develop their moral capacities. Jeong's idea of benevolent government and the politics of peace of Sara Ruddick share certain similarities. In this thesis, I will argue that maternal thinking – as proposed by Sara Ruddick – is the underlying mode of thought behind Jeong's political theory. Such a connection can be established through a close reading of Mengzi and identifying the theme of maternal thinking apparent in the classical Confucian text, as interpreted by the contemporary scholar Joanne Birdwhistell. Some common aspects of both Jeong and Ruddick's philosophy is their stern opposition to blind obedience to hierarchy, and defense of respectful communications. I will reveal these common aspects by mainly focusing on the idea of remonstrance promoted by Jeong, and its resemblance to the emphasis on Ruddick's view of maternal thinking and politics.

Master of Arts, University of Toledo, 2021, Philosophy

Sor Juana Ines de la Cruz has yet to achieve her proper place in the early modern canon of philosophy. For the past century Sor Juana, the 17th century Mexican nun and scholar, has been examined through different lenses—literary, gender studies, and Latin American philosophy. In this thesis, I argue for the need to examine Sor Juana's works through the lens of philosophy of literature. In three chapters, I look at two of Sor Juana's works and how she used the genres of letter writing and poetry to advance her philosophical ideas about women and herself. The first is a poem known as Hombres Necios or Foolish Men, and the second is a letter known as La respuesta a Sor Filotea or The Reply to Sor Filotea. Poetry and letter writing were some of the only genres permitted to women at this time. Sor Juana took advantage of this restriction and exploited the natural attributes of these two genres so that her arguments were less vulnerable to censorship. The first chapter examines Hombres necios through a philosophy of poetry lens. In the poem, Sor Juana asserts that there are sexual double standards that women suffer; these double standards are placed on them by men. Many scholars like Octavio Paz, Frank Warnke, Alan Trueblood, Electa Arenal, and Amanda Powell examine Sor Juana's poetry through literary or feminist lenses. I add to their interpretations and contribute to the philosophical discussion the idea that Sor Juana's poem creates a space for her arguments. By using the structure of the redondilla, or “little round one”, Sor Juana emphasizes different words to create double meanings and give words to the anger that women feel. The poem allows men a slight reprieve of guilt, before they are confronted with her conclusion that all men are to blame. The second and third chapter focuses on the similarities that Sor Juana draws between her own persecution and self-defense to that of Socrates found in Plato's Apology. By comparing the two defenses, we see parallels betw (open full item for complete abstract)

Master of Arts, University of Toledo, 2013, Philosophy

A productive relationship between the philosophy of mind and the empirical cognitive sciences not only is possible, but also is pursued productively by practitioners from both sides. In the first two chapters, I consider two examples of sets of concepts (“folk psychology” and the “architecture of the mind”) which are shared between the philosophy of mind and the empirical cognitive sciences and analyze them from both perspectives. I introduce a historical-analytical apparatus called “inherited ontologies” to track these sets of concepts and how they emerge, mutate, and replicate over time in order to show that what can begin as semantic opacity can end as ontological confusion. I argue that the important question is not whether we inherit our implicit ideas about the mind from our genes or our culture, but how shared inheritance manifests in different ways in different individuals. In the third chapter, I argue that the plurality of kinds of minds should inform how we research our minds. Instead of supposing that a plurality of approaches to study a plurality of minds is a problem to be solved, we should embrace cognitive and methodological diversity as not only possible but desirable in a shared problem space. The cognitive sciences should develop a unity of purpose without collapsing into a presumed uniformity of subject matter.

Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.), Bowling Green State University, 2022, Philosophy, Applied

This dissertation asserts we have prima facie reason to believe that at least sometimes, two or more moral persons can share a single brain and body. Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID), formerly known as Multiple Personality Disorder, is a disintegration of memory, consciousness, and experience. This gives the impression of multiple personalities who alternate control of the body, only to eventually change to another personality who often has no memory of the events that transpired, or even any other personalities supposedly sharing the body. While many philosophers agree that a body can house only one person with moral rights and duties, DID cases challenge this assumption. Derek Parfit believes that to be a person is to be a continuity of causally connected mental states, including memories, intentions, experiences, and personality traits. If an alternate personality qualifies as a person, then, there exist cases in which two or more persons can share a single brain and body. Some real-life cases, then, should also be considered as examples of multiple personhood. Given that we have prima facie reason to believe some alternate personalities (“alters”) are persons, some alters may then have a right to life. Treating DID with reintegration therapy involves something like killing an alter. As such, reintegration therapy is only sometimes morally permissible, due to the asymmetric claims to the body between the original personality and an alter.

MA, Kent State University, 2022, College of Arts and Sciences / Department of Philosophy

Why does academic philosophy in America have such a notably low number of Black graduates? As Black people in America enter the University at ever-growing rates, the field of philosophy itself has seen minimal increase in the number of Black students who decide to major in the field. Why is this? In this thesis, I examine how racialized embodiment impacts especially Black (male) philosophy students in North America. In order to address this question, this thesis will draw heavily upon the work of both Frantz Fanon's complex examination of the Black embodied experience in in his pivotal work Black Skin, White Masks and various works from Dr. George Yancy. In Chapter I, I turn to Fanon's analysis of racialized embodiment and its impact on Black bodies' relation to themselves and to society at large. Here I focus on concepts and analyses that clarify Fanon's understanding of self-constitution, paying close attention to how, for Black people, self-constitution entails a distinctive kind of mediation through a relation to the white ‘Other.' This relationship is burdened with racial implications that fix Black bodies into a position that does not coincide with how Black bodies understand themselves. In short: one's senses of self and world are shaped in and through the internalization of racialized norms that the Black body lives with on a daily basis. The mediation at work here results in a ‘double' or split sense of self, which in turn entails a distinctive kind of alienation from one's self as well as from socio-cultural, and, as we shall see, intellectual and academic possibilities. In Chapter II, I turn to the work of George Yancy, who, as a contemporary North American philosopher of race, has drawn extensively from Fanon's analyses of embodiment and self-constitution. My analysis will likewise employ Yancy's conceptual framework, which he has labeled the ‘density project', a style of philosophical writing that aims to expand philosophical boundaries (open full item for complete abstract)

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2021, Educational Studies

The roots of the close link between politics and education, recognized by numer-ous modern philosophers as well as contemporary scholars, can be found in ancient Western philosophy. This period of human history witnessed the emergence of philo-sophical movements which had more or less coherent political, educational, and meta-physical ideas, which used education as their main form of political activity, and which hoped to shape the system of education through politics. Examining and understanding these different ancient approaches is critical for making sense of the link between poli-tics and education today. Nevertheless, there has been little research exploring this link at its ancient roots. This study focuses on the Pythagorean, Socratic, Platonic, Cynic and Stoic movements. The politics of these movements are mainly explored through their views on gender, slavery, and socioeconomic systems, and categorized on a spectrum of con-servatives on one side and radicals on the other. The pedagogies of these movements are mainly categorized as teacher-centered or student-centered, and their curricula, educa-tional theories, practices and preferred student profiles are examined. This study aims to show that the political and educational approaches of these movements were in line with each other even if whether a movement is conservative or radical did not directly de-termine their pedagogy, which was rather determined by its political function according to the needs of the movement, and that education is necessary but insufficient for caus-ing social and political change. This study concludes with lessons drawn from the expe-rience of ancient philosophy for those who want to make a difference through education.

M.A. (Master of Arts in English), Ohio Dominican University, 2021, English

This paper examines Geoffrey Chaucer's Pardoner's Tale using one of Chaucer's most important sources: Boethius' The Consolation of Philosophy. Chapter one examines Boethius' contributions to philosophy, his contributions to education, and most importantly, his impact on Chaucer's literary art. Chapter one uses Boethius' Consolation to describe the consolatio genre and provides a contrast between authors like Dante, who use similar philosophical material to place judgement, and Chaucer, who uses philosophical material to promote questions instead of answers, shedding light on individual human choice. Chapter two analyzes the effects of Boethius' Consolation on The Pardoner's Tale. It examines Chaucer's translation of the Consolation, reveals the Boethian question addressed in the Tale—what is the outcome of the wicked?—and demonstrates Chaucer's ability to use medieval sermon structure to arrive at consolation. Chapter three surveys a flurry of scholarship surrounding perceptions of the Pardoner's audience and resulting character. This chapter encourages readers to apply a Boethian lens, considering consolation genre in addition to medieval sermon structure in order to ascertain a more contextually complete, and therefore hopeful, view of the Pardoner that is at odds with the predominant view of the character's ultimate fate.

PhD, University of Cincinnati, 2019, Arts and Sciences: Philosophy

Since Timothy van Gelder's 1995 paper “What Might Cognition be if not Computation?” there has been a growing distrust of representational accounts of cognition, most notably from proponents of relatively new programs like dynamical systems theory and ecological/embodied approaches to cognition. Some advocates of these programs have argued that the concept of “representation” is deeply flawed – does little explanatory work, prejudices what is researched and how results are interpreted, and loses sight of the complex interactions that hold between agents and their environments. In this dissertation, I will not try to challenge these claims. Instead, I will argue that responses from defenders of representational modeling often fail to adequately meet these challenges, underestimate their insights, and have a tendency to react by redefining “representation” in such a way that it loses its explanatory significance. Although I believe that the ultimate shape and utility of representational models of cognition will only be revealed in the course of doing science, I will advocate a new tack for defending representational modeling. I begin by acknowledging that representational terminology is indeed used inconsistently, and sometimes without warrant or explanatory power. Next, I examine cases from the cognitive neuroscience to try to show that we can distinguish between explanations whose representational features are closely tied to their explanatory ambitions and those that are not. I will argue that the representationalist should emphasize that information-processing solutions are contingent strategies available to organisms for producing adaptive behavior – as are varieties of synergistic agent-environmental coupling – and, therefore, there should be ways of marshaling evidence for or against the hypothesis that any particular cognitive/perceptual capacity is the result of a representational solution. She can then point out that explanatory representational models in neu (open full item for complete abstract)

Master of Arts (MA), Ohio University, 2015, Philosophy (Arts and Sciences)

Contemporary cosmology is teeming with model underdetermination and cosmologists are looking for methods with which to relieve some of this underdetermination. One such method that has found its way into cosmology in recent years is the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The criterion is meant to select the model that loses the least amount of information in its approximation of the data, and furthermore AIC shows a preference for simplicity by containing a penalty term that penalizes models with excessive complexity. The principle aim of this paper is to investigate some of the strengths and weaknesses of AIC against two philosophical backdrops in order to determine its usefulness in cosmological model selection. The backdrops or positions against which AIC will be assessed are I) realist and II) antirealist. It will be argued that on both of these positions there is at least one feature of AIC that proves problematic for the satisfaction of the aims of the position.

Master of Arts, University of Toledo, 2010, Philosophy

Ecological reconstruction challenges the historical chasm between culture and nature by using the normative implications of ecology to assert a primacy of relations in experience. Drawing upon the framework of John Dewey and classical American Pragmatism, I sketch out an experimental method for thinking about environmental philosophy that follows this reconstruction, moving beyond both applied ethics and dogmatic values. Central to this move is the possibility of opening up ecotonal spaces, literal and theoretical cites of intensified interaction between cultural and natural systems. These spaces furnish reconstruction with the experiences necessary to generate new concepts that set human communities on the course towards greater ecological attentiveness.

Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.), Bowling Green State University, 2012, Philosophy, Applied

This dissertation is about ‘mental disorder.' More specifically, the focus of this work will be a particular approach to understanding ‘mental disorder' which I label “biological functionalism.” What the defenders of biological functionalism claim is that any successful account of disorder must take seriously the idea of natural dysfunction. Because ‘natural dysfunction' is thought to be drawn directly from the facts of natural function, the biological functionalist goes on to assert that ‘natural dysfunction' is free of evaluative content. The relevance of this approach to ‘mental disorder' lies in its implications for the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). The DSM offers a definition of mental disorder which is intended to address certain concerns over the legitimacy of psychiatry. In particular, it is meant to answer anti-psychiatry critics who question the way the psychiatric establishment distinguishes between disorder and psychiatric normality. I argue that the DSM's efforts are not successful because a key component of its definition — ‘dysfunction' — is left ambiguous. To address this weakness, biological functionalism offers a naturalistic understanding of ‘dysfunction' which supposedly honors the DSM's scientific focus. My main contention is that the biological functionalist project fails on two counts. The first flaw is in its execution. I argue that leading biological functionalist accounts do not pay proper respect to the practical commitments of psychiatry. But a second, more critical flaw occurs at the conceptual level. Biological functionalism fails to recognize that ‘dysfunction' is an inherently evaluative concept. Consequently, the biological functionalist paradigm is left in a dilemma. It either commits the naturalistic fallacy; that is, it attempts to derive an evaluative sense of ‘dysfunction' from a strictly explanatory sense of ‘natural function.' Or it cannot account for the eval (open full item for complete abstract)

Master of Arts, The Ohio State University, 2024, Bioethics

From Aristotle to Engelhardt, philosophers and ethicists have struggled to find epistemic justification for a single set of provable and canonical content-full ethics to guide the moral decision making of the individual and nation-state alike. Where those such as Beauchamp and Childress in their account of Principlism presume something of a Rawlsian ‘common morality,' others such as H. Tristram Engelhardt Jr. argue that we may not take for granted even the simplest of presumptions regarding good and right moral action without either begging the question, arbitrarily affirming a particular point of departure, or invoking an infinite regress (Engelhardt ix, Beauchamp and Childress 3-5, 444-457). Herein, I aim to accomplish two purposes. First, I mean to call out the elephant in the room: If there is no God; if there is no creator or creators; if there is no higher transcendent purpose or meaning behind existence or ultimate judgement for our actions, then truly there is no absolute right or wrong. The Enlightenment Project has failed, and will necessarily fail to find a single set of provable canonical content-full ethics (Engelhardt vii). Second, I will propose a conceptual conjecture to assist with the consideration of this dilemma which I call A Priori's Wager. I propose that the human person is necessarily either the product of a creator or creators, and therefore possessing of a priori pre-existent purpose and meaning; or that the human person is the product of mere time and chance, and therefore possessing of only the post hoc purposes and meanings which we arbitrarily apply to ourselves. I argue that either of these premises may be true, but that the current scientific and philosophical methodologies available to us may neither prove nor disprove either premise. Given these competing premises of which one is necessarily true, but neither may be proven, I argue that we find ourselves fixed in something of a superposition of both transcendent obligati (open full item for complete abstract)

PHD, Kent State University, 2024, College of Education, Health and Human Services / School of Foundations, Leadership and Administration

This study investigates the educational dimensions of theatre through a post-critical philosophical lens, viewing theatre as an object of intrinsic value and significance. It examines how theatre sets the scene for democratic engagement for the diverse audiences who encounter it; explores its role as a public good, worthy of public support and engagement; and looks at how it operates educationally—both as an academic environment that fosters intellectual and emotional growth and as a laboratory for cultivating democratic citizenship. Additionally, this study argues for theatre's inclusion as a curricular subject in grades K–12 and proposes a pragmatic solution for rural schools. Because it conceptualizes theatre as an educational phenomenon rather than pure entertainment, it adds depth to ongoing discussions about theatre's worth in school settings and offers a more expansive understanding of how theatre engages audiences in all settings. Finally, this study sets the stage for deeper discussions and debate on how theatre fits into local schools, community arts organizations, and education more broadly.

Master of Arts, The Ohio State University, 1905, Graduate School

MA, Kent State University, 2024, College of Arts and Sciences / Department of Philosophy

Within Heidegger's work Being and Time, many scholars have argued that Heidegger's account of authenticity undermines elements of his project that were set out in the first division. One common complaint is that Heidegger's account of authenticity undermines his ability to account for Dasein as being-in-the-world. The concern, according to these scholars, is that the establishing normative force of the world gets stripped away through authenticity, which would lead to a worldless subject. My goal is to challenge these interpretations. I argue that authenticity actually brings into focus characteristics of the world like finitude, rather than creating a separation between subject and world. In doing this, I will lay out what exactly an account of authenticity centered on being-in-the-world looks like to show that it doesn't create problems for Heidegger's project.

Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.), Bowling Green State University, 2023, Philosophy, Applied

This dissertation explores the intersection of epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics. Specifically, it covers ground where these fields overlap in such a way that special interdisciplinary attention is required. Chapter I discusses the notion of epistemic harm within the epistemic injustice literature and argues that we should abandon the notion of epistemic harm in order to strengthen our notion of epistemic injustice. Chapter II continues to explore the intersection of epistemology and ethics and offers a refinement of the recent literature on epistemic trespassing, arguing that we need not limit our conception of epistemic trespassing to be a wrong perpetrated only by experts. Chapter III operates a broader level and argues for limitation on closed epistemic communities, that is, discursive communities who limit their membership in public fora. I argue that the meta level discourse on who is properly part of such groups cannot be constrained by what I call the Stay In You Lane (SIYL) Norm. Finally, in Chapter IV, using Chapter III as requiring engagement with trans-exclusionary feminism, I argue that traditional approaches to the question of trans policy, which attempt to resolve the question via an account of the metaphysics of gender, are misguided and that an ethics first approach yields a clear requirement for trans inclusive social policies.

MA, Kent State University, 2023, College of Arts and Sciences / Department of Philosophy

What is law, and how do judges apply laws? What factors affect how judges interpret laws and reach decisions? I will defend Dworkin's conception of law as integrity, in terms of how judges' decisions and application of laws create a coherent and predictable system of laws. I will use the Dobbs decision, which overturned Roe v. Wade and stripped women of their long-standing abortion rights, to illustrate the importance of the principles of stare decisis and integrity in a legal system. I will examine the HartDworkin debate regarding the nature of law and adjudication. I will then examine the views of Hart and Dworkin and the nature of their disagreement. I will move to evaluate their views in the context of the argument and the need for stability, predictability, and coherence in a legal system. I will argue that Dworkin's conception of law as integrity, which is grounded in the principle of stare decisis, is preferable to Hart's positivist conception of law and adjudication. I will use the decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, which overturned Roe v. Wade, to substantiate my argument by indicating that the Dobbs decision violates law as integrity and the principle of stare decisis.

Master of Arts, University of Toledo, 2022, Philosophy

When viewing the categories of art and craft as the field of philosophy has typically done, we are inevitably forced to make unfair and arbitrary categorizations of aesthetic artifacts based on an overly restrictive binary. This project attempts to dismantle this antiquated dichotomy by showing that food represents a prime example of a class of aesthetic objects which cannot be neatly or usefully categorized into either camp, and by further detailing how elements traditionally thought quintessential to each amount to little more than flimsy justifications for our attributions and classifications. In doing so, I hope to show a more useful metric by which we can evaluate aesthetic artifacts; one which accurately assesses the features of them by judging them on independent metrics associated with these existing elements.

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2022, Philosophy

This dissertation is a collection of four papers on George Berkeley and the role of metaphysics in natural science. Each paper addresses a separate scientific concept and examines Berkeley's critique of the application of that concept in demonstrations within physics and the mathematical principles of physics. These concepts are quantity of matter (i.e. mass) in chapter one, percussive force (i.e. impact) in chapter two, true motion in chapter three, and the fluxions of the calculus in chapter four. In each case, Berkeley directs his attention to the ontology of that concept. This attention manifests itself primarily in two ways. First, in some cases Berkeley recognizes that certain metaphysical assumptions about the nature of the entity in question influence (oftentimes in negative ways) the way natural philosophers develop and interpret the claims of their scientific theories. Second, in some cases Berkeley argues that a proper understanding of the entity in question (based in his idealist metaphysics) can rectify errors in the way natural philosophers develop and interpret the claims of their scientific theories. On the whole, Berkeley is concerned to show not just that the physics of his time is compatible with his metaphysics of idealism, but further that physics is more fully and properly understood only when founded on his idealism.

Master of Arts (MA), Ohio University, 2020, Philosophy (Arts and Sciences)

In the course of formulating the free will defense in his book, The Nature of Necessity, Alvin Plantinga contends that God knows counterfactuals of human freedom and thus possesses what is commonly called “middle knowledge.” My aim in this thesis is to show that the principal justification Plantinga gives for middle knowledge fails. Specifically, I note that Plantinga's intuitive case for middle knowledge tacitly assumes that the law of distribution holds for counterfactuals of freedom. I then draw on the modal semantics of David Lewis to argue that one ought to recognize that there might be ties in similarity among possible worlds and that the law of distribution, consequently, does not hold for counterfactuals of freedom. Finally, I complete my criticism of Plantinga's intuitive case by contending that the possible worlds relevant to determining the truth value of counterfactuals of freedom are very much among the sorts of possible worlds likely to allow for such ties.