Master of Arts (MA), Ohio University, 2015, History (Arts and Sciences)
The scholarship regarding US policy and military strategy in Vietnam is substantial, and by no means conclusive. To provide clear focus within the realms of national policy and military strategy, the analysis provided by this thesis is focused on the advice and actions taken by the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), and its commander General William Westmoreland from 1964 to 1968. Within the actions of MACV, this thesis seeks to determine the contribution of MACV in the decision to escalate US involvement in the Vietnam War. This thesis analyzes the US Army's doctrine, structure, and culture related to civil-military relations. Also, this thesis analyzes the military approach taken by MACV in fighting the Vietnam War at the operational level, and concludes with an analysis of a possible alternative to MACV's military strategy in the form of the Combined Action Program (CAP). This thesis concludes that MACV's operational approach was correct.
Committee: Ingo Trauschweizer (Advisor); John Brobst (Committee Member); Chester Pach (Committee Member)
Subjects: American History; History; Military History; Military Studies; Modern History