MA, Kent State University, 2019, College of Arts and Sciences / Department of Philosophy

While studying psychology is helpful in moral theorizing, we must ensure that it is done properly and that conclusions are not drawn too hastily. Joshua Greene uses research about how people make moral judgements as a part of his defense of utilitarianism. Greene claims that competing moral judgement systems create the tension between utilitarianism and deontology, a tension that has caused widespread moral disagreement. In this thesis, I will argue that Greene's dismissal of deontological moral theory is premature insofar as the relationship between the dual-process theory and moral theory is weak. In order to illustrate this, I begin by explicating Greene's argument as well as highlighting philosophical origins and presuppositions in his theory. Next, I examine the research applying Greene's method of study and model of moral judgement applied to psychopaths. Applying Greene's model to psychopaths raises questions about his methodology that extends to typical individuals. These issues concern the nature of his thought experiments, coding scheme, and underlying philosophical commitments. In the final chapter, I examine how these methodological issues function to weaken Greene's overall argument in favor of utilitarianism. I will argue that some of these flaws raise issues for incorporating empirical psychology into moral psychology more broadly.

Committee: Deborah Barnbaum (Advisor); Andreea Smaranda Aldea (Committee Member); Polycarp Ikuenobe (Committee Member); John Dunlosky (Committee Member) Subjects: Ethics; Philosophy; Psychology

BA, Oberlin College, 2020, Philosophy

I will define the meaning of subjective well-being that I believe is the most intrinsic normative good, explain why improving the subjective well-being of sentient individuals ought to be the highest ethical priority, and provide reasons for why finding a way to measure subjective well-being would essentially benefit decision-makers and grassroots altruists. Subjective well-being is a dauntingly nebulous property to attempt to measure with precision, but I will comment on the progress that philosophers and social scientists have made in this field. Although (1) there is no set of well-being criteria that is applicable to every sentient individual (including non-human animals) and (2) most sentient individuals are unable to communicate with us about their level of subjective well-being use or relevant experiential factors, we may yet be able to develop an intrapersonally and interpersonally cardinal method to measure subjective well-being.

Committee: Todd Ganson (Advisor) Subjects: Ethics; Philosophy; Philosophy of Science; Psychology; Welfare

Doctor of Philosophy, Case Western Reserve University, 2020, English

This dissertation describes an alternative to an especially influential understanding of how literature promotes social justice. According to this dominant paradigm, literature heightens our empathy through vivid depictions of suffering. Where this mode emphasizes stylistic vividness, I turn to works of fiction and autobiography from the years just before the Civil War to identify a wholly different didactic tradition—one that advances by means of what eighteenth-century critics derisively called vacuity or imaginative vacancy. Vacancy, I argue, is a tool for revealing networks of solidarity, distributed in time and space, and inaccessible by means of vivid description. Harriet Jacobs's offers an example of this dynamic in her treatment of violence in Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl. Many other famous ex-slave narrators, such as Frederick Douglass and Solomon Northrup, foreground scenes in which a master beats a slave until his whip drips with blood. Such scenes heighten the reader's empathy through their excruciating level of detail, particularizing the narrated violence until it seems almost present. When Jacobs incorporates the trope, though, she transforms it through generalization, describing how in the aftermath of Nat Turner's Rebellion “everywhere men, women, and children were whipped till the blood stood in puddles at their feet” and “the consternation was universal” (58). This scene is typical of Jacobs's treatment of violence elsewhere in her narrative where punishments are not meted out to particular slaves but to groups. Because her writing frustrates visualization and the free play of empathy, Jacobs is able to prevent identification at the individual level and to depict slavery instead at the level of systems and groups. Like Jacobs, the other writers I examine in this dissertation—Rebecca Harding Davis, Herman Melville, and Nathaniel Hawthorne—use vacancy to create alternative didactic forms capable of imagining and promoting solidarity.

Committee: Michael Clune (Committee Chair); Gary Stonum (Committee Member); Athena Vrettos (Committee Member); Timothy Beal (Committee Member) Subjects: American Literature; Political Science

Master of Arts (MA), Ohio University, 2024, Philosophy (Arts and Sciences)

This is a critical examination of several theories concerning the relationship between moral content and aesthetic value. It concentrates on the questions of how, if, and when the moral content may affect the aesthetic value of an artwork. The arguments are narrowly tailored by focusing the assessments on four theories—radical autonomism, radical moralism, moderate autonomism, and moderate moralism. The assessments and critiques are based on the work of philosopher Noel Carroll, and those who stand in opposition to his position of moderate moralism. Moderate moralism is not without philosophical gaps when scrutinized; nonetheless, it offers great insight into the intimate relationship between morality and the conferral of value upon artworks.

Committee: James Petrik (Committee Chair); Christoph Hanisch (Committee Member); Scott Carson (Committee Member) Subjects: Aesthetics; Art Criticism; Philosophy

Doctor of Philosophy, University of Toledo, 2023, Foundations of Education

Critical peace education sets forth a process-oriented pedagogy with key tenets that include inquiry, reflection, dialogue, critical value-assessment, and empowerment. Empowerment as tenet is unique because, when viewed comprehensively, it is recognized as an integral element required for the actualization of all other tenets within CPE. Although empowerment may take on many forms within the CPE framework, this work seeks to establish that its foundational component rests upon three distinct elements which include: the ability to establish and maintain authentic inner unification with peace (through the development of an integrated state of nonviolence), the ability to offer valid normative justifications for one's claims, and an ongoing commitment and willingness to reconstruct the conception of peace in pursuit of justice and fairness in a diverse biosphere. The prevalence of violence (specifically structural violence experienced as dehumanization, marginalization, and oppression) coupled with the rise of societal polarization, ingroup bias, and groupthink, highlight the need for a greater focus on and understanding of empowerment in CPE. This work seeks to emphasize that empowerment is a matter of justice which necessitates normative presuppositions for the validation of claims as well as ongoing reflection and praxis in the pursuit of justice as peace; however, without authentic commitment to external as well as internal obligations to peace, empowerment efforts in all forms will remain insufficient. This assertion underscores the need for a three angle approach to dynamic empowerment in CPE.

Committee: Dale Snauwaert (Committee Chair); Florain Feucht (Committee Member); Jeffery Warnke (Committee Member); Edward Janak (Committee Member) Subjects: Education Philosophy; Environmental Education; Higher Education; Peace Studies; Philosophy; Teacher Education

Master of Arts, The Ohio State University, 2022, Bioethics

This project is a critique of the concept of consensus and its relation to secular moral reasoning. Proponents of public deliberation argue that achieving consensus is crucial to informing moral norms in secular pluralist societies. Without a transcendental basis for morality, ascribing authority to moral norms requires a process of deliberation. Many bioethicists are concerned with formulating ways to ensure discourse is tolerant, non-coercive, mutually respectful, and grounded in intersubjective understanding. The problem is that secular discourse is fraught with varying conceptions of human rights, ethical principles, and what constitutes a morally authoritative consensus. Bioethicists acknowledge the tyranny of the majority problem, but secularism lacks a sufficient rationale to identify when a majority is wrong. Since competing visions of the good comprise bioethics and consensus does not necessarily indicate moral truth, moral uncertainty is the logical result of secular pluralism. Some moral scientists argue that science can inform moral norms, but a careful reading of their work suggests that what is being espoused is moral nihilism. From determinism to deep pragmatism, many scientists are inadvertently supporting a view of reality that obliterates the possibility of values. In secular pluralist societies, consensus is required to establish basic norms, but no account of consensus can indicate when moral truth is known. Consensus is necessary to fulfill the visions of moral scientists, but such scientists implicitly endorse nihilism. What secularists are discovering – by their own reasoning – is that moral truth is elusive, science cannot inform human values, and bioethical dilemmas are incapable of being resolved. The conclusion to this project offers an Engelhardtian solution. Not only is the principle of permission the only viable basis for secular pluralism – the principle coincides with moral scientists' own account of human nature.

Committee: Matthew Vest (Advisor); Ryan Nash (Committee Member); Ashley Fernandes (Committee Member) Subjects: Ethics; Philosophy; Philosophy of Science

Bachelor of Arts, Walsh University, 2020, Honors

Many believe that capitalism is inherently immoral, a system designed by the rich, for the rich. Events like the 2008 financial crisis seem to point to a conclusion of this sort as well. However, delving deeper into the roots of capitalism and its founder, Adam Smith, paint a different picture, with different intentions. The Theory of Moral Sentiments predates and provides the foundation for the Wealth of Nations. In both the timing of the books, and in their content, morality is clearly shown to be the bedrock upon which capitalism was built. Having proved this, one must then look to the 2008 crisis through the previously constructed lens, and evaluate the actions that led up to it. If they were immoral, as this thesis claims them to be, then the theory that morality is the basis of capitalism is given practical application.

Committee: Bradley Beach (Advisor) Subjects: Banking; Economic Theory; Economics; Finance; Philosophy

Doctor of Philosophy, Miami University, 2019, Educational Leadership

In this project, I examine the theoretical and practical arenas in terms of the conceptualization, implementation, and pedagogy of moral character. The fundamental concern is embodied in the reductive fallacy and the conceptual blurriness between moral character and moral virtue facing extant moral character definitions, as well as the attribution error and confirmation bias (Harman, 2000) for empirical measurements of moral character. The review of contemporary literature confirms but does not provide conceptually concrete and structurally holistic solutions to the fundamental problems diagnosed above. So I dive deep into the four legendary philosophers, Aristotle, Hume, Kant, and Dewey to explore how they conceptualize experiential moral character in terms of the five dimensions of its forming logical structure (i.e., distinct appearances, intrinsic motivations, operative strengths, active self-agency, and awakened supreme moral principles). Through reviewing the advantages and disadvantages of historic conceptualizations by the four philosophers, I re-conceptualize experiential moral character based on the Body-Heart-Mind-Soul model. In the end, I briefly analyze the three areas in which experiential moral character can be applied: empirical measurements in research, experiential moral character education intervention or practice, and self-meditation practice.

Committee: Kathleen Knight Abowitz (Advisor); Joel Malin (Committee Member); Thomas Poetter (Committee Member); Aimin Wang (Committee Member) Subjects: Educational Leadership

Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.), Bowling Green State University, 2019, Philosophy, Applied

In this dissertation, I construct scientifically and practically adequate moral analogues of cognitive heuristics and biases. Cognitive heuristics are reasoning “shortcuts” that are efficient but flawed. Such flaws yield systematic judgment errors, cognitive biases. For example, the availability heuristic infers an event's probability by seeing how easy it is to recall similar events. Since dramatic events like airplane crashes are disproportionately easy to recall, this heuristic explains systematic overestimations of their probability (availability bias). The research program on cognitive heuristics and biases (e.g., Daniel Kahneman's work) has been scientifically successful and has yielded useful error-prevention techniques, cognitive debiasing. I try to apply this framework to moral reasoning to yield moral heuristics and biases. For instance, a moral bias of unjustified differences in animal-species treatment might be explained by a moral heuristic that dubiously infers animals' moral status from their aesthetic features. While the basis for identifying judgments as cognitive errors is often unassailable (e.g., per violating laws of logic), identifying moral errors seemingly requires appealing to moral truth, which, I argue, is problematic within science. Such appeals can be avoided by repackaging moral theories as mere “standards-of-interest” (a la non-normative metrics of purported right-making features/properties). However, standards-of-interest do not provide authority, which is needed for effective debiasing. Nevertheless, since each person deems their own subjective morality authoritative, subjective morality (qua standard-of-interest and not moral subjectivism) satisfies both scientific and practical concerns. As such, (idealized) subjective morality grounds a moral analogue of cognitive biases, subjective moral biases (e.g., committed non-racists unconsciously discriminating). I also argue that cognitive heuristic is defined by its relation to rationa (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Sara Worley Ph.D. (Advisor); Richard Anderson Ph.D. (Other); Theodore Bach Ph.D. (Committee Member); Michael Bradie Ph.D. (Committee Member); Michael Weber Ph.D. (Committee Member) Subjects: Cognitive Psychology; Ethics; Philosophy; Philosophy of Science; Psychology

Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.), Bowling Green State University, 2015, Philosophy, Applied

Resentment is widely held to be central in moral practice and moral theory, perhaps even the key to understanding concepts like moral wrongness and moral responsibility. Despite this, philosophers pay relatively little attention to resentment itself. For the most part, it is often simply assumed that resentment is a kind of anger, where resentment is differentiated from anger by a belief, judgment, or thought that one has been morally wronged by the object of one's emotional response. However, this assumption gives rise to problematically circular accounts of our moral concepts, since it involves characterizing resentment in terms of the very concepts that moral philosophers were hoping to explain in terms of resentment. And while some philosophers have claimed that the circularity inherent in such accounts is unproblematic, I contend that such accounts are not informative enough to help us understand our moral concepts. My dissertation explores the implications of the assumption that resentment is simply a moral form of anger, and argues that this account of resentment is both inaccurate and not well-suited to the role that resentment plays in moral philosophy. First, I argue that despite prevailing assumptions to the contrary, resentment should not be thought of simply as a moral version of anger. Instead, I argue for a non-cognitive, adaptive account of resentment as an emotional response to violations of the interpersonal norms of one's social group. This account is both empirically well-grounded and consistent with evolutionary and developmental accounts of emotion. It also avoids the circularity inherent in contemporary characterizations of our moral concepts, when given in terms of resentment. Finally, it allows for a ready-made response to the charge that resentment is an immoral or imprudent emotion that we would be better off without. Resentment, on this account, is an adaptive response with deep biological roots, and it plays a crucial rol (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Michael Weber Ph.D (Advisor); Howard C. Cromwell Ph.D (Committee Member); Christian Coons Ph.D (Committee Member); Neal Tognazzini Ph.D (Committee Member); Sara Worley Ph.D (Committee Member) Subjects: Ethics; Philosophy

Master of Arts (MA), Ohio University, 2003, History (Arts and Sciences)

This thesis discusses Michael Walzer's role as a public critic of American foreign policy from the mid-1950s to the present. The purpose of this discussion is two-fold. First, it seeks to trace out a voice on the American liberal left that does not fit the common stereotype of a negativist, ideologically rigid leftist critic. Walzer's alternative liberal vision as articulated in the course of the past four decades demonstrates the ways in which it is possible for intellectuals on the left to remain true to liberal values and put forward a highly nuanced and constructive critique of official foreign policy without succumbing to negativism or ideological dogmatism. Second, this discussion is based on the premise that Walzer's ideas can best be understood not just by analyzing them philosophically but also by considering Walzer's main intellectual influences, his personal background, and the historical context in which he is writing. Although a lot has been written on Walzer's political thought per se, there has so far been no attempt to place the public writings of this important political philosopher in the context of his times. This thesis proceeds chronologically and is divided into five chapters. Chapters I and II discuss Walzer's personal background, education, and early political writings for Dissent magazine in the 1950s. Chapters III and IV deal with Walzer's political activism in the 1960s and discuss how his opposition to the Vietnam War led him to think about the moral aspects of warfare in more systematic terms, culminating in the publication of his most significant philosophical work on foreign policy, Just and Unjust Wars, in 1977. Chapters V and VI look at Walzer's contributions to the public foreign policy debate during the presidencies of Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and Bill Clinton, and also deal with Walzer's response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The thesis concludes with an epilogue outlining today's liberal foreign policy dilem (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Kevin Mattson (Advisor) Subjects: History, United States

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), Ohio University, 2003, Educational Research and Evaluation (Education)

This study investigates if differences exist in students' and instructors' ethical ideologies and ethical decision-making. Ethics comprises only a small portion of the athletic training curriculum, which is a competency-based model. Ethical decision-making, however, is vital to practice effectively across clinical settings, and an individual's ethical ideology may affect athletic training practitioners' ethical decision-making abilities. The Ethics Position (EPQ) and Dilemmas in Athletic Training Questionnaires (DAT-Q) assessed respondents' ethical ideologies and ethical decision-making. Respondents (N = 598) included 373 females (62.4%) and 225 males (37.6%), ranging in age from 18 to 63 years (M = 23.5, SD = 6.3). Principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation revealed both the EPQ and DAT-Q to possess reasonable construct validity. Internal consistency of the EPQ's idealism and relativism subscales and the DAT-Q scale were .79, .72 and .82, respectively. Overall, respondents reported higher idealism (M = 37.56, SD = 4.91) than relativism scores (M = 31.70, SD = 4.80). The mean DAT-Q score for all respondents was (M = 80.76, SD = 7.88). The research design incorporated three separate 2 (gender) x 3 (educational status) factorial ANOVAs utilizing idealism, relativism and DAT-Q scores as dependent measures. The main effect for gender illustrated that males reported significantly higher relativism scores, F (1, 592) = 9.183, p < .05, η² = .015, than females. The main effect for educational status revealed significant differences between students' and instructors' idealism, F (2, 592) = 3.99, p < .05, η² = .013, relativism, F (2, 592) = 15.53, p < .001, η² = .050, and DAT-Q scores, F (2, 592) = 8.06, p < .001, η² = .027. Post–hoc analysis using Tukey's HSD indicated instructors possessed lower idealism and relativism scores and higher DAT-Q scores than students. Findings do not support changes in athletic training educational practices to address gender sp (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Ralph Martin (Advisor) Subjects: Health Sciences, Education

Bachelor of Arts, Miami University, 2009, College of Arts and Sciences - Philosophy

The vast majority of moral theorists either assumes or accepts that moral status is an all or nothing concept. One either has full moral status, or one has no moral status. The problem with having an all or nothing approach to moral status becomes apparent when one wants to open the moral community to non-humans. Although many people might agree that animals deserve moral consideration, a significant majority of even those sympathetic to animals' suffering still resist putting animals and human beings on an equal moral footing. The “dog on the lifeboat” thought experiment lays bare this pro-human moral intuition. In this essay, I explore the ways in which Tom Regan, Peter Singer, R.G. Frey, and Ruth Cigman attempt to make sense of this pro-human moral intuition without denying the need for some moral consideration for animals. All of them justify the moral intuition that we must protect the life of a human over the life of an animal if forced into such a situation. They do this by arguing, in some way or another, that death is, generally speaking, more harmful for human beings. I reject this approach to justifying the pro-human moral intuition because I favor a view of the harmfulness of death where it makes little sense to make comparative judgments of death's harmfulness across species lines. In contrast, I argue that the all or nothing concept of moral status needs to be revised. I argue that moral status should adopt a sliding- scale model based on the distinction between moral agents and moral patients. This approach does not deny moral status of some degree to many animals, and the implications of this approach are not as wide reaching as to justify much of the current ways humans treat animal beings. This project is important because it takes on the task of making coherent a strong animal rights position that still holds on to a limited pro-human view. Many people might initially view these two views as contradictory or in tension. I am arguing that one does (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Asher Seidel PhD (Advisor); Gaile Pohlhaus PhD (Committee Member); Bryan Bannon PhD (Committee Member) Subjects: Animals; Philosophy

Ph.D., Antioch University, 2008, Antioch New England: Environmental Studies

This narrative inquiry, which draws on my experience as a land use decision maker, environmental educator, and scholar, examines the complexities of our human-nature relationship as we use and protect the life of the land in local communities. I began this research by interviewing seventeen land use decision makers representing a range of land use perspectives in New Milford, Connecticut, focusing on their views of land as a living community, their connections to land, and their sense of duty and responsibility.Their responses led me to further inquiry and drew me into a process that transformed my views of both land use policy and environmental education. This dissertation focuses on four processes: using a narrative approach to address land use conflict in order to better understand differing aspects of our relationship to land; finding new ways to talk about land and land use, drawing on our connections with nature and our awareness of ourselves as part of a larger community; shifting land use conversations from individual interests to our role as citizens in a community in order to gain new perspectives and begin to define land as more than a personal asset; and extending our consideration to resident natural communities as contributing members of our community, while moving towards a relationship with nature that is a conscious and integral part of our land use decision making. I conclude that learning and talking about our relationship with nature is integral to land use decision making as a democratic process. This knowledge and expression enables us to consider what we value about our resident land communities and what interests we will uphold. Otherwise, by default we will continue to make human-oriented land use decisions where the life of the land is ignored. The electronic version of this dissertation is accessible through the OhioLINK ETD center (http://www.ohiolink.edu/etd/).

Committee: Mitchell Thomashow PhD (Committee Chair); Meade Cadot PhD (Committee Member); Averell Manes PhD (Committee Member) Subjects: Adult Education; American Studies; Ecology; Environmental Science; Philosophy