Master of Arts, University of Akron, 2014, English-Literature

Read together, non-fiction, fiction, and poetry of the Korean War, from American, British, and Korean perspectives, inform one another to create a complex and engaging look into "the forgotten war." Taking a look at National Security documents from the Truman administration as well as Bruce Cumings' War in Korea, the Korean War might be understood from a historical perspective. Now read the fiction and poetry inspired by the war, about the war, sometimes by artists who served in the war, and the cracks begin to show in the master narrative that dictated American and allied nations' policy and action in the Korean conflict. Themes addressed in this thesis are "military readiness", "demeanor and performance", "brutal methods", "politics and propaganda", "bigotry and racism", "counter-culture" and more. The critical approaches used include new historicism, ecocriticism, deconstructionism, and others.

Committee: Mary Biddinger Dr. (Advisor); Patrick Chura Dr. (Committee Member); Joseph Ceccio Dr. (Committee Member) Subjects: Asian Literature; Asian Studies; History; Literature

Master of Arts, The Ohio State University, 2019, History

The Korean War is often remembered in America's public spaces with the phrase "The Forgotten War." It is also remembered as a war that is overshadowed by the legacy and remembrance of World War II and the Vietnam War. Both forgotten and overshadowed are not accurate words to describe the public or collective memory surrounding the Korean War because there are many places around the country that exist for the purpose of remembering the war. These places include war memorials, monuments, and museum exhibits that feature the bravery and courage the service members exhibited while defending American values abroad. Through a nationwide material cultural study, it has become clear that the Korean War is in fact remembered and has been remembered for a while. Many memorials around the country were built and dedicated in the 1990s, and the planning and design for these began even earlier. Korea was also remembered in the nation's capital with a national war memorial on the National Mall that was dedicated before a memorial for World War II was ever constructed. This thesis is focused on exploring how the war has been remembered and future efforts being put in place to ensure that the memory of the Korean War lives on. These efforts are to ensure that the memory does not fade into the background as white noise like older war memorials like those for World War I.

Committee: David Staley PhD (Advisor); David Stebenne PhD (Committee Member) Subjects: History

Master of Arts (MA), Bowling Green State University, 2016, History

M*A*S*H is an iconic, eleven season (1972-1983), American television series that was produced on the tail end of the Vietnam War during a period of upheaval for the American public. Set in Korea during the Korean War, M*A*S*H was a satire on the war in Vietnam. As a result, M*A*S*H presents numerous Asian (Korean) characters throughout the series, but often in limited, stereotypical roles. Despite producing America's most watched final season episode; "Goodbye, Farewell, and Amen," and being granted several Emmy nominations and awards, M*A*S*H has all but evaded lengthy academic study. This thesis primarily uses newspapers, both local and national, to understand how Asian stereotypes are presented in M*A*S*H with relationship to American society. Through the analysis of seven Asian-centered character roles, including; farmer/villager, houseboy/housekeeper, prostitute, war bride, peddler/hustler, orphan, and enemy, I explore the foundations of these stereotypes as well as how they were being utilized to reassure Americans of their own communal, Cold War, beliefs in a time of distress. I explore how these roles change and adapt over the course of the series and what may be motivating these changes, such as the Asian-American, Civil Rights and women's rights movements, and changing Cold War ideologies and objectives.

Committee: Michael Brooks Dr. (Advisor); Kristen Rudisill Dr. (Committee Member) Subjects: American History; Asian American Studies; Asian Studies; Folklore; Mass Communications; Military History

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 1994, Graduate School

Committee: Not Provided (Other) Subjects: History

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 1977, Graduate School

Committee: Not Provided (Other) Subjects: History

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2019, Music

This dissertation examines music in US-Korea relations from 1941 to 1960. Beginning during World War II, the US government disseminated Western classical and American music in Korea. After the war, the United States also gained the confidence of Koreans by supporting Korean traditional music that had been suppressed under Japanese colonial rule. Yet South Koreans were not merely passive recipients of US propaganda. As the Korean War divided Korea into North and South, South Korean officials used music to affirm the anti-Communist alliance between South Korea and the United States. American music spread rapidly in South Korea, contributing to the formation of South Korean identities different from those of the Communist North. By tracing a history of musical relations in the transitional period from the colonial era to the early Cold War, this project emphasizes that US Cold War music propaganda programs were not an entirely new initiative but built on the foundations laid in the 1940s. By demonstrating that a peripheral country used music as a tool for political negotiations with a superpower, this project also expands the horizons of scholarship on music propaganda, which has focused overwhelmingly on US and Soviet interventions in Europe. The US government's desire for hegemony provided both the political impetus and the resources for disseminating American music abroad, for music was an effective tool for cultural propaganda. The South Korean government's ambition of rebuilding a nationalist identity against the Communist North enabled the alliance and encouraged the acceptance of American music. Music diplomacy eventually supported a bilateral relationship based on shared political interests. The political purposes of the US and South Korean governments shaped listeners' experiences of Western music in South Korea.

Committee: Danielle Fosler-Lussier (Advisor); Ryan Skinner (Committee Member); Mitchell Lerner (Committee Member) Subjects: Asian Studies; International Relations; Music

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), Ohio University, 2019, History (Arts and Sciences)

This dissertation analyzes military innovation through the lens of the US Army's Cold War aviation program and its development of tactical airmobility. Army planners originally conceived of the airmobility concept in the 1950s. Staff officers argued that helicopters allowed ground forces to assault rapidly into enemy territory with personnel, equipment, and supplies to seize and hold key objectives. Beginning in the 1960s, that revolutionary doctrinal concept triggered innovative approaches that transformed the aviation program and its aircraft into a cornerstone of the Army's way of warfare. The rise of the organization and the airmobility concept, therefore, provide a useful case study of modern military innovation. Due to the Army Aviation branch's unique history, this examination adds to existing scholarship on institutions. Despite conflicting pressures internally and dissent externally, the aviation program managed not only to establish itself, but exploited new opportunities, adapted, and reformed in ways throughout the Cold War that guaranteed its continued existence. This dissertation also finds that one of the largest hurdles on the road to an airmobile Army was technology. Until the state of the art met the demands of the concept, doctrinal development stalled. The gas turbine engine fitted to conventional helicopter designs unlocked the potential of an airmobile Army, not an ultra-complicated cutting-edge airframe. Finally, this dissertation asks what role industry plays in the process of innovation. Heretofore unmined archival records from the principal manufacturers that helped make airmobility possible reveals how the helicopter industry grew alongside the Army, partners in progress toward airmobility. Connected from the beginning, they have long considered their successes as mutual accomplishments. As this dissertation demonstrates, understanding the role that technology played in military innovation requires analysis of the relationship (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Ingo Trauschweizer (Advisor); John Brobst (Committee Member); Chester Pach (Committee Member); Matthew LeRiche (Committee Member) Subjects: American History; Armed Forces; Business Administration; History; Military History; Technology

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2013, Political Science

Why do states use secrecy? Specifically, why do great powers often seem to create a kind of “backstage” area around local conflicts? That is, why create a kind of covert realm where external powers can meddle in local conflicts to pursue their security interests? This project generally analyzes how secrecy is used in international politics and why states are individually and collectively motivated to use it. Existing scholarship suggests states use secrecy to surprise their adversaries or insulate their leaders from dovish domestic political groups. I develop an alternative logic rooted in the desire to control conflict escalation risks. In the context of interventions in local conflicts by outside powers, I find intervening states use covert methods to maintain control over the perceptions and interpretations of outside audiences whose reactions determine the magnitude of external pressure on leaders to escalate further. Intervening in a secret, plausibly deniable manner makes restraint and withdrawal on the part of the intervening state easier. It also creates ambiguity about their role which can give the political space to responding states to ignore covert meddling and respond with restraint. Escalation control dynamics therefore make sense of why states intervene secretly and, more puzzling, why other states – even adversaries – may join in ignoring and covering up such covert activity (what I call “tacit collusion”). Drawing on Erving Goffman and others, I develop an “impression management” theory for why states individually and jointly use secrecy and political denial to achieve their goals. To illustrate several new concepts and evaluate the theory’s value-added, I use a sophisticated comparative case study research design that leverages within- and between-case variation in the Korean War, Spanish Civil War, and the civil war in Soviet-occupied Afghanistan. Each conflict hosts se (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Randall Schweller Ph.D. (Committee Chair); Richard Herrmann Ph.D. (Committee Member); Jennifer Mitzen Ph.D. (Committee Member) Subjects: International Relations; Political Science

Master of Arts, Miami University, 2009, History

This paper argues that had the United States military with the backing of the United Nations invaded North Vietnam without driving too close to China's border with Vietnam, its chances of winning the Vietnam War may have been dramatically improved. The study focuses on lessons that United States military should have learned from the Korean War and whether or not those applicable lessons were applied in the Vietnam War. The study focuses on the United States military's proximity to the Chinese border in both conflicts and the strategic effect of having the United Nations' support in both conflicts.

Committee: Allan Winkler PhD (Committee Chair); Amanda McVety PhD (Committee Member); Daniel Cobb PhD (Committee Member) Subjects: Military History

Master of Arts, The Ohio State University, 2021, History

This thesis evaluates the 24th Infantry Division's combat effectiveness during its first two months of combat during the Korean War, July-August 1950. The existing literature on the Division's combat record in Korea point to poor individual training, low morale, and a lack of discipline as the causes for the Division's disastrous defeats in key battles against the Korean People's Army (KPA). This thesis critically examines these claims in light of documentary evidence and oral veteran accounts to argue that the existing literature's diagnosis of poor training and morale are rooted in opinion instead of fact. The thesis re-evaluates the Division's combat record in Korea using regimental and divisional war diaries to objectively measure its performance in its execution of contemporary doctrine, adaptation to the tactical situation, and displayed proficiency of arms. The thesis ultimately argues that the 24th Infantry Division performed adequately in combat, and that its defeat is attributable to failures in strategic and operational leadership.

Committee: Peter Mansoor (Advisor); Mark Grimsley (Committee Member) Subjects: History

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2017, History

My project examines the formation, activation, and first forty-six months of life of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA/the Agency), designed to render civilian-sector aid to South Korea during and after the Korean War. The offspring of American priorities, interests, and majority funding, UNKRA was inextricably implicated in the Cold War. Although initially conceived as a possible template for future United Nations aid to other countries, the late 1950 retreat of anti-Communist forces in the Korean War stunted the Agency's potential, and created for it a most difficult organizational life. Employing a combination of archives left by UNKRA and its top three major backer states (the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada), as well as the papers of persons with a connection to the Agency, I seize upon two themes to argue that UNKRA was less thoroughly co-opted by the United States than suggested by the Agency's context, and by the background of its two sequential leaders: Agents General J. Donald Kingsley (former Truman Administration employee and head of the International Refugee Organization [IRO]), and John B. Coulter (former U.S. Army Lieutenant-General). Specifically, and in part building on threads within existing scholarship, I argue that 1) the willfulness of UNKRA's leaders, and 2) their respective positive attitudes towards the U.N. system, contributed to the Agency's limited but notable resistance against United States direction — at least below the level of major policy. By the standards of more structurally independent parts of the United Nations system, UNKRA's resistance to United States suggestion was not impressive. However, the context of UNKRA's incredibly United States-centric existence creates a different standard for judging the Agency. That UNKRA's first leader (Kingsley) sought to transform the Agency into something grand, expansive, and probably permanent may not have been appropriate to UNKRA's stunted situation, (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Mitchell Lerner (Advisor); Peter Mansoor (Committee Member); Nathan Rosenstein (Committee Member) Subjects: History

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2013, Womens Studies

The Korean War (1950-1953) produced tremendous geopolitical effects, which shaped Cold War politics worldwide. The war also sparked the rise of transnational adoptions and positioned Korea as the primary leader of these global exchanges. Since the war’s end, more than 200,000 Korean children have been sent to the West. Two-thirds of these children entered the United States – the world’s largest receiving country of foreign adoptions. The majority of these Korean adoptees grew up in white families, making these kinship units not only transnational but also transracial. Utilizing South Korea as a case study, my dissertation investigates four implications of these transnational and transracial adoptions: (1) the growth of what I characterize as the transnational adoption industrial complex – a neo-colonial, multi-million dollar industry that commodifies children’s bodies; (2) Korean adoptees’ greater access to American citizenship and naturalization due to their membership in the white, heteronormative family compared to other Asian immigrants; (3) the adoptive families’ disruption of traditional white and Asian American families, which are largely conceptualized as a same-race, genetically related units; and (4) recognition of adoptees as adults, who are experts in their own experiences, rather than perpetual children continually spoken for by adoptive parents and adoption practitioners. Cumulatively, this research underscores how transnational, transracial adoption changes the American and Korean landscape. Drawing from archival sources, interviews, and adult adoptee print and online writings, I challenge the portrayal of international adoption as solely an act of humanitarianism and child rescue. Instead, I contend that adoption is linked to American Cold War ambitions, including the desire to promote democracy abroad. In other words, transnational adoption allowed everyday Americans to join in the fight again (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Judy Tzu Chun Wu (Advisor); Lynn Itagaki (Committee Member); Eleana J. Kim (Committee Member); Wendy Smooth (Committee Member) Subjects: Asian American Studies; Asian Studies; Ethnic Studies; Families and Family Life; Womens Studies

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2008, History

This dissertation explores the background and the development of the 4.3 Incident in South Korea. The 4.3 Incident was an insurgency that lasted nine years in Cheju-do off the Korea peninsula from April 3, 1948. The Cheju Communists took the political initiative based on their long lasting anti-Japanese movement and the late establishment of the local Military Government in Chejudo after the liberation in 1945. The Cheju Communists played roles of a de facto government in the island, and passed the General Strike and the Autumn Harvest Rebellion of 1946 because of their independence from a national Communist organization. However, with the installation of provincial system on the island in late 1946 and the creation of the South Korea Labor Party (SKLP), the Cheju Communists transformed form workers of the de facto government to the members of a political party. The Military Government and the Cheju Communists began to confront each other after the memorial service of the March 1 Movement in 1947. Under the increasing pressure of the Military Government, young Cheju Communist leaders became determined to rise against the Military Government, and the Chollanam-do SKLP exploited their intention to sabotage the general election on May 10, 1948. The disturbances in the beginning phase of the 4.3 Incident were common disturbances led by decentralized SKLP organizations. However, due to the strong reactions of the Military Government, the Cheju Communists evolved from street fighters to guerrilla warriors. With the intervention of the Central SKLP, the guerrillas were reorganized into a Soviet Military style, and Dalsam Kim, the guerrilla leader, evacuated the island and became a representative of the Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea. The Military Government, at first, tried to resolve the disturbance by police operations and peace talks. Then, the Military Government understood the insurgency as guerrilla warfare. The Korean Constabulary took the responsib (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Allan R. Millett PhD (Committee Chair); John F. Guilmartin PhD (Committee Member); David Stebenne PhD (Committee Member) Subjects: Military History

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2006, History

As American military historians ponder the impacts of military intelligence operations on the conduct and outcome of the nation's wars, a key question comes to mind: how can we most objectively assess America's performance of military intelligence operations? In answering this question we must understand the complexity of military intelligence work, for it traverses that gray area where military strategy and foreign policy intertwine. Oftentimes, when policymakers and military leaders fail to synchronize American foreign policy objectives and military strategy, the intelligence community, which forms a bridge between the political and military realms, makes a convenient scapegoat for such policy failures. Conversely, intelligence successes most often remain highly classified to protect the collection capabilities that facilitated a corresponding operational success. Much better known for its failures than its successes, military intelligence is widely regarded as the quintessential oxymoron. Yet, worse contradictions in terms have affected the American conduct of war. For example, in the Korean War the American principle of “do more with less.” proved true for all parts of the United States Armed Forces in the Far East, including their military intelligence organizations. In the midst of a post World War II force reduction, military intelligence, performed the best that it could within prescribed geopolitical and military constraints. Moreover, the war catalyzed the chaotic reorganization of the U.S. national security structure, which had tremendous impact on military intelligence operations in Korea. It is in this context that we must reassess American military intelligence operations in the Korean War. For over a half-century, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur and his Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G-2), Major General Charles A. Willoughby, have borne the brunt of blame for the “intelligence failures” of June 25th and November 25th, 1950. All to (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Allan Millett (Advisor); John Guilmartin, Jr. (Other); Philip Brown (Other) Subjects: History, United States

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2005, History

Minds then Hearts examines the U.S. military's resistance and hostility towards psychological warfare and examines how this affected the weapon's use during the Korean War. The conventional military rejected psychological warfare as “paper bullets” that had no place in a military focused on lethal means – blast, heat, and fragmentation, to defeat its enemies. In particular this study will examine how the inability to demonstrate conclusively the effects of psychological warfare operations added to uncertainty and skepticism over the weapon's potential and actual impact on the battlefield. Additionally, the study explores how operational deficiencies such as a lack of resources and poor integration with combat arms created obstacles hampering the successful employment of psychological warfare against Chinese and North Korean forces. The study will also compare the Army's efforts to use the weapon with those of the Air Force that, at times, considered strategic bombing as synonymous with psychological warfare. Further, the Chinese and Russian use of atrocity propaganda, especially the forced confessions of waging biological warfare by American prisoners, will be examined in order to demonstrate how these efforts impacted on the American military's view of their own psychological warfare campaigns. The study acknowledges and describes the difficulties involved in evaluating the effectiveness of psychological warfare operations in general and during the Korean War. Minds then Hearts concludes that the most important obstacle to effective psywar operations was the failure of Army officers in the field to understand the potential of psychological warfare and thus, fail to integrate it properly into their combat operations. Many combat commanders saw psywar solely as an instrument designed simply to induce surrender. Psywar personnel, eager to demonstrate their worth did little to dispel this limited view. The inability of the psywar proponents to consistently provide demo (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Allan Millett (Advisor) Subjects:

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2004, History

In the earliest days of the Korean War, the Commander in Chief of the United States Far East Command, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur reported to President Harry Truman that South Korean troops were outmaneuvered, outgunned, and appeared beaten: “South Korean casualties as an index to fighting have not shown adequate resistance capabilities or the will to fight and our estimate is that a complete collapse is possible.” MacArthur's low opinion of Korean soldiers rested unchallenged, and remains unchallenged to this day. American advisors in Korea were responsible for the organization, training, and development of the Korean army. Fundamental to the evaluation of the Korean army's capability is an analysis of the American military advisory missions active in Korea from January 1946 to July 1953. This dissertation examines how these missions performed their mandated duties to organize, train, and mentor the Korean Constabulary and the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army. These advisors faced tremendous challenges ranging from cultural disconnects, inexperience, scarce resources, and lack of time. The North Korean invasion in June 1950 revealed crucial weaknesses in training, experience, leadership, and firepower. These weaknesses nearly brought the ROK Army to its knees by the spring of 1951. Once truce negotiations began, however, new command emphasis, new leadership, greater resources, and a coherent vision for reform produced a movement to create a new army that was better led, reorganized, and expanded. In the process, the Koreans developed confident leadership, trained units, and tactical and technical skills in fighting modern war. This new ROK Army fought critical battles from October 1952 through June 1953 that set the conditions for an Armistice agreement in July 1953. This study concludes that the successful reformation of the Korean Army (1951-1953) under the supervision of its American advisors enlarged the fighting ability of the Eighth United States Army a (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Allan Millett (Advisor) Subjects:

Bachelor of Science, Miami University, 2011, College of Arts and Sciences - Strategic Communication

This work is the transcript of a video interview conducted by the author on March 16, 2010 with Congressional Medal of Honor recipient Ronald E. Rosser. The interview takes place in Rosser's home in Roseville, OH. An Ohio native born Oct. 24, 1929, Rosser earned the starry honor during a snowy winter tour of Korea when he had only two months of 22 under his belt. At 80, Rosser delivers a dynamic retelling of his time in Korea and that fateful January night captured on that video and meticulously transcribed here. Supplemented with photos, the video was originally created in fulfillment of an assignment for Cheryl Heckler's Reporting and Newswriting class at Miami University in Oxford, OH and has since evolved to a work that intends to document, with respect and purity, an aging piece of American history.

Committee: Cheryl E. Heckler (Advisor); Janice Taylor (Committee Member); Devon S. DelVecchio PhD (Committee Member) Subjects: American History

Bachelor of Arts, Miami University, 2005, College of Arts and Sciences - English

A LIFE WITHOUT TEARS By Jennifer Strickland The Korean War changed the lives of an entire generation of people whose stories should continue to be told to posterity. This thesis is a screenplay that dramatically portrays the lives of a family in South Korea in the years leading up to the war. Their actions and words depict a time of change during which many sacrifices, both personal and economical, had to be made in order to survive. Although many elements of this screenplay are based on the stories of my mother's parents, it contains many fictional elements as well.

Committee: Eric Goodman (Advisor) Subjects: Mass Communications

BA, Oberlin College, 1983, History

Very little has been written on the peace movement during the Korean war. Historian Joseph Conlin assessed the period and concluded that "when hostilities with North Korean troops commenced in 1950, the American antiwar movement stood at its nadir." Lawrence Wittner's fine book Rebels Against War is devoted to the American peace movement from 1941 to 1960. Yet out of this book's 300- odd pages, less than three concern the movement during the Korean war- and most of this discussion is focused on those elements in the movement which supported the war. This is typical of the major secondary sources on the American peace movement. It is certainly true that the Korean war met with surprisingly little public resistance, especially initially. Republicans joined Democrats in applauding Truman's decision to intervene. More surprisingly, a number of traditionally pacifist individuals, organizations and periodicals endorsed the war, including some that had not supported World War Two. Prominent in this category were Norman Thomas, the Socialist Party, Dwight MacDonald and the Progressive.

Committee: Clayton Koppes (Advisor) Subjects: American History; History