Master of Applied Communication Theory and Methodology, Cleveland State University, 2012, College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences

The goal of this study is to add to the literature that extends the theory of cultivation into the realm of video games. Video game studies incorporating cultivation stress the importance of specifying a single genre of video games and measuring the cultivation effect, due to the lack of homogenous content between video games. It is possible that video games are actually an antithesis to the theory of cultivation because of content that is user-generated, which not only dissolves homogeneity between different games, but also the same game. Cultivation research has also suggested that second- order cultivation effects (on attitudes and beliefs) are moderated by factors that affect the experience during the encounter of information. This study looks at exposure to military-style video games to help better understand how video games may lead to a variety of cultivation effects. It includes measures of the independent variables of video game habits, gaming skill, traditional media use, political orientation, and contact with the military, and the dependent variables of first- and second-order cultivation effects, and self-efficacy.

Committee: Paul Skalski PhD (Committee Chair); Dalisay Francis PhD (Committee Member); Neuendorf Kim PhD (Committee Member) Subjects: Communication; Mass Communications; Mass Media

Master of Science (MS), Ohio University, 2021, Experimental Psychology (Arts and Sciences)

This study examines the differences between two types of judgment methods in terms of their resulting accuracy: holistic judgments and disaggregated judgments. Holistic judgments are judgments made by mentally combining all the information given to make an assessment. Disaggregated judgments, in contrast, combine ratings/subjective assessments of each piece information (i.e., cues) that represents an evaluated object. That is, instead of letting the participant combine cues mentally to render an overall evaluation, the disaggregated method asks participants to judge each cue, and uses a simple aggregation, performed independently of the person judging the cues to produce an overall evaluation. Past research found accuracy advantages of the disaggregated method over the holistic method. To test the robustness of the disaggregation advantage, we attempted to bias participant judgments by incorporating an irrelevant, yet affective cue into their judgments. The effect of biased information on these types of judgments has been theorized, but not properly or explicitly examined. In this study, 179 participants made holistic and disaggregated judgements about college football passing efficiency scores. Results showed no advantage of the disaggregated judgments in terms of criterion validity relating estimated performance to the objective passing efficiency scores. Notably, adding an affective cue into the judgment hurt all judgment methods alike. Further, we explored the biasing cue's usage patterns by examining regression β weights across participants; results showed no greater proportion of biased cue usage, relative to chance, in the holistic judgments. Finally, we examined if the level of sports fandom negatively impacted holistic judgments more than disaggregated judgments and found no difference. Post-hoc analyses utilized the lens model framework in an attempt to improve judgment accuracy. We found that statistically weighting disaggregated judgments as well as subs (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Claudia Gonzalez-Vallejo (Advisor); Keith Markman (Committee Member); Bruce Carlson (Committee Member) Subjects: Psychology

Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.), Bowling Green State University, 2019, Psychology/Experimental

The present study aimed to reconcile two hypothetical mechanisms driving JOL delay effects. The first hypothesis is the monitoring-dual-memories (MDM) hypothesis proposed by Dunlosky and Nelson (1992), which states that increased accuracy of delayed judgments of learning (JOLs) occurs because delayed JOLs activate the same memory storage system as the memory task itself (i.e., long-term memory). The second hypothesis is the accessibility model proposed by Koriat (1993) which states that delayed JOLs are more accurate because they increase retrieval fluency by reinforcing memory activation. Fluency research (e.g., Ball, Klein, & Brewer, 2014; Mueller, Dunlosky, Tauber, & Rhodes, 2014; Reber & Greifeneder, 2017) has not previously applied the accessibility model, but the model may explain fluency's effects on metacognitive illusions, such that increased processing leads to increased encoding fluency creating a false sense of knowing. This dissertation presents two experiments and a combined analysis in which I investigated the effects of fluency and JOL delay on the size of metacognitive illusions measured in ways that replicated previous research and in ways that are novel in learning research. Through an interaction between JOL timing and fluency, the MDM hypothesis explains the retrieval side of the memory process whereas the accessibility model explains the encoding side of the memory process. The remainder of the findings generally supported the MDM hypothesis. The present results also established a new avenue for investigating metacognitive illusions and call into question the findings of previous research. Specifically, participants' prediction of their future memory performance may not be as poor as previously thought. Implications for these findings and future directions are discussed.

Committee: Richard Anderson Dr. (Advisor); Lynn Darby Dr. (Other); Dale Klopfer Dr. (Committee Member); Laura Leventhal Dr. (Committee Member) Subjects: Psychology

MA, Kent State University, 2018, College of Arts and Sciences / Department of Psychological Sciences

Why does making judgments of learning (JOLs) influence subsequent memory, and when learners make JOLs for some items but not others, how is recall performance affected? To answer these questions, participants studied related and unrelated word pairs and made JOLs for half. Pair type was either randomly intermixed within a list (Experiment 1) or blocked (Experiment 2). I evaluated two hypotheses. The changed-goal hypothesis, proposed by Mitchum, Kelley, and Fox (J Exp Psychol Gen, 2016), states that making JOLs leads learners to notice differences in item difficulty and allocate more resources to learning easier pairs, ultimately leading to higher recall for easier (i.e., related) pairs and impaired recall for more difficult (i.e., unrelated) pairs. In contrast, the positive-reactivity hypothesis predicts increased recall performance for both related and unrelated pairs. As predicted by the positive-reactivity hypothesis, recall performance was higher for pairs that were judged versus not judged on both a mixed and blocked list of related and unrelated pairs. In Experiment 3, I evaluated one proximal mechanism for increased performance for judged pairs: The use of more effective encoding strategies during acquisition. Making JOLs did not influence strategy use, which suggests that the benefit of making JOLs on memory performance results from increased attention. These and other findings converge to support the claim that the requirement to monitor learning benefits memory.

Committee: John Dunlosky (Advisor); Maria Zaragoza (Committee Member); Katherine Rawson (Committee Member); William Lechner (Committee Member) Subjects: Cognitive Psychology; Psychology

Doctor of Philosophy, Case Western Reserve University, 2017, Psychology

Claims are more likely to be judged true when accompanied by information that, though related to the subject of the claim, is actually nonprobative. This finding, coined the truthiness effect, is thought to occur because the embellished claims are processed more fluently, and therefore seem more accurate, than the unembellished claims. Five experiments are reported that explore the explanations for this effect. After an initial replication using nonprobative images, two experiments diminish truthiness via manipulations designed to mitigate the use of fluency as a cue for determining truth value of the claims: first by slowing presentation rate of the stimuli and then by warning participants of the nonprobative nature of the accompanying images. The concluding two experiments test alternative accounts of the truthiness effect. In Experiment 4, truthiness was not observed when claims were presented in a forced-choice format, supporting the hypothesis that a shift in response criteria underlies the effect in the standard true-false format. Experiment 5 was conducted to determine if truthiness is better conceptualized as increased positive responding to embellished claims or diminished positive responding to unembellished claims. A full design was used in which presence of nonprobative information was manipulated between subjects for some participants and within subjects for others. Though results were equivocal, available evidence best aligns with an inhibition account of truthiness, in which participants adopt a more conservative criterion for statements without nonprobative information when other statements have such information.

Committee: Robert Greene PhD (Committee Chair); Elizabeth Short PhD (Committee Member); Brooke Macnamara PhD (Committee Member); Fey Parrill PhD (Committee Member) Subjects: Cognitive Psychology; Experimental Psychology; Psychology

PHD, Kent State University, 2016, College of Arts and Sciences / Department of Psychological Sciences

Early news reports sometimes contain errors based on mistaken information (hereafter misinformation) that must later be corrected. However, experimental research has consistently demonstrated that corrections reduce, but rarely eliminate, belief in the misinformation (see Lewandowsky et al., 2012, for a review). Although well-established, all prior studies of this phenomenon have provided the correction and the misinformation in the same news story, and assessed the effectiveness of the correction shortly after. However, in real-world situations, corrections are often issued days or weeks later and effective corrections need to lead to durable changes in beliefs. The present study aimed to address the limitations of prior studies by investigating (1) whether delayed corrections are less effective than immediate corrections and (2) whether corrections lead to durable changes in beliefs. Regarding the first goal, the present study found evidence that delayed and immediate corrections are equally effective. Across 2 experiments, a correction greatly reduced belief in the misinformation whether provided immediately after the misinformation or 2 days later. Regarding the second goal, the present study found evidence that the revised beliefs that result from corrections are not durable. Rather, across 3 experiments, belief in the retracted misinformation returned over the days following a correction, though not to pre-correction levels. Collectively, the results of the present study show that even when corrections greatly reduce belief in the misinformation, they do not eliminate the misinformation from memory. As a consequence, over time readers tended to fall back on the retracted misinformation, perhaps in an effort to maintain story coherence or because they forget the association between the correction and the misinformation. Based on these findings, future studies should focus on developing corrections that lead to enduring changes in mistaken beliefs.

Committee: Maria Zaragoza (Committee Chair); Jocelyn Folk (Committee Member); Jeffrey Ciesla (Committee Member); Christopher Was (Committee Member); Danielle Coombs (Other) Subjects: Psychology

PHD, Kent State University, 2016, College of Arts and Sciences / Department of Psychological Sciences

People generally believe that more fluently performing a task is related to better task performance. Thus, when studying items for an upcoming test, items that are allegedly more easily processed are judged to be more memorable. According to analytic-processing theory, when people are asked to judge their future memory performance, they search for cues – including those that allegedly reveal differences in processing fluency – that will help them reduce their uncertainty in how well they will remember each pair. Thus, a critical prediction is that if people believe a cue will impact fluency, then they also will predict that the cue will influence memory, even when it does not impact either. To test this prediction, I had participants make predictions of future memory performance for words presented in different colors (blue or green), because the different colors were not expected to impact processing fluency or memory. During the task instructions, some participants were led to believe that one color was easier to process than another, but nothing was mentioned about whether color was related to memory. Across seven experiments, color did not consistently influence final test performance. Most important, people's judgments were significantly higher for the color that had been associated with more fluent processing during the instructions. This and other evidence supports analytic-processing theory and suggests that using fluency to explain cue effects on memory predictions should be done with caution, because people's beliefs about fluency could be mistaken for true fluency effects.

Committee: John Dunlosky (Advisor) Subjects: Psychology

Master of Arts (MA), Bowling Green State University, 2016, Psychology/Experimental

This study examined the moderating influence of explicit attribution on the effects of fluency on judgments of an author's intelligence. In three experiments and a combined analysis participants recruited from the online recruiting database Amazon Mechanical Turk were asked to complete a survey. They were asked to rate an author's intelligence based on a single passage presented in high or low fluency font paired with one attribution condition. The attribution conditions consisted of two possible explicit attributions (to the author or experimenter) or up to two possible unspecified attributions. Previous research results were replicated. Additionally a significant main effect of fluency was found in all experiments and the combined analysis. A significant interaction of fluency and attribution were found in two experiments as well as the combined analysis. Post hoc testing revealed the fluency effect was restricted mainly to conditions in which the font choice was attributable to the author rather than being unattributed or attributable to the experimenter.

Committee: Richard Anderson (Advisor); Mary Hare (Committee Member); Laura Leventhal (Committee Member) Subjects: Cognitive Psychology; Psychology

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), Ohio University, 2015, Experimental Psychology (Arts and Sciences)

Morality by consensus refers to the idea that morality is influenced greatly by peer consensus information, specifically when the consensus information counters individuals' initial moral beliefs. Broadly, morality refers to anything related to the topics of right and wrong (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2009). Such an ambiguous definition emphasizes the variations in people's moral values, which they follow and use to make evaluations of others. As a result, moral beliefs are not consistent across individuals but unique to an individual or group with many personal attitudes simply representing socially accepted norms instead of developed individual preferences (Sherif, 1936). Nevertheless, people often overlook the personal nature of their moral values. They expect everyone to hold similar views and judge others negatively for having distinct moral beliefs (e.g. Hare, 1952; Haidt, Rosenberg, & Hom, 2003). People also overestimate the stability of their moral beliefs, assuming that they are resistant to change. In relation to morality, social consensus can be construed as the degree of social agreement about an action's goodness or badness (Jones, 1991), while more generally referring to the proportion of a population that supports a specific behavior or attitudinal position (Hodson, Maio, & Esses, 2001). The current studies sought to analyze the relationship between one's own preferences, perceived moral quality, and consensus information. They further examined the possibility that consensus information can influence ratings of moral acceptability more than one's own explicitly preferred course of action. The introduction more thoroughly examines the idea of morality by consensus and its related theories, beginning with a general discussion of morality and its real world application. It then segues into the conceptualizations of consensus and research related to moral identity, particularly how individual differences and deviations from moral behavior impact moral iden (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Mark Alicke (Advisor) Subjects: Experimental Psychology; Social Psychology

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2014, Political Science

In this dissertation, I use data collected from three experiments to examine the dynamics of racial ingroup bias. In particular, I look at the extent to which same-race politicians are either sanctioned or protected when they are linked to negative political events. I examine how different scenarios, or failure events, could have an impact on ingroup members' judgments of a same-race elected official. In the first empirical chapter, I use an experiment to test the effects of an incumbent mayor's race and the condition of his city on judgments of accountability for the incumbent (and candidates in an upcoming election). The second empirical chapter examines this bias in the context of an alleged scandal (i.e., sexual infidelity, financial impropriety), and considers whether socially reprehensible transgressions can be politically damaging, insofar as they preclude the accused elected official from the benefits of their group's protection. Finally, the third empirical chapter experimentally explores the limits of black racial group loyalty as it relates to marginalized subgroups and subtypes of African Americans. Specifically, it investigates whether non-protypical black officials (i.e., female, homosexual, Republican) of the ingroup benefit similarly from ingroup bias when they are linked to a negative political event. In general, I argue that racial minorities (i.e., blacks), disadvantaged by unequal representation, engage in group-serving biases that tend to protect same-race politicians who are beset by political or moral dilemmas.

Committee: Ismail White Ph.D. (Committee Co-Chair); Kathleen McGraw Ph.D. (Committee Co-Chair); Wendy Smooth Ph.D. (Committee Member); Thomas Nelson Ph.D. (Committee Member) Subjects: Political Science

Master of Science (MS), Wright State University, 2008, Human Factors and Industrial/Organizational Psychology MS

Configural spatial knowledge has been tested by having people point from one object to another or by having them sketch maps from memory. Several different pointing judgments have been used, but these judgments appear to differ both in superficial characteristics and in their implied theoretical mental model of spatial representation. This experiment compares two different pointing judgments: judgments of relative direction, based on a quasi-Euclidean model of spatial representation; and object-based judgments, based on an object reference model of spatial representation. Results supported the object reference model. Object-based judgments were more accurate, were made with more confidence and had shorter latencies than judgments of relative direction. Analyses of the sketch maps were consistent with the pointing judgments, suggesting the results reflect stored memory representations and not retrieval differences. Issues of generality of the results and practical ramifications of the research are discussed.

Committee: Herbert Colle (Advisor) Subjects:

Master of Science (MS), Wright State University, 2006, Human Factors and Industrial/Organizational Psychology MS

This study examined active regulation of speed during a low-altitude flight task as a function of global optical flow rate, speed, and the presence or absence of a concurrent altitude disturbance. The results showed that altitude clearly had an impact on speed control; specifically, control of speed was much more difficult when altitude disturbances were present. Even in the no altitude disturbance conditions, performance tended to be best at lower altitudes. Consistent with previous research, the results suggest that speed and altitude changes have additive effects on speed judgments. This is inconsistent with the simple global optical flow rate hypothesis that had suggested multiplicative effects; however, it is consistent with the general notion that judgments of self-motion are based on properties of optical flow fields (i.e., angles and angular rates) that depend on distance and motion relative to textured surfaces.

Committee: John Flach (Advisor) Subjects: Psychology, Experimental

Master of Arts, The Ohio State University, 2012, Psychology

A new version of a diffusion model for confidence judgments is presented. The original version of the model, RTCON, has previously been fit to quantile reaction times and confidence judgments from item recognition memory experiments. Here, we explore recent applications of a new version of the model to an associative recognition paradigm. Much of the research examining various models of memory has focused on differences in the shapes of z-ROC curves across tasks and has used these differences to argue for the existence of multiple memory processes. In an associative recognition task, our single-process model is able to fit and explain a variety of z-ROC shapes as well as individual differences in these shapes while simultaneously fitting quantile reaction times. The model and data show that the standard signal detection and dual-process interpretations of z-transformed receiver operating characteristic (z-ROC) functions are wrong. These results undermine some of the primary support for the existence of multiple memory processes.

Committee: Roger Ratcliff PhD (Advisor); Gail McKoon PhD (Committee Member); Per Sederberg PhD (Committee Member) Subjects: Cognitive Psychology

Master of Arts, The Ohio State University, 2012, Psychology

We applied a sequential sampling model (RTCON2; Ratcliff & Starns, submitted) to confidence judgments from a brightness discrimination task. Subjects in the experiments were asked whether test items were bright or dark, and responded with one of six possible choices that ranged from “very sure dark” to “very sure bright”. The confidence judgment and response time data are qualitatively similar to those typically found in recognition memory tasks. We fitted RTCON2 to the data and used the model to explain the mechanisms underlying the confidence judgment decision process. Because this was a perceptual task, we were able to control the stimulus strength values (brightness) and the variability of those values within an experimental condition. This allowed us to test the model's assumptions and quality of measurement of an important model component: between-trial variability in stimulus strength. We demonstrate the utility of RTCON2 when used in conjunction with explicit knowledge of external stimulus strength values. We also implement and discuss other applications of the combination of control over perceptual stimuli with the computational process model of RTCON2.

Committee: Roger Ratcliff PhD (Advisor); Gail McKoon PhD (Committee Member); Trisha Van Zandt PhD (Committee Member) Subjects: Behavioral Sciences; Cognitive Psychology; Experimental Psychology; Psychology; Quantitative Psychology

Master of Arts, The Ohio State University, 2011, Psychology

There exist several mathematical models that can explain choice, confidence, and reaction time in the context of simple decision making. The assumptions these models make about the accumulation of evidence used in making a decision also have implications for response reversals. This project used the expanded judgment task to test the expanded Poisson race model's predictions of the frequency of response reversals. For the first experiment, subjects had to decide between two decks of red and green cards, one of which was predominantly red while the other was predominantly green. Subjects viewed sequences of 1, 3, or 5 cards randomly drawn from one the decks, made a decision, and then viewed a further 2, 4, or 6 cards and made a confidence judgment in which they had the opportunity to reverse their decision. The results found that, qualitatively, the model fit the trends of the empirical data but tended to underestimate the average number of reversals. To examine whether the deviations from the model were due to order effects, a second experiment was run in which subjects only viewed 3 cards initially and 2 cards in the end, but every possible order of red and green cards was presented. However, no significant order effects were observed, providing support for the model's assumption that the serial position of a card had no impact on a subject's decision. Recommendations are given for the modification of the expanded Poisson race model to better handle the variability expressed in the data, future experiments are suggested to help further determine the extent of order effects in the tasks, and finally, potential applications with response reversals in competitive model selection are discussed.

Committee: Trisha Van Zandt PhD (Advisor); Roger Ratcliff PhD (Committee Member); Thomas Nygren PhD (Committee Member) Subjects: Quantitative Psychology

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2002, Psychology

The intuitive prosecutor metaphor of human judgment is a recent development within causal attribution research. The history of causal attribution is briefly reviewed, with an emphasis on explanations of attributional biases. The evolution of such explanations is traced through a purely-cognitive phase to the more modern acceptance of motivational explanations for attributional biases. Two examples are offered of how a motivational explanatory framework of attributional biases can account for broad patterns of information processing biases. The intuitive prosecutor metaphor is presented as a parallel explanatory framework for interpreting attributional biases, whose motivation is based on a threat to social order. The potential implications for person memory are discussed, and three hypotheses are developed: That intuitive prosecutors recall norm-violating information more consistently than non-intuitive prosecutors (H1); that this differential recall may be based on differential (biased) encoding of behavioral information (H2); and that this differential recall may also be based on biased retrieval of information from memory rather than the result of a reporting bias (H3). A first experiment is conducted to test the basic recall hypothesis (H1). A second experiment is conducted that employs accountability in order to test the second and third hypotheses.

Committee: Marilynn Brewer (Advisor) Subjects:

Master of Science (MS), Ohio University, 2008, Psychology (Arts and Sciences)

In two studies, the authors investigated how people evaluate hypocrites. Study 1 found that a hypocrisy-primed group, compared to a no hypocrisy-primed group, judged a hypocrite leniently, rating the hypocrite lower on prejudice, hypocrisy, and deception. However, when participants in the hypocrisy-primed group were able to establish credentials by signing a petition, they rated the hypocrite more harshly than their counterparts who were not allowed to establish credentials. Study 2 replicated this finding and also demonstrated that participants in the hypocrisy-primed group judged themselves less harshly than a hypocrite, rating themselves lower on prejudice, hypocrisy, and deception.

Committee: Mark D. Alicke PhD (Committee Chair); Emily Balcetis PhD (Committee Member); Keith Markman PhD (Committee Member) Subjects: Psychology

PHD, Kent State University, 2012, College of Education, Health and Human Services / School of Lifespan Development and Educational Sciences

One way to improve students¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿ academic performance is to improve their reading comprehension. Previous investigations demonstrated that testing students on learning material as well as having them use metacognitive strategies have independently improved reading comprehension. The test used in the learning phase in previous investigates has typically been experimenter created. In the proposed study, free recall of recently read text was used as the test in the learning phase. A second important aspect of the current investigation is the inaccuracy of students¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿ meta-comprehension judgments. Although use of metacognitive strategies does improve academic performance, students often make inaccurate judgments about what they know and are particularly inaccurate in their assessment of text comprehension. The aim of this study was to determine if free recall was an effective testing strategy for learning of text and long-term retention. Also, this study explored if self-selection of material versus experimenter- selection of restudy material improved long-term retention. Finally, this study explored the relationship between judgments of learning and re-study choices. Free recall did not improve participants reading comprehension, long-term retention and the accuracy of their judgments of learning in comparison to rereading the material. Participants who selected their restudy materials did not outperform those who did not select their restudy materials.

Committee: Christopher Was PhD (Committee Chair); Drew Tiene PhD (Committee Member); John Dunlosky PhD (Committee Member) Subjects: Educational Psychology

PHD, Kent State University, 2011, College of Arts and Sciences / Department of Psychological Sciences

Preschoolers' ability to make judgments of learning (JOLs) was examined in three experiments in which they were taught proper names for various animals. In Experiment 1, when judgments were made immediately after a name had been taught, nearly every child predicted subsequent recall of every name. When judgments were made after a delay of a few minutes, fewer (14 of 29) showed this response tendency. The delayed JOLs of those who predicted at least one recall failure were still overconfident, however, and were not correlated with final recall. In Experiment 2, children received a second study trial with feedback, made yes-no JOLs after a delay, and then completed a forced-choice task. In the forced choice task, an animal whose name had been recalled previously was pitted against an animal whose name had not been recalled. Compared to Experiment 1, more children predicted at least one recall failure, and predictions were moderately accurate. In the forced choice task, well-learned items were readily distinguished from less well-learned ones, even by children whose yes-no JOLs had been inaccurate. Experiment 3 examined the effect of providing an additional retrieval attempt with feedback on delayed JOLs. Half of the children received a single study session and the others received an additional study session with feedback. The number who predicted at least one recall failure did not vary by group. However, children in the practice group showed less overconfidence than children in the no practice group. In the forced-choice task, both groups showed the same high level of performance as the children in Experiment 2.

Committee: Dr. William E. Merriman (Advisor); Dr. John Dunlosky (Advisor); Dr. Katherine Rawson (Committee Member); Dr. Beth Wildman (Committee Member); Dr. Christopher Was (Committee Member); Dr. Janice Kroeger (Committee Member) Subjects: Cognitive Psychology; Developmental Psychology

MA, Kent State University, 2010, College of Arts and Sciences / Department of Psychological Sciences

When people judge their learning of items across study-test trials, their accuracy in discriminating between learned and unlearned items improves on the second trial. We examined the source of this improvement by estimating the contribution of three factors—memory for past test performance (MPT), new learning, and forgetting—to accuracy on trial 2. In Experiment 1, during two trials, participants studied paired associates, made a judgment of learning (JOL) for each one, and were tested. During the second study trial, we manipulated two variables: When the JOL was made (either immediately before or after studying an item) and whether participants were told the outcome of the previous recall attempt. In Experiment 2, the same procedure was used with a one week retention interval between study and test on trial 2. In both experiments, JOL resolution was higher on trial 2 then on trial 1. Fine-grained analyses of JOL magnitude and decomposition of resolution revealed several important findings. First, MPT contributed most to boosts in JOL magnitude and improvements in resolution across trials. Second, JOLs and subsequent resolution were sensitive to new learning and forgetting, but only when participants' judgments were made after and not before study. Thus, JOLs appear to integrate information from multiple factors, and these factors jointly contribute to JOL resolution.

Committee: John Dunlosky (Advisor); Maria Zaragoza (Committee Member); William Merriman (Committee Member); John Gunstad (Committee Member) Subjects: Psychology