Master of Arts, The Ohio State University, 2012, Psychology

Selective attention is a key construct in decision-making, but studies have rarely manipulated attention in the area of preventive health. We propose that attention manipulations can be used as a complement to other theory-based interventions in order to tackle important health challenges. In five studies, we experimentally manipulated attention to information and options and explore its causal effects on choice and valuation. Using disparate decision paradigms in health domains, incidental attention manipulations produced a measurable impact on preventive health behaviors, though the effect was limited (or nullified) outside of the lab. A new kind of preference reversal emerged, with covert attention manipulations (caused by the presentation of normatively-irrelevant integers) and overt manipulations (order effects and font size) presumably altering the information processed and the subsequent stream of information processing. In Study 1, directing initial attention towards a healthier snack option increased the likelihood of selecting it. Study 2 tested whether the subtle manipulation in Study 1was effective outside of the lab using similar manipulations between multiple snack options in a hospital cafeteria, but the effect failed to replicate. In Study 3, changing the order in which healthier breakfast items (fruit) were encountered when entering a hospital cafeteria caused a small increase in the proportion of fruit sales compared to less healthy options (pastries). Stronger, less subtle manipulations may be required in order for the effect to be broadly generalizable. In order to further test the generalizability of the effect of attention on preventive health choices, Studies 4 and 5 used an attention manipulation (font size) that could be manipulated more broadly (e.g., in public health campaigns). The results highlighted the active nature of processing highly salient information. In particular, directing attention to negative information (e.g., about vaccin (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Ellen Peters (Advisor); Michael DeKay (Committee Member); Phyllis Pirie (Committee Member); Mary Ellen Wewers (Committee Member) Subjects: Behaviorial Sciences

Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.), Bowling Green State University, 2023, Psychology/Industrial-Organizational

Validity information (effect sizes) for selection tests can be difficult for people to understand without some additional context. Previous research has investigated how using visual representations of effect sizes can help lay people understand the magnitude of the effect. The purpose of this study is to build upon the findings of previous research to investigate how cognitive heuristics (i.e., Anchoring and Adjustment and Range-Frequency Theory) may influence how people interpret visual presentation of validity coefficients. This study used a fully crossed 3 Comparison Effect Size Content (medical vs. nonsense vs selection) X 2 Presentation (sequential vs. simultaneous) X 2 Frequency Below (4 vs. 1) model. Despite expectations, findings from this study suggest that having a high frequency of comparison effect sizes below the focal effect size results in less positive impressions of a focal effect size, perhaps due to the cognitive load of interpreting multiple effect sizes. In addition, presenting the comparison effect sizes simultaneously resulted in higher estimates of the effectiveness of a hiring test. Based on the results of this study, it is recommended that practitioners hoping to present statistical information to a lay audience use caution and consider how best to present the information to ensure it is interpreted correctly. Limitations and future research directions are discussed.

Committee: Scott Highhouse Ph. D. (Committee Chair); Meagan Docherty Ph. D. (Committee Member); Margaret Brooks Ph. D. (Committee Member); James Foust Ph. D. (Committee Member) Subjects: Psychology

Master of Science (MS), Ohio University, 2023, Experimental Psychology (Arts and Sciences)

Both culturally and in decision-making research, humans have traditionally viewed guaranteed good things as highly valuable. However, in some contexts a guaranteed good thing may produce more negative experiences than not receiving one – if that means having to make a decision between the guarantee and something superior, but uncertain. The differences in emotional experiences that arise between only waiting for something favorable and having to choose between waiting for something favorable, or settling for something guaranteed, but less preferable have not been previously explored. Using an employment paradigm, Studies 1 and 2 provided evidence that receiving a guarantee can produce more anticipated regret and negative affect than having nothing for sure. Study 3 replicated those findings and further explored them through the lens of regulatory focus theory. Regulatory focus did not moderate the effects of receiving a guarantee but did produce differences in participant priorities and choice behavior; prevention focus, relative to promotion focus, made participants more likely to view being empty-handed as the more important concern and choose to settle for the guarantee. In sum, this work provides evidence that guaranteed good things can feel worse than having nothing for sure if they introduce a decision.

Committee: Keith Markman (Advisor); Dominik Mischkowski (Committee Member); Kimberly Rios (Committee Member) Subjects: Cognitive Psychology; Experimental Psychology; Psychology; Social Psychology

Master of Arts, The Ohio State University, 2020, Psychology

A sunk cost is a cost that has already been incurred and cannot be recovered (Mankiw, 2018). Previous research has demonstrated that people tend to consume more as sunk costs increase (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Thaler, 1980, Just & Wansink, 2011). This effect on consumption manifests as greater immediate usage intensity of an already-paid-for product, primarily attributed to a desire not to be (or appear to be) wasteful (Arkes & Blumer, 1985). However, there is reason to believe that sunk costs may not always elicit greater immediate consumption (Ashraf et al., 2010). This research explores contextual factors that reverse the traditional sunk cost effect on consumption and lead to increased saving behaviors rather than increased immediate consumption, while remaining consistent with reducing a feeling of psychological waste.

Committee: Duane Wegener (Committee Chair); Ellen Peters (Committee Member); Hal Arkes (Committee Member); Ian Krajbich (Committee Member) Subjects: Behavioral Psychology; Behavioral Sciences; Psychology

Master of Arts, The Ohio State University, 2019, Psychology

A meta-study is a collection of many very small studies, called micro-studies, based on one core design. Meta-studies address many disadvanta7ges of meta-analyses and provide a possible solution for the replication crisis in research. In addition to addressing the problems related to meta-analyses, meta-studies provide several unique advantages to conducting research, specifically by testing the limits of generalizability and by having higher statistical power than a traditional design of the same total sample size. As a demonstration of the methodology, we conducted two meta-studies of the risky-choice gain-loss framing effect. In addition to replicating many past findings involving the framing effect, we also found two novel results, one of which was particularly surprising. One novel result was the nonlinear moderation of the framing effect by extreme probabilities (e.g., 1% and 99%). Participants were less likely to exhibit the framing effect when presented with extreme probabilities than when presented with moderate probabilities. The surprising novel result was that the framing effect doubled in size when participants were presented with a slightly risky option instead of a certain option. This result is contradictory to both Prospect Theory and Fuzzy Trace Theory predictions.

Committee: Michael DeKay (Advisor); Paul De Boeck (Committee Member); Ellen Peters (Committee Member) Subjects: Psychology

Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.), Bowling Green State University, 2019, Philosophy, Applied

In this dissertation, I construct scientifically and practically adequate moral analogues of cognitive heuristics and biases. Cognitive heuristics are reasoning “shortcuts” that are efficient but flawed. Such flaws yield systematic judgment errors, cognitive biases. For example, the availability heuristic infers an event's probability by seeing how easy it is to recall similar events. Since dramatic events like airplane crashes are disproportionately easy to recall, this heuristic explains systematic overestimations of their probability (availability bias). The research program on cognitive heuristics and biases (e.g., Daniel Kahneman's work) has been scientifically successful and has yielded useful error-prevention techniques, cognitive debiasing. I try to apply this framework to moral reasoning to yield moral heuristics and biases. For instance, a moral bias of unjustified differences in animal-species treatment might be explained by a moral heuristic that dubiously infers animals' moral status from their aesthetic features. While the basis for identifying judgments as cognitive errors is often unassailable (e.g., per violating laws of logic), identifying moral errors seemingly requires appealing to moral truth, which, I argue, is problematic within science. Such appeals can be avoided by repackaging moral theories as mere “standards-of-interest” (a la non-normative metrics of purported right-making features/properties). However, standards-of-interest do not provide authority, which is needed for effective debiasing. Nevertheless, since each person deems their own subjective morality authoritative, subjective morality (qua standard-of-interest and not moral subjectivism) satisfies both scientific and practical concerns. As such, (idealized) subjective morality grounds a moral analogue of cognitive biases, subjective moral biases (e.g., committed non-racists unconsciously discriminating). I also argue that cognitive heuristic is defined by its relation to rationa (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Sara Worley Ph.D. (Advisor); Richard Anderson Ph.D. (Other); Theodore Bach Ph.D. (Committee Member); Michael Bradie Ph.D. (Committee Member); Michael Weber Ph.D. (Committee Member) Subjects: Cognitive Psychology; Ethics; Philosophy; Philosophy of Science; Psychology

Master of Arts (M.A.), Xavier University, 2019, Psychology

The current study examined the effects of an organization's personality and industry on its levels of organizational attraction (i.e., general company attractiveness, job pursuit intentions, and prestige). Participants were randomly assigned to either the healthcare or financial services industry and were asked to read descriptions of five organizations portraying different personality traits in the following order: Innovativeness, Dominance, Boy Scout, Thrift, and Style. Participants indicated their levels of organizational attraction for each organization, as well as which company they would choose if offered a job from all five organizations. Findings illustrated a significant main effect of organization personality on each of the three dimensions of organizational attraction, such that the organization portraying the Boy Scout trait had significantly higher levels of general company attractiveness, job pursuit intentions, and prestige than the other four traits. On the other hand, the Thrift trait resulted in the lowest levels of organizational attraction. It was also found that, if offered a job at all five organizations, the proportion of participants who selected the Boy Scout organization was significantly higher than the proportion of participants who selected any of the other four organizations. Lastly, there was not a significant interaction between organization personality and industry on organizational attraction, indicating a certain consistency of the most attractive and least attractive traits (i.e., Boy Scout and Thrift, respectively). These findings suggest that organizations should be aware of the personality they portray to potential applicants because of its significant influence on organizational attraction and subsequent applicant decision making.

Committee: Dalia Diab Ph.D. (Advisor); Morrie Mullins Ph.D. (Committee Member); Mark Nagy Ph.D. (Committee Member) Subjects: Organizational Behavior; Psychology

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2018, Psychology

Individuals' Decision-Making Ability Beliefs (DABs) have been previously connected to pre-experiential choice confidence (O'Dell, 2016). The goals of this dissertation are twofold. First, I sought to further expand the understanding and applicability of DABs. That is, I focused first of all on providing causal evidence of a link between DABs and pre-experiential choice confidence. Second, I aimed to also address some additional consequences of the pre-experiential choice confidence, especially for resistance to choice change. Results of this dissertation research showed that inflated or deflated beliefs about one's decision abilities were able to predict pre-experiential choice confidence. This included studies in which the DABs were measured (Study 1) and studies in which the DABs were manipulated (Studies 2 & 3). In both contexts, reported choice confidence correlated with resistance to choice change, even when controlling for potential antecedents of choice confidence (Studies 1 & 3). The DAB-manipulation data provide the best evidence to date that subjective beliefs about one's ability in specific decision-making contexts has downstream consequences beyond any influences of objective decision-making ability. The data documenting correlations between choice confidence and resistance to choice change provides the first initial indications that choice confidence has consequences beyond persistence of choices over time (cf. Folke, Jacobsen, Fleming, & De Martino, 2016).

Committee: Duane Wegener (Advisor); Richard Petty (Committee Member); Kentaro Fujita (Committee Member) Subjects: Behavioral Sciences; Psychology; Social Psychology

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2018, Communication

In this dissertation, I offer a social-psychological approach to analyzing the experience of individuals' judgment and decision-making processes about their engagement in low-cost but high risk online political behaviors. Drawing on social norms and risk judgment and decision-making frameworks, I propose a theoretical model to address citizens' experiences with networked authoritarianism in the context of online political expression. Online surveys conducted in two networked authoritarian contexts provide empirical evidence to test the proposed theoretical model in two separate studies. My findings suggest that how individuals feel about online political expression influences individuals' decision to engage in it more so than how much risk they think there is. Moreover, while salience of regime's repressive injunctive norm impacts both affective and cognitive risk components pertaining to online expression, it indirectly influences intention to express political opinions online via citizens' feelings about the behavior. The findings also reveal the conditional impact of regime opposition and involvement with the content of expressive behaviors on these relationships. Overall, by bringing the focus back to individuals, this project offers a more nuanced understanding of how online political expression contributes to endeavors to deal with repression at the citizen level.

Committee: Erik C. Nisbet (Advisor); R. Kelly Garrett (Committee Member); Robert M. Bond (Committee Member); Emad Khazraee (Committee Member) Subjects: Communication

Master of Science (MS), Ohio University, 2017, Experimental Psychology (Arts and Sciences)

Current food labels include comprehensive nutritional information, but evaluations of their effects on judgments of nutritional quality and food choice are scarce. Building on previous empirical research that demonstrates that amount and complexity of information is negatively related to judgment accuracy, this study used an experimental design to evaluate nutritional information labels of varying complexity. Lens model analysis (Brunswik, 1955; Cooksey, 1996; Hammond, 1955; Stewart, 1976) was used to quantitatively compare individuals' judgment accuracy to a gold standard nutritional quality criterion in three conditions that implemented front-of package (FOP) labels. The conditions were: no highlighted information, information highly related to nutritional quality highlighted, and information marginally related to nutritional quality highlighted. Findings indicate that different FOP labels had different effects on accuracy, but there were no effects of FOP labeling on judgment consistency, model agreement, or nutritional choice. Implications for understanding efforts to improve American food choices and reducing obesity are discussed.

Committee: Claudia González-Vallejo (Committee Chair); Jeffrey Vancouver (Committee Member); Sarah Racine (Committee Member) Subjects: Psychology

Master of Arts (MA), Bowling Green State University, 2017, Psychology

Decision-makers neglect prior probabilities, or base-rates, when faced with problems of Bayesian inference (e.g. Bar-Hillel, 1980; Kahneman & Tversky, 1972, 1973; Nisbett and Borgida 1975). Judgments are instead made via the representativeness heuristic, in which a probability judgment is made by how representative its most salient features are (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). Research has shown that base-rate neglect can be lessened by making individual subsets amenable to overall superset extraction (e.g. Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Evans et al. 2000; Evans et al. 2002; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). In addition to nested sets, psychological distance should change the weight afforded to base-rate information. Construal Level Theory (Trope & Liberman, 2010) proposes that psychological distances—a removal from the subjective and egocentric self—result in differential information use. When we are proximal to an event we focus on its concrete aspects, and distance from an event increases our focus on its abstract aspects. Indeed, previous research has shown that being psychologically distant from an event increases the use of abstract and aggregate information (Burgoon, Henderson, & Wakslak, 2013; Ledgerwood, Wakslak, & Wang, 2010), although these results have been contradicted (Braga, Ferreira, & Sherman, 2015). Over two experiments I test the idea that psychological distance increases base-rate use. In Experiment 1 I attempt to partially replicate previous research that indicates temporal psychological distance increases the use of the representativeness heuristic (Braga et al., 2015); that is, actually increases base-rate neglect. In Experiment 2 I tested this effect in problems of Bayesian inference, using the standard mammography (Eddy, 1982) and lawyers and engineers (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973) problems. My results provide preliminary, converging evidence that both social and temporal psychological distances increase the use of base-rate information.

Committee: Richard Anderson (Advisor); Scott Highhouse (Committee Member); Yiwei Chen (Committee Member) Subjects: Psychology

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 1967, Graduate School

Committee: Not Provided (Other) Subjects: Psychology

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2015, Psychology

Research on the psychology of judgment and decision making has focused considerable attention on how individuals value options, construct preferences, and make decisions. The decision-making process is often conceptualized in accordance with a value function (i.e., a usually concave relationship between the amount of a good and an individual's subjective value for that amount). A basic tenet of economic and psychological models of judgment and choice is diminishing marginal value, which assumes that individuals derive less marginal value from greater quantities of a good (e.g., individuals value their 1st dollar more than their 100th dollar). In this dissertation, I further the argument that the processing of symbolic numbers is subjective, and that differences in how individuals process numbers might then underlie differences in how they make judgments and decisions when numbers are involved. In Chapter 1, I review the numerical-cognition literature, which suggests that symbolic numbers are perceived in a subjective fashion and individuals differ in how they process symbolic numbers. Chapter 2 provides evidence that differences in symbolic-number mapping predict individuals' valuations in riskless and risky judgments; it also discusses implications for conceptualizations of value, risk aversion, and intertemporal choice. Whereas Chapter 2 focuses on individual differences in how individuals process symbolic numbers, Chapter 3 demonstrates that factors in the decision environment (i.e., time pressure and information-presentation formats for prices) can alter how individuals process symbolic numbers. Chapter 3 provides experimental evidence for hypotheses put forth in this dissertation. Chapter 3 more directly argues that value is jointly determined by: 1) subjective perceptions of symbolic numbers and 2) valuations based on these subjective perceptions. Building on this idea, Chapter 3 attempts to reconceptualize the nature of value and the construction of preferenc (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Ellen Peters (Committee Chair); Michael DeKay (Committee Member); Robert Cudeck (Committee Member) Subjects: Psychology

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2015, Psychology

Across six studies we investigate the role of attitude emotionality in both the intra- and interpersonal domains. In the intrapersonal domain, we demonstrate that when individuals have both positive and negative reactions toward an attitude object (i.e., express ambivalence), that the valence associated with greater emotionality tends to dominate when arriving at a summary judgment. Furthermore, individuals are also more consistent in the expression of their univalent summary judgments when they involve greater emotionality. In the interpersonal domain when individuals seek to communicate their positive evaluation to others, we demonstrate that attitude emotionality does not always dominate. Instead, we show that the impact of attitude emotionality depends on the type of object being evaluated. Expressing greater emotionality is more helpful for describing hedonic products (e.g., music and movies), while expressing less attitude emotionality is more helpful for describing utilitarian products (e.g., microwaves and blenders). This research therefore indicates the important role attitude emotionality plays in both judging and communicating. It also points to the intriguing irony that while attitude emotionality is associated with strong effects intrapersonally, it can be detrimental interpersonally.

Committee: Russell Fazio (Advisor); Richard Petty (Committee Member); Baldwin Way (Committee Member) Subjects: Communication; Marketing; Psychology; Social Psychology

Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.), Bowling Green State University, 2015, Psychology/Industrial-Organizational

People are getting tattooed more often than ever before, and this is particularly true of younger generations. However, little is known about how applicant tattoos influence the employee selection process. This study presented tattoos as stigmatizing marks, and used a policy-capturing methodology to examine the way in which specific dimensions of tattoo stigma – visibility, intentionality, perilousness, and context – are combined when making decisions about the suitability of tattooed applicants for blue and white collar jobs. Relative weights analysis revealed that tattooed applicant suitability was most negatively influenced when applicants had visible tattoos and were applying for white collar work. Additionally, there were differences in how the perilousness and job type cues were used in the decision task that were associated with stereotypical beliefs about tattooed people and right-wing authoritarianism.

Committee: Scott Highhouse PhD (Advisor); Michael Zickar PhD (Committee Member); Mary Hare PhD (Committee Member); Faulkner Sandra PhD (Committee Member) Subjects: Psychology

Doctor of Philosophy, Case Western Reserve University, 2015, Management

Fraud thrives in the financial marketplace despite the best efforts of the accounting community. Literature suggests both models and solutions to address the problem, yet a paucity of knowledge remains regarding how sympathy influences fraud. Although many of the largest frauds come from the professional investing community, little research exists on the pathways to fraud within it. I respond to calls for action from auditing and accounting literature, COSO, and practitioners in examining a powerful path to fraud inside the professional trading community, aggravated unintentionally by those who regulate them. I discover an environment where fraud is so pervasive, fraud can become the norm. While interviewing 31 professional investors and regulators, a passionate group of “ethical” fraudsters emerges. These fraudsters rationalize fraud as an ethical act, useful for protecting members of the public, given sympathetic circumstances. Following this line of reasoning, and aligned with literature from accounting, economics, and psychology, I operationalize an experiment. This experiment studies how the threat of detection, monetary rewards, and organizational culture interact to drive fraud when a sympathetic client exists. The data suggest the generalized existence of such “Robin Hood” fraudsters, given the opportunity to commit fraud to help their clients. Additionally, the data confirms the combinatory impact of the Fraud Triangle. Multiple factors need be present for fraud to emerge. Finally, while those in small firms act fraudulently due to the combination of money and a low chance of detection, those in large firms act due to money and a performance driven culture. In the qualitative study, traders expressed the belief that even when caught, the amount they will have to repay is relatively low. Additionally, regulators expressed the opinion that the amount requiring repayment will be high. Combining the results of the experiment with these assertions, I desig (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Timothy Fogarty (Committee Chair); Michael Akers (Committee Member); Don Giacomino (Committee Member); Tony Lingham (Committee Member) Subjects: Accounting

Master of Arts (M.A.), Xavier University, 2014, Psychology

Inaction inertia occurs when an individual is less likely to act on an attractive offer after having missed a previous, more attractive offer. Few studies have shed light on inaction inertia within an organizational setting, and even fewer have examined how individual differences may affect it. The purpose of the current study was to examine how maximizing tendency, or the tendency to pursue the best option, affects experiencing inaction inertia in a job offer context. A total of 117 participants were asked to imagine that they received an attractive job offer, had to miss it, and then one month later were offered a comparable but slightly less attractive job offer in terms of salary. They then rated their likelihood to accept the second job offer, followed by their satisfaction with the second job offer and their anticipated regret with accepting the second job offer. As hypothesized, results suggested those high in maximizing tendency were more likely to experience inaction inertia. As predicted, maximizing tendency also negatively predicted satisfaction with the second job offer. Contrary to hypotheses, maximizing tendency was not found to predict anticipated regret with accepting the second job offer. Overall, these results provide support for maximizing tendency as a predictor of experiencing inaction inertia.

Committee: Dalia Diab Ph.D. (Committee Chair); Morell Mullins Ph.D. (Committee Member); Mark Nagy Ph.D. (Committee Member) Subjects: Psychology

Master of Arts (MA), Bowling Green State University, 2013, Psychology/Industrial-Organizational

Research in unethical decision-making has shown that resisting the temptation to cheat requires self-regulatory resources. There is little research done to examine passive acts of unethical decision-making despite the regular occurrences of passive aggressive, deviant, and unethical work behaviors. The current study extends previous findings by examining unethical behaviors through passivity. Participants were asked to evaluate their own response on a situational-judgment task and report their grade for a monetary incentive. The results are consistent with previous findings such that individuals with depleted self-regulatory resources are more likely to give oneself a higher grade. However, there was no difference in behavior between different forms of cheating (active vs. passive).

Committee: Christopher Nye (Committee Chair); Scott Highhouse (Committee Member); Richard Anderson (Committee Member) Subjects: Ethics; Psychology; Social Psychology

Master of Arts, The Ohio State University, 2011, Psychology

Across psychology there exist innumerable examples of default biases that individuals tend to use when making judgments within specific domains (e.g., the correspondence bias, connectedness goals, stereotypes, etc). By their very nature, these default biases rely on relatively domain-specific knowledge that may not carry over into other domains. Due to its fundamental, low-level nature, evaluation of situations or stimuli as either positive or negative represents a facet of judgment that is pervasive across nearly all domains. Two experiments test the idea that the relative weight individuals give to positives versus negatives – their weighting bias – is an initial default bias that is related to the final judgments and decisions individuals make. In Study 1, participants who had little opportunity to override this default response showed greater correspondence between their weighting bias and their exploration of a novel environment. Study 2 demonstrated that when motivated to mistrust their default response, participants showed no correspondence between their weighting bias and their risk-taking behavior, but strong correspondence when they were motivated to trust their default response. It is argued that in the absence of relevant substantive knowledge, individuals do not act randomly across domains, but instead rely on their fundamental weighting of positives and negatives to navigate these ambiguous situations.

Committee: Russell H. Fazio PhD (Advisor); William A. Cunningham PhD (Advisor); Richard E. Petty PhD (Committee Member) Subjects: Personality; Personality Psychology; Psychology; Social Psychology

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2005, Psychology

Research on judgment and decision processes has demonstrated two general decision modes: an intuitive, efficient, cursory process (System 1), and an analytical, high effort, deliberative process (System 2). These two decision strategies have been assumed to be associated with controlled and automatic cognitive processes, respectively. It is unclear whether this is always necessarily the case – as automatic processes (e.g. priming effects) at the meta-decision level may lead an individual to become either more or less deliberative in examining information in order to form a judgment or make a decision. In four studies, the influence of priming effects upon decision behavior is investigated. Furthermore, this research provides an examination of how individual differences in decision making strategy use may similarly produce differences in information search strategies, as well as in decision outcomes. A model is tested across these studies in order to describe how the impact of priming influences and temperament may both stimulate information processing and choice behavior - a priming / temperament model of information processing in decision making.

Committee: Thomas Nygren (Advisor) Subjects: