Master of Arts (MA), Bowling Green State University, 2023, History

Interwar Europe was largely impacted by three major events: World War I and the postwar Treaty of Versailles, the Bolshevik Revolution, and the Great Depression. The British Empire, like the rest of Europe, had to find a way to pay its war debts, prevent the spread of communism, and fix the depressed economy. Britain came out of the period without falling to an extremist, authoritarian government that threatened the peace in Europe. During the late interwar period, three men contributed to the successful British war effort that eventually helped save Europe from Hitler and the Nazis. Winston Churchill is the most visible figure because he was the wartime prime minister who accurately predicted the aggressive nature of Germany's Nazi regime, establishing the Grand Alliance that had eluded his predecessor. John Maynard Keynes helped identify faults in the Versailles Treaty that would be rectified at the end of World War II, and he also helped the British economy survive the war. Though highly criticized for the British policy of appeasement, prime minister Neville Chamberlain rearmed the country and removed Britain from the gold standard in order to successfully revive the economy during the Great Depression. All three of these men made mistakes during this period as well, but only Chamberlain's name was tarnished as a result. Though Keynes and his economic theory do not appeal to everyone, he is still esteemed as a brilliant economist. Churchill caused the starvation death of three million Indian citizens yet is still celebrated as the savior of Europe. Chamberlain is saddled with the misconception that he failed to stand up to Hitler, making a war inevitable, despite his work mitigating the damage the Great Depression inflicted on the British economy. There is much more to the history of this period. This thesis compares the accomplishments and the mistakes of these three prominent British men and argues for a more balanced view of their contributions to the war (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Douglas Forsyth Ph.D (Committee Chair); Michael Brooks Ph.D (Committee Member) Subjects: European History; European Studies; History

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), Ohio University, 2020, History (Arts and Sciences)

A proper understanding of liberal internationalism requires an appreciation of both its domestic and international aspects. This dissertation reconstructs and evaluates the debates on international order that occurred within the most influential non-state foreign policy organizations in Britain and the United States between the 1930s and the 1950s—the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). The members of these two organizations played an integral role in the project to contrive a coherent intellectual framework for the largely incoherent and contentious system of liberal internationalism that the Allies had tried to impose in 1919. One of the hallmarks of liberal states is the prominence of non-state elites in the policymaking process. These non-state elites—just as much as the liberal internationalism they played an indispensable role in propagating—played a crucial role in the formation of a new foreign policy orthodoxy within the United States and Great Britain. But the nature and extent of the relationship between the liberal state and its non-state elites is contentious. In contrast with liberal and Marxist theorists—who argue that the liberal state is weak in comparison with either civil society or capitalist interests—I argue that the relationship between the liberal state and the CFR/Chatham House was one of symbiosis rather than of simple domination by one over the other. While the state in each instance was always the senior partner and always decided policy, the CFR and Chatham House nevertheless provided useful—arguably indispensable—functions for the liberal state in the formation and implementation of foreign policy. The fatal contradiction of liberal internationalism was that it simultaneously relied on strict legalism while also refusing to provide an answer to the most important legal question of both domestic politics and international relations: which institutions and individuals hold the (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Peter John Brobst (Advisor); Ingo Trauschweizer (Committee Member); Chester Pach (Committee Member); Nukhet Sandal (Committee Member) Subjects: American History; European History; History; International Law; International Relations; Modern History; World History

Master of Arts (MA), Bowling Green State University, 2018, History

This thesis examines developments in American nativist thought in the interwar era, with a particular focus on the Great Depression years. Starting in World War I, nativist concerns grew increasingly focused on ideology, guided by the principles of 100-percent Americanism. Fear of foreign “isms,” most notably communism, served as the new fulcrum for nativist currents in the United States. This thesis explores three distinct Depression-era right-wing extremist phenomena: The Black Legion, Charles Coughlin, and the German-American Bund. All three were disparate, dissimilar in composition, tactics, and appearance. The Black Legion was an outgrowth of the 1920s Ku Klux Klan and remained virulently racist and anti-Catholic. Coughlin was a Catholic priest who had found himself targeted by the same Klan the Black Legion grew out of. Tasked with starting a parish in a pre-dominantly Protestant community (in which the KKK still exerted a great deal of influence), Coughlin took to the airwaves. Soon, his “radio sermons” took on a more political flavor. Coughlin excoriated business leaders and bankers for their greed, laying the blame for the Great Depression at their feet. Finally, the German- American Bund developed from German-American solidarity movements initiated in the aftermath of World War I. Initially a response to oppressive treatment at the hands of American citizens during the war, some of these organizations, including the Bund, soon took up the cause for national socialism. Yet despite their differences, all three movements were underpinned by a powerful current of anti-communism. It is this common thread that gave shape to interwar era nativism.

Committee: Rebecca Mancuso Dr. (Advisor); Michael Brooks Dr. (Committee Member) Subjects: American History

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2016, History

This dissertation analyzes secret military cooperation between the Soviet Union and Germany from 1920 until 1933. Both states found themselves internationally isolated after World War I. Unable to meet their own security needs – despite immense ideological differences – they turned to each other in an unlikely partnership. Together, they established a network of secret military bases, testing grounds and laboratories inside Russia, where they jointly developed new aircraft, armored vehicles, and chemical weapons. Their work together provided a dark glimpse of the future: Soviet military intelligence reports chronicled the rise of pro-Nazi sentiment among the German officers. German intelligence in turn described the growing cult of Stalin and the scenes of mass starvation unfolding right outside the gates of their facilities in the wake of collectivization. And both sides practiced human experimentation in their joint chemical weapons facilities. But cooperation between the two states was more than just a harbinger of what was to come: the new ideas, technologies, and factories developed in this period of cooperation would serve a vital role in the course and conduct of the coming war. At its core, the interwar exchange of Russian space for German technology was a wager upon which the Second World War depended.

Committee: Jennifer Siegel (Advisor); Peter Mansoor (Committee Member); David Hoffmann (Committee Member); Alan Beyerchen (Committee Member) Subjects: History; Technology

MA, Kent State University, 2015, College of Arts and Sciences / Department of History

The 1920s represented the beginning of a new era in foreign policy for the United States. With Europe devastated by World War I, the United States became the new economic power in international relations but had no clear vision of how to use this power. The election of Republican Warren Harding in 1920 signaled the beginning of the Republican Ascendancy, the first of three Republican presidential victories, and new rhetoric on how to approach foreign policy based in conservative internationalism. Utilizing the definition presented by Thomas Knock in To End All Wars and rhetorical analysis, this project argues that the three administrations shared foreign policy language and used it to define a conservative standard for American participation in the era between the world wars. This shared language was used by the president, secretary of state, and secretary of commerce over the course of the decade to apparent success in the 1921-22 Washington Conference, 1929 Kellogg-Briand Pact, and 1930 London Naval Conference, only to unravel with the stock market crash in October 1929 and the following international Great Depression.

Committee: Mary Heiss Dr. (Advisor); Clarence Wunderlin Dr. (Committee Member); Kevin Adams Dr. (Committee Member) Subjects: American History; History; International Relations; Modern History; Rhetoric

MA, Kent State University, 2014, College of Arts and Sciences / Department of History

"Strange Times:" The Language of Illness and Malaise in Interwar France The interwar era was especially difficult in France given the stresses of the global depression, the rise of extreme politics, and most importantly the widespread perception of demographic crisis. Despite the clear division between radical right and left-wing political organizations, the two poles of the spectrum ultimately shared a level of discourse. Utilizing the literary criticism of Mikhail Bakhtin, which suggested that heteroglossic, or divisive rhetoric stood in contrast to unitary language, or overarching discourse, this project argues that the political left and right were united in their similar discursive employment of illness. The perception of demographic crisis lead many interwar era French to see their nation as somehow sick either metaphorically or literally. The discourse of illness and malaise is evident across the political spectrum, especially in the fields of politics, gender, and race.

Committee: Rebecca Pulju Dr. (Advisor); Stephen Harp Dr. (Committee Member); Richard Steigmann-Gall Dr. (Committee Member) Subjects: Demographics; European History; Gender; History; Modern History

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2011, History

This dissertation examines the experience of German military advisors in China during the interwar period. It explores the political, cultural, and social dimensions of military advising and the concept of military advisors as vehicles of transnational exchange. Between 1927 and 1938 over one hundred high-ranking German military officers traveled to China to advise Chiang Kai-shek and the Guomindang on military modernization and industrialization. The German advisors quickly learned that they could not impose German institutions and technology on China but rather, they needed to adapt to the foreign environment and situate their reforms within the Chinese context. The project required extensive archival research in Germany and the United States. Close readings of primary sources, including reports from the German military mission and the German Foreign Office as well as the personal papers, correspondence, and recollections of the advisors, have shed light on their experience and efforts to transform the Chinese army from a conglomeration of poorly trained and armed feudal warlord armies into a modern national military capable of defending the country against Japanese encroachment. Many of the advisors adapted to living and working in China and reconciled their foreign service with their sense of duty to the Fatherland. In China, German officers found a place to further hone their military skills while the Treaty of Versailles prevented them from practicing their craft in Germany. The advisors believed they were cultivating a future German ally and a bulwark against the rising tide of communism in Asia. The German military mission also promoted Sino-German trade, which took on added importance after the Nazis came to power in 1933 and launched their policy of rearmament. The increase in armaments production required greater access to raw materials. China possessed vast supplies of raw materials, which it traded with Germany in exchange for armaments. The Sino-German (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: John Guilmartin Jr. (Advisor); Alan Beyerchen (Advisor); Peter Mansoor (Committee Member) Subjects: Military History

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2011, History

The League of Nations Health Organisation, a technical body created in 1920 to address international health issues, was an unlikely setting for a revolutionary experiment in international relations. Yet the leaders of the organization created an international epidemic control system that not only brought together collaborators across enemy lines, but also garnered political support for a vision of international public health that posited that the well-being of the world's citizens deserved at least as much attention as the state's security or economic interests. The leadership of the Health Organisation leveraged the success of the older international epidemic control system, which they expanded with new technologies and information gathering practices, to attempt to manage endemic and non-infectious diseases at a distance. The experts at the organization went beyond older bacteriological models to posit a social-environmental understanding of health that maintained that social and physical surroundings were more determinative of health and illness than race or heredity alone. Although bacteriological understandings of health dictated certain international epidemic control techniques – most notably quarantine and disinfection – the increasing emphasis on environmental understandings illustrates the dramatic changes underway in international public health work between the world wars. The previous system, overseen by the Office International d'Hygiene Publique, relied on epidemic notifications sent over diplomatic channels. International public health came into its own at the League, granted its own section and charged to medical professionals rather than diplomats. Although few would argue that health cooperation had no political consequences, governments were more willing to cooperate on “technical matters” and the staff of the League of Nations Health Organisation were happy to feed into this perception and used it to justify their activities. During World War (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Christopher Otter (Advisor); John Burnham (Committee Member); Carole Fink (Committee Member) Subjects: History; International Relations; Public Health

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2008, History

The aim of this dissertation is to take a comparative and transnational approach to the formation of the military officer mentality and worldviews in interwar Europe by taking Germany and Turkey as case studies. It focuses on the years roughly from the Great Depression to the outbreak of the Second World War. The characteristics of military culture are examined through the publications of the defense press.Germany and Turkey were allies in the First World War and shared a similar fate as losers of that war. Both went through rapid territorial and political change; both positioned themselves as the opposite of the winning powers, Britain and France. Yet they had different attitudes toward the international system that was formed following the war: Germany was a revisionist power, whereas Turkey was an example of interwar countries that rejected irredentism. While they had different political systems (Weimar Republic until 1933, followed by Nazi dictatorship in Germany; single-party state until 1946 in Turkey), the impact of total war and the technological and socioeconomic changes of the post-1918 era engendered similar responses in the officer corps of these countries toward politics, international relations, and technological development. These responses led to three major themes: fear of defenselessness in the age of total war; the role of the military in nation-building; and the urge to discover and fight the internal enemies of the nation. A picture of self-conscious uncertainty emerged in the interwar military press, which betrayed signs of old institutions trying to adapt to a new world and fighting hard not to accept the changes. The German and Turkish officer cadres of the interwar era made the transition to the tactics and strategy of total war in the twentieth century, but most of their views on parliaments, democracy, and republicanism remained hostile and anchored in a previous era. These attitudes have influenced civil-military relations in both count (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Alan Beyerchen (Advisor); Stephen Kern (Committee Member); John Guilmartin (Committee Member) Subjects: European History

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2003, History

Military organizations are normally quite resistant to change the way they operate. For a number of complex reasons militaries have failed on occasion to anticipate, learn, and adapt to changes in the conduct of warfare. This work examines the anatomy of change and argues that achieving successful organizational change in the military results from garnering external support and winning internal consensus. It counters recent scholarship that maintains the Interwar Army was a hidebound organization, unable to overcome internal power struggles and achieve necessary reforms. It begins with an intellectual analysis of how and why organizational change occurs, examines the nature of revolutionary and evolutionary change, and offers one approach toward achieving lasting, meaningful modernization and innovation in the military. This work then examines the development of American antiaircraft artillery as a case study to illuminate the earlier discussion of theory as it relates to organizational and institutional change. Beginning in World War I and tracing the evolution of antiaircraft artillery through the Interwar Period and World War II, this study highlights the non-linear nature of change and the influence of technology, strategy, resources, and organizational politics on efforts to improve the American Army's ability to defend against air attack. It also provides valuable insight into the ability of the Army to learn from its mistakes and adapt to changing combat situations. From the Interwar development of doctrine to the prewar production of new weapons, the antiaircraft artillery establishment accepted limited, incremental success and did not sacrifice its overall development on the altar of sweeping reform. National military policy, strategy, operations, and tactics are analyzed as the expanding antiaircraft establishment defended the Panama Canal, Pearl Harbor, and the Philippines from Japanese attack, and fought through stubborn German resistance at Kasserine Pa (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Allan Millett (Advisor) Subjects:

Master of Arts (MA), Ohio University, 2012, History (Arts and Sciences)

The Balfour Declaration of 1917 committed the British government to supporting the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, but it also represented key shifts in the empire as a whole in the wake of World War I. Political changes enacted after the war, such as the creation of the League of Nations and later the British Commonwealth, were mirrored by a shift in the rationale for Britain's imperial holdings and allowed Zionist supporters to institutionalize their ideology. Many in Whitehall believed that the Zionist program would aid in creating a stable Middle East friendly to British interests; policies originating from the Colonial Office often reflected this belief. These edicts did not always translate into viable policies on the ground in Palestine, however, as the High Commissioner had to reconcile them with complex regional tensions. British rule in Palestine underscores both the power and pitfalls of an ideologically-motivated grand strategy.

Committee: John Brobst PhD (Committee Chair); Patrick Barr-Melej PhD (Committee Member); Paul Milazzo PhD (Committee Member) Subjects: European History; History; Middle Eastern History; Modern History; World History

Master of Fine Arts (MFA), Ohio University, 2005, Art History (Fine Arts)

This paper analyzes the sculptural collaboration between Pablo Picasso and Julio Gonzalez. It will examine each of the works born of the collaborative project at length, and discuss the major stylistic and thematic precursors to these works, both within each artist's oeuvre and art history in general. During the collaboration, each artist's unique sensibilities, skills, and styles merged to create just under a dozen works that have since resonated throughout the fields of art and art history. Also discussed will be the fact that these sculptures were created during the interwar period in Europe, which was a time of industrial, societal, and political upheaval. Each of these broad paradigm shifts is reflected within the works, and these works can, in fact, help to further our understanding of this tumultuous time period. While a good amount of important scholarship on the Picasso-Gonzalez collaboration exists, much of it is spread across a number of years and a number of sources. This paper will bring together and discuss this scholarship, and attempt to rectify any inconsistencies. Additionally, this paper will posit several new points born of the author's research and attempt to show that the process between the two artists was, indeed, collaborative and not a project solely guided by Picasso.

Committee: Joseph Lamb (Advisor) Subjects: Art History

PHD, Kent State University, 2009, College of Arts and Sciences / Department of History

Historical coverage of American perceptions of National Socialism normally begins with Adolf Hitler's appointment as chancellor in 1933. Yet American policymakers were aware of and reported on the party from its formation in the early 1920s, though their concern with Germany's political and economic stability caused them to inaccurately assess the growing National Socialist threat during this formative period. U.S. diplomats' often stark differences of opinion when it came to dealing with National Socialism before Hitler's chancellorship have been relatively unexamined. Consequently, a complete understanding of the interwar relationship between the United States and Germany and the American understanding of National Socialism has heretofore been impossible.Using extensive primary documentation from the State Department and U.S. military intelligence, this dissertation dissects American diplomatic reporting on Germany from the formation of the NSDAP through Hitler's appointment as chancellor. Part one examines U.S. assumptions about the Nazi Party from its infancy through the failed Beer Hall Putsch in 1923. Part two explores the U.S. failure to recognize that Hitler and the NSDAP were successfully reorganizing and restructuring their approach in the period prior to 1930. The final section details how American observers responded to a revitalized Nazi Party from 1930 to 1933. This study begins to fill the gap in the history of American perceptions of National Socialism by placing U.S. diplomatic reporting in its broadest historical context. Understanding American perceptions of National Socialism illuminates U.S.-German relations in the post-World War I era. At the same time the dissertation supplements the literature on U.S. policy history by contributing to a fuller understanding of the State Department's relationship with its diplomats and Foreign Service officers. Finally, with its emphasis on the American understanding of National Socialism, this dissertation a (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Mary Ann Heiss Ph.D. (Committee Chair); Clarence E. Wunderlin, Jr. Ph.D. (Committee Member); Kenneth R. Calkins Ph.D. (Committee Member); Steven W. Hook Ph.D. (Committee Member); James A Tyner Ph.D. (Committee Member) Subjects: American History; European History; History; International Relations