Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2006, Political Science

Though there is relatively little work on how states manage victory, the conventional wisdom in international relations scholarship is that moderation in victory is the only approach that will provide post-war stability. That is, defeated states should not be restricted in the post-war era, nor should the gains made by victors be too large. Otherwise, post-war stability is jeopardized. I argue that restrictive war-ending settlements tend to provide postwar stability when there is a large postwar gap in capabilities favoring the victors and those states actively enforce the settlement. When these conditions hold, postwar stability, defined as no or only minor alterations to the settlement attempted by the vanquished nation, can follow two pathways. The first is the acceptance of the restrictive settlement by the vanquished based on simple coercion, or where the defeated state is unable to challenge the settlement and thus grudgingly endures its treatment as long as the power gap favors the victors. The second, coercion plus socialization, is acceptance of the restrictive settlement by the defeated state based on legitimacy, or where the defeated state is eventually socialized to the settlement such that it no longer desires to challenge or alter the settlement even if the opportunity arises to do so. When the gap in capabilities between the victors and vanquished is not large or cannot be perpetuated because of lack of enforcement, a less restrictive settlement is more likely to provide postwar stability. To test my arguments against the conventional wisdom, I conduct a comparative analysis of all great power war-ending settlements since 1815. I find that restrictive settlements do in fact lead to postwar stability at least as often as lenient ones. Moreover, the comparative analysis demonstrates that the coercion and coercion plus socialization both enjoy strong support. To further probe the coercion plus socialization model, I conduct an in-depth case study of West (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Randall Schweller (Advisor) Subjects:

Master of Arts, The Ohio State University, 1946, Graduate School

Committee: Not Provided (Other) Subjects:

Master of Arts, The Ohio State University, 1967, Graduate School

Committee: Not Provided (Other) Subjects:

Master of Arts, The Ohio State University, 1969, Graduate School

Committee: Not Provided (Other) Subjects:

Master of Arts, The Ohio State University, 1969, Graduate School

Committee: Not Provided (Other) Subjects:

Master of Arts, The Ohio State University, 1969, Graduate School

Committee: Not Provided (Other) Subjects:

Master of Arts, The Ohio State University, 1952, Graduate School

Committee: Not Provided (Other) Subjects:

Master of Arts, The Ohio State University, 1971, Graduate School

Committee: Not Provided (Other) Subjects:

Master of Arts, The Ohio State University, 2007, Graduate School

Committee: Not Provided (Other) Subjects:

Master of Arts, The Ohio State University, 1971, Graduate School

Committee: Not Provided (Other) Subjects:

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2024, Political Science

Great power declines are rare and highly varied events of world historical importance. Despite near universal agreement that understanding the causes and process of decline is of existential importance, there is nothing resembling a scholarly consensus on any theory of decline. The following three papers cover the extant literature and justify the need for new theoretical work, present a new theory of state decline, and test that theory on the most well-known case of decline in the modern period: the collapse of the Soviet Union. Paper One provides an in-depth review of the decline literature, a collection of work that goes back centuries. While rich with ideas, it is hallmarked by informal and ad-hoc theories with untestable assumptions and hypotheses, weak or absent empirical strategies, and social/political judgements disguised as unbiased historical analysis. To make progress in this field would require a novel approach to thinking about decline. Paper Two sets out a new multi-level systemic theory of decline, drawing from innovative work in Complexity Theory. I argue that great power decline is the result of states seeking greatness in the first place, a goal that requires sacrifices in other areas of resilience and stability. States' attempts to manage risk and reward to maximize power creates vulnerabilities and those vulnerabilities can lead to declines. The theory is iii formally tested through a computational simulation model that shows how the proposed mechanisms can lead to decline. Paper Three applies the theory to the collapse of the Soviet Union, one of the most important political declines in modern history. Through in-depth case research, the case demonstrates the theoretical mechanisms and shows that the decline was the result of deliberate choices made by the state in the pursuit of power. The USSR accepted instability to break out of stagnation, making a rational risk calculation. But payoffs are never guaranteed: instead of increasing perfo (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Christopher Gelpi (Committee Chair); Bear Braumoeller (Advisor); Alexander Thompson (Committee Member); Randall Schweller (Committee Member) Subjects: International Relations; Political Science

Master of Arts (MA), Wright State University, 2024, International and Comparative Politics

How alliance structures form and why states balance, bandwagon, or remain neutral against other states is an enduring and important question in international relations. This thesis adds to the discussion of how states make alliance decisions by testing whether perceptions matter in predicting state balancing behavior and by proposing a new theoretical framework which allows for a better understanding of the mechanisms which drive the perception of aggressive intentions as a factor within Stephen Walt's balance of threat theory. In this thesis, I explore the construction of threat through a comparative case study analysis of border states of Russia following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine to explore how differing states responded with varying levels of threat perception of Russia and how actions and characteristics of these states shaped their differing responses in balancing. The case studies for this analysis include Ukraine, Finland, and Mongolia in relation to their perception of threat of Russian aggressive intentions.

Committee: Vaughn P. Shannon Ph.D. (Committee Chair); Pramod Kantha Ph.D. (Committee Member); Liam Anderson Ph.D. (Committee Member) Subjects: International Relations; Political Science

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2023, Political Science

States are usually the starting point of analysis when we think about international politics. They are the agents that cooperate, fight, and bargain over how goods are to be distributed around the world under conditions of anarchy. But to the extent that this really does describe the world well, it is not a transcendental truth but a contingent choice. The determinants of this choice, which concerns the location and configuration of political agency, is in some ways the key political question about governance. When do constituent actors facing interdependence solve problems collectively while remaining free to act on their own, and when do they cede their agency to a new corporate actor? The question brings up some important ironies: actors will only give up their basic sovereignty in situations with obvious, existential shared stakes, but these circumstances are the ones most likely to produce cooperation without resort to extreme measures. So why does unification ever happen? I argue that this puzzle comes from the ways in which standard theories treat expectations and beliefs: as forward-looking inferences about specific others. I argue instead that unification and agency transfer are the result of recognized shared interests combined with generalized shared pessimism about the prospects of cooperation learned from history rather than inferred from calculations about interests. In turn, more habitually cooperative systems will tend to produce optimism and thus decentralized collective governance. I develop this argument both verbally and formally, then test it on three mixed-methods case studies: the foundation if the United States, the 19th-century Concert of Europe, and the early modern Ming Chinese international order.

Committee: Alexander Thompson (Committee Chair); Jan Pierskalla (Committee Member); Jennifer Mitzen (Committee Member) Subjects: International Relations; Political Science

PhD, University of Cincinnati, 2023, Arts and Sciences: Political Science

Recent cases of hybrid warfare and other forms of ambiguous conflict present a challenge to crisis bargaining models, which describe crisis escalation as a three-part signaling process. First, states engaged in a policy dispute will make public demands about the disputed issue. Second, states follow with coercive threats if the demand is not met. Finally, states demonstrate resolve through increasingly hostile public behaviors that move the crisis closer to war. Thus, signaling is the primary strategic mechanism in crisis bargaining models. However, this traditional view of crisis escalation conflicts with some cases of international crisis. This presents a theoretical challenge to conventional bargaining and traditional views of escalation. To resolve this discrepancy, an alternative escalation model is presented below that attempts to resolve this theoretical and empirical discrepancy and explain cases of “hybrid warfare” without violating the foundational tenets of bargaining theory. The theory posits that states do not always utilize signaling as the primary strategic mechanism during an international crisis. Instead, they may utilize other strategic mechanisms to advance their interests. The model presented here, labeled “hybrid escalation,” describes one approach states take to crisis escalation that utilizes ambiguity. While escalating with military means, the hybrid state generates ambiguity by distorting information about the crisis using informational means like propaganda, censorship, proxies, disinformation, and other forms of deception. This allows the hybrid state to lower the traditional costs of escalation by exploiting various cost-lowering mechanisms that limit the typical material and political costs of escalation. To test the efficacy of this theory, I examine two recent conflicts associated with hybrid warfare. I test the data against two crisis bargaining models, traditional and hybrid escalation. I hypothesize that trad (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Brendan Green Ph.D. (Committee Chair); Thomas Moore Ph.D. (Committee Member); Richard Harknett Ph.D. (Committee Member) Subjects: Political Science

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), Ohio University, 2023, History (Arts and Sciences)

Despite holding office during some of the most fateful years (1970-1974) in Britain's twentieth century history, the government of Prime Minister Edward (Ted) Heath is one of the least studied British governments of the post-Second World War era. This is in large part because the Heath Ministry probably left the fewest policy legacies of any postwar British government. However, while Heath's time in 10 Downing Street has almost universally been deemed by historians as a failure, his one outright success –negotiating Britain's entry into the European Community – singlehandedly makes his one of the most influential and important governments in postwar British history, ending “one thousand years of history” and setting the country on a course that would lead to massive political and economic transformation. As a result, Heath and his government deserve far more attention than they've received from historians of British politics, British diplomacy, and European integration. As such, this dissertation makes two overarching arguments. First, it seeks to re-conceptualize Heath as a successful Prime Minister, if success can be defined by fully achieving the main political goal (British membership of the EC) that he prioritized when entering office. Secondly, it seeks to position Heath as one of the most influential postwar Prime Ministers due to his successful European policy; however, in Heath's case ‘influential' does not equal ‘eminence', as the legacy he bequeathed to his country was far from positive. This dissertation analyzes this legacy by contending that by the end of 1973, Britain's first year of EC membership, Heath's strategy for using the EC to rectify and strengthen Britain's place in the international system and to modernize the British largely lay in ruins. The failure of Heath's overall strategy set the tone for Britain's extended psychodrama with the European Community that had its logical, if not necessarily inevitable, climax in the Brexit vote of 2016. (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Peter John Brobst (Advisor); Steven Miner (Committee Member); Robert Ingram (Committee Member); James Mosher (Committee Member) Subjects: History

Master of Arts (MA), Bowling Green State University, 1954, Sociology

Committee: Joseph K. Balogh (Advisor) Subjects: Sociology

Master of Arts (MA), Bowling Green State University, 1954, Sociology

Committee: Joseph K. Balogh (Advisor) Subjects: Sociology

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2022, Educational Studies

The internationalization efforts of the United States (U.S.) institutions have resulted in large-scale international branch campuses and overseas representative offices. In this case study, the university's global physical presence will be referred to from hereon as a Gateway Office. This qualitative study investigates a Shanghai Gateway Office (SGO) affiliated with a large U.S. university. The office has fostered a robust global community by cultivating relationships between the home institution and the network abroad. This study employs a conceptual framework comprised of three perspectives to investigate an economically, politically, and culturally significant bi-national organization known as the SGO in the higher education landscape. This study was guided by three sets of research questions in an exploration of how the SGO operates as a bi-national organization affiliated with a U.S. university: (a) how does it negotiate resources within and between the two nations? (b) how does it establish legitimacy within and between the two nations? (c) how does it navigate cultures within and between the two nations? Case study, based on constructivist paradigm, served as the primary methodology. Artifact analysis of office displays, document analysis of the annual report, audit reports, newsletters, and articles about SGO history and leadership; and eight semi-structured interviews with key participants who participated and engaged with the SGO over the past five years, comprise the methods of data collection and analysis. In conjunction with study of artifacts and documents, the data were processed using a narrative inquiry-led restorying approach. To this methodological blueprint, I have added a culturally significant insider perspective by utilizing Chinese concepts such as Guanxi and Mianzi. The case reports and extended discussions provided a rich and nuanced description of the SGO from the bi-national perspective and revealed that, (a) the SGO survives by re (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Tatiana Suspitsyna (Committee Chair); Mark Bender (Committee Member); Penny Pasque (Committee Member) Subjects: Asian Studies; Comparative; Higher Education; International Relations; Organization Theory; Organizational Behavior

Master of Arts in History, Youngstown State University, 2022, Department of Humanities

The Middle East has historically been a region of the world where peace has been hard to achieve. Nations and populations, such as Israel, Syria, and Palestinians, have been at odds since the end of the Second World War. The United States showed great interest in the Middle East following the Second World War, making them an important part of the historical narrative there as well. This thesis looks primarily at the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, specifically through the career of Arlen Specter, a former United States Senator from Pennsylvania who served from 1981 to 2011. Facilitated mainly by primary source material from Senator Specter's career, this thesis illuminates the work of an often-forgotten politician who was very active in Middle Eastern politics. Specter saw Syria as an integral part of any prospect of peace between Israel and Palestine, and this thesis analyzes his personal efforts to develop relations with Syrian and Palestinian leaders in the hopes of achieving peace between Israel and Palestine, as well as between Israel and Syria. Overall, Specter's perspectives and actions work together to reveal a unique and nuanced approach to the Middle East that saw the importance of Syria, a nation that has been ostracized from the United States since 1979, in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The project begins with a historical narrative of Israel, Palestine, and Syria. Specter then becomes the focus, and his actions and work in and pertaining to the Middle East are examined, revealing Specter's uniqueness.

Committee: David Simonelli PhD (Advisor); Jacob Labendz PhD (Committee Member); Martha Pallante PhD (Committee Member); Adam Fuller PhD (Committee Member) Subjects: History; International Relations; Middle Eastern History; Modern History; World History

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2021, Political Science

The provision of global collective goods often features unequal burden-sharing, with states complaining that they are doing more than their fair share while others are doing less. What gives rise to fairness, however, has not been adequately theorized, leaving scholars unable to determine whether states are doing their fair share. I develop a normative theory of responsibility comprised of three principles---liability, community, and capacity---which collectively determine a state's fair share. The theory proposes that for any global problem, responsibility should be assigned first using liability as the most compelling principle, community second, and capacity last, with the expectation that liable actors pay the most and community actors pay more than capable actors. While this sequence should be followed in general, the exact weight to place on each principle is ultimately an empirical question that depends on the specific context we are applying the framework. The framework provides guidance on how to attach a concrete weight to each principle across different contexts. Two empirical metrics can be derived from this framework: the responsibility index and responsibility gap. The responsibility index builds on the theoretical framework to quantify how much each state ought to contribute for a given problem while the responsibility gap assesses the extent to which a state's contributions deviate from its assessed share under the index. I create both these metrics within the refugee domain, which is a particularly ideal application for the framework; despite wide consensus that the distribution of refugees is unfair, it remains unclear how best to reform it. Using the post-1975 Southeast Asian refugee crisis that affected Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia as an illustrative case, I find that neighboring countries tended to host far more than their fair share while the countries that should have contributed the most generally failed to host their fair share. This findi (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Alexander Thompson (Committee Co-Chair); Benjamin McKean (Committee Member); Alexander Wendt (Committee Co-Chair) Subjects: International Relations; Political Science