MA, Kent State University, 2012, College of Arts and Sciences / Department of Philosophy
This thesis reveals that Nietzsche is primarily a biological determinist, and although Nietzsche uses “freedom” terminology throughout his corpus, Nietzsche's revisionary conception of “freedom” not only accommodates his determinism, it requires it. The thesis begins by detailing Nietzsche's unique naturalistic approach — his “Hermeneutics of Suspicion” — which states that all conscious phenomena (i.e. actions, beliefs, morality) are derivatives of underlying physiological forces that we are neither aware of nor able to control. Next, it outlines how Nietzsche's hermeneutical approach undercuts the three descriptive components that are necessary for traditional notions of morality to exist — namely: free will, a stable/transparent “self,” and an essentially similar human “nature.” In doing so, the thesis demonstrates that traditional notions of “freedom” are illusory and turns its attention to the revisionary type of “freedom” Nietzsche actually affirms. Ironically, Nietzsche's notion of “freedom” actually rests upon his biological determinism because, according to Nietzsche, freedom is an ascent to fate — amor fati! Freedom is possible only for the rare higher types who are capable of overcoming the constraints and guilt imposed on them by traditional morality to fully express their unique biological and psychological dispositions. As such, Nietzsche's life task is to alert the nascent higher types to the real genealogy of values in order to free them from the impositions of morality, thereby clearing a path for their ascent to greatness.
Committee: Gene Pendleton (Advisor); David Odell-Scott (Committee Member); Linda Williams (Committee Member); Jennifer Larson (Committee Member)
Subjects: Philosophy