Master of Arts (MA), Ohio University, 2016, Philosophy (Arts and Sciences)

In this thesis the problem to be confronted concerns the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC) as understood by Aristotle in his Metaphysics (Gamma). For over a hundred years scholars have been questioning Aristotle's defense of the principle, and whether he succeeded in defending or demonstrating the veracity of the principle. One such scholar is Graham Priest (1998), who thinks that Aristotle's arguments are not only unsuccessful at demonstrating PNC, but they also do not provide any arguments against (A) Dialetheism or (B) Trivialism. Priest concludes with a positive thesis (C) that Aristotle's arguments do show that trivialism must be rejected. Thesis (A) is countered by a conception of contradiction that is formed from original Aristotelian texts and Alan Code (1987). Thesis (B) is countered by the same conception of contradiction, and three of Aristotle's own refutations. All of this is done in an effort to show that Aristotle established more than merely thesis (C).

Committee: Donald Carson (Committee Chair); James Petrik (Committee Member); Yoichi Ishida (Committee Member) Subjects: Logic; Philosophy