Master of Arts, The Ohio State University, 2024, Bioethics

From Aristotle to Engelhardt, philosophers and ethicists have struggled to find epistemic justification for a single set of provable and canonical content-full ethics to guide the moral decision making of the individual and nation-state alike. Where those such as Beauchamp and Childress in their account of Principlism presume something of a Rawlsian ‘common morality,' others such as H. Tristram Engelhardt Jr. argue that we may not take for granted even the simplest of presumptions regarding good and right moral action without either begging the question, arbitrarily affirming a particular point of departure, or invoking an infinite regress (Engelhardt ix, Beauchamp and Childress 3-5, 444-457). Herein, I aim to accomplish two purposes. First, I mean to call out the elephant in the room: If there is no God; if there is no creator or creators; if there is no higher transcendent purpose or meaning behind existence or ultimate judgement for our actions, then truly there is no absolute right or wrong. The Enlightenment Project has failed, and will necessarily fail to find a single set of provable canonical content-full ethics (Engelhardt vii). Second, I will propose a conceptual conjecture to assist with the consideration of this dilemma which I call A Priori's Wager. I propose that the human person is necessarily either the product of a creator or creators, and therefore possessing of a priori pre-existent purpose and meaning; or that the human person is the product of mere time and chance, and therefore possessing of only the post hoc purposes and meanings which we arbitrarily apply to ourselves. I argue that either of these premises may be true, but that the current scientific and philosophical methodologies available to us may neither prove nor disprove either premise. Given these competing premises of which one is necessarily true, but neither may be proven, I argue that we find ourselves fixed in something of a superposition of both transcendent obligati (open full item for complete abstract)

Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.), Bowling Green State University, 2023, Philosophy, Applied

This dissertation explores the intersection of epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics. Specifically, it covers ground where these fields overlap in such a way that special interdisciplinary attention is required. Chapter I discusses the notion of epistemic harm within the epistemic injustice literature and argues that we should abandon the notion of epistemic harm in order to strengthen our notion of epistemic injustice. Chapter II continues to explore the intersection of epistemology and ethics and offers a refinement of the recent literature on epistemic trespassing, arguing that we need not limit our conception of epistemic trespassing to be a wrong perpetrated only by experts. Chapter III operates a broader level and argues for limitation on closed epistemic communities, that is, discursive communities who limit their membership in public fora. I argue that the meta level discourse on who is properly part of such groups cannot be constrained by what I call the Stay In You Lane (SIYL) Norm. Finally, in Chapter IV, using Chapter III as requiring engagement with trans-exclusionary feminism, I argue that traditional approaches to the question of trans policy, which attempt to resolve the question via an account of the metaphysics of gender, are misguided and that an ethics first approach yields a clear requirement for trans inclusive social policies.

BS, Kent State University, 2020, College of Communication and Information / School of Media and Journalism

In this paper, I seek to bring epistemic principles, namely, epistemic justification, to the forefront of the discussion of journalistic best-practices. The goal is threefold: first, to examine contemporary views of best practices in the journalism industry using previous survey data and research papers on the subject; second, to provide a brief overview of some (but not all) epistemological principles relevant to the topic; third, to argue that epistemology would be the best starting point for developing or adopting best practices in the journalism industry (with a particular focus on reliabilism and virtue epistemology). The goal is to set the stage for, if not the development of a new theory that places greater emphasis on our approach to the concepts of knowledge, belief, and justification in an industry that deals in propositions as a commodity, further recognition and application of epistemological principles as an important component of journalistic best practices and journalism studies for future industry members.

Master of Arts (MA), Ohio University, 2020, Philosophy (Arts and Sciences)

This paper attempts to answer a theoretical question: How can ordinary people reliably gain knowledge from an epistemic system—a social system designed to have knowledge—whose interests may not align with theirs? I begin by constructing a model in which ordinary people attempt to gain knowledge from an epistemic system. I argue that people can gain knowledge from an epistemic system, but this possibility depends on the level of trust people have in the epistemic system. I then modify the model to represent the epistemic relationship between ordinary people and epistemic systems in a minimally-democratic society. I argue that a democratic society requires that its citizens be able to access knowledge within public epistemic systems, insofar as that knowledge is necessary for informed, critical thinking about important public matters. I conclude by pointing out how distrust between epistemic systems can prevent the required distribution of knowledge to ordinary people.

Ph.D., Antioch University, 2019, Leadership and Change

This dissertation investigates the potential of linking intersectionality and leadership theories utilizing a theoretical bricolage research strategy. In order to explore a theoretical merger between these two disparate disciples warrants a preliminary understanding of how the production of knowledge has constructed a long-standing epistemic bias against marginalized perspectives. This analysis will seek to illustrate how androcentrism pervades the corpus of intellectual thought and the resulting impact which extends beyond the traditional canon of epistemology to the field of leadership. Intrinsic to this analysis will be an exploration of social identity and how it interacts with larger social environmental factors such as power, privilege, and the nominal integration of intersectionality within leadership studies. This level of analysis will be used to construct a conceptual framework connecting the constructs of complexity, interdisciplinarity, epistemology, and oppression. Beyond exploring this theoretical merger, this examination will consider how an intersectional understanding of identity development can expand the epistemology of leadership theory. This dissertation is available in open access at AURA: Antioch University Repository and Archive, http://aura.antioch.edu/ and OhioLINK ETD Center, https://etd.ohiolink.edu/

Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.), Bowling Green State University, 2018, Philosophy, Applied

We all say that certain moral views – true or false, agreed to or not – are reasonable, rational or justified. When we say this, we mean, roughly, that the agent who has come to these views has answered her ethical questions in a responsible way and that her beliefs are defensible from her own perspective. Whether or not these beliefs turn out true, they have some epistemic merit. This work is an investigation into that notion of epistemic merit. It asks, "What makes a moral belief justified?"

PhD, University of Cincinnati, 2003, Arts and Sciences : Philosophy

My dissertation is an examination of the intersections between epistemology, philosophy of science, and feminist theory. Feminist philosophy of science creates new and valuable ways of looking at the sciences by using gender as a category of analysis, or a lens through which to critically assess and constructively build projects in science, as well as in the philosophy of science. I employ feminist philosophy of science and a gendered lens in particular to examine the computing sciences. Starting specifically from the underrepresentation of women in computing, the project creates a platform for exploring the dimensions and contributions of feminist philosophy of science. This is not merely a critique of philosophy of science or a feminist review of computing, but a positive project in its own right, examining the epistemological structure of scientific inquiry, including the nature of objectivity, epistemic agency and the composition of an epistemic community, the importance of those epistemic communities, and the role of values in science. A central tenet of the work is that objectivity in science does not require leaving personal and political commitments at the lab door, but that social, ethical, cultural, and other values play a foundational epistemological role in science. Using gender as a lens uncovers some of those values for critical evaluation. This is not to deny the importance of the natural, empirical world in science. I argue that a philosophical position must at minimum account for our actual relationships-emotional, embodied, social, etc.-in the world and their impact on our theorizing and that dismissing the embodied experience of scientists results in a diminished understanding of the world in addition to diminished epistemological theories.

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2006, Philosophy

The central question of this dissertation is whether we are justified in believing in the existence of abstract mathematical objects. In Part I, I provide an in-depth examination and criticism of the most popular argument for the justifiability of believing in the existence of mathematical objects, the Quine-Putnam Indispensability Argument. I argue that the naturalistic basis for the argument not only depends essentially upon an untenable form of radical confirmational holism, but is ultimately self-undermining. In Part II, I examine the most popular argument for the unjustifiability of believing in the existence of abstract mathematical objects, Field's Inexplicability Argument. I argue that not only does the argument ignore contemporary epistemological theories of justified belief and knowledge, but that the justificatory constraint that it suggests is implausible and open to general counterexample. Thus, in Parts I and II, I show that the most popular arguments for and against the justifiability of believing in the existence of abstract mathematical objects rest upon untenable epistemological theories. In Part III, I develop a new epistemological approach to justified belief, validationism. I argue that a validationist constraint on justified belief provides the minimal internalist condition that is needed for being justified and having knowledge. According to validationism, being justified requires one to have “validated” the reliability of the source of one's belief through regular comparison of the output of that source with the output of other established sources. Not only does this approach allow us account for our most fundamental epistemic intuitions, but it helps to explain why justified true beliefs are so valuable. In the end, I apply the validationist approach to the case of mathematics and argue that belief in the existence of abstract mathematical objects cannot be justified.

Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.), Bowling Green State University, 2006, American Culture Studies/Sociology

The Sociological Hitch focuses on my experiences in and related to higher education. I examine other major social institutions, such as work, law enforcement, and family. My major objective in the study is to offer a socially poignant testimony through the utilization of the auto-ethnographic method. The work of the classical Sociologist C. Wright Mills inspires the undertaking, namely Mills's notion of the Sociological Imagination. Feminist theory, and its experiential epistemology, in conjunction with New Left ideas about power, influences the scope of the study. Beyond the use of Mills, feminism, and Leftist social thought, I utilize auto-ethnographic materials and essays pertaining to auto-ethnography as a distinct methodology. The major method I employ is auto-ethnography, which involves the disclosure of personal experiences in the aforementionedinstitutions with a focus on higher education. Self-disclosure of direct experience, coupled with extended narration and reflection achieve a detailed account of a specific subjectivity. Through my subjectivity emerges an intrinsic social critique. In addition to the major method of auto-ethnography, The Sociological Hitch likewise employs open-ended interviews with thirteen interviewees. Through these interviews, I explore and investigate experiences interviewees had with social institutions, namely the aforementioned higher education, work, law enforcement, and family. The interviews reinforce my subjectivity and provide context for the social milieu under consideration. Analysis of the interviews in light of the auto-ethnography generate the findings that: 1) Biography confirms socio-structural reality, 2) Police, family, school, and work reproduce Society, and 3) Social problems translate into material problems. The major underlying conclusion The Sociological Hitch resonates the work of C. Wright Mills by declaring that assumed personal problems ought to prompt consequential social action.

Ed.D., Antioch University, 2025, Education

The persistent health disparities faced by Black, Indigenous, and People of Color (BIPOC) in the United States are deeply rooted in systemic racism embedded within medical education and clinical practice. Historical acceptance of racial supremacy in the United States has shaped both the foundations and continued practices of medical education, leading to entrenched biases that affect healthcare delivery and patient outcomes. This dissertation critically examines the intersection of race, education, and health by analyzing how historical and contemporary understandings of race and ethnicity shape medical curricula, healthcare practices, and patient care. Through the integration of Critical Race Theory (CRT), Social Cognitive Theory (SCT), and ScT, this study deconstructs racialized knowledge systems in medicine and examines their impact on health equity. CRT provides a lens to analyze how systemic racism is embedded within medical education and practice, illuminating the ways racial bias is institutionalized and perpetuated in healthcare structures. SCT contributes by exploring how individuals internalize societal norms and beliefs, which influence the attitudes and behaviors of both medical practitioners and patients. Finally, ScT emphasizes the role of social networks and relationships, highlighting how disparities in access to healthcare resources and support systems affect health outcomes in marginalized communities. Together, these theories offer a comprehensive framework for understanding the layered and interconnected influences of race, education, and healthcare, guiding the study's aim to challenge and dismantle biased practices within medical training and clinical care. Chapters I and II introduce the research problem and establish a comprehensive foundation, outlining key theoretical frameworks—CRT, SCT, and ScT—while exploring the historical roots of racialized practices in medicine, including the legacy of unethical experimentation and the Flexner Report (open full item for complete abstract)

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2024, English

Knowledge-Making in Early Modern Englishwomen's Literary Writings, 1570-1650 investigates early modern Englishwomen's exploration of scientific ideas and epistemological inquiries in several literary forms, arguing that their chosen literary conventions significantly influenced their epistemic exploration of science, and vice versa. The literary works of Englishwomen writers, rich with valuable scientific insights, have often been neglected in the field, and their contributions have yet to be fully integrated into the canon of English scientific history. In this dissertation, I rectify the historical oversight regarding Englishwomen's contributions by demonstrating their active participation in scientific and epistemological thinking of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries through their literary productions. This dissertation analyzes four literary works from the 1570s to the 1650s: Isabella Whitney's anthology A Sweet Nosegay (1573), Elizabeth Cary's closet drama The Tragedy of Mariam (1613), Lady Mary Wroth's prose romance The Countess of Montgomery's Urania (1621), and Hester Pulter's poetry collection Poems Breathed Forth by the Noble Hadassa (1640s-50s). I trace how these women writers deployed and reshaped epistemological inquiry to suit their creative endeavors, which reveals that literary forms served as vehicles for their investigation of scientific epistemologies, actively contributing to the scientific conversations of their time. Women writers critiqued, reinterpreted, and navigated theoretical knowledge, demonstrating a dynamic intersection between science, literature, and cultural narrative. In this way, literary forms provided these women with the means to question and reshape prevailing knowledge systems, offering diverse perspectives that are essential for fully historicizing women's knowledge-making in the early modern period. My project ultimately challenges the idea that science and art exist separately and highlights how creative and intellec (open full item for complete abstract)

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2024, Philosophy

This dissertation argues for a moderate view of the value or significance of reflection in epistemology. I arrive at the moderate view by arguing for the following three theses: (I) reflection cannot supply a genuine agential explanation of epistemic normativity; (II) extant empirically informed arguments fail to undermine the reliability and epistemic value of reflection; (III) reflection is an essential component of wisdom, and we can come to appreciate the distinctive social value of reflection by paying attention to its connection with wisdom. Chapter 1 introduces the background of the project. I explain what I mean by reflection. Then, I briefly describe the dialectical situation: in contemporary analytic philosophy, philosophers have taken extreme views on the significance of reflection in epistemology. This background is necessary for appreciating how the arguments in my dissertation cumulatively advance the epistemological literature on reflection by carving out a moderate position on the value of reflection. Finally, I provide summaries of individual chapters and indicate what role each chapter is playing in the overall argument of this dissertation. Chapter 2 argues that reflection does not supply us a genuine concept of epistemic agency, and it does not supply a genuine agential explanation of epistemic normativity. To be clear, this chapter has a broader target: it argues against epistemic agency and against an agential explanation of epistemic normativity. Prominent proposals about epistemic iii agency cash the idea out in terms of voluntary agency, reasons-responsiveness (in both its reflective and unreflective variants), or judgment. I show that each of these proposals faces the following dilemma: either the proposal fails to capture any genuine concept of agency, or it fails to adequately capture the class of items that are governed by epistemic norms. Chapter 3 argues that Hilary Kornblith's recent empirically grounded (open full item for complete abstract)

MA, Kent State University, 2023, College of Arts and Sciences / Department of Philosophy

This thesis will assess whether Laurence BonJour's foundationalism is a viable internalist theory of epistemic justification. BonJour's view seems to require a higher order awareness that the content of a basic belief accurately describes what is empirically given. One worry is that an analogue of Sellars' dilemma will arise with respect to this higher order state. A related concern is that such higher order states may not always be reliable. Where they are not reliable, it is hard to see how the basic belief would be epistemically justified. A similar concern arises with respect to non-basic beliefs. Only beliefs that follow from justified beliefs via objectively truth conducive inferences will be inferentially justified. However, whether or not a given inference is objectively truth conducive is a matter external to the agent. As such, it is difficult to see how a purely internalist view can account for the epistemic justification of non-basic beliefs.

Master of Arts (MA), Ohio University, 2023, Philosophy (Arts and Sciences)

In the meta-ethical debates about moral knowledge, there are many theoretical positions to consider. If one is to have an account of moral knowledge, that will inevitably be affected by how one thinks about knowledge in general. I will be transferring a general theory of knowledge and epistemic justification to the more specific domain of ethics, through the lens of epistemic fallibilism. My goal, in applying this epistemic framework to moral discourse, is to outline how moral fallibilism (my theory) can provide a unique and attractive account of moral knowledge. I will accomplish the application of epistemology to ethical theory by implementing Stewart Cohen's account of fallibilism (with its central notion of “relevance”), and by highlighting the aim and position of moral fallibilism by contrasting it with Mackie's error theory. Finally, I will illustrate moral fallibilism by applying it to contemporary moral concerns; the debate about abortion, in particular. Ultimately, I propose a fresh theory of moral knowledge that emphasizes the varying degrees of justification for our ethical beliefs while defending, at the same time, a moderate account of moral objectivity.

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2022, Political Science

Liberalism has traditionally been suspicious of considering the concept of care as a political principle fit for the public realm. Against this current, I propose a Liberalism with Care (LWC) where liberalism and care ethics lie in a complementary relationship. A liberalism that ignores the place of care in political life falls victim to two immanent critiques, of liberal subjectivity and liberal understanding. I argue that liberalism can best respond to these critiques by incorporating a principle of care which is a synthesis of care ethics and Dewey's affective epistemology. To locate a latent commitment to care in the liberal canon, I present a novel reading of John Stuart Mill's Utilitarianism and his collected works where I argue that a commitment to the cultivation of caring characters is a linchpin of his liberal utilitarianism. Mill's caring liberal utilitarianism also reveals the dangers of scaling up care to the public realm, and I consider reasons for why contemporary liberalism would rather prefer the concept of civic friendship than care as a political principle. I conclude that LWC dispels these concerns and better addresses the problems of liberalism than liberal skeptics often assume. Finally, I consider how our understanding of intersubjective boundaries can be reimagined into a caring view of boundaries. Considering two political events, one in South Korea and one in Nevada, I argue that the caring view of boundaries helps us avoid the unsatisfying features of existing accounts.

Ph.D., Antioch University, 2021, Leadership and Change

Womanism is a term curated by Alice Walker (2004) that centers Black women's lived experiences, past and present, encouraging Black women to no longer look to others for their liberation (Floyd-Thomas, 2006). Soul 2 Soul Sister's Facing Racism program is facilitated by Womanist instructors, who work with groups of mostly white people to address anti-Black racism. This qualitative study explored the experiences of white participants who took part in this program, Facing Racism, which holds Womanism as its central guiding principle. Although pre- and post-surveys were routinely conducted over the years about participants' experiences with Facing Racism, this study sought to take a deep dive using Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis to understand how the white participants made sense of the Facing Racism experience and the longer-term outcomes it promoted in addressing and ending anti-Black racism. The interpretive phenomenological analysis explored the experiences of white people who completed the Facing Racism program. Eight white participants were interviewed using open-ended questions. The key findings of the study included: a) indications of the transforming impact of Womanist and intergroup dialogue in anti-racism work, b) revelations of the preconceptions and biases antithetical to ending anti-Black racism that participants brought with them, c) an affirmation of anti-racism work that works beyond the intellect and the importance of heart and gut/soul work, and d) the identification of racial justice work as life-long work. The key contributions include: a) the verification of a Womanist epistemology as an effective means to address anti-Black racism, b) the value of Womanist ethos in conducting anti-Black racism work centering Black women and Black experiences, c) the introduction and nomenclature of a love-based revolution to address and eradicate anti-Black racism, d) identification of ways for white people to dismantle white supremacy (open full item for complete abstract)

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2021, Philosophy

The constitutive principles approach to scientific theories attempts to identify particular principles within science that serve unique roles in justifying or making possible the success of novel theories. The three essays that make up the bulk of this dissertation attempt to approach the topic of the constitutive a priori from various, previously unexplored angles. The first chapter extends the discussion of the constitutive a priori to a new area of contemporary physics – statistical mechanics. The Past Hypothesis is the claim that the universe came into being in a very low entropy state, and this hypothesis plays a major role in nearly all contemporary philosophical accounts of statistical mechanics. This chapter argues that the Past Hypothesis is best seen as a constitutive principle of statistical mechanics, and that this identification can help shed light on how the Past Hypothesis might be justified, given well-known problems regarding its confirmation. The second chapter updates the existing literature on constitutive a priori principles with a discussion of contemporary historical work on Newton and the scientific method of the Principia. It argues that this new work puts novel constraints on theories of constitutive principles. In particular, Newton's evidential strategies in the Principia must be captured by any constitutive principles account of the laws of motion. Finally, the third chapter investigates the constitutive a priori in the context of historical epistemology, a tradition within philosophy of science focused on the role of local, historical conditions on the success of the sciences. This chapter argues that critiquing the constitutive principles approach from the perspective of historical epistemology allows us to diagnose some of the faults in existing constitutive principles approaches, and points the way to an improved, revised conception. The overarching lessons of this dissertation are three-fold. First, the constitutive princip (open full item for complete abstract)

Master of Arts (MA), Ohio University, 2021, Philosophy (Arts and Sciences)

This paper responds to Jason Brennan's prominent critique of democracy. Brennan argues that the average citizen is ignorant and irrational, and votes incompetently, exercising illegitimate authority over her neighbors, thereby violating their right against subjection to incompetent government. He concludes that society should replace democracy with epistocracy; the rule of the educated. After clarifying the requirements of Brennan's proposal, I present two lines of defense for democratic theorists, both compatible with the competence principle at the heart of Brennan's argument. First, democracy can satisfy the standards of competence proposed by Brennan through institutional changes. And second, epistocracy falls short of its own epistemic standards by excluding voters, despite the place of voters in the division of political labor. I conclude that Brennan's argument does not undermine democracy's legitimacy, and in fact speaks against his epistocratic alternative.

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), Ohio University, 2021, Journalism (Communication)

This dissertation will utilize trauma scholarship and feminist standpoint theory as frameworks for understanding how women's accounts of gender-based violence have been—and continue to be—un- and under-valued by (and in) the media, culture, and society. The broad goal of this critical cultural and historical study is to 1) name, identify, and classify a phenomenon known as the first-person industrial complex; 2) examine the phenomenon's history; 3) identify systemic barriers to the phenomenon's elimination, including legal and ethical considerations; and 4) encourage others to partake in similar research and writing, and see their own stories of gender-based violence as valuable. Thus, this dissertation will examine the various flashpoints of women's first-person writing that have contributed to today's digital media landscape and will trace the history of the first-person industrial complex through primary documents containing such writing, including newspapers, magazines and digital media outlets. This work will draw from archival sources in order to trace the history of this phenomenon from 1841 to the present utilizing critical discourse analysis; will include qualitative analyses of legal and ethical structures that keep women's stories from being shared in an equitable way; and will conclude with a normative critique of the current landscape, offering potential solutions and new possibilities for research in this area.

BA, Oberlin College, 2021, Philosophy

Stereotypes are both acknowledged as harmful and harmless within current colloquial discussion. They can foster racist beliefs but are generally assumed to be false and irrelevant. Philosophy can provide valuable discourse for critically analyzing the function and subsequent harm of stereotypes. I follow general discourse on stereotypes within Epistemology by rejecting that all stereotypes should be assumed false. I explore an alternative reason to reject stereotypes by delineating the specific epistemic harm that stereotypes and stereotype-adjacent beliefs can enact not only on others, but on society at large. I compare various philosophical arguments that could dismantle stereotypes and reduce the potential harm that they enact. This thesis serves as a motivation for antiracist teachings founded on philosophical thought.