Master of Fine Arts, The Ohio State University, 2020, Design

In the public sector context, the use of participatory design methods such as codesign approaches have gained momentum since the beginning of the 21st century (Donetto et al., 2015; Steen et al., 2011). Many decision-makers see codesign as an opportunity to make the development of public services and policies more democratic, as this approach involves citizens in the design process. Codesign activities enable ordinary citizens to communicate their complex realities, thereby allowing the development of solutions that are better adapted to their needs (Blomkamp, 2018). However, the epistemic value provided by participants still needs to be effectively communicated to the designers and project sponsors to ensure a democratic codesign process (Aitamurto & Chen, 2017). In codesign activities, the synthesis and translation of the concepts that are proposed during plenary and wrap-up sessions can be problematic. For instance, ideas generated by a codesign team may be presented by a single team representative, who is often chosen for being the individual most comfortable speaking for the group. While this participant's account of the group's codesign outcomes is valid, it remains a single perspective; a single team representative may not reasonably represent the vision of all members of the group. Therefore, some ideas and nuances may inevitably be lost. Importantly, the ideas that are left out often come from more vulnerable participants, including minorities and those who have difficulty expressing their ideas in a conventional way (Richard Ferroudji, 2011; Proulx & Gauthier, 2014). To understand and address the problems surrounding this residual data, this research project presents and analyses the outcomes from a plenary session of a codesign activity organized at a public library in Montreal North, a disadvantaged borough of Montreal. This process examines the ideas and nuances presented by different participants through the presentations during the plenary sessi (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Sébastien Proulx Ph.D. (Advisor); Proulx Gauthier Ph.D. (Committee Member); Jeffrey Haase M.Arch (Committee Member); Jason Reece Ph.D. (Committee Member) Subjects: Design

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2024, Philosophy

This dissertation argues for a moderate view of the value or significance of reflection in epistemology. I arrive at the moderate view by arguing for the following three theses: (I) reflection cannot supply a genuine agential explanation of epistemic normativity; (II) extant empirically informed arguments fail to undermine the reliability and epistemic value of reflection; (III) reflection is an essential component of wisdom, and we can come to appreciate the distinctive social value of reflection by paying attention to its connection with wisdom. Chapter 1 introduces the background of the project. I explain what I mean by reflection. Then, I briefly describe the dialectical situation: in contemporary analytic philosophy, philosophers have taken extreme views on the significance of reflection in epistemology. This background is necessary for appreciating how the arguments in my dissertation cumulatively advance the epistemological literature on reflection by carving out a moderate position on the value of reflection. Finally, I provide summaries of individual chapters and indicate what role each chapter is playing in the overall argument of this dissertation. Chapter 2 argues that reflection does not supply us a genuine concept of epistemic agency, and it does not supply a genuine agential explanation of epistemic normativity. To be clear, this chapter has a broader target: it argues against epistemic agency and against an agential explanation of epistemic normativity. Prominent proposals about epistemic iii agency cash the idea out in terms of voluntary agency, reasons-responsiveness (in both its reflective and unreflective variants), or judgment. I show that each of these proposals faces the following dilemma: either the proposal fails to capture any genuine concept of agency, or it fails to adequately capture the class of items that are governed by epistemic norms. Chapter 3 argues that Hilary Kornblith's recent empirically grounded (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Declan Smithies (Advisor); Hilary Kornblith (Committee Member); Abraham Roth (Committee Member); Tristram McPherson (Committee Member) Subjects: Philosophy