The early twenty-first century zeitgeist has been characterized by a cultural and corporate fascination with leveraging mind-body practices such as meditation and yoga as tools for professional performance. At the same time, executive coaches trained in body-mind approaches to coaching make strong but as-yet unsubstantiated claims about the transformative power of body-based behavioral learning. Practitioner literature suggests that developing embodied self-awareness (ESA) enhances well-being, resilience, and relationships while building the emotional and social intelligence (ESI) that sets outstanding leaders apart from ordinary ones. These claims are consistent with theoretical relationships between brain, body, and behavior, but they have yet to be put to the empirical test. This mixed methods research project seeks to challenge, clarify, and validate these claims by examining the antecedents and outcomes of embodied self-awareness through both a theoretical and an empirical lens. Starting with a qualitative study based on critical incident interviews and thematic analysis, the research proceeds to gather survey-based data from over 550 professional coaches about their experience of embodied self-awareness, its potential outcomes, and the activities likely to produce it. Using factor analysis and structural equation modeling, results show that ESA has strong and significant effects on all dependent variables tested and that ESA can be cultivated through multiple avenues, including body-oriented coach training, yoga, meditation, and hands-on bodywork. Ultimately, by triangulating across methods and studies three convergent conclusions emerge: (1) Body-oriented coach training appears to have stronger effects on ESA than more commonly practiced pursuits such as yoga, mindfulness, and bodywork; (2) Developing ESA strengthens one's capacity for resilience, adaptability, and flourishing; and (3) ESA builds interpersonal competencies including empathy, connectedne (open full item for complete abstract)

Jakob von Uexkull (1864-1944) was a German-speaking biologist who emphasized that animals are not just complex machines but living subjects who each experience a world of their own. Uexkull called these worlds Umwelten, and this concept lies at the heart of a broad and positive reception of Uexkull's thought in French and German philosophy of the 20th century, and more recently in the philosophy of embodied cognitive science. Despite their diverse philosophical views, these readers of Uexkull all disagree with him on one crucial point: They deny Uexkull's claim that each individual human lives in their own private, closed Umwelt. I show that Uexkull uses the term Umwelt in two distinct senses: The phenomenal Umwelt, or p-Umwelt, describes the world given in subjective experience from the first-person perspective, while the ethological Umwelt, or e-Umwelt, describes the world of the animal as observed and described by an external observer from the third-person perspective. This distinction allows me to give a more precise account of the positions in the debate about open or closed Umwelten. Whether an e-Umwelt is described as open or closed is a methodological choice depending on one's explanatory project. In contrast, p-Umwelten are closed if subjective experience is always fundamentally private and open if it is not. Based on this distinction I argue that Umwelt cannot bridge the gap between ‘objectivist' ecological psychology and ‘subjectivist' enactivism, since this gap also separates e-Umwelt from p-Umwelt. On the question about the metaphysics of subjective experience, I discuss an enactive account of intersubjectivity that involves the sharing of experience in a strong sense and argue that an alternative account of intersubjectivity without strong sharing is both possible and preferable under some criteria for theory choice.

This dissertation aims to contribute to, and expand upon, two emergent movements in philosophy and cognitive science. The first is the move in the Western world to study non-Western and non-canonical philosophical traditions in a comparative and cross-cultural context. The second is the shift in contemporary cognitive science toward phenomenological approaches in embodied cognition, including 4E (embodied, enacted, extended, & embedded) cognition, ecological psychology, distributed languaging, and enactivism. This intersection promises to be especially fruitful because it is relatively unexplored, there is resonance between the many perspectives of embodiment around the world and problems faced by each movement are complementary. Instead of looking to this work for a single path, it should be understood as an invitation to consider how each tradition fits within the same world and then to reconsider our places within it. This project begins with the converging paths of nondualism in embodied cognitive science and Japanese philosophy before exploring three examples of fusion philosophy - an approach to comparative philosophy where emphasis is placed on mutual consideration and creating a new view by bringing distinct traditions together. The overall goal of the project is to demonstrate how the consideration of Japanese, Indian, and Buddhist philosophies and contemporary approaches in embodied cognitive science can be mutually beneficial. Chapter 1 engages with challenges that both fusion philosophy and embodied cognitive science face to invite us to consider the world and our relation to it differently. Chapter 2 is narrowly focused on the fusion of Chemero's Affordances 2.0 with the apoha theory of the Buddhist epistemologist Ratnakirti (11th Century). This narrow focus creates a space to explore the parallel work of Thompson (2021) that fuses the apoha theory of Dharmakirti with the enactive approach. One goal of this chapter is to pave the way fo (open full item for complete abstract)

Degree of hand preference is a robust indication of corpus callosum size, with individuals whose hand preference varies (called inconsistent-handers, or ICHs)typically having larger corpora callosa than individuals that prefer to use the same hand for most or all tasks (called consistent-handers, or CHs).A larger corpus callosum gives ICHs advantages on tasks that require the integration of information between the two hemispheres of the brain but is detrimental to their performance on tasks that require separation between the hemispheres. Thus, degree of hand preference is a trait variable that can explain individual differences in cognition. One's bodily posture affects cerebral activation, thereby producing cognitive changes as well. Cerebral activation largely favors the left hemisphere when seated; when standing, though, cerebral activity becomes more symmetrical and increases overall. Standing generally facilitates performance on tasks that require access to right-hemisphere processes or integration of information between the hemispheres. The present research aimed to examine the individual and interactive effects of handedness ad bodily posture on cognitive flexibility. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants were assigned to either sit or stand while performing tasks intended to measure cognitive flexibility. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with several ambiguous images and clicked the screen each time their perception of the image changed. In Experiment 2,participants read either a strong or weak argument in favor of comprehensive senior exit exams. No significant effects of handedness of posture emerged. Methodological considerations and limitations are discussed.

Scientists often gain insight into real-world phenomena indirectly, through building and manipulating models. But what accounts for the epistemic import of model-based research? Why can scientists learn about real-world systems (such as the global climate or biological populations) by interacting not with the real-world systems themselves, but with computer simulations and mathematical equations? The traditional answer is that models teach us about certain real-world phenomena because they represent those phenomena. My dissertation challenges this representationalist intuition and provides an alternative framework for making sense of scientific modeling. The philosophical debate about scientific model-based representation has, by and large, proceeded in isolation from the debate about mental representation in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Chapter one exposes and challenges this anti-psychologism. Drawing from "wide computationalist" embodied cognitive science research, I put forward an account of scientific models as socially-distributed and materially-extended mental representations. This account illustrates how views on mental representation can help advance philosophical understanding of scientific representation, while raising the question of how other views from (embodied) cognitive science might inform philosophical theorizing about scientific modeling. Chapter two argues that representationalism is untenable because it relies on ontological and epistemological assumptions that undermine one another no matter the theory of representation adopted. Views of scientific representation as mind-independent fail with the ontological claim that "models represent their targets" and thereby undermine the epistemological claim that "we learn from models because they represent their targets." On the other hand, views of scientific representation as mind-dependent support the ontological claim, but they do so in a way that also undermines the epistemolog (open full item for complete abstract)

I will tell you a story. A story that is also a theory. A story of embodied cognition that is as well a story of neuroscience. A story about perception, action, and other psychological events. A story about the role of the brain in these events. A story of resonance and an ecological cognitive architecture. Ecological psychology, I contend, must be complemented with a story about the role of the CNS in perception, action, and cognition. To arrive at such a story while staying true to the tenets of ecological psychology, it will be necessary to flesh out the central metaphor according to which organisms perceive their environment by resonating to information in energy patterns: what is needed is a theory of resonance. Here I offer the two main elements of such a theory: a framework (Anderson's neural reuse) and a methodology based on behavioral and coordination dynamics. In doing so, I examine the significance of embodiment, the explanatory strategy of ecological psychology, the compatibility of different cognitive architectures and ecological psychology, and the plausibility of resonance both in biological and explanatory terms. Finally, I review some future directions for the research on resonance.

The purpose of this qualitative practitioner research study was to describe middle school algebra students' experiences of learning linear functions through kinesthetic movement. Participants were comprised of 8th grade algebra students. Practitioner research was used because I wanted to improve my teaching so students will have more success in learning mathematics. Since this research focused on the mental constructions made by students as they attempted to make sense of mathematics kinesthetically, it is grounded in the philosophical tenants of constructivism (Piaget & Vygotsky), math representation theory, and kinesthetic movement. This study utilized multiple data sources which included pre-and post-teacher-made assessments with state standardized problems, audio and video transcriptions of class, small group activities, individual discussions, learning style inventory, and attitude survey on kinesthetic learning. Data was collected and analyzed through triangulation. The results of this study have important curricular implications for math educators to understand how students can learn through kinesthetic movements. Educators can support their students learning by incorporating movement into their classrooms. Recommendations for future research based on unanticipated findings are suggested.

This dissertation is a phenomenological account of embodied understanding that is located in the theoretical context of contemporary phenomenology (Dreyfus 1972, 2002, 2007a, 2007b; Kelly 2002; Ratcliffe 2002, 2008, 2015) and phenomenologically-inspired embodied cognition (Varela et al. 1991; Noe 2004, 2012, 2013, 2015; Thompson 2007; Chemero 2009; Rietveld and Kiverstein 2014). This dissertation is a phenomenological account in that I apply the phenomenological method as it has been in particular developed by Martin Heidegger in Being and Time (Heidegger 1962). This means that I provide a careful analysis of phenomena which I then analyze in terms of the conditions of their possibility. This phenomenological account is an account of embodied understanding in that it is only about those forms of understanding that are body-relational. This means that I am concerned here only with those forms of understanding that are responsive to the world in relation to the bodily structures of an agent, her bodily needs and her ability to sense and move. My dissertation identifies and analyzes two central structures of embodied understanding. Embodied understanding is body-relationally spatiotemporally schematic and integrated with affective concern. That embodied understanding is body-relationally spatiotemporally schematic means that embodied understanding exhibits a structure that allows it to be responsive to the experience of a world in space and time that is itself reflective of one's embodied ability to move and sense; i.e. that is reflective of an agent's embodiment (Husserl 1989; Noe 2004; Merleau-Ponty 2012). This responsiveness is possible, since embodied understanding shares characteristics with embodied experience by means of what Kant (1998) called `schemata'; a priori space and time determinations that allow embodied understanding to respond to the spatial and temporal characteristics of experience. That embodied understanding is integrated with affective concerns (open full item for complete abstract)

People who live with a concealable stigmatized identity (CSI) are frequently faced with the decision to share their unique attributes with others. These decisions, however, are sometimes difficult to make because a CSI is an identity that could be socially devaluing if it is made known. For example, revealing a depression diagnosis to an employer may lead to negative perceptions of the individual derived from common stereotypes associated with depression. However, not disclosing one's stigmatized identity may lead the individual to avoid seeking important medical or psychological help in order to keep their identity concealed. Along with mental health disorders, CSI's include a number of different identities such as a history of sexual assault, substance abuse disorder, sexual or gender minority identification, and HIV+ status. While each identity carries with it different degrees of stigmatization, life experiences, and health outcomes, everyone with a CSI shares the experience of decisions associated with the disclosure process. While disclosure, the sharing of personal information with others, is an important aspect of life for well-being and interpersonal relationships, it is crucial that people with a CSI disclose their identity in a way that avoids social rejection or physical harm (e.g., hate crimes). The disclosure process is typically a goal oriented, dyadic conversation in which people who want to disclose anticipate their confidant's reaction and adjust their goals and behaviors in order to gain the desired interpersonal and individual outcomes. Recent theory suggests that these goals arise from the activation of approach or avoidance motivational systems. Approach goals are aimed at achieving positive outcomes such as increased social support, while avoidance goals are interested in avoiding potential negative outcomes including social rejection. According to an embodied cognitive perspective, these different motivations may therefore lead to differen (open full item for complete abstract)

Previous research on embodied cognition suggested that physically disposing as opposed to physically retaining written thoughts results in using those thoughts less when forming attitudes. Accordingly, creating distance between oneself and one's positive thoughts can increase negative attitude evaluations. The focus of this study was to examine whether being mindful of positive thoughts would have similar unintended negative consequences regarding body dissatisfaction. Participants were 198 undergraduate students assigned to one of four conditions: mindfulness, thought disposal, thought protection, or control. After a brief intervention of mindfulness, physically disposing, physically retaining, or spell checking written thoughts, participants completed self-rating measures of body dissatisfaction. Results indicated no effect of intervention condition on measures of body dissatisfaction. Although the results showed that a brief mindfulness induction and physically manipulating positive thoughts did not influence body dissatisfaction ratings, future research may investigate the malleability of specific attitudes. Perhaps attitudes that are yet to be formed on novel topics are more malleable than attitudes that were previously formed on familiar topics.

There is an emphasis in education on teaching using digital media. Research suggests, however, that humans are participators and learning should reflect that. Since gestures have communicative functions, physical observation should lead to increased learning. The purpose of the current research is to determine if the principles of embodied cognition, meaning body-environment interactions that influence the way information is processed, extend to a vicarious experience of learning from an embodied source. Participants were randomly assigned to one condition (Letter-by-letter embodied, Non-letter-by-letter embodied, or Whole word non-embodied) in a between-participants design. First, participants watched words being written (letter-by-letter embodied condition), displayed letter-by-letter (letter-by-letter non-embodied condition), or displayed all at once (whole word non-embodied condition). Next, participants were given distracter tasks. Participants' memory for the words was tested with free recall and word stem completion tasks. The dependent measure was the amount of words correctly recalled. It was hypothesized that those in the letter-by-letter embodied condition would remember more words on both dependent measures. Hypotheses were supported. Possible explanations for results are discussed.

Research in cognitive science demonstrates that enactment is beneficial for encoding new information and retrieving prior knowledge. This study highlights the reciprocal relationship between enactment and prior knowledge as it benefits both teachers and learners. This thesis argues that enactment can be used to gain insight into students' prior knowledge in a way that verbal assessment may not. This thesis also argues that an enacted lesson informed by student prior knowledge will lead to greater learning than an enacted lesson not informed by prior knowledge. Sample lessons of both conditions are included. Results of this study have implications in the fields of education and educational research. This introductory study provides a basis for future studies involving but not limited to the topics of enactment and affect, enactment in learning and enactment in assessing prior knowledge.

Embodied cognition is a theory indicating that thoughts, feelings, actions, and behaviors are grounded in physical experiences. Embodiment suggests that what individuals experience physically translates into a related mental representation of that experience which influences how they react to the world around them (Landau, Keefer, & Meier, 2010). Particularly, recent research in embodiment has attempted to examine the intrapersonal association between physical and cognitive experiences. Much research has examined this phenomenon with regards to judgments or perceptions of acquaintances and strangers, but has not heavily focused on close interpersonal relationships with others. The current research aimed to activate the schema for closeness and assigned individuals to engage in a variety of postures, some ended in a "hug" position and others ended on a neutral position. Then, participants were asked a variety of questions about their feelings of closeness in their intimate relationships. I hypothesized that those ending with a hug posture would rate greater feelings of closeness to others than those who ended on a neutral posture. However, results suggested that the manipulated posture had no significant effects on closeness ratings. It is possible that previous postures primed a logical flow of thought toward shapes which may have interfered with the intended priming effect of the "hug."

Normally functioning humans are able to represent the internal states of others, an ability termed theory of mind. The ability has obvious fitness benefits, ranging from the mundane to the lifesaving, but particulars of how it operates are still debated. Adopting an embodied cognition stance, some authors (e.g., Iacoboni, 2009) have argued that behavioral mimicry, or personally reproducing the observable acts of a social other, may fundamentally underlie our ability to mind-read, yet this contention has received little empirical attention. Accordingly, I tested the hypothesis that mimicry can facilitate judgments of others' internal states, namely their intentions. In Experiment 1, participants viewed videos of an agent reaching toward one of two objects, cut early in the motion so as to leave the ultimately reached-for object ambiguous, and were asked to guess which was to be grasped. Participants who actively engaged their triceps brachii (the same muscle recruited to make reach motions) more accurately judged the intended object of another person. In Experiment 2, participants viewed targets immediately before they ultimately did or did not cooperate in a separate task and were asked to identify which decision they subsequently rendered. Disruption of the zygomaticus major (the muscle recruited for smiling, a signal of pro-social intent) led to impaired performance for noncooperating targets, but had no impact on cooperating ones. These findings provide some evidence of the role of mimicry in understanding the intentions of others and may therefore profit both the mimicry and theory-of-mind literatures. More broadly, it tentatively supports the burgeoning embodied cognition literature and shows that embodiment may have implications for valuable social-perceptual processes.

The perceived heaviness of an object is not perfectly correlated with an object's mass. For example, larger objects are perceived as lighter than smaller objects when mass is held constant (Charpentier, 1891). Both non-visual (i.e., touching or wielding an object out of view) and multimodal (i.e., vision + touch) heaviness perception seem to be related to an object's rotational inertia—the object's resistance to applied wielding torque (e.g., Amazeen & Turvey, 1996; Streit, Shockley, and Riley, 2007). Inertia models have explained instances of non-visual influences of size because for objects of a given mass, rotational inertia necessarily changes with changes in object size. Efforts have been made to understand the role of vision in heaviness perception based on rotational inertia and its corresponding relation to an object's kinematics (i.e., motion) (Streit, 2008; Streit et al., 2007). Streit (2008) discussed the importance of applied wielding torque in the proposed multimodally specified inertia model. Specifically, he looked at visual heaviness perception in which a perceiver's heaviness report was based on watching the wielding motions produced by another actor. Visual perception of others' actions depends on the perceiver's action system and changes online as a perceiver's action capabilities change (see Richardson, Fajen, Shockley, Riley, & Turvey, 2008 for a review). The current study tested the possibility that one's force production capabilities scale visual heaviness reports by having participants estimate the heaviness of visually viewed objects while wielding objects at different frequencies and orientations to vary applied wielding torque. When objects were wielded at a fast frequency in a vertical orientation, the viewed objects appeared heavier than when wielded at slower frequencies in the same orientation. However, no influences of applied wielding torque were found in the horizontal orientation nor as a function of object orientation. These resul (open full item for complete abstract)

How do experts' representations of knowledge differ from novices'? Traditional views suggest that knowledge is represented as a series of propositional codes. Experts' extensive knowledge may simply result in more or stronger codes than novices. However, recent theories suggest knowledge is embodied: Understanding the world arises from previous experiences interacting with the world rather than from links in a semantic network. Thus, expertise may lead to fundamentally different representations of domain information, containing different traces of perceptual and motor information. Building on embodied theories, two experiments examined the type of knowledge supporting novice and expert performance. Experiment 1 asked whether domain knowledge is needed to form embodied representations in ice hockey. Experiment 2 asked whether active football experience, in addition to domain knowledge, is needed to form embodied representations of football-specific action. Results demonstrate that domain knowledge is required. Moreover, motor experience is necessary in forming embodied representations involving domain-specific actions.