Master of Arts, The Ohio State University, 2013, Psychology

People make judgments and decisions differently depending on whether information that prompts these judgments or decisions is presented in a positive or negative light. This bias is known as the framing effect. Previous research has shown that high numeracy, the ability to understand simple mathematical and probabilistic concepts, makes such framing effects smaller, at least when numbers are involved. Here, we test the possibility that this effect of numeracy occurs because the highly numerate convert information presented in one frame to the other frame. We test the conversions by assessing memory for the frame that was not presented after the judgment has been made. We find that memories of the more numerate (as opposed to the less numerate) are consistent with such conversions, and such memories are associated with smaller framing effects. However these results are moderated by a number of factors: whether the percentage is round or precise, what type of judgment is being made, and how the framing effect is measured. We conclude that the conversions may explain at least a part of the relation between numeracy and framing. Further research is necessary to determine why the roundness of the percentage and the judgment being made affect our results.

Committee: Ellen Peters (Advisor); DeKay Michael (Committee Member); De Boeck Paul (Committee Member) Subjects: Cognitive Psychology; Psychology