M.A. (Master of Arts in English), Ohio Dominican University, 2021, English

This paper examines Geoffrey Chaucer's Pardoner's Tale using one of Chaucer's most important sources: Boethius' The Consolation of Philosophy. Chapter one examines Boethius' contributions to philosophy, his contributions to education, and most importantly, his impact on Chaucer's literary art. Chapter one uses Boethius' Consolation to describe the consolatio genre and provides a contrast between authors like Dante, who use similar philosophical material to place judgement, and Chaucer, who uses philosophical material to promote questions instead of answers, shedding light on individual human choice. Chapter two analyzes the effects of Boethius' Consolation on The Pardoner's Tale. It examines Chaucer's translation of the Consolation, reveals the Boethian question addressed in the Tale—what is the outcome of the wicked?—and demonstrates Chaucer's ability to use medieval sermon structure to arrive at consolation. Chapter three surveys a flurry of scholarship surrounding perceptions of the Pardoner's audience and resulting character. This chapter encourages readers to apply a Boethian lens, considering consolation genre in addition to medieval sermon structure in order to ascertain a more contextually complete, and therefore hopeful, view of the Pardoner that is at odds with the predominant view of the character's ultimate fate.

Committee: Jeremy Glazier (Advisor); Martin Brick (Committee Member) Subjects: Literature; Medieval Literature; Philosophy

Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2005, Philosophy

The study of parts and wholes, or mereology, occupies two of the best philosophical minds of twelfth-century Europe, Abelard and Pseudo-Joscelin. But the contributions of Abelard and Pseudo-Joscelin cannot be adequately assessed until we come to terms with the mereological doctrines of the sixth century philosopher Boethius. Apart from providing the general mereological background for the period, Boethius influences Abelard and Pseudo-Joscelin in two crucial respects. First, Boethius all but omits mention of the classical Aristotelian concept of form. Second, Boethius repeatedly highlights a rule which says that if a part is removed, the whole is removed as well. Abelard makes many improvements upon Boethius. His theory of static identity accounts for the relations of sameness and difference that hold between a thing and its part. His theory of identity also provides a solution to the problem of material constitution. With respect to the problem of persistence, Abelard assimilates Boethius' rule and proposes that the loss of any part entails the annihilation of the whole. More precisely, Abelard thinks that the matter of things suffers annihilation upon the gain or loss of even one part. He also holds that many structured wholes, namely artifacts, are strictly dependent upon their parts. Yet Abelard insists that human beings survive a variety of mereological changes. Abelard is silent about objects which are neither artifacts nor persons. I argue that Abelard has the theoretical resources to provide an account of the persistence of these types of object, so long as some forms are ontologically robust. Pseudo-Joscelin rejects the thesis that the removal of any part entails the destruction of the whole. The annihilation of a whole follows only from the removal of essential parts. Pseudo-Joscelin employs two basic principles in his theory of persistence. First, forms and the functions encoded in them play a primary role in identity and persistence. He also makes use of (open full item for complete abstract)

Committee: Tamar Rudavsky (Advisor) Subjects: Philosophy