MA, Kent State University, 2016, College of Arts and Sciences / Department of Philosophy
I focus on the debate between internalists and externalists concerning epistemic justification. A belief is justified when there is a reason why it is likely to be true. Internalists have traditionally interpreted this to mean having conscious access to evidence or good reasons for a belief. Externalists argue that justification is conferred on a belief by virtue of some fact which is (or may be) external to the conscious awareness of an agent, such as the reliability of a belief-forming mechanism in producing true beliefs. Laurence BonJour suggests that we can resolve the debate if we make a distinction between the first-person perspective of a believing agent and the perspective of some third-person assessor. He suggests that internalism is an account of first-person justification and that externalism is an account of third-person justification. I argue that making this distinction does not solve the debate. However, BonJour briefly suggests one important consideration in internalism's favor. I attempt to expand on that suggestion here. The idea is that any time that we want to assert that an agent's belief is externally justified, that claim turns on the fact that we, as the assessors of the epistemic agent, have conscious access to the relevant information that enables us to make a determination about the justification of that agent's beliefs. I conclude that conscious access is an indispensable aspect of epistemic justification.
Committee: Deborah Smith (Advisor); Michael Byron (Committee Member); Polycarp Ikuenobe (Committee Member); Kathryn Kerns (Committee Member)
Subjects: Philosophy