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The Epistemology of Reflection

Ambardekar, Pranav Niranjan
http://orcid.org/0000-0001-8519-7815
http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu17135981895309

Abstract Details

2024, Doctor of Philosophy, Ohio State University, Philosophy.
This dissertation argues for a moderate view of the value or significance of reflection in epistemology. I arrive at the moderate view by arguing for the following three theses: (I) reflection cannot supply a genuine agential explanation of epistemic normativity; (II) extant empirically informed arguments fail to undermine the reliability and epistemic value of reflection; (III) reflection is an essential component of wisdom, and we can come to appreciate the distinctive social value of reflection by paying attention to its connection with wisdom. Chapter 1 introduces the background of the project. I explain what I mean by reflection. Then, I briefly describe the dialectical situation: in contemporary analytic philosophy, philosophers have taken extreme views on the significance of reflection in epistemology. This background is necessary for appreciating how the arguments in my dissertation cumulatively advance the epistemological literature on reflection by carving out a moderate position on the value of reflection. Finally, I provide summaries of individual chapters and indicate what role each chapter is playing in the overall argument of this dissertation. Chapter 2 argues that reflection does not supply us a genuine concept of epistemic agency, and it does not supply a genuine agential explanation of epistemic normativity. To be clear, this chapter has a broader target: it argues against epistemic agency and against an agential explanation of epistemic normativity. Prominent proposals about epistemic iii agency cash the idea out in terms of voluntary agency, reasons-responsiveness (in both its reflective and unreflective variants), or judgment. I show that each of these proposals faces the following dilemma: either the proposal fails to capture any genuine concept of agency, or it fails to adequately capture the class of items that are governed by epistemic norms. Chapter 3 argues that Hilary Kornblith’s recent empirically grounded critique of the epistemic value of reflection fails. I argue that this critique fails even if we concede that (a) the empirical facts are as Kornblith says they are and (b) reliability is the only determinant of epistemic value. The critique fails because it seeks to undermine the reliability of reflection in general but targets only one of its variants, namely individual reflection, while neglecting social reflection. This chapter is written in a concessive spirit: I argue that even if we grant that individual reflection falls prey to the psychological distortions that Kornblith highlights (e.g., introspection failure, implicit bias, motivated reasoning, etc.), we have not been given sufficient evidence to believe that social reflection cannot overcome these distortions. I show that – under a range of conditions – social reflection does better at getting us closer to the truth compared to individual reflection. My analysis provides us prima facie grounds for optimism regarding the reliability of social reflection. Ultimately, then, Kornblith’s critique fails to undermine the epistemic value of reflection in general. Chapter 4 argues that reflection is an essential component of wisdom. The key claim in my argument is that wisdom requires higher-order normative guidance. On a broad conception of practical wisdom, wisdom requires being guided by diverse kinds of normative knowledge relevant to the good life. But this knowledge cannot merely be firstorder knowledge. I argue that wisdom requires certain kinds of self-knowledge, which iv essentially has higher-order content. Without the capacity for reflection, one cannot form or be guided by normative beliefs with higher-order content. Therefore, without the capacity for reflection, one cannot be wise. By paying attention to the connection between reflection and wisdom, we can recognize the distinctive value of reflection, which goes beyond its epistemic value. The distinctive value of reflection has a social dimension. In a nutshell, reflection is socially valuable because it enables the verbal transfer of wisdom. Chapter 5 recaps what I have argued for in this dissertation and concludes by discussing future directions of research.
Declan Smithies (Advisor)
Hilary Kornblith (Committee Member)
Abraham Roth (Committee Member)
Tristram McPherson (Committee Member)
148 p.
Philosophy
Reflection; Higher-order Reasoning; Epistemic Agency; Epistemic Value; Wisdom; Social Epistemology

Recommended Citations

Citations

  • Ambardekar, P. N. (2024). The Epistemology of Reflection [Doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University]. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu17135981895309

    APA Style (7th edition)

  • Ambardekar, Pranav Niranjan. The Epistemology of Reflection. 2024. Ohio State University, Doctoral dissertation. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center, http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu17135981895309.

    MLA Style (8th edition)

  • Ambardekar, Pranav Niranjan. "The Epistemology of Reflection." Doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University, 2024. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu17135981895309

    Chicago Manual of Style (17th edition)

osu17135981895309
84
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