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Towards A New Non-Ontic Conception of Scientific Explanation

An, Soyeong
http://orcid.org/0009-0003-7301-7831
http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1681966856785286

Abstract Details

2023, Doctor of Philosophy, Ohio State University, Philosophy.
This dissertation is about what is called a conception of scientific explanation. A conception of scientific explanation concerns some ontological questions about scientific explanation. Two related but distinct questions have been investigated: (1) What type of entity is an explanans? (2) In virtue of what, is a thing of that type explanatory? There are two competing conceptions of scientific explanation. One is the ontic conception and the other is the non-ontic conception. A conception is ontic if it says that (a) a type of thing that explains is primarily a thing in the world that is responsible for a target of explanation (ontic explanation) and (b) a type of entity explains if and only if it is either ontic explanation or accurately represents the relevant ontic explanation (ontic determination). A conception is non-ontic if it denies either (a) or (b) or both in one way or the other. The aim of this thesis is to propose and defend a new non-ontic conception. The three chapters are designed to proceed toward the said aim. In Chapter 1, I challenge claim (a) of the ontic conception, i.e., the existence of an ontic explanation. I examine the existing reasons to believe in ontic explanations and argue against them. The conclusion of this chapter is tentative, for all it shows is that no good reason has yet been proposed to support our commitment to an ontic explanation. Still, the conclusion is strong enough to lend support to the non-ontic conception denying ontic explanations in that it is better not to posit something if not necessary for the ontological parsimony. In Chapter 2, I deal with claim (b) of the ontic conception, i.e., the ontic determination. To this end, I examine Angela Potochnik’s non-ontic view, according to which whether something is explanatory is determined not only by what the relevant part of the world is like but also by some cognitive factor of those seeking an explanation. I agree with Potochnik in that some cognitive factor must play a role in determining whether something is explanatory. But I disagree with Potochnik in terms of the cognitive factor she identifies. So, in this chapter, I argue against the cognitive factor she identifies. Then, I propose and defend an alternative cognitive factor for explanation: Whether something is explanatory is determined not only by what the relevant part of the world is like but also by whether it can be represented in a cognitively manageable way. In Chapter 3, I then deal with claim (b) of the ontic conception from a different angle. In this chapter, I question whether a representation must be true to be explanatory (the truth requirement for genuine explanations). I provide an epistemological argument against the truth requirement and defend my argument from some possible worries. Then, I provide and defend an alternative view, according to which a representation is explanatory only if it is true for all we know (the epistemically constrained truth requirement for genuine explanations).
Christopher Pincock (Advisor)
Richard Samuels (Committee Member)
Stewart Shapiro (Committee Member)
122 p.
Philosophy of Science
scientific explanation; conceptions of scientific explanation; the ontic conception; the non-ontic conception

Recommended Citations

Citations

  • An, S. (2023). Towards A New Non-Ontic Conception of Scientific Explanation [Doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University]. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1681966856785286

    APA Style (7th edition)

  • An, Soyeong. Towards A New Non-Ontic Conception of Scientific Explanation. 2023. Ohio State University, Doctoral dissertation. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center, http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1681966856785286.

    MLA Style (8th edition)

  • An, Soyeong. "Towards A New Non-Ontic Conception of Scientific Explanation." Doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University, 2023. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1681966856785286

    Chicago Manual of Style (17th edition)

osu1681966856785286
133
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