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A D Kerr - Affective Rationality.pdf (759.62 KB)

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Affective Rationality

Kerr, Alison Duncan
http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1405090073

Abstract Details

2014, Doctor of Philosophy, Ohio State University, Philosophy.
Although the idea that emotions can be rational has come to be widely accepted by philosophers, theories of emotional rationality are generally wedded to particular theories about the nature of emotions. In contrast, I develop a theory of emotional rationality that is applicable to a broad range of theories of emotions in both psychology and philosophy. Emotional rationality is excellence in exercising one’s emotional capacities in one’s practical endeavors. From this definition of emotional rationality, I develop some rationality assessments of agents with respect to their emotions. The project is organized around three assessments: warrant, imprudence, and acumen. Emotion theorists commonly discuss three distinct static emotion assessments (fit, warrant, and benefit); I call this group, the traditional assessments. For each of these assessments, emotion theorists have claimed that it is an assessment of rationality. Roughly, an agent’s emotion is (i) fitting in a certain situation if the emotion corresponds to the relevant features of her situation, (ii) warranted in a certain situation if she has evidence that for the fittingness of the emotion, and (iii) beneficial in a certain situation if the emotion contributes to her well-being. I argue that none of the traditional assessments, as commonly understood, count as a rationality assessment. One problem with thinking that warranted emotions are rational is that an agent’s emotion may be accidentally warranted. In response, I introduce warrant*; roughly, an agent’s emotion is warranted* if the agent has evidence for the fittingness of the emotion and the emotion is grounded in that evidence in the right way. I introduce the assessment of imprudence in Chapter Three. An agent is imprudent with respect to a pattern of emotion tokens of the same emotion type felt in similar situations roughly if the agent fails to take steps to regulate her emotion tokens properly in light of actual relevant feedback providing evidence that the pattern is contrary to her practical endeavors. When an agent continues to feel emotion tokens that fit in a pattern of obviously detrimental emotions without taking steps to reduce or eliminate them (assuming she can), then she is failing to excel with respect to the exercising of her emotional capacities in her practical endeavors. I discuss the assessment of acumen in Chapters Four and Five. When an agent must make a choice while she feels an emotion, the emotion can make certain considerations more salient (for better or worse). When an agent deliberates, the collection of salient considerations makes up a framing. A framing of a situation is (more) successful for an agent to the extent that the framing includes more of the considerations evidentially available that actually are reason-giving for the agent in the situation and the considerations it leaves out are less weighty than the ones it includes. An agent is acuminous with respect to a pattern of emotion tokens of the same emotion type that are felt during deliberation to the extent that both the emotion tokens of the emotion type reliably enable the agent to form successful framings and the agent’s deliberations are properly responsive to these framings. An acuminous agent’s emotions reliably pick out considerations that are reason-giving for that agent.
Justin D'Arms (Advisor)
William Cunningham (Committee Member)
Richard Samuels (Committee Member)
Sigrun Svavarsdottir (Committee Member)
208 p.
Philosophy
emotion; rationality; affect; emotion regulation; decision making; deliberation; irrationality; arational; imprudence; acumen; emotion assessments; dynamic rationality; static rationality; fitting; warranted; beneficial; acuminous; imprudent;

Recommended Citations

Citations

  • Kerr, A. D. (2014). Affective Rationality [Doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University]. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1405090073

    APA Style (7th edition)

  • Kerr, Alison. Affective Rationality. 2014. Ohio State University, Doctoral dissertation. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center, http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1405090073.

    MLA Style (8th edition)

  • Kerr, Alison. "Affective Rationality." Doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University, 2014. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1405090073

    Chicago Manual of Style (17th edition)

osu1405090073
578
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This open access ETD is published by The Ohio State University and OhioLINK.