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Complete Dissertation (Carson).pdf (2.85 MB)
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Abstract Header
Secrecy, Acknowledgement, and War Escalation: A Study in Covert Competition
Author Info
Carson, Austin Matthews
Permalink:
http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1373974847
Abstract Details
Year and Degree
2013, Doctor of Philosophy, Ohio State University, Political Science.
Abstract
Why do states use secrecy? Specifically, why do great powers often seem to create a kind of “backstage” area around local conflicts? That is, why create a kind of covert realm where external powers can meddle in local conflicts to pursue their security interests? This project generally analyzes how secrecy is used in international politics and why states are individually and collectively motivated to use it. Existing scholarship suggests states use secrecy to surprise their adversaries or insulate their leaders from dovish domestic political groups. I develop an alternative logic rooted in the desire to control conflict escalation risks. In the context of interventions in local conflicts by outside powers, I find intervening states use covert methods to maintain control over the perceptions and interpretations of outside audiences whose reactions determine the magnitude of external pressure on leaders to escalate further. Intervening in a secret, plausibly deniable manner makes restraint and withdrawal on the part of the intervening state easier. It also creates ambiguity about their role which can give the political space to responding states to ignore covert meddling and respond with restraint. Escalation control dynamics therefore make sense of why states intervene secretly and, more puzzling, why other states – even adversaries – may join in ignoring and covering up such covert activity (what I call “tacit collusion”). Drawing on Erving Goffman and others, I develop an “impression management” theory for why states individually and jointly use secrecy and political denial to achieve their goals. To illustrate several new concepts and evaluate the theory’s value-added, I use a sophisticated comparative case study research design that leverages within- and between-case variation in the Korean War, Spanish Civil War, and the civil war in Soviet-occupied Afghanistan. Each conflict hosts several external interventions and several opportunities for tacit collusion; variation among these outcomes helps distinguish the relative importance of escalation and other considerations. Together, the conflicts span the early and late Cold War as well as a particularly important set of cases in the pre-bipolarity, pre-nuclear 1930s. Similar findings across time and space suggest the generalizability of the findings. My data are drawn primarily from primary documentation from internal decision-making and assessments, including original archival research on the American awareness and reaction to Soviet pilots fighting in the air war over Korea in the early 1950s. The project attempts to contribute to scholarly and policy knowledge in several ways. It provides a rare window into the tactics and politics of covert security competition, a set of practices that remain alive and well in places like the Middle East. The project also offers new historical findings, presents a novel theoretical framework for understanding how states manage publicity and use secrecy in international affairs, and helps better understand the difficult dilemma between political accountability and secrecy in foreign policy in democracy.
Committee
Randall Schweller, Ph.D. (Committee Chair)
Richard Herrmann, Ph.D. (Committee Member)
Jennifer Mitzen, Ph.D. (Committee Member)
Pages
433 p.
Subject Headings
International Relations
;
Political Science
Keywords
secrecy
;
covert
;
covert action
;
Korean War
;
Spanish Civil War
;
Afghanistan
;
Cold War
;
war
;
conflict
;
conflict escalation
;
peace
;
crisis
;
crisis prevention
;
crisis management
;
limited war
;
international security
;
acknowledgement
;
plausible deniability
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Citations
Carson, A. M. (2013).
Secrecy, Acknowledgement, and War Escalation: A Study in Covert Competition
[Doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University]. OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1373974847
APA Style (7th edition)
Carson, Austin.
Secrecy, Acknowledgement, and War Escalation: A Study in Covert Competition.
2013. Ohio State University, Doctoral dissertation.
OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center
, http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1373974847.
MLA Style (8th edition)
Carson, Austin. "Secrecy, Acknowledgement, and War Escalation: A Study in Covert Competition." Doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University, 2013. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1373974847
Chicago Manual of Style (17th edition)
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Document number:
osu1373974847
Download Count:
3,687
Copyright Info
© 2013, all rights reserved.
This open access ETD is published by The Ohio State University and OhioLINK.