This dissertation is a study of objectivity, language, and communication. While most of us take for granted that scientific discourse is objective, when it comes to other discourses, our inclinations are different. For example, we take for granted that humor discourse is not objective. While these attitudes about objectivity are commonplace, they raise questions about the factors that influence objectivity. The primary thesis that I defend is that a discourse's status with respect to objectivity is influenced by how a speaker uses that discourse, especially what a speaker takes for granted about the information that everyone in a conversation shares. When we talk to one another, we take for granted that there is a question that everyone is discussing. However, when a speaker uses an objective discourse in a conversation, someone in a disagreement over the question under discussion must be inattentive, biased, confused, or otherwise cognitively at fault. We take other things for granted in a conversation too, especially about the attitudes that the conversation serves to coordinate. A speaker who uses an objective discourse takes for granted that the discussion serves only to coordinate either epistemic or doxastic attitudes.
While conversational requirements are a mark of objective discourse, conversational latitude is a mark of non-objective discourse. Objectivity requires that a speaker take for granted that the discussion addresses a question that does not allow for cognitively faultless disagreement. Objectivity also requires that a speaker take for granted that the conversation only serves to influence either epistemic or doxastic attitudes. However, given that we are dealing with a discourse that is not objective, things are different. When a speaker uses a discourse that is not objective, a speaker might take for granted that there is a question is under discussion that gives rise to cognitively faultless disagreement. In addition, a speaker might take for granted that conversation serves to coordinate attitudes other than either knowledge or belief. For example, when a speaker uses a discourse that is not objective, a speaker might take for granted that conversation functions to coordinate desires, hopes, or even feelings.