Redefining Leadership on the Brink of US Army Force Integration

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ABSTRACT

The 1994 Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule excluded women from specific assignments and occupational specialties that carried a high probability for direct contact and engagement with hostile enemy forces in ground combat. In January 2013, Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin E. Dempsey announced the elimination of the 1994 Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule. The US Armed Forces’ plan to integrate women into previously closed duty positions and military units will go into effect no later than January 1, 2016. In a separate memorandum, General Dempsey expressed the commitment of the Joint Chiefs to ensuring that all service members would be granted equal opportunity to succeed in their chosen career fields, and called for the reexamination of occupational performance standards across the board. During this time of significant institutional change, army soldiers of all ranks are called upon to reconsider and redefine their concept of leadership, particularly in the all-male combat arms branches. Further analysis of army rhetoric reveals ingrained obstacles to force integration and diversification. This thesis examines army rhetoric in terms of the linguistic processes we use to define, categorize, and evaluate what we perceive in our environment, and aims to determine the extant challenges associated with force integration beyond the superficial physiological differences between men and women.
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1. Introduction

Multiple ethnicities, nationalities, religions, cultural practices, geographic regions, and educational backgrounds are represented within the US military. This diversity in the ranks is advantageous; a military whose individual members have different perspectives, strengths, and abilities has the potential to be most adaptable in chaotic combat conditions and innovative when faced with complex problems. Because of this, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 established the Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC) to examine the defense policies and practices in place at that time and determine how best to increase demographic diversity of military leadership (MLDC iii). Among the MLDC’s significant recommendations published in their final 2011 report called for the removal of “combat exclusion” policies for women across all branches of the Department of Defense (71).

The policies referred to here were placed into effect on 1 October 1994, with the establishment of the Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule. It defined “direct ground combat” as “engaging an enemy on the ground with individual or crew served weapons, while being exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of direct physical contact with the hostile force’s personnel” (“Report to Congress” 17). In terms of physical space and context, direct combat was defined as taking place “well forward on the battlefield while locating and closing with the enemy to defeat them by fire, maneuver, or shock effect” (“Report to Congress” 18). Women were precluded from assignment to units that routinely performed such direct combat missions; or to units whose missions required long-term “co-location” with units engaged in direct combat (“Report to Congress” 18). Women were also restricted from assignment to units that
were unable to provide them “berthing and privacy arrangements,” and from assuming jobs whose demanding “physical requirements would necessarily exclude the vast majority of women service members” (“Report to Congress” 18).

Fifteen years later, the MLDC’s review found these policies to be irrelevant in the context of ongoing combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The contemporary definitions of multiple terms and conditions deviate dramatically from their operational definitions as cited in 1994 (MLDC 73). The battlefield and associated “spatial concepts of ‘forward’ and ‘well forward’ are inadequate to convey the complexity” of current contingency operations (MLDC 73). The MLDC also noted that US Forces routinely face an enemy force that “is no longer clearly and consistently identifiable, and all units are essentially exposed to hostile fire” (73). Moreover, the MLDC noted that women frequently perform combat roles because the 1994 policy does not designate any specific duties off-limits (74). Because field commanders “have the authority to use their personnel as they see fit to fulfill the unit mission,” women are regularly tasked to perform combat duties outside of their trained occupational specialties (MLDC 74). The MLDC concluded that the 1994 policy had simply become obsolete, and its associated assignment restrictions nothing more than a “barrier to women’s advancement” (74).

On 9 January 2013, Army General Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote a memo to Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta stating the intent of each service’s Chief of Staff to integrate women into all military occupational fields (1). Dempsey referred to the formulation of a “deliberate, measured, and responsible” plan for force integration pending the evaluation of physical requirements associated with certain jobs (2). He indicated each branch of the military needed time “to institutionalize these
important changes and to integrate women into occupational fields in a climate where they can succeed and flourish” but that this integration was expected to occur by September 2015 (2). Subsequently, on 24 January 2013, Panetta and Dempsey wrote a memorandum to the military services announcing the elimination of the 1994 Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule. The memorandum directed all service branches to formulate detailed plans for integration of women into formerly closed units no later than 1 January 2016 (Dempsey and Panetta 1).

Given the established links between language, culture, and identity, therein lies the best approach for efficient and equitable force integration. This goal is attainable provided an appropriate level of care and attention is rendered in rewriting military doctrine to accommodate the new policies and practices. Business schools talk of driving organizational change through vision statements and managerial techniques. Many believe this paradigm fits neatly onto military organizations, recasting unit mission statements as organizational vision statements, officers as senior management, noncommissioned officers as middle management, and junior enlisted soldiers as workers. But where the corporate model falls short is that its brand of organizational change is conceived of and approved at the top levels within that same organization; military change is conceived of and approved outside the military, at the top levels of our civilian government. Military leaders at all echelons have no choice but to accept and implement new policies immediately and to the fullest extent.

Many would therefore regard military doctrine as a one-way transaction, so to speak—not a discussion, nor even an argument carefully laying out evidence in an attempt to persuade potential adherents—but rather a directive aimed at a specific,
limited, captive audience. But as Michel Foucault notes in “The Discourse on Language,” doctrine is worth examining as an indicator of change: “doctrine is, permanently, the sign, the manifestation and the instrument of a prior adherence—adherence to a class, to a social or racial status, to a nationality or an interest, to a struggle, a revolt, resistance or acceptance” (226). Army leadership doctrine formulated on the brink of change—in anticipation of it—should reveal much about its underlying culture. Further examination of this doctrine, then, will ideally point a clear way ahead in terms of ensuring equitable application of leadership standards during a time of sweeping change.

This thesis aims to examine Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, *Army Leadership*, in terms of how it defines leadership and its directives regarding intangible, subjective, and inscrutable matters. Defining an abstract concept such as *leadership* is challenging because of its subjective nature and the lack of clear parameters; moreover, an attempt to define and standardize the concept could potentially counteract diversity initiatives. The US Army’s use of the evaluation reporting system to enforce its own prescribed standards of leadership ensures soldiers at all levels continue to aspire to its published leadership ideal, by holding them accountable not only for their own character, traits, and actions, but for shaping others’ as well. This has the potential to limit the development of varying leadership styles, instead creating and propagating preferred leader types according to institutional norms.
2. Literature Review

Pinning down word meanings is arguably an impossible task. We formulate generalized concepts of what we experience in the world around us, and affix names to them. Though the decided-upon meanings of words tend to be close enough to generate agreement among people in general (most people are in accord regarding what matter of object qualifies as an apple, or which things are yellow in color, and so on). The labels are not required to be a tidy or precise fit; rather, there must simply be sufficient “overlap” between reference and referent to make a match (Aitchison 41). Yet the extent of the requisite overlap is shifty and imprecise—we usually think of apples as red, but they are often yellow or green, or the skin may have two or more colors; they can also tend towards pink or brown; the flesh is yellowish white and crisp, but with a range of firmness; they may be as small as a golf ball, as with crab apples, or closer in size to a softball. Essentially, we classify objects in the real world according to semantic categories in our minds, and the fit does not have to be perfect.

Prototype Theory—Matching Input to Mental Categories

In 1975, Rosch pointed out that the exact nature of the mental referent is similarly unclear. It’s difficult to say what the mental representation of a semantic category looks like (“Cognitive Representations of Semantic Categories” 193). Perhaps our idea of an apple is some amalgamation of all the apples we have ever seen, representative of all members of the category. Perhaps it’s a series of specimens from past experience that qualified for classification as apples. Perhaps it’s a listing of minimum qualifying characteristics—“critical features”—necessary for classification as an apple (193).
Fillmore’s telling article, “An Alternative to Checklist Theories of Meaning,” also published in 1975, noted that semantic theory offered a salient departure from this notion, through the combination of two views growing in popularity at that time: the “prototype idea” and the “frame idea” (Fillmore “An Alternative” 123). These two notions will be discussed in order here.

Rosch differentiated among the types of semantic categories that might exist in the brain. Some categories are based upon perception of purely physical properties, as with color. Rosch argued that in these instances, mental classification occurred by comparison of external stimuli to internal prototypes that were ideal representatives of their categories; the degree of similarity between the external stimulus and the mental prototype determined the degree of category membership (193). In other words, people classify sky blue, ocean blue, and slate blue all as blue, but might not rate them all as the same quality of representation of the “true” color (198). To ascertain whether a similar classification process occurred for semantic categories that are broader, more abstract, and subject to cultural influence, Rosch conducted a series of experiments.

Rosch first asked test participants to rate on a numeric scale how well various sample nouns represented the broader categories of fruit, birds, vehicles, vegetables, sports, carpenter’s tools, toys, furniture, weapons, and clothing (197). She found an “extremely high” rate of agreement among participants, especially for those items thought to be “very good examples of the category” (198). For example, people agreed that football, baseball, and basketball were more representative of the category sports than hunting, chess, or dancing; pants, shirt, and dress were more representative of clothing than hat, earmuffs, or cuff links (232, 233).
One particularly compelling finding from Rosch’s 1975 series of experiments was the determination that mental representations appear to be more akin to pictures than to words (192). Test subjects were able to provide faster responses when prompted with pictures rather than words. This reduced response time suggests less translation or processing is required in the brain for classification of visual, rather than verbal, inputs to occur. Rosch’s 1975 experiments also offered insights into mental categorization processes at more abstract semantic levels beyond the perception of color and other simple stimuli, which are “coded quite concretely” in the brain (192).

In analyzing the results of Rosch’s experiment, Aitchison argued that form did not necessarily influence ranking: carrot was identified as the second best example of *vegetable*, bearing no physical resemblance to the top-ranked pea, while the decidedly carrot-like parsnip was ranked 30th (Aitchison 55; Rosch 231). To agree with this conclusion, one must dismiss the obvious similarities found elsewhere: peas are ranked first in *vegetables*, and the synonymous green beans and string beans—similar in appearance to peas—are third and fourth, respectively (Rosch 231). In the category *weapons*, gun, pistol, and revolver are the top three; switchblade, knife, and dagger are sixth, seventh, and eighth, respectively (Rosch 230).

Similarly, Aitchison argued that function had similarly little influence on ranking because chair and sofa were deemed the best examples of *furniture*, while bench and stool—two items “closest in function to the prototypical piece of furniture”—were 29th and 32nd, respectively (Aitchison 55; Rosch 229). Yet again, this requires one to overlook obvious better matches—items that are, in fact, much closer in function to the chair and sofa than either the bench or stool. Couch, easy chair, and rocking chair
immediately follow sofa in *furniture*, and rocker and love seat come shortly thereafter (Rosch 229). In other lists, objects of both similar form and function regularly appear together. In the category *vehicles*, for example, automobile, station wagon, truck, car, bus, taxi, jeep, and ambulance take the top slots, in that order (Rosch 230).

Aitchison concludes that the process by which people rank order objects they deem as belonging in a given semantic category: “They were making some type of analysis, though its exact basis was unclear” (55). Neither she nor Rosch attempt to address word associations, which could better account for the demonstrated orderings and groupings of nouns. In other words, it’s worth looking into why some things seem to go together like—well, peas and carrots (Rosch 231). In a 1981 article co-authored by Carolyn Mervis, however, Rosch does address the relationships between members of the same category: “the most cognitively efficient, and therefore the most basic level of categorization, is that at which the information value of attribute clusters is maximized. This is the level at which categories maximize within-category similarity relative to between-category similarity” (Mervis and Rosch 92). The structure of the semantic category is graded, like a continuum; beyond the basic level, a hierarchy exists of increasingly abstract levels (92).

The similarity of a category member to the prototype is significant, particularly in terms of comparing typical and atypical category members. Mervis and Rosch noted that test subjects felt that similarity went only one way; that is, atypical category members were more similar to typical category members than the other way around (97). Applying this idea to the rankings within the category of *vegetables* in Rosch’s 1975 study, in formulating a comparison of carrots to parsnips, people would be more inclined to say,
“Parsnips are similar to carrots,” than, “Carrots are similar to parsnips.” This could be explained in terms of cultural familiarity—perhaps people are more familiar with carrots than parsnips, and it only makes sense to compare the unfamiliar to the familiar. Yet the application works for other categories, as well. Consider the category fruit, with its top-ranked orange and 20th-place lemon: two commonly known citrus fruits, similar in form and taste. When comparing them, people are likelier to say, “A lemon is kind of like an orange,” rather than the opposite. Mervis and Rosch cite George Lakoff’s 1973 work with linguistic hedges, describing the use of qualifiers such as true and technically to code “gradients of representativeness” (97). For example, consider the apple (ranked #2 in fruit) and the tomato (ranked #46). In describing them, people are likely to say, “A tomato is technically a fruit,” but not, “An apple is technically a fruit.” Instead of the latter, they would say, “An apple is a true fruit.”

As previously stated, a perfect match is not required for categorization, merely “family resemblance”: there are different degrees of shared characteristics among members of a single category (Mervis and Rosch 99). In terms of acquiring new categories, however, early exposure to category members that favor the prototype will result in faster, more accurate learning than exposure to “nonrepresentative examples” (99). Mervis and Rosch indicated that results from studies which exposed learners to a broad range of category examples—both good and bad—were mixed, with some studies showing superior results for training exclusively with good examples (99).

George Lakoff warned against two common misapplications of Rosch’s prototype theory. The prototype, or best example of a category, should neither be regarded as a specific example (such as orange representing all fruits) nor as “an abstraction, say a
schema or a feature bundle” (391). Cognitive categorization is based upon human understanding of an object’s properties gained through our interaction with that object in our environment, not upon inherent properties that an object has independent of human perception (392). Even in terms of “basic-level categorization” mentioned earlier—perception of color, for example—the determinant attributes used for classification are “a matter of interaction between people and objects” and are therefore “neither wholly objective nor wholly subjective” (392).

Frame Theory—Shifting Category Boundaries

Frame theory also addresses the relationships among words and concepts, “which link together as a system, which impose structure or coherence on some aspect of human experience” (Fillmore “An Alternative” 123). Similar to prototype theory, frame theory is not rigid or fixed; frames can be manipulated. As noted previously, one item can be a member of multiple semantic categories; similarly, elements can exist in multiple frameworks (Fillmore “An Alternative” 123). Several authors on the subject have discussed the boundaries associated with the term bachelor. Most people agree that the term simply refers to an unmarried male of marriageable age, but this “checklist” approach to the meaning overlooks its nuances. Would it be appropriate to call an 18-year-old high school senior a bachelor? Does the term include religious leaders whose roles require commitment to an unmarried life of celibacy? When Pope Benedict XVI resigned and retired in 2013, did he become a bachelor? In societies tolerant of polygamy, could a man with only one wife be considered a bachelor, since he is not married to the full limit allowed by law? These questions probe whether semantic frames
in these instances can be extended to accommodate atypical contexts not normally associated with the prototype application (Fillmore “An Alternative” 129).

To survive and adapt to their environments, humans must be able to adjust to deviations from the norm; prototype comparison only goes so far. In 1983, Barsalou conducted a series of experiments to determine the nature of the goal-oriented categories people spontaneously create within specific contexts—what he called “ad hoc categories”—and found that they had the same characteristics associated with the basic categories Rosch had previously studied (Barsalou 211). Ad hoc categories serve some purpose for the user beyond simple identification and classification; category members may otherwise appear unrelated. Examples of ad hoc categories are “things to take from one’s home during a fire,” or “things to pack in a suitcase” (214). Initial formations of these categories will have no corresponding mental representation, unlike common categories; but if an ad hoc category is frequently utilized—if a person often travels and so regularly needs to pack a suitcase—then category representations can be established in the memory (214).

Beyond the Laboratory—Real-World Applications

Studies of semantic categories and classification processes in the brain have applications in more abstract and social contexts as well. Kahneman and Tversky determined in 1973 that people make judgments about others (chosen professions or fields of study, achievement levels, etc.) based upon intuition and mental category classifications. Specifically, subjects disregarded given probabilities to select outcomes that best embodied a semantic category based upon a set of representative attributes
(Kahneman and Tversky 238). For example, given a sketch of a graduate student described as intelligent but not creative, who is detail-oriented and prefers systematic order, is introverted, and enjoys science fiction, an overwhelming number of respondents predicted his graduate studies to be in the field of computer science (238). Test subjects were provided with numerical data that illustrated a much higher statistical probability that the student in question would be studying business administration, humanities and education, physical and life sciences, or social science and social work than computer science. Indeed, computer science had the second lowest probability, ranking higher only than library science. Despite this information, they still overwhelmingly predicted the student’s field of study to be computer science (239).

Kahneman and Tversky determined that subjects make predictions “by selecting the outcome that is most representative of the input” (249). Yet they also found that subjects felt no less certain of their predictions than of their evaluations of the same inputs. Even when given factors that had no predictive value on the outcomes—and subjects were told outright that the factors were unreliable predictors—the variance was not significant enough to indicate determination based upon any factor other than representativeness of input. Subjects were placed into one of three groups. The first group was tasked to predict a student’s grade point average based upon academic standing relative to peers; the second, based upon performance on a mental concentration test that had the potential to yield inconsistent results; and the third, based upon sense of humor (when told outright that appreciation of humor does not accurately predict grade point average) (245–246). Predictions of academic performance based upon sense of humor were highest; those based upon performance on the mental concentration test were next highest; and
predictions based upon grade point average percentile were last. Kahneman and Tversky observed in their subjects the trend that expected performance outcomes increased in relation to a decrease in reliability or validity of input given (247). They found subjects’ predictions matched their evaluations “whenever the input and output variables are viewed as manifestations of the same trait” (247).

Because semantic category boundaries are blurry and movable, defining a trait and determining whether a performance outcome is a manifestation of it is very much a slippery and subjective slope. Lexical definitions are notoriously problematic and difficult to interpret, particularly without relevant frame information to determine the proper use and application of a term. In 2003, Fillmore proposed the revision of dictionary definitions to encompass not only a description of a word’s meaning, but also information and examples of its correct usage (“Double-Decker Definitions” 267). Fillmore outlines possible incorrect usages of the word *carrion* based upon its straightforward descriptive definition, simply “the rotting meat of a dead animal” (269). For example, Fillmore notes that it would not be unreasonable to apply this definition—rendered without a frame—to deli meats that were left out of the refrigerator and spoiled on the kitchen counter (269). Only speakers who are familiar with the frame—who know that *carrion* refers specifically to flesh from decaying animal carcasses that comprises the diet of scavengers—are likely to get the usage right (269).

Yet even when category definitions clear, perception and expectation can create audience bias that favors category membership over the sum of salient attributes required for classification in that category. In 2014, Galperin and Sorenson published their findings from a study of Canadian consumers’ preferences for chicken labeled as
“organic.” Of 571 responses analyzed, Galperin and Sorensen noted that not a single respondent correctly identified the requisite characteristics for chicken to be sold as organic (raised without antibiotics on 100% organic feed free of animal by-products); nearly a quarter could not name even a single attribute (6). Most cited characteristics that were required by law of all poultry (raised cage-free and without the use of growth hormones) and so failed to differentiate organic from conventional chicken (6).

Consumers who preferred to purchase organic chicken were also more likely to assign the category additional attributes, such as “natural,” “chemical-free,” and “tastes better”—resulting in these so-called “enthusiasts” ascribing the category an even higher value (7).

As Kövecses noted in 2006, the frames we construct help us make sense of the world, act and use language appropriately, and think about what we observe and experience (69). This complex network of frames is not just in our heads, so to speak—they are cultural constructs, since their understanding is shared among individuals and across subcultures and societies (Kövecses 69–70). Because we think about and define our experiences according to the frames specific to a certain culture—and those same experiences could be perceived and interpreted differently according to another culture’s frames—arguably, there is no way to frame experience in a neutral manner (Kövecses 91).

This is particularly true in light of the cultural and behavioral effects of frame and prototype theories. Semantic categories enable faster processing of input from the environment through the creation of “cognitive shortcuts” (Galperin and Sorenson 1). For these shortcuts to be effective, they must have some generally agreed-upon meaning, usually in the sense that category members serve as representatives of the whole
An airplane crash due to a single instance of engine failure can result in people avoiding travel on that model of plane, or avoiding airline travel altogether. Conversely, a single model of vehicle that is exceptionally valued by consumers can lead to increased sales of all models within that brand. Yet these so-called shortcuts fail in their effectiveness where the category label is not mapped to a definitive set of attributes (Galperin and Sorenson 9).

Violi notes that semantic frames can be stretched and manipulated “almost indefinitely” based upon the cultural and social context of the situation and the fuzziness of a given term’s boundaries. For example, in an American college dormitory room, a configuration of milk crates can be used as an entertainment center and a pile of books can be regarded as a chair. These instances show how a lexical category’s semantic configuration depends on the type of experience and application, a phenomenon called “semantic recontextualization” (223). There is potential for redefinition wherever typical properties are culturally relative; linguistic terms adapt readily to new physical and perceptual reconfigurations (223). Computers, for example, bear little resemblance today to their predecessors fifty years ago—their physical form has changed dramatically, and their functions and applications have expanded significantly—yet the nomenclature remains unchanged.

US Army Applications

Categorization, frame theory, and lexical semantics remain largely unexplored within the context of the US Army. Yet all three areas are particularly salient for the army, an organization notorious for its pursuit of uniformity and standardization. By
examining the leadership doctrine in terms of language and language processing in the brain, potential problems can be identified and future editions made clearer and more useful for the end user. For an organization as large and varied as the US Army, universality of application and ease of understanding are essential in technical writing that is intended to convey policies and expectations to its individual members.

Ongoing diversification initiatives and the impending gender integration of forces will drive changes to conventional military leadership principles and practices. Leader categories and prototypes that are well-established will be challenged by new, atypical category members—not only within the currently all-male occupations and units, but across the board. Associations, perceptions, and expectations directly influence recorded performance outcomes. To ensure equitable performance evaluations and career advancement opportunities for all leaders, the army must commit to identifying and correcting existing biases in army rhetoric.
3. Doctrinal Analysis

The army’s diversity necessitates standardization of doctrinal policies and practices to ensure shared understanding and equity at all echelons. Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, *Army Leadership*, carefully details the core qualities expected of leaders at all levels. It describes thirteen essential leadership “attributes” and ten core leader “competencies” organized into a comprehensive “army leadership requirements model” (1-5). Yet for all its specificity, ADRP 6-22 is not intended as a how-to manual for effective leadership. Rather, it should be viewed as a framework to impart a general sense of how the army expects its leaders to conduct themselves, and the ideologies the army expects its leaders to subscribe to.

Laying Leadership Groundwork—Indoctrination

It is likely surprising to people who have never been in the military that army leaders are expected to adhere to prescribed standards of conduct both on and off duty. Soldiers therefore cannot simply adopt a work persona that manifests the ideal traits; they must strive continually to become more and more like the ideal in every respect. ADRP 6-22 not only prescribes leaders’ conduct and observable qualities, but also their ethics, beliefs, and outlook. Army leaders are expected to be “transparent”: they must work under the assumption that every word and every action will be scrutinized, so their intentions must always be pure. It’s understood that leaders are human, and they will make mistakes, but these should be honest mistakes—missed judgment calls that a reasonable, impartial third party could understand the rationale behind—not rooted in or indicative of some underlying character flaw.
The army therefore aims to inspire and reinforce positive leader traits, which it operationally defines as being founded upon an individual’s character and core values. Individuals looking to succeed in the army will conform to the ideal, which could call for fundamental changes to individual identity. These changes begin immediately upon reception to the army at the basic combat training post, where new recruits begin indoctrination into the military way of life. Individuals from all socioeconomic, geographic, ethnic, and cultural backgrounds relinquish total control over their daily lives and are made to be as uniform as possible: “Typically, the days are regimented, and most activities are designed to make all trainees look and act alike. Their individual identities and personalities are temporarily removed in the attempt to produce the basic Soldier” (Riccio et al. 27). During the course of training, soldiers acquire basic jargon, common practices, and a new general perspective, with their focus shifting from self-preservation to team benefit.

Despite the name, there is not necessarily an automatic association of basic combat training with the acquisition of combat skills. Most people think of shouting drill sergeants in brown park-ranger hats storming up and down even ranks of freshly shorn soldiers. They think of barracks sleeping bays lined with neat rows of metal bunk beds and wall lockers, the floors buffed to a high shine. They think of soldiers in formation marching, running, and doing endless push-ups; soldiers peeling potatoes; soldiers shining boots; soldiers scrubbing latrine floors with toothbrushes. Most would likely identify the focus of basic combat training as making civilians into soldiers, rather than preparing recruits for the rigors of battle. Moreover, recruits do not necessarily think that they will ever see “actual combat”—a conception that recruiting stations do little to
dispel, instead directing recruits’ attention to incentives such as the GI bill, cash enlistment bonuses, or special training opportunities (such as paratrooper training, for example). Recruits are more likely to view basic combat training as a mandatory prerequisite to the occupational training courses they will attend upon its completion, and view their military occupational specialties as their “real” jobs in the army.

Though most people have stereotypical ideas of how new personnel are indoctrinated into the military culture, they likely never consider the sociolinguistic components of the indoctrination process. Soldiers must acquire new terms and speech patterns, and make adjustments to their mental lexicon and extant semantic categories. Immediately upon arrival to any basic combat training post, new soldiers are to begin memorizing information, known as required knowledge, and be able to recite it without error upon command. They must commit to memory “The Soldier’s Creed,” which is contained in chapter 3 of ADRP 6-22. “The Soldier’s Creed” indicates what soldiers’ priorities should be and conveys a basic expectation of their professional conduct. “The Soldier’s Creed” contains four tenets known as the warrior ethos. According to ADRP 6-22, the warrior ethos encapsulates “the internal shared attitudes and beliefs that embody the spirit of the army profession” (3-5). The warrior ethos comprises lines four through seven of “The Soldier’s Creed,” below:

I am an American soldier.
I am a warrior and a member of a team.
I serve the people of the United States and live the army values.
I will always place the mission first.
I will never accept defeat.
I will never quit.
I will never leave a fallen comrade.
I am disciplined, physically and mentally tough, trained and proficient in my warrior tasks and drills.
I always maintain my arms, my equipment, and myself.
I am an expert and I am a professional. 
I stand ready to deploy, engage, and destroy the enemies of the United States of 
America in close combat. 
I am a guardian of freedom and the American way of life. 
I am an American soldier. (3-4)

ADRP 6-22 also contains terms and prescribed definitions that soldiers must 
memorize, known as the seven army values. Soldiers should memorize the values in 
order; the acronym LDRSHIP is suggested as a mnemonic device (3-1). The seven army 
values are defined below:

Loyalty—Bear true faith and allegiance to the US Constitution, the army, your 
unit, and other soldiers. 
Duty—Fulfill your obligations. 
Respect—Treat people as they should be treated. 
Selfless service—Put the welfare of the nation, the army, and your subordinates 
before your own. 
Honor—Live up to army values. 
Integrity—Do what is right, legally and morally. 
Personal courage—Face fear, danger, or adversity (physical or moral). (3-2–3-3)

ADRP 6-22 acknowledges the diversity of army leaders, and the fact that each 
soldier brings a unique set of established personal values and skills to the team; the stated 
goal of this publication is to build upon these extant traits (3-1). Yet the regulation also 
states that by virtue of joining the military, soldiers accept an implicit agreement to 
replace their ingrained beliefs with doctrinal principles: “By taking an oath to serve the 
nation and the institution, one agrees to live and act by a new set of values—army 
values” (3-1). It is vital for leaders not only to learn and accept the army values 
themselves, but also to teach them to their subordinates, to create a shared understanding 
of institutional expectations for all members (3-1).

Warrior Ethos in Context
There is only one version of “The Soldier’s Creed,” and there is only one curriculum for army basic combat training. Whether or not soldiers enlist for an occupational specialty that is combat-related, all receive the same initial training and indoctrination. The line, “I stand ready to deploy, engage, and destroy the enemies of the United States of America in close combat” reveals an underlying assumption that combat is a universal possibility for every soldier in the army, regardless of gender, assigned occupational specialty, or unit of assignment. “The Soldier’s Creed” and its embedded warrior ethos were written in 2003, and fielded to the US Army in 2004; for more than a decade, military leaders have recognized and understood that the nature of contemporary military operations call for every soldier to be prepared for “close combat,” despite the standing combat exclusion policy. The warrior ethos encapsulates the nation’s and the army’s expectations of all soldiers to fulfill “required duties in a harsh and unforgiving environment which directly involves killing and also provides potential for being killed” (Riccio et al. 1). Only recently has the senior civilian leadership in the US government acknowledged that no soldier is exempt from combat. Combat exclusion policies should therefore not be mistaken for an “in-house” bid to keep women out of the combat arms occupations and units.

Semantic Problems in Military Technical Writing

The definitions of the army values in ADRP 6-22 do not have a dictionary-style format; they seem to aspire to a directive or instructional nature, as they are all formulated in the imperative mood. This is in keeping with a forty-year-old initiative to make all US military training and doctrinal literature more readable and comprehensible
to service members. In 1975, Kern et al. published the *Guidebook for the Development of Army Training Literature* for the US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. Kern and his colleagues noted that previous military technical manuals tended to be excessively wordy, with long sentences that were difficult for most service members to decode and comprehend (33). They noted how most military technical writing gave general information about a job, rather than outlining detailed steps to complete job-specific tasks (34). To make military technical writing more accessible and useful for the end user, the team recommended changing the focus of the writing to be “performance-oriented” rather than “topic-oriented” (34).

ADRP 6-22 seems to be written in this vein, making an attempt to tell readers “what to do” and “how to do it” (Kern et al. 34). Readers are given a list of seven values, charged to follow them, and issued guidance to achieve the desired performance outcome for each. Taking the first value, *loyalty*, as an example of this format: A soldier should be loyal; to achieve loyalty, he or she must have confidence in and alignment with the US Constitution, the force as a whole, the individual unit or organization to which assigned, and fellow service members. However, upon closer examination, each value’s definition is vague, lacks appropriate framing, or is reduced to tautology.

*Loyalty* is synonymous with faithfulness and allegiance; *duty* with obligation. For the first two values, then, soldiers are charged to achieve loyalty by being loyal, and to achieve duty by doing their duty. The definition of *respect* is little improved by the addition of the modal *should*—soldiers must treat others the way one ought to treat them, but no standard is given to establish or define correct treatment. Moreover, no illustration is provided to assist soldiers in determining treatment options commensurate to the
intended recipient’s level of deserving, or how soldiers should go about precisely establishing just desserts. Selfless service is assigning greater priority to the needs of subordinates and national and military interests over one’s own, but the definition lacks context. Certainly soldiers should not donate their entire paychecks to military charities, or pay for their subordinates’ rent and groceries. Honor is simply a reminder that each of the army values shares equal importance with the rest, and is not assigned any standalone definition. Integrity is synonymous with honesty and morality; besides a somewhat tautological construction, this definition also lacks any concrete method of establishing what constitutes “right” action beyond what is permissible by law and according to some undetermined moral code. The lack of legal context is problematic for soldiers, a group of professionals who are required to be globally deployable—what is legal in the United States might not be legal in another country, and vice versa. Personal courage is arguably the best defined of all the army values, though the call to action associated with the verb “face” is vague and directionless. Soldiers expect that fear, danger, and adversity are part and parcel of military service; the idea that they will “face” these things from time to time is regarded as a given.

Developing Leadership Traits—Beyond the Basics

Memorizing “The Soldier’s Creed” and the seven army values is the extent of the leadership development training prescribed by ADRP 6-22 that new recruits in the junior enlisted ranks receive. Moreover, they do not receive the publication in its entirety. Upon their arrival to the basic training post, they go through a reception and in-processing phase, where they receive uniforms, identification tags (commonly known as “dog tags”),
haircuts (male soldiers only), vaccinations, and vision, hearing, and dental examinations. New soldiers also receive “smart books” during the reception phase, which are pocket-sized compilations of basic knowledge requirements. The smart book—officially published by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) as TRADOC Pamphlet 600-4, *The Soldier’s Blue Book*—contains the army values with their definitions; “The Soldier’s Creed”; the lyrics to *The Army Goes Rolling Along* (the official army song) and *The Star-Spangled Banner*; the army rank structure; customs and courtesies; the military phonetic alphabet; how to tell military time; standards for physical fitness, appearance, and uniform wear; health, nutrition, and preventive medical guidance; and similar information. Though soldiers must memorize the ADRP 6-22 material contained in the smart book, the source doctrinal reference is not annotated anywhere. Initial entry soldiers therefore lack the potential to take charge of their own leadership development through independent study. Instead, they learn to model leadership from their experiences and interactions with their supervisors and other more experienced senior personnel.

This is standard practice in the army—true expertise is developed on the job, in the operational field units. Institutional training frequently results in little more than basic concept familiarity. In studying apprenticeship relationships in the military, Lave and Wenger found that most experienced personnel preferred to develop recruits who had no prior institutional training, because these trainees were free of assumptions, associations, and “bad habits” (73). Learning takes place first by observing experts in the performance of basic tasks and modeling the behavior. In this way, the novice learns “to organize his own behavior such that it produces a competent performance” (74). As the trainee’s skills
develop, he or she continues to perform the fundamental tasks with growing confidence and expertise, and gradually adds tasks that previously were done by a supervisor (74). This practice “results in a pattern of overlapping expertise, with knowledge of the entry level tasks most redundantly represented and knowledge of expert level tasks least redundantly represented” (75). Not only does this grow the expertise and confidence of the novice personnel, it fosters both a sense of personal responsibility for the job at hand and identification with the overall team (76).

Though learning through interaction with experts may be a more efficient and effective means of acquiring job skills and assimilating novices into the culture, failing to direct junior personnel to the doctrinal source of institutional standards and expectations does not prepare them for career advancement. They remain largely unacquainted with the reasoning behind the standards they must adhere to and enforce as future leaders. Upon promotion to the rank of sergeant, a soldier is immediately subject to the noncommissioned officer (NCO) performance evaluation measures outlined in Army Regulation (AR) 623-3, *The Evaluation Reporting System*. The stated purpose of the evaluation reporting system is to identify those leaders among their peers whose demonstrated capabilities indicate they are “best qualified for promotion and assignment to positions of greater responsibility”—or conversely, to help determine whether a poor leader should be “kept on active duty, retained in grade, or eliminated from military service” (3). Much is at stake, then, with every evaluation rendered. AR 623-3 directs that each evaluation gauge the soldier’s duty performance against the attributes and competencies in the army leadership requirements model from ADRP 6-22 (3).
The Army Leadership Requirements Model

The army’s leadership model comprises 23 components; these are split into two groupings, each with three categories. This first group, attributes, encompasses what a leader should be; the second group, competencies, encompasses what a leader should do. Attributes, according to ADRP 6-22, are founded in a leader’s identity and are organized into the three categories of character, presence, and intellect, which refer to the leader’s moral code, the way that others see the leader, and the leader’s social and cognitive abilities, respectively (1-5). Though intangible and abstract, leader attributes can be manifested in the ways “an individual behaves and learns within an environment” (1-5). Competencies, on the other hand, are a way of classifying a leader’s observed behavior. Because they are based in behavior rather than identity, competencies “can be developed” more readily—meaning that demonstrated leader behavior can be molded to conform to the standards in ADRP 6-22: “Leaders continuously refine and extend the ability to perform these competencies proficiently and learn to apply them to increasingly complex situations” (1-6). Competencies are also organized into three categories—leads, develops, and achieves. These terms refer to the manner in which a leader guides and influences others to accomplish organizational goals and missions; how a leader strives to improve their organizations, encourage teamwork, and prepare their subordinates for career advancement; and how well a leader manages and inspires personnel to efficiently, ethically, and consistently accomplish unit missions (6-1; 7-1; 8-1).

Attributes in Depth—Character
The attribute category of *character* comprises the army values, warrior ethos, *discipline*, and *empathy*. *Character* is internal and is considered the foundation of all the other leadership components, since a people’s core beliefs drive their actions. The army values and warrior ethos were discussed earlier in this chapter. *Discipline* is mentioned in the “Soldier’s Creed” and is explained in ADRP 6-22 as “the ability to control one’s own behavior” and the act of electing to make “right” decisions of one’s own volition (3-5). ADRP 6-22 also places the term in a broader context, noting that disciplined soldiers and teams take necessary actions in training, management, and administration to ensure their collective ability to accomplish the unit’s combat mission (3-5). ADRP 6-22 describes *empathy* as the ability to identify with others, assume their perspectives, and anticipate how situations might affect them emotionally (3-3). Leaders need to understand how their decisions affect their soldiers, and leaders must be aware of how their soldiers’ work performance can be influenced by personal life circumstances (3-3).

Frame theory is especially relevant in discussing empathy. Leaders who become frustrated at a soldier’s failure to perform his or her expected duties could be overlooking significant problems in the soldier’s personal life. A leader with empathy regards the soldier as a person, rather than as a job title or leadership role (such as “mechanic” or “platoon sergeant”) which reduces the soldier’s entire identity to his or her occupational function (Goffman 128). ADRP 6-22 stresses the importance of empathy in combat contexts as well, when soldiers are faced with “local populations, victims of natural disasters, and prisoners of war” (3-3–3-4).

A soldier engaged in direct combat is called upon to temporarily override his or her innate aversion to killing. This is accomplished through frame shifts. Based upon the
soldier’s interpretation of their actions as “hostile,” persons are recast as enemies, a label which essentially eliminates their humanity. Responding to a perceived battlefield threat with deadly force is not immoral. If the soldier wounds and incapacitates the very same individuals, they are no longer a threat and their humanity is restored. They are again recast, now as casualties and possibly prisoners of war, and the soldier is bound by the law of war to provide them medical care and refrain from harming them.

According to ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, compliance with the law of war is never optional, contextual, or subject to the individual soldier’s interpretation or discretion (1-13). The law of war is summarized as “the soldier’s rules,” below:

Soldiers fight only enemy combatants.
Soldiers do not harm enemies who surrender. They disarm them and turn them over to their superior.
Soldiers do not kill or torture any personnel in their custody.
Soldiers collect and care for the wounded, whether friend or foe.
Soldiers do not attack medical personnel, facilities, or equipment.
Soldiers destroy no more than the mission requires.
Soldiers treat civilians humanely.
Soldiers do not steal. Soldiers respect private property and possessions.
Soldiers should do their best to prevent violations of the law of war.
Soldiers report all violations of the law of war to their superior. (1-14)

These “soldier’s rules” form the generalized and inflexible frame for personal conduct in combat. Soldiers also follow the rules of engagement, which are subject to change based upon the type of mission the soldier is charged to accomplish and the circumstances at hand. Rules of engagement specify and limit the conditions under which soldiers may initiate or employ combat force; they are based upon a soldier’s right to self-defense (1-14).

Goffman noted the widespread use of “theater imagery” in daily life, particularly in distinguishing among a person’s various “capacities” (roles): “We say that John Smith is
a good plumber, bad father, loyal friend, and so forth” (128). The vocabulary of the stage is used in the army, as well; multiple instances are found in ADRP 1-02, *Terms and Military Symbols*. Staging refers to the act of “assembling, holding, and organizing arriving personnel, equipment, and sustaining materiel in preparation for onward movement” (1-79). *Theater* is a defined geographical region for which a combatant commander is responsible to conduct specific military operations (1-85). *Theater opening* is establishing ports of debarkation, a distribution system, and throughputs for personnel and equipment moving into theater; *theater closing* is the process of removing personnel and equipment from a theater and moving them back to home station (1-85; 1-86). *Role* is defined as “the broad and enduring purpose for which an organization or branch is established” (1-74). *Rehearsal* is practicing a set of actions expected to be taken during a mission or operation to improve outcomes during its actual execution (1-70). *Measure of performance* is defined as “a criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment” (1-55). In addition to clarifying and defining operational concepts, this terminology serves to prime soldiers to perform the wartime tasks and duties associated with their occupational fields. These duties typically differ markedly from a soldier’s garrison or peacetime duties. As Goffman noted, differentiating among a person’s various “roles” implies a duality in identity—“a stage actor” and a “staged character” (129). When soldiers struggle to psychologically disengage from the combat frame—when they are unable to switch from their wartime to their peacetime roles—the potential for significant psychological trauma exists.

Attributes in Depth—Presence
The attribute category of presence comprises the leader dimensions military and professional bearing, fitness, confidence, and resilience. It is the professional impression that a leader makes upon his or her subordinates. The category label presence is derived from the notion that a leader forges bonds with his or her team most effectively by sharing in hardships and trials; in other words, the leader must literally be present—not aloof, disengaged, or attempting to lead from a safe distance (ADRP 6-22 4-1).

Military and professional bearing refers to looking and acting the part of a leader: “possessing a commanding presence” and “projecting a professional image of authority” (4-2). Subordinates are unlikely to follow a leader who doesn’t seem to be in charge. ADRP 6-22 links military and professional bearing to fitness and expertise (a dimension within the attribute category intellect): “Skillful use of professional bearing—fitness, courtesy, and proper military appearance—can help overcome difficult situations. A professional appearance and competence command respect” (4-1). The mention of professional courtesy recalls the army value of respect, as well. Yet the elaboration upon military and professional bearing in ADRP 6-22 is not truly a clarification and reinforcement of these other concepts; the sparse definition provided simply cannot stand without them. The idea behind military and professional bearing is that good leaders look like good leaders, they seem like good leaders to the people around them, and they exude good leadership. Obviously this definition is circular and poor, so competence and fitness are added in to round out the concept. Because these attributes appear elsewhere in the army leadership requirements model, they are redundant and unnecessary here.

Fitness is preparedness for the physical rigors and emotional demands of combat (4-1). Repeated deployments—frequently characterized by extended work periods,
shortened rest periods, inadequate nutrition, elevated stress, and exposure to extreme climates, altitudes, and difficult terrain—can have negative effects on leaders’ cognitive functioning, emotional stability, and immunocompetence (4-1). Physical fitness and preventive medicine help to sustain soldiers in austere and adverse conditions. Soldiers in combat must be highly conditioned; they must have the requisite endurance to move and survive on the battlefield while carrying all equipment needed for the mission at hand.

According to Field Manual (FM) 3-21.10, *The Infantry Rifle Company*, soldiers can carry up to 30 percent of their body weight without compromising “agility, stamina, alertness, or mobility” (11-4). When carried loads exceed 45 percent of a soldier’s body weight, his or her “functional ability” decreases significantly; moreover, “training can only improve load-carrying capability by 10 to 20 percent” (11-4). Given an average soldier weight of 160 pounds, this yields a maximum acceptable load range of 48 to 72 pounds (11-4). However, many missions require soldiers to sustain themselves over longer periods without resupply. If missions are very complex, soldiers may have to carry a range of weapons and ammunition, as well. In these instances, carried loads can vary dramatically and regularly exceed the recommended 72-pound threshold (11-6).

*Resilience* and *confidence* are closely related to *fitness*; the latter promotes the former, according to ADRP 6-22: “Physically fit people feel more competent and confident, handle stress better, work longer and harder, and recover faster” (4-1). The doctrinal discussion specifically of *resilience* adds only the maintenance of leader focus on accomplishing the mission and other organizational goals (4-2). ADRP 6-22 roots *confidence* in professional competence, which is better addressed in the subsequent
Attributes in Depth—Intellect

The attribute category of intellect comprises the leader dimensions mental agility, sound judgment, innovation, interpersonal tact, and expertise. These attributes help a leader to solve problems, formulate plans, and foresee outcomes (5-1). The relationship between mental agility, sound judgment, innovation, and expertise is rather obvious; the inclusion of interpersonal tact here is somewhat surprising. ADRP 6-22 reminds leaders to consider the cultural and ethical implications of their plans, actions, and orders, “to consider unintended as well as intended consequences” (5-1).

Mental agility is the ability to quickly discern a problem and formulate possible solutions; it refers to “a flexibility of mind, an ability to anticipate or adapt to uncertain or changing situations” (5-1). This is strikingly close to the ADRP 6-22 description of innovation, which is the use of creative thought to adapt to new situations or produce new ideas (5-2). Based upon their doctrinal definitions, sound judgment and mental agility are likely to be confused. Sound judgment refers to the ability to assess a situation, draw reasonable conclusions, and formulate courses of action based upon predicted consequences (5-1–5-2). The chief difference is the inclusion of intuition and past experience in sound judgment when confronted with new situations, but discussion in these terms would fit just as well with innovation and mental agility—or expertise, defined as “the special knowledge and skill developed from experience, training, and education” (5-3).
Interpersonal tact is the awareness of others’ perspectives and an intuition of how best to interact with them (5-5). This dimension calls for leaders to recognize and appreciate diversity; to exhibit calm self-control and inspire it in others; and to remain sensitive to others’ emotions (5-2–5-3). Though this trait is fully developed in ADRP 6-22, it relates closely to the attribute of empathy discussed in the section on character and would fit quite well there without need of further explanation.

Competencies in Depth—Leads

The competency category of leads comprises the leader dimensions leads others, builds trust, extends influence beyond the chain of command, leads by example, and communicates. Leading others means influencing people to accomplish missions, but the overarching goal is to inspire long-term commitment to improving the organization (6-1–6-2). Effective leaders employ a variety of means to exert influence, and know which to apply in a given situation or context, and which team members respond best to each approach (6-2). Leaders resolve conflict, overcome resistance, and empower subordinates to exercise initiative (6-4–6-5). Leaders must be involved and invested in their subordinates and teams—they must balance mission requirements with subordinates’ welfare. This means setting priorities, enforcing standards of conduct and performance, and monitoring morale and behavior for indications of excessive stress or risk (6-6).

A leader who is invested in the welfare of his or her subordinates, encourages individual initiative, and fosters organizational commitment will naturally build trust within the team. Failure to adhere to any of the core leader competencies could erode trust within the organization. Playing favorites, demonstrating unethical behavior,
tolerating discrimination or harassment, and lacking cultural sensitivity are all examples
of how a leader can diminish trust within a team (6-7). Because the competency *builds
trust* is contingent upon multiple other components of the army leadership requirements
model, it could be eliminated as a standalone competency.

*Communicates* transcends the “simple transmission of information;” it is a way to
ensure understanding, identify solutions to problems, establish priorities, mend rifts, and
broker agreements (6-12). This competency also requires active listening on the leader’s
part; leaders should not allow emotion or opinion get in the way of the speaker’s message
(6-13). Leaders should employ a variety of communications techniques and methods to
ensure their message is received and understood by all members of the team (6-13).

*Respect, interpersonal tact, and empathy* are involved in communications, as leaders
must remain aware of cultural sensitivities and norms when interacting with others (6-
14). All information in ADRP 6-22 pertaining to the competency *communicates* could be
included in these other sections; *communicates* could therefore be eliminated as a
standalone competency.

The competency *extends influence beyond the chain of command* is defined entirely
in terms of other competencies within the same category, namely *leads others,
communicates, and builds trust*. *Extends influence beyond the chain of command* is
influencing people outside of a leader’s normal lines of authority to accomplish goals (6-
8). It also involves fostering relationships, negotiating, and understanding cultural
sensitivities and social norms (6-9). Similarly, the competency *leads by example* is
defined entirely in terms of attributes discussed previously. ADRP 6-22 charges leaders
to set a positive example for others to emulate in *military and professional bearing*,

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mental agility, sound judgment, resilience, expertise, and confidence (6-12). Because of these redundancies, extends influence beyond the chain of command and leads by example could be eliminated as a standalone competencies.

Competencies in Depth—Develops

The competency category of develops refers to the practice of improving the organization as a whole, being accountable for one’s own professionalism and expertise, and preparing individuals to progress in their careers (7-1). By improving self, others, and the overall organization, a leader by default improves the profession at large. The category comprises the leader dimensions creates a positive environment, prepares self, develops others, and stewards the profession.

The competency creates a positive environment is a natural result of manifesting other leadership attributes and competencies. It involves investing in the welfare of team members, encouraging initiative, and inspiring organizational commitment (leads others); providing candid input and feedback regarding individual and team performance (communicates); conducting oneself ethically (leads by example); fostering a learning environment by soliciting and seeking new approaches to problems (innovation); and celebrating diversity (interpersonal tact) (7-5). Because the definition does not significantly expand upon already established information in ADRP 6-22, creates a positive environment could be eliminated as a standalone competency.

Prepares self refers to being accountable for increasing and improving one’s own self-awareness, professional skills, and knowledge, with the goal of improving adaptability to changing circumstances (7-6). It is founded upon and defined in terms of
other leadership attributes and competencies (namely, *interpersonal tact, expertise* and *fitness*). It also expands upon the attribute *empathy*; ADRP 6-22 here encourages leaders to assess their actions from the perspective of someone else (7-7). *Prepares self* therefore could also be eliminated as a standalone competency.

*Develops others* expands upon other competencies, providing more detailed information and further recommendations. This competency focuses upon leader actions that will improve individuals and teams, through honestly assessing others’ performance, providing timely feedback and recommendations, and encouraging initiative and growth (7-15). As such, the discussion is better placed with *creates a positive environment, communicates, and leads others*.

The competency *stewards the profession* is manifested through a leader’s support and encouragement of subordinates’ efforts to expand their professional knowledge and skills (*develops others*), and efforts to improve the overall organization (*leads others*) (7-16). *Stewards the profession* is more appropriately viewed as an expected outcome of other leadership competencies, rather than a competency in its own right.

Competencies in Depth—Achieves

The competency category of *achieves* includes only the leader dimension *gets results*. This section of ADRP 6-22 describes techniques intended to assist leaders in managing resources and developing teams to consistently accomplish organizational goals (8-4). This section is framed as an “extended perspective” intended to regularly produce successful outcomes (8-1).
Propagating the Leadership Ideal—Enforcement through Evaluation

The observation, recording, and classification of leader behavior are the goal of the army evaluation reporting system. The evaluation reporting system ensures leaders at all levels work to develop others, prepare self, and steward the profession. However, it is also the way that preferred leader behaviors are reinforced and how specific leader prototypes are proliferated. Senior army leaders gauge their evaluations of junior leaders’ duty performance against their own experiences. The senior leaders counsel the junior leaders on how to meet their expectations and conform to their established leadership ideals. In turn, the junior leaders acquire and express these behaviors to ensure positive performance evaluations and career advancement opportunities. These behaviors become habit over time. As the junior leaders advance through the ranks and become senior leaders, they apply their previous experiences (and acquired measures of performance) in counseling and evaluating new leaders; the cycle therefore continues.
4. Findings and Conclusions

The current army leader prototype is male, a message that is conveyed in multiple ways. Men are on the cover of ADRP 6-22, *Army Leadership*: two male soldiers are shown in uniform wearing body armor, helmets, and sunglasses, and armed with M4 rifles. Most uniforms and equipment are fitted to the male form; in this respect, female soldiers have no choice but to literally fit themselves into the male frame. Official army news releases that discuss this issue are inconsistent in its treatment, sometimes reinforcing negative associations about women in service. The US Army web page news archives feature articles discussing a new combat uniform and body armor specifically designed for women. The two articles address the issues in fundamentally different ways; the former reinforces damaging assumptions about women in the army, while the latter reports the matter in a more objective manner.

Doctrine

The organization of required leadership traits discussed in ADRP 6-22, combined with the evaluation measures outlined in AR 623-3, prevent diversification of leadership ideals in the army. The poorly defined category boundaries do not permit ready classification of observed leader behaviors, rendering evaluation and processing of these observed behaviors all the more challenging, even with objective and quantifiable data. (For example, a leader completing a marathon in less than three hours could have this achievement recorded as a manifestation of *fitness, prepares self*, or *leads by example.*) Moreover, the high number of specified attributes and core competencies prevents diversification of leadership prototypes; rather, it encourages the pigeonholing of specific
leader behaviors into certain categories. Over time, these classifications become standard practice. Broadening the categories (and reducing their total number) leads to more innovative classification of input. For example, much more diversity among category members is allowed within the broader category *desserts* than within the more specific category *pies*. Reducing the number of categories and streamlining the overall army leadership requirements model would facilitate the diversification of leader prototypes.

Uniforms

The army combat uniform (ACU) was fielded to the force in 2005 (Hutto 1). Some common complaints about the poor fit for women include: the shoulders and back too are broad; the jacket length is too short, revealing the button fly on the trousers; the positioning of rank insignia (centered between the breasts) directs attention to the soldier’s chest; trousers have insufficient curvature between the waist and hips; trouser rise is too long and, as a result, the trouser crotch is too low; knee and elbow patches (which accommodate insertion of protective pads to facilitate firing from prone and kneeling positions) are not positioned over the wearer’s knees and elbows. A female soldier wearing an ill-fitting uniform in combat will not have proper range of movement in the arms and legs, and her protective padding will not function properly. These are legitimate concerns.

The army news archives feature a 2011 article, “Benning Female Soldiers Test New Women’s Army Combat Uniform,” that does not frame the issue this way. Instead, the author assures readers that “the new uniform is not a form fitting uniform that was designed to accent the female form” (Hutto 1). This statement immediately frames the
issue in terms of female sexuality. The article reports that the updated uniform “will hopefully allow female soldiers to look more professional and allow them to do their jobs better because they are more comfortable” (Hutto 1). This statement implies that appearance and comfort are female-specific concerns that affect job performance. These problematic statements appear legitimized because they are paraphrased quotes from a female army officer.

Equipment

The body armor that the army issues to its soldiers is also fitted for the male form. As with the combat uniform, this creates a number of issues for female soldiers in terms of fit: the shoulders tend to be too wide, the waist too large, and the torso too long. The large waist on the body armor results in the vest not fitting securely around the soldier’s torso; this is particularly problematic if the soldier is running. Body armor that is too long will cause chafing on the upper thighs of a soldier while walking or running, and will constrict blood flow for a soldier who is seated (particularly problematic for soldiers involved in convoy operations). The breadth of the vest’s shoulders prevents smaller framed soldiers from firing their rifles efficiently. The buttstock of the weapon cannot be placed into the “shoulder pocket” between the soldier’s clavicle and humerus bone. This placement is known as a “shoulder weld” and enables the firer to quickly acquire a consistent firing position by feel. Soldiers must be able to obtain the same firing position each time they engage a target; variance in positioning of the weapon causes inaccuracy of fires. Accurate aiming is achieved through consistent alignment of the firer’s eyes with the rear sight aperture and front sight post on the rifle. To achieve consistent sight
alignment and aiming, a soldier who cannot acquire a “shoulder weld” must instead acquire a “cheek weld,” which is consistent positioning of the cheek against the buttstock of the rifle. A soldier in combat is more efficient if he or she can simply raise the weapon to the shoulder and acquire a “shoulder weld,” as opposed to raising the weapon to the shoulder and dropping the head to the buttstock to acquire a “cheek weld.”

The author of a 2012 article announcing the army’s testing of body armor fitted for female soldiers discusses the adjustments purely in terms of functionality. Reporting on the shortened shoulder design of the new vests, the author writes: “The change translates to increased range of motion in the shoulders and upper arms and also allows weapons to be seated in the shoulder weld” and describes the new closer fit as “more secure and customized” (Leipold 1). The author reports that the shorter length of the vest prevents “rubbing on the hips, which can cause chafing while walking” (Leipold 2). Unlike the article about the women’s combat uniform, this article frames the technological developments of the body armor in terms of combat effectiveness and sustaining soldiers in battle, rather than appearance and comfort—a move which legitimizes rather than trivializes the matter.

The Origin of the Male Frame

Some might argue that the gendering of the army is entirely attributable to demographics; after all, men constitute the overwhelming majority of the total military population and account for more than 85% of the active army, according to the February 2015 Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) report. As previously noted, semantic categories in the brain develop—and their prototypical members form—according to our
experiences. We might intuitively guess that the number of male army leaders would be proportional to the number of males in the total army—about 85%. Routine exposure to a comparatively large male leader population could reasonably be expected to result in the formulation of a male leader prototype.

Surprisingly, the army maintains a disproportionately large female leader population in relation to its overall demographics. A 2009 army news article about Fort Jackson, South Carolina—one of the US Army’s four initial entry training stations (along with Fort Benning, Georgia; Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; and Fort Sill, Oklahoma)—stated that 22.4 percent of the post’s drill sergeant population was female (Kappler and Simpkins 1). This is significantly higher than the overall female population of the army; the DMDC online archive report for September 2009—the end of the fiscal year in which the aforementioned article was published—indicates that the total army was less than 14% female at the time (74,411 women out of 553,044 total soldiers). This variance is even more impressive given the target population of drill instruction: both drill sergeants and the soldiers they train are within the enlisted corps. According to the DMDC report, less than 13% of the enlisted population was female (59,401 women out of 457,980 enlisted personnel).

The highest female-to-male ratio was, and remains, in the officer corps. According to the DMDC report for February 2015, the army’s officer corps is more than 16% female (15,907 women of 95,707 officers). Admittedly, the female-to-male ratio decreases markedly with each progressive rank, but soldiers have the most direct contact with junior ranking officers. The large proportion of female drill sergeants, coupled with the fact that women occupy a higher percentage of the officer corps than the enlisted corps,
could lead someone to expect that junior soldiers would formulate a more egalitarian leader prototype.

But those army occupational fields that are open to women—in areas like logistics, administration, and communications—are not the prototypical army jobs. These fields have “equivalent” jobs in the civilian sector; because they can be classified into multiple categories, they are not “pure” examples of the category *army jobs*. Occupational specialties without any civilian “equivalents” include infantryman, tanker, cavalry scout, and multiple launch rocket system crewmember, to name a few. Because these and other jobs classified within the “combat arms” branches of the army were previously closed to women, 100% of the soldiers and leaders in these fields are male. Since the combat arms are the “best examples” of the category *army jobs*, and because 100% of their population is male, the inevitable result is that the prototypical army soldier—and leader—is male.

The only way to change the semantic category prototype is through exposure to and training with more varied samples. In other words, opening all army occupational specialties and units to women is the singular way to create leadership equality in a fundamental cognitive sense. Unfortunately, the first waves of women integrated into formerly-closed units and occupations are likely to receive poorer performance evaluations compared to their male peers, simply because they are dissimilar from the leadership prototypes extant within those contexts. Recall that the evaluation reporting system outlined in AR 623-3 aims to assess every leader’s current performance and potential for promotion against established standards—the army leadership requirements model (with its ingrained male prototype), the organization’s unique mission (formerly
accomplished exclusively by males), and a specified “set of duties, responsibilities, tasks, and objectives” (that were previously reserved for men) (3).

Frame theory is particularly relevant here. A female soldier serving in a newly opened combat arms leadership position is considered atypical of the established (all-male) category. In preparing her performance evaluation, her rater must determine whether the established frame can be extended to include her in the category—whether she demonstrates the right measure of the requisite leader attributes and core competencies associated with a role such as scout platoon leader.

Though the leader attributes and core competencies identified in ADRP 6-22 are the same for all leaders in the army, the doctrinal terms serve only as category labels. The categories themselves may contain vastly different criteria depending on the culture and context. Consider the core competency communicates. An infantry officer’s style of communicating with subordinates will differ markedly from a public affairs officer’s. Though both leaders may be equally clear and all soldiers understand their desired outcomes, neither officer is likely to achieve success in the other’s environment. That is, the infantry officer who shouts commands at the public affairs team and the public affairs officer who strives to be diplomatic and cordial in addressing the infantry platoon are equally likely to fail to inspire mission accomplishment in these out-of-context scenarios.
5. Recommendations

Disseminating publications containing institutional policy and doctrine is a reliable way to communicate standards and expectations to individual soldiers. However, the fundamental leadership doctrine in the army is problematic as it is currently written. The seven army values are essential foundational traits that all soldiers should have, and form the basis of their character. Character is, in turn, the source of all other leadership traits and behaviors. Because of their importance, the army values should be written in a manner that makes sense, to facilitate their acquisition and application. The army leadership requirements model features too many categories that are semantically indistinct. This fact fails to communicate the importance and meaningfulness of these traits for army leaders. Given the absolute control the military has over its own rhetoric, its application, and the end user, any demonstrated bias or lack of clarity tends to be interpreted as intentional.

1. Rewrite the doctrine to correct semantic issues.

In 1991, Margaret McKeown outlined several principles for writing effective definitions. First and foremost, she recommends that a definition be viewed as the first step towards “learning about a word rather than the primary mode for that learning” (137). The seven army values are constrained, as are most definitions (many lexicographers have noted), by available space—that is, they must be compact enough as to be readily memorized by all soldiers. Their formatting—with definitions presented in the natural structure of standard English, rather than dictionary format—is actually ideal
for ease of acquisition (141). The semantic quality of the definitions needs work, however; their structure is problematic from a logical standpoint, as previously noted.

The terms themselves likely do not require lexical definitions for the majority of soldiers entering the army. They understand the terms well enough. However, new recruits could have different associations with the terms; these associations need to be standardized according to army expectations for individual soldier conduct. The directive format that the army presently uses is appropriate in this context, so I will follow it below.

Loyalty as currently written is defined in terms of its synonyms. An improvement could be made by tying the definition to the oath of enlistment or oath of office that every soldier must swear upon entrance into army service: “to support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic.” Such a revision of the army value of loyalty could be just as readily memorized as the current circular definition. It might read, “Support and defend the US Constitution, the army, your unit, and other soldiers.” Duty is similarly problematic—it is synonymous with obligation, a term included in its doctrinal definition. It could be rewritten as, “Anticipate mission requirements and accomplish all tasks within your scope of responsibility.”

Respect does not operationally define acceptable or correct treatment of others; it merely charges soldiers to get it right. Given the focus on empathy, a possible rewrite of the definition is, “Treat people with professionalism, dignity, and compassion.” This definition includes a nod to military customs and courtesies, but fails to acknowledge the possible frame shifts required of soldiers in combat. It’s impossible to include that context without growing the definition substantially, or adding alternate definitions.
Selfless service as currently defined has no clear boundaries or context. The valuation of team, unit, army, and nation over self is an important concept to convey, but the present wording needs direction. Instead of charging soldiers to place the entire world’s needs before their own, it might be clearer and more beneficial to warn soldiers to consider the outcomes of their actions in advance. A possible redefinition is, “Always consider how your actions can affect the nation, the army, your unit, and your team.”

The definition of honor is virtually meaningless as it stands now—it merely indicates that all the other values are of equal importance. It’s a term that is possibly more effective when considering its opposite, so it could benefit from framing in this way. The definition might work better as, “Never do that which could bring shame upon you, the army, or the nation.”

The current definition of integrity is similarly directionless. This is extremely problematic given the difficult decisions soldiers are frequently faced with making in combat, where the actions they are called upon to take are within the law of war but may go against the soldier’s personal moral code. However, US soldiers’ rarely make ethical violations of the magnitude of war crimes, so a heavy-handed definition is not needed here. The definition could be improved as, “Conduct yourself ethically at all times according to the law, and behave as though someone were watching you.”

Personal courage requires only minor adjustment. Instead of telling soldiers merely to face fear, danger, and adversity, the definition should read, “Drive on with the mission, even in the face of fear, danger, or adversity (physical or moral).” This alternate definition recalls and reinforces the first tenet of the warrior ethos, as well.
2. Provide in-text illustrations.

A singular shortcoming with the army’s definitions of its core values is that they are rendered entirely in unillustrated text. Recall Rosch’s 1975 experiments which determined that participants responded more rapidly to priming with pictures than with words. Because less processing is required to encode input in visual rather than verbal form, military doctrine which aims to standardize soldiers’ definitions of terms would become more effective through the use of illustration. Though there are no direct pictorial equivalents for abstract concepts like the seven army values, salient case studies providing context and illustrating instances wherein others manifested the desired values would likely benefit the end users. Rosch and Mervis demonstrated in 1981 that effective training could be accomplished by exposure to “good examples” of a semantic category.

It’s worth noting that previous editions of *Army Leadership*—redesignated from field manual (FM) 6-22 in 2006, which itself superseded FM 22-100 in 1999—contained precisely these types of narratives which were seemingly intended to illustrate ideal manifestation of various army values, typically in combat contexts. No explanation is provided as to why these illustrative stories were removed from the 2012 publication. The 2008 version of the “smart book,” TRADOC Pamphlet 600-4, featured similar narratives that were removed prior to the 2014 publication. If these types of vignettes are reinserted in future editions, the leadership ideal should be illustrated using a diverse population of military leaders. In the superseded *Army Leadership* manuals and previous version of TRADOC Pamphlet 600-4, each publication features only a single female leadership vignette. Sergeant Leigh Ann Hester’s 2005 combat heroism (for which she earned the Silver Star) as a military police officer was highlighted in FM 6-22, to illustrate the
leadership attribute resilience (5-3). Captain Viola B. McConnell’s actions as an army nurse in the Korean War were highlighted in TRADOC Pamphlet 600-4, to illustrate the army value duty (37).

It is unlikely that soldiers keep and regularly study their smart books after graduation from their initial entry training, so perhaps the inclusion or exclusion of leadership vignettes is a moot point. Yet having a source text to reference throughout the initial indoctrination process is useful. Soldiers undoubtedly learn better when the material is presented multiple ways. During basic combat training, most soldiers have only their platoon drill sergeant to model leader behavior for them. They might briefly interact with other leadership—drill sergeants from other platoons, the company first sergeant, or the company commander—but they will have regular direct contact only with their own platoon drill sergeant. Reading these vignettes would at least provide new recruits an idea of leadership diversity, and would train them from the very beginning to consider how individual actions manifest the army values and warrior ethos.

3. Reduce the number of doctrinal leader attributes and core competencies.

Of leader attribute categories, character seems to be the most critical; the army values, warrior ethos, discipline, and empathy are important foundational traits for leaders to possess. Because actions are rooted in an individual’s character, the army is justified in requiring and reinforcing these traits in its soldiers.

As ADRP 6-22 is currently written, the attribute fitness is the only leader trait worth retaining from the category presence. Military bearing, confidence, and resilience could be eliminated as standalone attributes altogether; they could be included as desirable
manifestations of fitness, discipline, empathy, and expertise and addressed within those sections of ADRP 6-22.

Within the category of intellect, the leader attributes sound judgment, mental agility, and innovation are so closely related as to overlap semantically. These three attributes could be combined and relabeled as critical thinking. Interpersonal tact is essential and the discussion is fully developed as currently written in ADRP 6-22, but is so closely related to empathy that the two traits could readily be combined and interpersonal tact eliminated as a separate attribute.

Within the category of leads, the core competencies are largely defined in terms of traits found elsewhere in the army leadership requirements model. Leads others is a fully developed competency in ADRP 6-22, but all other competencies either overlap or are outright redundant restatements of other leader traits. Builds trust, extends influence beyond the chain of command, communicates, and leads by example could all be removed from this category.

Within the category of develops, the leader competencies creates a positive environment, prepares self, develops others, and stewards the profession are all alluded to within the ADRP 6-22 treatment of other traits in the army leadership requirements model; indeed, they could all be viewed as consequential to these other traits. Therefore, all can be eliminated as primary leader competencies.

The category of achieves outlines in depth a number of ways to measure leadership effectiveness and accomplish organizational missions consistently. It should be retained in its entirety.
This leaves only nine recommended leadership traits: army values, warrior ethos, discipline, empathy, fitness, expertise, critical thinking, leads others, and gets results.

With this reduced number of attributes and core competencies, there is no need for the category headers character, presence, intellect, leads, develops, or achieves. This is not to imply that the other attributes and competencies are unimportant; they are essential and valid points for leaders to consider and understand. However, they can all be organized and discussed within the framework of just nine leadership traits. The excessive redundancy, semantic overlap, and complexity in the current leadership requirements model render the material inaccessible to all but the most determined readers. Soldiers are therefore less likely become familiar with, refer to, or disseminate the army’s current leadership requirements and philosophies. All of the current guidance can be retained in ADRP 6-22, but overall reorganization and redesignation of primary traits would assist in readers’ comprehension and acquisition of concepts.

4. Work to correct, rather than enforce, the current gender framing of military leadership definitions.

The first women to enter the combat arms branches will be measured against extant male prototypes. Given military culture and the way that army doctrine is written and enforced, deviations from established norms are considered adverse. Females who manifest deviations from these established norms therefore stand to receive poorer performance evaluations. Moreover, these deviations are likely to be attributed to the leader’s gender; this coding has the potential to result in individual female leaders (category members) becoming representative of all females. Recall that Kahneman and
Tversky found that evaluations were strongly influenced by evaluator expectations of performance outcomes based upon their perception of individual traits. Where evaluators expect women soldiers to manifest a certain trait, they are likely to find confirmation of their expectations in the women’s performance.

The comprehensive changes to the evaluation reporting system concurrent with the integration of women into formerly closed occupations and units can be expected to partially correct for this bias. The way that leadership attributes and core competencies are recorded and classified on leader evaluation reports has changed dramatically. Unfortunately, the changes that have been fielded in this area are restricted to the evaluation reporting system—namely, report format and requirements. Changes made to the leadership doctrine were less comprehensive and will not correct for ingrained practices.

5. Ensure equitable reporting practices in army news coverage of force and policy changes.

Publication of biased news articles on the official website of the US Army implies that the army endorses these perspectives. The fielding of new equipment is a regular occurrence in our technologically advanced military. The fielding of new equipment to address problems or concerns that soldiers have expressed in the past should never be reported in a manner that trivializes those soldiers’ perspectives or experiences.

The most frequently cited concerns surrounding US Army force integration are the austerity and danger of combat zones; privacy considerations; and anticipated physical
demands (“Report to Congress” i–ii). Yet women soldiers have already been widely exposed to and involved in combat operations. Moreover, the integration of women into all fields is a plan senior military leaders have already set into motion. Of primary concern at this point is maintaining equitability as women assume new roles and responsibilities, and ensuring they are evaluated fairly and given equal chance to develop and progress as leaders in their chosen fields. To this end, the army must work to remove not only extant leadership prototypes in fields that were previously reserved for males, but general institutional bias. This initiative presents the opportunity to improve the overall quality of leadership doctrine to correct semantic issues and make it more practical for the end user. Otherwise, the army will continue to mold its soldiers and their leadership styles to long-standing frames, rather than truly diversifying and developing an adaptive force.
Works Cited


