GOVERNED BY GUERRILLAS: WHEN ARMED INSURGENTS BECOME POLITICAL LEADERS

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By

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When an internal conflict ends, many states are faced with a choice of whether or not the insurgents they were fighting against should become political figures they govern beside. Increasingly, peace settlements involve the proposed evolution of guerrilla groups into political parties, yet little is known about rebel groups’ long-term effectiveness in governing (Vines and Oruitemeka, 2008). However, the recurrent interest in converting guerrillas to politicians calls for a clear understanding of the chances of success. What makes a guerilla group more or less successful in governance? I hypothesized that a state with formerly armed insurgents would produce fewer pieces of legislation than before the new party took office, and would see higher levels of violence. Using Sinn Féin, I measured the ability of former insurgents to produce legislation and examined violence before and after power-sharing was in place. I found that fewer laws were created and violence was higher.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

When an internal conflict ends, facing many states is a choice of whether or not the insurgents they were fighting against should become political figures beside whom they govern. Increasingly, peace settlements involve the proposed evolution of guerrilla groups into political parties, yet little is known about rebel groups’ long-term effectiveness in governing. Understanding their direct impact is challenging because of elements such as power sharing arrangements, internal divisions, and murky electoral processes. However, the recurrent interest in converting guerrillas to politicians seems to call for a clear understanding of the chances of success. An assessment of post-conflict literature shows a severe dearth of information on these groups after conflict termination.

Some researchers have evaluated the transitional process, examining what structural changes need to be made as the group becomes less combative and more legislative; others have chosen to examine the elections themselves. As we get closer to the process of governing, less and less seems to be known. What makes guerrilla groups more or less successful in governance? This research evaluates the process after armed groups lay down their weapons and take political office.

Internal conflicts are some of the hardest to reconcile. States with internal conflict find themselves faced with numerous challenges, many of which involve former combatants. In recent decades, democratization has been the foundation for peace agreements and ceasefires. Consequently, guerrilla fighters are frequently offered immunity and a role in governance. These groups, which grew accustomed to using
violence and extreme methods to achieve their goals, must find ways to reshape their organizations, reframe their messaging, and develop new strategies to attract a wider field of constituents. They have a need for new skills in the political realm, often found in freshly recruited members. And always, a tension exists between the old messaging and new, threatening to create internal divides along the way as supporters must choose to continue supporting violence or to adapt to the new path.

Intrastate conflicts have far-reaching consequences. Though the majority of the violence is internal, regional instability may ensue. Concerns such as conflict contagion and refugee flows make the internal external, and reinforce the global nature of even the most distant conflicts. The Liberian civil war, for example, affected approximately 75% of the Liberian population and generated an estimated 750,000 refugees (McDonough, 2008). These refugees fled to neighboring states en masse, affecting the lives of others in the region. As of October 2016, there were more than 65 million forcibly displaced people in the world (UNHCR). Approximately 4,794,000 of them are the result of the Syrian civil war (UNCHR, 2016). These refugees are fleeing through regional states and are attempting to resettle across the globe. Though intrastate wars technically center on internal divides, their effects are far from isolated.

One of the more recent global contributions to post-conflict society is often packaged neatly as “state-building.” Conceptualizations of state-building are commonly constructed on largely untested patterns of behavior. Rebuilding domestic governments frequently centers on fostering liberal practices and market economies, though many of these states lack actors with experience in either (McDonough, 2008). As a result, those placed or elected into powerful roles are not equipped for success and frequently struggle
to maintain control. Guerrillas and other previously armed insurgents have skills and organizations that serve them well in battle, but do not necessarily translate to these new institutions. Yet, up to 43% of “terrorist” groups transition into non-violent politics (Wiegand citing Jones and Libicki, 2008). This means that a high percentage of violent organizations are likely to try to make the transition to political life. It is imperative, therefore, to better understand how this process works.

The outcome of group conversion remains largely untested, and what has been tested produced varying results. Some groups transition to political life decades after a conflict, such as the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa. Others are created as a part of post-conflict agreements, as was seen in Mozambique and El Salvador. Some of these agreements are not initially accepted or implemented. This was the case for the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), which walked away from power-sharing deals until an assassination forced a change in leadership and new members decided to participate in shared governance. Some groups find it hard to build a new base of support and others are unwilling to accept only limited power in government (Kovacs, 2008). If these groups do find supporters and win elections, the process of governing can be a mystery.

The way a war ends, as well as the means by which it terminates, can influence the state’s recovery. Since the 1990s, liberal paradigms have been guiding post-conflict activity more prominently than ever- promising stability with democratization. In addition, there has been increased international involvement in peace processes and a growing realization of the importance of post-conflict elections (Lyons, 2005). In many cases, these liberal trends are realized in the form of agreements that allow formerly
insurgent groups to participate as representatives in the government. Though these are common tools used to rebuild societies, research shows that they often produce mixed results in terms of success (Mukherjee, 2006).

Power-sharing agreements are a prominent element of post-conflict negotiations. Such arrangements usually entail allowances for political positions to be held by specific groups or they can allow insurgent groups to form new parties and participate in elections. The impact of these agreements is significant. The Power-Sharing Event Dataset (PSED) events shows that, “almost 45% of all observed power-sharing events were events in which rebel representatives took over senior and non-senior cabinet positions or were guaranteed seats in the national parliament” (Ottmann and Vullers, 2015, p. 337). The same dataset, through analysis of government-rebel dyads, classifies 111 instances of conflict in the mere 17 years between 1989 and 2006. Africa, in particular, has been the location of a high number of state-rebel conflict dyads. Of the 111 examples listed previously, 66 cases were located in Africa and 33 experienced conflict reoccurrence within five years of a peace agreement (Ottmann and Vullers, 2015). In a short period, a significant number of power-sharing societies returned to war, yet these new, more inclusive governments are becoming a feature of states around the world.

Once a new government has been created, what does governance look like? Reporting in some post-conflict power-sharing areas shows that groups within the new government may choose not to participate. UNITA in Angola chose non-participation as a means of expressing frustration in governmental proceedings and a lack of faith in the post-conflict government. Elected UNITA officials chose to boycott the electoral process
after they were unsuccessful in achieving early victories (Vines and Oruitemeka, 2008). Choosing non-participation is a strategic decision that demands further research. Does non-participation inherently signal a return to violence? In the case of UNITA, a refusal to participate in runoff elections was indeed a return to civil war. In other circumstances, this has not been the case. Whether this is a simple behavior encompassed by democratic methods or is a signal of failing liberal principles is one possible path for future research.

The differences between waging guerrilla warfare and actively participating in governance seem to be stark. So, what makes guerrilla groups more or less successful in governance? To begin to answer this question, I will provide an overview of existing research on the subject. This information provides the foundation for the hypotheses, which I will introduce next. Then, I will move into a discussion of the methods that I will use to evaluate these hypotheses. Formerly armed groups are becoming new political parties, but do not necessarily help to create peaceful states. By focusing on the role of Sinn Féin within the Northern Ireland Assembly, I hope to create a starting point from which formerly armed insurgents in political roles can be studied. This specific body of research can provide insight into the case of the IRA and Sinn Féin, which is beneficial on a micro-level for understanding the impact of power-sharing with former IRA members.

**Literature Review**

Existing research on post-conflict societies is broad. War termination, peace agreements, power-sharing, stability, and elections all command the attention of scholars worldwide. These areas of scholarship help to build a foundation upon which non-state groups who turn into political actors can be evaluated. The starting point for this research
is at the end of intrastate conflict, which is signified by the signing of an agreement or ceasefire. In the 111 civil wars between 1944 and 1999, 61 cases used power-sharing as a tool in peace agreements (Mukherjee, 2006). In these situations, insurgent groups become political parties and take elected or appointed office. Ideally, the state then begins to function again and the former insurgent group starts to govern. From this point forward, the newly formed political party will either succeed or fail in their attempts. It is at this stage that my primary research question can be asked: what makes violent non-state groups more or less effective in government?

War termination is an important consideration for post-conflict governance. For more than twenty years, post-conflict activity has focused with great emphasis on liberal paradigms promising stability with democratization (Ottmann and Vullers, 2015). Increased international involvement in peace processes and an increasing realization of the importance of post-conflict elections have also characterized modern solutions to civil war (Lyons, 2005). These trends are often expressed in the form of agreements that allow formerly insurgent groups to participate as representatives in the government. Though these are common tools used to rebuild societies, research shows that they often produce unclear results in terms of success (Mukherjee, 2006).

Militant groups can be termed guerrillas, terrorists, insurgents, militias, non-state actors, and so on. One attempt to clarify the difference focuses on targets and victims; if the group attacks soft targets, then it is likely to be viewed as a terrorist group. However, making this distinction is not always easy. In many ways, the decision on what to call a violent, armed group is dependent on perspective and is rarely universally accepted (Martin, 2017). A “terrorist” group may attack soft targets but aim to achieve political
goals, blurring the proposed line between “guerrilla” and “terrorist” (Stern and Berger, 2015). To complicate the matter further, the group itself may change over time and, as a result, so might their goals and classification (Martin, 2017). The specific criteria for non-government armed groups used in this research will be revisited during a discussion of research methods later on.

**Prevailing Trends**

Stages of post-conflict redevelopment form distinct phases. These are not always linear, as a conflict can easily reemerge after a failed negotiation or a misunderstanding. Research on non-government armed groups often begins in the post-conflict stage, concerning peacebuilding, power-sharing, and governance (Hatrzell and Hodie, 2003; Kovacs, 2008; Manning, 2004; Wiegand, 2010). The next phase considers the transition process as these groups change from warring parties to political ones. When the transformation is complete, elections must take place. However, the elections may happen before the party is fully developed. Post-conflict elections, then, become the final research area in the area of guerrillas in governance. To create a foundation for this discussion, a review of existing research in each of these phases can help expand understanding.

**Post-Conflict Processes and the Rise of Power-Sharing**

Research offers a wealth of information on post-conflict societies and their redevelopment. State fragility is one common area of focus: post-conflict states often show signs of collapse in the period following civil war. As legitimacy and capacity weaken, civilian repression often increases, and states then may follow a pattern of self-
destruction. There is a paradoxical relationship with guerrilla groups and state building, wherein the actors involved in creating a new government lack the necessary skills for peaceful redevelopment but are increasingly included in the process (McDonough, 2008). The line between post-conflict and pre-conflict then becomes blurred, complicating matters further.

There are a number of issues that can both generate and perpetuate conflict. The first of these is the distribution of political power, which affects state legitimacy and the efficacy of institutions. Unequal distributions of power and public goods are causes that often spark the creation of militant groups (Kovacs, 2008). The presence of these groups and internal political violence is a threat to the existing regime (Gurr, 1970). A focus on relative gains drives repression and can increases intragroup tensions, further fueling the conflict (McDonough, 2008). Guerrilla and other armed groups often arise out of this real or perceived deprivation, as weak or incapable governments do not meet their needs. As Gurr explains, “Deprivation induced discontent is a general spur to action. Psychological theory and group conflict theory both suggest that the greater the intensity of discontent, the more likely is violence” (1970, p. 13). These same concerns, though, can alternately turn groups towards using political office to reach their goals if they become convinced that it is necessary or possible to work inside existing institutions (Kovacs, 2008). This involvement may facilitate democratization, but can also lend itself towards the creation of a non-democracy. Liberation movements in particular may result in one-party systems, which are not necessarily full-fledged democracies (Ottoway, 1991). Partial or hybrid democracies are likely to see higher levels of violence than fully consolidated democracies. This is a problem that can perpetuate instability within the
state (Goldsmith, 2010). The threat from non-state militant groups is akin to that of strong military states; high military capacity frequently leads to support of authoritarian regimes (Beswick, 2014). Therefore, even if a group decides to transition to working within political institutions, the result may not be a liberal, democratic government.

Over the last few decades, the world has seen an increase in power-sharing agreements as a means of conflict resolution (Ottmann and Vullers, 2015). These agreements can have provisions for different parts of society. Agreements can divide power in terms of territory, economics, military, or political control (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003). Many agreements include provisions for several of these categories at the same time. The divisions between these types of power-sharing are blurred. Political power-sharing itself can come in many forms, offering specific roles within the government or merely the chance at being elected (Mukherjee, 2006). Additionally, there are arguable differences in agreements with heavy third party involvement and those with little outside support (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003). Discussions of power-sharing, therefore, increasingly need to address more diverse versions of the same concept.

Conflict termination can affect the terms of power-sharing. Formerly armed insurgents who were moderately successful may have different political gains than those who were essentially defeated. The nature of the conflict, including its end, can have a lasting impact on how the former insurgents and former government treat one another. Mutual cooperation is critical for this type of arrangement. Strom, Gates, Graham, and Strand detail the obstacles this poses when creating an agreement:

*Power sharing is challenging also because it typically requires the voluntary and sustained cooperation of political players with fundamentally different goals.*
Powerful political actors (players) typically have an outside option of withdrawing from joint decision making. If they do, they may attempt to secede or resort to armed violence, or at a minimum contest the legitimacy of the regime, any of which could inflict a heavy cost on others. A main premise of power sharing is, therefore, to guarantee each player capable of acting as a spoiler a sufficient payoff from cooperation and peaceful behavior. The hope is that each player will enter into the agreement expecting a higher payoff from peaceful cooperation than from withdrawal or violence, and that the rewards from cooperative behavior will in fact sustain this expectation (2017, p. 168).

Political exclusion is considered an important variable in both conflict and conflict recurrence. Political inclusion in and of itself, though, can vary in scope and practice and is not sufficient to eliminate friction (Call, 2012). In post-conflict agreements, power-sharing is an institutional way to ensure political inclusion. It can be used as a mechanism to decrease security fears by helping to spread power and control among different groups. In this way, the threat of one group monopolizing the government is lessened (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003). Notably though, power-sharing may or may not include inherently integrative policies or practices despite verbiage of cooperation. It is only in more recently published scholarly literature that differentiations in power-sharing typologies, practices, and implications have been considered more fully (Call, 2012). If the nature of the agreement is more superficial than inclusive, the agreement itself may not have the intended impact.

It has become common practice to include armed groups in the new government by way of formal agreement (Strom et al, 2017). As Kovacs explains, “the return to
normal politics should be on the basis of a new inclusive polity that brings together those who felt discriminated against, and those who were a part of the old political system, to share power and benefits in a new political system” (2008, p. 136). This sentiment, echoed by scholars such as Zartman and Wallensteen, recognizes a need for political expression from violent groups (Kovacs, 2008). The penchant towards inclusion drives many agreements towards democratization, as democratic structures inherently provide for these needs (Kovacs, 2008). However, the involvement of insurgent groups in post-conflict governance can be complicated by the motives of the current government in power. That government may use power-sharing agreements as a means of manipulating support and public opinion towards the guerrilla group. Offering a role in governance can diminish the group’s image to hardliner supporters and can damage their credibility (Mukherjee, 2008). Negotiations present an opportunity for the government to exploit weaknesses and achieve a better outcome for itself, which can make groups less willing to bargain with it later (Lebow, 1996).

Power-sharing agreements are a prominent element of post-conflict negotiations, but are not necessarily effective. Such agreements usually entail allowances for government positions to be held by specific groups or they can allow insurgent groups to form new parties and participate in elections. Research on the success of power-sharing agreements, however, shows mixed results. Approximately 44% of power sharing agreements fail to promote peace (Mukherjee, 2006). This failure in many cases has led directly back to war. The duration of time for which the agreement lasts varies greatly, as well. In one study of 61 power-sharing arrangements, “peace endured for a range of 95-183 months for 18 cases, 67-94 months in 24 cases, and merely 6-19 months in the
remaining 19 cases” (Mukherjee, 2006, p. 480). One of the possible reasons for inconclusive results is the multitude of meanings behind the phrase “power-sharing.” Various arrangements have included elements of territory, political office, military, and economics (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003). On its own, power-sharing appears to be just as fraught with potential vulnerabilities as many other popular elements of peace agreements (Mukherjee, 2006). Early evidence suggests that the practice of shared responsibility for politics, economics, territory, or military endeavors is not enough by itself to resolve conflict. While many post-conflict settlements have common threads of democratization, power-sharing, and the creation of new political parties, the long-term impact is not well understood.

The use of power-sharing as a concession during negotiations can be a source of distrust amongst the participants involved. Government representatives may offer power-sharing arrangements to create the illusion that they are in a strong position, in an attempt to force the insurgent group into accepting a ceasefire. In this case, they hope to send an exaggerated signal of their own power to shape the outcome (Mukherjee, 2006). In other conflicts, insurgents may view a power-sharing arrangement as a means of avoiding prosecution for war crimes. Amnesty is a frequent bargaining chip in post-conflict agreements, leading some groups to accept participation in government as a means of evading legal ramifications from their actions (Kovacs, 2008). Perceived leniency for former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) combatants was publicly cited by opposition to the attempted 2016 peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC rebels. They had been at war for more than 50 years. It was one of the most vocal reason that the first attempted agreement in 2016 failed (Shifter,
2016). Later that year, the Colombian Congress ratified a renegotiated settlement, which was tougher on former rebels than the earlier draft (Katkov, 2016). Offers that minimize or eliminate punishment inherently undermine the seemingly democratic principle of rule of law in society. Some research has indicated that these types of governments are not necessarily disinclined to use violence, even after a ceasefire. Situations where violence remains a cheap and easy option for the parties exacerbate this weakness (Curtis, 2012).

Government institutions and timing are also important factors. There are many potential vulnerabilities that could contribute to perpetuating unrest including, “…military-dominated regimes, economies based on humanitarian relief, black-market networks, predation, and social formations and identities shaped by insecurity and fear” (Lyons, 2005, p. 3). In other words, institutions that sustain war are ill suited to sustain peace. Demilitarization of politics is a critical element of long-term stability. Greater demilitarization, especially before an election, can lead to greater chances of successful transitions for these groups (Lyons, 2005). In this vein, some post-conflict agreements include provisions for power-sharing within the military (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003). However, this particular form of cooperation is frequently met with reluctance (Lyons, 1999). This is possibly because of its clear ties to group security and the vulnerable position that the group members would then be in.

The type of government that institutes power-sharing is an additional factor to consider. Democratic governments can come in different forms. The state can be parliamentary or presidential. The electoral system may be proportional or majoritarian. Accountability may also vary from state to state (Strom et al., 2017). Przeworski argued that power-sharing agreements would limit the competitiveness of elections in a
democracy, and thus may hinder democratic development (1991). In contrast, Lijphart conceptualized power-sharing as an institutionalization of democracy (1977). A study conducted by Strom et al. indicates that power-sharing is more prevalent among democracies than non-democracies, but is often introduced into post-conflict states that are not firmly democratic (2017). Inclusive power-sharing may inhibit democratic pillars including accountability, but is the form most commonly used in peace agreements that follow civil conflict.

Democratization persists as a favored theme of modern peace processes, and political parties are a key element within that. Converting armed non-state groups into political parties is a necessary part of this transition. Participation within a party provides an opportunity for representation and creates openings for addressing grievances (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003). However, this also presents a critical challenge, because “the militant, hierarchical, sectarian, and internally undemocratic nature of these groups work counter to the development of peaceful, democratic, transparent, and inclusive parties” (Kovacs, 2008, p. 135). This creates an obvious tension, since inclusiveness is a keystone of peacebuilding and democracy. Successful political parties need to be representative and need to be able to translate that representation into policy outcomes (Kovacs, 2008). Formerly armed groups, especially when contrasted with existing political parties, are not readily equipped for this process.

Organizational Transformation: Guerrillas to Political Actors

In order for a guerrilla group to become a political party, a number of transformations need to take place. Many of these are necessary to help ensure success as political actors. From the hierarchy guerrilla groups operate under to the ways in which
they attract support and achieve goals, substantial changes are often required. These changes frequently upset existing members, who may break ties and create splinter groups who contend for support of the same constituency. Additionally, new members do not always have the same attachments to ideals as previous members and tensions can arise out of this seeming lack of commitment to the cause. This complication further inhibits wider participation and representation which shows that, “…efforts to promote both peace and democratization in war-shattered societies through the transformation of armed groups to peaceful parties might undermine precisely those values that it sought to encourage” (Kovacs, 2008, p. 135).

Some parties successfully adapt to new ways of operating, but others find that maintaining old cleavages is a way to keep their party relevant. The process of becoming a sustainable party is complex. Groups need to ensure funding from sources that will remain after violence ends, often need to reform leadership, and must develop new tactics to achieve their goals (Manning, 2004). The organizations themselves face challenges in the form of adjustments to inter-elite relationships and adapting strategies to attract support. Inter-elite friction is a function of participating in electoral politics. Groups often need to seek out and recruit more members to participate in the new system, and consequently run the risk of alienating those members who were in support of the group’s “old ways.” Freshly recruited members are often willing to work within the redesigned political system—a concept at odds with strategies that made past members more comfortable. Additionally, newly recruited members may be brought in to serve as political leaders themselves, which exacerbates intragroup conflict by providing new
members with benefits and exposure from which past members are excluded (Manning, 2004).

The way a group is classified can also affect the ease with which it transitions to a political party. Wiegand argues that terrorist groups are less likely than guerrilla groups to make a successful transition to political life. This is in part because guerrilla groups are more likely than terrorist group to be included in peace processes and, later, are more likely to be involved in post-conflict governance (Wiegand, 2010). Yet the same organization may be termed “terrorist” by one observer and “insurgent” by the next (Martin, 2017). Successful transition should include elements of disarmament and demobilization and renouncing violence. They also require public declarations against violence and a break in ties with any remaining faction that may still use violence to achieve its goals. Perceptions can also influence whether their initial goals and grievances are viewed as legitimate by the state and by non-state actors who may be involved (Wiegand, 2010).

Other obstacles to organizational transformation come in the form of representation. In order to win seats in an election, a party must marshal public support. This pressure to turn out supporters is even greater in power-sharing arrangements where the number of parliamentary or government positions a group will receive is not predetermined in the peace agreement, but instead is contingent upon the proportion of the vote they receive. Some groups find it helpful to maintain their own power by continuing to accentuate ethnically segmented political polarization. This means that war-related tensions are not actually reduced in the new and inclusive government (Manning, 2004). Ethnic outbidding is a practice by which parties appeal almost exclusively to their
own group. These parties mobilize their own supporters with appeals to extremism and ethnically motivated fears and hardline campaign promises. There is some research supporting the idea that power-sharing may minimize these concerns, by ensuring that parties have representation (Mitchell, Evans, and O’Leary, 2009). However, not all power-sharing provides a guarantee of representation and may not provide the necessary assurances.

The methods that groups use to mobilize support from the wider population is another possible source of internal division (Wiegand, 2010). Some groups will splinter into several parties, which further divides the possible votes, and provides fewer opportunities to participate in government. This disintegration of the support base serves to exacerbate post-conflict tensions (Manning, 2004). Fewer votes translate into fewer seats in government, leaving frustrated citizens and militant fighters alike, feeling as though the new government is still unresponsive to their needs. Recruitment strategies used by new parties can involve collective or selective incentives, or a combination of both. The Renamo party in Mozambique is one example of a group trying to use both kinds of strategies. Their support base has been described as a “coalition of the marginalized” and includes remnants of their wartime supporters along with groups who have not been well served by the majority party in power. This strategy, however, has somewhat limited the group’s ability to reorganize internally, which Manning argues weakens their long-term prospects as a political party (2004).

Organizational transformations require the group to build a platform for change and to redefine their goals. They need to build political capacity to win elections, to legislate, and to govern. A need for civilian leadership that is responsive to members is
required, as well. This contrasts the way that many guerrilla groups function during conflict-with a top-down power structure and militant leadership (Wiegand, 2010). The creation of a political wing can complicate inter-group dynamics and some members may choose to continue with guerrilla or terrorist activities. If the political faction denounces this violent segment, it may be sincere or insincere in its declaration. In some cases, the political organization is merely a front and the militant wing is still the truly prioritized segment (Wiegand, 2010). De Zeeuw highlights these contradictions, inherent with “façade transformations,” wherein there is a failure to make significant organizational changes and the group still carries out its primary functions through violent means (2008, p. 18). One of the other challenges the new party will face is the reformation of negative perceptions (Wiegand, 2010). In some ways, these former guerrilla groups serving as opposition political parties simply provide, “the continuation of war by other means” (Kovacs, 2008). In this case, turmoil continues to destroy the state.

Disarmament is a critical step in ensuring that a guerrilla group is committed to leaving armed conflict for political life, and plays a role in the reformation of group perception. The probability of renewed conflict increases drastically if this step is not in place (Kovacs, 2008 and Wiegand, 2010). In some circumstances, political competition becomes a more effective means of reaching goals than violence had been (Wiegand, 2010). However, the new party will have to create relationships with other political parties, governing officials, organizations and society in order for this to be the case. Disarmament is a critical step in that process, as it is necessary for repairing relationships and building trust (Wiegand, 2010). The reasons a guerrilla group turns to political life can also affect its chances of successful transition. The government may have responded
to their requests or needs, the cost of violence may have increased too much, or a lack of support might cause the group to need a new strategy. These reasons can then affect the group politically through issues like member burnout or declining commitment to the cause. They may also experience a decline in popularity because of backlash from the conflict itself (Wiegand, 2010).

*Post-Conflict Elections*

Post-conflict elections are a critical part of stable progress after civil war. If there is a guerrilla, terrorist, or insurgent group that is trying to transition into a political role, these elections can be fraught with even more tension than would otherwise be the case. The time between a cease-fire and an election is a critical period (Lyons, 1999). This is the time when institutions are built, organizations are transformed, and judicial process may get underway. This can be a period of high risk, but offers citizens the opportunity to elect a government that can work towards lasting peace (Lyons, 1999). Elections themselves offer a “…means to legitimate the new leadership and institutional structures that emerge from a negotiated settlement to a civil war” (Lyons, 1999, p. 5).

The relationship between power-sharing agreements and post-conflict elections is complex. Jarstad’s research shows that power-sharing deals do not necessarily have a negative effect on peace after elections. However, her research also shows that conflict frequently continues after an election, and that power-sharing does not automatically facilitate a smooth voting process (Jarstad, 2009). Political arrangements to share power with former insurgents can limit competition in elections (Przeworski, 1991). Power-sharing can also create barriers to effective government, through gridlock and
institutionalized polarization (Jarstad, 2009). This can make re-election difficult down the road.

There are divisions between academics with differing opinions on the role of peacekeepers, new institutions, the importance of demilitarization, and timing in post-conflict elections. Some of the debates focus on whether it is better to have elections shortly after making an agreement, or whether it is prudent to let more time pass. Peacekeepers can provide security during post-conflict elections, which would otherwise be chaotic, but they also imply pressure from outsiders on domestic political outcomes. Successful elections show potential humanitarian aid providers that the country is moving in a positive direction, but if rushed they can fall apart more easily. These initial elections can set the stage for patterns of less democratic campaigning and elections in the future. The style of the early political behavior, “…often gets locked into political institutions and ideas, sending a country’s political development on a detour that makes democratic consolidation more difficult and war more likely” (Barcanti and Snyder, 2012, p. 826). Many aspects of the election process have a lasting impact on the newly formed government.

Perceptions of legitimacy in post-war elections are important, as the possibility for a return to violence is higher than it would be in a more stable state. The first election after a conflict is often one that garners enthusiasm from much of the population, but subsequent elections may not carry the same fervor. Within the population, ex-combatants are a particularly important subset to observe as they are the ones most like to turn to violence should the election be perceived as illegitimate. They are also the group within the society that has challenged the legitimacy of existing government structures.
Because of these qualities, ex-combatants are an important variable in post-conflict elections (Soderstrom, 2013). They can play a role in maintaining perceptions of legitimacy for the state.

The timing of elections may have a significant impact on the success of the post-conflict government. Elections held shortly after a peace accord can help to legitimize post-conflict institutions (Diamond, 2006). Though some scholars argue that elections that take place immediately after a peace agreement can help to consolidate the transition to democracy, there is compelling research showing that may not be the case (Barcanti and Snyder, 2012). If elections are rushed, the country does not have time to create or rebuild necessary elements of democratic societies such as the judicial system, media, or bureaucracy. With weak structures and institutions, the elections are more vulnerable to corruption and violence, which can hurt their claims of legitimacy later on (Barcanti and Snyder, 2012). Having underdeveloped structures and institutions leaves the state weak in the post-election period.

Post-conflict elections can favor recent combatants if held too soon after to a peace agreement is made. During this time, the group may still have access to a sizeable amount of material resources. Their organizational structure likely will still be quite strong, still full of members whose strengths are more military than political. Though they will not necessarily have greater support than incumbents running for office will, former combatants do have better name recognition and network connections than entirely new political parties. If the peace agreement allowed for the introduction of other new parties, this sets them at a distinct and potentially problematic disadvantage.
(Barcanti and Snyder, 2012). It is important to allow enough time to build or strengthen institutions, and to create some distance from the conflict.

Conclusion

The process from war termination through post-conflict elections is fraught with opportunities for civil war recurrence. For those states and parties who survive these post-conflict stages and move on to normal governance, questions linger about the efficacy of newly formed political parties and those they represent. Scholars and practitioners have lauded power-sharing agreements as a solution to issues of political exclusion within societies, encompassing well-respected liberal values and new opportunities for marginalized peoples. As a result, power-sharing has increased over the last three decades.

These arrangements often place politically unskilled fighters into roles requiring knowledge and abilities that they may not yet have. With expertise and techniques fomented by war, it would be unsurprising for ex-combatants to return to the familiarity and tangible results of violence. Power-sharing alone will not guarantee an end to conflict or smooth elections. Trying to compromise with the government they had formerly been at odds with creates another barrier to regular governance. Power-sharing governments frequently struggle with political gridlock, which can frustrate party members (Jarstad, 2009). Yet, we know that not all power-sharing agreements result in failure or war recurrence, which seems to indicate that some former guerrillas are able to govern effectively (Mukherjee, 2006). Studies have been done in recent years examining different types of power-sharing (Strom et al., 2015; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; Mukherjee, 2006). This research has provided insight into the effect it can have on
elections, conflict management, and democracy. However, the impact that the formerly armed insurgents have is not addressed. A closer examination, then, of the effects of formerly armed combatants in government is necessary. This will be done through the study of Sinn Féin in Northern Ireland.
Chapter 2: Methods and Research Design

This research project is designed to assess the efficacy of guerrilla groups who become political parties. Are former insurgents more likely to use political violence or create gridlock? One of the biggest shortfalls of existing research is that it often fails to isolate governments that include former guerrilla groups from those that do not. Since peacebuilding trends call for inclusion of marginalized groups in new governments, it is imperative that we increase the depth of our knowledge on what this inclusion looks like and what possible complications may arise. After civil war, state fragility is likely to be high, but how closely that is linked to new groups serving as political parties is unclear.

Previous research indicates that former insurgent groups might be more likely to use gridlock or boycotts, as well as violence, to reach their goals. This research tests whether that is an accurate assessment of governance by former guerrillas. It is designed to account for the role that other parties may play in the creation of new laws or political stalemates, by including news coverage of attempted bills. If the new political party does not hold significant power in the legislature, their efforts may be easily hindered by opposition. This case study design has been developed with this in mind.

Definitions of various armed non-state groups can be a source of confusion. As previously discussed, the same organizations can be described in one instance as a guerrilla group and in the next are cited as terrorists. Sometimes they are liberation movements, rebels, and insurgents. The lack of consistency in terminology complicates
greater understanding. These inconsistencies with naming groups means that any research produced is not necessarily as generalizable as some may interpret it to be and furthermore means that other researchers may miss crucial data by searching in the wrong places. The subject being studied needs clarification so that methods of measurement can ensure validity and reliability of results (Adcock and Collier, 2001).

In order to evaluate the success or failure of former guerrillas in government, I must operationalize success or failure in governance. For my purposes, this will be defined in terms of produced legislation and levels of political violence. These measures are designed to capture the ability of the party to translate objectives into policy, to utilize new methods of expression for grievances, and to test the ability of the group to stay non-violent. The research on transitioning groups highlights potential problem areas in terms of violent supporters, creating and understanding policy, maintaining constituencies, and working with former adversaries (Wiegand, 2010). Therefore, a logical starting point to understand their abilities in the post-war period is on the basis of these challenges.

Participation in government is a form of political inclusion, and has the potential to open channels to address grievances (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003). However, if the party cannot create legislation, then those grievances would likely be ignored. Since the party itself is often formed out of a need for more accurate representation, it follows that representation would need to turn into policy for the group transition to be considered successful. Because violence was a useful method for the group during war, it could offer an enticing and familiar way to handle ongoing disagreements. If the party were successful in achieving a share of power in the government, the use of violence would rightly be viewed as an effective strategy. This would hold true even if the group were
unsuccessful in achieving some of their other goals. However, they now have a method of expression from which they were previously excluded. Levels of violence can indicate whether inclusion in government sufficiently addresses the needs of their constituents. This would be an alternative to the violence triggered by needs, as advocated by scholars such as Gurr (1970), McDonough (2008), and Kovacs (2008).

This leads me to two hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 1:** A government with formerly armed insurgents in a power-sharing role will produce fewer pieces of legislation in a two-year span following a power-sharing arrangement than in a comparable two-year span prior to the agreement.

**Hypothesis 2:** Levels of violence will be higher in a state which includes formerly armed insurgents after they take a political role than prior to political power-sharing.

An important focus of this research is formerly armed groups who transition to political parties. To operationalize this, it must be divided into two parts: 1. the type of group during the conflict and 2. the party formed after an agreement has been made. The definition of organizations before transformation that qualify for this research is borrowed from De Zeeuw, “…a non-state organization with clear political objectives that contest a government’s authority and legitimate monopoly on violence and uses armed force in order to reform, overthrow, or secede from an existing state regime or control a specific geographic area” (2008, p.4). As explained by De Zeeuw, this differentiates between groups who use violence for primarily criminal motives as opposed to political
ones. It also allows for groups with articulated political goals who are logical participants in the government process after war termination. Organizations that qualify post-transformation can be operationalized as De Zeeuw, building on party definitions from Sartori, explained with “…’any political group that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections candidates for public office’ through non-violent means” (2008, p.5). De Zeeuw accurately describes a post-conflict political party. He notably argues that it may be less efficient than more established groups, and therefore can fit a looser description than established political parties in consolidated democracies can (2008).

In order to test Hypotheses 1, I will evaluate the legislative process and violence in one state before and after a power-sharing agreement. I expect that the barriers presented by former IRA members in government will be greater than the barriers of partisanship and active conflict being waged. There is a lack of research proving or disproving this assumption already in existence. The case study approach is necessary, because there is limited amalgamated data on this subject to use for a larger quantitative study. The use of a case study, furthermore, will allow for a clearer picture of what the process of creating laws or gridlock was like for that state. I will be using a before and after case study design, which is part of the Most Similar Case design method (George and Bennett, 2005). It will be necessary to examine the situations closely to evaluate whether violence is committed on behalf of that group, a different political party, or a combination of the two. In-depth research through process tracing should clarify whether the success or failure in governance was a result of cooperation, enmity, or outside factors. There is a possibility that the party may be successful in some endeavors, but
unable to pass legislation due to conflict or dysfunction with other members of the government. Process tracing will help to link all of the pieces of data together (George and Bennett, 2005). For my case, I will evaluate who proposed the legislation as well as whether it was successfully passed. Although this process involves different groups, it can help to measure ability to govern. By focusing on who proposes and passes each piece, I hope to clarify the role of a specific group within a larger governing body.

Hypothesis 2 centers on violence, because that is the tool used in conflict. Power-sharing datasets indicate that these agreements often fail and can result in a return to war (Ottman and Vullers, 2015; Call, 2012). Yet, studies on power-sharing use different thresholds for civil war recurrence. Data on the topic uses either 25 deaths per year or 1,000 deaths per year as the criteria for war (Ottman and Vullers, 2015; Mukherjee, 2006; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003). These two options are dramatically far apart. For Hypothesis 2, I chose to use terrorist incidents, because I wanted a measure that would capture the possible frustration of the former insurgent group, even if war did not reoccur.

To test Hypothesis 2, I will be using the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) from the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). This database collects information on terrorist incidents including instances of terror, injuries, casualties, and perpetrators. This data should provide an idea of what levels of violence looked like before and after power-sharing. The GTD information on perpetrators will help to clarify whether the groups involved in violence are the same as those involved in power-sharing, or some other entity. Differences in these levels before and after formerly armed insurgents take office will shed some light on the successes or pitfalls of this process.
I will also include an evaluation of whether the state returns to war after the agreement is implemented. Existing research has shown that post-conflict states face a wide array of challenges to stability and security (Lyons, 2005). If the presence of formerly armed insurgents does not contribute significantly to the weakness of the state, then it is one indication that the power-sharing role of former insurgents does not actively endanger the state any more than other post-conflict variables. Testing this in conjunction with Hypotheses 1 and 2 also allows for the possibility that the group itself may be effective in a political role—even if the state itself is unstable. Though data has been collected on the durability of power-sharing (see Mukherjee, 2006; Ottmann and Vullers, 2015), it does not single out political power sharing and formerly armed insurgents in political office. The research, though useful, is too broad to encapsulate the impact of the small group within the state.

Within existing literature, there is a vast array of case study research and a far smaller cadre of quantitative studies. In many ways, this lays a foundation for valuable future research. Case studies provide an opportunity for deeper understanding and can offer excellent grounds for comparison. These comparisons can lay the groundwork for drawing conclusions about bigger patterns and trends, within either a region or specific to a phenomenon. Often this happens through structured comparisons, which allow for strong arguments about causality (George and Bennett, 2005). While the depth of understanding provided by case studies is helpful, there are some drawbacks. A few cases seem to be the focus of a lot of research, while others are studied much less often. Cases such as Angola and Liberia have been the focus of numerous studies (see Lyons, 2005; McDonough, 2008; Vines and Ouritmemeka, 2008; Ottoway, 1998). This could be a
result of limited access to necessary information, but it is important to note as it effects the collective body of research from which others may begin their work.

Sinn Féin was selected by criteria that consider these topics, with some limitations due to availability of data. Northern Ireland is a post-conflict state, so comparisons of political violence and produced legislation can be made. A before and after design will allow me to examine the impact of the St. Andrews power-sharing agreement. There are limits to how well bias can be minimized, but an awareness of the nature of media coverage in conflict zones will provide some restriction to the collection of data from news sources.

The collection of this information can provide a more accurate view of post-conflict stability, but alone it will not allow for a direct consideration of causal mechanisms. For Sinn Féin, I will examine passed legislation, violence, and conflict recurrence. Data on legislation that is passed successfully will come from the Northern Ireland Assembly. Causality will be determined through an analysis of news coverage for two years after post-conflict elections. For this research, the span is limited to only two years, though a longer period would be beneficial in the future. Media coverage of the party’s activities will provide insight on their abilities within the broader government institutions.

How states function in the nuanced and complex aftermath of conflict is an enormous question to address. It is no surprise, then, that academic research has only addressed a comparatively narrow selection of the issues and behaviors associated with it. While there are a good many topics about which much has been established, there are many which have yet to be evaluated in depth. Some methods of inquiry, such as case
studies, as used more frequently than others, which can shape the kinds of data produced by researchers in this arena. There is an exciting opportunity to understand more clearly the dynamics of post-conflict zones and the challenges they face.

The assumption that a change in government is a change towards democracy, and that that change is inherently good for the country, lines the subtext of many post-conflict studies. This debate is not fully settled, and there is room to argue that the transition to democracy paradigm is not universally applicable. Though much of this research is founded in the implicit or explicit assumption that transitioning governments are moving in the direction of democratization, this is not always the case (Carothers, 2002). Even when post-conflict agreements are designed to build democratic states, authoritarian ones may be the true result (Mukherjee, 2008). Whether power-sharing governments can produce more democratic governance is critical to understanding these situations.

Overlying all of these concerns are debates about paradigms and research traditions. Some scholars would argue that guerrillas in power have no effect, because it is institutions that drive outcomes. Others would write off institutions and individuals as insignificant, choosing instead to focus on the state as a unitary actor. Some would focus on individual agency and behavior, or the society as a unit (Lim, 2010). Yet, there are considerable reasons to believe that guerrilla groups in government would have particular impacts and tendencies and, furthermore, to believe that these would have an effect on the wider world. The best way to settle this debate is, of course, to produce more research on the subject.

The resolution of intrastate conflict through power-sharing agreements appeases democratically minded outsiders and insiders alike. By offering an outlet for grievances
and a modicum of power to marginalized groups, it is hoped that future conflict can be avoided. However, data on power-sharing presents a picture of a solution that is incomplete. Whether formerly armed combatants can effectively hold political office is a question that has not satisfactorily been addressed by current research. By testing legislative productivity and levels of violence I hope to create a clearer picture of governance by ex-guerrillas. This research is limited in external applicability, but provides necessary insight to Sinn Féin.

**Case Study: Northern Ireland, the IRA, and Sinn Féin**

Are formerly armed insurgents capable of transitioning into political life? Successful transition would include an insurgent’s ability to behave like a political organization, not an armed rebellion. An effective political group should be able to make policy. Translating the aims of an organization into public policy and engaging with the political institutions are a basic necessity in making this change. As such, I would expect to see that former militant groups struggle to create and pass legislation. The idea that guides power-sharing is one of inclusion; with a political outlet for grievances, people should be less inclined towards violence. However, if former insurgents were unable to translate their aims into public policy, then the likelihood of a return to violence would be high. These questions are tested with the case of Sinn Féin and Northern Ireland.

There were several criteria that I used when selecting this case. The first was that the research focus on a post-conflict zone, which Northern Ireland is. The second criteria was that the group be a non-government armed force with political goals. The IRA meets this requirement. The third criteria is that the group transition into political life and have the ability to place candidates in public office without violence, which Sinn Féin has
done. For the purposes of my research, the group needed to take political office through a power-sharing agreement, which also fits with this case. Northern Ireland provided a clear example of former insurgents becoming politicians, since many within the leadership of the IRA became leaders within Sinn Féin. In some other potential case studies, new members became politicians on behalf of their party instead of the formerly armed insurgents. Northern Ireland presents the best scenario for an initial study of formerly armed insurgents in government.

**Background**

The divide amongst the population in Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom has roots dating back to the 1600s. For centuries, their differences simmered. This fight centered on whether Northern Ireland should be a part of the United Kingdom. Unionists wanted to remain in the United Kingdom, but nationalists wanted to be part of the Republic of Ireland. Patterns seen in Northern Ireland today still subtly reflect the very alliances that started decades earlier. From unionists and nationalists, militant groups formed and fought for their side. Negotiations attempted to bring all parties together and eliminate the violence, but were difficult to manage. Some of the nationalists formed a political movement: Sinn Féin. From an army of rebels came a political organization, which still functions to this day.

Northern Ireland consists of the nine counties of Ulster. In 1542, the king of England declared English rule over Ireland. Later, in 1606, English and Scottish settlers were relocated to Ulster. English settlers were largely Protestant, but the Irish were Catholic. In 1641, King Charles I of England was facing opposition from Protestant members of government. The Catholic Northern Irish revolted and pledged allegiance to
the monarchy. By the 1700s, Protestants or English nobles owned most of the land in Northern Ireland (Mulholland, 2002). By the following century, Ireland had officially become part of the United Kingdom. In 1801, the Irish parliament was abolished and the Irish revolted in protest. Later that century, the Northern Irish began to lobby for “home rule.” It would take three attempts to pass a bill allowing a parliament in Dublin to control local affairs. By the early 1900s, tensions between Protestant and Catholic groups led to proposals to divide Ireland into a north and south. The mostly Protestant northern counties would remain a part of the United Kingdom (Mulholland, 2002).

In 1914, the fierce division was felt in both Britain and Northern Ireland. British Conservatives backed the unionists in Northern Ireland, while the nationalists found support from the Liberals and Labour members. During World War I, all sides were involved in fighting. Then, on Easter in 1916, the “Easter Rising” started when Northern Irish republicans rebelled against home rule once more (Dixon, 2001). The British shut down the bloody uprising within one week and executed its leaders. This Easter Rising coincided with increased support for an early iteration of Sinn Féin, though the organization was skeletal at the time (Feeney, 2003). The harsh reaction of the British to the uprising contributed to a rise in sympathy for those who wanted independence (Dixon, 2001).

The IRA waged a war for independence from 1919-1921. In 1920, the British Government decided to partition Ireland. One year later, the government signed a treaty with Sinn Féin to establish a commission that would consider redrawing the border of Northern Ireland (Miller, 1998). The 1920 Act allocated some governing powers to six counties and two boroughs in Northern Ireland. This body would have limited control
over local issues, but was still under British supervision. Laws that would affect religious equality were beyond the scope of their power. They could make laws regarding social services, education, and economic development (Connoly, 1990). A new constitution in 1937 recognized Catholics as a protected minority, but the group still suffered attacks. Rioting in the 1960s led to a British intervention in 1972, when Northern Ireland Parliament was suspended. For the next two years, negotiations focused on power-sharing possibilities. These attempts were rejected by unwilling unionists and nationalists alike (Dixon, 2001).

“The Troubles” began in 1968, when differences between unionists and nationalists came to a head. Unionists, who were perceived by nationalists as slow to act, had dominated the parliament in Northern Ireland for five decades. Catholic nationalists wanted a quick end to perceived institutional discrimination and social problems. Tension from these disagreements spurred violence, which led the government of the United Kingdom to intervene. Four years later, in 1972, the U.K. suspended the government in Northern Ireland and imposed direct rule from London (Mulholland, 2002). Both nationalists and unionists resorted to paramilitary activity to support their side of the fight. One nationalist organization, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), sought complete British withdrawal and unification with Ireland. Over time, the IRA would splinter into several different groups when members disagreed about methods and objectives. Unionist organizations such as the Ulster Defense Association (UDA) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) opposed the IRA and its goals (McGrattan, 2010). Both sides had now developed militant organizations.
Modern conflict in Northern Ireland spanned three decades and claimed thousands of lives. The central struggle was one of independence: the Irish Republican Army sought to remove the British presence from their lands. However, not all Irish people supported efforts for independence; some wanted to remain united with Britain. The IRA was not representative of the entire Irish population. Over time, the IRA divided itself into several splinter groups with varying degrees of popularity and success. Though the IRA was significantly weaker than the British government, strategic acts of violence gave the IRA notoriety and leverage (Maillot, 2015). In 1969, the IRA divided into two groups: the Official IRA (OIRA) and the Provisional IRA. The OIRA split six years later. Sinn Féin was affiliated with the Provisional IRA, but separated from them in 1986 (Dixon, 2001).

Sinn Féin, the political wing of the IRA, existed in some form from the mid-1920s onward. In its early years, Sinn Féin was politically insignificant (Maillot, 2015). However, in the 1980s, a new wave of rebels was rising in the ranks of the IRA. Some of these fresh, young members had an eye towards electoral politics. This movement within the political wing of the IRA was met with uncertainty by pockets of supporters, but their involvement in electoral politics would outlast much of these initial reservations (Feeney, 2003). The split from the IRA came after a debate over whether or not they should break a longstanding boycott of the government. Sinn Féin developed a military wing called the Continuity IRA (CIRA), which was responsible for the 1998 Omagh bombing (Dixon, 2001).

For many years, Sinn Féin used both politics and violence as strategies in achieving their goals. The leadership believed that violence was not the solution, but that it was necessary to gain leverage for negotiations. This approach appeased Sinn Féin
supporters who viewed political engagement alone as ‘giving up’ the fight. Low polling numbers in the 1980s discouraged members who had hoped to see noticeable and steady changes. A bombing by the IRA in 1987 killed eleven people and contributed to Sinn Féin’s decision to eliminate violence as a strategy (Feeney, 2003). The politically focused members of the group had grown frustrated with the bombings and attacks.

The result of simultaneous violence and political efforts was disappointing. Though Sinn Féin leadership still believed that attacks would help bring about better negotiations, they were discouraged when it prevented political movement. Sinn Féin was struggling to get votes and seats in government. Negotiation attempts that failed to include ceasefire arrangements were ineffective. The party had also lost control over the IRA, who acted without regard to warnings from Sinn Féin about extreme violence. By the end of the 1980s, Sinn Féin was distancing itself from the IRA and its bloody strategies (Feeney, 2003).

There were many waves of peace and hostility in the conflict between the British and the IRA. The IRA was an armed response to perceived outsider occupation. For more than three decades, fighting took place between these groups claiming more than 3,700 lives (O Dochartaigh, 2015). Estimates suggest that an additional 50,000 were injured (BBC, 2017). Early efforts were unsuccessful in negotiating peace and mitigating violence; the time for an agreement was not yet ripe (O Dochartaigh, 2015). By 1994, a paramilitary ceasefire was in place. Though previous ceasefires had failed, this one helped to set the stage for the Good Friday Agreement, which would come four years later (McDowell, 2007). The path to this agreement was fraught with disagreements and political maneuvering that nearly derailed the entire process.
The British attempted to negotiate settlements before the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, but were unsuccessful. Their 1974 efforts failed to include extremist representatives. One of the main political parties at that time boycotted the process. A failure to include all sides contributed to the deterioration of possible agreements (The Troubles, BBC, 2017). Multiparty talks in 1996 were more successful, though there was some public opposition to the inclusion of paramilitary groups. The result of these talks was the Good Friday Agreement, and later, the St. Andrews Agreement.

The 1998 Good Friday Agreement was critical to the future of Sinn Féin. The process of negotiation solidified a tentative relationship between the involved parties, which had been at odds with one another for decades. Countless factors influenced the process, including a readiness on both sides to reach an agreement. There was also a recognition that allowing Sinn Féin to join political life was a necessary concession to stem additional violence. One British civil servant wrote:

If we are to give real encouragement to the republican movement to pursue their aims politically – and now is as good a time as any in view of their reported disillusion over the lack of success of their military campaign…a politicised Provisional Sinn Féin would be more likely to produce political stability throughout Ireland as a whole than the continuation of a terrorist movement, however isolated. It is in our interest to see a strong Provisional Sinn Féin, if at the expense of the SDLP, so that the extremists are brought into the mainstream of politics and are forced to act politically and in due course responsibly (‘The Republican Movement’, 5 May 1976, CJ4/ 1427, UK National Archives).
It had become clear that a policy focused on exclusion was exacerbating the inclination of the Irish to fight instead of participate through other channels. It seems that both the Irish and the British believed political involvement could be a way to achieve their respective goals (O Dochartaigh, 2015).

By early April 1998, the British and Irish governments had a rough blueprint for an agreement. However, in the last weeks of negotiation, tensions were high and both groups hinted at rejecting the plan. Issues that continued to divide and agitate participants included the release of paramilitary prisoners, IRA decommissioning, political representation, and North-South cooperation. On April 10, a final agreement was announced despite frustration with concessions on all sides. The Good Friday Agreement (also called “the Agreement”), reflected a focus on immediate concerns more than long-term political goals. In encompassed a compromise between Irish nationalism and Irish unionism. Irish unionists agreed to power-sharing and Irish nationalists agreed to the “consent principle.” This measure ensured that Northern Ireland would remain a part of the United Kingdom as long as a majority of the voting population favored it (Bew, Frampton, & Gurruchaga, 2009).

Nearly all major parties agreed to the framework provided by the Good Friday Agreement, with the exception of the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP). Sinn Féin sought the approval of its membership before agreeing to sign the deal, as did one other party. Campaigns both for and against the deal swept through the state, making the outcome unpredictable. Northern Ireland voted to accept the plan with 71% of the responses in favor and 81% turnout (The Good Friday Agreement, BBC, 2017). Elections were scheduled for a just few months later.
The Good Friday Agreement was an achievement in many ways. Political parties and former paramilitary groups accepted terms of power-sharing with one another. There was also an avenue for possible Irish unification through popular vote. If voters demonstrated popular support for the change, it could happen under the “consent principle” included in the settlement. Resistance to demilitarization threatened to derail the agreement and the fragile peace that came after. Decommissioning was the term for the process of relinquishing ammunition, rifles, explosives, and other weaponry. Unionist party members were uncomfortable that the IRA seemed to delay decommissioning and on those grounds refused to negotiate directly with members of Sinn Féin. Both Sinn Féin and UDP representatives were left out of talks in early 1998 after more episodes of violence. By April of that year, the Agreement was made and was ready for the next step (The Good Friday Agreement, BBC, 2017).

Voters accepted the Good Friday Agreement soon after it was announced. Nationalist approval was around 95%, showing particularly high levels of support. Among the unionists, a mere 53% voted in favor of the plan. The combined result was a majority show of support for the provisions outlined after decades of fighting. Though Sinn Féin was involved in the bargaining process, they did not have much power over decisions. As Bew et al. explained, “…even though great efforts were made to bring Sinn Féin along with the settlement, republicans were not permitted to define the parameters of the final outcome” (2009, p. 148). After 1998, resistance to decommissioning created an ongoing point of contention that delayed the formal transfer of powers until 1999. This resulted in British leadership seeking power-sharing with Sinn Féin (McGrattan, 2010).
Elections in June 1998 were for a new 108-seat assembly, which would elect the power-sharing executive as per the Agreement. A singular party was not able to control parliament under the terms of the new system. Instead, majority support from both unionists and loyalists was necessary for approval. Eighteen parliamentary districts supplied the votes in this system using proportional representation. There were 277 candidates from 17 official political parties, as well as three groups of independents. The referendum from the Good Friday Agreement was a key talking point for parties who had both supported and opposed its passage (Elliott, 2009). In this first election, Sinn Féin won the fourth highest number of seats: 18. The UUP, SDLP, and DUP all received more. By December, this round of newly elected politicians took office (The Good Friday Agreement, BBC, 2017).

**Figure 1:** Northern Ireland Assembly Elections 1998. Data from Whyte, 2002.
The results of this election supported the referendum that passed the Good Friday Agreement. There was some concern that the aggressive campaigning from anti-agreement parties would result in those parties gaining seats in the Assembly. This would hinder the implementation of the terms of the deal, as opponents would then hold significant power. However, the election reflected similar opinions to the referendum vote. The Good Friday Agreement seemed to maintain its support among the voters (Elliott, 2009).

In the decade from 1994 to 2004, Sinn Féin transformed from a political group on the periphery to a major party. They would eventually replace the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) as the largest nationalist party, though they started with a smaller constituency. Part of their success is the result of a shift into a new phase of political life. Termed “New Republicanism,” this effort was an attempt to address political gridlock with pragmatism. This era was marked by a change in tactics, as non-violent engagements and political efforts became the focus. The IRA continued to perpetuate some acts of violence during this time, but the IRA was now separate from Sinn Féin. A bombing in early 1996 led to another ceasefire later that year. In 1998, the parties finally made real progress on a deal and achieved the Good Friday Agreement (McDowell, 2007).

Despite the immense effort that went into reaching this point, tension continued to color relations between groups in Northern Ireland. Violent attacks, including bombings, and debates over decommissioning led to a deterioration of affairs (Dixon, 2011). By 2002, London had again imposed direct rule upon the area. The St. Andrews Agreement
in 2006 led to another new power-sharing government in 2008. In this iteration, the First Minister was a DUP member and Sinn Féin supplied the Deputy First Minister (The Good Friday Agreement, BBC, 2017). The St. Andrews Agreement and Act stipulated that each major party would receive one Executive position. The First Minister and the deputy First Minister had previously been elected, which disadvantaged smaller parties like Sinn Féin. The St. Andrews Agreement also added a provision for executive review (Northern Ireland Assembly, 2017).

Three years before the St. Andrews Agreement, the 2003 elections for the Northern Ireland Assembly produced an additional six seats for Sinn Féin. This time, 256 candidates vied for the 108 Assembly seats. Unlike the elections in 1998, 21 Independents ran for office. Despite unfavorable weather conditions and the ongoing conflict, voter turnout was high. In 2003, 63.1% of registered voters exercised their right to elect the Assembly. This election was significant for Sinn Féin, who became the largest nationalist party (Elliott, 2009).

By 2006, the St. Andrews Agreement was in effect. The 2007 Northern Ireland Assembly elections took place under this new framework. Sinn Féin was now one of the two biggest parties in the election, which was reflected in the results. The party gained another four seats in the Assembly. The two parties with the highest vote count were Sinn Féin and the DUP (Whyte, 2002). The top two parties were then supposed to nominate the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, as per the St. Andrews Agreement. A conflicting law, however, did not support this requirement. The Secretary of State asked two high ranking members of each party to take their respective roles, bypassing the nominations that had been expected. Unionist turnout had declined in this election, which
mean that the DUP and other unionist parties lost seats. The DUP expressed resistance to the process of adopting an Executive, which delayed its formation by seven months (Elliott, 2009).

![Northern Ireland Assembly Elections](image)

*Figure 2: Data for Northern Ireland Assembly Elections from Whyte, 2002 and the United Kingdom Electoral Commission, 2017.*

There have been noticeable trends in the electorate for Sinn Féin. Unionist support declined following the Good Friday Agreement. The nationalist party Sinn Féin, however, steadily increased its following (United Kingdom Electoral Commission, 2017). Among nationalist parties, Sinn Féin became a leading political force. This rise took place even amidst the turmoil between the Good Friday Agreement and the St. Andrews Agreement.
Sinn Féin and Power Sharing

There were many reasons why the IRA developed a political wing with Sinn Féin. O’Brien explains:

The thinking of the leadership was that, whatever else, the movement had to remain strong enough to become part of the ultimate political solution when the time came ... that meant getting into elections, maximizing their political support north and south, to arrive finally, at the negotiating ‘table’ with the strongest possible mandate. But this in itself was a significant admission, indicating that the IRA on their own were not able to beat the British out of Ireland (1999, p. 119)

The IRA was engaged in an asymmetrical fight in which the British were stronger and their side was divided into several groups with several goals. A young group of Sinn Féin members who came to power late in the conflict. They had a belief in reforming the movement for politics and led the way towards political life (O Dochartaigh, 2015). The decision to form Sinn Féin and focus on politics was not a unanimous one for the IRA.

Sinn Féin first entered into electoral politics in 1981, though members had reservations about the transition (Feeney, 2003). They participated in local political races and initially found great success. The group used test cases as a barometer for how much support Sinn Féin could receive. The test cases were tied to a well-known and politicized hunger strike, and were more successful than Sinn Féin had expected. However, after this initial round of wins, the group struggled to receive the same levels of energy. Subsequent elections did not produce the same results, which discouraged many of IRA members who were already hesitant about politics (Feeney, 2003).
Eventually Sinn Féin transitioned into wider electoral participation. What began as a separatist group expanded into a party with a diverse political agenda. In 2001, Sinn Féin became the leading nationalist party when it won more of the vote than the SDLP. (McGrattan, 2010). Many of the figures who first championed increasing Sinn Féin’s role in politics are still prominent figures in the party today. Their current legislative initiatives target healthcare and housing policies, tax reform, childcare, and debt (Sinn Féin General Election Manifesto, 2016). Sinn Féin appears to have expanded their focus and adapted to political life.

Though Sinn Féin saw electoral gains and underwent some organizational transformation, Northern Ireland has not seem a complete end to the conflict. In the time since the Good Friday Agreement, people and parties have been at odds over countless issues. These include disarming of Sinn Féin, Executive power arrangements, educational priorities, and language protections (Moriarty 2008e; Hennessy, 2009; Mulholland, 2002). Violence from some paramilitary actors has declined since 1998, but other activities have not. From 1996 to 2004, there were more than 6,000 sectarian incidents on record. Shootings and bombings continued, though at lower levels than before (McGrattan, 2010). These attacks are not attributed only to the IRA, though some IRA splinter groups have been implicated (START, 2016).

Sinn Féin makes an excellent case for study. As an armed group, the IRA participated in violent acts throughout Northern Ireland (McGrattan, 2010). In the 1980s and 1990s, members of the IRA revitalized Sinn Féin and began to participate in electoral politics and the development of legislation. These two actions qualify Sinn Féin for this study, by meeting the criteria outlined previously. This particular case study presents
some challenges, however. The violent wing and the political wing of the IRA were active at the same time, complicating the separation of guerrilla and political actor. The case of Northern Ireland has been the focus of a high volume of research and the separate views of the IRA and Sinn Féin have been well documented. Power-sharing was a part of the Good Friday Agreement, but British rule was imposed again less than a month after the new government took office. Therefore, an examination of legislative and political moves will begin after the 2007 St. Andrews Agreement, covering 2008 and 2009.

Sinn Féin’s political and non-political activities have received attention from the media. Stories on what they have proposed or blocked are included in local, if not international media. This coverage provides a deeper look at the political climate, and allows nuanced behaviors to be included. For example, at several points in this two-year period, Sinn Féin published policy papers that were not turned into legislation (Keenan, 2009a). The fact that they were producing such work, however, shows a degree of participation within the political system and an ability to understand policy creation.

The party at this time was experiencing some level of success at the polls, but had not yet been involved in the national governing process in any significant way (McGrattan, 2010). Their involvement was primarily in local elections. For many years, Sinn Féin boycotted the governing process altogether (Feeney, 2003). Highly visible party officials, such as Gerry Adams, have been involved with Sinn Féin since the split from the IRA in the 1980s. The official Sinn Féin website is littered with symbols and reminders of the armed conflict. Even the membership card for the party has a design of men holding guns and appearing to shout (SinnFéin.ie, 2017). Despite these ties to the violent past, Sinn Féin has managed to make some progress in its new politics-only role.
Chapter 3: Sinn Féin’s Legislative Efforts

Hypothesis 1 states that governments with formerly armed insurgents in political office will struggle to produce legislation. The presence of inexperienced political operatives with backgrounds in violence and alternative tactics could limit the ability of the group to compromise on public policy. Sinn Féin provides one instance of the transition from armed group to political actor. The IRA maintained a presence throughout Sinn Féin’s existence—meaning the original organization did not dissolve. Their early involvement in politics also sets them apart. However, Sinn Féin has made efforts to act separately from the IRA and its offshoots (Feeney, 2003). It does not seem as though early political attempts necessarily provided an education in making policy.

Early political agendas for Sinn Féin focused heavily on the same matters that the IRA sought to correct; namely, reunification with Ireland. Sinn Féin was a political creation designed to express the same wish. After trying to blend strategies of simultaneous violence and politics, Sinn Féin made the decision to use ballots instead of bombs (Dixon, 2001). After 1998, the offered demilitarization of Sinn Féin was a good faith gesture to show willingness to leave violence behind (Feeney, 2003). The hesitation of the group to follow through with the effort casted doubt on the organization’s promises (Moriarty, 2008e). Those doubts contributed to a cycle of mistrust and increasing tension that eventually led to the St. Andrews Agreement.
The Northern Ireland Assembly creates laws within Northern Ireland. Proposed legislation must pass through the Assembly by vote before moving on to the next stage. After passage, it must receive Royal Assent to become an official Act of the Assembly. At this point, it is a law. There are nine stages through which a bill may pass to become law. Not all of the stages are required. Some of the steps concerning revisions and proposals may be eliminated in certain cases. Special provisions allow for an accelerated bill’s passage in no fewer than ten days (Northern Ireland Assembly, 2017). The process for a bill becoming a law is both straightforward and documented clearly with the Assembly. This chapter will first evaluate the total number of bills passed by the legislature, and then the role of Sinn Féin in the process.

Early data for successful legislation comes from 2001 and 2002. Between 2003 and 2006, the Northern Ireland Assembly produced no bills that became law. During this time, they were under Direct British Rule. The number of successful bills during this time is higher than the two years following the St. Andrews Agreement. In 2001 and 2002, the Assembly created 17 and 14 official Acts respectively. The combined 31 laws, is notably higher than what the Assembly was able to do in later years. There were no outstanding bills awaiting approval after the 2000-2001 session, though the following year produced 15 unfulfilled proposed laws. This number was high, in part, because of the conflict that led to Direct Rule (Northern Ireland Assembly). These figures are represented in the graph below.

In the two years directly following the St. Andrews Agreement, the Assembly successfully passed 22 pieces of legislation that became official Acts of the Assembly. Thirteen were passed in 2008 and another 9 in 2009. In the 2007-2008 Assembly there
were eight bills proposed which did not garner Royal Assent. The following year, nine met the same fate. It should be noted that in some cases, the same bill was unsuccessful (Northern Ireland Assembly, 2017). The years preceding the St. Andrews Agreement were more productive legislatively, as the following graph expresses.

![Figure 3: Legislation Passed Before and After St. Andrews. Data from the Northern Ireland Assembly, 2017.](image)

This data alone does not provide a comprehensive portrait of Sinn Féin as a party. They were politically active in a variety of ways after the St. Andrews Agreement. Key behavior from Sinn Féin falls into four broad categories: blocking meetings or votes, organizing protests, policy-related behavior, and negotiation. The first category relates to instances of obstructionism wherein Sinn Féin operated through democratic structures to block activity altogether. Organized protests are another non-violent means of expressing political dissent, orchestrated by the group. Policy-related behavior can take several
forms. Policy was opposed, proposed, or supported by Sinn Féin. Published policy papers are placed into this category, as well. Lastly, negotiations undertaken by Sinn Féin show a commitment to power-sharing and liberal governance, as they are non-violent means of conflict resolution. These are all ways in which Sinn Féin was busy working on their platform, though they were not legislative outcomes. The first two years after the St. Andrews Agreement are outlined below.

![Sinn Féin Activity 2008-2009](image)

*Figure 4:* Sinn Féin Activity 2008-2009. Data from Moriarty, 2008a-f; Moriarty 2009a-c; De Breadun, 2009; Heaney, 3008; Hennessy, 2009; Keenan, 2009; Keenan and Moriarty 2008; McGee, 2009.

The most common behavior that Sinn Féin engaged in was negotiations. Considering the political climate in which Sinn Féin emerged, this is expected. In March 2008, they met with opposition party DUP about the peaceful transfer of policing powers to the Northern Territories. Existing animosity and distrust agitated both sides, who threatened to walk away from the discussion (Moriarty, 2008e). In June, two more negotiations took place. The first of these was facilitated by the British Prime Minister and included Sinn Féin and the DUP. The DUP was to take over the position of First
Minister from Sinn Féin, who would now be in a Deputy First Minister Role. The goal of these talks was to head off a crisis that would have been triggered if Sinn Féin refused to cooperate. Their refusal would trigger another election, or a potential return to British control (Moriarty, 2008a). It took ongoing efforts by all involved parties to reach an arrangement that would facilitate the transfer.

At the heart of these tensions was the frustration of Sinn Féin members over delayed implementation of protections outlined in the St. Andrews Agreement (Moriarty, 2008d). By the next year, Sinn Féin remained in negotiations. Concerns that mid-level DUP members were obstructing power-sharing mechanisms brought both parties and the British to the table once more. The power transitions negotiated earlier had gone through, but questions of implementation for St. Andrews provisions continued to frustrate Sinn Féin (Moriarty, 2009a).

Sinn Féin is a political actor which is tied to a violent background with the IRA. The ongoing use of negotiations to communicate with the party and resolve issues is a sign of their ability to work through problems in a non-violent manner. The talks are also a source of legitimacy, proving that the British and opposition parties acknowledge them as a political actor. Ongoing fights for provisions in agreements, such as the St. Andrews, reflect Sinn Féin’s ability to recognize and act on goals.

In the years following the St. Andrews Agreement, there was one instance of organized protest by the party. In 2008, they responded to the United Kingdom’s involvement in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan by organizing a protest at an event for returning soldiers. Sinn Féin got permission to stage the event through official channels, placing their event under the protection of official police forces. The campaign against
involvement in the war even expanded to include some media and billboards (Moriarty, 2008f).

Like the negotiations, Sinn Féin’s protest efforts demonstrate a way to engage in political disagreement without violence. Particularly interesting is their willingness to follow proper channels to participate. During the same parade of soldiers, a different political group had planned a protest but had not sought official approval. Accordingly, their protest was then targeted by police instead of protected by them (Moriarty, 2008f). Sinn Féin opposed involvement with these conflicts abroad and used non-violent means to mobilize their supporters and demonstrate their position.

Sinn Féin also engaged with policy and legislation. On three occasions, coverage of Sinn Féin showed opposition to policy proposals in the legislative assembly. In 2008, they opposed the Lisbon Treaty, with the argument that it was bad for Irish workers. Sinn Féin claimed, “It will reduce Ireland's political strength, further undermine neutrality and is bad for the economy and workers' rights. The Lisbon Treaty is bad for Irish farmers and bad for rural communities, and will show no progress for Irish fishing communities” (Moriarty, 2008b). That year they worked with four other parties to draft a Victims and Survivors Bill to create a commission for victim benefits. Before its official passage, Sinn Féin vocally opposed a proposed amendment that would alter the structure of the commission. The amendment would have altered the group structure from a committee of four equals, to one with a leader and three members (Heaney, 2008). In 2009, Sinn Féin objected to the policy proposals that would influence policing (Moriarty, 2009b).

In this time, Sinn Féin had also chosen to support some legislation. They backed a proposed hotel bed tax that would provide extra funding to the city. Sinn Féin argued that
this legislation would, “…provide extra and essential funding to this city, rather than being dependent on Government handouts which are dwindling” (De Breadun, 2009). Sinn Féin worked with the Labour party in mid-2009 on the job crisis. The collaboration between these two parties was notable given their open opposition on the Lisbon Treaty around the same time (McGee, 2009).

In October 2008, Sinn Féin organized themselves to block critical movement in the General Assembly, threatening to trigger special elections. The DUP argued that Sinn Féin had agreed to a voting system that provided the DUP with a permanent veto, which Sinn Féin denied. Sinn Féin chose to block Executive meetings until the issue was resolved (Keenan and Moriarty, 2008). The same strategy was used as a threat on a different issue. The party failed to pass the Irish Language Act, first introduced during the negotiations for the St. Andrews Agreement. Despite support from the British and Irish governments, the attempt was unsuccessful. Sinn Féin even threatened to block the election of a prominent DUP member, until they saw movement on the act (Moriarty, 2008c). Again, this is an example of Sinn Féin’s ability to use the political system in Northern Ireland to express their frustration and own plans.

Sinn Féin’s activity in the two years following the St. Andrews Agreement are indicative of their ability to move forward as a political party, instead of a militant group. With this approach to governing, they immersed themselves in the political process and found non-violent ways to reach their goals. They have shown a willingness to accept political losses, as well. By proposing policies, opposing legislation, supporting legislation, and blocking meetings and votes, they demonstrated their understanding of
government. Though they were not always successful, they did choose to participate in the process.

Some of the party’s behavior does not fit clearly into one of the outlined categories. The two instances of “unspecified behavior” represent policy papers written and circulated by Sinn Féin. In 2009, the party published policy papers on education and workforce development arguing that the government should triple the number of schools being built and create programs to retrain unemployed workers (Hennessy, 2009). Later that year they published a paper declaring new goals of increased community interaction and integration. This paper followed debates about the differences between the DUP and Sinn Féin concerning equality for their respective constituencies. In this instance, Sinn Féin lacked the political power to hold a vote and chose to try to progress their opinion through this document instead (Keenan, 2009b).

There are issues that Sinn Féin was unable to take to the Assembly. Other items that Sinn Féin was unsuccessful in adding to the Assembly’s agenda include Irish language protections, paramilitary funding, and post-secondary education (Keenan, 2009a). The fact that Sinn Féin made proposals for these issues indicates a transition towards comprehensive political action. These attempts were excluded from the data analyzed previously because they did not result in more significant action. However, that outcome has as much to do with opposition parties as it does with Sinn Féin, so it is important to consider.

Sinn Féin engaged in a variety of political activity between 2008 and 2009. In order to establish whether there was a noticeable pattern in those two years, I examined the same data on a timeline. Though two years is a short span of time from which to draw
a conclusion about the trajectory of the group, I felt it was necessary to understand whether there were any major differences between the two years.

Sinn Féin’s behavior in 2008 was more obstructionist than the following year. Most of the negotiations with opposition groups took place at this time. Three of the four instances of formal negotiation were in 2008 (Moriarty, 2008d and Moriarty, 2008e). This was the year when they protested the United Kingdom’s involvement in conflict abroad. In 2008, they opposed more policies than they did in 2009. This was when they chose to block meetings and important votes (Keenan and Moriarty, 2008). Most of Sinn Féin’s behavior in the first year following the St. Andrews Agreement was designed to show their opposition to policies and proposals. In contrast, the following year they were more proactive in trying to create their own legislation.

By 2009, Sinn Féin had begun to demonstrate more interest in producing public policy and expanding their platform. They proposed their own legislation twice that year and produced two papers on other legislative ideas. This was the time when they worked closely with the Labour party on the issue of jobs, despite differences with them. The second year after the St. Andrews Agreement for Sinn Féin saw more creation than obstruction and even some willingness to compromise and work with other parties (McGee, 2009).

If the party’s combined actions are considered, they seem to be on a positive track. By using the political system to express their constituents’ needs, Sinn Féin confers legitimacy to the Northern Ireland Assembly and distances themselves from violence. The overall productivity of the government is contingent upon many factors outside of Sinn Féin’s control. Their ability to engage in policy matters, however, shows that they
are willing to work with the government and not outside of it. An analysis of passed legislation was meant to produce a snapshot of Sinn Féin’s ability to govern; however, the lack of activity makes that particular indicator a little weak. Hypothesis 1 is supported by the data collected from the Assembly, though the difference in the two periods is not striking enough to be definitive. By evaluating Sinn Féin’s attempts to legislate, their political engagement, partnerships with other parties, and policy ideas, we can at least gain some understanding of whether the group is adapting to political life or has remained a military-focused group.

The scope of issues that Sinn Féin has sought to address, either successfully or not, is a sign of their ability to adapt to political life. The IRA was a violent group with a nearly singular purpose: unification with Ireland. The data collected shows that Sinn Féin has developed a much broader set of goals and interests. The leadership of Sinn Féin are members who were engaged in the paramilitary activities of the IRA (Feeney, 2003). Their willingness to work within the parameters of existing bureaucracy and government structures is apparent in much of their behavior during this time. In just these two years, Sinn Féin took a political interest in jobs, education, language protections, economics, and war.
Chapter 4: Sinn Féin and Political Violence

Post-conflict agreements focus on power-sharing as a way to minimize future violence (Kovacs, 2008). The implicit assumption in this behavior is that groups will turn to political life and away from other means of achieving their goals. There is also an assumption that group membership numbers will remain at their current level, meaning members support the leadership’s decision to engage in politics. Hypothesis 2 states that levels of violence will be higher in a state after a power-sharing arrangement than before it is implemented.

One of the challenges with studying Sinn Féin and the IRA is the notorious splinter groups that have come out of both entities. The IRA has divided countless times, and even Sinn Féin now has splinter groups. As an organization, Sinn Féin is separate from the IRA; the violence employed by one is not endorsed by the other (Feeney, 2003). However, there are likely individual members who engage with both Sinn Féin and the IRA. This analysis will focus on the group, not the individual. The goal is to understand how well the party can govern, not to establish what individual members may do.

The IRA’s activities are considered terrorism in many instances. Data on terrorist incidents, casualties, and fatalities was accessible for the United Kingdom. To find levels of violence in Northern Ireland, I used the START Global Terrorism Database (GTD). The GTD amalgamates data by country and region, so I started with terrorist incidents in six-year periods in Western Europe. I then narrowed the search to just incidents within
the United Kingdom. These datasets were pared down further to include only instances within the borders of Northern Ireland. There was activity outside of Northern Ireland that can be linked to groups within its borders, but the focus of this project is on levels of violence within Northern Ireland. Though these instances may be linked in cause, they are beyond the scope of this specific hypothesis. Finally, I divided the data into two categories based on when the terrorist incidents occurred. The six years prior to the St. Andrews Agreement and the six years following it became two separate sets of information.

The data provided by the GTD applies to Hypothesis 2. Armed groups in this conflict are frequently classified as “terrorist” for academic purposes. The GTD covers, “Threatened of actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation” (START, 2016). The breadth of this definition includes activities that would be linked to political, religious, and social conflict. All of these are a part of the tension in Northern Ireland. Furthermore, the GTD includes only activity that meets two of three categories:

1. The violent act was aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal
2. The violent act included evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) other than the immediate victims
3. The violent act was outside the precepts of International Humanitarian Law

Using terrorism data has the additional impact of capturing the activities of splinter and opposition groups. The data collected between 2003 and 2014 captures
violence caused by the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA), Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA), Dissident Republicans, Irish Republican Extremists, Real Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF), Loyalist Action Force, and others. This provides background information on who specifically is involved in the increased terrorist activity.

Data shows that terrorist activity in Northern Ireland increased noticeably after the St. Andrews Agreement. Terrorist incidents increased more than fatalities or casualties did. Prior to the St. Andrews Agreement, there were 82 terrorist incidents. In the six years following the agreement, however, that number jumps to a staggering 358 attacks (GTD, 2017). The number more than quadruples in that time. However, the number of terror incidents alone does not prove causality. In order to determine whether Sinn Féin is responsible for the increase, the data needs to be broken down further.

Figure 5: Violence Before and After the St. Andrews Agreement. Data from START GTD, 2017.
In order to present the most complete picture possible, I include instances of terrorism committed by Sinn Féin or the IRA. Sinn Féin grew out of the IRA (Feeney, 2003). Therefore, I examined both. The IRA and Sinn Féin are separate organizations, however, so their data is listed separately. Due to the nature of the GTD data, “unknown perpetrators” will be included in a second category. Incidents by unknown perpetrators are not necessarily the responsibility of the IRA or Sinn Féin, but because they have not been attributed to any other organization, I have included them. This is purely to provide a more detailed examination. Incidents by the IRA change minimally over the two periods that are studied. Prior to the agreement, five incidents occurred between 2003 and 2008. This is slightly higher than the number of incidents that occurred between 2009 and 2014. In the latter time span, the IRA is attributed with only one attack. The increase in violence, then, does not seem to be a direct result of the IRA. Sinn Féin does not appear in either dataset as a perpetrator. If Hypothesis 2 is evaluated about Sinn Féin and the IRA, then it is proven correct. Similar to the outcome of Hypothesis 1, the change in attacks is not significant enough to provide firm evidence that the new power-sharing arrangement had an impact. Other variables may have affected the outcome.
It should also be noted that terror attacks by unknown perpetrators increased significantly in this time. Though these incidents were not committed to Sinn Féin or the IRA, I include them to show the rise of violence in Northern Ireland. Between 2003 and 2008, there were 48 recorded terror attacks by unknown perpetrators. Between 2009 and 2014, this number jumps to 234. That is an increase of 186 incidents, which averages to 31 more attacks per year. These incidents may or may not relate directly to Sinn Féin, the
IRA, or the St. Andrews Agreement. To better understand whether the timing of agreement is related to the increase in violence, I created a timeline of the data.

There was a spike in injuries prior to the implementation of the St. Andrews Agreement in 2006. However, the number of incidents and casualties were low. Additionally, the injuries are attributed to one attack by an organization called the Orange Volunteers and the ensuing riots (Sharrock, 2005). After the St. Andrews Agreement was implemented, there was a steady increase in the number of incidents seen each year. Injuries similarly increase, though not as consistently. The number of injuries from terrorist attacks does not increase at the same rate as the number of incidents did. After the agreement was implemented, injuries over the six-year period totaled 101. This is

Figure 7: Yearly Terrorist Activity. Data from START GTD, 2017.
only 29 more injuries than the period before the agreement, despite the number of incidents being drastically higher.

Increase in terror incidents after the St. Andrews Agreement may reflect on the agreement itself, if different groups were reacting to the implementation with violence. However, the goal of this research is to determine whether a formerly armed group can transition into political life. Sinn Féin has cut ties with the IRA, but even when considered together the group seems to have moved away from terrorism as a strategy. Hypothesis 2 is not supported. Violence and terror attacks increased following the power-sharing agreement, but the formerly armed insurgents were not to blame.

**Conflict Recurrence**

Northern Ireland has not returned to war since passing the St. Andrews Agreement. Daily political life, however, still hinges on the divides of the past. Morrow claims that, “Resentment about the past continues to fuel political life. The understandable pragmatic desire to avoid the explosive political consequences of acknowledging atrocities that passed for heroism in the past has left a profound legacy of resentment and injustice that continues to prevent sustained trust in the present” (2012, p. 31). Interestingly, increased violence after the St. Andrews Agreement has not led back to war.

There are a number of possible reasons why Northern Ireland has not returned to war. Over the past several decades, Sinn Féin has been involved in numerous negotiations. The 1998 Good Friday Agreement was hailed as a breakthrough achievement, but did not maintain peace for more than a few years. Shortly after
implementation, Northern Ireland was back under direct rule from England (McGrattan, 2010). Why, then, did the same parties willingly participate in the St. Andrews Agreement instead of resorting to their old paramilitary ways?

The GTD data may shed some light on one possible reason for this behavior. Violence increased after the St. Andrews Agreement, but not because of Sinn Féin or the IRA. It is possible that splinter groups became frustrated with the failure of the Good Friday Agreement and decided to become more active. Future research could shed light on whether Sinn Féin members stayed loyal to the party or shifted back to paramilitary groups after perceived power-sharing failures.
Chapter 5: Conclusion

One of the biggest challenges that states face after conflict is how to handle former rebels. The decision to create more inclusive governments through power-sharing has become increasingly common. The goal of these arrangements is to provide a way for alienated groups to address grievances through existing institutions. However, there is a lack of understanding about how successful this particular process may be. Former insurgents do not necessarily have a background in politics or government, and members of their militias will not automatically become willing party participants. My research shows that the rebel-inclusive government in Northern Ireland experienced mixed successes and failures.

It is challenging to transform an organization from armed insurgent group to political party. Political parties need to win elections, translate goals into policy, and compromise with others. Post-conflict states with power-sharing arrangements often have two sides of the same conflict trying to govern next to one another (Kovacs, 2008). This can increase reluctance to grant concessions and can stall legislation. It is important for a government to be able to produce laws. Power-sharing data shows that armed groups are often included in political power-sharing specifically (Ottman and Vullers, 2015). Sinn Féin started as a part of the IRA, then separated and formed its own military wing. Over time, though, they distanced themselves from violence and focused their attention on
politics (Dixon, 2001). Though they struggled to win elections in the 1980s, by the time of the Good Friday Agreement they had made significant progress (Elliott, 2009).

Hypothesis 1 was a test of the ability of a former insurgent group to produce legislation, even within a mixed assembly. The Northern Ireland Assembly is a 108-seat body that Sinn Féin did not control. Therefore, I studied both the legislative output of the Assembly and the actions of Sinn Féin. This extra step clarified Sinn Féin’s role in passing, opposing, or obstructing bills that were proposed in the Assembly. By combining these two approaches, I was able to understand how Sinn Féin influenced the process.

The government of Northern Ireland produced more legislation in 2001 and 2002 than it did in the two years following the St. Andrews Agreement. Between 2001 and 2002, the Assembly successfully turned 31 bills into law. In contrast, they only passed 22 laws between 2008 and 2009. In the two earlier years, Sinn Féin and its members were frustrated with opposition parties and the distribution of power. Their activities focused on resistance and obstruction. In the two later years, however, their actions were more about creating and generating legislation. Sinn Féin worked with opposition parties and proposed their own policies. Even though the Northern Ireland Assembly was slightly less productive between 2008 and 2009, Sinn Féin was engaged in a number of political activities. Hypothesis 1 was supported; fewer laws were made after the power-sharing agreement was in place. It should be noted, however, that Sinn Féin had started to focus on policy creation by 2009.

Power-sharing provisions are often used in post-conflict agreements with the assumption that they will reduce violence in the future (Strom et al., 2015). However,
some research suggest that power-sharing is not enough to reduce violence (Jarstad, 2009). Sinn Féin’s history with the IRA and its offshoots complicated their ability to participate in politics. Over time, they cut ties with the IRA and began to focus only on electoral strategies (Dixon, 2001). Although they made this transition, many prominent members of the party were once involved in terrorist acts. Thus, the formerly armed insurgent group became a political party.

Hypothesis 2 stated that the impact of a formerly armed group in political office would be increased violence. One of the goals of power-sharing is that people will turn to policy instead of war. Because armed rebels are more familiar with bombs than bills, my expectation was that a return to violence would be likely. The data for Northern Ireland showed that violence did increase after the St. Andrews Agreement. It more than quadrupled in the six years following the agreement. However, a closer look at the data provided by the GTD shows that neither Sinn Féin nor the IRA was directly responsible for that change. Therefore, the group involved in governing was not the perpetrator of violence. Hypothesis 2 was meant to establish whether the former insurgents could choose politics and policymaking over their old ways. Since Sinn Féin and the IRA were not the reason for increased attacks, Hypothesis 2 was not supported.

Changes in levels of violence and legislative productivity are not only the result of one group. Policy creation is in the hands of the 108 legislators in the Northern Ireland Assembly, who may decide to work together or against one another for political or personal reasons. The GTD data indicated that it was not Sinn Féin committing acts of violence in the post-St. Andrews society. But the presence of Sinn Féin in the Assembly and executive changed the environment in Northern Ireland. Rather than their behavior
directly causing changes, their presence may have altered the system in ways which generated these new effects.

It is possible that the St. Andrews Agreement was at least partially a trigger for increased terror incidents. One potential explanation is that supporters of Sinn Féin felt disillusioned with their pivot into politics. Those supporters could then have joined splinter groups or been among the numerous unidentified attackers. However, Sinn Féin was increasingly successful at the polls and there is little evidence to suggest that their supporters were responsible for such attacks. Steady electoral victories indicate that Sinn Féin’s support base grew, not shrank. It is also possible that other militant organizations saw Sinn Féin’s success in achieving a share of power, and saw terrorism as a path towards that same end. More research would need to be done to determine the reasons for this.

In Northern Ireland, an increase in violence did not lead back to war. This could be due to a number of factors. Casualties and fatalities did not increase at the same rate as terrorist incidents, which may have diminished the perceived threat. The groups perpetuating the terrorist acts were also different from the groups directly involved in earlier conflict. Because violence was caused by so many different perpetrators, it was less of a coherent movement and more of a fragmented disruption to ordinary life. Northern Ireland is also part of the United Kingdom, so there is strong outside support for order in the area. This was seen in the numerous interventions where control of Northern Ireland was temporarily moved to England. Areas with more or less outsider involvement or weaker institutions may be more susceptible to conflict recurrence during this time. Economic conditions may be another factor that affects civil war recurrence. In the
1930s, when Northern Ireland was adopting a new constitution and Catholics were being persecuted, there were severe economic difficulties.

The study of Sinn Féin from 1998 to 2013 provides useful information for the present and possible research questions for the future. Sinn Féin is in some ways a unique example of a formerly armed group turned political party. Their organization had tried to participate in politics for decades before formally taking a role in the Legislative Assembly, though their efforts were inconsistent and on the fringes of local politics. The IRA is notorious for its numerous splinter groups, and Sinn Féin increasingly has the same issue. However, the case is similar to others in some ways. The tactics and goals of the IRA and Sinn Féin are commonly held desires of armed groups around the world. Members of the IRA became leaders of Sinn Féin, which means the transition to armed group is similar to organizations that do not leave a militant wing behind. The before and after case study design allowed for a comparative examination of Northern Ireland.

Sinn Féin appears to be on a path towards more productive involvement in politics. The fact that they negotiated the St. Andrews Agreement is a sign that they are committed to working within the laws and norms of Northern Ireland for the time being. Their progress from primarily obstructionist to willing participant shows their growth as a party. The recent passing of leader Marty McGuinness, brings to light new questions of what the party may look like when leadership without a militant history begins to take over (McHardy, 2017). Will new party leaders recognize the costs of violence and shy away from it, as Sinn Féin has? Or will the violence in the past become abstract and lose its power of deterrence? Only time will provide those answers.
These research questions were a test of Sinn Féin’s ability to be successful in government, by producing legislation and maintaining peaceful strategies. They were also a way to test one method of determining the success or failure of a party within the government. News coverage of Sinn Féin provided critical information in the understanding of the party’s role within a larger body. The Northern Ireland Legislative Assembly keeps very detailed records of bills and laws, and makes that data publicly accessible. These results are specific to Northern Ireland and not widely generalizable from this project alone. However, this limitation could be eliminated if this process was repeated with additional case studies.

In order to recreate this research with more cases, similar information would need to be collected. More cases could strengthen these findings or prove Sinn Féin to be an outlier, but are necessary to better understand the broader impact of former insurgents in government. The START GTD data was useful for interpreting violence in Northern Ireland, but unidentified actors committed many of the attacks. Since these instances were not attributed to Sinn Féin, they were not the focus of this research. Future research may dig deeper into these events to determine whether the St. Andrews Agreement was the cause.

The evaluation of conflict recurrence could benefit from a broader scope. By focusing on Northern Ireland, I was able to collect information about why increased violence did not escalate past a certain point. The increase in attacks without a return to war was a curiosity of Northern Ireland that I felt required further research. However, it could also be helpful to conduct a larger study of instances of formerly-armed insurgents in government to see what the bigger trend is, if one exists. The detail I was able to
collect puts Northern Ireland’s current political landscape into perspective. It is helpful in laying the groundwork for future examination of similar situations.

There are numerous other potential cases of formerly armed insurgents in politics. Mozambique is one example of this. The country was involved in a civil war from 1977 until 1992. After the brutal fighting had ended, guerrilla group Renamo transitioned into politics. The leadership of Renamo consists of powerful figures from the organization’s militant days. They share power in the legislature with opposition party, Frelimo (Vines, 2012). Renamo’s ability to aid in the production of legislation and their role in violence would be a great subject for future study. Angola is another example of a country where former insurgents became political actors. After their civil war, a power-sharing agreement was accepted. Leaders from the insurgency remained prominent in political activity in the time after the war (De Zeeuw, 2008). The datasets provided by Mukherjee and Hatrzell and Hoddie show that a significant number of power-sharing cases with former rebels are in Africa (Mukherjee, 2006 and Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003). It would be beneficial, then, to have research about African cases. There are cases outside of Africa, as well. Bosnia and Kosovo are popular case studies for power-sharing (see Manning, 2004, McEvoy, 2015). These cases have not been examined in terms of the formerly armed insurgent group’s success or failure. These cases each have some differences, but they could provide additional insight into the role of former insurgents in politics.

Northern Ireland has seen centuries of conflict. Today, groups fight for many of the same reasons. However, at least one group has transitioned from militant to political. Sinn Féin still participates in negotiations with opposition groups, while involved parties
threaten to boycott. In many ways, tension remains. The Good Friday Agreement was insufficient to prevent British direct rule in Northern Ireland. The St. Andrews Agreement was then created to divide power more fairly amongst parties in Northern Ireland.

In order for a former insurgent group to be successful in this examination, the government needed to be able to produce more legislation than before the agreement. For Sinn Féin, I considered the years before British intervention halted activity from the Assembly. This was necessary, as there was no legislative body during British rule. I also studied the two years that followed the St. Andrews Agreement. My hypothesis that fewer pieces of legislation would be created was proved correct. Success in this research is also defined by lower levels of violence than before the power-sharing agreement. I hypothesized that the former rebels would return to violence. This hypothesis was disproved, as terrorist incidents were higher after the St. Andrews Agreement.

It is critical to understand the role of these groups in government, given the prevalence of power-sharing as a tool for conflict management and conflict termination. There are many factors which may influence the stability of the government post-conflict, such as outsider involvement or economics (McEvoy, 2015). The former insurgent group is often only part of the government, which makes it even harder to understand. However, these groups play a critical role in post-conflict states. Their militant backgrounds often provide them with followers, dangerous resources, and power. Power-sharing asks them to relinquish those benefits and work with their former enemy. In the case of Sinn Féin, this has been moderately successful. Though conditions in Northern Ireland were
somewhat less than idea, Sinn Féin was consistently getting better at producing legislation and staying away from violence.
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