DETERMINING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ALLIANCE PATHOLOGIES IN BIPOLAR SYSTEMS: A CASE OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR FROM 431-421 BCE

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

By

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2016
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ABSTRACT


The literature proposes that bipolar systems and international systems with nuclear weapons will not have significant issues with alliance pathologies. But are alliance pathologies really insignificant in Bipolar Systems? The problem is that the literature only describes bipolar systems with nuclear weapons, so one cannot discern whether bipolarity or nuclear weapons alone are responsible for the insignificance of these alliance pathologies. So to solve this problem, this paper will examine a bipolar system in Classical Greece during the time of the Peloponnesian War to isolate any possible influence that nuclear weapons may have on alliance pathologies. This will be done using qualitative analysis in the form of an in-depth case study to focus on a total of six allies from the two superpowers – Athens and Sparta. The findings show that alliance pathologies significantly impact alliances in bipolar systems, which better clarifies the role between polarity, nuclear weapons, and alliance pathologies.
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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>CTBT</td>
<td>Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ExComm</td>
<td>Executive Committee of the National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>IRBM</td>
<td>Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis has been the most challenging and rewarding endeavor of my academic career. First, I would like to send a sincere thanks to my thesis committee members, particularly my thesis director, Dr. Liam Anderson, for the many hours of guidance that enabled me to complete this project. I would also like to acknowledge Dr. Laura Luehrmann, the director of the International and Comparative Politics program, and Ms. Joanne Ballmann, Administrative Staff, for their dedication and none wavering support for their graduate students during the process. In addition I would like to thank Dr. Greg Anderson of the Ohio State University, Dr. Arthur Eckstein of University of Maryland, and Dr. Bruce LaForse of Wright State University for their help introducing me to the Classics literature for my case study. Finally, I would like to thank my family, friends, and colleagues for all their support and encouragement throughout this long process.
Chapter I

“God made man, but Sam Colt made them equal”
- Variation of Advertisement from Colt’s Manufacturing Company

Introduction

This paper seeks to provide a deeper understanding of how Alliance Pathologies (adverse ally behaviors) relate to the International Distribution of Power (the number of great powers) and Nuclear Weapons. So what are Alliance Pathologies? They are behaviors conducted by allies out of their own self-interest that ultimately jeopardizes the overall security of their alliance. Some of these behaviors include: chain-ganging (aggressor dragging its alliance into war), buck-passing (not fulfilling ones commitments), entrapment (being pulled into a war for an ally’s interests), and abandonment (defection) (Christensen and Snyder 1990; Snyder 1984). This study will help establish a framework for scholars and policymakers to predict how these pathologies will impact their alliance partners. The current theory holds that Alliance Pathologies will have a significant impact on alliances in Multipolar Systems – an International Distribution of Power concentrated across at least three great powers (Christensen and Snyder 1990; Snyder 1984; Waltz 1979, 144). The theory also maintains that the effects of Alliance Pathologies are not significant in Bipolar Systems – a Distribution of Power concentrated across only two superpowers (Christensen and Snyder 1990; Snyder 1984; Waltz 1979). However, the literature has not taken into account that the Bipolar System discussed in the literature also contains Nuclear
Weapons. So the problem becomes figuring out which condition nuclear weapons or bipolarity determines the insignificance of these pathologies.

This leads me to my research question which is: Are alliance pathologies really insignificant to alliances in Bipolar Systems? Or is there something else driving this outcome? I am inclined to think that nuclear weapons may play a pivotal role here and not necessarily bipolar nature of the system as described. So in order to find out, I will explore a bipolar system free from nuclear weapons and their influence. By isolating the two variables nuclear weapons and bipolarity, I can implement the scientific control needed to determine which variable is responsible for this outcome. The difficult part becomes choosing a suitable worldwide bipolar system without nuclear weapons. However this can be resolved by substituting a worldwide bipolar system for one at the regional level, in which two great powers dominate the political landscape. So for instance I decided to set up a case study in Classical Greece during the Peloponnesian Wars, when Athens and Sparta were considered the two most powerful city-states within their sphere of influence. First, I will analyze the six most important allies of Athens and Sparta to see if any alliance pathologies can be observed. If pathologies are present I will then determine their impact on Athens and Sparta and in turn the bipolar system as a whole.

When completed this study will provide a clearer picture of how the international distribution of power, namely bipolar systems, factor into the significance of alliance pathologies. If this study affirms the current theory’s prediction – that alliance pathologies are not significant in Bipolar Systems. Then, there will be no doubt that nuclear weapons could have been involved in any way, since nuclear weapons did not
exist at the time of Classical Greece. However, if this study shows that alliance pathologies *do* significantly impact alliances in this bipolar system. Then, it may *suggest* that nuclear weapons could have been responsible for the lack of significant alliance pathologies in the bipolar system referred to in the literature. This would indicate that more research needs to be invested into learning how nuclear weapons influence alliance pathologies, so that scholars and policymakers alike can make more reliable predictions on the topic.

So why does this matter? Around the world today many countries seek to obtain nuclear weapons. Despite the persistent effort of the international community to curtail the spread of nuclear weapons through the United Nations’ 1968, ‘Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’ (NPT) and the 1996, ‘Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty’ (CTBT) some countries like India, Pakistan, and perhaps even North Korea still managed to have acquired some form of the capability (http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml; http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/CTBT/). This begs the question could the same alliance pathologies that have plagued other alliances have the same effect on alliances with nuclear powers. In other words could an ally like North Korea *chain-gang* China into a nuclear war with the United States, if North Korea decides to launch a nuclear assault on either South Korea or the United States? I think this it would be highly unlikely, since I do not think China would purposely risk so much over the interests of an ally. This is why I believe that nuclear weapons may play a role in deciding the significance of alliance pathologies and not necessarily the system’s international distribution of power.
Currently, however, this nuclear dimension of alliance pathologies has not been thoroughly explored. Glenn Snyder has made some progress, but he exclusively focused on how alliance pathologies conducted by nuclear powers would influence minor allies and not the other way around (1984). Snyder (1984) writes “To Europe nuclear abandonment means either a withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear deterrent or an evaporation of its credibility. Nuclear entrapment means the actual use of nuclear weapons in case deterrence fails, especially in a way that makes Europe the principal battleground” (492). While this suggests that alliance pathologies could occur when nuclear weapons are present, it does not suggest that they will have any significant impact on the alliance as a whole. And once again this discussion centers on nuclear weapons and alliance pathologies that are set in a bipolar system, an international distribution of power that Glenn Snyder himself concedes to having less problems with alliance pathologies (Snyder 1990).

This thesis will advance the study of alliance pathologies by determining the veracity of the literature’s claim that alliance pathologies are not significant in bipolar systems. This will also be the first time that anyone has scrutinized alliance pathologies in a bipolar system, isolated from nuclear weapons. At the same time this type of control will help one to recognize how influential nuclear weapons are on alliance pathologies. So the results will provide a fresh look at how alliance pathologies respond to the new conditions as well as add to our overall understanding into the nature of the problem.
Chapter II

Literature Review

Section A: Alliance Pathologies

In the International Relations literature there are two major themes concerning alliance pathologies. The first, alliance security dilemma, explains how countries form and manage alliances. This literature introduces the alliance pathologies of abandonment and entrapment.

The other theme explains how the, offensive/defensive advantage, influences the behavior of states involved in alliances. This approach introduces the notions of chain-ganging and buck-passing by examining how states perceive military advantages given conditions within the International System.

Alliance Security Dilemma

The alliance dilemma approach examines how alliances are formed and managed. Snyder (1984) writes, “The security dilemma in the alliance game has two phases: primary and secondary. The primary phase occurs during the process of alliance formation, the secondary one after alliances have formed” (462). The second phase of the alliance dilemma examines how firmly and readily an ally will commit itself to its alliance partners and support them in war. Snyder (1984) argues, “In the alliance security dilemma, the principal ‘bads’ are ‘abandonment’ and ‘entrapment,’ and the principal ‘goods’ are a reduction in the risks of being abandoned or entrapped by the ally” (466).

Abandonment - is when a country defects, realigns, or fails to maintain its commitments to the alliance (Snyder 1984; Snyder 1997). An ally that abandons its alliance reduces the
resources of the alliance which weakens it and requires other alliance member to provide additional support to maintain the alliance’s security. *Entrapment* occurs when states are ‘dragged into a conflict over an ally’s interests that one does not share, or shares only partially’ (Snyder 1984, 467). Entrapment takes place when allies wish to maintain the security of the alliance more than they are willing to allow the destruction of their ally.

An ally will choose abandonment or entrapment after estimating the trade-offs among the risks, benefits, and costs associated with the decision (Snyder 1984). However, the principal determinants are a combination of these factors – direct and indirect dependence, explicitness of commitment, disparity of interests in conflict with the opponent, and the behavioral record (Snyder 1984, 475). Proximate determinants such as strategic choice are also associated with the primary factors when determining alliance behaviors. Nevertheless, “If a state perceives its ally as less dependent, if the alliance commitment is vague, and if the ally’s recent behavior suggests doubtful loyalty, the state will fear abandonment” (Snyder 1984, 475). In addition, Snyder (1984) wrote “The greater one’s dependence on the alliance and the stronger one’s commitment to the ally, the higher the risk of entrapment” (467). Alliance behaviors within the alliance dilemma viewpoint originate from the interplay between these trade-offs.

**Offensive/Defensive Advantage**

The theme *Offensive/Defensive Advantage* describes how aligned countries perceive one another. A country that begins to perceive itself as having either an Offensive or Defensive Advantage in relation to an opponent behaves in a distinctive manner. Traditionally Quester (1977), writes that “offenses produce war and/or empire; defenses support independence and peace” (208). However, currently the perception of
‘offensive advantage’ represents the alliance behavior of ‘chain-ganging.’ Christensen and Snyder argue that ‘chain-ganging’ occurs when a country perceives itself as having an overwhelming ‘offensive military advantage’ over its adversary (1990). Chain-ganging - is when an aggressive country drags its entire alliance into war (Christensen and Snyder 1990). An example of a chain-ganging would be Austria at the beginning of the First World War. Austria’s aggression into Serbia dragged its alliance members (Central Powers) into war.

Conversely the perception of ‘defensive advantage’ is realized as ‘buck-passing.’ Buck-passing arises from a state’s perception that it has the ‘defensive advantage’ and that it would be better off ‘passing the costs’ of the alliance off to other alliance members (Christensen and Snyder 1990). Buck-passing - is when a country does nothing, while other countries contribute resources to the alliance (Christensen and Snyder 1990). An example of a buck-passing would be Great Britain, at the beginning of the Second World War. Great Britain provided little assistance to its allies, because it felt protected by the English Channel.

The alliance behaviors chain-ganging or buck-passing will occur if countries perceive themselves more favorably offensively or defensively. So what factors go into determining how a country perceives itself? Christensen & Snyder (1990) write, “The soldiers’ and policymakers’ perceptions of international structural incentives, including the offense-defense balance, are shaped by their formative experiences, especially in the last major war” (145). “If leaders believe offensive military doctrines to be efficacious, the likelihood of chain-gangs and quick escalation is high, while if they believe that defenses are hardy, they will try to pass the costs of opposing challengers onto other
actors” (Christensen 1997, 67). In addition, the decision makers’ past experiences and prior military strategies must also be considered against the country’s military capabilities. Jervis (1978) argues, “Technology and geography are the two main factors that determine whether the offense or the defense has the advantage” (194). Therefore, a country’s perceptions are based on the decision makers’ strategies and experiences coupled with the country’s military capability.

**Offensive Advantage and Chain-ganging**

A country determines it has an offensive advantage, by combining the ‘perceptions’ of decision makers and the degree of the country’s ‘vulnerabilities’ to other countries. Christensen and Snyder (1990) explain, “The greater the vulnerability of states (that is, the more favorable the technology or geography for the attacker), the greater is the propensity to align unconditionally and to fight all-out in defense of an ally from the first moment it is attacked” (144). In other words, weaker countries would be highly vulnerable if the chain-ganger (the aggressor) gets destroyed, so they remained aligned with the attacker. The degree of vulnerability and the perception of the country’s geographical and technological propensity also factors in before alliance members are pulled into war by the chain-ganger.

**Defensive Advantage and Buck-passing**

The decision to buck-pass is very similar to that of chain-ganging. A buck-passing country considers itself ‘less vulnerable’ to other countries. This view of being stronger is combined with the decision makers’ perspective of military advantage. Christensen and Snyder (1990) write, “The lesser the vulnerability of states, the greater is the tendency to pass the buck” (145). Jervis explains that “the defensive and deterrent military
technologies, as well as geographical configuration make conquest more difficult” (Jervis as cited in Christensen and Snyder 1990, 144). Since the buck-passer is ‘less vulnerable’ and has a strong defensive position, it is not in much danger. Therefore the buck-passer reduces its contributions to the alliance, which weakens the alliance and makes the allies contribute more for their safety.

**Similarities between the Two Themes**

**Chain-Ganging & Entrapment**

The alliance pathologies chain-ganging and entrapment are very similar. Both of these types of alliance pathologies focus on the offensive actions of allies. *Chain-ganging* - is the term given to a ‘state that drags its alliance partners into an unwanted war’ (Christensen and Snyder 1990). Even though alliance members do not wish to enter a conflict initiated by their aggressive ally, the ‘destruction of the chain-ganging state would cripple the security of the alliance,’ so the alliance is compelled to act (Christensen and Snyder 1990). *Entrapment* - is when a country is dragged into a conflict over an ally’s interests (Snyder 1984; Snyder 1997). Entrapment is similar to chain-ganging except that the entrapped states are not the aggressors starting the conflict. But both chain-ganging and entrapment pull alliance members into unwanted wars due to offensive actions.

**Buck-Passing & Abandonment**

Likewise buck-passing and abandonment are alliance pathologies that relate to the allies’ defensive actions. *Buck-passing* occurs when a state free-rides, while other states suffer the burden of providing excess security in the effort to balance threats (Christensen and Snyder 1990; Christensen 1997; Walt 1987). *Abandonment* - is when a country
defects, realigns, or fails to maintain its commitments to the alliance (Snyder 1984; Snyder 1997). Abandonment is similar to buck-passing, but unlike buck-passing, abandonment clarifies the importance of ‘defection’ from alliances. Both buck-passing and abandonment are examples of states optimizing their own defensive advantage at the expense of their alliance and its members.

Section B: International System and Alliance Pathologies

International Structure (Distribution of Power)

According to the balance-of-power theory, countries form alliances to confront other powerful countries and their alliances (Waltz 1979). The ‘balance-of-power’ reveals the ‘distribution of power’ within the international system (Waltz 1979; Walt 1987; Mearsheimer 1994). ‘The distribution of power’ in a bipolar system reflects the concentration of capabilities across two of the system’s units (Waltz 1979, 144). The United States and the Soviet Union from 1947-1991 during the Cold War is an example of a bipolar system. A multipolar system is a concentration of capabilities across more than two system units. The great powers during the First World War and the beginning of the Second World War represent multipolar systems. Countries in both multipolar and bipolar systems strive to build up their capabilities to protect themselves against external threats. Walt (1988) writes, “When faced with a clear external threat, these states almost always sought to counter the threat through some combination of external alignment and internal effort” (308). “States may balance externally, by combining their capabilities with others, or they may balance internally, by mobilizing their own resources in ways that will enable them to resist stronger states more effectively. Or they may do both”
According to the literature internal and external balancing correlates with a particular distribution of power. Mearsheimer (1990) writes, “Under multipolarity states tend to balance by external means; under bipolarity they are compelled to use internal means” (17). These different balancing techniques and their corresponding international systems are thought to dramatically influence the nature of alliance pathologies.

**External Balancing**

Waltz (1981) writes, “In the old days weaker powers could improve their positions through alliances by adding the strength of foreign armies to their own” (3). Waltz (1979) also explains, “*External efforts*, moves to strengthen and enlarge one’s own alliance or to weaken and shrink an opposing one” (118). External balancing pools resources and other capabilities together quickly, which is difficult if not impossible for some countries. Some countries lack the required resources and technology to develop the sophisticated weaponry needed to protect themselves from aggressors. While other countries may have the resources and know-how, but they may not have the time to develop the weaponry in a timely fashion. For these countries “External balancing of this sort is especially attractive because it is cheap and fast” (Mearsheimer 1990, 19). Mearsheimer (2001) writes, “Recruiting allies increases the amount of firepower confronting the aggressor, which in turn increases the likelihood that deterrence will work” (156).

**Association with Multipolarity**

Multipolar systems primarily use *external balancing* techniques to obtain resources, unlike bipolar systems. Nevertheless, “In most multipolar systems, both forms of balancing are possible” (Pape 2005, 15). The international system is *anarchic*,
meaning there is no governing authority in world politics above countries, i.e. there is no world government (Waltz 1979). So states pursue relative and absolute gains in the international system to better their position and provide for their security. “States seek to survive under anarchy by maximizing their power relative to other states, in order to maintain the means for self-defense” (Mearsheimer 1990, 12). Or Mearsheimer (1994) writes, “They can think in terms of absolute gains, which means each side focuses on maximizing its own profit, and cares little about how much the other side gains or losses in the deal” (12). However, Waltz (1979) argues, “Relative gains may be more important than absolute ones because one’s gain measured against that of others affects the ability to shift oneself” (134). Therefore, states form alliances by external balancing achieve greater relative gains improve their position and security in the international system.

External balancing is more prevalent in multipolar systems, since there is higher percentage of international capabilities spread more evenly throughout the world. As the system’s capabilities are spread across three or more countries the proportion of their capabilities move closer together. With capabilities in the international system approaching equality, alliances stand to gain significant resources from the relative gains of other states. Waltz (1979) writes, “Similarly, with a number of approximately equal states, strategy is at least partly made for the sake of attracting and holding allies” (165). “Flexibility of alignment then makes for rigidity in national strategies: a state’s strategy must satisfy its partner lest that partner defect from the alliance” (Waltz 1967, 218). Moreover, since the capabilities of countries are approximately equal, their reliance on alliance partners intensifies. “In alliances among equals, the defection of one party threatens the security of the others” (Waltz 1979, 168). Waltz explains that the reliance
on alliance partners makes them extremely ‘interdependent’ on each other (1979). This interdependence makes alliance members susceptible to the dangers of alliance pathologies putting alliances and their member states in danger.

Figure 1, illustrates the multipolar system’s capabilities during 1914. This graph represents the percentage of capabilities from each of the great powers and all of the lesser powers, which are grouped together in the ‘other states’ category. Clearly, many of the great powers’ capabilities are approximately equal to one another. States that balance externally, especially in multipolar systems, rely heavily on their alliance partners. This reliance on other states increases the likelihood that alliance pathologies will occur. Germany had no choice but to follow the chain-ganger Austro-Hungary into war, since its destruction would have seriously weakened the central powers. Moreover, Russian buck-passing in the later stages of the war seriously reduced the alliance’s capabilities for the United Kingdom and France. The data generated for this graph is provided by the EUGene software tool (http://www.eugenesoftware.org/). EUGene uses the capability score from the ‘Correlates of War CINC score,’ which measures capability by ‘summing all observations on each of the six capability components for a given year, converting each state's absolute component to a share of the international system, and then averaging across the six components’ (http://www.correlatesofwar.org/).
Expected Pathologies

States relying on external means for security will be affected more by alliance pathologies than states relying on internal means. By losing the contribution of some allies, the overall security of all alliance members is put into jeopardy as contributions decrease from lost members of the alliance (Waltz 1979). Therefore chain-ganging and buck-passing pose serious consequences to states that rely on external balancing techniques. Christensen & Snyder (1990) write, “Any nation that marches to war inexorably drags its alliance partners with it” (140). This example of chain-ganging illustrates how alliance partners will act in unusual ways in order to preserve the strength of their alliance.
The ambiguity within the international system attributed to external balancing bolsters alliance pathologies even more. External balancing also makes it very difficult for countries and alliances to estimate one another’s strength, since strength is derived from a hodgepodge of resources it is likely to be misinterpreted. Waltz (1981) writes, “Miscalculation causes wars. One side expects victory at an affordable price, while the other side hopes to avoid defeat” (6). He explains that states in a multipolar world are ‘tempted to act on advantages that are wishfully discerned and narrowly calculated’ (Waltz 1981). The ambiguity of how countries and alliances perceive offensive/defensive advantages with external balancing increases the likelihood that alliance pathologies will occur whenever external balancing dominates. According to the international relations literature external balancing is most prevalent in multipolar system. Therefore alliance pathologies are believed to take place more frequently in multipolar systems.

**Internal Balancing**

Internal balancing differs from external balancing in how countries seek to obtain their capabilities. Waltz (1979) explains, “Internal efforts, moves to increase economic capability, to increase military strength, and to develop clever strategies” (118). Countries choose internal balancing techniques in order to increase their own capabilities without using as much foreign assistance. This decreases ones dependence on foreign powers and alliances. However in order for a country to balance internally, it must already possess a significant portion of the distribution of power. In other words, the country must already be relatively strong in the international system.
Association with Bipolarity

Internal balancing primarily exists in bipolar systems. “In a two-power system the politics of balance continue, but the way to compensate for an incipient external disequilibrium is primarily by intensifying one’s internal efforts” (Waltz 1979, 118). This is largely attributed to the nature of a bipolar system, in which two countries hold the largest concentration of capabilities in the system. As fewer countries control a greater proportion of the international system’s capabilities, the proportion of the capabilities moves farther apart. (This can be illustrated by comparing Figure 1 with Figure 2.) This creates greater inequality among the countries in bipolar systems. Waltz (1979) argues, “In alliances among unequals, the contributions of the lesser members are at once wanted and of relatively small importance” (168). In other words bipolar superpowers stand to gain very little, in terms of relative strength from alliances with minor powers. Regardless of this superpowers in bipolar systems do form alliances with minor powers.

This diplomatic maneuver, which is often called external balancing, is limited in a bipolar world, because there are no potential great-power alliance partners, although it is still possible to ally with minor powers. During the Cold War, for example, both the United States and the Soviet Union had no choice but to ally with minor powers, because they were the only great powers in the system. (Mearsheimer 2001, 156)
Waltz (1979) argues, “The contributions [from allies] are useful even in a bipolar world, but they are not *indispensable* (169). Unlike multipolar systems in which countries are highly interdependent on each other, countries in bipolar systems are less interdependent. “Military interdependence varies with the extent to which, and the equality with which, great powers rely on others for their security” (Waltz 1979, 168). Since bipolar superpowers do not rely heavily on other countries for their security, military interdependence is low. Low interdependence of alliance partners decreases the influence of alliance pathologies in bipolar systems.

**Expected Pathologies**

Clearly states that do not rely heavily on other states and alliances for their security will not be as affected by alliance pathologies as states that do. In fact Christensen &
Snyder (1990) argue that bipolar superpowers rely primarily on internal balancing, so losing peripheral allies is irrelevant (142). It is not that alliance pathologies do not occur when states balance internally, but if they do, they would be inconsequential to the security of the alliance. “Bipolar superpowers do not need to chain themselves to small reckless allies, since the superpowers are not dependent on allies for their survival” (Christensen and Snyder 1990, 141). A superpower’s security is gained from its own resources, so it’s not threatened if a country decides to defect from an alliance. Internal balancing provides security, while at the same time creating a buffer to adverse alliance pathologies.

Moreover, internal balancing makes it easier for opposing coalitions to gauge the resources and capabilities of their adversaries, which reduces the miscalculations that produce wars. Waltz explains that this is possible since ‘internal balancing is more reliable and precise than external balancing’ (1979). “States are less likely to misjudge their relative strengths than they are to misjudge the strength and reliability of opposing coalitions” (Waltz 1981, 2). The conditions that influence minor powers into perceiving offensive/defensive advantage over others would be kept at a minimum. Therefore internal balancing mitigates the effects that alliance pathologies have on superpowers, since there is more clarity of opposing strengths.

Finally, the relative difference between the capabilities of countries in a bipolar system also factor in to the lack of alliance pathologies. Waltz (1967) argues, “The gross inequality between the two superpowers and the members of their respective alliances make any realignment of the latter fairly insignificant” (219). Waltz (1979) writes, “Third parties [in bipolar systems] are not able to tilt the balance of power by withdrawing from
one alliance or by joining the other” (169). The relative contributions of minor powers are considered too small to alter bipolar systems. Whereas minor powers in multipolar systems are consistently sought to do just that, *tilt* the balance of power in favor of one pole over the other.

**Section C: Nuclear Weapons and Alliance Pathologies**

**Nuclear Weapons and the International System**

How has the introduction of nuclear weapons affected the distribution of power in the international system? Since the distribution of power reflects how power capabilities are amassed between countries in the international system, the question really centers on whether or not nuclear weapons change how capabilities are redistributed within the system. According to Weber nuclear weapons have NOT significantly altered the distribution of capabilities among states (1990, 62). The possession of nuclear weapons alone does not make a state a great power. Waltz (1979) writes, “Great powers are strong not simply because they have nuclear weapons but also because of their immense resources enable them to generate and maintain power of all types, military and other, at strategic and tactical levels” (183). Even though nuclear weapons have not affected the distribution of power in the international system, they have affected the internal/external balancing techniques between states. Walt explains that weak states can resist the United States through three *internal balancing* techniques: increasing conventional military resources, using terrorism, or acquiring weapons of mass destruction, in order to resist the conventional military power of the United States (2005). “As these statements reveal,
weaker states are aware that a WMD arsenal can offset some – though of course not all – of the advantages that stronger states would otherwise possess” (Walt 2005, 139).

**Are Nuclear Weapons an Absolute Gain/Weapon?**

Generally states in the international system seek relative gains when they balance externally or internally. Nuclear weapons are indeed an internal means of balancing, but they do not increase gains relatively but absolutely. Once the requirements are met and a country possesses a nuclear capability, there is no value added from relative gains.

Levels of absolute capability are now more important than relative power because with nuclear weapons, what is crucial is each side’s ability to cripple the other, and this capability is measured by the match between the country’s forces and the targets it seeks to destroy, not between the two side’s forces. (Jervis 1989, 47)

The absolute quality of nuclear weapons makes it possible for weak states to stand up to strong states. Waltz (1990) writes, “Nuclear weapons have reversed the fates of strong and weak states” (744). Mearsheimer (1990) argues, “Nuclear weapons affect the degree of equality in the system. Specifically, the situation created by MAD bolsters peace by moving power relations among states toward equality” (20). This puts all owners of nuclear weapons on an equal footing, and all non-owners on an unequal footing in their relationship with nuclear powers.

**Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence**

Before the advent of nuclear weapons, countries had to deter potential aggressors with the relative increases made by external or internal balancing. Waltz (1990) claims, “Deterrence depends on what one can do, not on what one will do” (733). “A nonnuclear alliance provides the public good of deterrence through the political use of conventional weapons, that is, by threatening costly military retaliation to an undesired action by the
adversary” (Palmer & Sky 1999, 756). Now nuclear powers can easily deter aggressors by threatening to use their nuclear arsenal on aggressors. In fact Walt (2005) argues, “Weapons of mass destruction – and especially nuclear weapons – are extremely effective instruments of basic deterrence, because it is too dangerous to threaten a WMD-owning state with conquest or ‘regime change’” (139). Nuclear weapons provide their owners an absolute gain in the quality of deterrence, which will not disappear when the distribution of power shifts and/or their position in the system changes from great power to minor power. This gives nuclear states positive assurance that they will maintain their security simply by having a nuclear deterrent.

Nuclear deterrence creates another phenomenon known as Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). Mutual Assured Destruction is a form of deterrence arising from the consequences of what would happen if at least two nuclear powers would use nuclear weapons on each other. Jervis (1982) argues, “Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) escapes from the security dilemma as each side gains security not from its ability to protect itself, but from its ability to retaliate and so to deter the other from launching an attack” (374). Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) influences how nuclear powers behave in the international system by inhibiting them from rash actions. Brodie (1947) writes, “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them” (76). The devastating effects of nuclear weapons along with the possibility of MAD, restrains nuclear powers from engaging in frivolous activities on behalf of their allies.

Nuclear powers technically do not even need alliances. Joffe (1989) writes, “From the vantage point of pure strategic logic, they [alliances] are a luxury for those who
possess a credible independent deterrent” (31). Nuclear powers simply cannot gain any additional capabilities to improve their security blanket provided by nuclear weapons. Waltz (1993) goes a step further by arguing “Nuclear states easily generate second-strike forces, they do not need one another’s help at the strategic level. Strategically, nuclear weapons make alliances obsolete” (73). Clearly interdependence between nuclear powers and other allies is low in a nuclear world. Therefore, alliance pathologies will not affect nuclear superpowers the same way they do non-nuclear superpowers.

**Expected Pathologies**

Nuclear powers do not need to rely on alliances for their security, so alliance pathologies are not expected to influence nuclear powers. Waltz (1981) writes, “The non-additivity of nuclear forces means that in our bipolar world efforts of lesser states cannot tilt the strategic balance” (3). If the relative contributions of minor powers had more sway on nuclear powers, then nuclear superpowers would be at risk of alliance pathologies. However, because nuclear powers have all of the internal balancing they would ever need there is little chance that alliance pathologies will influence nuclear powers into doing something they do not wish.

Nuclear weapons provide deterrence between superpowers, which further eliminates the importance of alliances in a nuclear system. Jervis (1989) argues, “In the nuclear era, by contrast, security is provided by second-strike capability; defections by allies are therefore less damaging” (36). This deterrence has altered how countries perceive their offensive/defensive advantage in relation to other countries. Waltz (1993) writes, “Offensive and defensive advantage has been transformed by nuclear weapons into deterrent strength easily achieved” (71).
In assessing the relative lethality of offensive, defensive, and deterrent operations in particular historical eras, one must determine whether there was an absolute weapon – a weapon capable of destroying not just other weapons but also entire geographical areas, such as cities. When such a weapon exists, states can punish their opponents without first achieving victory through offensive or defensive operations. Thus deterrence dominates. From 1800 to 1944, force lethality grew markedly, but no absolute existed. Thus deterrence was dominated by offense or defense. But once the atomic bomb was developed in 1945, deterrent operations became easier and more robust than ever before (Adams 2003/4, 54-5).

In a nuclear world, non-nuclear minor powers may still perceive offensive or defensive advantages in relations with each other. However, nuclear powers will no longer perceive themselves in terms of offensive or defensive advantages, but focus on deterrence. Minor powers may try to use alliance pathologies to coerce nuclear superpowers into supporting them, but because nuclear powers are now concerned with deterrence they will not risk destruction over a minor power’s interests. Under such conditions alliance pathologies are not expected to pose problems in any system with nuclear weapons.

**Evaluating the Literature**

The literature indicates that states in bipolar systems as well as international systems with nuclear weapons will not have significant issues with alliance pathologies. The problem, of course, is that the literature only describes bipolar systems with nuclear weapons, so one cannot discern whether bipolarity or nuclear weapons alone are responsible for the insignificance of the pathologies. (Figure 3, illustrates this problem below using a two-by-two Figure.) Christensen (1997) in a later article almost seems to acknowledge this problem, “Many scholars believe the cold war peace to have been caused by the dual factors of MAD and bipolarity, but they have not carefully considered that the former condition may have depended on the latter” (94). In addition Christensen
and Snyder (1990) also cautioned in their original article, that any future research concerning alliance pathologies will need to factor in nuclear weapons, since nuclear deterrence could alter one’s defensive advantage and impair ‘traditional checkerboard balancing logic’ for multipolar systems in the future (168). “Insofar as nuclear weapons are likely to make each pole individually invulnerable to conquest, a nuclear-armed multipolarity may resemble the stable 1880s more than it will the chain-ganging 1910s or buck-passing 1930s” (Christensen and Snyder 1990, 168). But curiously they neglected to factor in how nuclear weapons may affect alliance pathologies in their description of bipolar systems.

The alliance dilemma literature does not fare much better. As mentioned above, Snyder (1990) argues that “The alliance management problem is easier in bipolar than multipolar alliances, at least in alliances of the superpowers, because the structure of the system provides little opportunity or incentive for defection” (Snyder 1990, 118). And even when introducing nuclear weapons Snyder (1984) recognizes that alliance pathologies are possible but changes his focus to demonstrate how small allies, not great powers will be affected by alliance pathologies. “Thus, to Europe nuclear abandonment means either a withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear deterrent or an evaporation of its credibility. Nuclear entrapment means the actual use of nuclear weapons in case deterrence fails, especially in a way that makes Europe the principal battleground” (Snyder 1984, 492). Although these are valid points and ought to be mentioned. These points, fail to address the problem of distinguishing which characteristic bipolarity or nuclear weapons are responsible for the determining the significance of alliance pathologies as desired.
This thesis seeks to resolve this problem, so that one can more easily distinguish whether bipolarity or nuclear weapons is solely responsible for the insignificance of alliance pathologies. In order to accomplish this task I will isolate the two independent variables by selecting a Case Study with a bipolar distribution of power, which will not have nuclear weapons. So for this paper I selected Classical Greece during the Peloponnesian Wars when Athens and Sparta were considered Dual Hegemons (two leaders) in the Greek sphere of influence. (See below for more details.) As this Case Study fits the criteria, I will now be able to analyze the most important minor powers using the method prescribed in the literature to ascertain whether or not alliance pathologies do or do not have a significant impact on their allies under the controlled conditions. This will provide greater insight into alliance pathologies and increase understanding of the political environment by enabling better policy recommendations for decision makers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nuclear Weapons</th>
<th>International Distribution of Power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NUKES</td>
<td>MULTIPOLAR: --, BIPOLAR: NOT SIGNIFICANT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO NUKES</td>
<td>MULTIPOLAR: SIGNIFICANT, BIPOLAR: My Research Question?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 3. Polarity, Nuclear Weapons, and the Impact of Alliance Pathologies*
Chapter III

Research Design

Variables and Operationalization

Independent Variable 1: Distribution of Power [Controlled by Case Selection]

The independent variable, distribution of power, comes from Waltz’s theory of the international political system (1979). He conceptualizes the ‘distribution of power’ as the spread of capabilities across the units of the international system (Waltz 1979). When two states possess the concentration of the international system’s power, the system is bipolar (Waltz 1979). An empirical example of a bipolar system is the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. When more than two states possess the concentration of the international system’s power, the system is a multipolar system (Waltz 1979). An empirical example of a multipolar is the type of international system before the First World War, in which several European countries possessed the concentration of the power in the international system.

Independent Variable 2: Nuclear Weapons [Controlled by Case Selection]

Nuclear weapons as a unit-level attribute stems from the International Relation’s literature on internal balancing via nuclear weapons. Waltz writes that nuclear capabilities are the product of the great national capabilities of states, but they do not influence the stability of the international system (1964). However if nuclear weapons provide states with internal means of protection, then states will rely less on external means of protection. Therefore alliances would be less meaningful in an international system with nuclear weapons.
**Dependent Variable 1: Significance of Alliance Pathologies**

The dependent variable, alliance pathologies, originates from the International Relation’s literature concerning alliances. Alliance pathologies encompass the adverse ally behaviors of chain-ganging, buck-passing, entrapment, abandonment, and other forms of opportunism (Christensen and Snyder 1990; Lake 1996). Empirically chain-ganging and entrapment represent the acts of a state dragging another state into a conflict (Christensen and Snyder 1990; Snyder 1984). Abandonment and Buck-passing are characterized by a state defecting from its alliance or not providing its share of the burden for the alliance’s security (Christensen and Snyder 1990; Snyder 1984). However in order to ease operationalization and maintain thoroughness, the Dependent Variable will be divided up by the two themes: offensive/defensive advantage and alliance dilemma.

The perception of one’s Offensive/Defensive Advantage is determined by three main indicators: (1) Geography, may impede an aggressor and favor defense or permit an attacker’s offense (Jervis 1978, 194). (2) Military Capability, derived from ‘technology can favor the aggressor or defender’ (Van Evera 1998, 16-18). (3) Formative experiences, obtained from prior wars shape how soldiers and policymakers view the international structure at the given moment (Christensen and Snyder 1990, 145).

The behaviors affiliated with Alliance Dilemma are operationalized as four indicators: (1) Dependence, how much one ally needs the assistance of another ally and their perception of this dependence (Snyder 1984, 471-2). (2) Explicit Commitment reduces fear that an ally will abandon the alliance whereas vague commitments increase these fears (Snyder 1984, 473-4). (3) “Strategic Interests is an interest of keeping the ally’s power resources out of the opponent’s hands” (Snyder 1984, 472-3). (4) Behavior
Record, strategy options influenced by ‘one’s own and others’ recent past’ (Snyder 1984, 474-5).

Figure 4, illustrates how the dependent variable, alliance pathologies, can be operationalized into measurable items such as geography, military capability (technology), behavior record as well as other points of interests needed to gauge the state’s perception of the offensive/defensive balance. Consequently this will help determine the major states dependence on their allies by ascertaining what the major power stands to lose or have the potential to lose should alliance pathologies occur. Therefore one can judge how significantly alliance pathologies can impact the major powers and their alliances by understanding what capabilities the major powers are at risk of losing from these adverse behaviors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variables (DV)</th>
<th>Operationalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Offensive/Defensive Advantage (DV1)</strong></td>
<td>Geography (DV1.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chain-Ganging</td>
<td>Military Capability (DV1.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buck-Passing</td>
<td>Formative Experience (DV1.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alliance Dilemma (DV2)</strong></td>
<td>Dependence (DV2.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrapment</td>
<td>Explicit Commitment (DV2.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abandonment</td>
<td>Strategic Interests (DV2.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Behavior Record (DV2.4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 4. Dependent Variables and Operationalization**

**Hypotheses:**

The literature review indicates that alliance pathologies can be subdivided into two themes. This required refining the research question into sub-hypotheses to account for each theme’s pathologies. So that observations from both themes will be accounted for in
the overall assessment. This will eliminate the possibility of ‘false-negative’ reporting from the data indicating that pathologies are *not* present when in fact they are.

- (H0) Alliance Pathologies are *not significant* in Bipolar Systems.
- (HA1) Alliance Pathologies are *significant* in Non-Nuclear Bipolar Systems.
  - (HA1.a) Alliance Pathologies associated with Offensive/Defensive Advantage are *significant* in Non-Nuclear Bipolar Systems.
  - (HA1.b) Alliance Pathologies associated with the Alliance Dilemma are *significant* in Non-Nuclear Bipolar Systems.

**Case Selection**

**Classical Greece**

I selected Classical Greece during the period 460 BCE – 420 BCE, to study the alliance behaviors among two superpowers and eliminate any possible influence that might be associated with nuclear weapons. I chose this particular time and place for the following reasons. First, during this period the Persian Empire had little to no influence on Greek affairs. The Peace of Kallias around 449 BCE, retracted Persian activity to the areas east of Cyprus (Cawkwell 1997). It was not until 412 BCE after the Athenian disaster in Sicily that Persia re-emerged to play a major role as a power broker in the Greek World. This makes it possible to evaluate the Greek’s alliance behaviors without outside interference.

Second, between 460 – 412 BCE the Greek world came to be dominated by the two Greek city-states Athens and Sparta, a phenomenon referred to as ‘Dual Hegemony’ in the literature (Dickens 1911, 242). It is also clear that the Greeks themselves considered Athens and Sparta to be the two most powerful states of the time and these ideas are reflected in their writings. Herodotus (1.28) writes that the King of Lydia, Croesus,
sought out the most powerful Greek states to form an alliance, he discovered that the
“Spartans were the most eminent of the Doriains and the Athenians of the Ionian.” These
notions also extend to the Attic Orators like Isocrates who writes:

Some of the Greeks follow us, others follow the Spartans, and the governments by
which they manage their cities have divided most of them along these lines. Thus
whoever thinks that the others will accomplish anything good before the two
leading cities are reconciled is quite naïve and out of touch with the situation. But
someone who is not only seeking to make a display, but wishes to accomplish
something, must look for the kind of arguments that will persuade these two
cities to share equally with each other, to take up joint leadership, and to gain
advantages from the Persian King that they currently want to get from the other
Greeks. (Isoc. 4.16-17)

Nevertheless, Thucydides (1.18) explains that this condition continued to grow after the
Persian Wars and becoming more solidified as the Greeks “split into two divisions, one
group following Athens and the other Sparta. These were clearly the two most powerful
states, one being supreme on land, the other on the sea.” This drove the two hegemons to
compete in order to acquire as many allies as possible, developing into ‘a condition of
bitterly rivalrous bipolarity’ (Eckstein 2006, 48).

So is there any way to measure the disparity between the hegemons and the rest? It
is indeed possible to get a sense of this disparity by comparing the total population
estimates available for the Greek city-states of this era. Morgenthau (1967) writes “the
size of population is one of the factors upon which national power rests” (119). The
scholars making these estimates take into account the state’s total size in square
kilometers in conjunction with the amount of arable land required to support a given
population. While the numbers of these estimates vary it is possible to get a sense of the
scale for the populations in question. So for instance Beloch (1922) estimates that the
Athenian territory could support a total population of 200,000 people (273). (According
to Legon [1981] Beloch’s estimates for the Athenian population are among the lowest proposed by any scholar.) While, Finley (1963) writes “the Athenian population was at its peak, at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War in 431, the total, including men, women and children, free and slave, was about 250,000 or perhaps 275,000” (54-5).

Beloch estimates the total Spartan population including citizens, freemen (Perioeci), and slaves (Helots) to have been approximately 230,000 people (Beloch 1922, 284-5). As for the rest, Corinth could support a total population estimated to be between 60,000 and 70,000 people (Beloch 1922; Salmon 1997, 130). Megara’s total population is estimated to have been approximately 40,000 people (Beloch 1922, 309; Legon 1981, 24). Beloch (1922) estimates Thebe’s total population to be around 30,000 to 50,000 people before the start of the Archidamian War in 431 BCE (287-8). And the total population for Samos is estimated to have been as large as 50,000 people (Shipley 1987, 15).

Another way to get a sense of the population size is to examine how many heavy infantry (hoplite) troops each city-state could field to support their military engagements. After all Morgenthau (1967) writes “it is thus obvious that a nation cannot be of the first rank without a population sufficiently large to create and apply material implements of national power” (120). So I will demonstrate this by showing how many hoplites the two major powers and a few of the others supplied at the final battle of the Persian Wars, the Battle of Plataea in 479 BCE. According to Herodotus (9.28) the Athenians supplied 8,000 hoplites to the battle, Corinth supplied 5,000 hoplites, and Megara supplied 3,000 hoplites. Various other Greek city-states supplied an assorted number of hoplites as well as a total of 69,500 auxiliaries (Herodot. 9.29). The Spartans on the other hand supplied a total of 10,000 hoplites of which 5,000 were of the freemen (Perioeci) class as well as
35,000 light infantry helots (Herod. 9.28). The total Greek forces at the Battle of Plataea numbered 110,000 (Herod. 9.30). So from the total number of Greek forces at the Battle of Plataea, the Spartans provided roughly 41% of the total troop strength. Table 1, summarizes the total population estimates as well as the hoplite contributions per city-state in the table below.

Table 1. Estimated Total Population and Hoplite Contributions per City-State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City-State</th>
<th>Estimated Total Population</th>
<th>Hoplite contributions at the Battle of Plataea, 479 BCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Athens</td>
<td>200,000 – 275,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sparta</td>
<td>230,000</td>
<td>10,000 (5,000 Perioeci)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corinth</td>
<td>60,000 – 70,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Megara</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thebes</td>
<td>30,000 – 50,000</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samos</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mytilene</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chios</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Hoplites:</strong></td>
<td><strong>38,700</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Forces:</strong></td>
<td><strong>110,000</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

So what was the role of the Greek allies from 460 BCE – 420 BCE? Modern political theory maintains that allies do not play a major role in inter-state relations when there are two superpowers, because modern superpowers rely primarily on internal resources rather than external resources from allies. However this does not seem to be the case with allies in Classical Greece. Mosley (1971) writes, “The great powers did not depend upon the inventions of weaponry and technology for their strength so much as upon military and naval training and tactics and, to an even greater extent, upon the extension of alliances” (319). This point is exemplified by Thucydides in the Mytilenian debate, when Cleon argues that the Mytilenian revolt must be punished or other allies
will revolt. Thucydides (3.39) writes, “If our efforts are successful, we shall recover a city that is in ruin, and so lose future revenue from it, on which our strength is based.” It is clear that Athens relied heavily on her allies for strength in this period.

Sparta also relied heavily on her alliance to aid in putting down insurrections in the Peloponnese. Sparta had captured and enslaved the population of Messene, who became known as Helots (Cartledge 2009). The Helots would frequently rise up and rebel against the Spartans. Kagan (2009) writes, “Sparta’s security and its way of life rested, to some considerable degree, on the integrity of its alliances, so even the suggestion of defections that might lead to dissolution was alarming” (65). It is apparent that the Spartans used their alliance to enhance their power position in the Peloponnese.

It is among these Athenian and Spartan allies that I will evaluate the implication of alliance pathologies for this case study. I will analyze a total of six allies, three of the most prominent allies from the Athenian alliance known as the Delian League and three of the most important allies from the Spartan alliance sometimes referred to as the Peloponnesian League. The allies that I will be studying from the Delian League will include: Samos, Chios, and Mytilene. And the allies I have chosen to examine for the Peloponnesian League include: Thebes, Corinth, and Megara. I will use the operationalized indicators geography, military capability, behavior record, etc. to ascertain not only how the dependent variables affect Athens and Sparta, but also the entire system as a whole. I will primarily focus on alliance behaviors during the Archidamian War (431 – 421 BCE), but I will also examine alliance behaviors that occurred during the First Peloponnesian War (ca 460 –446 BCE), and in some instances earlier to establish a pattern of activity.
Method of Analysis

Process Tracing

In order to investigate the causal mechanism for my hypotheses I plan on using the process tracing method. Process tracing will enable me to investigate the causal chain of events to see how conditions are translated into outcomes (Van Evera 1997, 64). Van Evera (1997) explains that “Antecedent conditions will leave footprints in this process: actors may refer to their importance and events will occur in a sequence that follows their appearance or disappearance” (74). This method would be useful for my thesis, since there is a lack of quantitative data in Classical Greece, indicating that process tracing would be quite suitable. Moreover the process tracing variety of analytical explanation would be beneficial by clarifying the causal path and integrating it with the theory. George and Bennett (2005) explain that this is done by being deliberately selective on what the proposed conditions are the affect the outcomes. George and Bennett argue that process tracing should be applied to testing alternative theories since they can specify either complementary or exclusive causal processes from the theories (218).

Types of Evidence

I will gather case evidence from a variety of primary sources such as: histories (including historical speeches), philosophies, dramatic literature, and inscriptions off of monuments. I will also gather secondary sources from political science, history, and geography.
Peculiarities of Classical Greece

A key defining characteristic of the Greek city-state was the fierce desire to be politically independent. Each city-state desired it at almost any cost.

In practice autonomous means that it [city-state] can make its own decisions, free from violent interference by a stronger state, about what is and what is not in the interest of its survival, and it can dispose of the military means necessary to the implement measure necessary to ensure its survival. (Ostwald 1982, 29)

Greek city-states fiercely defended their autonomy and independence from other city-states. “Of course the very act of joining a large-scale alliance meant the surrender of an independent foreign policy, especially where the alliance treaties were concluded forever and there was no explicit right of secession” (Ryder 1965, 20). This is also reflected in the modern political theory. As, Morgenthau (1967) argues, “A nation loses its sovereignty when it is placed under the authority of another nation, so that it is the latter that exercises supreme authority to give and enforce the laws within the former’s territory” (305). Joining an alliance typically restricts a country’s foreign policy, but it is still considered independent if it can make and pass its own domestic laws.

Classicists debate why city-states align with particular city-states. Macmullen (1963) writes, “Big powers in Greece throughout the fifth and fourth centuries preferred to deal with poleis of like constitution, and tended to encourage or impose their own form of government on other states as a prerequisite to alliance” (122). He also explains that if a city-state entered into an alliance with a city-state with an opposite form of constitution, its loyalty was always in question (Macmullen 1963). But city-states with opposite forms of constitutions did become allies. “Ideological considerations were apparent in the aims and practice of Greek diplomacy, but they were largely evident as pretext and material for propaganda” (Adcock and Mosley 1975, 139). Both Thucydides and Aristotle claim
that Mantinea, a Spartan ally, had a democratic constitution, while Sparta had an oligarchic constitution (Amit 1973, 138). However Adcock and Mosley (1975) claim, “Treaties and alliances were normally concluded for immediate and pressing reasons” (136). “It was usually a reaction to a danger rather than an abstract anticipation of some situation that led states to seek allies” (Adcock and Mosley 1975, 132). Both of these arguments appear in modern political science. However the latter argument suggesting city-states form alliances out of fear is the most prominent Balance of Threat literature.

Another issue of contention may be the role of honor and ethnicity to compel allies to behave in certain ways. Lebow (2007) writes, “Sthenelaïdas appealed to his countrymen’s spirit and yearning for honor and related desire to avoid shame by ignoring the pleas of their hard-pressed allies” (169). While role of honor and ethnicity (kinship) appears to have played a role, the observations from the case study show that the great powers leveraged these characteristics when it suited them. But minor powers who tried to use the same qualities to induce major powers to come to their aid were more often than not left disappointed. In 426 BCE, the Ambraciots and several other allies convinced the Spartans to help them against their enemies, but these allies were defeated when the Spartans took the opportunity to withdraw after making a secret deal with the Athenians (Thuc. 3.109). According to Thucydides (3.109) Demosthenes’ purpose in offering this deal was to discredit the Spartans with the Greek world and the rest of their allies. But this action does not seem to have significantly harmed Sparta’s reputation, because in 416 BCE the Melians also thought that these characteristics would encourage the Spartans to come to their rescue when the Athenians threatened the Melians to join the Athenian alliance or face destruction. According to Thucydides the Melians argued:
What we lack in power, we trust that it will be made up for by our alliance with the Spartans, who are bound if for no other reason, than for honor’s sake, and because we are their kinsmen, to come to our help. (Thuc. 5.104)

In the end the Spartans did not come to the aid of Melos. “The Melians surrendered unconditionally to the Athenians, who put to death all the men of military age, and sold the women and children as slaves” (Thuc. 5.116). Moreover, the Athenians behaved no differently than Sparta in this respect. In 429 BCE, the Plataeans held-out under a Peloponnesian siege on the promise that the Athenians would come to their aid (Thuc. 2.74). Of course the Athenians never came and the city was lost in the same manner as Melos. And the Athenians had no misgivings about crushing revolts by their kinsmen. In 441 BCE, the Athenians put down the Samian Revolt, which was conducted by their kinsmen. When questioned about these practices at the Debate in Camarina in 415 BCE, an Athenian named Euphemus replies:

When a man or city exercises absolute power the logical course is the course of self-interests, and ties of blood exist only when they can be relied upon; one must choose one’s friends and enemies according to the circumstances on each particular occasion. (Thuc. 6.85)

In another Thucydides translation by Benjamin Jowett in 1881, there is more of an emphasis on the great power using ethnicity as a form of ‘expediency’ to ‘manage allies’ and achieve one’s self-interests.

There are three possible limitations to selecting Classical Greece as my research case. First, there is a lack of reliable quantifiable data. Therefore collecting accurate census data, numbers of soldiers, and ships will be difficult to achieve. Second, the alliances formed by the Greek city-states were not multilateral agreements between each city-state in the alliance. Ryder (1965) writes, “This series of bilateral agreements
between the Spartans and Athenians only reflected the dominance of the two cities within their two alliance systems, and alliances themselves, though uniting numerous cities, were not truly multilateral in form” (3). Finally, the Greek city-states did not use ‘permanent ambassadors’ or establish ‘diplomatic missions to other city-states’ (Eckstein 2006; Mosley 1971). The lack of diplomats between city-states would make it difficult for the city-states to resolve their issues and maintain tabs on each other. These three issues will pose a minor challenge when conducting research during this time period, but they do not threaten the project as a whole.
Chapter IV
The Spartan Allies

Section A: Thebes

Thebes became the leading city-state of the Boeotian district by the middle of the 5th century BCE by creating a federation of independent cities and towns sometimes referred to as the Boeotian League (Larsen 1968). Boeotia itself is located in central Greece and consists of open plains with rivers and lakes bounded by the Cithaeron and Parnes Mountains to the southeast (bordering Attica), ‘the Gulf of Corinth to the south, the Gulf of Euboea to the east, Locris to the north, and Phocis to the west’ (Grant 1986, 113). Plant (1994) explains that “The topography of Boeotia is well suited to hoplite battles, with ample open land to allow the hoplites to meet in disciplined formations” (272). According to Plant ‘many commanders in the fifth and fourth centuries’ preferred Boeotia as a battleground since many significant Greek battles took place there including: Battle of Plataea, Battle of Tanagra, Battle of Oinophyta, and Battle of Delium (Plant 1994). This coincides with Plutarch referring to Boeotia as ‘the stage of war’ and that the Boeotians themselves were ‘always in arms’ and ‘their hands were upon their shields’ (Plut. Moralia 193. e 18). Nevertheless “Boeotia was rendered indifferent to maritime matters by her fertile soil and by the mountain rim of her old lake basin, which kept her chief centers of population secluded from the coast” (Semple 1931, 602). These plains allowed the Boeotians to produce a high quality variant of heavy wheat known throughout the Mediterranean. “The wheat of Boeotia occupies the first rank, that of Sicily the second, and that of Africa the third. … The Boeotian wheat, again, weighs a
whole pound more than these last, and that of Africa a pound and three quarters” (Plin. Nat. 18.12). In addition Theophrastus writes “Athletes in Boeotia consume scarcely three pints, while, when they come to Athens, they easily manage five” (Theophr. Hist. Plant. 8.4.5). These Boeotian attributes allowed the people to not only provide for themselves but also create one of the largest cavalries in Greece.

Boeotian cities and towns competed to become the hegemon of Boeotia during much of the 6th and 5th centuries BCE. According to Herodotus magistrates from Thebes refer to Tanagra, Coronea, and Thespia as being their allies in 506 BCE (Herod. 5.79; Larsen 1968). But the city Orchomenus west of Lake Copaписание ‘had a tendency to go its own way and oppose Thebes’ dominating the eastern region of Boeotia (Larsen 1968, 27). Plataea nearly eight miles south of Thebes had a long history of opposing Theban ambitions (Thuc. 2.5). Around 519 BCE Thebes put so much pressure on Plataea that the Plataeans requested an alliance with Sparta, but the Spartans refused and suggested that Athens would be better suited to be their ally due to the distance between them (Herod. 6.108; Thuc. 3.55; Larsen 1968). The Plataeans took the advice and became allies with Athens (Herod. 6.108). Immediately after Plataea established the alliance with Athens, Thebes sent an army to attack Plataea requiring the Athenians to come to the city’s defense (Herod. 6.108). However, before the fighting started Corinthian arbiters settled the dispute by demarcating one side of the Asopus River, and from Plataea to Hysiae on the other side to represent the new frontier between Plataea and Boeotian (Herod 6.108). Theban hostility towards Athens ensued from the establishment of the Athenian and Plataean Alliance which frustrated Theban attempts to win over new Boeotian cities and towns into its sphere of influence (Figueria 1981; Larsen 1968).
Then in 506 BCE Herodotus (5.79) mentions that the Peloponnesians, Boeotians, and Chalcidians organized a joint attack on Attica from three different directions. The Boeotians captured the ‘two outlying Attic demes of Oenoe and Hysiae, while the Chalcidians broke in from another direction and devastating that part of Attica (Herod. 5.74; Larsen 1968). However the Corinthians were unhappy to discover that the true purpose of the Spartan invasion was to install the Athenian tyrant, Isagoras, so they deserted the Spartans at Eleusis in southern Attica (Herod. 5.74). Herodotus (5.75) writes “Then the other allied troops [Peloponnesians], when they saw the split between the Spartan kings and the desertion of the Corinthians, also abandoned their positions and left the field.” Until this point the Athenians held off attacking the Boeotian and Chalcidian troops to focus on the Spartans, now attacked and defeated both of them piecemeal (Herod. 5.74-7; Buck 1972, 100). The Athenians re-captured Oenoe and presumably Hysiae, since Thucydides refers to Oenoe as an Athenian fortress on the Boeotian and Attica frontier in 431 BCE (Thuc. 2.18; Larsen 1968, 30). In addition to the losses suffered by Boeotia, Athens settled 4,000 Athenians in Chalkis to deprive the richest class of Chalcidians and to establish a garrison to control the area (Herod. 5.77; Herod. 6.100; Tod no. 12 & 42; Meiggs & Lewis no. 15; Ostwald 2002, 135). Sparta’s abandonment directly led to the defeat of Boeotia and Chalkis by Athens, who established a lasting foothold in Chalkis with an Athenian garrison.

The First Peloponnesian War (ca. 460 – 446 BCE)

In 457 BCE Phocis invaded Doris capturing one of its three towns in central Greece. Sparta considered Doris to be its metropolis or mother city, so the Spartans mobilized an allied force to eliminate the Phocian threat from Doris (Thuc. 1.107; Sealey
1976; Hornblower 1983). Soon “The Spartans compelled the Phocians to come to terms and to give back the [Dorian] town which they had taken” (Thuc. 1.107). At this point Thucydides (1.107) tells us that the Spartans waited in Boeotia for a safe route home to develop. However Diodorus (11.81) reveals that the Thebans appealed to the Spartans for help re-establishing their city as the Boeotian hegemon. A position they lost after being humiliated by the Greek world for their alliance with Persia during the Persian War. Nevertheless the Thebans pledged that they would wage war on Athens if the Spartans would re-establish them as the Boeotian hegemon (Justinus 3.6). According to Diodorus (11.81) The Spartans decided that it was in their interests to bolster Thebes as a counterbalance to Athens. Plant (1994) suggests that the Spartans may have been carrying out this process while they were at Tanagra, since Tanagra had its own coinage and protective walls (two significant displays of independence and power in classical Greece) and likely stood in the way of Theban Hegemony (268-9). Nevertheless the Athenians came up to fight the Spartan and Boeotian troops at the Battle of Tanagra in 457 BCE resulting in a narrow victory for the Spartans that allowed the Spartans to return to the Peloponnese (Plat. *Menex*. 242; Paus. 1.29.9). Kagan (1969) writes “The Athenians could not yet know that the Spartans were prepared to abandon their Theban allies, if, in fact they already decided to do so” (93). Not long after the Spartan departure, the Athenians met the Boeotians at the Battle of Oenophyta in 457 BCE. The Athenians soundly defeated the Boeotians at the battle and proceeded to conquer the rest of Boeotia (except Thebes), Phocis, and Locris (Thuc. 1.108; Diod. 11.83).

In 447 BCE Orchomenus successfully led some of the Boeotians towns in a revolt against the Athenians (Larsen 1968, 128). Athens responded by dispatching 1,000
hoplites, commanded by Tolmides, to Boeotia where they captured Chaeronea and established a garrison (Thuc. 1.113). But the Boeotians attacked the Athenians at Coronea on their way home killing some and taking others prisoner. According to Thucydides (1.113) “The Athenians then made a treaty by which they got back their prisoners at the price of evacuating the whole of Boeotia.” Buck (1970) argues that from the Athenian point of view, a rising Orchomenus as the Boeotian hegemon could balance Thebes and so ‘Orchomenus, Plataea, and Thespiae together could check Thebes’ creating a ‘convenient buffer’ for Athens (226). This may also represent the fragile state of the Delian League at the time which saw revolts in Euboea and Megara following the one that occurred in Boeotia (Thuc. 1.113).

**The Archidamian War (431 – 421 BCE)**

In March 431 BCE Thebes launched a surprise night attack on Plataea using a vanguard of 300 soldiers with the rest of their forces en route (Thuc. 2.2; Thuc. 2.5; Diod. 12.41). According to Thucydides “Realizing that war was certain to come, the Thebans were anxious to get control of Plataea first (since Plataea had always been hostile to them) while it was still peacetime and war had not yet actually broke out” (2.2). Kagan (1969) offers an alternative “This time they [the Thebans] wanted to control Plataea, which guarded the road to Thebes from Athens, before the war got under way” (342). The Thebans tried to take the city from inside using sympathetic Plataeans; but when the majority of the Plataeans noticed the relative small size of the Theban force they counterattacked, taking advantage of the Thebans’ unfamiliarity of the city’s layout to kill and capture a number of prisoners (Thuc. 2.3-4). When the news reached Athens, the Athenians instructed the Plataeans not to do anything ‘irrevocable’ with the Theban
prisoners without first consulting them (Thuc. 2.6). But it was already too late, the Plataeans put 180 prisoners to death even though the main ‘Theban force left the Plataean territory without doing any harm’ (Thuc. 2.5). Afterwards Athenian troops marched into Plataea bringing provisions and establishing a garrison of 80 Athenians but did not advance to Thebes, instead they evacuated the majority of the population including the women, children, and men unable to fight (Thuc. 2.6; Thuc. 2.78; Diod. 12.42).

The Spartans responded by sending messengers to their allies with instructions to send two-thirds of their troops and supplies to the Isthmus of Corinth to invade Attica (Thuc. 2.10). The Spartans also sent an envoy to Athens to see whether the Athenians would give in to their terms (see the Megara section below for more details). “But the Athenians refused him admission to the city or access to their assembly” (Thuc. 2.12). So in May 431 BCE the Spartans and their allies invaded Attica to lay waste to the land and destroy property in order to incite the Athenians to come out from behind their walls and fight a pitched battle. “The Boeotians had provided their contingent and also their cavalry for the main force and with their remaining troops went out against Plataea and laid waste there” (Thuc. 2.12). The Peloponnesians and Thebans first set out to besiege the Athenian fort at Oenoe which defended Attica from Boeotia and was probably used to resupply the Athenian garrison at Plataea, but they failed to make any progress capturing the fort (Thuc. 2.18-9). So they made their way south to plunder the Eleusinian and Thriasian plains. They subsequently pillaged Acharnae, only seven miles from Athens, before heading north to Decelea and continuing on to Oropus where they retired to Boeotia (Thuc. 2.21-3; Bury 1967). The Peloponnesians and their allies repeatedly invaded Attica nearly every summer thereafter.
But in 429 BCE the Peloponnesians and Thebans focused their energy on besieging Plataea rather than invading Attica (Thuc. 2.71). Kagan (1974) asserts that the ‘destruction of the previous year had been thorough’ and Attica was still dealing with a devastating plague from the preceding year. The Peloponnesians started by proposing to the Plataeans that their city would be given immunity if they renounced their alliance with Athens and become neutrals (Thuc. 2.72; Thuc. 3.64; Thuc. 3.68; Diod. 12.47). The Spartans granted the Plataeans an armistice to go to Athens to confer with them on their predicament (Thuc. 2.72-3). The Athenians responded by saying that they have ‘never once abandoned them to an aggressor’ while they were allies and that the Plataeans should maintain their oaths and ‘not make any changes in the existing alliance’ (Thuc. 2.73). After learning that the Plataeans would not renounce their alliance, the Peloponnesians began building a circumvallation wall around the city to prevent raids and used other siege methods to bring about the city’s destruction or surrender (Thuc 2.75-7; Diod. 12.47). The Peloponnesians later dismissed the majority of their troops leaving only a small contingent along with some Thebans to finish building and guarding the counter-wall (Thuc. 2.79; Diod. 12.47). By the summer of 427 BCE the Plataeans were running out of food and surrendered to the Peloponnesians (Thuc. 3.52; Diod. 12.56). Afterwards the Plataeans were put on trial to determine whether they have helped Sparta during the course of the current war. The Plataeans argued that they and the Spartans fought together against the Persians; but the Thebans argued that they helped in the reduction of Aegina, a Peloponnesian ally during the First Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 3.52-6). In the end it was decided that the Plataeans refused to renounce their alliance with Athens thereby losing their immunity, which made them and their city a valid
enemy target for destruction (Thuc. 3.64; Thuc. 3.68). Thucydides (3.68) writes that ‘Not less than 200’ Plataean men were put to death while their women were made into slaves. The city itself was re-settled by political refugees from Megara and pro-Spartan Plataean faction survived (Thuc. 3.68).

The Thebans intervened into Megara’s affairs when in 424 BCE Megara’s democratic party plotted with some Athenian generals to capture the city by giving the Athenians access to the city, but as the events transpired the Megarians refused to admit the Athenians (Thuc. 4.66-72). As a result the Athenians captured other parts of the Megarid namely the port city of Nisaea causing great turmoil for the city-state (Thuc. 4.69-72). Fearing that Boeotia could be cut off from their Peloponnesian allies and be left at the mercy of the Athens, the Boeotians marched into Megara on their own accord to assist the Megarians. Demand (1982) writes that this was the ‘first independent action by the Boeotians outside of Boeotia itself (41). The Boeotians met the Spartans in Megara and even though Megara lost its port at Nisaea, the Peloponnesian League retained Megara as an ally and the Boeotians averted possible isolation.

Later that same year Athens launched a two-pronged offensive into Boeotia to turn some Boeotian cities over to the Athenian side (Thuc. 4.89; Diod. 12.69). The Athenian general Demosthenes sailed to Siphae with a force of Acarnanians, but failed to achieve his objective when a Phocian leaked the details of the Athenian plan to the Spartans and Boeotians who quickly reinforced the area (Thuc. 4.89). Meanwhile the second stage of the Athenian plan called for the Athenian general, Hippocrates, to make an assault on Delium. But by the time Hippocrates arrived at Delium it was already crawling with Boeotian troops. Realizing that the Athenians lost the initiative Hippocrates began
fortifying Delium (Thuc. 4.89-90). According to Thucydides (4.95) Hippocrates rallied his troops by saying, “If we are victorious, the Peloponnesians, without the support of the Boeotian cavalry, will never again invade our land, and in one battle you will both gain this country and do much to free your own.” The Boeotians defeated the Athenians at the Battle at Delium, but an Athenian garrison still held Delium, so the Boeotians assaulted Delium, clearing it of Athenian troops 17 days later (Thuc. 4.96-101; Diod. 12.70).

SUMMARY

The Theban attack on Plataea in March 431 BCE clearly shows that chain-ganging led to the outbreak of the Archidamian War. In fact several indicators that characterize how a country perceives its Offensive Advantage are represented in this particular case. For instance Boeotia’s geography (DV1.1) lacked the natural physical defenses capable of deterring potential aggressors. The open plains and river valleys described by Grant (1986) did little to hinder the onslaught of invading forces. Even though the Cithaeron and Parnes Mountain ranges on Boeotia’s southeastern border provided some protection against the Athenians. These obstacles were circumvented by Athens’ close relationship with Plataea and Chalkis by the start of the Archimadian War. Essentially Thebes found itself in a weak defensive position surrounded by hostile neighbours. The Thebans likely developed offensive strategies to make up for their defensive shortcomings.

Likewise, the Boeotian land supported a well-fed population leading to significant military capabilities (DV1.2) that made hoplite and cavalry forces widely available. Thucydides writes that the Spartans relied solely on the city-states Phocis, Locris, and Boeotia in central Greece to supply the Peloponnesian League with cavalry (Thuc. 2.9).
The Athenians on the other hand had their own cavalry squadron, which was complemented by the renowned Thessalian cavalry (Thuc. 2.22; Herod. 5.63; Arist. Const. Ath.19. 5). Actually right before the Battle of Delium in 424 BCE the Athenian General, Hippocrates, rallied his troops by saying that if the Athenians won the battle and destroyed the Boeotian cavalry, the Peloponnesians would not be able to invade Attica again (Thuc. 4.95). The Spartan dependence on Boeotia’s cavalry as well as the distance between the two allies enabled the Boeotians to make their own foreign policy decisions without too much interference from Sparta. So leading up to the Archidamian War, Thebes primarily focused its foreign policy on absorbing Plataea into the Boeotian League.

**Formative experience (DV1.3)** acquired during previous conflicts also influenced Theban military strategies at the onset of the Archidamian War. First, Herodotus (6.108) mentions that Thebes sent an army to attack Plataea in 519 BCE after the city-state formed an alliance with Athens. Even though the Boeotians broke off the impending attack when all parties submitted to arbitration. Thebes distinctly coveted Plataea to such a degree that the newly formed Athenian – Plataean alliance failed to deter Theban aggression from the outset. Perhaps Thebes sought to test Athens’ resolve to protect its new ally. Or maybe Thebes wanted to incorporate as much of Plataea’s territory as possible into Boeotia before Athens and Plataea grew closer together. Nevertheless this act established a precedent for Theban offensive action against Plataea despite her alliance with Athens.

Second, the joint Chalkidian, Boeotian, and Peloponnesian assault on Athens in 506 BCE directly led to Boeotian and Chalkidian defeats. The Boeotians showed early
signs of success in the conflict by capturing the Athenian frontier demes of Hysiae and Oenoe (Herod. 5.74). But Sparta’s lack of transparency with her allies caused the Peloponnesian coalition to disintegrate, compelling the entire force to withdraw back into the Peloponnese. Sparta abandoned Boeotia and Chalkis at a critical time in the campaign, leaving them vulnerable to Athenian counterattacks. Ultimately Athens retaliated and retook the territories lost during the Boeotian and Chalkidian offensives (Herod. 5.74-7; Thuc. 2.18). In the end the Spartans put their own interests ahead of their allies, who suffered the consequences.

Third, in 457 BCE during the First Peloponnesian War while the Spartans waited in central Greece for a route home to develop, they likely helped the Thebans restore their hegemonic position in Boeotia to counterbalance Athens growing power (Diod. 11.81; Justinius 3.6; Thuc. 1.107). Together the Thebans and Spartans defeated the Athenians at the Battle of Tanagra in 457 BCE. But soon after the battle the Spartans made their way home leaving the Thebans exposed to Athenian reprisals. The Athenians defeated the Boeotians at the Battle of Oenophyta in 457 BCE, which allowed Athens to dominate most of Boeotia, Phocis, and Locris for ten years until the Boeotian city-state Orchomenus successfully led a revolt in 447 BCE (Thuc. 1.108; Thuc. 1.113; Diod. 11.83).

The combination of geographical features and formative experiences inspired Thebes’ offensive actions during the outbreak of the Archidamian War. Boeotia’s natural physical geography provided insufficient defense to the area from outsiders. But the land itself supported the development of significant military capabilities that could be used for offensive purposes. At the same time Boeotia’s history suggests that in the years leading
up to Archidamian War, Thebes was not afraid to attack Plataea regardless of her alliance with Athens. Likewise Thebes joined two previous Spartan alliances to attack Athens, only to be abandoned by Sparta on both occasions suffering losses during the first episode and near total Athenian domination on the second. Buck writes (1972) “It would not be surprising if Boeotian, and particularly Theban, confidence in Spartan leadership ebbed, and if the leaders of the Theban oligarchy felt that Sparta could not be trusted in grave situations” (100). Considering these circumstances Thebes would feel obligated to carry out a preemptive attack to secure vital objectives in the event of another large scale conflict. Kagan (1969) explains that Plataea guarded a strategic road connecting Athens and Thebes (342). Not only could Plataea alert Athens of a Theban invasion but also serve as an Athenian garrison along with Oenoe to launch incursions into Boeotia (Thuc. 2.6; Thuc. 2.78; Thuc. 2.18; Diod. 12.42). In addition Grundy (1894) writes that another strategic road located at Plataea went from Plataea to Megara (6-7). This road may have served as a major means of communication between the Thebans and the Peloponnesian League. Had the Thebans not taken Plataea when they did, the Plataeans and the Athenians could have cut off Theban communications with the Peloponnesians once the conflict started leaving the Boeotians and other central Greek allies isolated from the Peloponnesians making them easier to defeat.
Section B: Corinth

Corinth had considerable influence within the Peloponnesian League in the period leading up to the Peloponnesian War. This influence not only stemmed from being a powerful ally but also from her strategic location. Corinth resided along the southwestern portion of the Isthmus of Corinth, the only land bridge connecting the Peloponnese with mainland Greece. Thucydides (1.13) writes that “Corinth [was] an important mercantile center, though in ancient days traffic had been by land rather than by sea. The communications between those who lived inside and those who lived outside the Peloponnese had to pass through Corinthian territory.” Corinth took advantage of this situation by collecting duties on Peloponnesian imports and exports (Strab. 8.6.20). But more importantly, Corinth was fortunate enough to occupy the narrowest portion of the Isthmus of Corinth where it is less than 4 miles (6 km) wide (Finley 1977). According to Finley (1977) “Early in the sixth century the diolkos was constructed, a paved or rock-cut track 5-foot (1.5 m) gauge by which ships or their cargoes could be wheeled across the Isthmus on bogeys” (154). Perhaps this system could allow commercial shipping to cut across the Isthmus between the Corinthian ports of Lechaeum on the Corinthian Gulf and Cenchreae on the Saronic Gulf (Salmon 1997, 31). Nevertheless, Corinth prospered from her ideal location to such a degree that she started to be referred to as ‘Wealthy’ in the Classical World (Strab. 8.6.20).

The Greek geographer Strabo (8.6.23) writes “The city [Corinth] had territory that was not very fertile, but rifted and rough.” Corinth relied on trade for importing vital foodstuffs and other resources like timber for shipbuilding to maintain her own maritime trade routes (Semple 1931; Hasebroek 1965). In turn the city-state gained the reputation
as a major manufacturing center by exporting items such as pottery and other wares
(Semple 1931; Hasebroek 1965; Salmon 1997). The port city Lechaeum along the Gulf of
Corinth became Corinth’s primary port due to the city’s location near the western shore
of the Isthmus. This oriented the city’s commerce and subsequent colonization along the
Ionian and Adriatic Sea areas west of Greece proper. (It is important to note that colonies
of Classical Greece were independent city-states in their own right, not like the colonies
of Spain, France, and England during the Age of Discovery.) Corinthian colonists
founded Syracuse in Sicily around 733 B.C.E. to escape overpopulation and to take
advantage of the land’s ability to grow wheat (Cartledge 2009, 115-125; Semple 1931,
350; Grant 1986, 614). Corinthian colonists also settled Corcyra in the eighth century
B.C.E. to export the timber in the area (Grant 1986, 185; Semple 1931, 281). Corinth
went on to establish many other colonies in the Ionian Sea to create a sphere of influence
in northwest Greece. But Syracuse and Corecyra stood apart from the other Corinthian
colonies by being more powerful. Graham (1964) argues that the distance between
Corinth and these two colonies granted Syracuse and Corecyra less cultural influence from
their metropolis, which can be expressed by the difference in the coinage between the
colonies and metropolis.

Eventually Corecyra began establishing her own colonies in the same area. Some of
these colonies received colonists from both Corecyra and Corinth leading to disputes
between the two over who could be claimed as the metropolis. According to Herodotus
(3.49) “ever since the original settlement of the island the two peoples [Corecyra &
Corinth] have been on bad terms.” And Thucydides adds that “the first naval battle on
record is the one between the Corinthians and the Corecyraeans: this is about 260 years
ago” (1.13). Graham (1964) argues that Corinth pursued a foreign policy that undermined Corcyra’s influence in the co-founded colonies to promote Corinth’s interest and maintain her sphere of influence. He uses the colony Leucas as an example, since Plutarch explains that Themistocles, who served as an arbiter that settled a dispute between Corcyra and Corinth by confirming the ‘administer Leucas as a common colony of both cities’ (Them. 24.1). However Thucydides describes Leucas as none other than a Corinthian colony (1.30). However Graham’s example of Apollonia offers a more robust portrayal of this phenomenon. According to Strabo (7.5.8) Apollonia was founded by both the Corinthians and the Corcyraeans. However Pausanias (5.22.4) writes “Apollonia was a colony of Corcyra, they say, and Corcyra of Corinth, and the Corinthians had their share of the spoils.” But Thucydides (1.26) again refers to Apollonia solely as a Corinthian colony. Leading Graham (1964) to conclude that in the period leading up to the Archidamian War, Corinth eroded so much of Corcyra’s influence in some of these co-founded colonies that contemporaries began to think of them solely as Corinthian colonies.

To complicate matters further Athens started operating in northwest Greece, establishing the Pan-Hellenic colony of Thurii in southern Italy by inviting colonists from all over the Greek world (Diod. 12.10-11; Strab. 6.1.13; Arist. Pol. 5.1303a). At the same time Athens concluded alliances with the city-states Rhegion (Italy) and Leontini (Sicily) sometime between 446 – 440, BCE based on the writing style from the marble inscriptions used for the oaths of allegiance (Tod 1946, no 57). Wick (1976) suggests that the alliances with Rhegion and Leontini were likely connected to the foundation of Thurii, since Athens was too far away to send a quick response in the event that the
colony should find itself threatened (297). But in 434/3 BCE a civil dispute erupted in Thurii over Athens being the metropolis, but this was settled when all sides agreed to ‘Delphi’ becoming their metropolis (Graham 1964, 198; Diod. 12.35). Even though Athens no longer needed Rhégion and Leontini to help protect Thurii, they remained Athenian allies due to threatening nature of Syracuse (Wick 1976). Athens later reaffirmed these treaties in 433/2 BCE by altering their preambles while leaving the rest of the text intact (Wick 1976; Thuc. 3.86; Fornara 1983, no. 124 & 125). Wick (1976) writes “All later Athenian activities in the West were intimately connected with Athenian alliances there” (293).

Athens also took control of Naupactus, an Ozolian Locrian town along the northern shore of the Gulf of Corinth (Thuc. 1.103). Corinth worried that the Athenians would harass Corinthian shipping from this new naval base by denying Corinth its vital maritime supplies. In 464 BCE a large earthquake rocked Laconia, provoking the helots (descendants of the Ancient Messenians) living there under Spartan domination to revolt (Thuc 1.101; Meiggs 1979). Sparta called upon the Peloponnesian League as well as the Athenians to help subdue the revolt (Thuc 1.102). (In this period, 462 BCE, the Athenians and the Spartans were still allies and on good terms dating back to 480 BCE.) However, the Spartans were suspicious that the non-Dorian Athenians would sympathize with the Messenians and inspire them with ‘radical’ thoughts and actions, so the Spartans dismissed the Athenians (Thuc. 1.102; Diod. 11.67). Athens reacted to the snub by withdrawing from their anti-Persian alliance with Sparta and allying with Sparta’s arch-enemy Argos (Thuc. 1.102). Then around 459 BCE the helots and Spartans reached an agreement allowing the revolting helots to leave the Peloponnese without Spartan
interference (Thuc. 1.103). Athens re-settled these Messenian helots at Naupactus, creating a staunch Athenian ally in the region (Thuc. 1.103).

The First Peloponnesian War (ca. 460 – 446 BCE)

In the winter of 461 BCE a border war between Corinth and Megara resulted in Megara withdrawing from the Peloponnesian League in order to seek the protection of the Athenian alliance (See Below). Athens quickly took advantage of the situation by using the port of Pagae to access the Corinthian Gulf and bolstering Megara’s defenses to keep the Corinthians at bay (Thuc. 1.103). The Athenians then landed at the port of Haliae on the Argolid coast, where a combined force of Corinthian and Epidaurian soldiers defeated the Athenians in battle (Thuc. 1.105; Diod. 11.78). However Athens turned the tide by defeating the Corinthians in a sea battle near the island of Cecryphalia between Aegina and the Argolid coast within the Saronic Gulf (Thuc. 1.105; Diod 11.78). Aegina, another naval power had long been at odds with Athens and sometimes Corinth, who supplied Athens with twenty ships to attack Aegina 487 BCE, now entered the war on the side of the Corinthians and Epidaurians (Herod. 6.88-93; Thuc. 1.105; Hornblower 1983, 16; Bury 1967, 258-60). The Athenians quickly engaged the Aeginetans near their coast capturing 70 Aeginetan ships and making landfall on the island (Thuc. 1.105; Diod. 11.78). The Corinthian and Epidaurians tried to help the Aeginetans in two ways. First, they landed a relief force of 300 hoplites on the island. Second, the Corinthians sent a force to the Geraneia Heights in Megara to capture the new Athenian fortifications built there (Thuc. 1.105). The Corinthians hoped that this would draw the Athenians forces to Megara and away from Aegina (Thuc. 1.105). However these efforts failed when the Athenians raised a ragtag force of Megarians supported by Athenians who thwarted the
Corinthians’ push into the Geraneia Heights (Thuc. 1.105-6). Aegina fell to the Athenians in 457 BCE, who required the Aeginetans to remove their fortifications and hand-over their fleet (Thuc. 1.108; Diod. 11.78; Salmon 1997).

Following Aegina’s capitulation, in 456 BCE the Athenians sailed around the Peloponnese burning Spartan dockyards at Gytheum, they captured the Corinthian colony Chalcis (on the northern shore of the Gulf of Corinth), and attacked Corinth’s neighbor Sicyon (Thuc. 1.108; Kagan 1969). Not long afterwards the Athenians made use of the Megarian port at Pagae (on the Gulf of Corinth) to launch another attack on Sicyon (Thuc. 1.111). From Sicyon the Athenians took their Achaean allies to capture the Acarnanian town of Oeniadae but failed in the attempt (Thuc. 1.111). By 454 BCE, Sealey (1976) explains, the Athenians changed their policy by not launching any major operations in Greece for the next three years, and that the Five Years’ Truce in 451 BCE was, a continuation of this policy (272-3). Thucydides attributes the Five Years’ Truce to Athens trying to free up resources for her concurrent war against the Persians in Egypt and Cyprus from 460 – 449 BCE (Thuc. 1.112; Cawkwell 1997; Sealey 1976; Meiggs 1979). However by 447 BCE Athens suffered a series of setbacks when Boeotia, Euboea, and Megara rebelled from the Athenian alliance (Thuc. 1.113). According to Thucydides (1.115) “Soon after they [the Athenians] had returned from Euboea the Athenians made a Thirty Years’ Truce with Sparta and her allies: Athens gave up Nisaea, Pagae, Troezen, and Achaea – all places which they had seized from the Peloponnesians.” Athens still controlled Aegina but agreed to allow some autonomy for its inhabitants.
The Archidamian War (431 – 421 BCE)

Just prior to 435 BCE the democratic faction at Epidamnus, a Corcyrean colony with a sizable number of Corinthian colonists, expelled the aristocrats ruling the city-state (Thuc. 1.24). These aristocrats linked up with Illyrian tribes (barbarians) in the area and started making raids on the city-state (Thuc. 1.24; Kagan 1969). Facing a serious threat, Epidamnus turned to her metropolis Corcyra for assistance both to ‘help make a settlement with the exiled party [the aristocrats] and to end the war with the foreigners’ (Thuc. 1.24; Diod. 12.30). But the Corcyreans refused to receive the Epidamnian ambassadors, thwarting their attempt to receive aid (Thuc. 1.24). Ultimately the Epidamnians found support in Corinth by claiming that their city was founded by a Corinthian (Thuc. 1.25). In essence the Epidamnians asked Corinth to become her metropolis in order to protect the city, and Corinth accepted.

Corinth sent more settlers and troops to Epidamnus, who traveled overland from the colony of Apollonia in order to avoid interference from the Corcyrean navy (Thuc. 1.26). Once the Corcyreans learned what the Corinthians had done, they sent a naval force to Epidamnus demanding that they reinstate the exiled aristocratic party and expel the Corinthian troops and settlers (Thuc. 1.26). The Epidamnians refused, so the Corcyreans started to besiege the city (Thuc. 1.26). The Corinthians, supported by several allies, declared war on the Corcyreans and sent a naval force to relieve Epidamnus (Thuc. 1.27–28). But the Corcyreans soundly defeated the Corinthians at the Battle of Leucimme, in 435 BCE, which was followed up by a Corcyrean offensive aimed against Corinth’s supporters like the Corinthian colony of Leucas and the Elean port at Cyllene (Thuc. 1.29-30; Diod. 12.31; Salmon 1997; Sealey 1976). In response Corinth began
building a more formidable navy (Diod. 12.32; Thuc. 1.31). Anticipating another
Corinthian offensive, Corcyra established a defensive alliance with Athens in 433 BCE
(Thuc. 1.44; Bury 1967). Corcyra’s envoys essentially argued that Athens should
establish an alliance with them in order to avoid their navy falling into Corinthian hands.
“Your aim, no doubt, should be, if possible, to prevent anyone else having a navy at all:
the next best thing is to have on your side the strongest navy that there is” (Thuc. 1.35).
Consequently Athens sent ten triremes (Ships) to reinforce Corcyra (Thuc. 1.45).
According to Kagan (1969), “The Spartans had indicated their disapproval of the
Corinthian policy; they had themselves stayed aloof and seem to have restrained their
allies” (264). Nevertheless Corinth proceeded to attack Corcyra at the Battle of Sybota
433 BCE, but this time only Megara and Elis supported the Corinthian endeavor (Thuc.
1.46). The Battle of Sybota in 433 BCE was largely a draw; the Corinthians broke-off the
engagement when they saw additional Athenian ships inbound to support the 10 triremes
already present (Thuc. 1.50). Despite the fighting between the Athenians and Corinthians,
the ‘Thirty Years’ Peace was still in force’ (Thuc. 1.53; 1.55).

Soon after in late 433 BCE, Athens ordered the Corinthian colony Potidaea, which
was also a member of the Delian League, to stop receiving Corinthian magistrates and to
remove the city’s fortifications (Thuc. 1.56). According to Thucydides (1.56) “these
demands were made because Athens feared that, under the influence of Perdiccas
[Macedonian King] and of the Corinthians, Potidaea might be induced to revolt and
might draw into the revolt other allied cities in the Thracian area.” Perdiccas, once an
Athenian ally, became a fierce enemy when he learned that Athens supported his brother
and other rivals (Thuc.1.57). Perdiccas’ intentions became clear when he started to
communicate with his Chalcidian and Bottiaeans to urge them to revolt against Athens (Thuc. 1.57). According to Cole (1974) “Perdiccas is aiming at the establishment of an anti-Athenian coalition in the north, which will eliminate all further possibility of encroachment in the Thermaic Gulf and ensure the integrity of Macedonia’s boundaries” (62). As tensions surged between Athens and Potidaea, the Potidaeans sent representatives not only to Athens and Sparta, but also to Corinth to promote her cause (Thuc. 1.58). Thucydides (1.58) writes that “Spartan authorities promised to invade Attica if the Athenians attacked Potidaea.” So the Potidaeans entered into an alliance with the Chalcidians and the Bottiaeans before revolting from Athens (Thuc. 1.58). The Athenians responded to the earlier Macedonian incitement by sending a contingent of 30 Athenian ships with troops to quell any revolts in the northern Aegean (Thuc. 1.57).

Upon arriving the Athenians discovered that Potidaea and others cities were already revolting, so they decided to concentrate their forces on their primary objective – Macedonia (Thuc. 1.59). Corinth sent a contingent of Corinthian volunteers and Peloponnesian mercenaries to Potidaea to bolster its defenses (Diod. 12.34; Thuc. 1.60).

At this time the Macedonian king Perdiccas switched sides again, re-allying with Athens, which allowed Athens to concentrate all her efforts on the Potidaean revolt (Thuc. 1.61). (Macedonia flip-flopped alliances at least three times from the start of the Thracian revolt to the time Athens started blockading Potidaea [Thuc. 1.56-62]. During the entire course of the Peloponnesian War, Macedonia was known to be an unreliable ally, changing sides at least nine times [Hornblower 1983, 78; Errington 1990, 18].) Nevertheless, the Athenians and their reinforcements defeated the Corinthian contingent at the Battle of
Potidaea in 432 BCE, enabling them to besiege and blockade Potidaea (Thuc. 1.61-65; Diod.12.36).

The Athenian blockade of Potidaea induced Corinth to call upon Sparta to gather the Peloponnesian League members at the First Assembly to discuss whether the Thirty Years’ Peace of 446 BCE had been broken. The Spartans let their allies address the assembly so that their grievances could be brought out into the open. For an example, the Megarians asserted that the Megarian Decree, which barred them from using any port within the Athenian Empire, caused them significant economic hardship (See Below). But the Corinthians argued that the Athenians had been encroaching on their neighbors as well as other Spartan allies (Thuc. 1.69; 1.118). Corinth cited the Athenian interference in the dispute between Corinth and Corcyra (Thuc. 1.68). They further blamed the Spartans for not coming to Potidaea’s aid by invading Attica as they promised (Thuc. 1.58; 1.71).

The Corinthians ended their speech with a threat, “Do not force the rest of us in despair to join a different alliance” (Thuc. 1.71). After listening to their allies, Thucydides writes “the Spartans voted that the treaty had been broken and that war should be declared” (1.88). The Spartans first consulted the Oracle at Delphi and then recalled her allies to the Second Assembly at Sparta to put the war to a vote (Thuc. 1.118-119). The Spartans once again allowed the allies to address the assembly to present their views. The Corinthian representatives made one last effort to persuade the Peloponnesian allies to vote in favor of war during the final speech, by urging the city-states that had not yet encountered Athenian encroachment living in the interior or away from major trading routes to support the ‘maritime powers’ to ensure that they would have an outlet to import and/or export their commercial goods (Thuc. 1.120). This suggests that further Athenian
expansion could reduce the maritime powers’ ability not only to trade in general but also to operate at all if Athens dominated the sea. They then explained that if Sparta’s allies hesitated and did not attack Athens while they had their chance, they would risk being dividing and conquered later.

‘If this was merely a question of boundary disputes between equals and affecting individual states separately, the situation would not be so serious; as it is, we have Athens to fight, and Athens is so much stronger than any single state in our alliance that she is capable of standing up to all of us together. So unless we go to war with her not only in full force but also with every city and every nationality inspired by the same purpose, she will find us divided and will easily subdue us.’ (Thuc. 1.122)

Finally they declared that they would be justified going to war since they would be fighting to ‘liberate the Hellenes’ from the yoke of Athenian domination (Thuc. 1.124).

Once the Spartans put the issue up to a vote ‘the majority voted for war,’ but they decided to delay attacking Athens in the short-term to finalize preparations (Thuc. 1.125). In the meantime both Sparta and Athens sent multiple envoys to see if either side would yield.

After Thebes attacked Plataea in 431 BCE all diplomatic exchanges between Athens and Sparta ceased. Thucydides (2.7) writes that Athens promptly sent embassies to areas surrounding the Peloponnese such as: Corcyra, Cephallenia, Acarnania, and Zacynthus to create new allies and strengthen their existing relationships. The Athenians then conducted raids on the Peloponnese and some of the Corinthian colonies in the Ionian Sea near Acarnania by capturing the city-states Solium and Astacus as well as the four states on the island of Cephallenia: Paleans, Cranaeans, Samaeans, and Pronnaeans (Thuc. 2.30). Corinth successfully recovered Astacus a few months later only to lose it
again a few years later (Thuc. 2.33; 2.102). Clearly from the outset of the Archidamian War Athens applied pressure to Corinth and her allies in northwest Greece.

In the summer of 430 BCE, the Corinthian colony Ambracia along with its Chaonian allies stormed the nearby city Amphilochian Argos in Amphilochia (Thuc. 2.68). (Amphilochian Argos was allied to both Acarnania and Athens [Thuc. 2.68].) The Ambraciotns successfully gained control of the surrounding territory, but failed to take control of the city so they withdrew (Thuc. 2.68). Meanwhile the Athenian admiral Phormio, based in Naupactus, “instituted a blockade to prevent anyone entering or leaving Corinth and the Gulf of Crisa” (Thuc. 2.69; Diod. 12.47). Sparta also led a failed attack on the island of Zacynthus, whence the Athenian fleet launched raids into the Peloponnese (Thuc. 2.66; 2.80; Salmon 1997). During the summer of 429 BCE, the Ambraciotns and the Chaonians convinced the Spartans to attack Acarnania by claiming that dislodging it from the Athenian alliance would weaken Athenian capabilities in the area and at the same time provide a jumping off point to assault Zacynthus and Cephallenia (Thuc. 2.80; Diod. 12.47). The Spartan commander, Cnemus, led a combine force of Corinthian allies made up of Ambraciotns, Leucadians, and Anactorians as well as Chaonians and Peloponnesians (Thuc. 2.80). In addition, the Corinthian navy was supposed to support the land forces by conducting raids on the coast to draw the Acarnanian forces away from the interior where the army would strike (Thuc. 2.83). Cnemus proceeded to march his army into the interior away from the support of the Corinthian navy (Thuc. 2.80). However, He failed to take his objective of Stratus after several of his local Chaonian allies died trying to take the city (Thuc. 2.81; Diod. 12.47). So Cnemus and the remainder of the army retreated first to Oeniadae and eventually to
Leucas (Thuc. 2.84). At the same time the Athenian navy based in Naupactus sent a contingent of 20 ships to engage a Corinthian fleet almost twice its size (Thuc. 2.83-4; Diod. 12.48). The Athenians destroyed 12 ships before the rest of the Corinthians made their way to the Elian port of Cyllene (Thuc. 2.83-4). At Cyllene the Peloponnesians made repairs and acquired some more ships before setting out again to confront the Athenians (Thuc. 2.85). The Peloponnesians managed to capture several Athenian ships trapped along the coast while they were en-route back to Naupactus, which they left unguarded (Thuc. 2.90-1). But the Athenians re-engaged the Peloponnesians as they were celebrating causing them to panic and flee (Thuc. 2.92). The sea battle was ultimately a draw, but the Peloponnesians feared that Athenian reinforcements were on their way so they did not venture out to sea thereafter (Thuc. 2.92).

By the summer of 426 BCE, the Messenians in Naupactus felt increasingly threatened by the Aetolians living to the north of them (Thuc. 3.94). So they appealed to the Athenian general Demosthenes to carry out an expedition into Aetolia. According to Diodorus (12.60) “He then moved across to Aetolia and raided many villages there. The Aetolians, however, gathered their forces against him, and a battle took place in which the Athenians were defeated.” Even before the Aetolians defeated the Athenians, they sent envoys to Sparta and Corinth requesting that they provide assistance for an Aetolian offensive against Naupactus (Thuc. 3.100). Sparta dispatched 3,000 hoplites under the command of Eurylochus to plunder the area around Naupactus in Ozolian Locris, where they linked up with the Aetolians and other local allies. Salmon (1997) contends that it is likely that Corinth ‘provided a significant portion of the force’ even though Thucydides does not mention it (316). But the Spartans departed when they realized that they could
not capture Naupactus (Thuc. 3.102). The Ambraciots once again insisted that the Spartans should lead an invasion into Amphilochia and Acarnania (Thuc. 3.102). The Spartans made their way to the Aetolian city of Proschium near the border of Acarnania, where they waited while the Ambraciots mobilized their army (Thuc. 3.102).

That winter the Ambraciots invaded Amphilochia with their hoplites seizing the stronghold of Olpae (Thuc. 3.105). The Acarnanians reacted by sending a relief force to Amphilochn Argos and requesting Athenian aid and leadership (Thuc. 3.105). Meanwhile the Ambraciots in Olpae called for more reinforcements at home to strengthen their army before marching into Acarnania (Thuc. 3.105). Once the reinforcements arrived in Olpae, the Peloponnesians advanced into Acarnania from Proschium, Aetolia, only to find the majority of its inhabitants and army had gone to defend Amphilochn Argos (Thuc. 3.106). The Peloponnesians successfully joined forces with the Ambraciots at Olpae (Thuc. 106). Demosthenes arrived not long afterwards with 200 Messenian hoplites and 60 Athenian archers (Thuc. 1.107). The two sides remained at their positions for a few days, but when the two sides finally engaged one another the Athenians had the upper hand. The Athenians then proposed a secret deal with the Spartans to let them go free, while the rest of their allies would be left to the mercy of the Athenians and their allies (Thuc. 3.109). Thucydides writes that this was supposed to damage the Spartan’s reputation:

Demosthenes’ aim was in part to weaken the army of the Ambraciots and their mercenary followers, but chiefly he wanted to bring the Spartans and the Peloponnesians into discredit with the Hellenes [Greeks] in these parts, as a people who put their own safety first and let down their allies. (Thuc. 3.109)
So many Ambraciots died in the confusion that followed, that their city could no longer muster any kind of defense. The Athenians pressed the Acarnanians to advance into Ambracia to conquer the region, but they declined (Thuc 3.113; Diod. 12.60). According to Diodorus (12.60) “At this point the Acarnanians – scared that if the Athenians got control of the city, they would become tougher neighbors than the Ambraciots – refused to follow them.” Instead the Acarnanians and Amphilochnians concluded a Hundred Years’ Peace with the Ambraciots that ended the fighting between them (Thuc. 3.114; Diod 12.60).

**SUMMARY**

Corinth did not directly drag Sparta into the Archidamian War by invading Athens or any other member of the Delian League, but took advantage of her prominence in the Peloponnesian League and the following conditions to entrap Sparta into declaring war against Athens to suit her own interests. Sparta’s **dependence** (DV2.1) on Corinth not only stemmed from her strategic location along the Isthmus of Corinth, but also her significant naval contribution to the Peloponnesian League. The Spartans knew that they could not afford to ignore Corinthian grievances for long, since Corinth was one of the major naval powers of the period. Corinth’s naval clout would have undoubtedly increased in the face of Aegina’s defeat during the First Peloponnesian War when Athens took possession of the Aeginetan navy (Thuc. 1.108; Diod. 11.78). The Corcyraeans enticed Athens to come to their aid by exploiting Athenian fears that the Corinthians, who possessed the third most powerful navy, could seize the Corcyraean fleet and thereby threaten Athenian ambitions (Thuc. 1.33; 1.35). Likewise, the two loyal Corinthian colonies Ambracia and Leucas provided ships to the Spartan side indicating
that Corinth was associated with three of the seven city-states providing Sparta with ships (Thuc. 2.9). In this case Corinth and Sparta shared the same strategic interests (DV2.3), as Snyder (1984) writes ‘keeping the ally’s power resources out of the opponent’s hands’ (472). It is not clear how much Corinth could influence her colonies in forming allegiances with Sparta or any other power should Corinth decide to defect. But Sparta clearly catered to Corinth and her colonies to ensure they had the forces necessary to meet any challenges posed by a great naval power like Athens.

Corinth’s behavior record (DV2.4) shows that she strived to maintain and widen her sphere of influence in northwestern Greece. Corinth settled colonies in the northwest to guarantee trade requirements for the city’s survival (Semple 1931). Although in later years Corinth struggled to remain the dominant power in the area when disputes arose between Corinth and Corcyra over who controlled the colonies settled by citizens of both city-states (Graham 1964). The Epidamnus dispute between Corinth and Corcyra can be viewed within this framework (Graham 1964). Corcyra’s assault on Epidamnus compelled Corinth to respond by sending its fleet and declaring war on Corcyra (Thuc. 1.27-8). Corinth probably viewed Athens’ defensive alliance with Corcyra as further Athenian interference into her sphere of influence, a trajectory that Athens initiated by establishing Thurii, forming alliances with Rhegion and Leontini, and re-settling Messenians at Naupactus (Wick 1976), as well as reducing Aegina during the First Peloponnesian War.

Sparta showed her commitment (DV2.2) to support her allies by holding the First Assembly of 446 BCE, which determined that Athens violated the Thirty Years’ Peace treaty, though in reality Athens did not violate the Peace by allying herself to Corcyra,
since Corcyra was neutral and permitted to join whichever alliance she wished (Thuc. 1.35). On the other hand, Corinth’s interference with Potidaea, who was already a member of the Delian League, clearly infringed on the treaty’s provisions. The Spartans further cemented their commitment to the allies during the Second Assembly of 446 BCE when the majority of her allies voted in favor for war. Athens remained steadfast in her conviction that the Thirty Years’ Peace had not been violated. Moreover, Athens insisted that Sparta should seek arbitration as the means to settle the international dispute as specified in the Thirty Years’ Peace (Thuc. 1.140; 1.144). But Sparta failed to submit the dispute to arbitration; thereby making an explicit commitment (DV2.2) to support her allies against Athens in wartime. Later on the Spartans acknowledged that they were primarily responsible for the Archidamian War:

“In the first war they thought that the fault had been more on their side, partly because the Thebans had entered Plataea in peace time and partly because, in spite of the provisions in the previous treaty that there should be no recourse to arms if arbitration were offered, they themselves has not accepted the Athenian offer of arbitration. (Thuc. 7.18)"

These conditions enabled Corinth and her colonies, especially Ambracia, to entrap Sparta into carrying out military operations in the northwest that did little to advance Sparta’s strategic position in the war. The Ambraciots persuaded the Spartans to support their cause by arguing that if they could subdue the Acarnanians, they would be in a better position to capture the Zacynthus and Cephallenia islands from where the Athenian fleet launched raids into the Peloponnese (Thuc. 2.80; 2.66; 2.80; Diod. 12.47). In addition to the capturing the islands, Thucydides mentions that the Spartans thought that they could also use this opportunity to take Naupactus, the port from where the Athenians were attempting to confine the Corinthian fleet within the Gulf of Corinth (Thuc. 2.69;
2.80; Diod. 12.47). According to Kagan (1974) “Here is another of many instances when the Spartans were led into dangerous undertakings on behalf of their allies, and in this case the appeal was persuasive and the prospects seemed good” (107). However neither the islands nor the Athenian blockade operating out of Naupactus seriously threatened Sparta in the broader sense. Sparta would have been better served, focusing on objectives that reduced the Athenians’ ability to fight rather than concentrating on this campaign. The entire affair turned out to be a diversion courtesy of Sparta’s own allies.

**Section C: Megara**

Megara occupies the northeast portion of the Isthmus of Corinth connecting the Peloponnese with central Greece. This strategic location enabled Megara to permit or deny invaders access to other regions of Greece. The topography of Megara further restricts troop movements, with the Geraneia Mountain range running along its southern border. Legon (1981) describes the Scironia Way through the Geraneia as “unlike the modern roads, which are cut into the mountainside at higher elevations, the ancient path narrowed here to a treacherous ledge” (34). Megara’s ally during the First Peloponnesian War (ca. 460-446), Athens, took advantage of Megara’s topography by guarding the Geraneia passes to prevent any Peloponnesian land forces from passing through the Isthmus of Corinth and reaching the Athenian territory of Attica (Thuc 1.107).

Megara took advantage of its geography by establishing a port on both its west and east coasts. The western port Pagae, on the Gulf of Corinth promoted, trade opportunities in the west resulting in the establishment of the Megara Hyblaea a colony in Sicily just north of Syracuse (Grant 1986). The eastern port Nisaea, on the Saronic Gulf, gave
Megara access to trade in the east where she established the colonies of Byzantium and Heraclea Pontica (now Eregli, Turkey) (Grant 1986; Semple 1931). Megara depended on these colonies to import grain supplies and other raw materials, since she lacked the agricultural ability to provide for herself she had poor soil quality (Semple 1931, 350). Megara balanced trade by importing grains and exporting manufactured goods (Semple 1931; Hasebroek 1965; & Legon 1973). “The area of the Isthmus and the Saronic Gulf, including as it did Corinth, Sicyon, Megara, the Argolid, Aegina, and above all Athens, became one large manufacturing area” (Hasebroek 1965, 72).

Megara primarily competed with the other city-states in the surrounding region. Athens conducted a difficult land and sea war against the Megarians to control the island of Salamis in the Saronic Gulf circa 570 – 65 BCE (Plut. Sol. 12.3; Hornblower 1983; Botsford 1930). According to Adcock & Mosley (1975), in the sixth century BCE Athens secured the title to the island of Salamis claimed by both Megara and Aegina to improve her security, since Athens did not have a great deal of influence over her neighbors (23). After defeating the Megarians, the Athenian issued a decree to establish a cleruchy on Salamis clarifying the island’s tax and military obligations to the Athenians (Tod 1946, no 14; Fornara 1983, no 44). This incident increased Athens’ regional influence at the expense of Megara.

The First Peloponnesian War (ca. 460 – 446 BCE)

Diodorus writes, “During the winter of 461 BCE a dispute arose between Corinth and Megara over some frontier land, and the two city-states went to war” (Diod. 11.79). Hornblower (1983) explains, “That the old quarrel between Corinth and Megara was
about borders; by the end of the archaic period Corinth had absorbed most of this frontier zone of good arable land” (96). Corinth’s population had been on the rise and needed the additional land to support its population (Hornblower 1983). As the war progressed the underpowered Megara contracted an alliance with Athens when it became clear that Sparta would not get involved in the dispute (Diod. 11.79; Thuc. 1.103). According to Kagan (1969) “She [Megara] must have known of Corinth’s special position in the Spartan alliance and that Sparta would surely side with Corinth” (25). At this point Megara became the ‘first city-state to abandon the Peloponnesian League’ (Cartledge 2002, 193)

Athens immediately began securing the Isthmus of Corinth to protect Megara from the attacking Corinthians and the rest of the Peloponnesian League. Thucydides writes that “the Athenians held Megara and Pagae, and built for the Megarians their long walls from the city to Nisaea, garrisoning them with Athenian troops” (1.103). This enabled the Athenians to re-supply Megara by sea using the port of Nisaea on the Saronic Gulf (Legon 1968). “It was chiefly because of this that the Corinthians began to conceive such a bitter hatred for Athens” (Thuc. 1.103). The Megarian alliance also gave Athens access to the Corinthian Gulf via the port of Pagae allowing Athens to sail directly to the city-states in the west to trade and spread her influence (Sealey 1976; Bonner 1923). This would only provoke Corinth’s anger further, since Corinth established many city-states in western Greece as colonies and commercially dominated the area (Legon 1973). Corinth and her allies later planned to storm the fortifications in the Megarid to seize the Geraneia heights at the Battle of Megara 458 BCE, so that Athens would send reinforcements to Megara in order to relieve the Athenian siege on Aegina (Thuc. 1.105; Diod. 11.79.3).
But instead Athens mustered a ragtag group of old men and adolescent boys that forced the Corinthians to withdrawal after losing a series of engagements in the territory (Thuc. 1.105).

Sparta largely stayed out of the conflict until the central Greek city-state Phocis invaded Doris in 457 BCE. The Spartan-led force decided to cross the Gulf of Corinth on boats to reach central Greece instead of crossing the Isthmus of Corinth on account of it being fortified by the Megarians and Athenians. Once the Spartans restored the Dorian towns, they were unable to return home by boat since the Athenians began operating a naval squadron in the Gulf of Corinth (Sealey 1976). At this point Thucydides (1.107) tells us that the Spartans decided to wait in Boeotia for a safe route home to develop. While waiting in Boeotia they began bolstering Thebes as the Boeotian hegemon (Justinus 3.6; Diod. 11.81). In addition the Spartans may have also started secret negotiations with members of the anti-democratic party in Athens to shake the foundation of the Athenian Democracy (Thuc. 1.107-8). These secret negotiations and actions in Boeotia threatened Athens, so the Athenians decided to take the offensive by engaging the Spartans in central Greece (Plant 1994; Thuc. 1.107-8). The Athenians marched into Boeotia where they confronted an amalgamation of Spartan and Boeotians troops at the Battle of Tanagra 457 BCE (Plat. Menex. 242; Plat. Alc. 1: 112C; Paus. 1.29.9). Reece (1950) argues that “the battle of Tanagra was entirely the result of an Athenian attempt to trap the Spartan expeditionary force, and that if left to themselves the Spartans would have gone straight home after dealing with the Phocians” (75). The Spartans and their allies narrowly won the battle. Afterwards “the Spartans then marched down into the Megarid and after cutting down some of the plantation trees, returned home through
Geraneia and past the Isthmus” (Thuc. 1.108). Demand (1982) suggests that the Spartans and Athenians may have negotiated a treaty after the Battle of Tanagra that would have allowed for the Spartan troops to return home unmolested, if the treaty did not bind the Athenians from pursuing the Boeotians (33). Ultimately the Megarian defection and the Athenian presence in the Isthmus of Corinth caused the Spartans hardships while trying to employ their military forces outside of the Peloponnese.

Euboea defected from Athens in 446 BCE compelling Athens to send troops to put down the insurrection. As Athens tried to bring order back to Euboea, Megara also defected destroying the Athenian garrisons with the help of Corinth, Sicyon, and Epidaurus (Thuc.1.114). At this time Megara also made an alliance with Sparta (Diod. 12.5). The Athenians immediately put their Euboean expedition on hold and marched directly to Megara to plunder the territory (Diod. 12.5). Diodorus (12.5) writes, “When [the Megarians] emerged from Megara to defend their territory, a battle took place. The Athenians were victorious and pursued the Megarians back within their fortifications.” The Athenians went back to Euboea quelled the unrest and subjugated the island. The Spartans then invaded Attica and laid waste to the territory as far as Eleusis and Tharia, and then they returned to the Peloponnese (Thuc. 1.114; Diod.12.6). Thucydides writes, “Soon after they had returned from Euboea the Athenians made the Thirty Years’ Truce in 446 BCE with Sparta and her allies: Athens gave up all the places which they had seized from the Peloponnesians” (1.115). By the end of the First Peloponnesian War Athens lost influence in Boeotia and Megara. And although Athens maintained control of Euboea and Chalkis it was shaky. After the war all conquests were returned to their
original state at the start of the conflict with the exception of Aegina remaining a
dominion of Athens.

**The Archidamian War (431 – 421 BCE)**

In the years immediately preceding the Archidamian phase of the Peloponnesian
war, Corinth had an ongoing dispute with her colony Corcyra over its settlement
Epidamnus. Megara and several other allied city-states provided ships, money, and men
to Corinth to confront the Corcyraeans. But after the Corinthians suffered a humiliating
defeat at the Battle of Leucimn 435 BCE, Corinth began rebuilding her navy with the
help of various allies (Diod. 12.32; Salmon 1997). Legon (1973) argues that Megara may
have been helping Corinth acquire some of the necessary raw materials from the Aegean
Sea to reconstruct its navy since Corcyra controlled the Ionian Sea from where Corinth
normally acquired these materials (165-7). Megara also took part in the Battle of Sybota
433 BCE when the Corinthians launched a second attack on Corcyra which resulted in a
draw (Thuc. 1.46).

Not long after the Battle of Sybota 433 BCE, Athens instituted the Megarian
Decree. The decree barred Megara from the Athenian Agora (Market) and all the other
harbors within the Athenian Empire. “They [The Athenians] accused Megara of
cultivating consecrated ground, of cultivating land that did not belong to them, and giving
shelter to slaves who escaped from Athens” (Thuc. 1.139). However Kagan (2003)
writes, “The true purpose of the Megarian Decree was as a moderate intensification of
diplomatic pressure to help prevent the spread of the war to Corinth’s allies by ensuring
Megara was punished for its behavior at Leucimn and Sybota” (39). However Legon
(1973) describes the decree as a means to prevent Megara from providing shipbuilding materials to Corinth and her allies (170). A writer from the era, Pseudo-Xenophon (a.k.a. Old Oligarch), describes how a naval power can weaken its adversaries by using embargoes to regulate what a state can import and export.

Wealth they [the Athenians] alone of the Greeks and non-Greeks are capable of possessing. If some city is rich in ship-timber, where will it distribute it without the consent of the ruler of the sea? Again if some city is rich in iron, copper, or flax, where will it distribute it without the consent of the ruler of the sea? However, it is from these very things that I have my ships: timber, iron, copper, flax, and wax – each from a different place. In addition, they [The Athenians] will forbid export to wherever any of our enemies are, on pain of being unable to use the sea. (Ps. Xen. Const. Ath. 2. 11-12)

Due to Megara’s reliance on food imports, the effects of the Megarian Decree forcefully hit home with the population ‘slowly starving’ as indicated by Aristophanes’ play Acharnians (532-537). Bury (1967) writes “The decree spelt economic ruin to Megara, and Megara was an important member of the Peloponnesian league; the Athenian statesman knew how to strike” (394). Legon (1973) explains that the Athenian ability to disrupt Megarian trade would have had a ‘major impact on nearby Peloponnesian states’ (167). The spillover from the Megarian Decree would likely affect other members of the Peloponnesian League. Sparta as leader of the Peloponnesian League surely would have noticed the weakening of its league members.

The situation came to a head in 432 BCE when Corinth requested Sparta to assemble its allies to discuss war with Athens after the Corinthian colony Potidaea, a member of the Athenian Empire, defected and was under siege by Athens (Thuc. 1.66-67). At Sparta’s First Assembly, the Megarian delegates argued that the Athenians were responsible for a number of grievances, but they insisted that the Athenians broken the
Thirty Years’ Peace of 446 BCE by implementing the Megarian Decree (Thuc. 1.67). After the Peloponnesians declared war at the Second Assembly, they sent embassies to Athens (432-1 BCE) giving them an ultimatum that if their grievances were not addressed there would be war. According to Thucydides “The chief point and the one that they [The Spartans] made most clear was that war could be avoided if Athens would revoke the Megarian Decree” (Thuc. 1.139). The leading Athenian citizen, Pericles, asserted that the Megarian Decree did not violate the Thirty Years Peace and that Sparta had ignored provisions within the treaty to settle interstate disputes peacefully through arbitration, which coincidentally violated a provision in the treaty (Thuc. 1.144; Thuc. 1.140; Thuc. 7.18). The Athenians took Pericles’ advice not to give in to Spartan demands, but indicated their willingness to resolve any disputes peacefully through arbitration.

Megara suffered tremendously during the course of the war. Athens invaded Megara at least one to two times per year (Thuc. 2.31; Thuc. 4.66). And without the cessation of the Megarian Decree food shortages continued. According to Legon (1968) “They were now almost entirely dependent upon overland importation of vital foodstuffs from Boeotia and Corinth” (214). In 427 BCE, the Athenians captured and fortified the island of Minoa in order to be closer to the port city Nisaea (Thuc 3.51). Legon (1981) explains that the forward location made it easier for the Athenians both, to monitor shipping and, to launch surprise attacks. The increased scrutiny on Megara’s port only intensified the population’s hardships. Thucydides (4.66) makes a vague reference that Megara had a revolution in which the democratic faction drove out the city’s oligarchic faction (Legon 1968, 214). Legon (1968) suggests that the Megarian revolution most
likely took place around 427 BCE, since Thucydides writes that the Spartans allowed ‘political refugees from Megara’ to settle in Plataea after it was destroyed (Thuc. 3.68). Even though the democratic faction came out on top, Gomme (1956) suggests that these leaders were only ‘leaders of the popular party’ and that they did not ‘carry the majority with them’ (3:528). He adds that “the majority were not fanatical, and were more patriotic than loyal to the party, anxious to preserve their independence of both Athens and their Peloponnesian neighbours” (Gomme 1956, 3:528). Legon (1981) agrees “They [The Megarians] were still just as bitter against the Athenians” (238). The strong anti-Athenian sentiment of the population and the democratic leaders’ narrow hold on power kept Megara from joining the democratic leaning Athenian alliance.

During the eighth year of the war 424 BCE, Megara decided to recall the oligarchic exiles now living around Pagae who were conducting acts of brigandage (Thuc. 4.66). According to Legon (1968) “This hostile force effectively cut Megara’s link with Boeotia and increased her isolation” (214). Megara hoped to prevent these exiles from plundering the countryside and strengthen their ability to continue fighting the Athenians. However leaders of the democratic party realized that they would probably lose public support once the oligarchic faction returned on account of Megara’s suffering population, so they decided to collude with Athenian generals to capture the port city of Nisaea and Megara by opening the city gates and allowing a mixture 600 Athenian and Plataean hoplites to enter the city (Thuc. 4.66-69). But when it came time to act the Megarians refused to open their city gates, so the Athenians focused their efforts on Nisaea instead. A Spartan force came to reinforce its garrison at Nisaea, but the garrison already surrendered giving Athens control of Nisaea (Thuc 4.69-72). A Theban force combined with the Spartan
force compelling the Athenians to retreat back to Nisaea (Thuc. 4.72-73). The Megarian oligarchs took advantage of the situation allowing the Spartans to enter the city, while the Megarian democrats fled (Thuc. 4.73-74).

**SUMMARY**

Like Corinth, Megara did not chain-gang Sparta into the Archidamian War by invading Athens or any other member of the Delian League. Rather, Megara used her influence to pressure Sparta and the other allies into declaring war on Athens. Sparta depended (DV2.1) on Megara to allow her army to march across the Isthmus of Corinth to invade Attica. Megara also served as a major link in Sparta’s line of communication between her allies in Boeotia, Phocis, and Locris that she relied on to augment her forces. But most importantly Megara was one of the few city-states in the Peloponnesian League capable of supplying ships to Sparta. These capabilities surely would have increased Megara’s value to Sparta and the rest of her allies.

Megara’s behavior record (DV2.4) reflected her willingness to defect from the Peloponnesian League in order to achieve her own goals. During the outbreak of the First Peloponnesian War, Megara defected when it became apparent that Sparta would not support her in the border dispute against Corinth. Instead Megara allied with Athens, who quickly seized the opportunity to take advantage of Megara’s port on the Corinthian Gulf, Pagae, to obtain more efficient access to the west (Thuc. 1.103). A position that Athens later used to launch sea attacks on Corinth’s neighbor Sicyon (Thuc. 1.111). Athens also moved quickly to secure her position in the Megarid by fortifying the Geraneia Heights to prevent any unforeseen Peloponnesian intrusions. Blocking the Isthmus of Corinth
caused difficulties for Sparta when they tried to support Doris in central Greece. These actions highlight how much Megara had to offer either ally. Both Athens and Sparta strived to keep Megara in their alliance to maintain these strategic interests (DV2.3) for themselves and reduce them for their adversary. So when Megara pressed Sparta to act against Athens, Sparta had to respond. Especially after Corinth threatened Sparta that the allies would defect if she did not.

Sparta gave Megara the same explicit commitment (DV2.2) to fight as she gave Corinth (see above). Not long after the Battle of Sybota in 433 BCE, Athens started enforcing the Megarian Decree causing significant economic hardships for Megara (Thuc. 1.139; Aristoph. Ach. 532-537). Legon (1973) argues that the disruption from Megarian trade probably had a ‘major impact on nearby Peloponnesian states’ (167). This likely would have given Sparta the urgency to resolve the issue as quickly as possible. Sparta approached Athens with an ultimatum threatening war if Athens refused to address Aegina’s loss of independence, ending the siege in Potidaea, and ending the Megarian Decree. “But the chief point and the one that they [the Spartans] made most clear was that war could be avoided if Athens would revoke the Megarian Decree” (Thuc. 1.139). Athens rebuffed Sparta on these claims by stating that none of them violated the Thirty Years’ Peace (Thuc. 1.139; 1.144). In the end the Megarian Decree did not directly violate Thirty Years’ Peace, but it served as the Peloponnesian League’s best justification for declaring war on Athens.

Megarians exploited these conditions to entrap Sparta and the rest of the Peloponnesian League into declaring war on Athens to relieve their suffering. This laid the groundwork for Thebes to attack Plataea. But once the war was underway, Megara
did not attempt to entrap Sparta or any of the allies any further. Unlike the Corinthians, the Megarians appeared to be solely interested in the survival of their state. So Megara did not attempt to entrap her allies elsewhere.
Chapter V

The Athenian Allies

Section A: Samos

Samos was a founding and prominent member of the Athenian led Delian League. The city-state, Samos, was located on an island measuring 28 miles (45 km) long and 12.5 miles (20 km) wide in the Aegean Sea about 1.5 miles (2.4 km) from Asia Minor (Finley 1977, 179). Shipley (1987) adds “Its natural resources, too, which are plentiful in comparison with much of Greece, go some way towards explaining its ancient prosperity and power” (5-6). Strabo (14.1.15) writes “Samos is not altogether fortunate in regard to wines, but in all other respects it is a blest country, as is clear from the fact that it became an object of contention in war.” The island’s landscape consisted of forest covered mountains and plains more suitable to growing fruits and vegetables than cereals (Shipley 1987, 6-8). Samos also possessed a natural harbor enabling it to develop a substantial maritime fleet used for trade and warfare (Thuc. 8.76).

Samian trade centered in the southern Aegean Sea, where Samos was able to take advantage of the natural sea and wind currents as well as her location to bolster her maritime commerce and take control of the sea using piracy (Shipley 1987, 11-12; Cook 1963, 90). This allowed Samos to establish trade relations with city-states along Asia Minor including the Aegean islands of Korsiai, Icaria, Cyclades, Dodecanese, and Rhodes that eventually led to trade with the Levant and Egypt (Shipley 1987, 11-12). Conversely the city-state Miletus, located in nearby Asia Minor, became a major Samian trade rival with whom she competed for influence (Shipley 1987, 47; Hasebroek 1965,
The Samian navy reached its peak during the tyranny of Polycrates circa 525 BCE, who used it as a means to conquer and rule several islands in the region (Thuc. 1.13; 3.104; Herod. 3.39). Polycrates also formed a relationship with Egypt in addition to using his navy to stave off Persian expansion in the region (Bury 1967, 233). However, Polycrates turned on his Egyptian friends by courting the Persians with whom he colluded to send 40 ships to attack Egypt (Herod. 3.44). Polycrates was captured and killed circa 523 BCE enabling the Samian aristocrats to take over the island’s governance. But the aristocrats failed to maintain Samos’ sea-power, which came to an end in 517 BCE (Burn 1962, 129). The Persians attacked and gained control of Samos by installing Polycrates’ exiled brother Syloson as its vassal ruler (Burn 1962, 129; Mitchell 1975, 86-7; Herod. 3.139-142).

Miletus led the first Ionian Revolt against Persia in 499 BCE, in which Samos joined despite a long history of hostility between the two city-states (Shipley 1987, 107). The Ionian city-states even started to mint a common coinage to signify their ‘unity and determination’ in the revolt (Bury 1968, 243). But the Persians proceeded to chip away at the rebel coalition by attacking strategic rebel locations such as the Hellespont and the island of Cyprus (Herod. 5.103; 5.116). Capturing Cyprus gave the Persians’ Phoenician fleet the ability to freely move around in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. The turning point came in 494 BCE when the Phoenician fleet engaged the Ionian fleet near Lade Island in the vicinity of Miletus (Meiggs 1979, 29). Samos contributed 60 warships to the engagement but withdrew them at the last moment inducing others to do the same (Herod. 6.9; 6.14). Herodotus (6.14) records “The sight of the Samians under sail for home was too much for the Lesbians, who were next in line; they soon followed suit, as,
indeed did the majority of the Ionian fleet.” The Phoenicians defeated what remained of the Ionian fleet enabling the Persians to capture Miletus (Herod. 6.18-20).

After abandoning the Ionians at the Battle of Lade in 494 BCE, the Samians switched sides fighting alongside the Persians during the Persian Wars (Shipley 1987, 108). A few Samians even earned Persian distinction at the Battle of Salamis 480 BCE when they captured some Greek ships (Herod. 8.85). However in the summer of 479 BCE, Herodotus (9.90) writes that three Samian aristocrats assured the Greeks that if they sailed their fleet to Samos where the Persian fleet was harbored, the island would rise up in revolt. Persuaded by this proposal, the Greek fleet set out towards Samos. The Persians, weakened by their earlier defeat at Salamis, decided not to engage the Greeks and withdrew their forces across the Mycale Strait to Ionia (Herod. 9.96; Diod. 11.34). But in the meantime the Persians grew more suspicious and restricted the Samians from carrying their weapons, inciting the Samians to revolt which encouraged other Ionians to follow in the Samians’ lead (Herod. 9.99; 9.103).

The second Persian revolt in 479 BCE sparked a debate among Spartan and Athenians within the Greek alliance (also known as the Hellenic League), as to how they were going to protect the Ionians from the Persians in the long term. The Spartans leading the alliance proposed that the Ionians should be evacuated back to the Greek mainland (Herod. 9.106). However the Athenians argued that they should remain in Ionia and incorporated into the Hellenic League, to provide them with some security (Herod. 9.106). According to Herodotus (9.106) “They brought into the confederacy the Samians, Chians, Lesbians, and other island peoples who had fought for Greece against the foreigner; oaths were sworn, and all these communities bound themselves to be loyal to
the common cause.” The new Ionian allies and the Athenians quickly took advantage of this added strength by claiming another victory over the Persians at the Battle of Sestos 479 BCE at the Hellespont (Herod. 9.121; Thuc. 1.89). The Greek momentum continued until Spartan leadership of the alliance was put into jeopardy when a scandal revealing the Spartan general Pausanias’ fascination with Persian customs and traditions became known (Thuc. 1.95). The allies also strongly disliked Pausanias’s dictatorial leadership style (Thuc. 1.95). Several alliance members finally convinced Athens to take over leadership of the alliance in 477 BCE (Thuc. 1.96; Meiggs 1979, 43). Thucydides (1.96) writes “Next the Athenians assessed the various contributions to be made for the war against Persia, and decided which states should furnish money and which states should send ships.” Athens placed the allies’ collected money into a treasury on the Island of Delos where the representatives of the alliance frequently met, giving rise to the ‘Athenian alliance’ being referred to as the Delian League by modern scholars (Bury 1967, 328).

The First Peloponnesian War (ca. 460 – 446 BCE)

Samos fought alongside Athens as a member of the Delian League throughout the course of the First Peloponnesian War. The majority of Samian activity throughout the war can be ascertained indirectly, since the historical texts generally refer to the primary acting city-states and categorize the rest simply as ‘allies.’ For instance, Thucydides (1.104) documents that Athens sent a fleet with their allies to support the Egyptian revolt from Persia in 459 BCE. Meiggs (1972) suggests that a large number of Ionian ships, including Samian, participated in this endeavor since Athens was fighting on two-fronts and needed to take advantage of the extra manpower and resources (107). A marble stele
recovered from Samos reveals that a Samian captain captured 15 Phoenician ships at the
Battle of Memphis in 459 BCE (Peel as cited in Meiggs & Lewis 1969, no. 34; Formara
1983, no. 77).

Thucydides (1.108) also describes how troops from Athens, Argos, and
‘contingents from their other allies’ marched into Boeotia to confront an army of
Spartans and Thebans at Battle of Tanagra in 457 BCE. But after the Spartan and Theban
victory at the battle, the Spartans dedicated a gold shield to Olympia revealing that
Ionians also fought at the battle. The Greek geographer, Pausanias, (5.10.4) writes “The
temple has a golden shield; from Tanagra the Lacedaemonians and their allies dedicated
it, A gift taken from the Argives, Athenians and Ionians, The tithe offered for victory in
war." A marble epigraph discovered in Olympia corroborates Pausanias’ claim with some
variations, such as the dialect (Meiggs & Lewis 1969, no. 36). This surely demonstrates
that the Ionians took part in the battle and that Samian troops likely participated along
with others from Chios and Lesbos.

By 454 BCE the Athenian expedition in Egypt turned into a disaster when the
Athenian force succumbed to a siege on the island of Prosopitis after holding out for 18
months (Thuc. 1.109; Shipley 1987, 111). (The Persians drained the channels
surrounding the island to besiege it by land [Thuc. 1.109].) Not long afterwards, Plutarch
tells us that Samian representatives proposed that the treasury for the Delian League
should be transferred from Delos to Athens, which happened shortly thereafter (Plut.
Arist. 25; Plut. Per. 12.1; Thuc. 1.96). Legon (1972) argues “this proposal could only
have been made by a dedicated Athenian ally” (146). According to Legon (1972)
“Athens’ recent debacle in Egypt revived fears of a Persian naval presence in the Aegean,
making the Delian treasury vulnerable” (146). This may reveal why there was little to no opposition mentioned by fellow alliance members. Of course, the alternative to this may simply be that Athens moved the Delian Treasury to Athens as her own power as the league’s hegemon grew.

Samos Revolts (ca. 441 BCE)

By 441 BCE Samos and Miletus became embroiled in a conflict over who could take possession of Priene, which ended their six-year truce (Thuc. 1.115; Plut. Per. 25; Diod. 12.27). By this point Miletus was a tributary member of the Delian League, which put Miletus into the category of states contributing funds to the Delian League. Kagan (1969) explains that Athens stripped Miletus of its navy and forced it to become a democracy after losing the revolts in the 452/1 BCE and 446/5 BCE (98-101). Samos was still a non-tributary member that supplied troops and maintained its own navy to support the Delian League. This enabled Samos to keep a highly skilled military force intact, while Miletus’ military strength was increasingly neglected. According to Thucydides (1.115) “After having the worst of the fighting the Milesians came to Athens and lodged violent protest against the Samians.” Thucydides also claims that there were several private Samian citizens who wanted a democratic government instead of an oligarchy (Thuc. 1.115). Kagan (1969) writes, “apart from their preferences and advantage, the Athenians could not simply ignore a war between two members of their alliance, particularly if one was strong and the other weak” (170). However Plutarch (Per. 25) explains that Athens offered to arbitrate in the dispute between Samos and Miletus, but this was rejected. Quinn (1981) writes “A refusal to submit to Athenian arbitration was a
direct challenge to Athens and as such was a sufficient reason for her to act as she did” (11).

Athens responded by sending 40 triremes to Samos, setting up an Athenian garrison, and establishing a democracy (Thuc. 1.115). The Athenians also relocated 100 Samian men and boys, as hostages, to the island of Lemnos before returning to Athens (Thuc. 1.115). Some of these hostages escaped to Asia Minor where they facilitated contact between, Pissuthnes, the Persian Governor of Sardis and the oligarchs remaining in Samos enabling them to form an alliance (Thuc. 1.115). At this point the Persians amassed 700 mercenaries and led them into Samos, where they imprisoned the Samian democrats, detained all Athenians on the island, rescued the Samian hostages on Lemnos, and made preparations to attack Miletus (Thuc. 1.115).

In the meantime Samos sought support from potential allies. Samos quickly approached Sparta, the hegemon of the Peloponnesian League, seeking assistance. The Spartans initially showed interest but decided against participating after their primary naval power, Corinth, vetoed the action at an alliance assembly (Thuc. 1.40). Kagan (1969) adds “It appears that there were also defections in Caria, Thrace, and the Chalcidice” (172). Thucydides (1.115) only mentions that “Byzantium joined them [The Samians] in revolting from Athens.” But Thucydides does not acknowledge any connection between the Samian and Byzantium revolts except that they occurred at the same time.

Once the Athenians learnt what happened, they dispatched 60 ships to Samos commanded by Pericles. Sixteen of these ships were diverted to Caria to observe the
Phoenician fleet while others travelled to Chios and Lesbos to bring reinforcements (Thuc. 1.116). The remaining 44 Athenian ships engaged 70 Samian ships near Tragia Island culminating in a Samian defeat (Thuc. 1.116). By this time 40 more Athenian ships arrived along with 25 ships from Chios and Lesbos (Thuc. 1.116). The Athenians then landed troops on Samos to make preparations to blockade Samos forcing her to surrender. After hearing rumors that the Phoenician fleet was on the move, Pericles took 60 ships from the Athenian fleet and set out to Caunus and Caria to investigate (Thuc. 1.116). The Samians took advantage of this moment to launch a surprise attack against the Athenians on both land and sea, and to regain control of the island for 14 days (Thuc. 1.117). But when Pericles returned, he resumed the blockade that lasted until Samos surrendered almost nine months later (Thuc. 1.117). Thucydides (1.117) says the Samians “pulled down their walls, gave hostages, handed over their fleet, and agreed to pay reparations in instalments at regular intervals.” Four marble stele fragments found in Athens record the new oaths the Samians swore to the Athenians after their defeat (Meiggs & Lewis 1969, no 56; Fornara 1983, no 115). Fornara (1983) indicates that these inscriptions are incomplete but basically signify that the Samians swore that they ‘shall not rebel against the peoples of the Athenians either by word or deed or from the allies of the Athenians’ (no 115). Shipley (1987) argues that “the major effect of the Athenian War on Samos was to deprive it of an active role in allied naval and military expeditions, and any say in the use of the military resources of the allies” (117). Essentially Samos came out of the revolt transformed into a tributary member of the Delian League, albeit an important one.
The Archidamian War (431 – 421 BCE)

Samos remained a loyal Athenian ally within the Delian League all through the Archidamian War. Like the First Peloponnesian War, specific Samian actions in the Archidamian War are not acknowledged (see above). But the revolt of Lesbos in 428 BCE made Athens suspicious that Chios and Samos would also revolt. Such concerns were not without merit, since a large number of exiled factions were operating in and around Chios and Samos, plotting to seize control of their respected city-states. The threat to Samos stemmed from a group of Samian exiles ensconced at Anaia located on the mainland across from Samos in Asia Minor (Thuc.4.75; Thuc. 3.32). Thucydides (4.75) writes “they [the Samian exiles in Anaia] helped the Peloponnesians by sending them pilots for their fleet, at the same time creating a state of disturbance in the city of Samos and welcoming all exiles from there.” This threat was realized in 428/7 BCE when the Athenians dispatched a fleet commanded by Lysicles to collect tribute from their allies (Thuc. 3.19). At one point Lysicles and his soldiers trekked from Myos, Caria, in a northwestern direction crossing the Maeander River when he and his soldiers were attacked and killed by Carians and the people of Anaia (Thuc. 3.19). Anaia and its inhabitants remained a nuisance for Athens throughout the Archidamian War.

SUMMARY

Samos neither buck-passed nor abandoned the Delian League during the Archidamian War. This may be surprising since Samos’ behavior record (DV2.4) shows a long history of defecting when it mattered the most. Two Samian defections during the Ionian Revolt as well as the defection during the Persian Wars highlight how frequently Samos abandoned her allies. These defections often altered the course of the conflict. The
Samian defection at the Battle of Lade in 494 BCE encouraged other states to do likewise, including the Lesbian states, resulting in Miletus’ defeat at the battle (Herod. 6.14). The revolt during the Persian War in 479 BCE sparked widespread Ionian revolts, which allowed the Hellenic League to capitalize on the activity by expanding its alliance into Persian held territories in the Aegean Sea (Herod. 9.103; 9.121; Thuc. 1.89). Moreover, the debate that following the revolt among the Hellenic League’s leadership showcased Athens’ explicit commitment (DV2.2) to the Ionians by championing their admission to the league and their intransigence when hearing the proposal of an Ionian evacuation to other areas of Greece (Herod. 9.106).

It is difficult to say whether Samos and Athens shared similar strategic interests (DV2.3) during the Persian Wars, since the Samians fought on the Persian side for the majority of the conflict. The Samian Admiral Theomestor even served with such distinction that the Persian King made him the tyrant of Samos (Herod. 8.85). But Samos seems to have changed sides when Persia’s weakness became clear after suffering from a series of defeats by the Greeks. This also could be the result of political expediency from domestic political factions rather than shared strategic interests. But by the time of the Egyptian debacle in the First Peloponnesian War, Persia’s resurgence aligned Samian and Athenian strategic interests (DV2.3) closer together. The potential Persian threat to the league’s treasury in Delos compelled Samos to recommend transferring it to Athens (Plut. Arist. 25; Legon 1972, 146). A move Legon interprets as coming from a ‘dedicated Athenian ally’ (1972). However, it is also worth mentioning that Samos (through Samian factions) entreated Persian support during the revolt of 441 BCE, after Samos tried to acquire Priene from her regional rival Miletus. Here Samos appears to be more concerned
with her own self-interests than the broader interests of the alliance and how these actions would affect Athens.

Athens’ dependence (DV2.1) on Samos gradually changed from the formation of the Delian League to the beginning of the Archidamian War. Originally Samos was a non-tributary member of the Delian League contributing ships (Thuc. 1.96). But after Athens put down the Samian revolt in 441 BCE, she became a tributary member of the league. From this point on, Samos would be required to hand over funds directly to Athens to help finance alliance activities. This also took away Samos’ ability to protect themselves from outside threats. But Shipley claims that Samos likely continued to provide Athens with rowers to man the Athenian ships (1987). This status change suggests that Athens’ dependence on Samos would decrease while on campaign or in the field. In other words Samian battlefield defections would have less impact on Athens and the entire alliance. Although failure to pay tribute to Athens would also cause hardship, but it would not immediately influence the outcome of a campaign or battle. This would mitigate the overall effects felt by the alliance and Athens brought on by the Samians’ opportunism.

The combination of these factors suggests that Samos would likely abandon Athens during the Archidamian War. Athens made an explicit commitment to the Ionians at the Hellenic League debate several years before the start of the Archidamian War. The strategic interests of the two states seem to be aligned for the most part but occasionally diverged when local self-interests and self-preservation dictated otherwise. Samos’ long history of defections and revolts prior to joining the Delian League suggests that this pattern of behavior would continue. But Samos played the part of a loyal ally all through
the early years of the Delian League. The Samian Revolt of 441 BCE required Athens to lessen her dependence on Samos by altering the alliance obligations between the two states to ensure that this type of disruption would not affect the stability of the alliance again. Snyder (1984) writes “If a state perceives its ally as less dependent, if the alliance commitment is vague, and if the ally’s recent behavior suggests doubtful loyalty, the state will fear abandonment” (475). Athens’ suspicions that Samos would abandon the Delian League became more evident after the Mytilene revolted in 428 BCE, prompting the Athenians to keep an even closer eye on the city-state. The possibility that exiled factions could install an unfriendly domestic government in Samos made Athens leery. But in the end Samos remained loyal to Athens throughout the course of the Archidamian War.

Section B: Chios

Chios was another great co-founder of the Delian League. Grant (1986) describes Chios as “A Greek Island, thirty miles long (from north to south) and from eight to fifteen miles broad, five miles from the coast of Ionia (western Asia Minor)” (165). Unlike Samos, Chios was known for its vineyards which produced ‘the best of wines’ (Strab. 14.1.15; Plin. Nat. 14.9). According to Plutarch (Mor. 470F), Socrates remarked that “Chian wine costs a mina, a purple robe three minae, a half-pint of honey five drachmas." Barron (1986) explains that this is an exaggeration that equates to nearly “three months’ wages” emphasizing the high quality of the wine found on Chios (95).

As an island city-state, Chios was naturally well suited for sea trade. According to Strabo (14.1.35) Chios had “a good port and with a naval station for eighty ships.” And Aristotle (Pol. 1291b) observed that a large portion of its population took part in sea
trade. Despite these advantages trade in the Aegean Sea was a fierce enterprise. Herodotus (1.165) even mentions that the Phocaeans requested to purchase the Oenussae islands from Chios, but the Chians refused to sell the islands because they were ‘afraid that they [Oenussae islands] might be turned into a new centre of trade’ which would compete with Chios itself. The majority of Phocaeans eventually settled in Corsica just off of the Italian peninsula (Herod. 1.165). Nevertheless Chios became well-known as a wealthy city-state in the 5th century BCE (Quinn 1981).

Eventually Persia absorbed Chios into the Persian Empire like so many of the other Ionian states. However Chios joined the Milesian-led Ionian Revolt that erupted in 499 BCE. And Chios distinguished herself at the Battle of Lade in 494 BCE, after Samos deserted the battle inspiring a large number of Lesbian and other Ionian city-states to do the same. The Chians remained loyal to Miletos and provided significant maritime resources to the fight against the Persians. Herodotus (6.15) explains that the Chians did not want to be known as ‘cowards,’ so they kept all of their 100 ships engaged in the battle refusing to withdraw. The Chians battled the Persian contingent of Phoenician ships by continuously charging into the ships creating havoc and allowing the Chians to capture ‘a number of enemy ships’ (Herod. 6.15). But by the end it was in all in vain as the Persian side won the day.

Chios joined the Hellenic League in 479 BCE after the Battle of Mycale along with Samos and Lesbos (Herod. 9.106). As mentioned above, the Athenians dissuaded the Spartans from attempting to relocate the Ionian population, including the Chians and Samians, back to Greece proper. Even though Athens led the attack during the Battle of Sestos in 479 BCE, Sparta remained the leader of the alliance (Herod. 9.121; Thuc. 1.89).
However, widespread allied discontent over Spartan leadership finally allowed Athens to take over the leadership of the alliance by 477 BCE (Thuc. 1.96). Chios became one of the Delian League’s co-founders and one of its most prominent non-tributary members (Thuc. 1.19).

The First Peloponnesian War (ca. 460 – 446 BCE)

Chios fought alongside Athens as a member of the Delian League during the First Peloponnesian War. But like Samos, specific examples of Chian deeds throughout the conflict are not explicitly documented. As a maritime power, Chios, likely supported the Athenian fleet with troops and ships for the sea battle against the Corinthians near the island of Cecryphalia and the assault on Aegina (Thuc. 1.105; Diod. 11.78). In addition Chios probably assisted Athenians with their Egyptian campaign of 459 BCE (Thuc. 1.104). However the most credible instance of Chian involvement in the First Peloponnesian War emerges from the Battle of Tanagra in 457 BCE when the Peloponnesians dedicate a victory trophy over the Athenians, Argives, and Ionians to a temple (Paus. 5.10.4). Even though there is no outright claim that the Chians were among the Ionians taking part in the battle, they were likely involved due to their importance to Athens and the rest of the Delian League.

Chios is better known for helping Athens put down the Samian revolt of 441 BCE. As mentioned above, the Athenians sent 16 ships to Chios and Lesbos to gather reinforcements should the need arise (Thuc. 1.116). The remaining Athenian ships commanded by Pericles defeated the Samian fleet off of the Island of Tragia. According to Thucydides (1.116) “Later they [Athenian fleet] were reinforced by forty ships from
Athens and twenty-five from Chios and Lesbos.” Athens utilized these additional forces to install a maritime blockade, and land troops on the island to take control of Samos. After being diverted for a short time elsewhere, Pericles returned to Samos where re-established the blockade by adding 40 more ships from Athens and 30 more ships from Chios and Lesbos (Thuc. 1.117). The Samians capitulated nine months later.

**The Archidamian War (431 – 421 BCE)**

Chios actively took part in the Archidamian War on the side of Athens and the Delian League. According to Thucydides (2.9) Chios primarily supplied Athens with ships. Fortunately the historical record describes several examples of how Chios supported Athens during the Archidamian War. In 430 BCE Pericles led a combined expedition of 100 Athenians ships filled with infantry and cavalry, augmented by 50 ships from Chios and Lesbos, to conduct raids on the Peloponnese (Thuc. 2.56; 6.31). At first the combined force ravaged the countryside near Epidaurus and then they tried to take the city itself, but failed in the attempt (Thuc. 2.56). So they turned their attention to destroying the countryside near Troezen, Haliae, Hermione, and continued to raid the coast of the Peloponnese (Thuc. 2.56). From there the Athenian led force conducted an assault on Prasiae, a fortified area along the coast of Laconia (Thuc. 2.56). Afterwards they left the Peloponnese and returned to Attica.

The effects of the Mytilene Revolt in 428 BCE reverberated around the region. For instance the Peloponnesians sent a fleet under the command of Alcidas to support the revolt, which struck a great deal of fear in the Ionians since they lacked adequate fortifications to protect themselves from Peloponnesian raids (Thuc. 3.33). Quinn (1981)
suggests that this fear may have been the catalyst for Chios to build fortifications on the island, which may have been misconstrued by the Athenians as preparations for a revolt (41). According to Thucydides (4.51) by the winter of 425-4 BCE “the people of Chios also demolished their new fortifications as the result of pressure from the Athenians, who suspected them of contemplating a revolt.” But they did so only after receiving ‘the most reliable guarantees possible that Athens had no intention of altering the existing state of affairs in Chios’ (Thuc. 4.51).

The existence of a pro-Spartan faction probably gave rise to the suspicion that Chios would revolt. A marble stele found south of Sparta shows that the ‘friends of Sparta among the Chians,’ donated money to Sparta’s war effort sometime during the Archidamian War circa 427 BCE (Tod 1946, no. 62; Meiggs & Lewis 1969, no. 67). However, Quinn (1981) argues that the group did not have strong influence, since Chios did not follow Lesbos’ example by revolting (40). He also claims that when Alcidas, the Spartan fleet commander, captured and killed some Chian prisoners ‘there was no friendly understanding’ between the two city-states (Quinn 1981, 40). In fact Quinn (1981) speculates that the most influence that ‘the friends of Sparta among the Chians’ had on the Chian state was in 425 BCE when the Athenians ordered the dismantling of the Chian fortifications. But it seems unlikely that Chios would have revolted in 425 BCE, since Chios supported Athenian activities at Pylos in 425 BCE by contributing four of the 50 ships that served as reinforcements from Zacynthus (Thuc. 4.13).

In 423 BCE the Spartans and Athenians just completed negotiating an armistice (Thuc. 4.119). The city Scione, located in Pallene, unaware that negotiations had ended began to revolt from the Delian League (Thuc. 4.120). The Spartan General, Brasidas,
who had been leading a mix force of Helots and Spartan mercenaries to encourage cities and towns in the region to defect from the Delian League, quickly came to Scione to offer his support (Thuc. 4.120). Not long afterwards another city in Pallene, Mende, also revolted from Athens and once again Brasidas pledged his support to city’s inhabitants (Thuc. 4.123). To stop the hemorrhaging of allies, Athens dispatched a force of 50 ships consisting of 10 ships from Chios to their destination at Scione and Mende (Thuc. 4.129). The Athenians managed to gain access into Mende and recovered the city (Thuc. 4.130). They then turned their focus to Scione where they established a blockade to besiege the city that lasted until 421 BCE (Thuc. 4.133; 5.32). Once the Athenians captured Scione Thucydides (5.32) writes “They put to death the men of military age, made slaves of the women and children, and gave the land to the Plataeans to live in.”

summary

Chios failed to exhibit the behaviors associated with abandonment or buck-passing throughout the course of the Archidamian War. In fact the behavior record (DV2.4) of the Chians almost never veers from that of a steadfast ally from the time of the Persian Wars until the end of the Archidamian War. That is not saying that Chios never abandoned her allies; Chios joined the Milesian Revolt in 499 BCE abandoning the Persians. But once Chios joined the revolt she remained a dedicated ally. The Chian fleet even distinguished itself at the Battle of Lade in 494 BCE by not abandoning its allies unlike Samos, Lesbos, and several of the other Ionian allies (Herod. 6.15). In fact the Chians never considered revolting lightly; Thucydides (8.24) claims “they never ventured upon it [revolt] until they had many good allies ready to share the risk with them.”
The alliance behavior coming from Chios remained consistent throughout the Archidamian War. Perhaps the Revolt of Mytilene in 428 BCE raised concerns in Athens as to whether Chios would also revolt. Immediately after the revolt, the Athenians held a debate to consider their response to the revolt and those responsible for it. At the debate the unofficial leader of the Assembly, Cleon, argued that Athens’ strength depended (DV2.1) on her allies to such a degree, that it was in Athens interests to crush the revolt in Mytilene and punish its inhabitants to deter other states from following in their example and weakening Athens further (Thuc. 3.39-40; Bury 1967, 416). At this point Chios was the only other non-tributary state besides the Lesbian states providing Athens with ships, so Athens likely felt extremely vulnerable. And this is reflected in Thucydides when he states that the new Chian fortifications led the Athenians to suspect that the Chians were planning to revolt (Thuc. 4.51). However, the Chians were easily dissuaded after Athens made an explicit commitment (DV2.2) that ‘Athens had no intention of altering the existing state of affairs in Chios’ (Thuc. 4.51). This new explicit commitment was more directed to the Chians than the earlier Athenian commitment made to the Ionians during the Persian Wars in 479 BCE (Herod. 9.106). This would have likely boosted the Chians’ confidence in Athens and eased the tensions between the two allies.

Chios and Athens probably still shared the same strategic interests (DV2.3) within the Aegean Sea. A Persian resurgence in the area would have threatened the interests of both Chios and Athens. Chios relied on Athens’ maritime support to keep Persia in check. Athens support was especially valuable considering Ionia was unfortified and vulnerable to sea raids (Thuc. 3.33). Even though Sparta was willing to haphazardly support revolts in the Aegean Sea, the Peloponnesians did not have the capability or desire to remain in
the area at that time. This would have likely opened the door for Revanchism on the part of Athens and Persia to regain territories in Ionia.

**Section C: Mytilene**

The states of Lesbos became significant actors in the Aegean Sea. So much so that these states became involved with the Delian League at its onset as non-tributary allies to Athens. Grant (1986) describes Lesbos as “the largest of the Greek islands off the West (Aegean) coast of Asia Minor, at the entrance to the Gulf of Adramyttium (Edremid)” (342). This location allowed the Lesbian inhabitants to take advantage of its natural resources to conduct trade throughout the region. Grant (1986) writes “The fertile soil and favorable climate of the island sustained a Pentapolis (group of five cities) comprising Mytilene (SE) – which, although far the strongest, never completely dominated the others – Methymna, Eresus (SW, famous for its wheat), Antissa (NW), and Pyrrha” (342). Lesbos was well-known for its vineyards that produced high quality wines that had a sea-water flavor (Strab. 14.1.15; Plin. *Nat*. 14.9). On the island Mytilene developed a ‘substantial fleet’ and possessed an excellent natural harbor to house it (Legon 1968, 201). Strabo (13.2.2) writes “Mytilene has two harbors, of which the southern can be closed and holds only fifty triremes, but the northern is large and deep, and is sheltered by a mole.” These attributes allowed the Aeolian communities on the island to develop Mytilene into a significant actor in the Aegean.

Ultimately Persia came to dominate the whole of Lesbos sometime in the 6th century BCE along with the rest of the western portion of Asia Minor. By 499 BCE, some of the Lesbian city-states joined the Ionian Revolt led by Miletus. Lesbos as a
whole contributed 70 vessels to the Ionian side at the Battle of Lade in 494 BCE against the Persians (Herod. 6.8). But of course the Lesbians withdrew once the Samians abandoned the battle. (It is not known how many of these vessels came from Mytilene, but it is fair to say that it was a large portion.) According to Herodotus (6.14) “The sight of the Samians under sail for home was too much for the Lesbians, who were next in line; they soon followed suit, as, indeed did the majority of the Ionian fleet.” This enabled the Phoenician fleet to defeat the Ionians fleet and the Persians to capture Miletus (Herod. 6.18). Afterwards the Persian fleet captured Chios, Lesbos, and Tenedos (Herod. 6.31).

Lesbos joined the Spartan-led Hellenic League in 479 BCE along with Samos and Chios (Herod. 9.106). Athens assigned Lesbos the status of a non-tributary ally (Thuc. 1.19). This required Lesbian city-states to supply the Delian League with ships instead of money. The only mention of how many ships Athens required from a non-tributary ally comes from Mytilene in 428 BCE when it tried to abandon the alliance. According to Thucydides (3.3.4) “The ten triremes of Mytilene which happened to be serving with the fleet according to the provisions of the alliance were kept back by the Athenians and their crews placed under arrest.” Unfortunately this only refers to Mytilene and in the year 428 BCE. So one cannot surmise the cumulative number of ships Athens required from the whole of Lesbos and how that number may have changed from year-to-year or given situation.

The First Peloponnesian War (ca. 460 – 446 BCE)

The historical record fails to demonstrate how Mytilene participated in the First Peloponnesian War as a member of the Delian League. The only mention of Mytilene
from around this time period comes from the Samian Revolt in 441BCE. As mentioned above, Athens dispatched 16 ships to Chios and Lesbos to muster reinforcements as a precaution (Thuc. 1.116). When the time came Chios and Mytilene augmented the Athenian fleet with a total of 25 ships (Thuc. 1.116; Diod. 12.27). And later when the Athenians required more ships to blockade Samos, both Mytilene and Chios provided a total of 30 more ships (Thuc. 1.117; Diod. 12.28). It is not clear how many of these ships came from Mytilene, but she clearly supported Athens efforts in suppressing a revolting ally.

The Archidamian War (431 – 421 BCE)

The earliest mention of Lesbos during the Archidamian War comes in 430 BCE when Pericles commanded a raiding expedition into the Peloponnese. Lesbos and Chios provided a total of 50 ships to the Athenian expedition (Thuc. 2.56; 6.31). Once again Thucydides does not specify if any of these Lesbian ships came from Mytilene. But the Athenian led expedition which concentrated its efforts on raiding the coast and ravaging the countryside along a route from Epidaurus, Troezen, Haliae, and Hermione (Thuc. 2.56). Having been unsuccessful capturing any cities or fortifications the Athenians and the rest of their allies returned to Attica.

In the summer of 428 BCE “the island of Lesbos, except for Methymna, revolted from Athens” (Thuc. 3.2). Interestingly enough Thucydides (3.2; 3.13) writes that the Lesbians had been wanting to revolt for some time before the outbreak of the Archidamian War, but refrained from carrying it out since the Spartans would not accept them into their alliance. This is likely due to a provision made in the Thirty Years’ Truce
at the end of the First Peloponnesian War that stated that neither Athens nor Sparta could accept new members into their alliance from the other’s alliance (Thuc. 1.35). Nevertheless Thucydides writes that the Lesbians had been planning to revolt anyway and were in the midst of making preparations to do so.

They were waiting until they had narrowed the mouths of their harbours and finished the fortifications and the shipbuilding which they had in hand; also for the arrival of various supplies which were due to come from Pontus – archers, corn, and other things that they had sent for. (Thuc. 3.2)

Forewarned, the Athenians sent representatives to dissuade the Mytilenians from trying to unite all of Lesbos under their leadership and making military preparations, but they failed (Thuc. 3.3; Diod. 12.55). Alarmed, the Athenians quickly dispatched 40 ships to intervene in Lesbos before the preparations could be completed (Thuc. 3.3; Diod. 12.55). The Athenians planned on catching the Mytilenians off guard while they were distracted at a feast honoring Malean Apollo (Thuc. 3.3). Thucydides (3.3) writes that “If this planned worked, so much the better; if not, they were to order the people of Mytilene to surrender their ships and demolish their fortifications, and, if they failed to comply with these demands, to make war on them.” But the Lesbians discovered that the Athenians were on their way and ‘reinforced the unfinished parts of their walls, and their harbor, and stood on guard’ to wait for the Athenians to arrive (Thuc. 3.3).

Once the Athenians arrived it became clear that the Mytilenians had rebelled and so the Athenians ‘made war upon them’ (Thuc. 3.4). The Athenians also realized that they would not be able to handle the majority of Lesbos with the force they brought, so they made an armistice with the Lesbians (Thuc. 3.4). The Mytilenians used this time to send a delegation to Athens requesting the withdrawal of the Athenian fleet as well as try
to convince the Athenians that there was little threat of a revolution in Lesbos (Thuc. 3.4). In the meantime the Mytilenians also sent a delegation to Sparta requesting military assistance (Thuc. 3.4). Not surprisingly, the delegation sent to Athens failed to make progress and so ‘Mytilene and the rest of Lesbos, except for Methymna, went to war with Athens’ (Thuc. 3.5).

The Mytilenians first attacked an Athenian camp, but the Mytilenians lacked confidence to press on, and returned to their city (Thuc. 3.5). Afterwards the Mytilenians did not dare to venture back out before they received the anticipated military support from the Peloponnesians (Thuc. 3.5). The Athenians took advantage of this inactivity to build fortified camps on both sides of the city and to blockade the two harbors to deny access to the sea (Thuc. 3.6). By now, the Mytilenian delegation successfully persuaded the Spartans to accept them into their alliance (Thuc. 3.15). The Spartans vowed to invade Attica and to also send 40 ships to reinforce the Mytilenians in Lesbos (Thuc. 3.15-16). At this point, the Mytilenians and a force of mercenaries went on the offensive against Methymna, the pro-Athenian hold out, but failed to take the city (Thuc. 3.18). Instead the Mytilenians withdrew to the Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eresus where they strengthened their defensive walls and increased their internal security before going back to Mytilene (Thuc. 3.18). Once the Mytilenians departed, a force from Methymna attacked Antissa and was soundly defeated by the Antissians (Thuc. 3.18). This event clarified to the Athenians that the Mytilenians controlled the majority of land on the island. Consequently the Athenians sent reinforcements to Lesbos under the command of Paches, who directed the building of a chain of fortifications to keep the Mytilenians trapped inside their city (Thuc. 3.18). According to Thucydides (3.18) “Mytilene was
now firmly blockaded both from the land and the sea, and winter was approaching.”

From this point on Athens began to besiege Mytilene. Despite Athens’ attempts to seal off Mytilene from the outside world, that winter a Spartan named Salaethus managed to sneak into Mytilene to inform the magistrates that Sparta was going to invade Attica and that Sparta would also send forty ships to Lesbos to assist them (Thuc. 3.25). Thucydides (3.25) writes, “The Mytilenians were encouraged by this and became less inclined to try to make terms with Athens.”

When the summer of 427 BCE arrived the Peloponnesians invaded Attica as promised. The Peloponnesians wanted to create as much havoc as possible in Attica to hinder Athens’ ability to quell the revolt in Lesbos by making Athens fight on ‘two fronts at once’ (Thuc. 3.26). Thucydides (3.26) writes, “The invading forces destroyed everything that had started to grow up again in the districts which they had laid waste previously, and they went on to destroy such property as had been left untouched in earlier invasions.” At the same time the Peloponnesians sent 42 ships under the command of admiral Alcidas to provide assistance to the Mytilenians (Thuc. 3.26). But the Peloponnesian fleet wasted so much time on the way to Lesbos that the starving Mytilenians surrendered to the Athenians before the expeditionary force could arrive (Thuc. 3.27; 3.29). When the Peloponnesians heard what happened they considered making a surprise landing on Lesbos in the hope to catch the Athenians off guard, but Alcidas decided to hurry back to the Peloponnese as soon as possible in order not to risk losing the Peloponnesian fleet to the Athenians (Thuc. 3.30; 3.31; 3.33).

After Mytilene surrendered, the Athenians immediately condemned the male population to death and enslaved the women and children (Thuc. 3.36; Diod. 12.55). The
Athenians sent a single trireme to relay the message to Paches in Lesbos (Thuc. 3.36). However, the next day the assembly held another debate on the matter and reversed their decision. The debate basically centers on two arguments. The first, put forward by Cleon, asserted that the Athenians should stick to original resolution (Thuc. 3.36). He reasons that by destroying a revolting city-state, other city-states would be less inclined to revolt in the future (Thuc. 3.40). He explains that the process of putting down a revolt takes a long time, which drains vital resources and puts manpower at risk (Thuc. 3.39). In addition Cleon emphasizes the point, that “If our efforts are successful, we shall recover a city that is in ruins, and so lose the future revenues from it, on which our strength is based” (Thuc. 3.39). This fear was compounded with the worry that their other allies would revolt putting further strain on their resources while fighting both the Peloponnesians and their own allies at the same time (Thuc. 3.39). So to solve this problem, Cleon sought to deter other allies from revolting by destroying Lesbos and making it an ‘example’ to the rest of the allies (Thuc. 3.40; 3.44). However, Diodotus disputed the notion that destroying Lesbos would deter the other allies from revolting. He claims that if a state realizes that their revolt is on the path to failure, they will likely come to terms while they are ‘still capable of paying an indemnity and continuing to pay tribute afterwards’ (Thuc. 3.46). He goes on to say that by implementing Cleon’s method the city-state would ‘hold out against siege to the very end, since surrender early or late means just the same thing,’ their destruction (Thuc. 3.46). Eventually the Athenians reversed their decision and dispatched a ship to Lesbos saving some of the inhabitants.
SUMMARY

Mytilene clearly abandoned Athens and the Delian League during the Archidamian War. The majority of the indicators show that Mytilene had a natural inclination to abandon Athens. This should not be surprising given the general behavior record (DV2.4) of the Lesbian city-states from the period during the Persian Wars. The Lesbian city-states abandoned Persia to fight alongside of the Ionians during the Ionian Revolt of 479 BCE. Then the Lesbian states once more abandoned the Ionians at the Battle of Lade in 494 BCE when the Samians left the engagement (Herod. 6.14). This allowed the Persians to defeat Miletos, which stifled the Ionian Revolt. Afterwards in 479 BCE the Lesbian states joined the Hellenic League, which later became the Delian League to fight the Persians (Herod. 9.106). One cannot determine whether Mytilene itself was involved in these revolts against Persia, since Herodotus does not mention Mytilene specifically. But one can imagine that Mytilene played a large role given her power and influence on Lesbos. Mytilene even began to pursue options to defect from the Delian League before the Archidamian War, but Sparta denied her entry (Thuc. 3.2; 3.13).

The character of the Delian League changed as more states were reduced from non-tributary to tributary status before the start of the Archidamian War. As the war approached only two Delian League members, Lesbos and Chios remained non-tributary allies (Thuc. 1.19; 2.9). The lower number of non-tributary states providing resources to Athens, likely increased Athens’ dependence (DV2.1) on the ships and contingents provided by Mytilene and the rest of Lesbos. Mytilene was known as a major force in the Aegean Sea due to its substantial navy (Legon 1968, 201). One cannot say exactly what
each of the city-state in Lesbos supplied Athens. But Athens likely depended on Mytilene for ships, rowers, as well as the location of its harbor. The only provisions explicitly mentioned by Thucydides (3.3.4) states that Mytilene had to supply ten triremes to serve with the Athenian fleet. However, during times of crisis Athens would likely call on these allies to reinforce her fleet. This happened in 441 BCE when Samos revolted; Athens requested and received reinforcements from Lesbos enabling Athens to subdue the revolt (Thuc. 1.116; 1.117; Diod. 12.27). The more Athens relied on Mytilene the greater the risk Mytilene posed to Athens if Mytilene decided to revolt from the alliance.

Athens and the rest of Lesbos both shared the same strategic interests (DV2.3) when fighting the Persians during the establishment of the Delian League. However this began to change as the Mytilenian envoy to Sparta alludes, “When we saw that they were becoming less and less antagonistic to Persia and more and more interested in enslaving their own allies, then we became frightened” (Thuc. 3.10). From this point on the envoy declares that ‘fear was the bond’ to keep Mytilene loyal to Athens (Thuc. 3.12). Fear, that Athens would reduce Mytilene into a tributary ally if Mytilene acted contrary to what Athens expected.

It also appears that Mytilene had become disillusioned with Athens’ leadership of the alliance and tried to sever her ties with Athens to join Sparta before the outbreak of the Archidamian War (Thuc. 3.2; 3.13). Even though Athens received word that the Mytilenians were preparing to revolt in 428 BCE, the Athenians were in denial and failed to act (Thuc. 3.2; 3.3). Athens did not even make Mytilene an explicit commitment (DV2.2) to ease the situation and bring Mytilene back into the fold. Instead the Athenians
tried to coerce Mytilene to conform and maintain the status quo. When this failed the only option that Athens had left was to send in the fleet to force Mytilene to comply.
Chapter VI  

Conclusion

Recap

The goal of this thesis is to determine the significance of alliance pathologies in a bipolar international distribution of power. This tests the literature’s current prediction that alliance pathologies are not significant in bipolar systems. But it goes a step further by representing the first time that alliance pathologies have been studied in a bipolar system without nuclear weapons. This eliminates any possibility that nuclear weapons could influence alliance pathologies and clarify the true association between alliance pathologies and the bipolar distribution of power.

To carry this out I selected the bipolar system of Athens and Sparta during the Peloponnesian Wars to see if any alliance pathologies could found here that make a significant impact on their alliances. The case study itself examined the three most important allies from both Athens and Sparta. By investigating these six allies using the operationalized indicators provided in the literature review, I was able to determine not only when alliance pathologies occurred but also how they impacted their respective ally. This enabled me to analyze the observations against the hypotheses allowing me to determine the significance of the alliance pathologies in this bipolar distribution of power. And in turn help deepen the overall understanding of how alliance pathologies relate to the international distribution of power.

The rest of the chapter consists of analyzing the hypotheses against the Archidamian War observations made in the case study sections. Afterwards, I used these
analytic inferences to determine the significance of alliance pathologies in relation to the bipolar distribution of power. Finally, I applied this information to offer some foreign policy implications and suggest future research topics to advance the field of study.

**Analyzing the Hypotheses**

**(H0) Alliance Pathologies are not significant in Bipolar Systems. Reject:**

The null hypothesis, derived from the literature, proposes that alliance pathologies do not make a significant impact on alliances in bipolar systems (Christensen and Snyder 1990; Snyder 1984; Waltz 1979). This stems from the notion that great powers in bipolar systems rely primarily on their own resources using internal balancing rather than alliances – external balancing (Waltz 1979; Christensen and Snyder 1990, 141-2). However, the observations made during this study show that the bipolar states, Athens and Sparta, relied heavily on their allies for specific advantages such as: geographic location, military capabilities, and raw materials as well as their other attributes. This reliance on external balancing made Athens and Sparta extremely vulnerable to alliance pathologies.

The two most noticeable examples of alliance pathologies causing the serious problems for Athens and Sparta during the Peloponnesian War include the Theban attack on Plataea in 431 BCE and the Mytilene Revolt in 428 BCE. Firstly, the Theban attack on Plataea in 431 BCE sparked the outbreak of the Archidamian War 431 – 421 BCE. This event clearly demonstrates that Thebes chain-ganged Sparta into a conflict against the Athenian before the Spartans wanted. Although the Spartans in concert with their allies previously declared war on the Athenians, the Spartans and their allies did not immediately take action against the Athenians. Instead the Spartans decided to postpone
invading Attica until they completed making all the necessary preparations. In addition the Spartans dispatched several diplomatic envoys to Athens to see whether or not war could be avoided.

However once Thebes attacked Plataea the diplomatic exchanges between Sparta and Athens stopped, forcing Sparta to request her allies to send their military forces to the Isthmus of Corinth to invade Attica. This Theban act clearly influenced Sparta’s behavior. But the question becomes what would Sparta have lost if Athens would have attacked or even taken control of Thebes? After all Sparta did not hesitate to abandon Thebes during the First Peloponnesian War at the Battle of Oenophyta in 457 BCE. What makes this episode different? Possibly the Spartans wanted to safeguard Thebes as a northern counterbalance to Athens’ growing power as described by Diodorus (11.81). Or perhaps the Megarian Decree already began causing food shortages in Megara, amplifying the value of Thebes and the rest of Boeotia to supply foodstuffs for Megara. What is clear, Sparta relied heavily on Thebes and the other city-states in central Greece to supply the Peloponnesian League with cavalry troops (Thuc. 2.9). Sparta likely allowed herself to be dragged into war by the Thebans to secure possession of these resources. But at the outset Sparta made the decision to support Thebes, a move that significantly impacted Sparta’s involvement in the Archidamian War.

Second, the Mytilene Revolt in 428 BCE in the midst of the Archidamian War shows how Athens regarded defections from her alliance. It is possible to observe the significance of this event through the Mytilene Debate in 427 BCE that followed the revolt, when the two Athenians Cleon and Diodotus debate the best whys to punish Mytilene to dissuade other allies from following in Mytilene’s footsteps. But Cleon and
Diodotus both agreed that Mytilene provided meaningful financial resources to Athens as well as other contributions (Thuc. 3.39; 3.47). It’s not made explicitly clear what these other contributions are, but it is likely that Athens relied on Mytilene for its ships, rowers, and harbor location as well as other factors. The potential permanent loss of these contributions likely drove Athens behavior in the way she sent a fleet to Mytilene to force the city-state back into the Athenian alliance. This would assure Athens would continue receiving these contributions. Not to mention stem the spread of defections from other allies in the Delian League.

Nevertheless, one can easily see that the Mytilene Revolt had a significant impact on Athens. Not only did it require Athens to devote time, manpower, and other resources to put down the revolt. But it also served as a distraction for the Athenians by taking their focus away from pursuing their adversaries in the Peloponnesian League. Therefore the revolt greatly influenced Athens and damaged her overall war effort at a critical moment in time.

*(HA1) Alliance Pathologies are significant in Non-Nuclear Bipolar Systems.* Fail to Reject:

In addition to the two salient examples described above, there are other examples where alliance pathologies significantly affected the two great powers during the Archidamian War. But in order to eliminate the possibility of ‘false-negative’ reporting from the evidence indicating that both alliance pathology themes are *not* present when in fact they *are*, I will evaluate each of these pathologies using the sub-hypotheses. This will better demonstrate how the alliance pathologies impacted Athens and Sparta.
(HA1.a) *Alliance Pathologies associated with Offensive/Defensive Advantage are significant in Non-Nuclear Bipolar Systems.* Fail to Reject:

**Chain-Ganging:**

The Theban attack on Plataea in 431 BCE (described above) represents the only instance of chain-ganging during Archidamian War. Sparta likely allowed herself to be dragged into the war because she needed the Theban cavalry and food resources to maintain the Peloponnesian military capability to fight Athens. The Spartans would have needed this military support since they had already declared war on Athens at the behest of their Peloponnesian allies. Losing a powerful ally like Thebes would have not been in Sparta’s interest.

**Buck-Passing:**

No observable significance due to the lack of data. It may be possible to analyze the Athenian Tribute Lists to see whether or not the amount of tribute paid by allies varied considerably in relation to certain events. But, of course the more powerful allies I selected for this case study started off as non-tributary allies within the Delian League. So there should not be much information available for these states anyway. Another problem with the Tribute lists is that they are incomplete and full of lacunae as they did not survive well into modern times. Despite these issues scholars continue to study the Athenian Tribute Lists, so there may be possibilities in the future to study alliance pathologies using these lists as more information comes available.
**HA1.b) Alliance Pathologies associated with the Alliance Dilemma are significant in Non-Nuclear Bipolar Systems. Fail to Reject:**

**Entrapment:**

Corinth and Megara both took advantage of their influence within the Peloponnesian League to pressure Sparta into declaring war on Athens during the meeting of the Second Assembly in Sparta sometime in 432/1 BCE (Thuc. 1.119). These states felt increasingly threatened by Athens ongoing encroachment into Corinth’s sphere of influence and the hardships caused by the Megarian Decree imposed by Athens. Sparta’s inaction and lack of involvement to resolve these issues resulted in Corinth threatening to abandon the Peloponnesian League if the Spartans failed to address these grievances (Thuc. 1.71).

The sections from the case study indicate how much Sparta needed to cater to Megara and Corinth in order to profit from their specific military advantages. Corinth and Megara both occupied strategic locations along the Isthmus of Corinth connecting the two halves of Greece, a vital piece of geography for an army dominant ally like Sparta. Not to mention Sparta would have likely remembered their difficulties crossing between central Greece and the Peloponnesse during the First Peloponnesian War when Megara abandoned the Peloponnesian League. In addition, Sparta relied heavily on both Corinth and Megara to provide the Spartans and the Peloponnesian League with military ships. And Corinth held the distinction of possessing one of the most important navies of the period. All of these factors combine to give Sparta a pretty good reason to support these allies even though it really was not in Sparta’s interest to do so. Therefore the use of entrapment substantially influenced Sparta’s outlook and her engagement in the war against the Athenians from the inception of the Archidamian War.
Abandonment:

Mytilene represents the best example of a state abandoning either Athens or Sparta during the Archidamian War. The Mytilene defection caused great worry within Athens. The fear that a powerful ally like Mytilene could defect compelled the Athenians to act swiftly to quell the revolt and deter similar activities from other allies.

Conclusion & Foreign Policy Implications

By examining the hypotheses one can see that once alliance pathologies materialized, they made a significant impact on the alliances led by Athens and Sparta throughout the Peloponnesian Wars. This indicates that the literature’s prediction that alliance pathologies do not make a significant impact on alliances in bipolar systems does not stand up to the evidence presented. But the results impart greater value by adding to our overall understanding of how alliance pathologies relate to the international distribution of power (namely bipolarity), and nuclear weapons. The evidence shows that alliance pathologies consistently agree to have made a significant impact on alliances in systems without nuclear weapons. However the significance of alliance pathologies consistently disagrees when the international distribution of power is considered – especially in bipolar systems. This suggests that nuclear weapons could have been responsible for the absence of substantial alliance pathologies in the bipolar system of the Cold War referred to in the literature. Figure 5, illustrates this consistency that nuclear weapons have in determining the significance of alliance pathologies using a two-by-two figure.
So what is it about this bipolar system without nuclear weapons that make alliance pathologies significant? After re-examining the case study it becomes clear that the two bipolar states, Athens and Sparta, depended heavily on their allies to provide them with certain types of military ‘technology and geography’ to enhance their warfighting capabilities. Athens indeed needed her allies to provide ships, manpower, and finances to conduct military operations and to ensure they received the necessary shipments after the Spartan army started invading the Athenian countryside, which denied Athens the ability to use its own resources and geography. The Mytilene Debate stresses how much Athens depended on her allies by acknowledging that their ‘strength was based on the revenues from their allies’ and that punishing Mytilene would ‘deter other allies from carrying out further revolts in the future’ (Thuc. 2.9; 3.39; 3.44). Likewise, Sparta depended on her allies Corinth and Megara to provide the Peloponnesian League with naval ships while Thebes and the rest of central Greece provided Sparta with cavalry forces (Thuc. 2.9).
The Spartan king Archidamus even urged the Spartans to delay rushing into war against the Athenians so that the Spartans would have enough time strengthen their ‘navy’ and ‘cavalry’ forces which were inferior to those of Athens (Thuc. 1.80-81). More importantly Sparta had to satisfy Corinthian and Megarian wishes in order to ensure Sparta’s access to the Isthmus of Corinth that connected the Peloponnese to the rest of Greece. Without this valuable piece of real-estate the Spartans would have found it difficult to pursue any military objectives against the Athenians outside of the Peloponnese. The perception of these technological and geographic attributes shaped how the states and their leaders viewed the offensive/defensive advantage within the system. And the dependence of the two major powers to exploit and protect their allies’ technologic and geographic advantages compelled the two great powers to act in ways in which they may not have acted otherwise.

So why are bipolar systems with nuclear-weapons not significantly impacted by alliance pathologies? Unlike other types of great powers, nuclear powers with advanced delivery systems like Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) are not dependent on allies for their ‘technology and geography.’ This eliminates the need for nuclear powers to pursue allies in order to gain offensive/defensive advantages, which instead allows them to focus their attention on maintaining an effective nuclear deterrent. According to Waltz (1993) “No one has been able to figure out how to use strategic nuclear weapons other than for deterrence, nuclear weapons eliminate the thorny problems of estimating the present and future strengths of competing states and trying to anticipate their strategies” (73). This can be demonstrated using the brief synopsis of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis below.
Not long after seizing power in Cuba, Fidel Castro announced his intention to put Cuba onto the path of socialism and started nationalizing the country’s businesses. This eventually led to the United States (U.S.) and Cuba to sever all foreign ties. As a result the Cubans turned to the Soviet Union to provide them with economic aid and a large array of military supplies including: tanks, artillery, fighter planes, and anti-aircraft guns (Khrushchev 1970, 491). Then after the failed U.S. invasion of Cuba in April of 1961 at the Bay of Pigs, the Soviet Union intensified their efforts to supply Cuba with military equipment. The Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev ultimately convinced a reluctant Fidel Castro to emplace nuclear weapons in Cuba to deter any future American invasions (Khrushchev 1974, 511). Since both the Soviet Union and Cuba thought that another U.S. invasion of Cuba was imminent, they agreed to emplace the R-12 (SS-4) Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) and R-14 (SS-5) Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) in Cuba to deter any possibility that the United States would think about attacking Cuba in the future (Podvig 2004; Khrushchev 1970; Khrushchev 1974).

By this time the U.S. possessed not only the Atlas and Titan Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM), but also the Polaris Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM), and the Jupiter Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBM) stationed in the United Kingdom, Italy, and Turkey (Nash 1997; Podvig 2004). In addition to these missile systems, the United States Air Force had the Strategic Air Command (SAC), which was capable of delivering more than 2,000 nuclear weapons with over 1,200 bombers to targets within the Soviet Union (Norris and Chochran 1997 cited by Podvig 2004). The Soviet Union on the other hand possessed the R-7A (SS-6) and R-16 (SS-7) ICBM capable of reaching the United States, but in far fewer numbers (Nash 1997;
But by the end of 1962 the Soviet Union had about “100 Tu-95 and 60 3M bombers, which could deliver about 270 nuclear weapons on U.S. Territory” (Podvig 2004, 4).

Nevertheless, once the Kennedy Administration learned that the Soviet Union was putting nuclear weapons in Cuba they assembled a team known as the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm) to discuss possible courses of actions to deal with the situation. President Kennedy was deeply concerned that “a miscalculation – a mistake in judgement” throughout the ordeal would lead to grave consequences (R. Kennedy 1969, 49). Robert Kennedy (1969) explains that President Kennedy’s ideas on ‘miscalculations’ were influenced by his reading of Barbara Tuchman’s book *The Guns of August*, which details the outbreak of the First World War (49). These, of course, are the same miscalculations that allowed ‘Cult of the Offensive’ to develop into alliance pathologies, which is what the literature describes as the main driver for the outbreak of the First World War (Waltz 1979; Waltz 1981; Posen 1984).

Surprisingly these same notions of offensive advantage were circulating among the ExComm members throughout the Cuban missile crisis. General Curtis LeMay of The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), is known to have vigorously argued in favor of an ‘immediate military’ offensive against the Soviet missiles sites in Cuba before they became operational (R. Kennedy 1969, 28). Moreover when President Kennedy briefed the leaders of Congress on the situation, they ‘strongly advised military action’ stating that the blockade would be too weak of a response (R. Kennedy 1969, 42). But Robert Kennedy (1969) writes that when responding to the congressional members, “He [President Kennedy] reminded them that once an attack began our adversaries could
respond with a missile barrage from which many millions of American would be killed” (43). Clearly, President Kennedy was thinking more in terms of nuclear deterrence than offensive advantages. And it appears that Khrushchev was also thinking in terms of deterrence as well. He writes in his memoirs, “In our estimation the Americans were trying to frighten us, but they were no less scared than we were of atomic war” (Khrushchev 1970, 496).

Ultimately the Soviet Union and the United States agreed to withdraw their MRBM and IRBM nuclear weapons from their allies’ territories in exchange for assurances that neither of their allies would be invaded by the opposing bloc. It appears that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States were willing to be entrapped into a nuclear war over the interests of Cuba or Turkey. Of course, Cuba and Turkey were rather unhappy with this development. According to Khrushchev (1970) “Our relations with Cuba, on the other hand, took a sudden turn for the worse. Castro even stopped receiving our ambassador. It seemed that by removing our missiles we had suffered a moral defeat in the eyes of the Cubans” (500). And Turkey vehemently resisted the withdrawal of the missiles eighteen months prior to start of the Cuban Missile Crisis (R. Kennedy 1969, 71).

The synopsis of the Cuban Missile Crisis shows that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union gained any technological or geographic value from Cuba or Turkey. Both the United States and the Soviet Union were already capable of destroying each other without the help of these allies. And even though there was some talk of exploiting offensive/defensive advantages throughout the crisis, this was subdued by the overarching role of nuclear deterrence by the primary decision makers.
So what are the foreign policy implications? The threat of alliance pathologies will likely be less acute to states capable of providing for their own security – especially if they have a nuclear capability. Alliance pathologies themselves will likely continue to occur but with little concern to the nuclear powers. More research needs to be focused on predicting how nuclear states will react to alliance pathologies, so that we can make more reliable foreign policy recommendations to decision makers. But for now, policymakers and decision makers at the helm of nuclear states should exercise a policy of great restraint and caution when dealing with alliance pathologies – especially when they affect other nuclear powers. As nuclear powers may still be hassled from time to time by alliance pathologies in one form or another whether it is by buck-passing or abandonment. On the flipside nuclear powers could even become guilty of performing alliance pathologies themselves in the form of ‘nuclear abandonment’ by withdrawing their nuclear deterrent from areas where it provides security for non-nuclear allies (Snyder 1984).

Other states without the means to provide for their own security will likely continue to rely on external means, making them susceptible to alliance pathologies. This may even encourage some states to acquire nuclear weapons themselves if there are no alternative allies willing to provide them with support. But it is likely that the number of states possessing nuclear weapons will remain low as the international community continues to work to stem the spread of nuclear weapons. So the threat of alliance pathologies causing problems for these types of alliances will remain for the foreseeable future. But it is important to know what alliance pathologies are and how recognize them when they occur, so that steps can be taken to avoid the misadventures they cause.
Suggestions for Future Research

Future research needs to be invested into learning how nuclear weapons influence alliance pathologies and vice versa, so that scholars and policy-makers alike can make more reliable predictions on the topic. Glenn Snyder (1984) made some headway by focusing on how nuclear powers may conduct alliance pathologies themselves. But it still may be possible for alliance pathologies like buck-passing and abandonment to cause serious problems for their nuclear allies, especially if they are being denied crucial resources or strategic locations from their allies. These are some topics that may advance the literature even further.
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